

Foundations of Financial Economics

Two DSGE: introduction

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Topics

Two period General equilibrium pricing of intertemporal contracts:
setting up a model

- ▶ Economic environment: information tree, real part of the economy
- ▶ Market environment: available contracts
- ▶ Models: Arrow-Debreu economy and Finance (or Radner) economy

Environments and general equilibrium

Common assumptions: regarding the **economic environment**

1. the time-information structure;
2. the real part of the economy, in particular regarding intertemporal preferences.

Different assumptions regarding the **market environment**

1. simultaneous markets' opening;
2. sequential markets' opening;

Lead to **different definitions of GE** (general equilibrium)
(that may be **equivalent or not**)


The time-information tree

This refers

- ▶ to the moments in which markets open
- ▶ to the timing of the decisions

In discrete time we have to distinguish between

- ▶ time: the timing for stocks and prices of stocks
- ▶ periods: the timing for flows and prices of flows



The time-information tree: cont

We assume:

- ▶ $t \in \mathbb{T} = \{0, 1\}$
- ▶ information changes along time, from the perspective of $t = 0$.

Most variables are 2-period random sequences

$$X = \{X_0, X_1\}$$

are determined on the basis of the information known at time $t = 0$:


- ▶ at the end of period $t = 0$, they are observed

$$X_0 = x_0$$

- ▶ at the end of period $t = 1$, they are contingent on the information available at the end of period $t = 0$

$$X_1(\omega), \omega \in (\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$$

The time-information tree



Economic environment

The time-information tree

- If Ω is discrete, at $t = 1$ we have

$$X_1 = (x_{1,1}, \dots, x_{1,s}, \dots, x_{1,N})^\top$$

- and the sequences of outcomes and probabilities are


$$\begin{array}{c} x_{0,1} \\ | \\ \hline 0 \qquad \qquad \qquad 1 \end{array} \quad \left(\begin{array}{c} x_{1,1} \\ \dots \\ x_{1,s} \\ \dots \\ x_{1,N} \end{array} \right), \quad \left(\begin{array}{c} \pi_1 \\ \dots \\ \pi_s \\ \dots \\ \pi_N \end{array} \right)$$

Timing of contracts

We distinguish:

- ▶ **spot** contracts: contract, delivery and payment done in the same period

contract, payment and delivery



- ▶ **intertemporal or forward** contracts: contract and payment in one period, delivery in a future period

contract and payment delivery



They differ along two dimensions:

- ▶ the **timing** (which may be relevant if there is , v.g., impatience, depreciation)
- ▶ the **information** set associated to the several actions (and prices) involved



The real part of the economy

Refers to:

- ▶ the way resources are obtained, or the **technology** in the economy:
 - ▶ **exchange** economies: the availability of the resources is independent of decisions throughout time,
 - ▶ **production** economies: availability of resources is dependent on decisions in previous periods
- ▶ the structure of **preferences**: in this case preferences over 2-period random sequences
- ▶ agents **distribution** : homogenous or heterogenous regarding
 - ▶ endowments or technology
 - ▶ preferences
 - ▶ information

The real part of the economy

Technology

- ▶ The resource for agent i of the economy is a process $Y^i = Y^i = \{y_0^i, Y_1^i\}$ where $y_{t,s}^i$ is the endowment of agent i at time t for the state of nature s ;

$$\begin{array}{c} y_0^i \\ | \\ 0 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{-----} \\ | \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \left(\begin{array}{c} y_{1,1}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,s}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right) \\ | \\ 1 \end{array}$$

- ▶ in an **exchange economy**

$$Y_1^i \text{ independent of } Y_0^i$$

- ▶ in a **production economy**

$$Y_1^i = Y_1^i(y_0^i) \text{ dependent on } y_0^i$$

The real part of the economy

Preferences

- The consumption $C^i = \{c_0^i, C_1^i\}$ is the consumption flow for agent i

$$\begin{array}{c} c_0^i \\ | \\ 0 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{---} \\ | \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \left(\begin{array}{c} c_{1,1}^i \\ \vdots \\ c_{1,s}^i \\ \vdots \\ c_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right) \\ | \\ 1 \end{array}$$

- is evaluated by an intertemporal utility functional

$$U^i(C^i) = U^i(c_0^i, C_1^i)$$

The real part of the economy

Benchmark preferences

- ▶ The most common utility functional is the **discounted time-additive von-Neuman Morgenstern** functional

$$U(C^i) = u^i(c_0^i) + \beta^i \mathbb{E}^i[u^i(C_1^i)] = u^i(c_0^i) + \beta^i \sum_{s=1}^N \pi_s^i u^i(c_{1,s}^i)$$

where $0 \leq \pi_s \leq 1$ and $\sum_{s=1}^N \pi_s^i = 1$;

- ▶ or, equivalently

$$U(C^i) = \mathbb{E}_0^i \left[\sum_{t=0}^{t=1} (\beta^i)^t u^i(c_{t,s}^i) \right]$$

- ▶ Observations

- ▶ the utility functional $U(\cdot)$ is doubly additive: **linear** as regards **both** time and the states of nature;
- ▶ probabilities may be objective or subjective
- ▶ particular relationship between the intertemporal and the risk aversion properties

The real part of the economy

Benchmark preferences

- ▶ Write is as $U(c_0, C_1) = u(c_0) + \beta \sum_s \pi_s u(c_{1,s})$
- ▶ The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is a random variable

$$IMRS_{0,1_s} = \frac{\partial_{c_0} U}{\partial_{c_{1,s}} U} = \frac{u'(c_0)}{\beta \pi_s u'(c_{1,s})},$$

