Critical authoritarianism

Chris Cutrone

Immanent critique

Whenever approaching any phenomenon, Adorno's procedure is one of *immanent dialectical critique*. The phenomenon is treated as not accidental or arbitrary but as a necessary form of appearance that points beyond itself, indicating conditions of possibility for change. It is a phenomenon of the necessity for change. The conditions of possibility for change indicated by the phenomenon in question are explored immanently, from within. The possibility for change is indicated by a phenomenon's self-contradictions, which unfold from within itself, from its own movement, and develop from within its historical moment.

Everything is taken not merely as it "is," as it happens to exist, but rather as it "ought" to be, as it could and should be, yielding as-yet unrealized potentials and possibilities. So it is with "authoritarianism," in Adorno's view. For Adorno, the key is how psychological authoritarianism is self-contradictory and points beyond itself. Adorno is interested in the "actuality" of authoritarianism: as Wilhelm Reich put it, the "progressive character of fascism;"[1] as Walter Benjamin put it, the "positive concept of barbarism."[2]

This demands a critical approach rather than a merely descriptive or analytically positive or affirmative approach. For something can be affirmed either in its justification and legitimation or in its denunciation. In either case, the phenomenon is left as it is; whereas, for Adorno, as a Marxist, "the point is to *change* it."[3]

So, what possibilities for change are indicated by authoritarianism, and how are such possibilities pointed to by the categories of Freudian psychoanalysis? For Adorno, it is unfortunate that social contradiction has passed from ideology and politics in society to individual psychology (indeed, this expresses a political failure), but there it is.[4] The "F-scale" is misleading, as Adorno notes, in that it might—despite its being posed as a "scale" —be mistaken for a matter of difference in kind rather than degree. Meaning that, for Adorno, everyone is more or less susceptible to fascism—everyone is more or less authoritarian.

The competing aspects of the individual psyche between liberal individuality and authoritarian tendencies is itself the self-contradiction of authoritarianism Adorno sought to explore. In capitalism, liberalism is the flip-side of the same coin as fascism. Individualism and collectivism are an antinomy that express capitalist contradiction. For individualism violates true individuality and collectivism violates the true potential of the social collectivity. Individuality and collectivity remain unfulfilled desiderata, the aspirations and goals of bourgeois society, its emancipatory promise. For Adorno (as for Marx), both are travestied in capitalism—mere "shams."

Authoritarianism is an expression of that travesty of society. Fascism is the sham collectivity in which the sham individuality hides itself; just as liberalism is the sham individuality that conceals the collective condition of society. That collective condition is not a state of being but the task of the need for socialism beyond capitalism. Fascism as well as liberalism expresses that unfulfilled need and tasking demand for socialism in capitalism.

So what would it mean to critique authoritarianism in an immanently dialectical manner? What is the critical value of authoritarianism, in Adorno's view? How can the potential possibility pointing beyond capitalism be expressed by authoritarianism and revealed rather than concealed by individual psychology? How is society critically revealed in authoritarianism, pointing to socialism?

Psychology

In "Sociology and psychology"[5] Adorno diagnoses the division of psychology from sociology as itself a symptom of contradiction in society—of the actual separation and contradiction of the individual and the collective in capitalism.

In *The Authoritarian Personality*,[6] Adorno et al. wrote that the fascist personality was characterized by identification with technology, the love for instruments as "equipment." Here, Adorno found the emancipatory potential beyond capitalism precisely in such identification and imitation: it becomes a matter of the form of individuation. In "Imaginative excesses," orphaned from *Minima Moralia*,[7] Adorno wrote that,

> [N]o… faith can be placed in those equated with the means; the subjectless beings whom historical wrong has robbed of the strength to right it, adapted to technology and unemployment, conforming and squalid, hard to distinguish from the wind-jackets of fascism… the subhuman creature who as dishonour's progeny shall never be allowed to avert it… The bearers of technical progress, now still mechanized mechanics, will, in evolving their special abilities, reach the point already indicated by technology where specialization grows superfluous. Once their consciousness has been converted into pure means without any qualification, it may cease to be a means and breach, with its attachment to particular objects, the last heteronomous barrier; its last entrapment in the existing state, the last fetishism of the status quo, including that of its own self, which is dissolved in its radical implementation as an instrument. Drawing breath at last, it may grow aware of the incongruence between its rational development and the irrationality of its ends, and act accordingly.

In "On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening," Adorno seeks to redeem authoritarianism in his conclusion when he offers that, "Even discipline can take over the expression of free solidarity if freedom becomes its content." He goes on that, "As little as [authoritarianism] is a symptom of progress in consciousness of freedom, it could suddenly turn around if [individual psychology], in unity with the society, should ever leave the road of the always-identical"[8]—that is, in going beyond capitalism. Here, critical authoritarianism is met by a critical individualism in which "collective powers are liquidating an individuality past saving, but against them only individuals are capable of consciously representing the aims of collectivity."[9] What are the aims of the collectivity expressed by the identification with technology? What Adorno following Benjamin called "mimesis"[10] Freud analyzed psychologically as "identification." Adorno wrote that "the pressure to be permitted to obey… is today more general than ever." But what Marx called the "industrial forces of production" are constrained and distorted by the "bourgeois social relations of production" in capitalism. There is a homologous contradiction within the individual personality.

In "Reflections on Class Theory", Adorno wrote that,

> Dehumanization is no external power, no propaganda, however conceived, no exclusion from culture. It is precisely the intrinsic reality of the oppressed in the system, who used formerly to stand out because of their wretchedness, whereas today their wretchedness lies in the fact that they can never escape. That they suspect that the truth is propaganda, while swallowing the propaganda culture that is fetishized and distorted into the madness of an unending reflection of themselves. This means, however, that the dehumanization is also its opposite. In reified human beings reification finds its outer limits. They catch up with the technical forces of production in which the relations of production lie hidden: in this way these relations lose the shock of their alien nature because the alienation is so complete. But they may soon also lose their power. Only when the victims completely assume the features of the ruling civilization will they be capable to wresting them from the dominant power.[11]

Society

Karl Marx regarded the "necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as a phenomenon of "Bonapartism" —the rise to power of Louis Bonaparte as a result of the failure of the Revolution of 1848 in France. This was Marx's difference from the anarchists: the recognition of the necessity of the state in capitalism.[12] Hence one should regard Marx on the dictatorship of the proletariat as a "critical Bonapartist."[13] Bonapartism expressed an objective societal need rather than a subjective attitude. Bonapartist response to the objective social crisis and contradiction of capitalism pointed beyond itself and so required a dialectical critique, which Marx thought the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon failed to provide by treating Bonapartism as objectively determined, apologizing for it, as did the sentimental socialist Victor Hugo who treated Bonapartism as a monstrous historical accident like a "bolt from the blue."[14] Fatalism and contingency were two sides of the same contradiction that obscured a necessity that could be addressed properly only in a dialectical way. These are the terms in which Adorno addressed "authoritarianism."

Adorno's "critical authoritarianism" addresses what the "immanent dialectical critique" of authoritarianism would mean, both in terms of Freudian psychoanalytic categories of description, and in terms of (absent) politics for socialism. Adorno's *Dream Notes* records a dream of his participating in a gang-rape, as a primal scene of fascism.[15] The "delightful young mulatto . . . the kind of woman one sees in Harlem" who catches his eye admonishes him that "This is the style of the Institute." The homosexuality and sado-masochism of authoritarianism in pre-Oedipal psychology; the desire as well as fear to "liquidate the ego" in ambivalence about individuality; critical (as opposed to methodological or affirmative) individualism; the desire and fear of collectivity in authoritarian collectivism; projection, identification and counter-identification providing for social cohesion as well as for separation and atomization—these are the themes of Adorno's critical approach to psychology in late capitalism.

A similar thought was articulated contemporaneously by Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (BSWM), which characterizes negrophobic racism as "repressed homosexuality" and a "narcissistic disorder." Fanon describes the Freudian approach to rape fantasies as a masochistic fear and desire that is an internalized projection of parental authority, a self-sadism. One fears what one wishes to happen; a wish is a way of mastering a fear by internalizing it; a fear is a way of repressing a wish. The reason rape is so traumatic is that it activates and violates such infantile experiences. There is the experience of parental seduction harking back to the anal phase of libido development, when the child experiences itself as unable to control its excretion, which is experienced as disturbingly involuntary, a blow to narcissism in the difficulty of toilet training, seeking to please the parents' expectations. The parents' cleaning of the infant is pleasurably stimulating, and the child internalizes the parent's simultaneous desire and disgust, attraction and repulsion, which becomes the complex of feelings, the combination of shame and guilt with pleasure, that the child takes in its own bodily functions. Humiliation at loss of self-control is a formative experience of transforming narcissism into identification. The infant's desire for the parents is an identification with the feared power.[16] The parents embody the ego-ideal of self-control. This is channeled later through gendered object-libido in the Oedipus complex as genital pleasure, but retains the sado-masochistic qualities of the anal phase, which precedes gender identification and so exhibits more basic, homosexual (ungendered) qualities that prevents the recognition of difference and individuality. In a narcissistic—authoritarian—society everyone becomes trapped in a static and self-reinforcing identity, where the need was actually to allow the opening to non-identity of freedom: the freedom to "overcome oneself" allowed by the healthy ego.

