Labor Supply

Econ 3470 Lecture 4

Labor Economics

2016-2017 Term 1

Outline

- Basic Static Model of Labor Supply
 - Slope of Utility Function
 - Difference between Male and Female Labor Supply
 - Corner Solution
- 2 Extensions of the Basic Static Model
 - Discontinuous Budget Constraint
 - Fixed Costs of Working
 - Fixed Money Costs
 - Fixed Time Costs
 - Transfers
 - Income Replacement Program
 - Income Maintenance Program
- Model of Household Production
 - Life Cycle Aspect of Labor Supply
 - Policy Implication

Assumptions:

- Agents maximize own utility of the simple form U = U(C, L), where C is consumption, L is leisure.
- All workers live one period.
- Workers earn a wage W per unit of time.
- Each worker is endowed with one unit of time.
- Each worker has unearned income V even if the worker does not work.
- Price of consumption goods is P.

Objective function of the worker

$$\max_{C,L} U(C,L) \quad s.t. \quad V + W(1-L) = PC$$

$$\mathfrak{L} = U(C, L) + \lambda [V + W(1 - L) - PC]$$

Assuming interior solution, the first order conditions are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial C} = 0 \Rightarrow U_C - \lambda P = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial L} = 0 \Rightarrow U_L - \lambda W = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial \lambda} = 0 \Rightarrow V + W(1 - L) - PC = 0$$

$$\frac{U_L}{U_C} = \frac{W}{P}$$

- $\frac{U_L}{U_C}$ MRS: amount of C willing to give up for 1 unit of L.
- $\frac{W}{P}$ price ratio: number of units of C obtained from giving up 1 unit of L.

when U is fixed

$$U(C, L) = \bar{U}$$

$$U_L dL + U_C dC = 0$$

$$\frac{dC}{dL} = -\frac{U_L}{U_C}$$

Total differentiate FOC:

$$U_{CC}dC + U_{CL}dL - Pd\lambda = \lambda dP$$

$$U_{LC}dC + U_{LL}dL - Wd\lambda = \lambda dW$$

$$-PdC - WdL = -(1 - L)dW - dV + CdP$$

Slutsky equation: effect of a wage increase on the consumption of leisure

$$\frac{dL}{dW} = (1 - L)\frac{dL}{dV} - \frac{U_C^2}{\lambda \Delta}$$

where
$$\Delta = \left| \begin{array}{ccc} U_{CC} & U_{CL} & -P \\ U_{LC} & U_{LL} & -W \\ -P & -W & 0 \end{array} \right| > 0$$

Total effect = income effect + substitution effect

The substitution effect is

$$\frac{dL}{dW}|_{U} = -\frac{U_{C}^{2}}{\lambda\Delta} < 0$$

The income effect is $(1-L)\frac{dL}{dV}$

> 0 if L is normal

< 0 if L is inferior

Hours of work H = 1 - L, is a function of P, V and W.

- If *L* is inferior, then both the income and substitution effects are negative.
 - Increasing W will reduce consumption of leisure and increase the hours of work.
- If L is normal, the two effects are offsetting, and the net result is ambiguous.




Figure 1: Isolating Income and Substitution Effects




Figure 2: Isolating Income and Substitution Effects




Figure 3: Isolating Income and Substitution Effects




Figure 4: Wage Increase with Substitution Effect Dominating




Figure 5: Wage Increase with Income Effect Dominating




Figure 6: An Individual Backward Bending Labor Supply Curve

- Initial hours of work is low, income effect is small and dominated by substitution effect ⇒ labor supply curve is positively sloped
- As H increases, income effect may dominate ⇒ the well known backward-bending labor supply curve

When W increases, 2 effects

- Substitution effect: $W \uparrow, L$ more expensive $\rightarrow L \downarrow$
- Income effect: $W \uparrow$, real income $\uparrow \rightarrow L \uparrow$ if L is normal, $L \downarrow$ if L is inferior

If L is normal

- ullet total effect ambiguous, but at low W
- low H, income effect small \Rightarrow substitution effect dominates
- as $W \uparrow \Rightarrow L \downarrow$ and $H \uparrow$
- at hight H, income effect gets stronger

If *L* is inferior, $W \uparrow \Rightarrow L \downarrow$.






