A. Introduction:

I chose "dc030778938b8b6f98236a709d0d18734c325accf44b12a55ecc2d56b8bb9000" from dasmalwerk.eu.

Environment set up: Window10 X64 VM


Tools: Wireshark, strings, dependency walker, ollydbg, ida,...

Procedure: I'd do Basic Static Analysis, then Advanced Static Analysis, Basic Dynamic Analysis then Advanced Dynamic Analysis.


B. Analysis:

Basic Static Analysis:

Checking Peid, we can see that it is not packed



Using strings on the exe, I found some interesting string



It also listing many popular internet browser like Chrome, Moz and Mail, outlook, thunderbird, even services like SMTP, NNTP, HTTP, POP3 with repeatedly include "password" and "username"

```
PopServer
PopPort
PopAccount
PopPassword
_mtpServer
mtpPort
_mtpAccount
_mtpPassword
SMTP Email Address
SMTP Server
POP3 Server
POP3 User Name
SMTP User Name
NNTP Email Address
NNTP User Name
NNTP Server
IMAP Server
IMAP User Name
Email
HTTP User
HTTP Server URL
POP3 User
IMAP User
HTTPMail User Name
HTTPMail Server
SMTP User
POP3 Port
SMTP Port
IMAP Port
```

Checking dependency walker, we can find some net indicator imports.

PI	Ordinal	^	Hint	Functio	on		Entry Point	
C	N/A	1	21 (0x0079)	Interne	tCrackUrIA		Not Bound	
C	N/A	1	23 (0x007B)	Interne	tCreateUrIA		Not Bound	
PI	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function		Entry Point			^
C	N/A	33 (0x0021)	WSAStartup		Not Bound			
C	N/A	38 (0x0026)	closesocket		Not Bound			
C	N/A	39 (0x0027)	connect		Not Bound			
C	N/A	42 (0x002A)	gethostbyname		Not Bound			
C	N/A	54 (0x0036)	inet_addr		Not Bound			
C	N/A	62 (0x003E)	recv		Not Bound			
C	N/A	67 (0x0043)	select		Not Bound			v
-			1					
E	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function		Entry Point			^
C 3		37 (0x0025)			ws2_32.accept			
C 3	2 (0x0002)	38 (0x0026)	bind		ws2_32.bind			
100		39 (0x0027)	closesocket		ws2_32.closesocket			
TC à					ws2_32.connect			
C 3		46 (0x002E)	getpeername		ws2_32.getpeername			
C 3			getsockname		ws2_32.getsockname			
C	7 (0x0007)	52 (0x0034)	aetsockont		0x00001D80	I		~

```
4 | rL: WFCFSN { 1192
                             In peview, I found 3 urls in the .data section:
c\n4qiygu.http:/
/reninparwil.com
                             leftthenhispar.ru
/zapoy/gate.php.
                             reninparwill.com
http://leftthenh
ispar.ru/zapoy/g
                             reptertinrom.ru
ate.php.http://r
eptertinrom.ru/z
apoy/gate.php..Y
UIPWDFILE0YUIPKD
FILEOYUICRYPTED0
YUI1.0......MOD
```

I also found it might be changing and creating Registrykey

100	PI	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function	Entry Point	
	C	N/A	455 (0x01C7)	RegEnumValueA	Not Bound	
	C	N/A	462 (0x01CE)	RegOpenCurrentUser	Not Bound	
	C	N/A	463 (0x01CF)	RegOpenKeyA	Not Bound	- 1
	C	N/A	464 (0x01D0)	RegOpenKeyExA	Not Bound	
	C	N/A	474 (0x01DA)	RegQueryValueExA	Not Bound	- 1
	C	N/A	487 (0x01E7)	RegSetValueExA	Not Bound	
	<					>

From the basic analysis, I suspect this might taking password and username of the computer and send it to the connected url. It might be program to start at power on cause of the registry changing.

