

Consensus protocols

Highly dependable systems – 2022/23


Lecture 6

Lecturers: Miguel Matos and Rodrigo Miragaia Rodrigues


Last lecture: atomicity / linearizability (works for (N,N)-atomic registers as well)

- For any operation, there exists a **serialization point**, between the invocation and the reply, such that if we move the invocation and the reply to that point, the resulting execution obeys the sequential specification of a read/write register (operations appear to be executed at some instant between its invocation and reply time)
 - If the last operation does not return, the serialization point may or may not be included
 - (failed writes may or may not complete)

Examples of atomic executions



Consensus




The consensus problem

- Basic idea: each process has an input proposal
- All processes must reach the same output decision
- Must be safe despite faults, asynchrony
- This is a key building block in many systems
 - generic state machine replication
 - coordination systems like Apache ZooKeeper (CFT)
 - permissioned blockchains or permissionless side chains (BFT)

Specification in the crash model: Uniform consensus

- Events:
 - -Request: <Propose, v>
 - Indication: <Decide, v'>
- Properties:
- C1. Validity: Any value decided is a value proposed
- C2. [Uniform] Agreement: No two processes decide differently
- C3. Termination: Every correct process eventually decides
- C4. Integrity: No process decides twice

Example of a valid trace



Algorithm to solve consensus in the crash model: Paxos

- Submitted for publication in 1990
- Reviewers said it was mildly interesting, though not very important – and that the presentation was distracting
- Paper was rejected and shelved
- Eventually published after a decade
- Then adopted at Google (published in 2006)
- Now a standard building block used by many systems

Paxos in a nutshell

- This is covered in another course, plus our focus is not on the crash model
- Here, we give a brief outline


Overview

- Any process can propose v, first to reach a majority wins
- How do we select among multiple proposals?
- Associate timestamp <seqno, process id> with v
- Protocol has two phases:
 - First, processes read the state of others to form proposal
 - Second, try to convince other to accept their proposal

Protocol steps (first phase)

- 1. Process p chooses a proposal timestamp n = [sn,p]
- 2. All processes keep track of:
 - timestamp accepted and associated value <n_a, v_a>, and
 - most recent promise not to accept lower timestamps, n_h
- 3. p sends prepare msg, asking all processes if they already accepted any proposals with n_a< n
- 4. if so, reply $< n_a$, $v_a >$ else set $n_h = n$ (and return this promise not to accept anything below n)

First phase example run



Protocol steps (second phase)


- After p collects quorum of replies, send either a previously accepted value (if it was received) or its own proposal in an <accept, <n,v>> message
- 2. Processes accept proposal if $n \ge n_h$ setting:

$$n_h = n_a = n$$

 $v_a = v$

(Then convey decision to all processes through accepted message)

Second phase example run




Paxos in practice – multi-Paxos

- Instead of running two phases for every "operation":
 - use phase 1 to nominate a leader (run phase 1 for all possible operations / instances of consensus)
 - let the leader run phase 2 each time an operation is executed (thus concluding one of the consensus instances)
 - if leader is non-responsive, then goto first step
- Parallel to IBFT (phase 1 is a round change, phase 2 is the normal case operation)

Why is Paxos safe?

 Agreement is guaranteed by the fact that if a proposal with v is accepted (majority of accepts were issued), then any higher-numbered proposal must have value v



But is it live?

