# Foundations of Financial Economics Household behavior: two period deterministic cases

Paulo Brito

<sup>1</sup>pbrito@iseg.ulisboa.pt University of Lisbon

February 25, 2022 (revised March 4, 2022)

# Topics for this slide

- 1. Intertemporal choice
- 2. Intertemporal household problem subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
- 3. Intertemporal household problem subject to sequencial budget constraints

#### Summary

1. We address the structure and economic meaning of the intertemporal utility function

$$U(c_0, c_1)$$

where  $c_t$  is consumption in period t

- 2. Next, we consider the **two simplest benchmark problems** in financial economics
  - 2.1 The household problem when it can make **real forward contracts** (contract now for delivery in the future)

$$V(q, w) = \max_{c_0, c_1} \{ U(c_0, c_1) : c_0 + q c_1 = w \}$$

2.2 The household problem when it can make **spot financial contracts** (buy and sell securities). Example, the "financial approach" is

$$V(q, w) = \max_{c_0, c_1, \theta} \{ U(c_0, c_1) : \text{s.t } c_0 + \theta S = y_1, \ c_1 = V\theta + y_2 \}$$

3. Then we take those problems as a building block of a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) (next lecture)

 $1. \ Intertemporal \ consumption \ preferences$ 

## Consumption sequences

- ▶ We **index** variables by time.
- ▶ In the simplest case, we have  $\mathbb{T} = \{0, 1\}$
- ▶ Consider the **sequences**  $\{c_0, c_1\}$ , where  $c_t$  is consumption in **period** t = 0, 1
- ▶ The value of sequence  $\{c_0, c_1\}$  is measured by the intertemporal utility functional ,

$$U = U(\{c_0, c_1\}),$$

- We take a decision at a particular point in time t = 0
- The **optimum** is a sequence of consumption in the present and in the future,  $\{c_0^*, c_1^*\}$ , for which U is **maximum**

# Intertemporal choice

- ightharpoonup Indexing consumption by time t has two consequences:
  - introduces an **heterogeneity**:
    therefore, we can use **general** concepts and results of choice
    among **different goods** as in the slide **basic utility theory**
  - but it also introduces an **order relationship among consumption in different moments in time**  $c_0$  and  $c_1$ : therefore, we need **particular** concepts and results related to **intertemporal arbitrage**
  - ▶ it requires an assumption on information: **perfect information** in this slide
- ▶ In this case a intertemporal preference with perfect information

As a generic utility function

- ▶ Dealing with sequences  $\{c_0, c_1\}$  as a vector of real non-negative numbers  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+$
- ▶ Therefore the **intertemporal utility function** (IUF) can be seen as a mapping  $U: \mathbb{R}^2_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ ,

$$U = U(c_0, c_1)$$

where U is a number allowing to rank vectors  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1)$ 

ightharpoonup Behavioral and information assumptions on choice over time, are implicitly introduced by mathematical properties of U

#### Static assumptions

- ▶ First assumption:  $U(\cdot)$  is **continuous** and **differentiable** in both arguments  $(c_0, c_1)$
- ▶ Intuition: we can value sequences of consumption and assess the value of small changes in the quantities of consumption at any point in time (today or tomorrow); small changes of the quantities of the consumption generate small changes in value:
  - we can assess **how** the intertemporal utility changes for small changes in the distinguish the value
- ► Second assumption: Positive marginal utility:

$$U_0 \equiv \frac{\partial U(c_0, c_1)}{\partial c_0} > 0, \ U_1 \equiv \frac{\partial U(c_0, c_1)}{\partial c_1} > 0$$

Intuition: consumption in every period is a good, in the sense that it increases intertemporal utility; and there is **no** satiation at every point in time.

