

# Lott and Mustard Replication

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## Introduction

Detering crime is a topic that comes across nearly all political debates, with each party having its own solution to the problem. This issue is extremely important to Americans, which is why it is brought up by politicians constantly. People have desire to feel safe and secure in their neighborhoods and homes. One policy initiative that has been proposed and passed by many state legislatures across the United States, is a right to carry law. A passage of this law would give the citizens of that state the ability to carry concealed weapons. The logic being that criminals would be less likely to commit a crime if they reasonably believed an individual may have a gun. In their 1997 paper entitled "Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, by John Lott and David Mustard, the authors sought to answer the question of how right to carry laws affected crime. In this paper I am seeking to replicate their results using modern difference-in-differences research designs that are robust to the differential timing issue that Lott and Mustard(LM) faced.

## Background and Economic Theory

In the original LM study, the authors were looking to find the impact of right to carry laws on crime in the United States. The conclusions from the LM study showed that right to carry laws were main factor causing crime to drop when compared to states that did not adopt a right to carry law. LM coded the laws according to Cramer and Kopel's definition of a shall issue state. LM used a classic difference-in-differences two-way fixed effect model with county and year fixed effects. One of the issues with the two-way fixed effects model that LM used is the issue of variable timing of treatments. Over the course of the time period examined states rolled out right to carry laws at various points throughout the time period. I summarize the roll out of right to carry laws by year in Table 1 below.

Table 1: State Roll out of Concealed Carry

Years	States
1977	Alabama, Connecticut, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington
1981	Indiana
1986	Maine
1988	Florida
1989	Virginia
1990	Georgia, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
1991	Idaho, Mississippi, Oregon
1992	Montana

A right to carry law is simply a law that allows

## Data

In the original Lott and Mustard paper, the authors used county level crime data for their analysis. For this replication I will be using state level crime data for a variety of reasons. The main reason is that the gun laws passed were ultimately passed at the state level, and there are some concerns that county level data will have much more measurement error than at the state level. I provide a summary of the variables in Table 2 below. In the table we can see the arrest rate broken down by the type of crime committed. The arrest rate is defined as the number of arrests per offense. I also show the crimes committed per 100,000 people broken down by crime type.

Table 2: National Sample Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Shall Issue Dummy	816	0.19	0.39
Arrest Rate for a particular crime			
Violent Crimes	802	41.09	22.20
Property Crimes	809	16.92	4.68
Murder	806	91.30	55.94
Rape	799	41.02	17.39
Robbery	808	31.46	13.59
Aggravated Assault	809	44.62	16.98
Burglary	809	13.80	4.57
Larceny	809	18.54	5.20
Auto Theft	808	22.35	37.61
Crime Rate for a particular crime per 100,000			
Violent Crimes	816	483.93	318.94
Property Crimes	816	4,618.34	1,210.46
Murder	816	7.77	6.88
Rape	816	33.98	15.07
Robbery	816	163.42	176.25
Aggravated Assault	816	278.76	159.65
Burglary	816	1,239.34	417.76
Larceny	816	2,968.71	751.02
Auto Theft	816	410.30	231.15
Real per capita income data			
Personal Income	816	9,351.82	4,689.70
Unemployment Insurance	816	50.02	38.08
Income Maintenance	816	115.28	70.95
Retirement payments per person over 65	816	1,002.23	546.47
Population	816	4,646,787.00	5,010,350.00
Population per square mile	816	355.97	1,408.25

For each crime there are states for which we have no measurement of arrest rate during various years. This is reflected in Table 2 under the number of observations column.

## Empirical Model and Estimation

### Two Way Fixed Effects

The two way fixed effects model estimated by LM is shown below in equation 1.

$$Y_{it} = \delta SI_{it} + \alpha_i + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

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Table 3: Two Way Fixed Effect Regression Results