Fanon sought to provide an account of how "racial narcissism"—the failure of the individual ego—could yet point beyond itself, specifically in its treacherously dyadic character of Self and Other, to the need that was blocked: "the world of the You."[17]

Adorno brings into his discussion of *The Authoritarian Personality* a key background writing for Fanon's BSWM, Jean-Paul Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*, which assumes,

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

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Introduction to "Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*"

Chris Mansour

WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO CLAIM that a person, social group, or historical moment is authoritarian by varying degrees? In what way can the emergence of modern authoritarianism be accounted for and how would it be overcome? These were central questions in the landmark 1950 study *The Authoritarian Personality* (AP), coauthored by T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. AP emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, a time when finding answers to the rise of fascism was a desideratum for intellectuals and political figures. Adorno et al.'s research focused specifically on the field of social psychology, investigating how unconscious fears and desires played into the formation of prejudiced attitudes.

Two years before AP appeared in print, Adorno wrote what was intended to be the last chapter of the volume, "Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*." For reasons that are unclear, the draft never made it past the editing phase. More curiously, his typescript remains unpublished until this day. Thus, for this special issue of the *Platypus Review*, we will publicly circulate "Remarks" for the first time. The paper invites a reconsideration of the AP study and its findings. But more importantly, given that our current moment is arguably experiencing a new rise of authoritarianism internationally, discovering what propels these tendencies continues to be an urgent matter. In publishing the typescript, we aim to challenge the way we account for authoritarianism in the 21st century. Detlev Claussen, Chris Cutrone, Juliet Mitchell and Kirk Wetters have been invited to respond to Adorno's paper in light of the present.

Before introducing "Remarks," the AP project should be briefly summarized for readers who are unfamiliar with it. The four authors involved, later to become known as the "Berkeley group," first assembled to start the interdisciplinary project in 1945. Institutionally, it was a joint undertaking between the Berkeley Public Opinion Study and the Institute for Social Research. AP was the first of five volumes published in the Studies in Prejudice series edited by Marx Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman. The American Jewish Committee sponsored the entire series with hopes that it would enable their mission of countering discrimination, particularly anti-Semitism.

In general it was believed that even with the defeat of the Third Reich, elements of a fascist mentality still lingered. Systematized bigotry was not confined to Europe alone but affected the totality of industrialized capitalist society. Since a large, organized fascist movement never breached its shores, America was a seemingly peculiar country to evaluate for the rise of prejudiced personalities. Nevertheless, signs of anti-Semitism were unmistakably present, albeit not as strongly expressed as in Europe. In the U.S., discriminatory opinions against Jews were admixed with other racist prejudices, especially against black people. As the authors found, those who are biased against one social group are likely to be prejudiced against others since their views are built on irrational grounds. A study of the prejudiced personality was therefore no less pressing on the other side of the Atlantic.

The Berkeley group administered attitude and personality questionnaires to 2099 subjects that were mainly from the Bay Area. Around 80 individuals then took part in further interviews and tests, such as the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Four scales to measure the subjects' susceptibilities to anti-democratic ideas were created: the A-S Scale (anti-Semitism); the E-Scale (ethnocentrism); Politico-Economic Conservatism scale (conservative ideological commitments); and the F-Scale (fascistic potential). From these case studies, they devised a table of nine components describing the "syndromes" affiliated with authoritarian qualities. Below are the features highlighted:

• *Conventionalism.* Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
• *Authoritarian submission.* Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
• *Authoritarian aggression.* Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
• *Anti-intraception.* Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.
• *Superstition and stereotypy.* The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.
• *Power and "toughness."* Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension, identification with power-figures; overemphasis on the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.
• *Destructiveness and cynicism.* Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.
• *Projectivity.* The disposition to believe that wild and

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The call to advent: An answer to Chris Cutrone's "Why not Trump?"

Daniel Lommes

THE SHORT ARTICLE "WHY NOT TRUMP?" by Chris Cutrone in Platypus Review #89[1] is both brilliant and deeply flawed. It is brilliant in its provocative polemic, starting with the title, forcing us to engage with the question in a fresh way. This undeniably is what Cutrone intended, a challenge starting with and finally culminating in "the obvious question that is avoided but must be asked by anyone not too frightened to think." Yes, we must ask the question. Yes, we need to think about it clearly. Cutrone is not just right; he is persuasive.

But he does not stop here, in this, his moment of triumph. Instead, over the course of only six lines, he veers off into very strange territory indeed. Earlier, he finds it "useful to treat all of Trump's claims as true," but in the end this carefully worded methodological caveat is discarded. It is hammered away in a smashing of all caution, in a construction of perfect clarity: No problem is left; There is just "the only answer" to the question that, until this very point, Cutrone had successfully problematized.

On a closer look, there were troubles before. Cutrone clears Trump from accusations of "racism" and "misogyny," takes him at his word that he will be a "boring" president, and questions his narcissism. Yes, the text was written before the debates, before we heard of Alicia Machado and *Access Hollywood*, before October, when even the last appearance of politics was swept away in waves and waves of scandal. But even before he announced his run for President, now 15 months in the past, we had more than enough evidence: Trump actually is pandering to racism, and he is a misogynist and a narcissist—he is everything but boring. We need to think beyond scandals, but we do not need to ignore them. Defects in Trump do not excuse Clinton, or vice versa. Scandal-driven partisanship too often selectively blinds otherwise smart people.

"Why not Trump?" has many answers, but there is an obvious one: She is the lesser of two evils. This is true in many respects: Trump on climate change and the possibility of him misunderstanding nuclear deterrence may threaten our very existence. Yes, Clinton is no champion of environmentalism, but she will implement something resembling the Paris Agreement. Yes, she wants conflict with Russia, but she also knows how a cold war works. Trump empowering radical reactionary forces is a broadly liberal issue, but for some[2] it is much more threatening. Yes, bourgeois morality is not our political goal, but it is a valuable fallback position. Trump's win guaranteeing a conservative Congress and Supreme Court at first seems a minor political point. But combined with an emboldened self-proclaimed "silent majority" of deafeningly loud reactionaries, all major progressive gains of the past, few as they are, could be back on the table.

Yes, it is very possible a Trump win could lead to a populist government "for everyone" (though conditions[3] may apply). But the suggestion that "worse" than the status quo is "beyond any U.S. President's control" is laughable. Yes, it is very possible "everything is open to compromise" for Donald Trump. But this is far from reassuring. Some of those who will sit at Trump's "compromise" table want both monarchy and slavery back. "Everything that Trump calls for exists already"; he will preserve the status quo: a fragile claim in a text predicated on the belief he represents a genuine possibility—perhaps the "last chance"—for change.

It strangely feels like Cutrone wanted to ask, "What speaks for Clinton, except #nevertrump?" The simple answer, from a left perspective, is "virtually nothing." But the more powerful "Why not Trump?" seems to have taken over and derailed the train of thought. If we do not consciously ignore the last six lines, the text comes down to one of two things. Either Cutrone is trying to call us to adventure and ends up at the advent of the saviour. "When Trump lies, still, his lies tell the truth," the braggart speaking in tongues; he is a capitalist celebrity channelling the values of the Left. Or, alternatively, Cutrone quietly deals us a hand of immiseration: With such a divisive President, the Left will finally awaken. But the Left is no ancient beast that slumbers. The Left is a project for the future, one we must build within ourselves, our communities, our political discourses. The forces that do sleep are of a much older sort. There is worse than now, and not all change is good change. These, the simplest lessons one can possibly draw from history, were somehow swallowed by polemics. This is fascinating—but not in a good way.

The perspective change involved in asking myself "Why not Trump?" was both surprising and welcome. Why "virtually the entire mainstream" is opposed to Trump is a very good question. We are in desperate need of a question to explore what the Left can learn from the Trump candidacy, from both its causes and its effects. But "Why not Trump?" is not that question. **|P**

1 Available online at: <http://platypus1917.org/2016/09/06/why-not-trump/>.
2 I am not usually seen as "the Other," but the current normalization of racism should scare everyone shitless.
3 See previous note.