Static assumptions

► Third assumption: non-increasing marginal utility for every period

$$U_{00} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 U(c_0, c_1)}{\partial c_0^2} \le 0$$
, and  $U_{11} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 U(c_0, c_1)}{\partial c_1^2} \le 0$ 

Intuition: remember last slide

Dynamic assumptions

▶ Definition: the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is

$$IMRS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1) = -\frac{dc_1}{dc_0}$$

- ▶ **Intuition**: how much are we willing to sacrifice consumption at t = 1 (tomorrow) in order to increase une unit of consumption at t = 0 (today)?
- ▶ For a compensated change in  $c_0$  and  $c_1$  such that dU = 0, we have

$$U_0(c_0, c_1)dc_0 + U_1(c_0, c_1)dc_1 = 0$$

then the IMRS is equal to the ratio of the marginal utilities

$$| IMRS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1) = \frac{U_0(c_0, c_1)}{U_1(c_0, c_1)} |_{U=\text{constant}}$$

Dynamic assumptions

► Fourth assumption: we can have the following types of intertemporal dependence. Using the gross or Edgeworth elasticity

```
\begin{cases} \text{intertemporal substitutability} & (\mathbf{U}_{0,1} < 0 \text{ that is } \uparrow c_1 \implies \downarrow U_0(c_0, c_0) \\ \text{intertemporal independence} & (\mathbf{U}_{0,1} = 0 \text{ that is } \uparrow c_1 \implies = U_0(c_0, c_0) \\ \text{intertemporal complementarity} & (\mathbf{U}_{0,1} > 0 \text{ that is } \uparrow c_1 \implies \uparrow U_0(c_0, c_0) \end{cases}
```

► Intertemporal elasticity of substitution

$$EIS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1) = \frac{d \ln(c_1/c_0)}{d \ln IMRS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1)} = \frac{c_0 U_0 + c_1 U_1}{c_1 U_1 \varepsilon_{00} - 2c_0 U_0 \varepsilon_{01} + c_0 U_0 \varepsilon_{11}}$$

where 
$$\varepsilon_{ij} = -\frac{U_{ij}c_j}{U_i}$$
 for  $i = 0, 1$  and  $U_{ij} = \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial c_i c_j}$ 

- ▶ Intuition: how much does the rate of growth of the ratio  $c_1/c_0$  changes for a one percent increase in the *IMRS*. This provides a measure of relative intertemporal substitution/complementarity of consumption
- ▶ In particular:  $EIS_{0,1} > 0$  if there is intertemporal substitution,  $EIS_{0,1} = 0$  intertemporal independence and  $EIS_{0,1} < 0$  intertemporal complementarity (again in the Edgeworth sense)

#### Intertemporal choice

Introducing the time arrow

- ► Time can be introduced parametrically or via temporal utility functions
- ▶ **Discounting**: time is introduced via a time-weight: usually a **discount factor**

$$\{\beta^t\}_{t=0}^T = \{1, \beta, \beta^2, \dots, \beta^t \dots\}$$

where

$$\beta \equiv \frac{1}{1+\rho}$$

where  $\rho$  is the rate of time preference: as

$$\rho > 0 \implies 0 < \beta < 1$$

Example:

$$U[\lbrace c \rbrace] = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$

▶ **Temporal utility functions** dependent on time: example the "temporal" preferences are different for different time periods

$$U[\{c\}] = U(\mathbf{u_0}(c_0), \mathbf{u_1}(c_0, c_1))$$

Main assumptions regarding intertemporal preferences

#### Definition 1

**Stationary preferences**: if the temporal utility functions are independent of time (but there can be discounting)

#### Definition 2

**Impatience**: if there is a preference for consumption today, at t = 0 rather than in the future t = 1, 2, ...

Main assumptions regarding intertemporal preferences

#### Definition 3

We say there is

- ▶ intertemporal independence if an increase in  $c_0$  leaves constant the marginal utility of consumption at time t = 1,  $U_{1,0} = U_{0,1} = 0$
- ▶ intertemporal substitution if an increase in  $c_0$  decreases the marginal utility of consumption at time t = 1,  $U_{1,0} = U_{0,1} < 0$
- ▶ intertemporal complementarity (addiction) if an increase in  $c_0$  increases the marginal utility of consumption at time t = 1,  $U_{1,0} = U_{0,1} > 0$

How can we identify those properties in particular utility functions?

