

SOLUTION OF EXERCISESHEET 4

Exercise 4-1

Let adversary \mathcal{A} can choose x_1 and x_2 . Then corresponding keyed functions

$$\begin{aligned} F_k(x_1) &:= G_n(k) \oplus x_1 \\ F_k(x_2) &:= G_n(k) \oplus x_2 \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{A} can compute $F_k(x_1) \oplus F_k(x_2) = (G_n(k) \oplus x_1) \oplus (G_n(k) \oplus x_2) = x_1 \oplus x_2$

Hence this will not be a PRF as adversary can easily distinguish from a uniformly selected function f by checking

$$(F_k(x_1) \oplus F_k(x_2)) \oplus x_1 \Rightarrow (x_1 \oplus x_2) \oplus x_1 = x_2$$

or

$$(F_k(x_1) \oplus F_k(x_2)) \oplus x_2 \Rightarrow (x_1 \oplus x_2) \oplus x_2 = x_1$$

Exercise 4-2

(a) $F'_k(x) = F_k(x \oplus 1^n)$

Assume $F'_k(x)$ is not a secure PRF and an adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish $F'_k(x)$ and a random function $f(x)$.

We construct \mathcal{B} , an adversary for $F_k(x)$ that runs \mathcal{A} as a subroutine.

\mathcal{B} queries \mathcal{A} with $x \oplus 1^n$ and outputs what \mathcal{A} outputs.

\mathcal{B} is an efficient adversary to $F_k(x)$.

But $F_k(x)$ is secure and \mathcal{B} can't exist.

$\Rightarrow F'_k(x)$ is a secure PRF

(b) $F'_k(x) = F_k(x) \parallel F_k(x \oplus 1^n)$

$\Rightarrow F'_k(x)$ is not a secure PRF.

Adversary \mathcal{A} can make two queries $x_1 = 000$, $x_2 = 111$

$$F'_k(x_1) = F_k(000) \parallel F_k(111) = F_k(x_1) \parallel F_k(x_2)$$

$$F'_k(x_2) = F_k(111) \parallel F_k(000) = F_k(x_2) \parallel F_k(x_1)$$

The left and right halves of the results correspond to each other and vice versa and produce not uniformly random results.

The adversary can therefore distinguish $F'_k(x)$ from a true random function.

(c) $F'_k(x_1 \parallel x_2) = F_k(x_1) \parallel F_k(x_2)$

$\Rightarrow F'_k(x)$ is not a secure PRF.

Adversary \mathcal{A} can make the query $x_1 = 00$

$$F'_k(x_1) = F_k(0) \parallel F_k(0)$$

The left and right halves of the results correspond to each other and vice versa and produce not uniformly random results.

The adversary can therefore distinguish $F'_k(x)$ from a true random function.

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(d) $F'_k(x) = F_k(0||x) || F_k(1||x)$

Constructing a distinguisher \mathcal{D} for F_k from a distinguisher \mathcal{D}' for F'_k . \mathcal{D} runs \mathcal{D}' . When \mathcal{D}' asks to call its oracle on a string x , \mathcal{D} calls its oracle on the strings $0||x$ and $1||x$, concatenates the answers, and gives the resulting string to \mathcal{D}' as its answer. Finally \mathcal{D} outputs what \mathcal{D}' outputs.

It is clear that

- \mathcal{D} runs in poly time if \mathcal{D}' does;
- if \mathcal{D}' 's oracle implements F_k , its success probability is the same as that of \mathcal{D}' when its oracle implements F'_k ; and
- if \mathcal{D}' 's oracle implements a random function, its success probability is the same as that of \mathcal{D}' when its oracle does likewise.

(e) $F'_k(x) = \text{truncate last } m \text{ bits of } F_k(x), m < |F_k(x)|$

$F'_k(x)$ has the form $\{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \Rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n-m}, |x| = n$

Assume $F'_k(x)$ is not a secure PRF and an adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish $F'_k(x)$ and a random function $f(x) \in \{0, 1\}^{n-m}$.

