

Lott and Mustard Replication

Patrick Massey

05/04/2022

Introduction

Detering crime is a topic that comes across nearly all political debates, with each party having its own solution to the problem. This issue is extremely important to Americans, which is why it is brought up by politicians constantly. People have desire to feel safe and secure in their neighborhoods and homes. One policy initiative that has been proposed and passed by many state legislatures across the United States, is a right to carry law. A passage of this law would give the citizens of that state the ability to carry concealed weapons. The logic being that criminals would be less likely to commit a crime if they reasonably believed an individual may have a gun. In their 1997 paper entitled "Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, by John Lott and David Mustard, the authors sought to answer the question of how right to carry laws affected crime. In this paper I am seeking to replicate their results using modern difference-in-differences research designs that are robust to the differential timing issue that Lott and Mustard(LM) faced.

Background and Economic Theory

In the original LM study, the authors were looking to find the impact of right to carry laws on crime in the United States. The conclusions from the LM study showed that right to carry laws were main factor causing crime to drop when compared to states that did not adopt a right to carry law. LM coded the laws according to Cramer and Kopel's definition of a shall issue state. LM used a classic difference-in-differences two-way fixed effect model with county and year fixed effects. One of the issues with the two-way fixed effects model that LM used is the issue of variable timing of treatments. Over the course of the time period examined states rolled out right to carry laws at various points throughout the time period. I summarize the roll out of right to carry laws by year in Table 1 below.

Table 1: State Roll out of Concealed Carry

| Years | States |
|-------|--|
| 1977 | Alabama, Connecticut, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington |
| 1981 | Indiana |
| 1986 | Maine |
| 1988 | Florida |
| 1989 | Virginia |
| 1990 | Georgia, Pennsylvania, West Virginia |
| 1991 | Idaho, Mississippi, Oregon |
| 1992 | Montana |

A right to carry law is simply a law that allows an individual to carry a concealed handgun outside of ones home. Deterrence is the the theory of utilizing laws and policies to shift individuals away from negative behavior. The laws are intended to create a deterrence for criminals to commit crime when they might reasonably believe an individual is armed. When LM performed their analysis they used a two-way fixed effects model to identify the effect of the passage of these right to carry laws. The regression results from LM indicate that 5 of their variables of interest are significant at the 95% level (Violent Crime, Murder, Aggravated Assault, Robbery, and Burglary) and two on the cusp of significance at the 95% level (Rape, and Property Crime). This does not match the results from this replication, although we are supposedly using the same or very similar data. The results from the LM study show that an issuance of a right to carry law resulted in approximately a 5% drop in violent crime and a rise in property crime of about 2.5%. The authors attribute this to a substitution effect where property crimes are less likely to have an encounter between individuals and criminals.

Data

In the original Lott and Mustard paper, the authors used county level crime data for their analysis. For this replication I will be using state level crime data for a variety of reasons. The data set I will be using is a panel data set from 1977 to 1992. The main reason is that the gun laws passed were ultimately passed at the state level, and there are some concerns that county level data will have much more measurement error than at the state level. I provide a summary of the variables in Table 2 below. In the table we can see the arrest rate broken down by the type of crime committed. The arrest rate is defined as the number of arrests per offense. I also show the crimes committed per 100,000 people broken down by crime type. The presence of a right to carry law in a state is identified by a shall issue dummy. The Violent Crime variable represents murder, rape, aggravated assault and robbery. The Property Crime variable represents burglary, larceny,

and auto theft.