## Intertemporal preference

#### How to characterize it

▶ We consider a stationary consumption process, i.e,

$$c_0 = c_1 = \bar{c} \text{ constant}$$

▶ Determining impatience: we use  $IMRS_{0,1}$ . We say the **IUF** displays impatience if

$$IMRS_{0,1}(\bar{c}) = \frac{U_0(\bar{c})}{U_1(\bar{c})} > 1$$

Intuition: to keep intertemporal utility constant, if we increase  $c_0$  by one unit, the reduction in consumption in period t = 1 should be bigger than one unit. This means that **consumption at** t = 0 has more value than consumption at t = 1.

▶ Intertemporal dependence—can be determined by the Allen-Uzawa elasticity  $\varepsilon_{01}$ .

$$\varepsilon_{0,1}(\bar{c}) = -\frac{U_{01}(\bar{c})\,\bar{c}}{U_{0}(\bar{c})} \begin{cases} > 0, & \text{intertemporal substitutability} \\ = 0, & \text{intertemporal independence} \\ < 0 & \text{intertemporal complementarity} \end{cases}$$

This is the simplest intertemporal utility function:

▶ **Assumption 1**: the IUF is intertemporally **additive** 

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$
, where  $\beta \equiv \frac{1}{1 + \rho}$ 

where  $\beta \in (0,1)$  is the psychological discount factor and  $\rho$  is the rate of time preference, and  $u(\cdot)$  is called the Bernoulli utility function

▶ **Assumption 2**: u is increasing and concave  $u''(c_t) < 0 < u'(c_t)$ , t = 0, 1

Example 1: additive IUF

▶ Marginal utilities for  $c_t$ , t = 0, 1 are positive

$$U_0 = u'(c_0) > 0, \ U_1 = \beta u'(c_1) > 0$$

▶ Utility function is concave

$$U_{00} = u''(c_0) < 0, \ U_{01} = 0, \ U_{11} = \beta u''(c_1) < 0$$

ightharpoonup The IMRS is

$$IMRS_{0,1} = \frac{U_0}{U_1} = \frac{u'(c_0)}{\beta u'(c_1)}$$

Therefore: marginal utility for period t = 0 is proportional to the discounted marginal utility for period t = 1 (from the perspective of period t = 0)

$$u'(c_0) = \beta u'(c_1) IMRS_{0,1}$$

we will see an analogous equation again and again translating the idea of intertemporal arbitrage.

Example 1: additive IUF

► The Allen-Uzawa elasticities are

$$\varepsilon_{00}(c_0) = -\frac{u''(c_0)c_0}{u'(c_0)}, \ \varepsilon_{01} = 0, \ \varepsilon_{11}(c_1) = -\frac{u''(c_1)c_1}{u'(c_1)}$$

► The elasticity of intertemporal substitution between period 0 and 1 is

$$EIS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1) = \frac{c_0 u'(c_0) + \beta c_1 u'(c_1)}{\beta c_1 u'(c_1) \varepsilon_{00}(c_0) + c_0 u'(c_0) \varepsilon_{11}(c_1)}$$

#### Example 1: additive IUF

For a stationary consumption path  $\{\bar{c}, \bar{c}\}$  we find:

▶ The IMRS is independent from  $\bar{c}$  and

$$IMRS_{0,1}(\bar{c}) = \frac{1}{\beta} = 1 + \rho > 1$$

this means that the IUF displays **impatience**, and this effect is captured by time discounting

▶ It displays intertemporal independence because

$$\varepsilon_{0,1}(\bar{c}) = 0$$

Intuition: the marginal valuation of consumption at time t=1 is independent of the history of consumption

► The IES is

$$IES_{0,1}(\bar{c}) = -\frac{u'(\bar{c})}{u''(\bar{c})\bar{c}} > 0$$

Intuition: this is interpreted as a measure of the preference for **consumption smoothing** through time

Example 1: additive IUF

#### Particular case:

► Isoelastic utility function

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{c^{1-\zeta} - 1}{1-\zeta} & \text{if } \zeta \neq 1\\ \ln(c) & \text{if } \zeta = 1 \end{cases}$$

