Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 DoD Cyber Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

North Korea accompanied their cyberattacks with coercion, intimidation, and the threat of terrorism.

Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 National Security Strategy - § 5 references coded [ 0.51% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.21% Coverage

American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and embedding our actions within wider regional strategies.

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

On territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

America’s energy revival is not only good for growth, it offers new buffers against the coercive use of energy by some

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

In many cases, our use of targeted sanctions and other coercive measures are meant not only to uphold international norms, but to deter severe threats to stability and order at the regional level.

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary

Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 White House Report on Cyber Deterrence Policy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.18% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

In response to North Korea’s destructive and coercive cyber attack in November 2014 – which was intended to harm a U.S. business and suppress free speech – the Administration announced new sanctions on certain North Korean actors.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2017 National Security Strategy - § 4 references coded [ 0.24% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

As a growing supplier of energy resources, technologies, and services around the world, the United States will help our allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce.

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

We will not allow adversaries to use threats of nuclear escalation or other irresponsible nuclear behaviors to coerce the United States, our allies, and our partners.

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

Economic tools—including sanctions, anti-money-laundering and anti-corruption measures, and enforcement actions—can be important parts of broader strategies to deter, coerce, and constrain adversaries.

Reference 4 - 0.07% Coverage

We will maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, including our commitments under the   
47   
Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Defense Strategy Summary - § 7 references coded [ 1.90% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.23% Coverage

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.

Reference 2 - 0.28% Coverage

In the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion.

Reference 3 - 0.37% Coverage

North Korea seeks to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage by seeking a mixture of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Reference 4 - 0.28% Coverage

They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense;

Reference 6 - 0.36% Coverage

Counter coercion and subversion. In competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.

Reference 7 - 0.19% Coverage

We will support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure our interests and counteract this coercion.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Defense Strategy - § 19 references coded [ 1.39% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

I have reached this conclusion based on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the IndoPacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military preparations.1

Reference 3 - 0.09% Coverage

Day after day, the Department will strengthen deterrence and gain advantage against competitors’ most consequential coercive measures by campaigning – the conduct and sequencing of logicallylinked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time.

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power to counter forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners.

Reference 5 - 0.13% Coverage

Now and over the next two decades, we face strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military   
capabilities; emerging   
technologies; competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the U.S. homeland and to strategic stability; an escalation of competitors’ coercive and malign activities in the “gray zone”; and transboundary challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the defense enterprise.

Reference 6 - 0.06% Coverage

These developments and the threats they present are interconnected – in part because our competitors deliberately link them to erode deterrence, exert economic coercion, and endanger the political autonomy of states.

Reference 7 - 0.09% Coverage

Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.

Reference 8 - 0.09% Coverage

The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests.

Reference 9 - 0.10% Coverage

The PRC’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control.

Reference 10 - 0.08% Coverage

Competitors’ Gray Zone Activities. Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government.

Reference 11 - 0.04% Coverage

The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners.

Reference 12 - 0.07% Coverage

Our competitors, particularly the PRC, are pursuing holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundations of a stable and open international system.

Reference 13 - 0.07% Coverage

We will work together with our Allies and partners to modernize denial capabilities, increase interoperability, improve resilience against attack and coercion, share intelligence, and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence.

Reference 14 - 0.07% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will improve our baseline understanding of the operating environment and seek to shape perceptions, including by sowing doubt in our competitors that they can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions.

Reference 15 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response.

Reference 16 - 0.04% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select, acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors.

Reference 17 - 0.04% Coverage

The Department will seek to improve denial capability, including resilience, particularly for those most exposed to military coercion.

Reference 18 - 0.09% Coverage

The Department will also support Ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India.

Reference 19 - 0.07% Coverage

The Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Military Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 1.83% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.15% Coverage

For the first time in our Nation’s history, the United States faces two major nuclear powers that may employ nuclear coercion as a way to meet their national objectives. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia possess the will and the means to pose an existential threat to our way of life.

Reference 2 - 0.68% Coverage

ECONOMIC TRENDS. Growing economic strength drives global influence and undergirds other elements of national power, which will continue to fuel the PRC’s coercive actions.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Security Strategy - § 16 references coded [ 1.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.04% Coverage

Autocrats are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.

Reference 2 - 0.16% Coverage

The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order.

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

The necessity to protect forests globally, electrify the transportation sector, redirect financial flows and create an energy revolution to head off the climate crisis is reinforced by the geopolitical imperative to reduce our collective dependence on states like Russia that seek to weaponize energy for coercion.

Reference 4 - 0.03% Coverage

They leverage access to their markets and control of global digital infrastructure for coercive purposes.

Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage

We have also experienced a global energy crisis driven by Russia’s weaponization of the oil and gas supplies it controls, exacerbated by OPEC’s management of its own supply.

Reference 6 - 0.02% Coverage

And secure, in that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation.

Reference 7 - 0.05% Coverage

In a competitive world, where other powers engage in coercive or unfair practices to gain an edge over the United States and our allies, this takes on a special importance.

Reference 8 - 0.03% Coverage

They strongly disapprove of aggression, coercion, and external interference.

Reference 9 - 0.02% Coverage

Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries.

Reference 10 - 0.06% Coverage

Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity.

Reference 11 - 0.06% Coverage

And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.

Reference 12 - 0.08% Coverage

We also will partner with like-minded nations to co-develop and deploy technologies in a way that benefits all, not only the powerful, and build robust and durable supply chains so that countries cannot use economic warfare to coerce others.

Reference 13 - 0.10% Coverage

Our societies, and the critical infrastructure that supports them, from power to pipelines, is increasingly digital and vulnerable to disruption or destruction via cyber attacks. Such attacks have been used by countries, such as Russia, to undermine countries’ ability to deliver services to citizens and coerce populations.

Reference 14 - 0.07% Coverage

As we work with South Asian regional partners to address climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the PRC’s coercive behavior, we will promote prosperity and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region.

Reference 15 - 0.07% Coverage

America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms.

Reference 16 - 0.08% Coverage

Together, we will support effective democratic governance responsive to citizen needs, defend human rights and combat gender-based violence, tackle corruption, and protect against external interference or coercion, including from the PRC, Russia, or Iran.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 1 reference coded [ 0.24% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

Our adversaries will be made to doubt the efficacy of their military capabilities as well as the belief that they can conduct unattributed coercive actions against the United States.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.14% Coverage

Russia remains a persistent cyber threat as it refines its cyber espionage, attack, influence, and disinformation capabilities to coerce sovereign countries, harbor transnational criminal actors, weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships, and subvert the rules-based international system.

**Annotations**

1 Campaigning as a form of persistence.