Pragmatics: Meaning and Doing

Introduction to Linguistics, Fall 2015

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(1) **The Cooperative Principle** (Grice 1975, paraphrased): Make your contribution as is required, when it is required, for the purposes of the conversation in which you are engaged.

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- We can assume that our interlocutors are not speaking at random
- We can assume that our interlocutors are contributing with the aim of achieving some desired outcome of conversation (transfer of information, social nicety, etc)
- When the face (semantic) value of their contribution fails to measure up to these assumptions, we can reason about what they mean, rather than what they have said

The Gricean Maxims

(2) Quality:

- Do not say false things.
- Do not say things for which you lack evidence.

(3) Quantity:

- Make your contribution as informative as is required
- Do not say more than is required
- (4) Relation/Relevance: Make your contribution relevant
- (5) Manner:
 - Avoid obscurity
 - Avoid ambiguity
 - Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
 - ▶ Be orderly

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(6) S: I think I'm going to win the Boston marathon this year!H: Yup, and I'm the King of England.



Presupposition

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(7) P: Have you stopped beating your wife?

D: No!

P: So you're still beating her?

D: I never was!

(8) S: Did Jordan fail algebra again?H: What do you mean? She only took it this year.

(9) " 'That woman who knew I had dyslexia-I never interviewed her.' "

(New York Times, September 16, 2000 – George W. Bush speaking of Gail Sheely)



Accommodation

- (10) S: I need to leave work early today. I'm picking up my sister from the airport.H: Okay!
- (11) S: I need to leave work early today. I'm picking up my hippo from the vet.

H: !?

Presupposed information acts as if all interlocutors are already aware of it. This can be a way of "slipping" information into the background. Sometimes this is easily done (the speaker has a sister), sometimes it makes no sense (!) – and sometimes it can be manipulative (example 7).

Speech acts: doing by saying

In addition to meaning by saying, we can also do. Austin (1956) observes that there is a class of things we can say that do something like report our intentions – but, in so doing, constitute the performance of the intention:

- (12) I promise to come to your party! [a promise]
- (13) I apologize for stepping on your foot. [an apology]
- (14) I (hereby) eat this steak! [not a steak-eating]
- (15) John promises to come to your party. [not a promise]

Felicity conditions

In order to be a speech act, a number of conditions of utterance must be met:

- the speakers needs to have the power to perform the act (legally or otherwise)
- the external conditions need to be appropriate
- it must be an act for which there is an associated convention of doing by saying

Here are some possible speech acts:

a bequest, a christening, a marriage, a request, an accusation, a recommendation

What other acts can you think of? What are their felicity conditions? How can they "go wrong"?

Food for thought: Does the speaker *really* need to have the requisite intentions? (if I promise without intention, have I still promised?)