- ▶ The Hicks-Allen elasticities are

$$\varepsilon_{0,0} = -\frac{u''(c_0)}{u'(c_0)} c_0, \quad \varepsilon_{1_s,1_s} = -\frac{u''(c_{1,s})}{u'(c_{1,s})} c_{1,s}, \quad s = 1, \dots, N$$

- ▶ The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is also a random variable

$$IES_{0,1}(s) = \frac{c_0 u'(c_0) + \beta \pi_s u'(c_{1,s})}{\beta \pi_s u'(c_{1,s}) c_{1,s} \varepsilon_{0,0} + c_0 u'(c_0) \varepsilon_{1_s,1_s}}$$

(because of the separability between c_0 and C_1)

The real part of the economy

Benchmark preferences

- If we assume that CRRA

$$CRRA = -\frac{u''(c_{1,s})}{u'(c_{1,s})} c_{1,s}$$

is constant and equal to $\varrho > 0$, then

$$\varrho = \varepsilon_{0,0} = \varepsilon_{1_s,1_s}, \text{ for every } s = 1, \dots, N$$

- Then

$$IES_{0,1}(s) = \frac{c_0 u'(c_0) + \beta \pi_s u'(c_{1,s})}{\beta \pi_s u'(c_{1,s}) c_{1,s} \varrho + c_0 u'(c_0) \varrho} = \frac{1}{\varrho}$$

the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is state independent and is equal to the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion

- This means that the intertemporal and the stochastic properties of preferences cannot be distinguished.

The real part of the economy

Epstein-Zin preferences

- ▶ In order to distinguish between the intertemporal preferences and the risk aversion a utility function which is becoming in macroeconomics is the Epstein-Zin utility functional (usually applied to infinite horizon models)
- ▶ A two period version of the model can be the following
- ▶ Let $U(c_0, C_1)$ be the intertemporal and $V(c_0, C_1) = u^{-1}(U(c_0, C_1))$ for

$$v(c_0, C_1) = (1 - \beta)u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1^c)$$

where c_1^c is the certainty equivalent of consumption at period $t = 1$:

- ▶ intertemporal preferences are represented by $u(c)$, which is increasing and concave $u''(c) < 0 < u'(c)$
- ▶ choice over uncertainty is represented by

$$v(c_1^c) = \mathbb{E}[v(C_1)]$$

is a utility function displaying risk aversion

The real part of the economy

Epstein-Zin preferences

- Therefore

$$v(c_0, C_1) = (1 - \beta)u(c_0) + \beta u\left(v^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}[v(C_1)]\right)\right)$$

- A popular version of the model assumes:
 - A generalized logarithm utility (also called iso-elastic)

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\zeta} - 1}{1 - \zeta}$$

- A CRRA function

$$v(c) = \frac{c^{1-\varrho} - 1}{1 - \varrho}$$

- It can be proved that, if $\zeta = \varrho$ this model reduces to the benchmark case (prove this)

The real part of the economy

Distribution

- ▶ The **idiosyncratic** components defining a consumer are:
 - ▶ endowments (Y^i)
 - ▶ preferences (β^i, u^i)
 - ▶ information \mathbb{P}^i (only make sense with subjective probabilities)
- ▶ Agents may be homogeneous or heterogeneous regarding one or all of the previous variables and parameters

in a **homogeneous**, or representative agent economy:
endowments, preferences and information are equal, i.e,
 $Y^1 = Y^I = Y$, etc

in a **heterogeneous** economy: agents can differ in one of the three dimensions: endowments ($Y^i \neq Y^j$), preferences ($\beta^i \neq \beta^j$ or $u^i(.) \neq u^j(.)$), or information ($\mathbb{P}^i \neq \mathbb{P}^j$)


The market setting

Autarky versus trade economies

The economies are distinguished by the exchanges that agents can make.

- In **autarky** we will have

$$c_{t,s}^i = y_{t,s}^i, \quad t = 0, 1, \quad s = 1, \dots, N$$

$$c_0^i = y_0^i \quad \left(\begin{array}{c} c_{1,1}^i \\ \dots \\ c_{1,s}^i \\ \dots \\ c_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right) = \left(\begin{array}{c} y_{1,1}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,s}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right)$$


The market setting

Autarky versus trade economies

- If there are **markets for intertemporal transfers of contingent goods**, agents can trade and be able to make

$$c_{t,s}^i \neq y_{t,s}^i, \quad t = 0, 1, \quad s = 1, \dots, N$$

by shifting resources across **time** and **states of nature**.

$$\begin{array}{c} c_0^i \neq y_0^i \\ \hline \begin{array}{ccc} \left(\begin{array}{c} c_{1,1}^i \\ \dots \\ c_{1,s}^i \\ \dots \\ c_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right) & \neq & \left(\begin{array}{c} y_{1,1}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,s}^i \\ \dots \\ y_{1,N}^i \end{array} \right) \end{array} \\ \hline \begin{array}{cc} | & | \\ 0 & 1 \end{array} \end{array}$$

The market setting

Real versus financial markets

We distinguish further:

- ▶ **real markets:** market for goods, which can be spot or forward
- ▶ **financial market:** market on financial instruments, which are always forward

Types of markets and GE

We consider next two economies which are distinguished by the type of intertemporal contracts available:

- ▶ **Arrow Debreu economies:** there are AD contingent goods \Rightarrow there is **simultaneous market equilibrium**
- ▶ **finance economies:** Radner economies in which financial assets are traded \Rightarrow there is **sequential market equilibrium**

They can be **equivalent under some conditions**, i.e., have the same equilibrium allocations