Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2010 National Security Strategy - § 11 references coded [ 0.65% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

More broadly, though, we have wrestled with how to advance American interests in a world that has changed—a world in which the international architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weight of new threats, the global economy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses, and the universal aspiration for freedom and dignity contends with new obstacles.

Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage

This strategy recognizes the fundamental connection between our national security, our national competitiveness, resilience, and moral example.

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

That includes our military might, economic competitiveness, moral leadership, global engagement, and efforts to shape an international system that serves the mutual interests of nations and peoples.

Reference 4 - 0.03% Coverage

Yet even as we have maintained our military advantage, our competitiveness has been set back in recent years.

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

We are recovering from underinvestment in the areas that are central to America’s strength. We have not adequately advanced priorities like education, energy, science and technology, and health care—all of which are essential to U.S. competitiveness, long-term prosperity, and strength.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

The Office of Management and Budget, Departments of the Treasury, State, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, United States Trade Representative, Federal Reserve Board, and other institutions help manage our currency, trade, foreign investment, deficit, inflation, productivity, and national competitiveness.

Reference 7 - 0.06% Coverage

Competition among states endures, but instead of a single nuclear adversary, the United States is now threatened by the potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them.

Reference 8 - 0.05% Coverage

The United States has lost ground in education, even as our competitiveness depends on educating our children to succeed in a global economy based on knowledge and innovation.

Reference 9 - 0.04% Coverage

In this new era, opening markets around the globe will promote global competition and innovation and will be crucial to our prosperity.

Reference 10 - 0.05% Coverage

As we go forward, our trade policy will be an important part of our effort to capitalize on the opportunities presented by globalization, but will also be part of our effort to equip Americans to compete.

Reference 11 - 0.06% Coverage

Even though many defining trends of the 21st century affect all nations and peoples, too often, the mutual interests of nations and peoples are ignored in favor of suspicion and self-defeating competition.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace - § 4 references coded [ 0.39% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

The theft of intellectual property threatens national competitiveness and the innovation that drives it~

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

Competition in these markets drives innovation, while a free-trade environment enables manufacturers to keep prices competitive and standards high~

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

Results can range from unfair competition to the bankrupting of entire firms, and the national impact may be orders of magnitude larger~

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

They foster innovation; facilitate interoperability, security, and resiliency; improve trust in online transactions; and spur competition in global markets~

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2017 National Security Strategy - § 76 references coded [ 3.79% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.04% Coverage

Americans have had to compete with adversarial forces to preserve and advance our security, prosperity, and the principles we hold dear.

Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage

A Competitive World The United States will respond to the growing   
political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world.

Reference 3 - 0.03% Coverage

These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades

Reference 4 - 0.03% Coverage

The contest over information accelerates these political, economic, and military competitions.

Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage

Competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict—although none should doubt our commitment to defend our interests.

Reference 6 - 0.06% Coverage

An America that successfully competes is the best way to prevent conﬂ ict. Just as American weakness invites challenge, American strength and confidence deters war and promotes peace.

Reference 7 - 0.03% Coverage

The competitions and rivalries facing the United States are not passing trends or momentary problems.

Reference 8 - 0.05% Coverage

But to maintain these advantages, build upon our strengths, and unleash the talents of the American people, we must protect four vital national interests in this competitive world.

Reference 9 - 0.05% Coverage

The United States must preserve our lead in research and technology and protect our economy from competitors who unfairly acquire our intellectual property.

Reference 10 - 0.03% Coverage

We will compete with all tools of national power to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power.

Reference 11 - 0.03% Coverage

We will compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American interests and principles are protected.

Reference 12 - 0.04% Coverage

We must do so in a way that respects free markets, private competition, and the limited but important role of government in enforcing the rule of law.

Reference 13 - 0.04% Coverage

Today, American prosperity and security are challenged by an economic competition playing out in a broader strategic context.

Reference 14 - 0.05% Coverage

Regulatory and corporate tax policies incentivized businesses to invest overseas and disadvantaged American companies against foreign competitors.

Reference 15 - 0.06% Coverage

Reduced business tax rates and a territorial system for foreign subsidiary earnings will improve the competitiveness of American companies and encourage their return to the United States.

Reference 16 - 0.04% Coverage

These improvements will increase national competitiveness, beneﬁ t the environment, and improve our quality of life.

