Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2009 Cyberspace Policy Review Assuring a Trusted and R - § 3 references coded [ 0.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence,

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

deter,

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2010\_national\_security\_strategy - § 15 references coded [ 0.54% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

determination to deter aggression

Reference 2 - 0.02% Coverage

ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent

Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage

Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats

Reference 4 - 0.05% Coverage

Defense: We are strengthening our military to ensure that it can prevail in today’s wars; to prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, and our allies and partners;

Reference 5 - 0.02% Coverage

deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments

Reference 6 - 0.04% Coverage

the United States is now threatened by the potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them

Reference 7 - 0.02% Coverage

We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and

Reference 8 - 0.05% Coverage

This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains

Reference 9 - 0.07% Coverage

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

Reference 10 - 0.03% Coverage

We will deter, prevent, detect, defend against, and quickly recover from cyber intrusions and attacks by:

Reference 11 - 0.03% Coverage

effective border security and immigration enforcement must keep the country safe and deter unlawful entry.

Reference 12 - 0.02% Coverage

Deterring Threats to the International Financial System

Reference 13 - 0.07% Coverage

we will strengthen our regional deterrence postures—for example, through phased, adaptive missile defense architectures—in order to make certain that regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

deter vital threats

Reference 15 - 0.06% Coverage

we will place renewed emphasis on deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use development and security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in Cy - § 6 references coded [ 1.35% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

to deter and mitigate insider threats, DoD will strengthen its workforce communications, workforce accountability, internal monitoring, and information management capabilities.

Reference 2 - 0.33% Coverage

DoD seeks to foster a stronger culture of information assurance within its workforce to assure individual responsibility and deter malicious insiders by shaping behaviors and attitudes through the imposition of higher costs for malicious activity.

Reference 3 - 0.21% Coverage

The development of international   
shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence.

Reference 4 - 0.25% Coverage

oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuade and deter malicious actors, and reserve the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate

Reference 5 - 0.24% Coverage

DoD will expand its formal and informal cyber cooperation to a wider pool of allied and partner militaries to develop collective self-defense and increase collective deterrence.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

create coalitions to deter malicious activities in cyberspace.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011-national-military-strategy - § 17 references coded [ 2.89% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

we will be prepared to act as security guarantor – preferably with partners and allies, but alone if necessary – to deter and defeat acts of aggression.

Reference 2 - 0.09% Coverage

deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international stability as we fight these campaigns.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 4 - 0.07% Coverage

We will adapt deterrence principles to our efforts in countering extremists.

Reference 5 - 0.02% Coverage

difficult to deter directly

Reference 6 - 0.02% Coverage

Deter and Defeat Aggression

Reference 7 - 0.10% Coverage

the Joint Force will be prepared to deter and defeat regional aggression that would threaten our national interests

Reference 8 - 0.70% Coverage

Deter Aggression: The United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, deterring nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners will continue to be the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In support of the President’s vision, we will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The Joint Force will provide capabilities to deter aggression and assure our allies and partners through our nuclear arsenal and overseas missile defense capabilities. We will continue to lead in advancing Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities against limited attacks and we seek opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners in this area.

Reference 9 - 0.14% Coverage

We must also maintain a robust conventional deterrent. Deterrence and   
assurance requires the ability to rapidly and globally project power in all domains.

Reference 10 - 0.41% Coverage

We will support whole-of-nation deterrence approaches that blend economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence adversary behavior. Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives can be just as effective as in altering its strategic calculus through the threat of retaliation. The most effective deterrence approaches make use of both techniques, while also providing potential adversaries acceptable alternative courses of action.

Reference 11 - 0.27% Coverage

We must also adapt deterrence principles to 21st century security challenges. We will enhance deterrence in air, space, and cyberspace by possessing the capability to fight through a degraded environment and improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems or supporting infrastructure.

Reference 12 - 0.15% Coverage

These collective domains are essential and interdependent mediums for the Joint Force’s projection and sustainment of power and ability to deter and defeat aggression.

Reference 13 - 0.19% Coverage

We will also train for power projection operations in space-degraded environments that minimize the   
9   
incentives to attack space capabilities, and will maintain a range of options to deter or punish such activities.

Reference 14 - 0.11% Coverage

Working with Canada and Mexico, we will remain prepared to deter and defeat direct threats to our North American homeland.

Reference 15 - 0.08% Coverage

employs a combination of detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered defense.

Reference 16 - 0.32% Coverage

Joint nuclear forces will continue to support strategic stability through maintenance of an assured second-strike capability. We will ensure our nuclear forces remain effective, safe, and secure. We will retain sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against unexpected geopolitical change, technological problems, and operational vulnerabilities.

Reference 17 - 0.09% Coverage

measure joint readiness across the services to deter conflict and respond promptly during contingencies.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011\_International\_strategy\_for\_cyberspace - § 9 references coded [ 0.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Deterring

Reference 2 - 0.02% Coverage

and appropriate deterrence~

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Deterring

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

deter

Reference 5 - 0.02% Coverage

deterring malicious actors,

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

Deterrence

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

domestic deterrence

Reference 8 - 0.03% Coverage

collective deterrence capabilities

Reference 9 - 0.03% Coverage

deter malicious activities in cyberspace

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\QDR as of 29JAN10 1600 - § 12 references coded [ 0.15% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Deter

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

deter conflict

Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage

Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.

Reference 4 - 0.02% Coverage

We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

prevent-and-deter

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

and deterring other potential major adversaries

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

deter,

Reference 11 - 0.06% Coverage

Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

deter