scendant,[46] we won't even understand the body if we don't follow that method.

SOCRATES He speaks well, my friend. Still, Hippocrates aside, we must consider whether argument supports that view.

PHAEDRUS I agree.

SOCRATES Consider, then, what both Hippocrates and true argu-
d ment say about nature. Isn't this the way to think systematically about the nature of anything? First, we must consider whether the object regarding which we intend to become experts and capable of transmitting our expertise is simple or complex. Then, if it is simple, we must investigate its power: What things does it have what natural power of acting upon? By what things does it have what natural disposition to be acted upon? If, on the other hand, it takes many forms, we must enumerate them all and, as we did in the simple case, investigate how each is naturally able to act upon what and how it has a natural disposition to be acted upon by what.

PHAEDRUS It seems so, Socrates.

e SOCRATES Proceeding by any other method would be like walking with the blind. Conversely, whoever studies anything on the basis of an art must never be compared to the blind or the deaf. On the contrary, it is clear that someone who teaches another to make speeches as an art will demonstrate precisely the essential nature of that to which speeches are to be applied. And that, surely, is the soul.

PHAEDRUS Of course.

271 SOCRATES This is therefore the object toward which the speaker's whole effort is directed, since it is in the soul that he attempts to produce conviction. Isn't that so?

PHAEDRUS Yes.

SOCRATES Clearly, therefore, Thrasymachus and anyone else who teaches the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is: whether it is

SOCRATES Let's look at it this way, then.

PHAEDRUS How?

SOCRATES Suppose I were trying to convince you that you should *b* fight your enemies on horseback, and neither one of us knew what a horse is, but I happened to know this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse is the tame animal with the longest ears—

PHAEDRUS But that would be ridiculous, Socrates.

SOCRATES Not quite yet, actually. But if I were seriously trying to convince you, having composed a speech in praise of the donkey in which I called it a horse and claimed that having such an animal is of immense value both at home and in military service, that it is good for fighting and for carrying your baggage and that it is useful for much else besides— *c*

PHAEDRUS Well, that would be totally ridiculous.

SOCRATES Well, which is better? To be ridiculous and a friend? Or clever and an enemy?

PHAEDRUS The former.

SOCRATES And so, when a rhetorician who does not know good from bad addresses a city which knows no better and attempts to sway it, not praising a miserable donkey as if it were a horse, but bad as if it were good, and, having studied what the people believe, persuades them to do something bad instead of good—with that as its seed, what *d* sort of crop do you think rhetoric can harvest?

PHAEDRUS A crop of really poor quality.

SOCRATES But could it be, my friend, that we have mocked the art of speaking more rudely than it deserves? For it might perhaps reply, "What bizarre nonsense! Look, I am not forcing anyone to learn how to make speeches without knowing the truth; on the contrary, my advice, for what it is worth, is to take me up only after mastering the truth. But I do make this boast: even someone who knows the truth couldn't produce conviction on the basis of a systematic art without me."

e PHAEDRUS Well, is that a fair reply?

SOCRATES Yes, it is—if, that is, the arguments now advancing upon rhetoric testify that it is an art. For it seems to me as if I hear certain arguments approaching and protesting that that is a lie and that rhetoric is not an art but an artless practice.[31] As the Spartan said, there is no genuine art of speaking without a grasp of truth, and there never will be.

261 PHAEDRUS We need to hear these arguments, Socrates. Come, produce them, and examine them: What is their point? How do they make it?

SOCRATES Come to us, then, noble creatures; convince Phaedrus, him of the beautiful offspring,[32] that unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to make a proper speech on any subject either. And let Phaedrus be the one to answer.

PHAEDRUS Let them put their questions.

SOCRATES Well, then, isn't the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the lawcourts and on other public occasions but also in private? Isn't it one and the

b same art whether its subject is great or small, and no more to be held in esteem—if it is followed correctly—when its questions are serious than when they are trivial? Or what have you heard about all this?

PHAEDRUS Well, certainly not what *you* have! Artful speaking and writing is found mainly in the lawcourts; also perhaps in the Assembly. That's all I've heard.

SOCRATES Well, have you only heard of the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—those they wrote in their spare time in Troy? Haven't you also heard of the works of Palamedes?[33]

c PHAEDRUS No, by Zeus, I haven't even heard of Nestor's—unless by Nestor you mean Gorgias, and by Odysseus, Thrasymachus or Theodorus.[34]

SOCRATES Perhaps. But let's leave these people aside. Answer this

to that extent you will be less than perfect. But, insofar as there is an art of rhetoric, I don't believe the right method for acquiring it is to be found in the direction Lysias and Thrasymachus have followed.