Reference 17 - 0.04% Coverage

by modernizing our tax system and making our businesses globally competitive, our economy will grow and make the existing debt more serviceable.

Reference 18 - 0.04% Coverage

The United States will expand trade that is fairer so that U.S. workers and industries have more opportunities to compete for business.

Reference 19 - 0.06% Coverage

e United States distinguishes between economic competition with countries that follow fair and free market principles and competition with those that act with little regard for those principles.

Reference 20 - 0.07% Coverage

We will compete with like-minded states in the economic domain—particularly where trade imbalances exist— while recognizing that competition is healthy when nations   
share values and build fair and reciprocal relationships.

Reference 21 - 0.09% Coverage

COUNTER FOREIGN CORRUPTION: Using our economic and diplomatic tools, the United States will continue to target corrupt foreign officials and work with countries to improve their ability to fight corruption so U.S. companies can compete fairly in transparent business climates.

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

promote free market competition

Reference 23 - 0.10% Coverage

To maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth and security , such as data science, encryption, autonomous technologies, gene editing, new materials, nanotechnology, advanced computing technologies, and artificial intelligence.

Reference 24 - 0.07% Coverage

To retain U.S. advantages over our competitors, U.S. Government agencies must improve their understanding of worldwide S&T trends and how they are likely to influence— or undermine—American strategies and programs.

Reference 25 - 0.07% Coverage

Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societies.

Reference 26 - 0.08% Coverage

In addition to these illegal means, some actors use largely legitimate, legal transfers and relationships to gain access to fields, experts, and trusted foundries that fill their capability gaps and erode America’s long-term compet itive advantages.

Reference 27 - 0.03% Coverage

We must defend our National Security Innovation Base (NSIB) against competitors.

Reference 28 - 0.05% Coverage

We will consider restrictions on foreign STEM students from designated countries to ensure that intellectual property is not transferred to our competitors

Reference 29 - 0.04% Coverage

Our Nation must take advantage of our wealth in domestic resources and energy efficiency to promote competitiveness across our industries.

Reference 30 - 0.06% Coverage

We will expand our export capacity through the continued support of private sector development of coastal terminals, allowing increased market access and a greater competitive edge for U.S. industries.

Reference 31 - 0.03% Coverage

A   
central continuity in history is the contest for power. The present time period is no different.

Reference 32 - 0.09% Coverage

Three main sets of chal-   
lengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners.

Reference 33 - 0.07% Coverage

Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals compete across political, economic, and military arenas, and use technology and information to accelerate these contests in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor.

Reference 34 - 0.04% Coverage

These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.

Reference 35 - 0.05% Coverage

Protecting American interests requires that we compete continuously within and across these contests, which are being played out in regions around the world

Reference 36 - 0.04% Coverage

The outcome of these con-   
26   
tests will influence the political, economic, and military strength of the United States and our allies and partners.

Reference 37 - 0.07% Coverage

The United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength, foremost by ensuring our military power is second to none and fully integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power.

Reference 38 - 0.10% Coverage

A strong military ensures that our diplomats are able to operate from a position of strength. In this way we can, together with our allies and partners, deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of managing competitions without violent conﬂ ict and preserving peace.

Reference 39 - 0.01% Coverage

Renew America’s Competitive Advantages

Reference 40 - 0.06% Coverage

The contests over influence are timeless. They have existed in varying degrees and levels of intensity, for millennia. Geopolitics is the interplay of these contests across the globe.

Reference 41 - 0.03% Coverage

But some conditions are new, and have changed how these competitions are unfolding.

Reference 42 - 0.06% Coverage

We believed that liberal-democratic enlargement and inclusion would fundamentally alter the nature of international relations and that competition would give way to peaceful cooperation

Reference 43 - 0.06% Coverage

In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their inﬂ uence regionally and globally.

Reference 44 - 0.04% Coverage

In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.

Reference 45 - 0.05% Coverage

In addition, adversaries and competitors became adept at operating below the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of international law.

Reference 46 - 0.02% Coverage

e United States must prepare for this ty pe of competition

Reference 47 - 0.07% Coverage

China, Russia, and other state and nonstate actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is actually an arena of continuous competition.

Reference 48 - 0.05% Coverage

Our adversaries will not ﬁ ght us on our terms. We will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values.

Reference 49 - 0.04% Coverage

Our diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic agencies have not kept pace with the changes in the character of competition.

