Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2009 Cyberspace Policy Review Assuring a Trusted and R - § 33 references coded [ 0.49% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

Other intrusions threaten to damage portions of our critical infrastructure

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

response and recovery

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 4 - 0.04% Coverage

The status quo is no longer acceptable. The United States must signal to the world that it is serious about addressing this challenge with strong leadership and vision

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

territorial jurisdiction,

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

overeign responsibility

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

use of force.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence,

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

military capabilities

Reference 10 - 0.05% Coverage

Anchoring and elevating leadership for cybersecurity-related policies at the White House signals to the United States and the international community that we are serious about cybersecurity.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

threats

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

develop U.S. operational capabilities in cyberspace.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

integrate capabilities,

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

uneven capabilities across various groups,

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility,

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

and use of force.

Reference 17 - 0.02% Coverage

prevent, and respond to significant cybersecurity incidents

Reference 18 - 0.02% Coverage

apply technical capabilities to the defense of the national infrastructure

Reference 19 - 0.02% Coverage

help the Federal government prevent as well as detect malicious behavior.

Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

capability

Reference 21 - 0.02% Coverage

pilot deployments of intrusion detection and prevention systems for the benefit of federal networks

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

prevention

Reference 23 - 0.03% Coverage

The U.S. Government should invest in processes, technologies, and infrastructure that will help prevent cyber incidents

Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

preventing,

Reference 25 - 0.02% Coverage

Information is key to preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents

Reference 26 - 0.07% Coverage

The strategy also must include prevention, mitigation, and response against threats to or subversion of the people who operate and benefit from the infrastructure, the processes that run or take advantage of the infrastructure, and the supply chains used to build and maintain the infrastructure

Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 28 - 0.03% Coverage

Develop a process between the government and the private sector to assist in preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents.

Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

deter,

Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

prevent,

Reference 31 - 0.02% Coverage

nsure U.S. capabilities to operate in cyberspace in support of national goals;

Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 33 - 0.04% Coverage

Capacity Building: Encompasses the overall scale of resources, activities, and capabilities required to become a more cyber-competent nation.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2010\_national\_security\_strategy - § 39 references coded [ 1.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

The Strategic Environment—The World as It Is

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Use of Force

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

The World as It Is,

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

To succeed, we must face the world as it is.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

an unmatched military

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

determination to deter aggression

Reference 7 - 0.02% Coverage

prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

facing consequences when they do not.

Reference 9 - 0.04% Coverage

there must be consequences for those nations that break the rules—whether they are nonproliferation obligations, trade agreements, or human rights commitments.

Reference 10 - 0.06% Coverage

there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.

Reference 11 - 0.02% Coverage

ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent

Reference 12 - 0.03% Coverage

We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

The Strategic Environment—The World as It Is

Reference 14 - 0.03% Coverage

drew a swift and forceful response from the United States and our allies and partners in Afghanistan

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

most powerful military,

Reference 16 - 0.05% Coverage

Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats

Reference 17 - 0.05% Coverage

Defense: We are strengthening our military to ensure that it can prevail in today’s wars; to prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, and our allies and partners;

Reference 18 - 0.02% Coverage

deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments

Reference 19 - 0.04% Coverage

the United States is now threatened by the potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them

Reference 20 - 0.07% Coverage

we embrace America’s unique responsibility to promote international security—a responsibility that flows from our commitments to allies, our leading role in supporting a just and sustainable international order, and our unmatched military capabilities.

Reference 21 - 0.06% Coverage

We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and   
★ 17 ★   
NaTIONal SeCurITy STraTegy   
to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security.

Reference 22 - 0.04% Coverage

our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced

Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

Use of Force

Reference 24 - 0.02% Coverage

mitigating where possible the need for the use of force.

Reference 25 - 0.05% Coverage

This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains

Reference 26 - 0.05% Coverage

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction

Reference 27 - 0.06% Coverage

When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

Reference 28 - 0.05% Coverage

The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force

Reference 29 - 0.07% Coverage

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

Reference 30 - 0.03% Coverage

We will deter, prevent, detect, defend against, and quickly recover from cyber intrusions and attacks by:

Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

response to cyber attacks

Reference 32 - 0.03% Coverage

effective border security and immigration enforcement must keep the country safe and deter unlawful entry.

Reference 33 - 0.02% Coverage

Deterring Threats to the International Financial System

Reference 34 - 0.04% Coverage

Our strategy to attack these networks must respond in kind and target their illicit resources and access to the global financial system through financial measures,

Reference 35 - 0.07% Coverage

We will continue to reassure our allies and partners by retaining our ability to bring precise, sustained, and effective capabilities to bear against a wide range of military threats and decisively defeat the forces of hostile regional powers

Reference 36 - 0.07% Coverage

we will strengthen our regional deterrence postures—for example, through phased, adaptive missile defense architectures—in order to make certain that regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities.