PHAEDRUS Where can we find it then?

SOCRATES My dear friend, maybe we can see now why Pericles was *e* in all likelihood the greatest rhetorician of all.

PHAEDRUS How is that?

SOCRATES All the great arts require endless talk and ethereal speculation about nature: This seems to be what gives them their lofty *270* point of view and universal applicability. That's just what Pericles mastered—besides having natural ability. He came across Anaxagoras, who was just that sort of man, got his full dose of ethereal speculation, and understood the nature of mind and mindlessness—just the subject on which Anaxagoras had the most to say. From this, I think, he drew for the art of rhetoric what was useful to it.

PHAEDRUS What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES Well, isn't the method of medicine in a way the same as *b* the method of rhetoric?

PHAEDRUS How so?

SOCRATES In both cases we need to determine the nature of something—of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we'll have will be an empirical and artless practice. We won't be able to supply, on the basis of an art, a body with the medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with the reasons and customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we want.

PHAEDRUS That is most likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES Do you think, then, that it is possible to reach a seri- *c* ous understanding of the nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the world as a whole?

PHAEDRUS Well, if we're to listen to Hippocrates, Asclepius' de-

269 Socrates So Sophocles would also tell the man who was showing off to them that he knew the preliminaries of tragedy, but not the art of tragedy itself. And Acumenus would say his man knew the preliminaries of medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phaedrus Absolutely.

Socrates And what if the "honey-tongued Adrastus" (or perhaps Pericles)[45] were to hear of all the marvelous techniques we just discussed—Speaking Concisely and Speaking in Images and all the rest
b we listed and proposed to examine under the light? Would he be angry or rude, as you and I were, with those who write of those techniques and teach them as if they are rhetoric itself, and say something coarse to them? Wouldn't he—being wiser than we are—reproach us as well and say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, you should not be angry with these people—you should be sorry for them. The reason they cannot define rhetoric is that they are ignorant of dialectic. It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what rhetoric is when they
c have mastered only what it is necessary to learn as preliminaries. So they teach these preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in rhetoric, thinking the task of using each of them persuasively and putting them together into a whole speech is a minor matter, to be worked out by the pupils from their own resources"?

Phaedrus Really, Socrates, the art these men present as rhetoric in their courses and handbooks is no more than what you say. In my
d judgment, at least, your point is well taken. But how, from what source, could one acquire the art of the true rhetorician, the really persuasive speaker?

Socrates Well, Phaedrus, becoming good enough to be an accomplished competitor is probably—perhaps necessarily—like everything else. If you have a natural ability for rhetoric, you will become a famous rhetorician, provided you supplement your ability with knowledge and practice. To the extent that you lack any one of them,

question yourself: What do adversaries do in the lawcourts? Don't they speak on opposite sides? What else can we call what they do?

Phaedrus That's it, exactly.

Socrates About what is just and what is unjust?

Phaedrus Yes.

Socrates And won't whoever does this artfully make the same d
thing appear to the same people sometimes just and sometimes, when he prefers, unjust?

Phaedrus Of course.

Socrates And when he addresses the Assembly, he will make the city approve a policy at one time as a good one, and reject it—the very same policy—as just the opposite at another.

Phaedrus Right.

Socrates Now, don't we know that the Eleatic Palamedes is such an artful speaker that his listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and also in motion?[35]

Phaedrus Most certainly.

Socrates We can therefore find the practice of speaking on opposite sides not only in the lawcourts and in the Assembly. Rather, it e
seems that one single art—if, of course, it is an art in the first place—governs all speaking. By means of it one can make out as similar anything that can be so assimilated, to everything to which it can be made similar, and expose anyone who tries to hide the fact that that is what he is doing.

Phaedrus What do you mean by that?

Socrates I think it will become clear if we look at it this way. Where is deception most likely to occur—regarding things that differ much or things that differ little from one another?

Phaedrus Regarding those that differ little. 262

Socrates At any rate, you are more likely to escape detection, as

you shift from one thing to its opposite, if you proceed in small steps rather than in large ones.

PHAEDRUS Without a doubt.

SOCRATES Therefore, if you are to deceive someone else and to avoid deception yourself, you must know precisely the respects in which things are similar and dissimilar to one another.

PHAEDRUS Yes, you must.