Reference 50 - 0.03% Coverage

U.S. military strength remains a vital component of the competition for influence.

Reference 51 - 0.05% Coverage

Where possible, the U.S. Government will work with industry partners to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in key technologies and manufacturing capabilities.

Reference 52 - 0.04% Coverage

The United States will simplify and update regulations for commercial space activity to strengthen competitiveness.

Reference 53 - 0.06% Coverage

e United States will fuse our analysis of information derived from the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains to compete more effectively on the geopolitical stage.

Reference 54 - 0.06% Coverage

Competitive Diplomacy Across the competitive landscape, America’s diplomats are our forward-deployed political capability, advancing and defending America’s interests abroad.

Reference 55 - 0.02% Coverage

Diplomacy sustains dialogue and fosters areas of cooperation with competitors.

Reference 56 - 0.04% Coverage

We must upgrade our diplomat ic capabi l ities to compete in the current environment and to embrace a competitive mindset.

Reference 57 - 0.06% Coverage

Fair and reciprocal trade, investments, and exchanges of knowledge deepen our alliances and partnerships, which are necessary to succeed in today’s competitive geopolitical environment

Reference 58 - 0.06% Coverage

We will strengthen economic ties as a core aspect of our relationships with like-minded states and use our economic expertise, markets, and resources to bolster states threatened by our compet itors .

Reference 59 - 0.05% Coverage

America’s competitors weaponize information to attack the values and institutions that underpin free societies, while shielding themselves from outside information.

Reference 60 - 0.08% Coverage

Risks to U.S. national security will grow as competitors integrate information derived from personal and commercial sources with intelligence collection and data analytic capabilities based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning.

Reference 61 - 0.08% Coverage

PRIORITIZE THE COMPETITION: We will improve our understanding of how adversaries gain informational and psychological advantages across all policies. The United States must empower a true public diplomacy capability to compete eﬀ ectively in this arena.

Reference 62 - 0.06% Coverage

We will craft and direct coherent communications campaigns to advance American inﬂ uence and counter challenges from the ideological threats that emanate from radical Islamist groups and competitor nations.

Reference 63 - 0.02% Coverage

Local voices are most compelling and effective in ideological competitions.

Reference 64 - 0.04% Coverage

This Administration has the confidence to compete to protect our values and interests and the fundamental principles that underpin them.

Reference 65 - 0.06% Coverage

Working with these countries made the United States wealthier and   
more competitive. This progress illustrates how eﬀ ective foreign assistance programs should reach their natural endpoint.

Reference 66 - 0.03% Coverage

Today, the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world.

Reference 67 - 0.04% Coverage

China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand inﬂ uence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.

Reference 68 - 0.02% Coverage

A competition for influence exists in these institutions.

Reference 69 - 0.10% Coverage

Authoritarian actors have long recognized the power of multilateral bodies and have used them to advance their interests and limit the freedom of their own citizens. If the United States cedes leadership of these bodies to adversaries, opportunities to shape developments that are positive for the United States will be lost.

Reference 70 - 0.08% Coverage

We require integrated regional strategies that appreciate the nature and magnitude of threats, the intensity of competitions, and the promise of available opportunities, all in the context of local political, economic, social, and historical realities.

Reference 71 - 0.05% Coverage

The United States must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

Reference 72 - 0.04% Coverage

Strategic competitors often exploit rather than discourage corruption and state weakness to extract resources and exploit their populations.

Reference 73 - 0.04% Coverage

A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Paciﬁ c region

Reference 74 - 0.08% Coverage

The United States remains ﬁ rmly committ ed to our European allies and partners. The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty .

Reference 75 - 0.04% Coverage

The region spans the terrorist threats emanating from the Middle East and the competition for power unfolding in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Reference 76 - 0.06% Coverage

In Venezuela and Cuba, governments cling to anachronistic leftist authoritarian models that continue to fail their people. Competitors have found operat ing space in the hemisphere.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 5 references coded [ 2.85% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.68% Coverage

Competitors deterred from engaging the United States and our allies in an armed conflict are using cyberspace operations to steal our technology, disrupt our government and commerce, challenge our democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.

Reference 3 - 0.48% Coverage

These States have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose longterm strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and partners.

Reference 4 - 0.36% Coverage

The private sector owns and operates the majority of U.S. infrastructure and is on the frontlines of nation-state competition in cyberspace.