Figure 7: An Individual Backward Bending Labor Supply Curve

Slope of Utility Function



(a) High Value of Leisure



(b) Low Value of Leisure

Difference between Male and Female Labor Supply


- Men: both income and substitution effects are small
- Women: larger response to wage change; substitution effect > income effect

Recent evidence


- Men: LS slightly backward bending. Effect is small and could be even zero.
- ullet Women: LS strongly upward slopping \Rightarrow strong substitution effect

So far we have only looked at interior solution: 1 - L > 0. Solution need not be interior.

In a no-work solution, $U_L > \lambda W$ for $L \in [0,1]$, so that L = 1 and H = 0.



Given V, the slope of the indifference curve passing through the allocation (1, V) represents the individual's reservation wage.



By definition


$$\frac{U_L(V,1)}{U_C(V,1)} = \frac{W_R}{P}$$


or

$$W_R = \frac{PU_L(V,1)}{U_C(V,1)}$$

For individuals to be willing to work $W > W_R$.

 W_R depends on the level of V. If leisure is normal, then W_R increases with V.





Aggregate LS Curve

Aggregate LS curve is simply the horizontal summation of the individual LS curves.

W increases

- ↑ or ↓ hours of work of existing workers
- must increase the number of workers in the labor force, i.e. more are willing to work.


Hence, even though individual labor supply may be backward bending, the aggregate curve is usually assumed to be positively sloped.

Assumption that there is free choice of working hours at a constant wage rate is often considered as unrealistic.

Often argued that hours of work is not subject to choice in most cases.

Why?

Constraint on working hours may be due to nature of the work such as some work involves team production (e.g. movie-making, performing arts) or supervision. In that case work schedule has to be more regulated. With constraint on wage and hours \Rightarrow discontinuous budget constraint exists in employment contracts, implicit or explicit.



Either work or not work \Rightarrow both are not efficient.


However, if choose to work, it is not necessary inefficient.

In the real world, monitoring to reduce shirking is more efficient when workers work the same hours.

Acceptance of a take-it or leave-it package of wage and hours by worker would not necessarily represent an interior solution.

Given large enough range of jobs, each offering different working hours at the same wage corresponding to a worker's marginal product, then the budget constraint would be linear and continuous even though each point or segment on the line corresponds to a different job.

When hours of work is not flexible, may need to pay a compensating wage.



At W_B utility is maximized at U_1 and the individual want to work H_B hours.

The firm is only willing to allow him to work for H_A hours, which for the individual will be on a lower utility at the given wage.

In order to induce that person to work for H_A hours, the firm have to offer wage W_A that is higher than W_B , which is called the compensating wage.

$$W_A = \frac{\Delta C}{H_A} > W_B$$

Fixed Costs of Working

Costs that any individual who wants to work must pay every time he works. Be careful not to confuse with the fixed hiring or training costs incurred by the firm or the worker at the beginning of employment.

These costs can be classified into two different types

- Fixed money costs
- Fixed time costs

Fixed Money Costs

Assume an individual need to pay α per working day, i.e. commuting cost, socializing, baby sitting, etc.

The budget will be

$$U = \begin{cases} U(V,1) & \text{if } L = 1\\ U(V + WH - \alpha, 1 - H) & \text{if } L < 1 \end{cases}$$

If no fixed money cost $(\alpha = 0)$


$$W_R = W_R^0; H_R = 0$$

If positive fixed money cost ($\alpha > 0$)

$$W_R = W_R^1; H_R > 0, \text{ where } W_R^1 > W_R^0$$


Fixed Money Costs

If no fixed money cost



Fixed Money Costs

If positive fixed money cost



Fixed Money Costs

Note that:


- W_R is higher with fixed cost. With $\alpha>0$, labor supply discontinuous; H=0 for wage $< W_R^1$. Reservation wage, $W_R^1>W_R^0$, will be higher, so that the probability of a corner solution is higher.
- H will not be < H_R.
 Minimum hours of work is H_R.
 Because it is not worthwhile to work just a few hours in the face of fixed cost.

Fixed Money Costs

• If L is normal, the LS curve shift to the right as a result of fixed cost. For any given wage $> W_R^1$, the hours of work will be higher than if there is no fixed cost and L is normal, because the fixed cost reduces his income, so that the income effect implies lower consumption of leisure, or more hours of work.

Fixed Money Costs

Labor Supply



Fixed Time Costs


Instead of money costs, sometimes working involves time cost (t), e.g. commuting time each working day.