Impossibility of consensus (FLP)

- There is no deterministic protocol that solves consensus in an asynchronous system where even a single process may suffer a crash fault
 - Fisher, Lynch, and Paterson. Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process. JACM, Vol. 32, no. 2, April 1985, pp. 374-382
- We will present a simple and elegant proof for consensus among two processes
 - The main result applies to an arbitrary number of processes

Proof of the impossibility of consensus

- By contradiction, let's consider that there exists an algorithm that solves consensus
- We consider three different executions of that algorithm, with varying network conditions
 - Note that any behavior from the network is possible in an asynchronous system
- The two processes executing consensus are called A and B

Execution #1

- Both processes propose 0 initially
- Process B crashes as soon as the execution starts
- By the validity condition of the specification, process
 A must decide 0
- And by the termination property it must eventually decide → let's say it decides at some instant t1

Execution #2

- Both processes propose 1 initially
- Process A crashes as soon as the execution starts
- By the validity condition of the specification, process
 B must decide 1
- And by the termination property it must eventually decide → let's say it decides at some instant t2

Execution #3

- Process A proposes 0 and process B proposes 1 initially
- Messages between A and B (in both directions) are delayed such that they are never delivered up until max(t1,t2)
- Process A decides 0 by t1, since its execution is indistinguishable from execution #1
- Process B decides 1 by t2, since its execution is indistinguishable from execution #2
- We found a contradiction (which?)

Byzantine fault tolerant consensus

- Recall previous specification (crash model):
 - Termination: Every correct process eventually decides
 - Validity: Any value decided is a value proposed
 - —Integrity: No process decides twice
 - Agreement: No two processes decide differently
- Which property needs to be revisited in the Byzantine model?

Weak Byzantine consensus

- Termination: Correct processes eventually decide.
- Weak validity: If all processes are correct and some process decides v, then v was proposed by some process.
 - If some processes are faulty, any value may be decided
- Integrity: No correct process decides twice.
- Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently.

Strong Byzantine consensus

 Strong validity: If all correct processes propose the same value v, then no correct process decides a value different from v;

otherwise, a correct process may only decide a value that was proposed by **some** correct process or the special value □

Weak vs Strong Byzantine consensus

- Strong validity does not imply weak validity
- Strong validity allows to decide □
- Weak validity requires (only if all processes are correct) that the decided value was proposed by some (correct) process
- The two Byzantine consensus notions are not directly comparable
- For this class, we focus on weak validity

Implementing BFT consensus

- Strategy is similar to Paxos, i.e., modularize into:
- EpochChange
 - Choose a leader, and make sure any previously decided value carries over to the new epoch
- EpochConsensus
 - Try to reach decision within an epoch
 - May fail, in which case it aborts and returns state to initialize new EpochConsensus

Byzantine Epoch Change

- Leverage Byzantine leader election protocol from Lecture 3
- Recap: if the consensus algorithm is not making progress (timeout), process i broadcasts a NEWEPOCH message to all processes.
- If a process receives more than f NEWEPOCH messages, also broadcasts NEWEPOCH
 - -Prevents unwanted epoch change. Why?
- If a process receives more than 2f NEWEPOCH messages it changes epoch.
 - Cannot wait for more. Why?

EpochConsensus: interface

- Tries to achieve consensus within an epoch, but may abort unless leader is correct and network behaves synchronously
- Interface (events):
 - Request: (bep, Propose | v): Proposes value v for epoch consensus. Executed only by the leader I.
 - Request: \(\text{bep, Abort} \): Aborts epoch consensus.
 - Indication: (bep, Decide | v): Outputs a decided value v of epoch consensus.
 - Indication: (bep, Aborted | st): Signals that epoch consensus has completed the abort and outputs internal state st.

EpochConsensus: specification (for epoch with timestamp *ts*)

- Validity:
 - If (all processes are correct and) a process ep-decides v, then v was ep-proposed by a leader of epoch consensus with timestamp ts' ≤ ts.
- Uniform agreement:
 No two correct processes ep-decide different values.
- Lock-in:
 - If a correct process ep-decided v in an epoch consensus with timestamp ts' < ts, processes cannot decide a value v'≠v.
- Termination:
 - If the leader is correct, has ep-proposed a value, and no correct process aborts this epoch consensus, then every correct process eventually ep-decides

Byzantine Epoch Consensus (read phase)

- Leader sends READ to all processes
- Processes reply with STATE message containing its local state <valts, val, writeset>:
 - (valts, val) a timestamp/value pair with the value that the process received most recently in a <u>Byzantine</u> <u>quorum of WRITE messages</u>
 - 2. **writeset** a set of timestamp/value pairs with one entry for every value that this process has ever written (where timestamp == most recent epoch where the value was written).