Reference 5 - 1.15% Coverage

The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy directs the Department to defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war by building a more lethal force, expanding alliances and partnerships, reforming the Department, and cultivating talent, while actively competing against and deterring our competitors. Taken together, these mutually reinforcing activities will enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Cyber Strategy - § 9 references coded [ 1.39% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

Our competitors and adversaries, however, have taken an opposite approach.

Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage

New threats and a new era of strategic competition demand a new cyber strategy that responds to new realities, reduces vulnerabilities, deters adversaries, and safeguards opportunities for the American people to thrive.

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

The Administration recognizes that the United States is engaged in a continuous competition against strategic adversaries, rogue states, and terrorist and criminal networks.

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

The United States Government will nurture innovation by promoting institutions and programs that drive United States competitiveness.

Reference 5 - 0.22% Coverage

The United States Government will work against the illicit appro-   
review of   
P I L L A R I I : PROM O T E A M E R I C A N PRO S P E R I T Y   
priation of public and private sector technology and technical knowledge by foreign competitors, while maintaining an investor-friendly climate.

Reference 6 - 0.13% Coverage

Our peer competitors are implementing workforce development programs that have the potential to harm long-term United States cybersecurity competitiveness.

Reference 7 - 0.14% Coverage

The Administration will leverage the President’s proposed merit-based immigration reforms to ensure that the United States has the most competitive technology sector.

Reference 8 - 0.29% Coverage

Such investment will provide greater opportunities for American firms to compete while countering the influence of statist, top-down government interventions in areas of strategic competition. It will also protect America’s security and commercial interests by strengthening United States industry’s competitive position in the global digital economy.

Reference 9 - 0.11% Coverage

Our leadership in building partner cybersecurity capacity is critical to maintaining American influence against global competitors.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Defense Strategy Summary - § 23 references coded [ 6.00% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding.

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

This unclassified synopsis of the classified 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates our strategy to compete, deter, and win in this environment.

Reference 5 - 0.29% Coverage

The reemergence of long-term strategic competition, rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this reality.

Reference 6 - 0.32% Coverage

National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations.

Reference 7 - 0.24% Coverage

The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.

Reference 8 - 0.34% Coverage

In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

Reference 9 - 0.11% Coverage

Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power.

Reference 10 - 0.37% Coverage

Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion).

Reference 11 - 0.33% Coverage

The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed.

Reference 12 - 0.39% Coverage

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the   
Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.

Reference 13 - 0.26% Coverage

A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.

Reference 14 - 0.27% Coverage

As we expand the competitive space, we continue to offer competitors and adversaries an outstretched hand, open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national interests.

Reference 15 - 0.32% Coverage

With our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.

Reference 16 - 0.18% Coverage

Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power.

Reference 17 - 0.33% Coverage

Foster a competitive mindset. To succeed in the emerging security environment, our Department and Joint Force will have to out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate revisionist powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and other threat actors.

Reference 18 - 0.21% Coverage

Doing so requires a competitive approach to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field a lethal force.

Reference 19 - 0.36% Coverage

During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably compete to: deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of armed conflict.

Reference 20 - 0.24% Coverage

To address the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions and capabilities, we must invest in modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable budgets.

Reference 21 - 0.30% Coverage

We must anticipate how competitors and adversaries will employ new operational concepts and technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.

Reference 22 - 0.30% Coverage

A modernized Global Operating Model of combat-credible, flexible theater postures will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options.

Reference 23 - 0.17% Coverage

The Global Operating Model describes how the Joint Force will be postured and employed to achieve its competition and wartime missions.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Military Strategy Description - § 8 references coded [ 7.75% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.75% Coverage

Force design innovates to enable the Joint Force to do what it does differently to retain a competitive advantage against any adversary.

Reference 2 - 0.23% Coverage

Reemergence of great-power competition

Reference 3 - 0.48% Coverage

Technology and the changing character of war: diffusion, competition, and new threats

Reference 4 - 0.94% Coverage

These trends, especially those posed by the reemergence of great power   
competition with China and Russia, represent the most difficult challenges facing the Joint Force.

Reference 5 - 1.43% Coverage

In a security environment where the homeland is no longer a sanctuary and every operating domain is contested, competitors and adversaries will continue to operate across geographic regions and span multiple domains to offset or erode Joint Force advantages.

