

SOLUTION OF EXERCISESHEET 6

Exercise 6-1

(a)




Figure 1: Decryption for CBC* mode

(b) As shown in the above figure, let us assume

$$d_i = \text{Dec}(c_i)$$

So

$$\begin{aligned} m_1 &= d_1 \oplus IV \\ m_2 &= d_2 \oplus d_1 \dots \end{aligned}$$

To show that this CBC* doesn't have indistinguishable encryptions, let us consider message in the format $m = m_1 || m_2 || m_3 || \dots || m_n$. Also we know for CPA, adversary A is allowed of multiple encryptions.

Let us consider A choose two messages i.e., m_1 and m_2

$$\begin{aligned} m_1 &= m_{1_1} || m_{1_2} || m_{1_3} || \dots || m_{1_n} \\ m_2 &= m_{2_1} || m_{2_2} || m_{2_3} || \dots || m_{2_n} \end{aligned}$$

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And m_1 is chosen in such a way that $m_{1_1} = m_{1_2} = m_{1_3} = \dots = m_{1_n}$ and m_2 is chosen in such a way that $m_{2_1} \neq m_{2_2} \neq m_{2_3} \neq \dots \neq m_{2_n}$

With these kind of messages chosen, A can distinguish m_1 and m_2 by checking

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= c_3 = \dots = c_i \\ c_2 &= c_4 = \dots = c_{i+1} \\ \text{where } i &\text{ is an odd number } \leq n \end{aligned}$$

If the above check is satisfied then the cipher c corresponds to m_1 . Else it corresponds to m_2 . With this construction A can distinguish between the messages with a probability equal to 1.

Exercise 6-2

Task: Show that Π_{CBC} is not CCA-secure by demonstrating a successful adversary.

Assume $n = 3$

The adversary \mathcal{A} can choose the two messages $m_0 = m_0^1 || m_0^2 = 000\ 000$ and $m_1 = m_1^1 || m_1^2 = 111\ 111$ which he sends to the challenger. Then he gets the ciphertext $c_b = (c_b^0 || c_b^1 || c_b^2) = (IV || f_k(IV \oplus m_b^1) || f_k(f_k(IV \oplus m_b^1) \oplus m_b^2))$ back.

Then \mathcal{A} flips the last bit from c_b^2 , so $(c_b^2)' = c_b^2 \oplus 001$ and asks the decryption oracle for the decryption of $c'_b = c_b^0 || c_b^1 || (c_b^2)'$. Because $c'_b \neq c_b$ the decryption oracle answers with $m' = f_k^{-1}(c_b^1) \oplus c_b^0 || f_k^{-1}(c_b^2) \oplus c_b^1 = f_k^{-1}(f_k(IV \oplus m_b^1)) \oplus IV || f_k^{-1}((c_b^2)') \oplus f_k(IV \oplus m_b^1) = m_b^1 || f_k^{-1}((c_b^2)') \oplus f_k(IV \oplus m_b^1)$. m_b^1 is now either m_0^1 or m_1^1 because the change in $(c_b^2)'$ doesn't impact m_b^1 . So the adversary can say for sure, if the received ciphertext c_b is the encoding for m_0 or m_1 .

$\Rightarrow \Pi_{CBC}$ mode is not CCA-secure

Exercise 6-3