

Post-Quantum

Cryptography Conference

## Post-Quantum Firmware Signing in IoT: Practical PQC-FOTA Implementation



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# Post-Quantum Firmware Signing in IoT: Practical PQC-FOTA Implementation

A practical implementation of PQC-FOTA for secure, future-proof firmware in IoT devices against evolving quantum threats.



# Why do we need Firmware Signing in IoT?

With the emergence of **quantum threats**, traditional signing methods like RSA and ECDSA pose significant risks.

Crypto-agility

# Agenda



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✓ IoT Constraints

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✓ PQC Integration

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✓ Bootloader Verification

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✓ Hybrid Signing

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✓ PQC Migration Roadmap

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# IoT Constraints

**Classical  
Cryptographic  
Algorithms**

**FOTA Compatibility**

**Resource &  
Performance Limits**

# PQC Integration

## Firmware Signing [Python]



## ESP32 Secure Boot Verification [C]



# Bootloader Verification [C]

```
#include <oqs/oqs.h>

OQS_STATUS status = OQS_SIG_verify(
    "ML-DSA-65",
    firmware_data,
    firmware_len,
    signature,
    sig_len,
    public_key
);

if (status == OQS_SUCCESS) {
    printf("PQC verification passed\n");
} else {
    printf("Verification failed\n");
}
```

**OQS C API:**

**OQS\_SIG\_verify()**

# Demo

```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/esp-idf/tools]
└─$ # Generate with default (ML-DSA-44)
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py gen

# Generate with ML-DSA-65
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py gen ML-DSA-65

# Sign firmware.bin with ML-DSA-65
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py sign ML-DSA-65 firmware.bin firmware.sig

# Verify signature
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py verify ML-DSA-65 firmware.bin firmware.sig

[+] Generated ML-DSA-44 keypair
  Private key: secure_boot_signing_key_ML-DSA-44.pkl
  Public key : signature_verification_key_ML-DSA-44.pkl
[+] Generated ML-DSA-65 keypair
  Private key: secure_boot_signing_key_ML-DSA-65.pkl
  Public key : signature_verification_key_ML-DSA-65.pkl
[+] Signed firmware.bin with ML-DSA-65, signature written to firmware.sig
[+] Verification SUCCESS for firmware.bin using ML-DSA-65
```

```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/esp-idf/tools]
└─$ echo "tampered" >> firmware.bin
python3 sign_firmware_pqc.py verify Falcon-512 firmware.bin firmware.sig

[-] Verification FAILED for firmware.bin using Falcon-512
```

# Hybrid Signing (ECDSA + MLDSA)

Header layout example:

Firmware

ECDSA Signature


ML-DSA Signature

Metadata

Verification Policy:

1. Verify both (strict mode)
2. Accept either (compatibility mode)

# PQC Integration Roadmap



# Q&A