Reference 6 - 1.23% Coverage

To achieve military advantage over competitors and adversaries, the NMS introduces the notion of joint combined arms, defined as the conduct of operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains.

Reference 7 - 1.04% Coverage

Achieving the Joint Chiefs’ vision will require people—the Joint Force’s primary source of competitive advantage—to continuously adapt and innovate to maintain their competitive edge.

Reference 8 - 1.64% Coverage

The 2018 National Military Strategy describes a roadmap for how the Joint Force will defend the homeland and retain its competitive advantage to deter competitors and defeat adversaries, whether great power competitors like China and Russia or other security challenges, now and into the future.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Defense Strategy - § 28 references coded [ 1.94% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

The PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will align policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence—tailored to specific competitors and challenges and coordinated and synchronized inside and outside the Department.

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military preparations.1

Reference 4 - 0.05% Coverage

America has never been afraid of competition, and we do not shy away from tough challenges, especially when it comes to securing our national interests and defending our national values.

Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage

Tailored to specific circumstances, it applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

Day after day, the Department will strengthen deterrence and gain advantage against competitors’ most consequential coercive measures by campaigning – the conduct and sequencing of logicallylinked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time.

Reference 7 - 0.10% Coverage

The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power to counter forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners.

Reference 8 - 0.04% Coverage

We will make our supporting systems more resilient and agile in the face of threats that range from competitors to the effects of climate change.

Reference 9 - 0.08% Coverage

The Department’s priorities support broader whole-of-government efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values, while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges.

Reference 10 - 0.13% Coverage

Now and over the next two decades, we face strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military   
capabilities; emerging   
technologies; competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the U.S. homeland and to strategic stability; an escalation of competitors’ coercive and malign activities in the “gray zone”; and transboundary challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the defense enterprise.

Reference 11 - 0.06% Coverage

These developments and the threats they present are interconnected – in part because our competitors deliberately link them to erode deterrence, exert economic coercion, and endanger the political autonomy of states.

Reference 12 - 0.14% Coverage

Competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by creating anti-access/area-denial environments; developing conventional capabilities to undertake rapid interventions; posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression; and using the cyber and space domains to gain operational, logistical, and information advantages.

Reference 13 - 0.05% Coverage

At the same time, our competitors are building larger and more diverse nuclear arsenals and working to distract and divide the United States and our Allies and partners.

Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage

Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.

Reference 15 - 0.06% Coverage

The proliferation of advanced missiles, uncrewed aircraft systems, and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten U.S. forces, Allies, and partners, in indirect and deniable ways.

Reference 16 - 0.07% Coverage

Our competitors, particularly the PRC, are pursuing holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundations of a stable and open international system.

Reference 17 - 0.11% Coverage

Meeting the challenge requires a holistic response: integrated deterrence. In the past, the Department’s approach to deterrence has too often been hindered by competing priorities; lack of clarity regarding the specific competitor actions we seek to deter; an emphasis on deterring behaviors in instances where Department authorities and tools are ill-suited; and stovepiping.

Reference 18 - 0.07% Coverage

Integrated deterrence is how we will align the Department’s policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence – tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department.

Reference 19 - 0.10% Coverage

Effective deterrence requires the Department to consider how competitors perceive U.S., Ally, and partner stakes, commitment, and combat credibility; their perception of their own ability to control escalation risks; and their view of how the status quo will evolve – in part as a result of U.S., Ally, and partner actions – if they do not use force.

Reference 20 - 0.07% Coverage

Through close collaboration with U.S. Government departments and agencies and with our Allies and partners, we will diversify our posture and broaden the scope of cooperation, adding complexity to competitors’ military planning and execution.

Reference 21 - 0.02% Coverage

The Department must seek to avoid unknowingly driving competition to aggression.

Reference 22 - 0.09% Coverage

We will strengthen strategic stability through dialogue with competitors, unilateral measures that make command, control, and communications more robust, and by developing defenses and architectural   
10 2022 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY   
resilience to maintain operational capabilities in cyberspace and space during conflict.

Reference 23 - 0.07% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will improve our baseline understanding of the operating environment and seek to shape perceptions, including by sowing doubt in our competitors that they can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions.

Reference 24 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response.

Reference 25 - 0.04% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select, acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors.

Reference 26 - 0.06% Coverage

And we will support regional partners’ ability to respond to regional contingencies, provide strategic indicators and warning, and reduce competitors’ ability to hold key geographic and logistical chokepoints at risk.

