Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2010\_national\_security\_strategy - § 4 references coded [ 0.18% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

We must deny these groups the ability to conduct operational plotting from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position operatives, including those from Europe and North America.

Reference 3 - 0.03% Coverage

In Afghanistan, we must deny al-Qa’ida a safe haven, deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government

Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage

We must also safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in Cy - § 2 references coded [ 0.72% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

denial of access or service that affects the availability of networks, information, or network-enabled resources

Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage

Active cyber defense is DoD’s synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. It builds on traditional approaches to defending DoD networks and systems, supplementing best practices with new operating concepts. It operates at network speed by using sensors, software, and intelligence to detect and stop malicious activity before it can affect DoD networks and systems.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011-national-military-strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.13% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives

Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage

employs a combination of detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered defense.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011\_International\_strategy\_for\_cyberspace - § 2 references coded [ 0.11% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

deny criminals safe havens,

Reference 2 - 0.09% Coverage

Deny terrorists and other criminals the ability to exploit the Internet for operational planning, financing, or attacks.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\QDR as of 29JAN10 1600 - § 1 reference coded [ 0.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries’ objectives

Files\\2015 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2014 Quadrennial Defense Review CLEAN - § 3 references coded [ 0.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region.

Reference 2 - 0.02% Coverage

With the President’s Budget, our military will be able to defeat or deny any aggressor.

Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage

The Joint Force must also be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.

Files\\2015 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 National Military Strategy CLEAN - § 8 references coded [ 0.81% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries

Reference 3 - 0.28% Coverage

If deterrence fails, at any given time, our military will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale, multi-phased campaign while denying the objectives of — or imposing unacceptable costs on — another aggressor in a different region.

Reference 4 - 0.05% Coverage

Deter, Deny, and Defeat State Adversaries

Reference 5 - 0.09% Coverage

the U.S. military stands ready to project power to deny an adversary’s objectives

Reference 6 - 0.10% Coverage

In case of aggression, denying adversaries their goals will be an immediate objective.

Reference 7 - 0.04% Coverage

Deny an adversary’s objectives

Reference 8 - 0.15% Coverage

Deny an Adversary’s Objectives. Denying an adversary’s goals or imposing   
unacceptable costs is central to achieving our objectives.

Files\\2015 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 National Security Strategy CLEAN - § 2 references coded [ 0.08% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

If deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters.

Reference 2 - 0.02% Coverage

deny the peaceful use of outer space.

Files\\2015 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 WH Report on Cyber Deterrence Policy Final CLEAN - § 8 references coded [ 0.91% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

Deterrence by Denial

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Influence is achieved by credibly demonstrating the ability and willingness to deny benefits or impose costs to convince the adversary that restraint will result in better outcomes than will confrontation.

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

Deterrence by denial efforts aim to persuade adversaries that the United States can thwart malicious cyber activity, thereby reducing the incentive to conduct such activities.

Reference 4 - 0.02% Coverage

Deterrence by Denial

Reference 5 - 0.20% Coverage

Pursuing defense, resiliency, and reconstitution initiatives to provide critical networks with a greater capability to prevent or minimize the impact of cyber attacks or other malicious cyber activity, and reconstitute rapidly if attacks succeed.

Reference 6 - 0.07% Coverage

(2) deny adversaries access to infrastructure used to conduct malicious cyber activity.

Reference 7 - 0.18% Coverage

Law enforcement can also be an effective deterrent to cyber threats both through denial (e.g., taking down a criminal botnet that could be used in an attack) or cost imposition (e.g., arresting the perpetrators of cyber attacks).

Reference 8 - 0.11% Coverage

Law enforcement can also deny adversaries access to the infrastructure used to conduct malicious cyber activities against the United States.