SOCRATES And is it really possible for someone who doesn't know what each thing truly is to detect a similarity—whether large or small—between something he doesn't know and anything else?

b PHAEDRUS That is impossible.

SOCRATES Clearly, therefore, the state of being deceived and holding beliefs contrary to what is the case comes upon people by reason of certain similarities.

PHAEDRUS That is how it happens.

SOCRATES Could someone, then, who doesn't know what each thing is ever have the art to lead others little by little through similarities away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape this being done to himself?

PHAEDRUS Never.

c SOCRATES Therefore, my friend, the art of a speaker who doesn't know the truth and chases opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thing—not an art at all!

PHAEDRUS So it seems.

SOCRATES So, shall we look for instances of what we called the artful and the artless in the speech of Lysias you carried here and in our own speeches?

PHAEDRUS That's the best thing to do—because, as it is, we are talking quite abstractly, without enough examples.

SOCRATES In fact, by some chance the two speeches do, as it seems,

d contain an example of the way in which someone who knows the truth

they heard that?

PHAEDRUS What could they say? They would ask him if he also knew to whom he should apply such treatments, when, and to what extent.

SOCRATES What if he replied, "I have no idea. My claim is that whoever learns from me will manage to do what you ask on his own"? *c*

PHAEDRUS I think they'd say the man's mad if he thinks he's a doctor just because he read a book or happened to come across a few potions; he knows nothing of the art.

SOCRATES And suppose someone approached Sophocles and Euripides and claimed to know how to compose the longest passages on trivial topics and the briefest ones on topics of great importance, that he could make them pitiful if he wanted, or again, by contrast, terrifying and menacing, and so on. Suppose further that he believed that by teaching this he was imparting the knowledge of composing tragedies— *d*

PHAEDRUS Oh, I am sure they too would laugh at anyone who thought a tragedy was anything other than the proper arrangement of these things: They have to fit with one another and with the whole work.

SOCRATES But I am sure they wouldn't reproach him rudely. They would react more like a musician confronted by a man who thought he had mastered harmony because he was able to produce the highest and lowest notes on his strings. The musician would not say fiercely, "You stupid man, you are out of your mind!" As befits his calling, he would speak more gently: "My friend, though that too is necessary for understanding harmony, someone who has gotten as far as you have may still know absolutely nothing about the subject. What you know is what it's necessary to learn before you study harmony, but not harmony itself." *e*

PHAEDRUS That's certainly right.

him explain Good Diction?[42]

PHAEDRUS But didn't Protagoras actually use similar terms?[43]

SOCRATES Yes, Correct Diction, my boy, and other wonderful things. As to the art of making speeches bewailing the evils of poverty and old age, the prize, in my judgment, goes to the mighty Chalcedon-
d ian.[44] He it is also who knows best how to inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again with his words' magic spell, as he says himself. And let's not forget that he is as good at producing slander as he is at refuting it, whatever its source may be.

As to the way of ending a speech, everyone seems to be in agreement, though some call it Recapitulation and others by some other name.

PHAEDRUS You mean, summarizing everything at the end and reminding the audience of what they've heard?

SOCRATES That's what I mean. And if you have anything else to add about the art of speaking—

PHAEDRUS Only minor points, not worth making.

268 SOCRATES Well, let's leave minor points aside. Let's hold what we do have closer to the light so that we can see precisely the power of the art these things produce.

PHAEDRUS A very great power, Socrates, especially in front of a crowd.

SOCRATES Quite right. But now, my friend, look closely: Do you think, as I do, that its fabric is a little threadbare?

PHAEDRUS Can you show me?

SOCRATES All right, tell me this. Suppose someone came to your friend Eryximachus or his father Acumenus and said: "I know treat-
b ments to raise or lower (whichever I prefer) the temperature of people's bodies; if I decide to, I can make them vomit or make their bowels move, and all sorts of things. On the basis of this knowledge, I claim to be a physician; and I claim to be able to make others physicians as well by imparting it to them." What do you think they would say when

60

can toy with his audience and mislead them. For my part, Phaedrus, I hold the local gods responsible for this—also, perhaps, the messengers of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have inspired me with this gift: certainly *I* don't possess any art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS Fine, fine. But explain what you mean.

SOCRATES Come, then—read me the beginning of Lysias' speech.

PHAEDRUS "You understand my situation: I've told you how good *e*
it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out. In any case, I don't think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don't happen to be in love with you. A man in love will wish he had not done you any favors—"

SOCRATES Stop. Our task is to say how he fails and writes artlessly. Right?