Table 2: National Sample Summary Statistics

| Variable | N | Mean | St. Dev. |
|---|-----|--------------|--------------|
| Shall Issue Dummy | 816 | 0.19 | 0.39 |
| Arrest Rate for a particular crime | | | |
| Violent Crimes | 802 | 41.09 | 22.20 |
| Property Crimes | 809 | 16.92 | 4.68 |
| Murder | 806 | 91.30 | 55.94 |
| Rape | 799 | 41.02 | 17.39 |
| Robbery | 808 | 31.46 | 13.59 |
| Aggravated Assault | 809 | 44.62 | 16.98 |
| Burglary | 809 | 13.80 | 4.57 |
| Larceny | 809 | 18.54 | 5.20 |
| Auto Theft | 808 | 22.35 | 37.61 |
| Crime Rate for a particular crime per 100,000 | | | |
| Violent Crimes | 816 | 483.93 | 318.94 |
| Property Crimes | 816 | 4,618.34 | 1,210.46 |
| Murder | 816 | 7.77 | 6.88 |
| Rape | 816 | 33.98 | 15.07 |
| Robbery | 816 | 163.42 | 176.25 |
| Aggravated Assault | 816 | 278.76 | 159.65 |
| Burglary | 816 | 1,239.34 | 417.76 |
| Larceny | 816 | 2,968.71 | 751.02 |
| Auto Theft | 816 | 410.30 | 231.15 |
| Real per capita income data | | | |
| Personal Income | 816 | 9,351.82 | 4,689.70 |
| Unemployment Insurance | 816 | 50.02 | 38.08 |
| Income Maintenance | 816 | 115.28 | 70.95 |
| Retirement payments per person over 65 | 816 | 1,002.23 | 546.47 |
| Population | 816 | 4,646,787.00 | 5,010,350.00 |
| Population per square mile | 816 | 355.97 | 1,408.25 |

For each crime there are states for which we have no measurement of arrest rate during various years. This is reflected in Table 2 under the number of observations column.

Empirical Model and Estimation

Two Way Fixed Effects

The two way fixed effects model estimated by LM is shown below in equation 1.

$$Y_{it} = \delta SI_{it} + \alpha_i + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Y_{it} is represents the logged crime rate for state i at time t . α_i represents state fixed effects, and θ_t represents time fixed effects. SI_{it} is an indicator for the presence of a shall issue law. With the isolation of state and time fixed effects. δ represents the impact of a shall issue law. The results from the regression are shown below in Table 3 below. Only one crime, Violent Crime, is statistically significant at the 90% level. I show that right to carry law results in a 7% drop in violent crime. No other crimes I tested are significantly different from 0. These results are very different than the ones presented in the LM study.