We construct \mathcal{B} , an adversary for $F_k(x)$ that runs \mathcal{A} as a subroutine.

\mathcal{B} queries \mathcal{A} with x and outputs the result truncated by the last m bits.

\mathcal{B} is an efficient adversary to $F_k(x)$ but shortened by m bits.

Since the results of $F_k(x)$ are uniformly distributed, a shortened result of $F_k(x)$ is uniformly distributed as well.

Therefore \mathcal{B} can't exist.

$\Rightarrow F'_k(x)$ is a secure PRF

Exercise 4-3

Task: Prove that indistinguishability of multiple encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper does not imply indistinguishability of encryptions under a chosen plaintext attack.

We show this by a proof by contradiction. Let's assume that an arbitrary encryption scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ exists, that is EAV-Mult secure.

$\Pi' = (Gen', Enc', Dec')$ is constructed as follows:

$Gen' = Gen$

$Enc'(k, m) :$

$c \leftarrow \overline{Enc(k, m)}$

if $m = r : (r \text{ is chosen uniformly at random, but is fixed for all encryptions})$

return r, k, c

else :

return $r, 0, c$

$Dec'(k, c) :$

$\text{parse}(\perp, \perp, c)$

$m \leftarrow Dec(k, c)$

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return

Proof, that Π' remains EAV-mult secure:

Proof by contradiction: We assume there is an adversary \mathcal{A} who can break Π' . We then construct an adversary \mathcal{B} against Π as follows: The adversary \mathcal{B} has access to the encryption function Enc . To use the adversary \mathcal{A} against the security of Π' , \mathcal{B} has to provide the interface for \mathcal{A} . He does this by simulating the encryption for \mathcal{A} (Here an encryption oracle isn't required from \mathcal{A}).

\mathcal{A} outputs two message vector $(m_0^1, m_0^2, \dots, m_0^t)$ and $(m_1^1, m_1^2, \dots, m_1^t)$ with $|m_0^i| = |m_1^i| \forall i$. The adversary \mathcal{B} then samples a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and invokes his own encryption function $Enc(k, m)$ to

compute $tup^i = \begin{cases} (r, k, Enc(k, m_b^i)) & , \text{if } m_b^i = r \\ (r, 0, Enc(k, m_b^i)) & , \text{else} \end{cases}$

Then he forwards $(tup^1, tup^2, \dots, tup^t)$ to \mathcal{A} . Eventually \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' . The adversary \mathcal{B} outputs the same bit b' .

We see, \mathcal{B} is efficient, if \mathcal{A} is.

To analyse the success, look at the two cases for tup^i . In the first case the key will be returned and so the scheme can be broken, but the probability for this is: $Pr[PrivK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi'}^{mult}(\lambda) = 1] = \frac{t}{2^{|m^i|}}$. In second case the probability $Pr[PrivK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi'}^{mult}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + negl(\lambda)$, because the information of the value of r doesn't help to break the scheme.

But \mathcal{A} can break Π' nevertheless. So $Pr[PrivK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi'}^{mult}(\lambda) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + negl(\lambda)$. If the addition from r and k to the encoding $Enc(k, m)$ is not the reason for the non-negligible probability, it has to be the encoding itself.

But we know, that Π is EAV-Mult so $Enc(k, m)$ cannot have the probability $Pr[PrivK_{\mathcal{B}, \Pi}^{mult}(\lambda) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + negl(\lambda)$. So the adversary \mathcal{A} cannot exist. And therefore holds: Π' remains EAV-mult secure.

Describe a successful adversary against the CPA security of Π' :

For the first call to the encryption oracle, the adversary can choose the message randomly. It is very unlikely that he guesses the message so that $m = r$. In this case, he would learn k immediately. If the adversary doesn't guess the correct message he learns r . With this information he can choose the next message correct with $m = r$ and then learn k .

Because he knows all about the encryption except k yet, he now knows the complete encryption scheme and can distinguish for any two messages sent to the challenger, from which message he receives the ciphertext. So the adversary can win the game with a probability of 1 which is greater than a negligible function.