Advanced Static Analysis:

Open IDA, I can't seem to find the main function of the program. I found the string that we found from strings:

```
* .data:18018498 ; char aLoginData[]
.data:18018498 aLoginData db 'Login Data',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_180891D2+1Bfo
.data:18018498 ; char aLogins[]
.data:18018498 aLogins db 'logins',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_18089802C+36fo

* .data:18018492 ; char aOrigin_url[]]
.data:18018492 aOrigin_url db 'origin_url',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_18088D9E:loc_18088E81fo

* .data:180184AD ; char aPassword_value[]
.data:180184AD aPassword_value db 'password_value',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_18088D9E:loc_18088E1Bfo

* .data:180184BC aUsername_value db 'username_value',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_18088D9E:loc_18088E35fo

* .data:180184CB ; char aFtp_1[]
```

And

```
; CODE XREF: <mark>sub_10008D9E</mark>+5C<sup>†</sup>j
offset aOrigin_url ; "origin_url"
01 loc_10008E01:
91
                     push
                     push
                               [ebp+lpString] ; lpString1
99
                     .
call
                               İstrompiA
                                                                          ı
                     and
                               eax, eax
10
                               short loc_10008E1B
                      inz
                               [ebp+arg 4]
                     push
12
                               dword_10012D3C
15
                     pop
18
                                                 ; CODE XREF: sub_10008D9E+72†i
1B loc_10008E1B:
                              offset aPassword_value ; "password_value"
                     push
1B
                               [ebp+lpString] ; lpString1
20
                      push
23
                     call
                               1strcmpiA
28
                     and
                               eax, eax
2A
                      jnz
                               short loc 10008E35
2C
                     push
                               [ebp+arg_4]
2F
                               dword_10012D40
                     pop
35 loc_10008E35:
                                                 ; CODE XREF: sub_10008D9E+8Cfj
35
                     push
                              offset aUsername_value ; "username_value"
3A
                     push
                               [ebp+lpString] ; lpString1
3D
                     call
                               IstrompiA
42
                              eax, eax
short loc_10008E4F
                     and
44
                     inz
                               [ebp+arg_{4}]
                     push
46
                               dword_10012D44
49
50
                     pop
```

It seems like these are the steps to obtain username and password. I suspect the info is stored in ebp+arg 4.

BASIC DYNAMIC ANALYSIS:

Using Process Explorer I found a weird rundll32.exe



It also writes winrar in the registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\WinRAR with value: "7B32334637354239432D444131362D343638372D414544432D3338333043353642304238457D" but I don't think it is very relevant.

Later on when I search for the hash of the malware on virusTotal and Any.run, it seems that this is a typical Pony virus action.

Time	Domain Requested reninparwill.com
12:18:45	reninparwill.com

I also spotted a dns request to reinparwill.com.

ADVANCED DYNAMIC ANALYSIS:

Since this is a suspected username and password stealing malware, I can't really interact with them through the debugger, but I do find out a file that it might be interacting with

C:\ProgramData\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP\sm.dat

```
| NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP | NUP
```

The program trying to gain privileged with push-ret

Another suspect is that it might be looking for passwords that is used by the user on the software of the machine by brute force.



C. Challenges:

This project is very challenging to me as the normal malware design is much harder to be analyzed. I can't find the main function and can't really interact with the dynamic tools much.

D. Summary:

To summarize my finding, I'd say that this malware is a information stealing malware, when infected, it will try to gain privileged and start stealing password information and send it to the hardcoded url. I'm not sure how it will send the data, one by one or in packet.

This malware is very dangerous as it targeted a big number of software and services like https, thunderbird, firefox, chromes and even facebook. The risk of information lost is very high, and it can even be used for illegal activity or identity theft.

A way to remove this malware is simply just to disable the suspected malware executable through task manager or Diskcleanup in Windows. You can use Safe Mode reboot to eliminate the malware also.