

Kenya Experiences – Oversight Assessments


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Outline

- 1. Structure of the National Payment System (NPS).
- 2. Categories and performance of Payments Service Providers (PSPs).
- 3. Highlights of overall FMI risks per category
- 4. Tools for Oversight
- 5. Assessments conducted on FMIs

Structure of the National Payments System (NPS)



Categories of PSPs in Kenya

| FM | l category | Category business model | Number of authorised PSPs | |
|-----|--|---|---------------------------|--|
| 1. | KEPSS (RTGS) | Large Value Payment system | 1 | |
| 1. | Electronic money issuers | Converts Kenya currency to electronic form (e-money). Allows customers to cash-in (deposit) and cash-out (withdraw). Example: Safaricom PLC | 7 | |
| 2. | Electronic wallet providers | Utilizes e-money for payments with no option of cash-in or cash-out, i.e., no agent network. Example: Cellulant Kenya Limited | 7 | |
| 3. | Payment gateways | Enables businesses/institutions/Government agencies to accept/collect payments from customers/public electronically. Example: Pesapal Limited | 18 | |
| 4. | Payment switches | Facilitate exchange of payment instructions between financial institutions such as banks, ATMs, payment cards. Example: Integrated Payment Services Ltd (PesaLink) | 3 | |
| Tot | Total number of authorised PSPs as at January 16, 2024 | | | |

Highlights of overall FMI risks per category

| PSP category | Highlights of key risks |
|-----------------------------|--|
| KEPSS (RTGS) | Liquidity Risks Legal Risks Systemic Risks Settlement Risks Credit Risks Business Risks Operational Risks |
| Electronic money issuers | Fiduciary risk: Loss of customer funds held or failure to maintain 1:1 parity between e-money and customer funds held in trust accounts Operational risk: Platform instability/system failure Fraud risks due to its prevalence and ubiquity |
| Electronic wallet providers | Fiduciary risk: Loss of customer funds held Operational risk: Platform instability/system failure |
| Payment gateways | AML/CFT risk particularly for cross-border payments Risk of facilitating illicit activities under the guise of enabling merchants settle transactions |
| Payment switches | Operational risk: System stability and business continuity risks as switches connect multiple institutions through a central infrastructure |



Tools for Oversight



Licensing & Annual Renewal

As part of the licensing process, review:

- Articles of incorporation
- **Business Plans**
- **Systems Rules**
- System Security audit reports
- Risk management, AML/CFT & business continuity policies etc.

Offsite supervision

During operation, the PSP provides regular information and reporting to CBK which is analyzed for reporting and monitoring of risks and exposures e.g.,

- Market focused monitoring e.g. consumer related complaints based on volume and nature, growth trends of products and services in the market
- Institution-focused monitoring e.g. trust fund governance and safeguarding, financial performance i.e. profitability and operational efficiency

Onsite supervision

On a regular or ad-hoc basis. CBK will carry out risk-based compliance reviews at the premises of the PSP and based on the findings, may make recommendations for remediation.

This is guided by:

- supervisory programs,
- Annual Plans and
- an onsite oversight framework
- Strategy and governance
- Financial risk e.g. fund safeguarding
- Conduct risk
- Operational, AML/CFT/CPFan d IT risk



Assessments conducted on FMIs

| FMI | Scope |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. KEPSS Self-Assessment | KEPSS system and its operations |
| | Compliance of CBK to each PFMI principle applicable to it as a payment system. |
| | Responsibilities of CBK as the relevant authority for financial market infrastructures. |
| 2. Mobile Money Service Providers | AML/CFT/CPF inspections |
| | Trust Income utilization – Reporting, |
| | Governance, Interest utilization |
| | Cyber risk assessment |