PHAEDRUS Yes. *263*

SOCRATES Now isn't this much absolutely clear: We are in accord with one another about some of the things we discourse about and in discord about others?

PHAEDRUS I think I understand what you are saying; but, please, can you make it a little clearer?

SOCRATES When someone utters the word "iron" or "silver," don't we all think of the same thing?

PHAEDRUS Certainly.

SOCRATES But what happens when we say "just" or "good"? Doesn't each one of us go in a different direction? Don't we differ with one another and even with ourselves?

PHAEDRUS We certainly do.

SOCRATES Therefore, we agree about the former and disagree *b*
about the latter.

PHAEDRUS Right.

SOCRATES Now in which of these two cases are we more easily deceived? And when does rhetoric have greater power?

53

PHAEDRUS Clearly, when we wander in different directions.

SOCRATES It follows that whoever wants to acquire the art of rhetoric must first make a systematic division and grasp the particular character of each of these two kinds of thing, both the kind where most people wander in different directions and the kind where they do not.

c PHAEDRUS What a splendid thing, Socrates, he will have understood if he grasps *that!*

SOCRATES Second, I think, he must not be mistaken about his subject; he must have a sharp eye for the class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs.

PHAEDRUS Of course.

SOCRATES Well, now, what shall we say about love? Does it belong to the class where people differ or to that where they don't?

PHAEDRUS Oh, surely the class where they differ. Otherwise, do you think you could have spoken of it as you did a few minutes ago, first saying that it is harmful both to lover and beloved and then immediately afterward that it is the greatest good?

d SOCRATES Very well put. But now tell me this—I can't remember at all because I was completely possessed by the gods: Did I define love at the beginning of my speech?

PHAEDRUS Oh, absolutely, by Zeus, you most certainly did.

SOCRATES Alas, how much more artful with speeches the Nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are, according to what you say, than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong? Did Lysias too, at

e the start of his love-speech, compel us to assume that love is the single thing that he himself wanted it to be? Did he then complete his speech by arranging everything in relation to that? Will you read its opening once again?

PHAEDRUS If you like. But what you are looking for is not there.

SOCRATES Read it, so that I can hear it in his own words.

SOCRATES You were quite right to remind me. First, I believe, there is the Preamble with which a speech must begin. This is what you mean, isn't it—the fine points of the art?

PHAEDRUS Yes. *e*

SOCRATES Second come the Statement of Facts and the Evidence of Witnesses concerning it; third, Indirect Evidence; fourth, Claims to Plausibility. And I believe at least that excellent Byzantine word-wizard adds Confirmation and Supplementary Confirmation.

PHAEDRUS You mean the worthy Theodorus?

SOCRATES Quite. And he also adds Refutation and Supplementary *267* Refutation, to be used both in prosecution and in defense. Nor must we forget the most excellent Evenus of Paros,[37] who was the first to discover Covert Implication and Indirect Praise and who—some say—has even arranged Indirect Censures in verse as an aid to memory: a wise man indeed! And Tisias[38] and Gorgias? How can we leave them out when it is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear great and great things small; they who ex- *b* press modern ideas in ancient garb, and ancient ones in modern dress; they who have discovered how to argue both concisely and at infinite length about any subject? Actually, when I told Prodicus[39] this last, he laughed and said that only he had discovered the art of proper speeches: What we need are speeches that are neither long nor short but of the right length.

PHAEDRUS Brilliantly done, Prodicus!

SOCRATES And what about Hippias?[40] How can we omit him? I am sure our friend from Elis would cast his vote with Prodicus.

PHAEDRUS Certainly.

SOCRATES And what shall we say of the whole gallery of terms Polus[41] set up—speaking with Reduplication, Speaking in Maxims, Speak- *c* ing in Images—and of the terms Licymnius gave him as a present to help

the speeches, having considered unsoundness of mind to be by nature one single kind within us, proceeded to cut it up—the first speech cut its left-hand part, and continued to cut until it discovered among these parts a sort of love that can be called "left-handed," which it correctly denounced; the second speech, in turn, led us to the right-hand part of madness; discovered a love that shares its name with the other but is actually divine; set it out before us, and praised it as the cause of our
b greatest goods.

PHAEDRUS You are absolutely right.

SOCRATES Well, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able to think and to speak; and if I believe that someone else is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable of encompassing many, I follow "straight behind, in his tracks, as if he were a god."[36] God knows whether this is the right
c name for those who can do this correctly or not, but so far I have always called them "dialecticians." But tell me what I must call them now that we have learned all this from Lysias and you. Or is it just that art of speaking that Thrasymachus and the rest of them use, which has made them masters of speechmaking and capable of producing others like them—anyhow those who are willing to bring them gifts and to treat them as if they were kings?