Reference 27 - 0.04% Coverage

At the same time, the Department will continue to prioritize maintaining open lines of communication with the PLA and managing competition responsibly.

Reference 28 - 0.05% Coverage

Our country has faced and prevailed in multi-year competitions with major powers threatening or using force to subjugate others on more than one occasion in the past.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Military Strategy - § 4 references coded [ 2.82% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.67% Coverage

Large-scale combat has now been introduced into the strategic competition between autocracies and democracies, further stressing the rules-based international order.

Reference 2 - 0.55% Coverage

The PRC is our most consequential strategic competitor, modernizing its military and preparing to fight and win a war with the United States.

Reference 3 - 1.00% Coverage

The current environment requires the Joint Force to strengthen and integrate deterrence across domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict; modernize the nuclear enterprise; assure allies and partners; and prepare to prevail in great power conflict.

Reference 4 - 0.60% Coverage

As our most consequential strategic competitor, the PRC is unequivocal in its pursuit to reshape an authoritarian world order with no democratic values.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Security Strategy - § 84 references coded [ 4.74% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests, position the United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical competitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow.

Reference 2 - 0.03% Coverage

We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.

Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage

We’ve made a generational investment to upgrade our Nation’s infrastructure and historic investments in innovation to sharpen our competitive edge for the future.

Reference 4 - 0.09% Coverage

The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the competition between our countries responsibly.

Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage

These competitors mistakenly believe democracy is weaker than autocracy because they fail to understand that a nation’s power springs from its people.

Reference 6 - 0.04% Coverage

We will continue to invest in boosting American competitiveness globally, drawing dreamers and strivers from around the world.

Reference 7 - 0.04% Coverage

But I am more confident than ever that the United States has everything we need to win the competition for the 21st century.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT COMES NEXT

Reference 9 - 0.02% Coverage

The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies

Reference 10 - 0.02% Coverage

Cooperating to Address Shared Challenges in an Era of Competition

Reference 11 - 0.02% Coverage

Investing in Our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

PART I: THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT COMES NEXT

Reference 14 - 0.05% Coverage

We are now in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world. The terms of geopolitical competition between the major powers will be set.

Reference 15 - 0.05% Coverage

We face two strategic challenges. The first is that the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.

Reference 16 - 0.06% Coverage

No nation is better positioned to succeed in this competition than the United States, as long as we work in common cause with those who share our vision of a world that is free, open, secure, and prosperous.2

Reference 17 - 0.05% Coverage

The second is that while this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders

Reference 18 - 0.09% Coverage

But we must be clear-eyed that we will have to tackle these challenges within a competitive international environment where heightening geopolitical competition, nationalism and populism render this cooperation even more difficult and will require us to think and act in new ways.

Reference 19 - 0.07% Coverage

We will build the strongest and broadest possible coalition of nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a darker vision and thwarting their efforts to threaten our interests.

Reference 20 - 0.06% Coverage

The risk of conflict between major powers is increasing. Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world.

Reference 21 - 0.04% Coverage

Competition to develop and deploy foundational technologies that will transform our security and economy is intensifying.

Reference 22 - 0.05% Coverage

The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad.

Reference 23 - 0.07% Coverage

We have always succeeded when we embrace an affirmative vision for the world that addresses shared challenges and combine it with the dynamism of our democracy and the determination to out-compete our rivals.

Reference 24 - 0.02% Coverage

The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies

Reference 25 - 0.07% Coverage

The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.

Reference 26 - 0.06% Coverage

As a result, the United States and our allies and partners have an opportunity to shape the PRC and Russia’s external environment in a way that influences their behavior even as we compete with them.

Reference 27 - 0.07% Coverage

Some parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between the United States and the world’s largest autocracies. We understand these concerns. We also want to avoid a world in which competition escalates into a world of rigid blocs.

Reference 28 - 0.02% Coverage

Cooperating to Address Shared Challenges in an Era of Competition

Reference 29 - 0.03% Coverage

Heightened competition between democracies and autocracies is just one of two critical trends we face.

Reference 30 - 0.07% Coverage

These two trends affect each other—geopolitical competition changes, and often complicates, the context in which shared challenges can be addressed while those problems often exacerbate geopolitical competition

Reference 31 - 0.11% Coverage

We cannot succeed in our competition with the major powers who offer a different vision for the world if we do not have a plan to work with other nations to deal with shared challenges and we will not be able to do that unless we understand how a more competitive world affects cooperation and how the need for cooperation affects competition.