Table 3: Two Way Fixed Effect Regression Results

| Dependent Variables: | lvio | lmur | lrap | laga | lrob | lpro | lbur | llar | laut |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Model: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| <i>Variables</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Shall issue law dummy | -0.0699* | -0.0550 | -0.0378 | -0.0641 | -0.0299 | 0.0023 | -0.0317 | 0.0090 | 0.0193 |
| | (0.0391) | (0.0379) | (0.0453) | (0.0474) | (0.0466) | (0.0215) | (0.0256) | (0.0212) | (0.0401) |
| Arrest rate for the crime category | -0.0003 | -0.0004* | -0.0007 | -0.0029*** | -0.0015 | -0.0023* | -0.0060*** | -0.0011 | -0.0003** |
| | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | (0.0006) | (0.0008) | (0.0009) | (0.0012) | (0.0019) | (0.0011) | (0.0001) |
| Population per square mile | -0.0008*** | -0.0008*** | 0.0003 | -0.0007*** | -0.0009*** | -0.0005*** | -0.0006*** | -0.0005*** | -0.0008** |
| | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (0.0001) | (0.0002) | (0.0001) | (0.0003) |
| Real per capital income data: | | | | | | | | | |
| Retirement payments per person over 65 | 0.0001 | 0.0002 | -7.16×10^{-5} | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | -5.94×10^{-5} | 6.14×10^{-6} | -6.89×10^{-5} | 6.56×10^{-5} |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (8.76×10^{-5}) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | (6.72×10^{-5}) | (0.0001) | (6.54×10^{-5}) | (0.0001) |
| Personal income | 2.16×10^{-5} | 4.37×10^{-5} | 1.63×10^{-5} | $4.75 \times 10^{-5**}$ | -2.72×10^{-5} | $-3.36 \times 10^{-5*}$ | -3.95×10^{-5} | $-3.23 \times 10^{-5**}$ | $-6.45 \times 10^{-5*}$ |
| | (1.71×10^{-5}) | (2.9×10^{-5}) | (2.39×10^{-5}) | (2.15×10^{-5}) | (3.02×10^{-5}) | (1.75×10^{-5}) | (2.52×10^{-5}) | (1.43×10^{-5}) | (3.35×10^{-5}) |
| Income maintenance | -0.0002 | -0.0002 | -0.0006 | 0.0007 | -0.0009 | -0.0002 | -0.0002 | -0.0002 | -0.0006 |
| | (0.0006) | (0.0004) | (0.0007) | (0.0008) | (0.0007) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0003) | (0.0007) |
| Unemployment insurance | -0.0002 | -0.0009* | -0.0005 | -1.81×10^{-5} | -0.0008 | 0.0004 | 0.0007* | 0.0004 | -0.0006 |
| | (0.0004) | (0.0005) | (0.0004) | (0.0004) | (0.0005) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0003) | (0.0006) |
| Population | $6.05 \times 10^{-8***}$ | 2.43×10^{-8} | $-5.76 \times 10^{-8**}$ | $6.64 \times 10^{-8**}$ | $6.12 \times 10^{-8*}$ | 3.08×10^{-8} | 3.71×10^{-8} | 2.44×10^{-8} | $7.66 \times 10^{-8*}$ |
| | (2.02×10^{-8}) | (2.83×10^{-8}) | (2.48×10^{-8}) | (2.37×10^{-8}) | (3.32×10^{-8}) | (1.78×10^{-8}) | (2.65×10^{-8}) | (1.56×10^{-8}) | (3.61×10^{-8}) |
| ppwm1019 | -67.75 | 35.85 | -69.55 | -17.45 | -150.7*** | -21.92 | -10.01 | -31.77 | -45.32 |
| | (44.05) | (47.73) | (53.73) | (68.53) | (48.32) | (21.58) | (33.90) | (21.24) | (42.81) |
| ppbm1019 | 222.6** | 162.7 | -49.98 | 348.1** | 197.4 | 19.08 | 20.20 | -7.450 | 328.0** |
| | (77.94) | (98.61) | (103.5) | (120.7) | (130.3) | (61.76) | (96.81) | (58.08) | (119.5) |
| ppnm1019 | 357.2 | -407.1 | -58.62 | 466.0 | 228.6 | 131.4 | 365.5** | 44.66 | 38.23 |
| | (206.1) | (319.6) | (188.6) | (271.6) | (222.9) | (103.3) | (170.8) | (74.89) | (222.4) |
| ppwf1019 | 75.22 | -37.48 | 81.06 | 19.49 | 157.1*** | 28.53 | 11.36 | 40.50* | 45.59 |
| | (44.76) | (48.25) | (57.46) | (69.48) | (50.97) | (23.08) | (35.18) | (22.67) | (46.77) |
| ppbf1019 | -163.1** | -96.81 | 44.73 | -295.3** | -161.6 | 2.184 | -8.400 | 25.99 | -276.4** |
| | (75.03) | (98.61) | (98.68) | (112.5) | (111.8) | (56.58) | (86.23) | (54.16) | (111.7) |
| ppnf1019 | -279.5 | 350.6 | 153.3 | -373.3 | -167.8 | -146.4 | -380.1** | -56.35 | -23.43 |
| | (204.6) | (276.4) | (180.9) | (256.0) | (230.8) | (108.8) | (176.9) | (77.93) | (229.5) |
| ppwm2029 | 4.834 | 20.51 | 3.572 | -4.094 | 44.13* | 5.920 | 10.01 | 7.838 | 6.416 |
| | (15.53) | (15.08) | (14.55) | (18.95) | (21.91) | (7.574) | (10.74) | (6.271) | (20.01) |
| ppbm2029 | -4.124 | -50.20 | 134.1 | -83.05 | -35.76 | -27.51 | -59.19 | -15.55 | -122.4* |
| | (40.84) | (64.15) | (119.7) | (62.56) | (71.33) | (35.65) | (37.43) | (34.36) | (62.94) |
| ppnm2029 | -64.95 | 120.3 | 63.76 | -64.31 | -108.6 | -95.23* | -95.75 | -75.44 | -85.69 |
| | (99.36) | (152.6) | (115.7) | (128.6) | (173.4) | (53.62) | (80.17) | (51.38) | (124.4) |
| ppwf2029 | 3.919 | -18.12 | 24.64 | 14.34 | -43.77 | -4.257 | -8.442 | -4.947 | -10.94 |
| | (18.29) | (19.03) | (17.35) | (21.46) | (26.90) | (7.981) | (13.61) | (6.581) | (20.68) |
| ppbf2029 | 11.31 | 59.85 | -86.21 | 83.52 | 27.84 | 35.33 | 43.28 | 31.89 | 131.1** |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Observations | 802 | 806 | 799 | 809 | 808 | 809 | 809 | 809 | 808 |
| R ² | 0.97909 | 0.94701 | 0.93976 | 0.96156 | 0.98311 | 0.95910 | 0.95208 | 0.96166 | 0.95518 |
| Within R ² | 0.40574 | 0.29930 | 0.50171 | 0.44814 | 0.48069 | 0.48718 | 0.46057 | 0.48721 | 0.54198 |