Spectacle, ideology, and the rhetoric of the authoritarian personality

Kirk Wetters

FROM WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL PRECONDITIONS is it possible to come to a "rational" view of society—a society which, in its current mode of rationality, is arguably less than 200 years old? If such a view is putatively or provisionally achieved, to what extent are contributing psychogenetic factors overcome and left behind, and to what extent do they remain latent or dormant? These are theoretical questions that underlie *The Authoritarian Personality* (AP) study, which, according to the final words of Adorno's "Remarks on the Authoritarian Personality" (published here for the first time), seeks to study modern society from the "receiver's end."[1]

Assuming there is a degree of historically or dialectically founded confidence about the present state of rationality, does this ensure that the rational view is not still influenced by "opinional" traces? Are not the most robust claims to science and objectivity not forced to conceive and assert themselves in a battle of opinions in which subjectivity and irrationality seem to play a major role? The rational grounding, which is axiomatic for scholarly-academic-scientific commitments to truth under the epistemic conditions of modern social organization, may be heterogeneous to the everyday exchange of opinions, which by definition is influenced by authority and psychology (among numerous other factors).

A "settled" opinion is thus the diametrical opposite of a scholarly hypothesis. The intrinsic irrationality, even anti-rationality, and fixed decisiveness that characterize individual political opinions is incompatible with the skeptical provisionality that ideally shapes scholarly-academic opinion. In order to bridge this gap, everyday opinion-formation would need to procedurally restructure itself according to a version of the scientific method—or the underlying conditions of both would have to change radically. Such a bridge is what modern democracies expect of "an informed public." But it remains doubtful under the conditions of twentieth-century mass media (and twenty-first-century electronic media) whether such an ideal coalescence of psychology, education, sociocultural enlightenment, media, and information flow is still imaginable even as a goal. And what role might such a goal play in the ongoing management of expectations in the face of relentless social and economic upheaval and transformation?

Adorno's Theory of Ideology in Context

One of the central claims of Adorno's "Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*," which is carried through in his important study from the 1950s, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," is that anti-Semitism and prejudice are not naturally occurring grassroots psychological phenomena. They are thus not constants of all societies. The empirical research of the AP study also consistently showed that racism and xenophobia are not merely derivative of economic factors. To the extent that this is a departure from assumptions frequently attributed to "orthodox" Marxism, the AP should be understood in the context of a movement within Marxism, broadly understood, and non-Marxist sociology in the direction of a theory of ideology. Here one might think of the Weimar-era theories of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, the ideology theory of the early Wilhelm Reich, the late cultural theory of Freud, the work on mass delusion by Hermann Broch and Elias Canetti, and more recently, Louis Althusser's work and Cornelius Castoriadis' concept of "magma" as the quasi-transcendental base for the "imaginary institution of society."

The theoretical urgency to address the question of ideology has not lessened in an era when the motives of "Trump voters" and "Brexit supporters" and "radicalized individuals" have become the object of relentless oracular pronouncements in the mass media. Since Peter Gordon recently made the case for the rehabilitation of the AP in such contexts,[2] I will not do so extensively here. I share Gordon's view that the AP has been frequently underestimated and too quickly disparaged for its supposedly low theoretical and methodological level, for its empiricism and positivism. Read in the context of contemporary debates and as a contribution to the "ideological turn" sketched above, the very question of the appropriate theoretical "level" to address such problems becomes extremely uncertain. In the present moment, aspects of Adorno's theorizations that fell by the wayside in the last part of the twentieth century may become cogent again in the age of the internet and Trump (who, if not purely a creation of the internet, is at least a revenant of the authoritarian personality under the conditions of a technologically altered media landscape).

The theory of ideology that emerges from the "Remarks" presupposes the still familiar, yet ever-transforming, socioeconomic pressures of advanced capitalism, which enable a mass-psychological feedback loop defined by "manipulation" or "molding" from above and "susceptibility" from below. The overall dynamic of the authoritarian personality is, however, primarily top-down and broadly structural. This conception is based on the thesis of the historical weakening of the autonomous, free-thinking individual due to the deeper encroachment of capitalism into both society and the psyche.[3] Individuals and groups of individuals are thus not primarily responsible for the rise of fascism (or comparable movements) because susceptibility is understood as a psychological factor beyond the individual's control, whereas the enabling conditions for both susceptibility and its manipulation emerge from society as a whole. This conception runs counter to the assumption (which remains widespread) that the best therapy for prejudice is education and cross-cultural experience. Based on the AP research, Adorno is convinced that such well-intentioned efforts are in vain because the personality structure of "high scorers" (e.g., authoritarian personalities) leads them to stubbornly uphold their own "pseudo-reality" in the face of contradictory experiential data and information. High scorers, virtually by definition, are immune to everything that contradicts their preconceived ideas and are thus effectively lost causes for education, socialization, and *Aufklärung*.

Politically speaking, therefore, the AP findings (and to a lesser extent Adorno's "Remarks") frequently focus on the mystery of the low scorer. What are the chances that low scorers would be able to collectively resist the pressure exerted by the self-reinforcing authority complex of the high scorers in the context of the rigid conformism promoted by advanced capitalism? Posed this way, the overall outlook is not very optimistic, insofar as no therapy is recommended for high scorers and the "susceptibility" of everyone else is extremely uncertain. Nothing short of a fundamental transformation of the organization of society will do, but the authority structure of capitalist democracies makes it difficult to imagine such a transformation is possible or even desirable. And, to the extent that change appears possible, there is a significant chance that this opening itself will play into the hands of "high scorers."

This summary of Adorno's theory of ideology was mostly intended to offer basic orientation to readers who are unfamiliar with or skeptical about the AP study. My aims in what follows are informed by the expectation that the 2016 reader of the AP will be viscerally and pragmatically struck by the degree of analogy—even identity—between the political-ideological fractures and concerns of the present day and those analyzed by Adorno in the 1940s and 1950s.

F for Phony

For Adorno, the spectacle of ideology is conceived as a form of illusion productive of delusion. This starts with the frequent "pseudo"-constructions, such as the supposition of "a pseudo-rational ideology whose inherent untruth is never quite hidden to the fascist personality"; and it continues in the functional analysis of anti-Semitism, which aids modern subjects in "penetrating an otherwise opaque, alienated social reality." Functionally and subjectively, the false consciousness of anti-Semitism is akin to that of "conspiracy theories"—a term that did not exist in Adorno's time, but which seems quite relevant to his overall conception. One might even hypothesize with Adorno that anti-Semitism is the prototypical conspiracy theory. Ironically, however, such pseudo-realities, which are meant to serve as antidotes to the opaqueness of modern social reality, and which are "libidinally" invested with unquestioned authority, only take the subject deeper into unreality, into a disconnected interiority: "[T]he techniques of the demagogue and the hypnotist coincide with the psychological mechanism by which individuals are made to undergo the regressions which reduce them to mere members of a group."[4]

Adorno understands the groupthink that comes into being between authoritarian personalities, in their shared psychological structure, as functionally related to hypnotism and mind control. This may seem alarmist and antithetical to democratic premises about subjective autonomy, but one could equally say that Adorno—who did not live to see the 1978 Jonestown massacre—is speaking in a very down-to-earth way about phenomena that have become so familiar that they are virtually normalized and thereby discounted as mere aberrations. The only leap in his argument, if there is one, lies in the implication—following Peter Gordon's essay cited above—that modern societies themselves are structured in a way that makes possible, furthers, and perhaps even universalizes such phenomena. In order to function optimally, coercion and suggestion require a state of latency, an almost hypnotic state, which is the precondition and normal situation of modern systems of authority. "Suggestive" authorities of this kind only become manifestly illusory when their systems crash, when they are hacked, hijacked, or derailed. The fundamental difference between a genuine authority and a fake one is only a matter of the degree to which crises of confidence are able to be successfully weathered. This can be seen in the relation of Bernie Madoff to the 2008 financial crisis and in Donald Trump's relation to the Republican Party. The latency effect through which all authorities can be imagined as awaiting their ultimate validation sows doubt everywhere, and at the same time makes the "pseudo-realities" all the more consoling. One might think of them as extending themselves invisibly to such an extent that—to follow the thread of current media tropes—it becomes deeply uncertain who is "inside a bubble" and whether there is anyone who is not in one.

This point of ideological relativism, however, which seems to be more a part of the present moment, can be distinguished from Adorno's claim in the "Freudian Theory" essay, which, as I will suggest below, appears to contrast in significant ways with the "Remarks," which focus more on the potential all-pervasiveness of illusion. According to the essay on Freudian theory, the susceptibility necessary for propaganda to have its intended manipulative effect is always accompanied by a half-conscious awareness of the "phoniness" that results, for example, from the excessive repetition of propaganda themes such as "blood and soil."[5] Following this train of thought, Adorno writes in the essay's conclusion:

> The category of "phoniness" applies to the leaders as well as to the act of identification on the part of the masses and their supposed frenzy and hysteria. Just as little as people believe in the depth of their hearts that the Jews are the devil, do they completely believe in their leader. They do not really identify themselves with him but act this identification, perform their own enthusiasm, and thus participate in their leader's performance. It is through this performance that they strike a balance between their continuously mobilized instinctual urges and the historical stage of enlightenment they have reached, and which cannot be revoked arbitrarily.[6]

These sentences on phoniness, which implicitly rely on central claims of Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), correspond to a passage of Adorno's "Remarks" in which he references the "frequent indices [in the AP] that even our high-scoring subjects are hardly ever fully convinced." However, unlike the essay on "Freudian Theory" which speculates about a dialectic of disillusionment, the earlier text reasons that the lack of full *belief* "permits the assumption that modern anti-Semitism feeds to a great extent on an artificial pseudo-tradition arbitrarily summoned by its promoters and arbitrarily adhered to by their rank and file." The latent

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awareness of the illusory quality of the illusion may thus either play into a dialectics of disillusionment or feed a frenzy of identification.