Derivatives

$$U_0 = c_0^{-\zeta}, \ U_1 = \beta \ c_1^{-\zeta}, \ U_{00} = -\zeta c_0^{-\zeta - 1}, \ U_{01} = 0, \ U_{11} = -\zeta c_1^{-\zeta - 1}$$

► The IMRS is

$$IMRS_{0,1} = \frac{1}{\beta} \left(\frac{c_1}{c_0}\right)^{\zeta}$$

Example 1: additive IUF

For a stationary consumption path  $c_0 = c_1 = \bar{c}$ :

► The IMRS is

$$IMRS_{0,1} = \frac{1}{\beta} > 1$$

It displays impatience

- ▶ The AU elasticities are constant  $\varepsilon_{00} = \varepsilon_{11} = \zeta$
- ► The IES is also constant

$$EIS_{0,1} = \frac{1}{\zeta}$$

this is why  $\zeta$  is called the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution .

Example 2: endogenous discount factor

► Uzawa and Epstein-Hynes utility

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \frac{b(c_0)v(c_1)}{b(c_0)v(c_1)}$$

the discount factor is endogenous i.e.  $\beta = b(c)$  with b'(.) < 0 (rich people are more patient) v'(.) > 0

The crossed AU elasticity is for a stationary sequence is

$$\varepsilon_{0,1}(c) = -\frac{b'(c)v'(c)c}{u'(c) + b'(c)v(c)} \neq 0$$

displays intertemporal dependence (substitutability or complementarity depending on the sign of  $u^{'}(c) + b^{'}(c)v(c)$ )

Example 3: habit formation

#### ▶ Habit formation

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta v(c_0, c_1).$$

for  $v_{c_0}(c_0, c_1) < 0$  where  $c_0$  refer to consumption habits The crossed AU elasticity is for a stationary sequence is

$$\varepsilon_{0,1}(c) = -\frac{\beta v_{c_0 c_1}(c) c}{u'(c) + \beta v_{c_0}(c)} c$$

can display intertemporal substitutability, independence or complementarity depending on the relationship between time discounting and the relative importance of habits, i.e., the magnitude of  $v_{c_0}(c)$ 

#### Example 3: habit formation

► Consider the intertemporal utility function

$$U(c_0, c_1) = \ln(c_0) + \beta \ln\left(\left(\frac{c_1}{c_0}\right)^{\eta}\right), \ \eta > 0$$

Derivatives

$$U_0 = \frac{1 - \beta \eta}{c_0}, \ U_1 = \frac{\beta \eta}{c_1}, \ U_{00} = -\frac{1 - \beta \eta}{c_0^2}, \ U_{01} = 0, \ U_{11} = -\frac{\beta \eta}{c_1^2}$$

► The IMRS is

$$IMRS_{0,1}(c_0, c_1) = \left(\frac{1-\beta\eta}{\beta\eta}\right)\frac{c_1}{c_0}$$

► The AU elasticities are constant

$$\varepsilon_{00} = \varepsilon_{11} = 1, \ \varepsilon_{01} = 0$$

► The IES is also constant

$$EIS_{0,1}(c_0,c_1)=1$$

for any  $(c_0, c_1)$ 

Case 2: habit formation example, cont

For a stationary sequence  $c_0 = c_1 = c$ 

► The IMRS

$$IMRS_{0,1}(c) = \frac{1 - \beta \zeta}{\beta \zeta}$$

the utility displays impatience if  $\zeta < \frac{1}{2\beta} = \frac{1+\rho}{2}$ .

Intuition: there is impatience (according to the above definition) if the weight of past consumption is not too strong

As  $\varepsilon_{01} = 0 = 0$  the model displays intertemporal independence (but this is special to this example).