PHAEDRUS They may behave like kings, but they certainly lack the knowledge you're talking about. No, it seems to me that you are right in calling the sort of thing you mentioned dialectic; but, it seems to me, rhetoric still eludes us.

d SOCRATES What are you saying? Could there be anything valuable which is independent of the methods I mentioned and is still grasped by art? If there is, you and I must certainly honor it, and we must say what part of rhetoric it is that has been left out.

PHAEDRUS Well, there's quite a lot, Socrates: everything, at any rate, written up in the books on the art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS "You understand my situation: I've told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out. In any case, I don't think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don't happen to be in love with you. A man in love *264* will wish he had not done you any favors, once his desire dies down—"

SOCRATES He certainly seems a long way from doing what we wanted. He doesn't even start from the beginning but from the end, making his speech swim upstream on its back. His first words are what a lover would say to his boy as he was concluding his speech. Am I wrong, Phaedrus, dear heart?

PHAEDRUS Well, Socrates, that was the end for which he gave the *b* speech!

SOCRATES And what about the rest? Don't the parts of the speech appear to have been thrown together at random? Is it evident that the second point had to be made second for some compelling reason? Is that so for any of the parts? I at least—of course I know nothing about such matters—thought the author said just whatever came to mind next, though not without a certain noble willfulness. But you, do you know any principle of speech-composition compelling him to place these things one after another in this order?

PHAEDRUS It's very generous of you to think that I can understand *c* his reasons so clearly.

SOCRATES But surely you will admit at least this much: Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work.

PHAEDRUS How could it be otherwise?

SOCRATES But look at your friend's speech: Is it like that or is it otherwise? Actually, you'll find that it's just like the epigram people say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

d PHAEDRUS What epigram is that? And what's the matter with it?

SOCRATES It goes like this:

A maid of bronze am I, on Midas' tomb I lie
As long as water flows, and trees grow tall
Shielding the grave where many come to cry
That Midas rests here I say to one and all.

e I'm sure you notice that it makes no difference at all which of its verses comes first, and which last.

PHAEDRUS You are making fun of our speech, Socrates.

SOCRATES Well, then, if that upsets you, let's leave that speech aside—even though I think it has plenty of very useful examples, provided one tries to emulate them as little as possible—and turn to the others. I think it is important for students of speechmaking to pay attention to one of their features.

265 PHAEDRUS What do you mean?

SOCRATES They were in a way opposite to one another. One claimed that one should give one's favors to the lover; the other, to the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS Most manfully, too.

SOCRATES I thought you were going to say "madly," which would have been the truth, and is also just what I was looking for: We did say, didn't we, that love is a kind of madness?

PHAEDRUS Yes.

SOCRATES And that there are two kinds of madness, one produced by human illness, the other by a divinely inspired release from normally accepted behavior?

b PHAEDRUS Certainly.

SOCRATES We also distinguished four parts within the divine kind and connected them to four gods. Having attributed the inspiration

of the prophet to Apollo, of the mystic to Dionysus, of the poet to the Muses, and the fourth part of madness to Aphrodite and to Love, we said that the madness of love is the best. We used a certain sort of image to describe love's passion; perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us astray. And having whipped up a not altogether implausible speech, we sang playfully, but also appropriately *c* and respectfully, a story-like hymn to my master and yours, Phaedrus—to Love, who watches over beautiful boys.

PHAEDRUS And I listened to it with the greatest pleasure.

SOCRATES Let's take up this point about it right away: How was the speech able to proceed from censure to praise?

PHAEDRUS What exactly do you mean by that?

SOCRATES Well, everything else in it really does appear to me to have been spoken in play. But part of it was given with Fortune's guidance, and there were in it two kinds of things the nature of which it *d* would be quite wonderful to grasp by means of a systematic art.

PHAEDRUS Which things?

SOCRATES The first consists in seeing together things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give. Just so with our discussion of love: Whether its definition was or was not correct, at least it allowed the speech to proceed clearly and consistently with itself.

PHAEDRUS And what is the other thing you are talking about, Socrates?

SOCRATES This, in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind according *e* to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do. In just this way, our two speeches placed all mental derangements into one common kind. Then, just as each single *266* body has parts that naturally come in pairs of the same name (one of them being called the right-hand and the other the left-hand one), so