Adorno was thus open to different models, both to one that imagines the zombie-like perpetuation of baseless stereotypes and conspiracy theories and to another that admits the possibility or inevitability of disillusionment that may eventually break the hypnotist's spell. In addition to the stereotypical repetitions of propaganda, which inevitably wear thin and reveal their phoniness, Adorno implies that there is a possibility of disillusionment inherent in the asynchrony between the achieved "historical stage" and heterogeneous holdovers, "archaic inheritances" to use the Freudian term, from pre-modern epochs. Because of this historical asynchrony, so Adorno implies, the high scorers must know that the illusions of authority and propaganda oppose the norms and expectations of the world in which they live. This contradiction is the very point. But in highlighting the futility of this opposition and the subjective awareness of its consequent phoniness, Adorno postulates that such illusions cannot endure permanently. The precise outcome, however, of complex forms of what is now called cognitive dissonance is anything but certain.

Secularization / Political Theology / Biopolitics

Throughout Adorno's writings on the authoritarian personality, topics are addressed that were already referred to under the headings of "secularization" and "political theology." Adorno avoids these terms, undoubtedly because he preferred not to directly engage with problematic sub- and meta-discourses, which easily turn into distractions or critical negotiations in their own right. This is precisely what happened later on, and Adorno himself was drawn into these topics, for example, in 1962 at the Seventh German Congress of Philosophy in Münster on the topic "Philosophy and the Question of Progress,"[7] at which he and Karl Löwith were keynote speakers. In relation to these later developments, especially the German secularization debates of the early 1960s and the Schmitt-Blumenberg clash on the topic of political theology of the late 1960s and early 1970s,[8] Adorno's "Remarks" can be read as an anticipation.

I cannot go into detail here, but the fundamental question of both secularization and political theology is: What happened to religion in modernity? Particularly, what happens to religious ideas, concepts, imagery, institutions, and expectations at a point in history when the possibility of the emphatic belief in such inheritances has been fundamentally eroded? These questions are evidently connected to the prevalence of phoniness introduced above. According to Adorno's "Remarks," such unbelievable materials from tradition are compulsively resurrected as pseudo-traditions. The trigger of this compulsive asynchrony is identified as modernity's "unmitigated social pressure," which "is used to remobilize the traces of old and sometimes half-forgotten prejudices and stereotypes. But these traces remain incompatible with the stage of rationality society has reached today." Adorno concludes this paragraph with a speculation on how this contradiction, rather than leading to disillusionment (and thereby to *Aufklärung* conceived as the provisional reconciliation of the subjective and the objective), may actually fuel violence: "Those who are incapable of believing in their own cause, i.e., the adepts of technology who supply themselves with demonological notions from the attic of their intellectual household, must constantly prove to themselves the truth of their gospel through the reality and irreversibility of their deeds."

Hans Blumenberg's argument against Carl Schmitt's idea of political theology proceeds similarly: "[T]he persistence in language of a stratum of expressions (*Ausdrucksschicht*) also has the consequence that what had already become metaphorical can again be taken literally. Such misunderstandings have their own kind of historical productivity."[9] Schmitt famously argued that all modern political concepts are secularized theological concepts, thereby asserting a thoroughgoing but disavowed continuity between modern societies and their pre-modern predecessors. Arguments in this form remain potent critical tools in support of a variety of positions, for example in Giorgio Agamben's *The Kingdom and the Glory* (Italian 2009), which derives the modern concept of economy from early Christian Trinitarian theology. Blumenberg, without refuting or denying the possibility of continuities and holdovers from earlier historical moments, argues that the image-world and claim to truth of religious traditions has been unmoored in modernity. The traditions themselves are largely invalidated and anachronistic, but the traditional ideas, concepts, and images remain available as metaphors that can be rhetorically exploited under the aegis of their tacitly acknowledged phoniness (in Adorno's sense). Franco Moretti's partly Blumenberg-inspired 1994 theory of the "modern epic" helps to further illustrate this complex thought. According to Moretti, in modernity the sign—which Blumenberg somewhat more narrowly calls the "stratum of expressions" —"runs amok."[10] Moretti's version of the thesis, which might be traced back to Friedrich Schiller's "The Greek Gods" and "On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry," claims: "Language is emancipated from established tradition." "Once . . . 'firm traditions' are broken, the old signs do not fall dumb at all: If anything they speak in even louder voices. . . . It is a magic language, which utters only the words desired by the listener."[11]

Blumenberg seeks to refute all secularization theses that view modernity merely as a substantial continuity or transformation of older religious ideas and institutions. Blumenberg, like Adorno in the "Remarks," sees the "stratum of expressions" as detached from their sources and continuously available for rhetorical exploitation as well as top-down and bottom-up instrumentalization. In the context of the debate with Schmitt, there can be no doubt that Blumenberg's discreet irony—in speaking, for example, of the "historical productivity" of "misunderstandings"—intends to address the question of the motive and justification of violence, just as Adorno addresses it in the idea of ideological performers who "must constantly prove to themselves the truth of their gospel through the reality and irreversibility of their deeds."

Adorno also strikingly argues that the carryover of religious ideas in the context of secular state power and violence is decisively proven by the persistence of (pseudo-) religiously-motivated delusion and violence in the United States. In the U.S., "the fake element" is even more pronounced because "historical memories hardly go beyond the threshold of the capitalist era"; the recent origin of the U.S. "excludes any real impact of tradition." The U.S. is, to put it in Blumenberg's language, a land in which the "stratum of expressions" can—now in Moretti's terms—completely "run amok." From the European view, the U.S. is a land of enlightened institutions that never experienced any kind of enlightenment. The U.S. is a land in which the connection to pre-modern traditions is broken and merely rhetorical-instrumental. And, one might add from the perspective of 2016: This particular form of political-theological asynchrony (the casual instrumentalization of the stratum of expressions) has become a global syndrome.

To conclude, I will propose that Adorno's "Remarks" on the AP can be speculatively linked to another later theoretical conception, that of biopolitics. I will only mention the names of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben in passing,[12] but my hypothesis is that the AP seeks to account for many of the same phenomena, namely: the rise of an administrative-economic state with the potential to fundamentally transform human life while overriding the inherited nineteenth-century ideals and institutions of liberalism and democracy. By now such dystopian visions are nothing new—think of Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932)—but the AP's historical placement of these concerns in the post-war U.S., in the heart of liberal-democratic forms, may provoke the reader in Trump's 2016 to wonder why such dystopias were never taken more seriously. It was, no doubt—I am old enough to remember it—partly a result of the institutional chauvinism of U.S. liberal-democratic culture itself, which could never easily accept that critiques after the fashion of Adorno might apply at home as well as abroad. Historically the U.S. view, to the extent that I can report it anecdotally, tended to understand authoritarianism as a problem of the "second" and "third" worlds. Adorno, on the other hand, not unlike other Europeans, saw the U.S. precisely as the problem's cutting edge: "The more people become 'socialized,' i.e. molded through total adaptation to the social structure, the more findings—pertinent to the essence of society as such—can be gathered from the study of this society's members." "Populations are treated *en masse* because they are no longer 'masses' in the old sense of the term."

The top-down, systematic-secular instrumentalization of the "stratum of expressions" in the context of a capitalistically rationalized social organization implies a biopolitical scenario in which individuals in societies appear as a "bundle of conditioned reflexes" more than as a collective of autonomous, free-thinking individuals. Of course, everyone is free to reject this model on account of its excessive grimness. This rejection has occurred with great regularity for decades, often for good reasons, but it may also be that the AP and Adorno remain relevant as a warning against the "ticket thinking" of liberal-democratic ideology itself, which is not automatically immune to forms of authoritarianism and illusionism endemic to the society as a whole—especially not in the moment when such institutions self-servingly suggest that they alone can offer "salvation" and foolproof solutions to every conceivable problem.