Reference 32 - 0.07% Coverage

Tensions will further intensify as countries compete for resources and energy advantage—increasing humanitarian need, food insecurity and health threats, as well as the potential for instability, conflict, and mass migration.

Reference 33 - 0.05% Coverage

We recognize that we will undertake such effort within a competitive environment where major powers will be actively working to advance a different vision.

Reference 34 - 0.07% Coverage

We will use the impulses released by an era of competition to create a race to the top and make progress on shared challenges, whether it is by making investments at home or by deepening cooperation with other countries that share our vision.

Reference 35 - 0.06% Coverage

3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

Reference 36 - 0.07% Coverage

We will use these capabilities to outcompete our strategic competitors, galvanize collective action on global challenges, and shape the rules of the road for technology, cybersecurity, and trade and economics.

Reference 37 - 0.05% Coverage

In a competitive world, where other powers engage in coercive or unfair practices to gain an edge over the United States and our allies, this takes on a special importance.

Reference 38 - 0.05% Coverage

Fourth, we will avoid the temptation to see the world solely through the prism of strategic competition and will continue to engage countries on their own terms.

Reference 39 - 0.14% Coverage

Fifth, we recognize that globalization has delivered immense benefits for the United States and the world but an adjustment is now required to cope with dramatic global changes such as widening inequality within and among countries, the PRC’s emergence as both our most consequential competitor and one of our largest trading partners, and emerging technologies that fall outside the bounds of existing rules and regulations.

Reference 40 - 0.04% Coverage

To preserve and increase international cooperation in an age of competition, we will pursue a dualtrack approach.

Reference 41 - 0.09% Coverage

This decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our competition with the PRC, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal   
12 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY   
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with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence.

Reference 42 - 0.02% Coverage

Investing in Our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge

Reference 43 - 0.05% Coverage

To outcompete our rivals and tackle shared challenges, America will need to maintain and refine its competitive edge by making critical domestic investments.

Reference 44 - 0.10% Coverage

In 2021, we boosted our competitiveness by enacting the largest investment in physical infrastructure in nearly a century, including historic investments in   
14 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY   
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transportation, broadband, clean water, and energy infrastructure that will increase economic growth for decades to come.

Reference 45 - 0.06% Coverage

We recognize the importance of the semiconductor supply chain to our competitiveness and our national security, and we are seeking to reinvigorate the semiconductor industry in the United States.

Reference 46 - 0.04% Coverage

Across these efforts, we are mobilizing the talent, grit, and innovation of American workers, who can out-compete anyone.

Reference 47 - 0.06% Coverage

Our intelligence relationships with our allies are a strategic asset that will increasingly factor in to our competition with our rivals, especially in technological competition.3

Reference 48 - 0.08% Coverage

Similarly, we want our Indo-Pacific allies to be engaged cooperatively with our European allies on shaping the order to which we all aspire, and by standing up to Russia and cooperating with the European Union and United Kingdom on our competition with the PRC.

Reference 49 - 0.04% Coverage

Amid intensifying competition, the military’s role is to maintain and gain warfighting advantages while limiting those of our competitors.

Reference 50 - 0.03% Coverage

Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons.

Reference 51 - 0.07% Coverage

More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior below and above the traditional threshold of conflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence.

Reference 52 - 0.07% Coverage

Integration across domains, recognizing that our competitors’ strategies operate across military (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space) and non-military (economic, technological, and information) domains—and we must too.

Reference 53 - 0.06% Coverage

Integration across regions, understanding that our competitors combine expansive ambitions with growing capabilities to threaten U.S. interests in key regions and in the homeland.

Reference 54 - 0.06% Coverage

Integration across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict.

Reference 55 - 0.07% Coverage

Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well.

Reference 56 - 0.02% Coverage

building our strength at home to maintain a competitive edge

Reference 57 - 0.02% Coverage

to outcompete our rivals who offer a different vision

Reference 58 - 0.03% Coverage

dealing with the challenges to the international order posed by our strategic competitors

Reference 59 - 0.01% Coverage

Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia

Reference 60 - 0.04% Coverage

We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the PRC while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia.

Reference 61 - 0.06% Coverage

The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.