Outcome of the read phase

- Read phase obtains the states from a byz. quorum of processes to determine whether there exists a value that may have been epoch-decided (if so, it must be written, to ensure lock-in property)
- If so, send this value in the subsequent WRITE
- What are the required conditions to be able to affirm that a value may have been epoch-decided?

Outcome of the read phase

- The value corresponds to the highest timestamp in a byzantine quorum of (timestamp, value) pairs reported in distinct STATE messages
 - This is the most recent value for which a process claims to have received a Byzantine quorum of WRITEs
- The value appears in the writeset of at least f+1 processes
 - This ensures value occurs in the writeset of a correct process
- If no value meets these two conditions, then outcome is unbound

Read phase: coping with byzantine leaders

- Leader sends the STATEs collected in the read phase to all
 - processes send their states digitally signed, to prevent tampering
- All processes independently check, based on information in state messages, if some value may have already been ep-decided in a previous epoch (lock-in property)


Read phase: coping with byzantine leaders

- A leader cannot forge STATE values of other processes, thanks to the use of digital signatures
 - but it can omit information from some process
 - or send different values regarding its state to different processes
- However, the conditions governing the outcome of the read phase prevent safety violations


Write phase

- If a process receives a Byzantine quorum of WRITE messages from distinct processes containing the same value v, it sets its state to (current_epoch, v) and broadcasts an ACCEPT message
- When a process receives a Byz. quorum of ACCEPT messages from distinct processes containing the same value v, it epoch-decides v

Example execution: byzantine leader q in epoch 5



Example execution: correct leader r in epoch 6



Correctness sketch


- Agreement property:
 - Usual contradiction proof based on collecting 2f+1 ACCEPTs, and the fact that correct processes do not send conflicting ACCEPT messages
- Validity property:
 - Weak validity applies only to executions with only correct prcesses, simplifying the proof
- Termination and abort behavior property:
 - Follows from sequence of steps after correct leader starts the protocol

Correctness sketch (lock-in property)

- assume process p ep-decided v in consensus instance ts' < ts
- then, p collected 2f+1 ACCEPTs for v, at least f+1 from correct processes, who set value and timestamp to <v,ts'>
- those ACCEPTS follow from receiving 2f+1 WRITEs, at least f+1 from correct processes, who added (ts',v) to their writeset
- now let's consider the first subsequent instance ts* where a correct process receives COLLECTED, we prove that the outcome of the read phase has to be v
 - Between ts' and ts* no correct process received COLLECTED, thus did not send write, thus state variables valts, val, and writeset did not change
 - Thus the f+1 correct processes use (ts',v) as the starting value of ts* and include it in writeset
 - By construction of the outcome of the read phase, its output must be bound to ts'
 - Therefore, all correct processes that write will write v, implies that correct processes that decide will decide v in ts*
 - Recursively using the same argument until round ts establishes the property

State machine replication (SMR)

- 1. Take an arbitrary service, make it deterministic Example: an append-only sequence of blocks of transactions
- 2. Replicate the server
- 3. Enforce that correct replicas execute request in the same order (follow the same sequence of state transitions)
- 4. Use voting to guarantee that client sees correct output



From consensus to state machine replication

- Consensus protocol is at the heart of solving point number 3
 - Clients issue several requests independently of each other
 - Each request is assigned a sequence number, thus defining order by which they are executed
 - Instantiate one consensus instance per sequence number, to determine which request gets executed at that point in the sequence
- Can optimize the EpochConsensus protocol for this setting:
- When instantiating new epoch, read phase of the protocol can be executed only once for requests in the interval [current, +∞)

Acknowledgements

Rachid Guerraoui, EPFL