# Detecting Access Control Vulnerabilities in Web Applications

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# How we got here?

- Formalizing SQL injection attacks (POPL'06)
- Dynamic detection of SQL injections (POPL'06)
- Static detection of SQL injections (PLDI'07)
- Static detection of XSS vulnerabilities (ICSE'08)
- □ Concolic testing to detect SQL injections (ISSTA'08)

### What's next?

- □ SQL injection & XSS ⇔ buffer overflow
  - Application agnostic
- □ Access control errors ⇔ wrong logic
  - Application specific
- Challenge: Can application-specific access control errors be detected fully automatically without explicit access control policies?

### Access Control Vulnerabilities

- Failure to guard privileged resource
  - A chain is as strong as its weakest link



- $\square > 14\%$  web applications have it [WASC'07]
  - Difficult to design and implement perfect checks
- Culprit of privilege escalation attacks
  - Exposure of sensitive information or operations

### Predictable URLs

 Earnings of NetApp and Disney were leaked to Bloomberg in Nov., 2010

**LEAKED** 

http://media.netapp.com/documents/financial-fy11-q2.pdf

http://media.netapp.com/documents/financial-q1-fy11.pdf

http://media.netapp.com/documents/financial-10-q4.pdf

http://media.netapp.com/documents/financial-q3-10.pdf

# **Bloomberg**

File posted without any required password



File obtained from "a restricted area of the company's website."

### **Exploited Access Control Errors**



- Business Wire
  - Important files were uploaded but not linked
  - Link format

http://website/press\_release/08/29/2007/00001.html

- Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann
  - Obtained trading information
  - Profited over \$8 million

# Key Challenge

- Specifications for automated detection
  - Manual specification
    - Time-consuming, and often absent
  - Probabilistic-based inference
    - Imprecise and computationally expensive



# Key Insights

 Source code of an application implicitly documents intended accesses of each *role*

 Access control policy can be extracted from differences in *per-role sitemaps*



#### index.php

include("functions.php");

Add user

Delete user

#### userDelete.php


include("functions.php");
 delete\_user();

#### userAdd.php

add\_user();

#### functions.php

if (!\$SESSION["admin"])
 die("Access denied!")



Entry

#### index.php



Sitemap for normal users

include("functions.php");

Add user

Delete user

userDelete.php

include("functions.php");
 delete\_user();

userAdd.php


add\_user();

functions.php



if (!\$SESSION["admin"])
die("Access denied!")

\$\_SESSION["admin"]=false





include("functions.php"); Add user Delete user

Privileged

**Vulnerability Detection** 

userDelete.php

include("functions.php"); delete\_user();

Privileged

userAdd.php




add\_user();

functions.php

if (!\$SESSION["admin"]) die("Access denied!")

\$\_SESSION["admin"]=false

# Technical Approach



Spec inputs: (entry points, role-based states)


 $N_{\alpha}$  explicitly reachable nodes of role a (adminstrators)

 $N_b$  explicitly reachable nodes of role b (normal users)

Privileged privileged nodes

Vuls vulnerabilities

# Sitemap Builder



Context-Free Grammar Constructor

Given role-based specifications, it statically generates CFGs to approximate dynamic outputs

**Link Extractor** 

With a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) that matches links, it extracts explicit links from a CFG

#### Context-Free Grammar Constructor

Sitemap Builder

Context-Free
Grammar
Constructor

Link Extractor

- CFG approximates dynamic output
  - $\blacksquare$  PHP page  $\to$  AST  $\to$  IR  $\to$  grammar rules  $\to$  CFG
- Path exploration based on branch feasibility
  - Z3 for arithmetic/Boolean constraints
  - Our own string solver for string constraints

```
function checkUser() {
  if (!$_SESSION["validUser"])
    header("Location: login.php");
}
checkUser();
sensitiveOperation();
```

#### Constraint: \$\_SESSION["validUser"] = false

- Only administrators can pass this check and reach sensitiveOperation()
- Normal users are redirected to "login.php"