Reference 37 - 0.01% Coverage

deter vital threats

Reference 38 - 0.06% Coverage

we will place renewed emphasis on deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use development and security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism

Reference 39 - 0.04% Coverage

hared sea, air, and space domains. These shared areas, which exist outside exclusive national jurisdictions, are the connective tissue around our globe

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in Cy - § 15 references coded [ 3.86% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

t cyberspace is embedded into an increasing number of capabilities upon which DoD relies to complete its missio

Reference 2 - 0.03% Coverage

d cyberspace capabilitie

Reference 3 - 0.16% Coverage

Cyber Threats   
“The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.”

Reference 4 - 0.33% Coverage

In developing its strategy for operating in cyberspace, DoD is focused on a number of central aspects of the cyber threat; these include external threat actors, insider threats, supply chain vulnerabilities, and threats to DoD‘s operational ability.

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

Moreover, this threat continues to evolve as evidence grows of adversaries focusing on the development of increasingly sophisticated and potentially dangerous capabilities.

Reference 6 - 0.15% Coverage

the rapidly evolving threat landscape presents a complex and vital challenge for national and economic security.

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

denial of access or service that affects the availability of networks, information, or network-enabled resources

Reference 8 - 0.24% Coverage

As directed by the National Security Strategy, DoD must ensure that it has the necessary capabilities to operate effectively in all domains- air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace

Reference 9 - 0.24% Coverage

to deter and mitigate insider threats, DoD will strengthen its workforce communications, workforce accountability, internal monitoring, and information management capabilities.

Reference 10 - 0.33% Coverage

DoD seeks to foster a stronger culture of information assurance within its workforce to assure individual responsibility and deter malicious insiders by shaping behaviors and attitudes through the imposition of higher costs for malicious activity.

Reference 11 - 1.06% Coverage

As malicious cyber activity continues to grow, DoD has employed active cyber defense to prevent intrusions and defeat adversary activities on DoD networks and systems. Active cyber defense is DoD’s synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. It builds on traditional approaches to defending DoD networks and systems, supplementing best practices with new operating concepts. It operates at network speed by using sensors, software, and intelligence to detect and stop malicious activity before it can affect DoD networks and systems.   
As intrusions may not always be stopped at the network   
boundary, DoD will continue to operate and improve upon its advanced sensors to detect, discover, map, and mitigate malicious activity on DoD networks.

Reference 12 - 0.21% Coverage

The development of international   
shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence.

Reference 13 - 0.25% Coverage

oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuade and deter malicious actors, and reserve the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate

Reference 14 - 0.24% Coverage

DoD will expand its formal and informal cyber cooperation to a wider pool of allied and partner militaries to develop collective self-defense and increase collective deterrence.

Reference 15 - 0.09% Coverage

create coalitions to deter malicious activities in cyberspace.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011-national-military-strategy - § 49 references coded [ 6.55% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.03% Coverage

The ongoing shifts in relative power

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

While the strength of our military will continue to underpin national security,

Reference 3 - 0.02% Coverage

military capabilities

Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage

we will be prepared to act as security guarantor – preferably with partners and allies, but alone if necessary – to deter and defeat acts of aggression.

Reference 5 - 0.04% Coverage

defend against and defeat threats to our homeland.

Reference 6 - 0.08% Coverage

Our foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life.

Reference 7 - 0.09% Coverage

deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international stability as we fight these campaigns.

Reference 8 - 0.12% Coverage

potential adversaries who underestimate our continued military strength and will to protect our national interests do so at their peril.

Reference 9 - 0.09% Coverage

The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable future

Reference 10 - 0.14% Coverage

China’s decades-long economic growth is expected to facilitate its continued military modernization and expansion of its interests within and beyond the region.

Reference 11 - 0.08% Coverage

Other states in Asia, too, are becoming more militarily capable as they grow more prosperous.

Reference 12 - 0.16% Coverage

In the Middle East, a nuclear armed Iran could set off a cascade of states in the region seeking nuclear parity or increased conventional capabilities; that could lead to regional conflict.

Reference 13 - 0.05% Coverage

platforms that challenge our ability to project power

Reference 14 - 0.04% Coverage

relative ease of developing potent capabilities.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 16 - 0.10% Coverage

requires America’s Joint Force possesses the reach, resolve, and ability to project decisive military power.

Reference 17 - 0.10% Coverage

There are no more vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life.

Reference 18 - 0.09% Coverage

defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country

Reference 19 - 0.07% Coverage

We will adapt deterrence principles to our efforts in countering extremists.

Reference 20 - 0.02% Coverage

difficult to deter directly

Reference 21 - 0.10% Coverage

they make cost/benefit calculations and are dependent on states and other stakeholders we are capable of influencing.