It would go beyond the scope of this essay to chart in detail the specific differences, the ideals and unique ideological resources, that may be carried within the whole range of inherited traditions. Such differences allow figures as divergent as Adorno, Blumenberg, and Agamben to chart the limits of biopolitical feedback-loops. The crucial questions of the "outside," of the re-functionalization of the stratum of expressions, remains open. In the (AP) study, Adorno offers a unique reflection on the problem of biopolitics and archaic inheritances in the final part of a section on the thirty-second U.S. President, F.D.R., whose political and biological legitimacy were frequently questioned by "high scorers."[13] Based on the material of the (AP) interviews, Adorno interprets this "birther" phenomenon (as it would be called today) in terms of a bio-psychological "usurper complex" which parasitically operates within and against the norms of modern liberal democracy by re-describing its forms and institutions in dynastic, mythic, and archaic terms. This crucial passage hypothesizes an alternate scenario of "archaic inheritance" and concretely stages the origin of the "stratum of expressions" in a way that can account for differences of motivation and psychology. The archaic inheritance of the "usurper complex" opposes modern social form and its democratic ideals to such an extent that the two can become mutually unrecognizable—co-present only in the form of a cognitive dissonance. In Adorno's terms one might see it as a competition of phoniness—between mutually exclusive yet oscillating illusions. But as long as they are unable to recognize each other, a permanent state of crisis and hostile coexistence should be expected. **|P**

1 All citations to the text under discussion, Theodor Adorno's "Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*" by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, Sanford" refer to the text as published in *Platypus Review* 91 (November 2016) available at: <http://platypus1917.org/2016/11/08/remarks-authoritarian-personality-adorno-frenkel-brunswik-levinson-sanford/>.
2 Peter E. Gordon, "The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump," available online at: <https://www.boundary2.org/2016/06/peter-gordon-the-authoritarian-personality-revisited-reading-adorno-in-the-age-of-trump/>.
3 Peter Gordon underscores this aspect in "The Authoritarian Personality Revisited.".
4 Theodor W. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," in *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, edited and introduced by J. M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 2005)), 138.
5 Ibid., 149.
6 Ibid., 152.
7 Proceedings published in *Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Fortschritt*, ed. Helmut Kuhn and Franz Wiedman (Munich: Verlag Anton Pustet 1964). Hans Blumenberg's critique of the concept of secularization (and of Löwith's conception in particular), later published in *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, was first presented in this context.
8 See, especially, Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity, 2008 [1970]), 116-130; Hans Blumberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 89-102.
9 Blumberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern,* 89.
10 Franco Moretti, *Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Márquez,* trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1996 [1994]), 85.
11 Ibid., 87 and 83.
12 As an example of the disconnect between the discourse of biopolitics and Adorno, see the 2003 German essay-collection on "biopolitics and racism," *Biopolitik und Rassimus*, ed. Martin Stingelin (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003).
13 T. W. Adorno, "Politics and Economics in the Interview Material," in T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel I. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, vol. 2 (New York: Norton, 1969 [1950]), 688-9.

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as Adorno does, contemporary anti-Semitism as a norm and not an aberration. He states simply that what needs to be explained is why anyone is "*not* anti-Semitic." But this pointed not to a problem of psychology but of *society*. As Adorno commended Sartre's treatment of anti-Semitism:

> We distinguish between anti-semitism as an objective social phenomenon, and the anti-semite as a peculiar type of individuality similar to Sartre's exposé which, for good reasons, is called "Portrait of the Antisemite" rather than "Psychology of Anti-semitism". This kind of personality is accessible to psychological analysis.... It would be quite impossible to reduce the objective phenomenon of present-day anti-semitism with its age-old background and all social and economic implications, to the mentality of those who, to speak with Sartre, have to make their decision in regard to this issue. Today, each and every man is faced with a tremendous bulk of objectively existing prejudices, discriminations and articulate anti-semitic attitudes. The accumulated power of this objective complex is so great and apparently so far beyond individual powers of resistance that one might indeed ask, why are people not antisemitic, [sic] instead of asking why certain kinds of people are anti-semitic. Thus, it would be naive to base a prognosis of anti-semitism, this truly "social" disease, on the diagnosis of the individual patients.

This means that the self-contradiction expressed by (non-)racism is one of society as well: the racist society points beyond itself objectively as well as subjectively, socially as well as individually. Racism as a problem contains the key to its own solution.[18] Anti-Semitic demagogues identified with Jews when imitating their stereotypical mannerisms;[19] white racists of the Jim Crow era performed minstrel shows in black-face. As Fanon put it, "Long ago the black man admitted the unarguable superiority of the white man, and all his efforts are aimed at achieving a white existence;" "For the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white."[20] Racism will end when black people become white. Or, as Adorno put it in "Reflections on Class Theory," "Only when the victims completely assume the features of the ruling civilization will they be capable to wresting them from the dominant power." Racism's abolition will be its *Aufhebung*: it will be its *Selbstaufhebung*, its self-completion as well as its self-negation. So will be the overcoming of authoritarianism in capitalism more generally.

The infamous "F-scale" of *The Authoritarian Personality* is a *scale*, which means that authoritarianism or predisposition to fascism is not a difference in kind but of degree: Everyone is more or less authoritarian. The most authoritarian thing would be to deny—to fail to recognize—one's own authoritarianism. **|P**

1. "[T]he mass basis of fascism, the rebelling lower middle classes, contained not only reactionary but also powerful progressive social forces. This contradiction was overlooked [by contemporary Marxists]". In Wilhelm Reich, "Ideology as Material Power" in *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* [1933/46], trans. Vincent Carfagno (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970), 3–4.
2. Walter Benjamin, "Experience and Poverty" [1933], *Selected Writings* vol. 2 1927 –34, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, Harvard, 1996), 732.
3. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" [1845], available online at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/>.
4. See Max Horkheimer, "On the Sociology of Class Relations" [1943] and my discussion of it, "Without a Socialist Party, there is no Class Struggle, only Rackets," *Nonsite.org* (January 11, 2016), available online at: <http://nonsite.org/the-tank/max-horkheimer-and-the-sociology-of-class-relations>. In "The Authoritarian State" [1940/42], Horkheimer wrote that,

> Sociological and psychological concepts are too superficial to express what has happened to revolutionaries in the last few decades: their will toward freedom has been damaged, without which neither understanding nor solidarity nor a correct relation between leader and group is conceivable.

(*The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gephardt [New York: Continuum, 1985], 95–117.)
5. "Sociology and Psychology" [1955], originally written by Adorno for a festschrift celebrating Max Horkheimer's sixtieth birthday. The piece was published in English translation in two parts in the *New Left Review*, vol. 46, Nov-Dec 1967, 63-80 and vol. 47, Jan-Feb 1968, 79-97.
6. Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).
7. Adorno, "Imaginative Excesses" an unpublished piece intended for *Minima Moralia*, [1944–47] published as section X of "Messages in a Bottle," trans. Edmund Jephcott, *New Left Review*, vol. 200, July-August 1993, 12–14.
8. Adorno, "On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening" [1938], *Essays on Music*, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 314.
9. Ibid., 315.
10. See Benjamin, "On the Mimetic Faculty," *Selected Writings* vol. 2 1927–34, Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 19989). 720–722: "The child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher, but a windmill and a train" (720).
11 Adorno, "Reflections on Class Theory", in *Can One Live After Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney Livingstone et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 93-110.
12 See Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* [1852] Ch. VII, where he finds that political atomization leads inexorably to the authoritarian state in Bonapartism:

> Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection . . . and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, an unlimited governmental power which protects them . . . and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The[ir] political influence . . . therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power which subordinates society to itself.

(Available online at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch07.htm>.)
Marx's discussion of the French peasants of the mid-19th century also applied to what he called the "lumpenproletariat" as a constituent of Bonapartism, and so would apply to the working class in capitalism today without a political party organized for the struggle to achieve socialism. The "sack of potatoes" or of "homologous magnitudes" is what Adorno, among others, characterized as the "masses" in the 20th century. (For instance, Benjamin wrote in the Epilogue to "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" [1936] that fascism gave the masses the opportunity to express themselves while depriving them their right to change society.)
Adorno paraphrases Marx here when he writes that,

> The masses are incessantly molded from above, they must be molded, if they are to be kept at bay. The overwhelming machinery of propaganda and cultural industry evidences the necessity of this apparatus for the perpetuation of a set-up the potentialities of which have outgrown the status quo. Since this potential is also the potential of effective resistance against the fascist trend, it is imperative to study the mentality of those who are at the receiver's end of today's social dynamics. We must study them not only because they reflect these dynamics, but above all because they are the latter's intrinsic anti-thesis.

The manifestation—and potential resolution—of this contradiction of the masses in capitalism that otherwise resulted in Bonapartism was through the politics of socialism: Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" was to be achieved by the mass-political socialist party. Marx broke with the anarchists over the latter's refusal to take "political action" and to thus consign the working class to merely "social action." i.e. to avoid the necessary struggle for state power.
13 See my "Proletarian dictatorship and state capitalism," *Weekly Worker* 1064 (June 25, 2015), available online at: <http://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1064/proletarian-dictatorship-and-state-capitalism/>.
14 Marx, Preface to the 1869 edition of *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* [1852], available online at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/preface.htm>.
15. Adorno, "New York, 8 February 1941" in *Dream Notes* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 5-6.
16. See Anna Freud, "Identification with the Aggressor," Ch. IX, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* [1936].
17. Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, [1952], trans., Charles Lam Markmann, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 181.
18. This is because, according to Adorno, "Those who are incapable of believing their own cause... must constantly prove to themselves the truth of their gospel through the reality and irreversibility of their deeds." Violent action takes the place of thought and self-reflection; but this suggests the converse, that critical thinking could prevent such disastrous action. See Adorno, "Education after Auschwitz" [1966], in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. and ed. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 191–204.
19. See Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda" [1951], in *The Culture Industry* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 132–157.
20. Fanon, *Black Skin*, 178.