2. Intertemporal household problem with an intertemporal budget constraint

#### Contract environment

- A household has a resource (endowment) in positive amount (w > 0)
- ▶ Wants to consume over two periods,  $\{c_0, c_1\}$ , today  $c_0$  and in the future  $c_1$ .
- ▶ There is a market for **forward contracts** allowing for contracting today for delivery in the future, at a price set today, q > 0. We take the price paid today as a *numéraire* and all the variables are denominated at todays' price
- ▶ The value of the consumption sequence is assessed by an intertemporal utility function:  $U(c_0, c_1)$ ;
- ► The budget constraint,

$$c_0 + q c_1 \le w,$$

timing: period t = 0

# The household problem

▶ The intertemporal problem for the consumer is

$$v(w) = \max_{c_0, c_1} \{ U(c_0, c_1) : c_0 + q c_1 \le w \}$$

▶ The (interior) optimum  $(c_0^*, c_1^*)$  satisfies the conditions

$$\begin{cases} qU_0(c_0^*, c_1^*) = U_1(c_0^*, c_1^*) & \text{(optimality condition)} \\ c_0^* + pc_1^* = w & \text{(budget constraint)} \end{cases}$$

## The household problem: interpretation

► At the optimum: the IMRS is equal to the relative price (internal = external valuation)

$$\mathit{IMRS}_{0,1}^* = \mathit{IMRS}_{0,1}(c_0^*, c_1^*) = \frac{U_0(c_0^*, c_1^*)}{U_1(c_0^*, c_1^*)} = \frac{1}{q}$$

- Intuition: at the optimum increasing one euro of consumption tomorrow should be matched by a reduction in 1/q euro of consumption today, ie  $dc_0^* = -qdc_1^*$
- ightharpoonup Therefore q is an **intertemporal relative price**: i.e., an opportunity cost for changing the consumption sequence across time.

# The household problem

#### Example

► The simplest problem

$$v(w) = \max_{c_0, c_1} \{ \ln(c_0) + \beta \ln(c_1) : c_0 + q c_1 = w \}$$

Timing of the decision: beginning of period t = 0

► The Lagrangean is

$$\mathcal{L}(c_0, c_1, \lambda) = \ln(c_0) + \beta \ln(c_1) + \lambda (w - c_0 - q c_1)$$

► The first order conditions

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial L}{\partial c_0} = \frac{1}{c_0} - \lambda = 0 & \Longrightarrow c_0 = \frac{1}{\lambda} \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial c_1} = \frac{\beta}{c_1} - q\lambda = 0 & \Longrightarrow c_1 = \frac{\beta}{\lambda} q \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = c_0^* + qc_1^* = w & \Longrightarrow \frac{1}{\lambda} = \frac{w}{1+\beta} \end{cases}$$

# The household problem

#### Example

▶ The solution is

$$\begin{cases} c_0^* = \frac{w}{1+\beta} > 0 \\ c_1^* = \frac{\beta w}{q(1+\beta)} > 0 \end{cases}$$

- ► Interpretation:
  - 1. although there is only trading at t = 0, consumption is **positive** in every period
  - 2. consumption in every period is a fraction of total wealth
  - 3. consumption dynamics (i.e., change from t=0 to t=1) depends on the ratio  $\frac{\beta}{q}$ : i.e., on the relative internal valuation of time relative to the market price of forward contracts
  - 4. if  $\frac{\beta}{q} = 1$  there is complete **consumption smoothing over time**, i.e.,  $c_0^* = c_1^*$

3. Intertemporal household problem with a sequence of budget constraints

#### Contract environment

- A household receives instead a **sequence** of endowments  $\{y_0, y_1\}$  in positive amounts
- Wants to consume one good over two periods,  $\{c_0, c_1\}$ , today  $c_0$  and in the future  $c_1$ .
- ► There are spot real markets (for the good) opening at every period with price equal to 1
- ▶ There is also a market for **spot financial contracts** opening at every period. In this market the asset (that can be seen as a durable good) can lend and borrowed at period t = 0 paying or receiving an interest income at period t = 1.
- Now, every agent has faces a **sequence of budget constraints** (because trade in the good market can take place also at period t=1)

#### Warning:

- ▶ There at least three different approaches to this problem: more finance-oriented or more macro-oriented
- Next we will follow a macro-oriented approach
- ▶ When dealing with uncertainty we will see a finance-oriented approach
- ▶ Off course, they should give the same solutions