### Link Extractor



- Our link extraction algorithm
  - Does not directly intersect CFG with DFA
  - Efficiently extracts links from CFG based on DFA

echo "<div><a href=" . \$lang . ".php>Anchor</a></div>";

 $S0 \rightarrow S1 S2$   $S1 \rightarrow \text{"<div><a href="}$   $S2 \rightarrow S3 S4$   $S3 \rightarrow \text{"english"} | \text{"spanish"} | \text{"french"}$   $S4 \rightarrow \text{".php>Anchor</a></div>"$ 

#### Links

- "english.php"
- "spanish.php"
- "french.php"

# Vulnerability Detector

# **Vulnerability Detector**

- Failed forced browsing
  - Redirects users to another location
  - Displays error messages
    - No sensitive information or operation
- When is a forced browsing successful?
  - CFG of administrator vs. CFG of normal users
    - No additional redirections
    - The CFG sizes are not significantly different



### Implementation





- Based on work of Wassermann and Minamide
- Adds support for roles
- Connects nodes of a Web application
- Explores paths based on branch feasibility

#### Specification rules

- Only require specifications of two sets
  - Set of entry nodes
  - Set of role-based critical application states
- Support abstract and concrete value, and regular expressions

### Evaluation

- Subjects
  - Seven applications
- Metrics
  - Effectiveness
    - Vulnerable nodes
    - False positives
  - Performance
    - Coverage
    - Analysis time

Cubinat	Eilee	LOC			
Subject	Files	PHP	HTML		
SCARF	25	1,318	0		
Events Lister	37	2,076	544		
PHP Calendars	67	1,350	0		
PHPoll	93	2,571	0		
iCalendar	183	8,276	0		
AWCM	668	12,942	5,106		
YaPiG	134	<b>4,</b> 801	1,271		

Project	Privileged	Vulnerable	FP	Guarded <sup>-</sup>	Admin		Normal	
					Node	Edge	Node	Edge
SCARF	4	1	0	3	19	149	15	69
SCARF (patched)	4	0	0	4	19	149	15	69
Events Lister v2.03	9	2	2	5	23	113	14	26
PHP Calendars	3	1	0	2	19	35	19	30
PHPoll v0.97 beta	3	3	0	0	21	63	19	58
iCalendar v1.1	1	0	0	1	51	292	50	292
AWCM v2.1	47	1	0	46	176	2,634	129	2,438
AWCM v2.2 final	47	0	0	47	180	2,851	133	2,612
YaPiG v0.95	11	0	0	11	54	260	44	154

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AWCM v2.1	47	1	0	46	176	2,634	129	2,438
AWCM v2.2 final	47	0	0	47	180	2,851	133	2,612
YaPiG v0.95	11	0	0	11	54	260	44	154

Duning	Nodes			Context-F	ree Grammar	Carraman	Time (a)
Project	Entry	Active	Orphan	Variables	Productions	- Coverage	Time(s)
SCARF	1	19	0	158	719	100.0%	6.02
SCARF (patched)	1	19	0	159	719	100.0%	6.01
Events Lister v2.03	4	23	5	100	2,083	100.0%	3.84
PHP Calendars	3	15	0	48	255	80.0%	5.09
PHPoll v0.97 beta	5	21	6	115	224	100.0%	4.26
iCalendar v1.1	2	52	2	811	4,774	90.4%	760.62
AWCM v2.1	1 <i>7</i>	208	22	410	422	79.3%	89.48
AWCM v2.2 final	16	209	14	451	484	79.9%	108.51
YaPiG v0.95	7	59	3	332	532	91.5%	208.38

### Conclusion

- □ First role-based static analysis
  - Detects access control vulnerabilities
  - Requires minimal manual effort
- Per-role sitemaps
  - Inference of implicit access assumption
  - Forced browsing to detect unprotected access
- Effective and scalable technique