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dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.
• *Sex.* Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on."

In the preface of the AP book, Horkheimer claims that the quantitative and qualitative research conducted by Adorno et al. assisted in the discovery of a new anthropological species. There was, in other words, something distinctly modern about the authoritarian personality in the 20th century. Accordingly, the AP study sought to trace the contours of this new type by investigating individuals' deep-seated characterological traits—many of which, the authors explained, were planted in early childhood development.

Adorno's "Remarks" critically assesses the AP study's sole focus on the individual psyche. He envisioned the final chapter as an opportunity to frame the problem of prejudice as being intimately entwined with, and mediated by, the "objective spirit" of an antagonistic society: that of capitalism. "Our detailed analysis of subjective patterns," he writes, "does not mean that, in our opinion, prejudice can be explained in such terms. On the contrary, we regard the analysis of objective social forces which engender prejudice as the most pressing issue in contemporary research into anti-minority bias." From this standpoint, a high-scoring respondent is not an exception to modern society, but rather an *amplified feature* of the kind of subjects it produces. As Adorno wrote elsewhere, social truth is located "in and through the extremes, in the extremes themselves." Adorno is trying to negotiate the ways that empiricism converges with and deviates from Critical Theory. This uneasy relationship is one of the reasons why "Remarks" is so interesting.

Our primary motivation in publishing this typescript is not simply its historical and scholarly value. As a psychological and political issue that is yet to be overcome, the question of authoritarianism strongly resonates with our current circumstances. We thought it would be a provocative gesture to publish the paper at the moment of the 2016 US presidential election. The Trump campaign has been one of the most unprecedented bids in modern history. There has been no shortage of articles accusing him and his "irredeemable" base of being fascistic. At the same time, the Hillary Clinton campaign has been characterized as relying upon a "pathologization of dissent" that itself shows strong signs of authoritarianism. If we are to follow the thought process presented by Adorno in "Remarks," then it is not enough to psychologize the character-type of the modern American voter. Such "diagnoses" must also take into account how these phenomena are symptomatic of a faltering political system that has no Left to lead it. When the only serious alternative to Trump is perpetuating the status quo—which is wholly embodied in the Clinton campaign—then the problem of authoritarianism will continue to reappear. It is not a question of if, but rather *when* and *how*.

We are pleased to make "Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*" public for the first time with the permission of the Max Horkheimer Archives, where the original typescript resides. The archive have requested that we retain all the typescript's original features, including typos and errors. Since Adorno's paper is incomplete, endnotes have been added to cite sources and offer further explanations where this seemed necessary. Otherwise, we have stayed faithful to the original document. **|P**

Corbyn, continued from page 2

1. Quoted in Keith Laybourn, *A century of Labour: A history of the Labour Party*, (Stroud: Sutton, 2000), 104.
2. Tim Bale, *Five year mission: The Labour Party under Ed Miliband*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
3. John McDonnell quoted in The Corbyn Story, aired 13 July (London: BBC Radio 4, 2016), radio broadcast.
4. Quoted in Joos Couvee, "Corbyn set to run for Labour leadership", *Islington Tribune*, 3 Jun, 2015
5. Quoted in Sam Caldwell, "Labour loses its grip as NUS joins the awkward squad", *Socialist Worker*, 10 Apr 2004
6. Jackie Ashley, "here lies New Labour—the party that died in Iraq", *The Guardian*, 31 Jan 2010.
7. Jonathan Foster & Patricia Wynn Davies, "Labour may be sued for dropping left-winger", *The Independent*, 28 Sept 1995.
8. Quoted in Lewis Minkin, *The Blair Supremacy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 394.
9. Ibid, 428.
10. Ibid, 718.
11. See "11 University Labour Clubs threaten to disaffiliate from Labour Students over OMOV", *Labour List*, 20 Feb 2014.
12. Yanis Varoufakis, *And the weak must suffer what they must*, (New York City: Nation Press, 2016), 214.
13. Tariq Ali, *The Extreme Centre*, (London: Verso, 2015), 20.
14. Varoufakis, *And the weak must suffer what they must*, 214-215.
15. Quoted in Hilary Wainwright and Leo Panitch, "An interview with Jeremy Corbyn", *Red Pepper*, Dec 2015.
16. Quoted in Stephen Bush, "Why has Labour's "swing voter" endorsed Jeremy Corbyn?", *New Statesman*, 29 July 2015.
17. Quoted in Nicholas Watt, "Unison endorses Jeremy Corbyn for Labour leadership", *The Guardian*, 29 July 2015.
18. Paul 't Hart, "Symbols, rituals and power: The lost dimensions of crisis management", *Journal of contingencies and crisis management*, 41.
19. James Marshall, "How to win", *Weekly Worker*, 29 Sept 2016.
20. George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier*, (1937).
21. Ibid.
22. Yannis Stavrakakis, "Populism in power: Syriza's challenge to Europe", Juncture, (2015).
23. Quoted in Jon Lee Anderon, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (London: Bantam, 1997), 356.

Understanding the Corbyn phenomenon

Context and prospects

Alec Burt

In September 2015, the veteran radical Member of Parliament Jeremy Corbyn defeated three other mainstream candidates to be elected leader of the UK Labour Party. He won over 250 thousand votes from members, registered supporters, and affiliated union members, 59 percent of the total. Corbyn was backed by most major unions, including Unite, the CWU, ASLEF, and UNISON.

During the first few months of Corbyn's leadership, he enjoyed an uneasy peace with the 230 or so members of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP, the collective organization of Labour's members of the House of Commons), the vast majority of whom had little confidence in his leadership. This peace was shattered, however, in the wake of the shock result of the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union held last June. In the turmoil that followed the Leave vote, most of Corbyn's Shadow Cabinet resigned and Labour MPs very publicly attacked their leader. These rebels were concerned by the prospect of an early general election, and convinced that Corbyn and his supporters had undermined the Remain vote (despite Corbyn's public support for staying in the EU).

Corbyn was challenged for the leadership by "soft left" MP Owen Smith. However, Smith's campaign—despite being backed by the entire Labour establishment and all living former leaders—failed to persuade either the membership or the union leadership (with the exception of the GMB and USDAW). Corbyn was re-elected in September 2016 with an even larger mandate, securing 313,000 votes and a majority of affiliated supporters, registered supporters, and members.

This essay attempts to place these results within an historical context and suggest how New Labour's vapidity and the Financial Crisis facilitated this upset. As a recalcitrant Corbynista, I will offer my thoughts on how he can energize his leadership. In particular, I believe it is essential for him to move beyond the anti-austerity that catapulted him into the leadership, to form a more comprehensive programme for economic reform, one that we should articulate using aggressively populist rhetoric.

The historical context: Failure of the Labour Left

Since its foundation in 1900, the Labour Party has had a sizable leftist group. By "leftist", I broadly mean those members and supporters who openly identified with being "on the left" of the Party, or were considered so by observers (for example, because they held policy positions that were considered "left-wing" by Party standards of the day, e.g. supporting unilateral nuclear disarmament).

Despite the left's regular conflicts with the rest of the Party, for nearly its whole history leftists have been excluded from the most senior positions, including the powerful post of "leader " (leaders are always either Prime Minister when the Party commands a majority in the House of Commons, or prospective Prime Minister when in opposition). Indeed, the history of the Labour left reads like a catalogue of failure.

Given the popular perception of the government of Clement Attlee (1945-1951) amongst British socialists—see, for example, Ken Loach's *The Spirit of '45*, a eulogy masquerading as a documentary—this may come as a bit of a surprise. Despite the undisputed successes of Attlee's reforming administration, he was no radical leftist, as Ralph Miliband asserted with his characteristic vigor in *Parliamentary Socialism*. Attlee's government did nothing to seriously reform the power structures of pre-war Britain. Despite the dream of bringing the commanding heights of the economy into public ownership, many industries, such as sugar and insurance, were never nationalized despite plans to do so. Those industries that were nationalized , such as coal, continued to be run by the same people who had run them before the war. The offspring of the country's elite continued to be educated in Public Schools (an idiosyncratic English term referring to elite private "high schools" such as Eton College and Harrow School, Attlee was himself a former Public School boy). The City of London and armed forces—those twin bulwarks of the establishment—were buoyed by Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell's huge rearmament programme (1950-51), which was funded partly by cuts to the new National Health Service.