▶ The problem (assuming an additive intertemporal utility)

$$\max_{c_0,c_1,a_1,a_2} U(c_0,c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$
 subject to 
$$c_0 + a_1 = y_0 + a_0, \text{ (budget constraint in period } t = 0)$$
 
$$c_1 = y_1 + (1+r)a_1 - a_2 \text{ (budget constraint in period } t = 1)$$
 
$$c_0 \ge 0, c_1 \ge 0, a_1 \text{free}, a_2 \ge 0 \text{ (other constraints)}$$

where  $a_0$  is the level of the asset at beginning of period 0 and  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  are the levels at the end of period 0 and 1, and r is the real interest rate.

- Assumptions:  $0 < \beta < 1$ , u''(c) < 0 < u'(c) (there is no satiation and  $u(\cdot)$  is concave
- ▶ The initial resource,  $a_0$ , is finite

Meaning of the last constraints:

consumption cannot be negative

$$c_0 \ge 0, c_1 \ge 0$$

- $\triangleright$   $a_1$  free means the consumer can be in one of the three positions
  - ightharpoonup can be a net debtor if  $a_1 < 0$
  - ightharpoonup can be a net creditor if  $a_1 > 0$
  - ▶ neither a debtor nor a creditor  $a_1 = 0$
- ▶ the non-Ponzi game condition: cannot be a debtor at the end of the last period

$$a_2 \ge 0$$

Next, we prove that, it will never be optimal to have  $a_2 > 0$ 

Optimality of  $a_2 = 0$ 

▶ Substitute  $c_0$  and  $c_1$  in the utility function, assume that  $\beta > 0$  and r is finite, and consider the constraint for  $a_2$ 

$$\max_{a_1, a_2} \{ u(y_0 + a_0 - a_1) + \beta u(y_1 + (1+r)a_1 - a_2) : a_2 \ge 0 \}$$

▶ The first order conditions are (for R = 1 + r)

$$u'(c_0) = \beta(1+r)u'(c_1) \iff IMRS_{0,1} = \beta R$$
$$\beta u'(c_1) = \lambda$$
$$\lambda a_2 = 0, \ \lambda \ge 0, \ a_2 \ge 0$$

We have  $a_2 > 0$  if and only if  $\lambda = 0$ , but in this case either there is satiation or  $c_1 \to \infty$  and  $c_0 \to \infty$ . But this is only possible if  $a_0 + y_0 \to \infty$ . Therefore we should have  $a_2 = 0$  and  $\lambda > 0$ .

The consumer problem in a frictionless case

▶ Taking  $a_2 = 0$  and assuming  $a_1$  is free (i.e., the consumer can borrow or lend freely) we can eliminate  $a_1$  in the sequence of budget constraints, to get

$$c_0 + mc_1 = a_0 + y_0 + my_1$$

where m is the market discount factor

$$m \equiv \frac{1}{1+r} \equiv \frac{1}{R}$$

Relationship between the two environments

- ▶ This implies that if  $w = a_0 + y_0 + m y_1$  and the non-Ponzi game condition holds, such that the consumer chooses optimally the last time financial wealth  $a_2 = 0$
- ▶ if there are no constraints on  $a_1$  then sequence of budget constraints is equivalent to an intertemporal budget constraint formally similar to the first problem

$$c_0 + mc_1 = a_0 + y_0 + my_1 \iff c_0 + qc_1 = w$$

▶ if  $m = \frac{1}{R} = q$  the stochastic discount factor is the relative price for forward contracts and  $w = a_0 + y_0 + my_1$  financial plus "human wealth"

Question

- ▶ Remember the last slide
- ▶ What are the consequences of the existence of a friction taking the form of a constraint in  $a_1$ ? For instance: there is a window of financing such that  $a_1 \ge -\ell(a_0 + y_0)$  where  $\ell$  is a limit to borrowing?
  - would the problem in the two environments be equivalent?
  - would the arbitrage condition

$$IMRS_{01} = \beta R$$

still hold?