Such time costs do not lower the worker's income, but reduce the number of hours available to him. Again, this will result in a budget set as in


$$U = \begin{cases} U(V,1) & \text{if } L = 1 \\ U(V + WH, 1 - H - t) & \text{if } L < 1 \end{cases}$$

The reservation wage will again increase, making work less likely. Fixed time cost $t>0 \Rightarrow W_R^2 \uparrow, H_R^2>0$. $H_R^2 < H^1$ work less hours than the case without t.

Fixed Time Costs



Fixed Time Costs



Income Replacement Program

Governments often run programs which compensate individuals for the loss of income, usually due to circumstances out of the individuals' control. Examples are unemployment insurance and disability compensation. The problem with full income replace is that there is a very large disincentive effect.

Income Replacement Program





Figure 8: Budget constraint with a spike

Another type of transfer program protects the income level of individuals or households.

One way of maintaining the level of income is by guaranteeing a minimum.

If G is the protected income level, then

$$Benefit = \begin{cases} G - WH & \text{if } WH < G \\ 0 & \text{if } WH \ge G \end{cases}$$



Originally choose to work H_0 hours of work and earn income WH_0 . Out of work due to reasons not controlled by worker, the government provides same income, i.e. $WH_0 = G$. Utility increases from U_0 to U_2 .

If workers work less than before, say H_1 instead of H_0 . He will get $WH_1 + (G - WH_1) = G$, utility is U_1 which is lower than not working at all. Therefore large disincentive to work.


If utility at H_2 hours of work is higher than U_2 , then out of welfare program with higher utility.

In order to provide less disincentive to work and make people out of welfare program, government can impose a less than 100% tax rate.

Benefit =
$$\begin{cases} G - (1-t)WH & \text{if } (1-t)WH < G \\ 0 & \text{if } (1-t)WH \ge G \end{cases}$$

$$H^* = \frac{G}{W(1-t)}$$

If $H > H^*$, do not get benefit.



With welfare and no work at U_0 .

Under the new scheme, work H_1 hours and earn income tWH_1+G and achieve utility U_1 .

It's better for the worker to work.

 \uparrow welfare \rightarrow work less but better than 100% income replacement.

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Example Wage = $10/hr Welfare if no work = $500 Tax is 50\% \Rightarrow new wage = $5/hr Now choose point R and work 10 hours \Rightarrow work less
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


Figure 9: Effect of a welfare program on hours of work

Model of Household Production (Becker 1965)

Previous assumption - utility is a function of consumption goods and leisure

Leisure - represent non-market time

In reality, consumption does not simply represent instantaneous derivation of utility from consumption goods purchases in the market. Rather, consumption goods and leisure are no more than inputs into a production process that transform these ingredients into other commodities which are then consumed for utility.

Often we combine inputs of market goods, X, and household time, T, to produce commodities, which ultimately yield satisfaction or utility, U, to the household.

Some examples:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{eating} = \mathsf{food} + \mathsf{time} \\ & \mathsf{travelling} = \mathsf{money} + \mathsf{time} \end{aligned}$$

$$U = f(Z_1, Z_2, ..., Z_n) = F(Z) = h(X, T)$$

where $Z_i = g(x_i, t_i)$ Z = g(X, T).

Slope of the isoquant = "wage rate" or the implicit valuation of its time since it shows how many market goods, X, can be saved by using an additional unit of household time, T.






Figure 10: Utility Isoquants

Substitutability in household production

Threshold levels: no substitutability if either one is below the level.






Wage increase

- Income effect and substitution effect increase for X
- ullet Income effect and substitution effect for ${\mathcal T}$ works in opposite direction


$W_0 \uparrow \rightarrow W_1$

- ullet Observed equilibrium $E_0 o E_2$ 这里先看income effect再看substitute effect
- Income effect $E_0 \rightarrow E_1$, consume more of both goods, X and T intensive activities
- Substitution effect $E_1 \to E_2$, utilize more good-intensive and less time-intensive activities (substitute away from T into X)



Two major differences, between conventional consumer demand theory and the household production approach:

- Household production approach emphasizes that commodities consumed require both goods and time inputs. Focus on the extent to which particular commodities are good intensive or time intensive. i.e. wage increase $W_0 \rightarrow W_1$; equilibrium $E_0 \rightarrow E_2$
 - Commodity A (good intensive): income and substitution effects work in the same direction → increase go to the restaurant
 - Commodity B (time intensive): income effect positive, substitution effect negative
 cook at home



- Substitution effect in the household production approach has two reinforcing components.
 - i.e. wage increase
 - Use less time inputs and use more goods inputs (in production)
 - Consume less time-intensive commodities and more goods-intensive commodities (in consumption) 在produce和consumption两个过程中都有体
 - \Rightarrow substitution occurs in household production as well as in household consumption.