Reference 62 - 0.12% Coverage

Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.4

Reference 63 - 0.03% Coverage

Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly global.

Reference 64 - 0.04% Coverage

In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade.

Reference 65 - 0.06% Coverage

We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.

Reference 66 - 0.02% Coverage

While we compete vigorously, we will manage the competition responsibly.

Reference 67 - 0.05% Coverage

The United States must maintain and increase international cooperation on shared challenges even in an age of greater inter-state competition.

Reference 68 - 0.06% Coverage

In an ideal world, governments would compete responsibly where their interests diverge and cooperate where they converge—but things have not always worked out this way in practice.

Reference 69 - 0.05% Coverage

Across both tracks, we will also seek to harness the positive effects of competition, promoting a race to the top, to increase international efforts on these challenges.

Reference 70 - 0.04% Coverage

We will continue to seek pragmatic engagement with competitors about strategic stability and risk reduction.

Reference 71 - 0.09% Coverage

By doing so in close coordination with our allies and partners, we will establish fair rules while also sustaining our economic and technological edge and shape a future defined by fair competition—because when American workers and companies compete on a level playing field, they win.

Reference 72 - 0.04% Coverage

Technology is central to today’s geopolitical competition and to the future of our national security, economy and democracy.

Reference 73 - 0.10% Coverage

We are already rallying like-minded actors to advance an international technology ecosystem that protects the integrity of international standards development and promotes the free flow of data and ideas with trust, while protecting our security, privacy, and human rights, and enhancing our competitiveness.

Reference 74 - 0.05% Coverage

We must ensure strategic competitors cannot exploit foundational American and allied technologies, know-how, or data to undermine American and allied security.

Reference 75 - 0.05% Coverage

European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared security at this time of intensifying competition.

Reference 76 - 0.05% Coverage

Our priority is to work with Canada and Mexico to advance a North American vision for the future that draws on our shared strengths and bolsters U.S. global competitiveness.

Reference 77 - 0.07% Coverage

We will seek to offer opportunities that reflect America’s competitive advantages, promoting inclusive growth, respecting workers’ rights, and protecting the region’s resources for future generations.

Reference 78 - 0.07% Coverage

Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever, threatening Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potential economic opportunities. and intensifying competition to shape the region’s future.

Reference 79 - 0.05% Coverage

Working with allies and partners, we will develop policies and regulations that enable the burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector to compete internationally.

Reference 80 - 0.06% Coverage

Adapting the Intelligence Community (IC), including by aligning our organizations to better address competition, embracing new data tools, and enhancing integration of open source material.5

Reference 81 - 0.10% Coverage

With the key elements outlined in this strategy, we will tackle the twin challenges of our time: out-competing our rivals to shape the international order while tackling shared challenges, including climate change, pandemic preparedness, and food security, that will define the next stage of human history.

Reference 82 - 0.09% Coverage

By enhancing our industrial capacity, investing in our people, and strengthening our democracy, we will have strengthened the foundation of our economy, bolstered our national resilience, enhanced our credibility on the world stage, and ensured our competitive advantages.

Reference 83 - 0.11% Coverage

By deepening and expanding our diplomatic relationships not only with our democratic allies but with all states who share our vision for a better future, we will have developed terms of competition with our strategic rivals that are favorable to our interests and values and laid the foundation to increase cooperation on shared challenges.

Reference 84 - 0.12% Coverage

By leveraging our national strengths and rallying a broad coalition of allies and partners, we will advance our vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world, outmaneuvering our competitors, and making meaningful progress on issues like climate change, global health, and food security to improve the lives not just of Americans but of people around the world.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.20% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

Over the last ten years, it has expanded cyber operations beyond intellectual property theft to become our most advanced strategic competitor with the capacity to threaten U.S. interests and dominate emerging technologies critical to global development.

Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage

Our goal is a modern digital economy that promotes practices that enhance the security and resilience of our digital ecosystem while preserving innovation and competition.

**Annotations**

1 Campaigning as a form of persistence.

2 Competition rooted in liberalist ideals.

3 Both realist and CPT concepts of competition??

4 PRC strategy has elements of all theoretical paradigms, mixing both sets of LOEs (OBJs and National Interests): competitiveness, resilience, alliance and partnerships, mutual interest/common cause...Building a vision for the future has "World as It Ought to Be" undertones.

5 Impacts to the IC