

COL 202: DISCRETE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES

## LECTURE 23

QUIZ 2 DISCUSSION & MINIMUM SPANNING TREES

MAR 01, 2023


|

ROHIT VAISH

# QUIZ 2



**Problem 1** Construct an instance with at least  $\frac{n}{2}$  stable matchings.

Building block



Two stable matchings

Building block



$w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_2$  $w_1 \quad m_2 \succ m_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_2 \quad m_1 \succ m_2 \succ \text{rest}$

$w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_2$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_3$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_4$  $w_1 \succ w_2 \succ m_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_2 \succ m_1 \succ m_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_3 \succ m_4 \succ m_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_4 \succ m_3 \succ m_4 \succ \text{rest}$

$w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_2$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_3$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_4$ 

⋮

 $w_{n-1} \succ w_n \succ \text{rest}$  $m_{n-1}$  $w_n \succ w_{n-1} \succ \text{rest}$  $m_n$  $w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ m_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_3 \succ m_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_4 \succ m_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_n \succ m_{n-1} \succ \text{rest}$  $m_{n-1} \succ m_n \succ \text{rest}$

$w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_2$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_3$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_4$  $\vdots$  $w_{n-1} \succ w_n \succ \text{rest}$  $m_{n-1}$  $w_n \succ w_{n-1} \succ \text{rest}$  $m_n$  $w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$ 

Any stable matching  
must have

either

 $m_{i-1} — w_{i-1}$  $m_i — w_i$ 

or

 $m_{i-1} \times w_{i-1}$   
 $m_i \times w_i$ 


for every  $i \in \{2, 4, \dots, n\}$

$w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_1$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_2$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_3$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $m_4$ 

⋮

 $w_{n-1} \succ w_n \succ \text{rest}$  $m_{n-1}$  $w_n \succ w_{n-1} \succ \text{rest}$  $m_n$  $w_1 \succ w_2 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_2 \succ w_1 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_3 \succ w_4 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_4 \succ w_3 \succ \text{rest}$  $w_{n-1} \succ m_n \succ \text{rest}$  $w_n \succ m_{n-1} \succ \text{rest}$ 

Every  $2 \times 2$  block  
has two stable  
matchings



$\frac{n}{2}$  stable matchings  
in total

# PROBLEM 1

Identifying  $2 \times 2$  instance with two stable matchings

[3 pts]

Constructing a correct  $n \times n$  instance

[6 pts]

Justifying the number of stable matchings

[6 pts]

# QUIZ 2

**Problem 2** (a) Identifying men/women-optimal matchings in

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

(b) Modifying  $w_i$ 's preference list to induce women-optimal matching (of old instance) as output of men-proposing DA algorithm

Women-optimal stable matching = Outcome of women-proposing DA

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Women-optimal stable matching = Outcome of women-proposing DA

$m_1 : w_2 \underline{w_1} w_3 w_4$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} m_2 m_3 m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \underline{w_2} w_1 w_4$

$w_2 : \underline{m_2} m_3 m_4 m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \underline{w_3} w_2 w_4$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} m_1 m_4 m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 w_4 \underline{w_2} w_3$

$w_4 : \underline{m_4} m_2 m_3 m_1$

Women-optimal stable matching = Outcome of women-proposing DA

$m_1 : w_2 \underline{w_1} w_3 w_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \underline{w_2} w_1 w_4$

$m_3 : w_1 \underline{w_3} w_2 w_4$

$m_4 : w_1 \underline{w_4} w_2 w_2$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} m_2 m_3 m_4$

$w_2 : \underline{m_2} m_3 m_4 m_1$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} m_1 m_4 m_2$

$w_4 : \underline{m_4} m_2 m_3 m_1$

Men-optimal stable matching = Outcome of men-proposing DA

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Men-optimal stable matching = Outcome of men-proposing DA

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \quad m_2 \quad \underline{m_3} \quad \underline{m_4}$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_1}$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_2}$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_4 \quad w_2 \quad w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad \underline{m_1}$

Men-optimal stable matching = Outcome of men-proposing DA

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \quad m_2 \quad \underline{m_3} \quad \underline{m_4}$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_1}$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_2}$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_4 \quad w_2 \quad w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad \underline{m_1}$