Clustered (state & year) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Bacon Decomposition

The two way fixed effects model has been a workhorse for empirical economic literature, and for good reason. It is intuitive and is able to isolate out the ATT. However recent literature has shown that there may be some underlying issues with the two way fixed effects model. The issue occurs when there is differential timing of treatment under the two way fixed effects model, in this scenario we are using already treated groups as controls. This is not ideal and can add bias to our estimators. The LM study is an excellent example of differential timing as states were issuing laws at different times as shown in Table 1. It turns out the issue is not plainly differential timing, the issue is that we may have heterogeneous treatment effects. If that is the case then TWFE estimator will be biased. Goodman-Bacon (2021) decompose the weighted 2x2's we see that decomposition in Table 4 below. What we see is that we are putting a not insignificant amount of weight on the Later to Earlier treated group, around 2.3%. The reason this is problematic is that we are using an earlier treated group as a control group for a later treated group. If there is a heterogeneous treatment effect that our TWFE estimator is wrong. It is reasonable to assume that there would be heterogeneous treatment effect in this study, which means we can not rely on the TWFE model to have an unbiased estimator.

Table 4: Bacon Decomposition

| | Weight | Average Estimate |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------------|
| Violent Crime | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | 0.07561 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | -0.02812 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | -0.07645 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | -0.11202 |
| Murder | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | 0.07974 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | -0.00789 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | 0.00179 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | -0.05551 |
| Rape | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | -0.03864 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | -0.19207 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | -0.08243 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | 0.00406 |
| Aggravated Assault | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | 0.11645 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.00612 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | -0.14717 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | -0.18354 |
| Robbery | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | 0.10775 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.10999 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | 0.08955 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | -0.01341 |
| Property Crime | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | -0.01052 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.05383 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | 0.00644 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | 0.02810 |
| Burglary | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | -0.03397 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.03046 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | -0.05563 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | 0.00858 |
| Larceny | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | -0.00608 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.05034 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | 0.02077 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | 0.03746 |
| Auto Theft | | |
| Earlier vs Later Treated | 0.0683810 | 0.08313 |
| Later vs Always Treated | 0.1589397 | 0.21147 |
| Later vs Earlier Treated | 0.0233921 | 0.08680 |
| Treated vs Untreated | 0.7492871 | 0.03507 |

Callaway and Sant’anna

Callaway and Sant’anna (2020) seek to rectify the issues we see with TWFE models with differential timing. The group time ATT is what CS seek to estimate, this estimator is the ATT for different groups, that are treated at different times. We can estimate the group time ATT using equation 2 below.

$$ATT(g, t) = E \left[\left(\frac{G_g}{E[G_g]} - \frac{\frac{\hat{p}(X)C}{1-\hat{p}(X)}}{E \left[\frac{\hat{p}(X)C}{1-\hat{p}(X)} \right]} \right) (Y_t - Y_{g-1}) \right] \quad (2)$$

I estimate the group ATT and summarize the results in Table 5 below. We see that empirically these treatment effects are much smaller than the estimates I generated from the TWFE model. With the standard errors accounted for none are significantly different from 0. This is huge change from the the TWFE model estimated by LM.

Table 5: Callaway Sant’anna Group ATT

| | Violent Crime | Murder | Rape | Aggravated Assault | Robbery | Property Crime | Burglary | Larceny | Auto Theft |
|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|--------------------|---------|----------------|----------|---------|------------|
| Overall ATT | -0.015 | -0.056 | 0.010 | -0.010 | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.006 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Std. Er. | 0.022 | 0.028 | 0.023 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.036 |

Sun and Abraham Event Study

Conclusion