Dependent Variables:	lvio	lmur	lrap	laga	lrob	lpro	lbur	llar	laut
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Variables</i>									
Shall issue law dummy	-0.0699*	-0.0550	-0.0378	-0.0641	-0.0299	0.0023	-0.0317	0.0090	0.0193
	(0.0391)	(0.0379)	(0.0453)	(0.0474)	(0.0466)	(0.0215)	(0.0256)	(0.0212)	(0.0401)
Arrest rate for the crime category	-0.0003	-0.0004*	-0.0007	-0.0029***	-0.0015	-0.0023*	-0.0060***	-0.0011	-0.0003**
	(0.0004)	(0.0002)	(0.0006)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0012)	(0.0019)	(0.0011)	(0.0001)
Population per square mile	-0.0008***	-0.0008***	0.0003	-0.0007***	-0.0009***	-0.0005***	-0.0006***	-0.0005***	-0.0008**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Real per capital income data:									
Retirement payments per person over 65	0.0001	0.0002	$-7.16 \times 10^{-5}$	0.0001	0.0001	$-5.94 \times 10^{-5}$	$6.14 \times 10^{-6}$	$-6.89 \times 10^{-5}$	$6.56 \times 10^{-5}$
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	( $8.76 \times 10^{-5}$ )	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	( $6.72 \times 10^{-5}$ )	(0.0001)	( $6.54 \times 10^{-5}$ )	(0.0001)
Personal income	$2.16 \times 10^{-5}$	$4.37 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.63 \times 10^{-5}$	$4.75 \times 10^{-5**}$	$-2.72 \times 10^{-5}$	$-3.36 \times 10^{-5*}$	$-3.95 \times 10^{-5}$	$-3.23 \times 10^{-5**}$	$-6.45 \times 10^{-5*}$
	( $1.71 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $2.9 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $2.39 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $2.15 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $3.02 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $1.75 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $2.52 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $1.43 \times 10^{-5}$ )	( $3.35 \times 10^{-5}$ )
Income maintenance	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0006	0.0007	-0.0009	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0006
	(0.0006)	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0007)
Unemployment insurance	-0.0002	-0.0009*	-0.0005	$-1.81 \times 10^{-5}$	-0.0008	0.0004	0.0007*	0.0004	-0.0006
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0006)
Population	$6.05 \times 10^{-8***}$	$2.43 \times 10^{-8}$	$-5.76 \times 10^{-8**}$	$6.64 \times 10^{-8**}$	$6.12 \times 10^{-8*}$	$3.08 \times 10^{-8}$	$3.71 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.44 \times 10^{-8}$	$7.66 \times 10^{-8*}$
	( $2.02 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $2.83 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $2.48 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $2.37 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $3.32 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $1.78 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $2.65 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $1.56 \times 10^{-8}$ )	( $3.61 \times 10^{-8}$ )
ppwm1019	-67.75	35.85	-69.55	-17.45	-150.7***	-21.92	-10.01	-31.77	-45.32
	(44.05)	(47.73)	(53.73)	(68.53)	(48.32)	(21.58)	(33.90)	(21.24)	(42.81)
ppbm1019	222.6**	162.7	-49.98	348.1**	197.4	19.08	20.20	-7.450	328.0**
	(77.94)	(98.61)	(103.5)	(120.7)	(130.3)	(61.76)	(96.81)	(58.08)	(119.5)
ppnm1019	357.2	-407.1	-58.62	466.0	228.6	131.4	365.5**	44.66	38.23
	(206.1)	(319.6)	(188.6)	(271.6)	(222.9)	(103.3)	(170.8)	(74.89)	(222.4)
ppwf1019	75.22	-37.48	81.06	19.49	157.1***	28.53	11.36	40.50*	45.59
	(44.76)	(48.25)	(57.46)	(69.48)	(50.97)	(23.08)	(35.18)	(22.67)	(46.77)
ppbf1019	-163.1**	-96.81	44.73	-295.3**	-161.6	2.184	-8.400	25.99	-276.4**
	(75.03)	(98.61)	(98.68)	(112.5)	(111.8)	(56.58)	(86.23)	(54.16)	(111.7)
ppnf1019	-279.5	350.6	153.3	-373.3	-167.8	-146.4	-380.1**	-56.35	-23.43
	(204.6)	(276.4)	(180.9)	(256.0)	(230.8)	(108.8)	(176.9)	(77.93)	(229.5)
ppwm2029	4.834	20.51	3.572	-4.094	44.13*	5.920	10.01	7.838	6.416
	(15.53)	(15.08)	(14.55)	(18.95)	(21.91)	(7.574)	(10.74)	(6.271)	(20.01)
ppbm2029	-4.124	-50.20	134.1	-83.05	-35.76	-27.51	-59.19	-15.55	-122.4*
	(40.84)	(64.15)	(119.7)	(62.56)	(71.33)	(35.65)	(37.43)	(34.36)	(62.94)
ppnm2029	-64.95	120.3	63.76	-64.31	-108.6	-95.23*	-95.75	-75.44	-85.69
	(99.36)	(152.6)	(115.7)	(128.6)	(173.4)	(53.62)	(80.17)	(51.38)	(124.4)
ppwf2029	3.919	-18.12	24.64	14.34	-43.77	-4.257	-8.442	-4.947	-10.94
	(18.29)	(19.03)	(17.35)	(21.46)	(26.90)	(7.981)	(13.61)	(6.581)	(20.68)
ppbf2029	11.31	59.85	-86.21	83.52	27.84	35.33	43.28	31.89	131.1**



Observations	802	806	799	809	808	809	809	809	808
R <sup>2</sup>	0.97909	0.94701	0.93976	0.96156	0.98311	0.95910	0.95208	0.96166	0.95518
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.40574	0.29930	0.50171	0.44814	0.48069	0.48718	0.46057	0.48721	0.54198

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*Clustered (state & year) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

## Bacon Decomposition

Table 4: Bacon Decomposition

	Weight	Average Estimate
Violent Crime		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	0.07561
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	-0.07645
Murder		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	0.07974
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	0.00179
Rape		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	-0.03864
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	-0.08243
Aggravated Assault		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	0.11645
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	-0.14717
Robbery		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	0.10775
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	0.08955
Property Crime		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	-0.01052
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	0.00644
Burglary		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	-0.03397
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	-0.05563
Larceny		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	-0.00608
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	0.02077
Auto Theft		
Earlier vs Later Treated	0.0683810	0.08313
Later vs Earlier Treated	0.0233921	0.08680

Callaway and Sant’anna

Sun and Abraham Event Study

Conclusion