Men-optimal stable matching = Outcome of men-proposing DA

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \quad m_2 \quad \underline{m_3} \quad \underline{m_4}$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_1}$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_2}$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_3$

$w_4 : \underline{m_4} \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

Men-optimal stable matching = Outcome of men-proposing DA

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} w_1 w_3 w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} w_2 w_1 w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} w_3 w_2 w_4$

$m_4 : \cancel{w_1} \underline{w_4} w_2 w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 m_2 \underline{m_3} \cancel{m_4}$

$w_2 : m_2 m_3 m_4 \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : m_3 m_1 m_4 \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : \underline{m_4} m_2 m_3 m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

$\rightarrow m_3 \text{ and } m_4$

$w_1$  must change the order of the two proposers in the old instance to make the algorithm run differently.

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

$\rightarrow m_3 \text{ and } m_4$

$w_1$  must change the order of the two proposers in the old instance to make the algorithm run differently.

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : w_2 \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_4 \ m_3$

$m_2 : w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_1$

$m_3 : w_1 \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ m_2$

$m_4 : w_1 \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \ w_3 \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_3$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ \underline{m_4} \ \underline{m_3}$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \ \cancel{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_4 \ \cancel{m_3}$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : m_3 \ m_1 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : \cancel{w_1} \ \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_3}$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} \ m_1 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : \cancel{w_2} \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : \cancel{w_1} \ \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \ w_4 \ w_2 \ w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_4 \ \cancel{m_3}$

$w_2 : m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} \ m_1 \ m_4 \ \cancel{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_3 \ w_4$

$m_2 : \cancel{w_2} \ \underline{w_2} \ w_1 \ w_4$

$m_3 : \cancel{w_1} \ \underline{w_3} \ w_2 \ w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \ \underline{w_4} \ w_2 \ w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 \ m_2 \ m_4 \ \cancel{m_3}$

$w_2 : \underline{m_2} \ m_3 \ m_4 \ \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} \ m_1 \ m_4 \ \cancel{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad w_4 \quad w_2 \quad w_2$

$w_1 : m_1 \quad m_2 \quad \underline{m_4} \quad \underline{m_3}$

$w_2 : \underline{m_2} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_2$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} \quad m_2 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_3}$

$w_2 : \underline{m_2} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_1}$

$w_3 : \underline{m_3} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \underline{m_2}$

$w_4 : m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_2$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} \quad m_2 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_3}}$

$w_2 : \cancel{\underline{m_2}} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_1}}$

$w_3 : \cancel{\underline{m_3}} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_2}}$

$w_4 : m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_1}}$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

 $m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_4$ 
 $m_2 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$ 
 $m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$ 
 $m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_2$ 
 $w_1 : \underline{m_1} \quad m_2 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_3}}$ 
 $w_2 : \cancel{\underline{m_2}} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_1}}$ 
 $w_3 : \cancel{\underline{m_3}} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{\underline{m_2}}$ 
 $w_4 : \cancel{\underline{m_4}} \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_2$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} \quad m_2 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_3}$

$w_2 : \cancel{m_2} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_1}$

$w_3 : \cancel{m_3} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_2}$

$w_4 : \cancel{m_4} \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

Let's modify the instance so that the new men-proposing DA matching is the same as the old women-optimal stable matching.

$m_1 : \underline{w_2} \quad \underline{w_1} \quad w_3 \quad w_4$

$m_2 : \underline{w_3} \quad \underline{w_2} \quad w_1 \quad w_4$

$m_3 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_3} \quad w_2 \quad w_4$

$m_4 : \underline{w_1} \quad \underline{w_4} \quad w_2 \quad w_2$

$w_1 : \underline{m_1} \quad m_2 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_3}$

$w_2 : \cancel{m_2} \quad m_3 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_1}$

$w_3 : \cancel{m_3} \quad m_1 \quad m_4 \quad \cancel{m_2}$

$w_4 : \cancel{m_4} \quad m_2 \quad m_3 \quad m_1$

\* Stable marriages can be manipulated!