Household is a producer as well as consumer.

Some implications:

- Wage ↑⇒ goods-intensive commodities ↑, e.g. fast-food outlets, prepared foods, day-care, etc.
- Even sleep (a very time-intensive activity) time is affected by wage: Biddle and Hamermesh (1990, JPE) find that people of higher potential earnings power sleep less because it costs them more (in terms of forgone income) to sleep longer.
- Market wages, non-labor income, household production efficiency: not only the first two matter, the third one is also important.

Some implications:

- Comparative advantage (market vs. household) and specialization, economies of scale, co-operative daycare arrangement
- Time reallocation between household production and labor market (in response to wage increase) will be small if few substitutes exist for household labor.
- Life cycle time allocation and nature of activities in different stages of life cycle: work more during peak earning years, travel before and after working ages

A further refinement: triple choices time = market work, household work, leisure

So a wage increase has two substitution effects

- between market work and household work
- between market work and leisure




Figure 11: Large versus small substitution effects

- Left figure: shows the tradeoffs between goods and household work time that keep utility constant.
 - Gradual bend implies reduction in hours of household work can be easily compensated for by purchasing more goods.
 - Explain why female's substitution effect of wage increase is large.
- Right figure: shows the goods/leisure trade-off
 - Steeper bend implies greater difficulty in substituting goods for leisure time without loss of utility.

Weekly Hours Spent in Household Work, Paid Work, and Leisure Activities by Men and Women over Age 18, 2008

	Households with Children < 6		Households with Children 6-17		Households with No Children < 18	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Paid Work ^a	20	42	26	39	21	30
Household Work ^b	41	23	32	18	24	16
Leisure ^c	32	32	36	38	45	46
Personal Care ^d	74	70	73	72	76	74

Figure 12: Weekly hours spent in household work, paid work, and leisure activities by men and women over age 18, 2008




Figure 13: Household productivity can change over the life cycle




Figure 14: Life-cycle allocation of time

Other considerations:

- Specialization of function. Do both work for pay?
- Labor supply in recession: "discouraged" vs. "additional" worker effect

Example

Jack and Jill both have 10 hours of time

Jack can either produce \$ 10 worth of household goods/hr or \$20/hr

market wage.

Jill can either produce \$25 worth of household goods/hr or \$15/hr market wage.

Individual's Budget




Figure 15: Budget lines and opportunity frontier of married couple

Joint Household Budget




Figure 16: Budget lines and opportunity frontier of married couple

Who Work's Where?





Figure 17: The division of labor in the household

Who Work's Where?


At point P:

- Panel a: Jill specializes in the household sector and Jack divides his time between the labor market and the household.
- Panel b: Jack specializes in the labor market and Jill divides her time between the labor market and the household.
- Panel c: Jack specializes in the labor market and Jill specializes in the household sector.

Market wage is along budget constraint AB Single parent with dependent child Without program, do not work and no income




If guaranteed welfare such that income is at least AC (for earnings $\leq AC$, \$1 earning $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ \$1 welfare \downarrow)



Modify the welfare program such that it is a child support assurance program

Welfare for both mother and child: ACGF If mother work AEF




For working hours \leq $GC \Rightarrow$ AE (for the child program) +EC (from the welfare)

For working hours \geq *GC* \Rightarrow receive only *AE*+ earnings


Three different responses from three kinds of people

- remain at C (U isoquant very steep)
- reduce working hours if they already work before the child support program
- join labor force, move from C to H

The response from the first 2 kinds of people



The response from the third kind of people



Reference

- Becker, Gary (1965) A Theory of the Allocation of Time, Economic Journal, 75 pp.493-517.
- Borjas, George (2013) Labor Economics, Chapter 2 and 3
- Ehrenberg and Smith (2015) Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy, Chapter 6 and 7