The left was forced further into retreat following Labour's defeat in the 1951 general election. For the rest of the decade Aneurin Bevan and his supporters faced defeat after defeat at the hands of Hugh Gaitskell (leader 1955-1963), who by the early 60s had achieved the majority of his objectives without, according to Anthony Crossland, "conceding an inch."[1]

Following Gaitskell's premature death, Harold Wilson (leader 1963-1976, prime minister 1964-1970, 1974-1976) spent most of his premiership placating the Party's various warring factions without ever fully committing to any side. For example, he was able to side-step the thorny issue of the Party's position on Britain's membership of the European Economic Community (a Conservative government had taken Britain into the group in 1973) by holding a referendum on the issue and allowing his cabinet to campaign on both sides (Roy Jenkins et al. for remain; Tony Benn et al. for leave).

Michael Foot (leader 1980-1983) and George Lansbury (leader 1932-1935) were seen as coming from the left of the Party (for example, Foot was a Bevanite in the 1950s, a lifelong supporter of unilateral disarmament, and had campaigned for Britain to leave the EEC during Wilson's referendum). However, both men drew support from across the PLP, with many rightists seeing their respective leaderships as necessary concessions. It is telling that Foot threw his weight behind Denis Healey when Tony Benn famously challenged him for the Deputy Leadership in 1981. This contest, which Healey narrowly won partly thanks to the decision of Neil Kinnock (later leader, 1983-1992) and other "left wing" MPs to abstain, is traditionally seen as the turning point in the "battle for the Labour Party" in the early 80s. By 1984 Kinnock—himself of South Wales mining stock—was refusing to support the National Union of Mineworkers in its infamous dispute with Margaret Thatcher's government.

By the mid-1990s the Left had ceased to be a meaningful force in Labour politics. By the 2000s, left-wing activists (in the anti-capitalist, anti-free trade, radical environmental, and anti-war movements) were rarely members of the Party. For example, the veteran campaigner Peter Tatchell, who had been a high-profile Labour parliamentary candidate in the 1980s, left the Party in 2000 and joined the Green Party in 2004.

Those who remained failed to make much impact. Left-wing MPs John McDonnell and Diane Abbott both failed comprehensively in their respective leadership bids in 2007 and 2010. Tim Bale's account of Ed Miliband's leadership published just before the 2015 General Election made no reference to Jeremy Corbyn.[2] Following Miliband's resignation, McDonnell told supporters the "best [they] could hope for is a couple of weeks of trying to get on the ballot paper [prospective leadership candidates require a minimum number of nominations from Labour MPs to stand]."[3] Corbyn, with a degree of reluctance, agreed to stand as a left candidate to, in his words, offer members "a broader range of candidates."[4] Corbyn only scraped onto the ballot paper. He did not expect to win.

It is also important to remember that the trades union movement, with some exceptions, has pretty consistently come out against the left during times of open Party conflict. As when, for example, the Communist Party of Great Britain attempted to affiliate with the Party during the 1920s. Or when Benn challenged Healey in 1981, or the leadership risked an embarrassing defeat over Iraq at the 2002 Party Conference.

It is vital, then, for us to try to understand how Jeremy Corbyn's apparently remarkable victory came about. How this quiet, bearded man in his late 60s, who had never held ministerial office, achieved what Tony Benn and Nye Bevan could not.

New Labour and the origins of the Corbynistas

It would be impossible for me to offer a comprehensive explanation; instead, I hope to identify important contributory factors. First, the New Labour government (1997-2010)—undoubtedly one of the most right-wing European governments ever to have claimed the mantle of social democracy—pursued many policies that alienated and angered left-leaning people across the country.

The instances are well-known—the introduction and subsequent raising of university student tuition fees, for example. When, contrary to an earlier promise, the government pushed through a rise in tuition fees in 2003, Labour Students (a New Labour vanguard) lost control of the National Union of Students' presidency for the first time in a generation. Kat Fletcher, now a key Corbyn supporter, won that vote. At the time she told the NUS conference "I've been a member of the Labour Party for many moons—but I've been let down repeatedly. I'm interested in finding an alternative to New Labour."[5]

One mistake outshone all others, however: Iraq. Looking back from 2010, Jackie Ashley concluded that after the Iraq war "the Party was broken, below the skin, and has never healed ... [u]ncountable numbers of decent people, in constituency parties, think-tanks and public life, lost heart and turned away."[6]

Needless to say, Jeremy Corbyn, a former chair of the Stop the War Coalition, was active in many campaigns that sprang up in opposition to New Labour.

Disconnect with New Labour was about more than policy, however. New Labour's spin-heavy and autocratic approach to government and party management put off large numbers of supporters. Conference became a stage-managed week of sound bites, delegates were carefully vetted, votes planned in advance. MP selection—although nominally the responsibility of local members—was carefully managed so that candidates favored by the leadership were well positioned for success. In the run up to the 1997 General Election, Leeds North East constituency Labour Party (CLP) selected Liz Davies, associated with the left-wing *Labour Briefing*, as their candidate. Tony Blair was furious and the National Executive Committee (NEC) overruled the decision.[7] The Party would later introduce a National Parliamentary Panel to vet potential candidates to ensure the Davies situation was not repeated.

This system could also function in reverse. When David Miliband was planning on leaving Tony Blair's office, a Millbank (Millbank Tower, south of the Palace of Westminster, was site of the Party's headquarters for much of this period, and the 1960s skyscraper became synonymous with the New Labour machine) official Margaret McDonagh was assigned the task of finding Miliband a House of Commons seat. Within a few months, David Clarke, MP for North Shields, had suddenly announced his retirement and Miliband was selected for the seat despite having few connections with the area. After the election Clarke was elevated to the peerage, a common conciliation to MPs who were asked to step aside by New Labour mandarins.

The rationale for the system of selection was explained by New Labour apparatchik David Gardener, "[w]e are a broad church. But we also want candidates we can rely on to sustain Labour in power."[8] Andrew Lawnsley explained that "[i]n the Blairite conception of parliamentary democracy the role of New Labour MPs [was] to sustain the Government."[9] New Labour was willing to tolerate the likes of Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell addressing anti-war rallies as vivid reminders of the dark past New Labour had emerged from, but nothing more.

The effect of these changes was to drive many members—uninspired by New Labour's heavy reliance on business marketing techniques, and no longer convinced that they could have any real impact on decisions—out of the Party. During the New Labour years the Party hemorrhaged support. Between 1997 and 2006 the Party lost half its membership. Lewis Minkin concluded that many of these left because of perceived lack of influence (e.g. in policy making or candidate selection).[10]

Those who remained agitated for change. I myself was briefly involved in one such campaign when my university Labour Club, along with ten others, voted to disaffiliate from Labour Students (LS) . Many of us had long been campaigning for democratic changes in how the organization was run—in particular greater use of "One member, one vote". We felt the previous delegate-based system rendered LS little more than an oligarchy, tightly controlled by a small Blairite clique. After the LS leadership blocked moves to debate a change in the voting system at the conference in 2014, we decided to disaffiliate.

It is worth noting, of course, that New Labour could always count on a degree of backing while it was able to win elections and, in the words of Liz Kendall, Owen Smith et al., "put our principles into action." However, following the defeats in 2010 and 2015, when millions of "safe" Labour voters abandoned the party for UKIP and the SNP, radical supporters became increasingly unconvinced even by this argument.

Corbyn and anti-austerity

There was one factor, however, that really changed the game: "austerity". In his recent analysis of the origins of the Eurozone crisis, Yanis Varoufakis noted how Europe's social democrats embraced neoliberalism and financialization and in return were "lulled into a haze of mythological faith, ... where a mystery goose would lay increasing quantities of golden eggs from which the welfare state, which remained the sole surviving connection with their conscience, could be financed."[12] Nowhere was this truer than in Britain, where—in return for, in the words of Tariq Ali, continuing "Thatcherism by the same means"[13]—the New Labour government was permitted a share of the City's ballooning profits to fund badly-needed investment in Britain's welfare state.

However, as Varoufakis also notes, when tax revenues from the financial services industry disappeared in the wake of the Financial Crisis, and governments felt compelled to bail out failing banks, Europe's social democrats "did not have the mental tools, or the moral values, with which... to subject the collapsing system to critical scrutiny... [they were] ready to ... bow their heads to the bankers' demands for bailouts to be purchased at the price of self-defeating austerity for the weakest."[14] Put simply, the whole raison d'etre of Europe's new generation of social democrats vanished with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, but by then none of them knew anything different.

The 2015 Labour manifesto promised to match the Conservative fiscal plans. Even then, in the wake of Labour's defeat, potential candidates for the leadership attempted to outdo each other in abandoning the few progressive elements of that manifesto. By embracing frankly savage austerity, the mainstream of the PLP dealt itself a fatal blow. Members—many of whom may have experienced the reality of austerity firsthand or witnessed its effects on families, friends, or colleagues—were simply unprepared to support a leadership candidate promising more of the same.

Reading the debates from last year's campaign and before, the word "austerity" appears again and again. For example, Green Party's 2015 Party election broadcast featured four actors (representing the four main Party leaders) singing "It's sweeter when we all agree / A Party political harmony ... Austerity! / Austerity! / Austerity! / Austerity!" A search of "austerity" produces 17,700 results on the *New Statesman* website. Jeremy Corbyn himself acknowledged in an interview with *Red Pepper* magazine that "[t]he whole basis of the [2015] campaign was anti-austerity."[15]

In particular, anti-austerity was crucial in persuading union bosses to support a leftist candidate. One of the first suggestions that an upset might be in the offing during the summer of 2015 was when UNISON, which represents over one million public sector workers, decided to endorse Corbyn. As the *New Statesman* noted at the time "[t]he development is still something of a shock within Labour circles, ... Unison is ... regarded as representing the centre of the Labour Party. 'Unison is us,' one MP once remarked to me: public sector, soft-left, not antagonistic towards the New Labour era but not nostalgic for it either."[16]

UNISON's members were furious at facing not only the pressure of working in organizations that were being asked to find huge savings, but also at being subjected to years of pay freezes. Freezes that Labour endorsed in the years before the 2015 General Election. The union's General Secretary argued at the time "Jeremy Corbyn's message has resonated with public sector workers who have suffered years of pay freezes and redundancies."[17]

Even the language of the debate played a part. Paul 't Hart wrote in 1993 that "[t]he most important instrument of crisis management is language. Those who are able to define what the crisis is all about also hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for [its] resolution."[18] The rhetoric employed during the fiscal or "austerity" crisis severely disadvantaged the "moderates" in the Party. The left has successfully used the term "austerity" to draw a stark dividing line between those who were apologists for the modern capitalist system and those, like Corbyn, who were not.

Corbyn's leadership so far

So where does this leave Jeremy Corbyn? His future prospects are mixed. Having spent years as a backbench MP, Corbyn has found it difficult to adapt to the realities of running a major political party . At times the leadership has seemed paralyzed by a mixture of paranoia, inexperience and confusion—decisions going unmade, shadow ministers left without direction, media messages bungled.

Naturally, Corbyn has faced and will continue to face huge obstacles. There have been Labour MPs who have undermined him at every turn, some individuals have never missed an opportunity to parade across the TV screens filled with faux outrage at the latest artificial drama. Of those 172 who voted no confidence in Corbyn's leadership at the beginning of the summer, many will find it impossible to admit they were wrong and openly reconcile themselves to a very different kind of Labour Party.

The media, including the *Guardian*, has been at best apprehensive and at worst actively hostile towards Corbyn; more than happy to spread negative rumors or dwell with glee on any and all mistakes.

It is, of course, unfair, but wholly predictable under the circumstances. Someone as radical and anti-establishment as Corbyn is inevitably going to face significant opposition. The ruling class will not surrender the gains they have made under neoliberalism easily.

Consequently, to stand a chance of electoral success, a radical opposition leader has to be a ruthlessly efficient political operator. There can be little room for error in the face of an establishment onslaught. Luckily there are some positive indications that Corbyn is beginning to settle into the leadership role, certainly his conference speech this year was a noted improvement on the previous year.

Suggestions from a recalcitrant Corbynista: Clever of head, crude of mouth

So what should be Corbyn's strategy going forward? I would make four broad suggestions: seek to further democratize the Party but without engaging in "open warfare"; actively marginalize surviving traditional far-left organizations ; develop a radical, innovative, and intelligent policy programme; and learn to articulate that programme using aggressively populist language.

Corbyn has hundreds of thousands of loyal supporters within the Party. Moves to further democratize the Party machine (by, for example, increasing the power of conference) will inevitably lead to the gradual evolution of Labour from "clique-en-masse" to a powerful socialist movement controlled by its members.

We should, however, resist the temptation to take out our anger on "right-wing" Labour MPs by moving to deselect them (see James Marshall's recent piece in the *Weekly Worker*).[19] There is a reason why many of the right of the Party have been mentioning deselection repeatedly in the media; they are itching for a fight, for a chance to show "the trots for what they really are". Instead Corbyn's approach to the PLP should be "divide and rule", bringing the soft left into the fold, isolating the "core group negative" and starving them of oxygen.

Greater democracy—by, for example, utilizing electronic voting to bypass the stuffy atmosphere of local meetings—also has the added benefit of aiding in my next suggestion: marginalizing traditional far-left organizations . Something exemplified by a recent row in Momentum (a pro-Corbyn pressure group). The Alliance for Workers' Liberty (AWL) and other organizations were furious when the movement's leadership decided to introduce an all member electronic voting system for its conference in January. Far-left organizations like the AWL know that a traditional system of branch meetings, delegates, block votes, central committees etc., allows small but disciplined groups of activists to take control of much larger organizations such as Momentum.

In The *Road to Wigan Pier* George Orwell bemoaned "the horrible—the really disquieting—prevalence of cranks wherever Socialists are gathered together."[20] On a broader level, we cannot let this new movement, which has engaged so many people previously uninterested in organized politics, be hijacked by the "cranks" of the AWL or Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). Not only have these groups failed to demonstrate that they are capable of achieving any meaningful political success, they also regularly court controversy and in doing so risk discrediting Corbyn's Labour Party.

Take, for example, the SWP, which has thrown its "weight" behind Corbyn, happily distributing placards at his rallies. The SWP's leadership destroyed what little reputation their movement still enjoyed by their unjust and offensive handling of a series of rape allegations in 2013. It is not clear if this "Party" has achieved anything in its forty year history, apart from widespread and justified contempt. Certainly, its electoral performance has been laughable. It is part of the Trade Union and Socialist Coalition, one of whose candidates managed to get zero votes (he could have voted for himself) in a Kent local government election in 2015. We have no need for such people.

As noted above, Corbyn's anti-austerity message allowed him to galvanize support from across the left. It would, however, be a mistake to think that we can use the same message to win a general election or that anti-austerity can form the basis of a truly radical economic programme. Unfortunately Corbynomics remains primarily concerned with building an adequately funded and comprehensive welfare state. Important though this objective is, we cannot limit our ambitions to returning to pre-2010 spending levels. You cannot tax and spend your way to a fundamental realignment of the relationship between capital and labour. Marshall is right to heap disdain on the editor of the *Morning Star* Ben Chacko whose "sights are set on 'saving an A&E or a youth club.' That he does so in the name of Marxist politics and creating a mass movement on the scale of the Chartists shows an inability to grasp even the A in the ABC of communism."[21]

The first step is to clearly define what our key economic aims are, at least in the medium term. Some examples of these aims might be: stability, a greater equality in the distribution of wealth and income, employees having a far more important role in the running of businesses (e.g. economic democratization), labour-saving technologies benefiting the workforce as a whole instead of just capital, and economic growth that is both environmentally and economically sustainable.

The second step would be to be open-minded about how to achieve these aims. With state ownership of industry and state planning now so widely discredited (and understandably so) we cannot afford to be exclusive. There is value to be found in the "Varieties of Capitalism" school that so influenced Ed Miliband, the Keynesian ideas of Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, Yanis Varoufakis's plans for global monetary reform, and the more radical market socialism of the likes of Richard Wolff.

We should not be scared of articulating this radical intelligent programme with a degree of crudeness, however. Our message to the UK population must be unashamedly populist, learning from the successes (and failures) of our comrades in Latin America, Greece and elsewhere. We should seek to, in the words of Yannis Stavrakakis, use a "popular-democratic egalitarian grammar," where "the people" are our "nodal point". We should present ourselves as uniquely placed to "voice [the people's] grievances and demands." The image of Britain we must conjure is, to paraphrase Benjamin Disraeli and his unlikely reincarnation Ed Miliband, of "two nations": "the establishment, the power bloc versus the underdog, the people." The ascetic, quietly-spoken and modestly-dressed Corbyn is well suited to such a rhetoric.

Either we on the left take up the arms of populism, or we risk leaving them at the disposal of a right-wing demagogue, someone in the shape of Nigel Farage or Donald Trump.

Hopes for the future

Enrique Oltuski—an anti-Batista, but also anti-Castro political activist in pre-revolutionary Cuba—remarked upon meeting Ernesto "Che" Guevera that "[i]n spite of everything... one can't help admiring him. He knows what he wants better than we do. And he lives entirely for it." Although, Jeremy Corbyn is, of course, not really comparable to Che Guevera (he has a far greater respect for human rights for example!), there is nonetheless something about this quote that reminds me of Corbyn. He has a clarity of vision, an unwillingness to ignore the barbarism of modern capitalism and war that I have a huge respect for.

A remarkable collection of forces have coalesced to put him in Labour's driving seat. The onus is now on Corbyn, his team, and supporters to grasp this opportunity with both hands and exploit it for all its worth. Whether Corbyn's leadership heralds a paradigm shift in British politics or ends up being the last hurrah of a dying leftist movement remains to be seen. I so wish it to be the former, but we shall have to wait and see. **|P**

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