Reference 22 - 0.16% Coverage

When directed, we will provide capabilities to hold accountable any government or entity complicit in attacks against the United States or allies to raise the cost of their support.

Reference 23 - 0.17% Coverage

We will, on order, be prepared to respond to any attack across the full spectrum of military capabilities with an appropriate and measured response at a time and place of our Nation’s choosing.

Reference 24 - 0.02% Coverage

Deter and Defeat Aggression

Reference 25 - 0.06% Coverage

Preventing wars is as important as winning them, and far less costly

Reference 26 - 0.10% Coverage

the Joint Force will be prepared to deter and defeat regional aggression that would threaten our national interests

Reference 27 - 0.70% Coverage

Deter Aggression: The United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, deterring nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners will continue to be the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In support of the President’s vision, we will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The Joint Force will provide capabilities to deter aggression and assure our allies and partners through our nuclear arsenal and overseas missile defense capabilities. We will continue to lead in advancing Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities against limited attacks and we seek opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners in this area.

Reference 28 - 0.14% Coverage

We must also maintain a robust conventional deterrent. Deterrence and   
assurance requires the ability to rapidly and globally project power in all domains.

Reference 29 - 0.41% Coverage

We will support whole-of-nation deterrence approaches that blend economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence adversary behavior. Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives can be just as effective as in altering its strategic calculus through the threat of retaliation. The most effective deterrence approaches make use of both techniques, while also providing potential adversaries acceptable alternative courses of action.

Reference 30 - 0.27% Coverage

We must also adapt deterrence principles to 21st century security challenges. We will enhance deterrence in air, space, and cyberspace by possessing the capability to fight through a degraded environment and improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems or supporting infrastructure.

Reference 31 - 0.15% Coverage

Defeat Aggression: The core task of our   
Armed Forces remains to defend our Nation and win its wars. To do so, we must provide capabilities to defeat adversary aggression.

Reference 32 - 0.10% Coverage

Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our Nation and allies or to preserve broader peace and security.

Reference 33 - 0.13% Coverage

Defeating adversary aggression will require the Joint Force to support National approaches to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies

Reference 34 - 0.27% Coverage

core military competencies include complementary, multi-domain power   
A prosperous and interconnected world   
requires a stable and secure environment, the absence of territorial aggression or   
conflict between states, and reliable access to resources and cyberspace for stable markets.   
8   
projection,

Reference 35 - 0.15% Coverage

These collective domains are essential and interdependent mediums for the Joint Force’s projection and sustainment of power and ability to deter and defeat aggression.

Reference 36 - 0.19% Coverage

We will also train for power projection operations in space-degraded environments that minimize the   
9   
incentives to attack space capabilities, and will maintain a range of options to deter or punish such activities.

Reference 37 - 0.10% Coverage

Cyberspace – Cyberspace capabilities enable Combatant Commanders to operate effectively across all domains

Reference 38 - 0.19% Coverage

The disposition, strength, and readiness of our Joint Force form a global defense posture that provides unsurpassed capabilities allowing us, uniquely, to lead efforts that strengthen security across all regions

Reference 39 - 0.06% Coverage

shape our joint force to be able to aggregate capabilities quickly

Reference 40 - 0.05% Coverage

safeguarding our economic and security interests worldwide.

Reference 41 - 0.11% Coverage

Working with Canada and Mexico, we will remain prepared to deter and defeat direct threats to our North American homeland.

Reference 42 - 0.04% Coverage

preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear arms.

Reference 43 - 0.14% Coverage

We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait

Reference 44 - 0.23% Coverage

To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.

Reference 45 - 0.15% Coverage

Capabilities – Our strategy, forged in war, is focused on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations.

Reference 46 - 0.30% Coverage

Joint Forces will secure the ‘.mil’ domain, requiring a resilient DoD cyberspace architecture that employs a combination of detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered defense. We will improve our cyberspace capabilities so they can often achieve significant and proportionate effects with less cost and lower collateral impact.

Reference 47 - 0.32% Coverage

Joint nuclear forces will continue to support strategic stability through maintenance of an assured second-strike capability. We will ensure our nuclear forces remain effective, safe, and secure. We will retain sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against unexpected geopolitical change, technological problems, and operational vulnerabilities.

Reference 48 - 0.12% Coverage

Readiness is the ability to provide and integrate capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions.

Reference 49 - 0.09% Coverage

measure joint readiness across the services to deter conflict and respond promptly during contingencies.

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011\_International\_strategy\_for\_cyberspace - § 64 references coded [ 2.50% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

Defense: Dissuading and Deterring

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

consequences

Reference 3 - 0.03% Coverage

distant and often-fraught borders~

Reference 4 - 0.03% Coverage

threaten users’ confidence in online commerce

Reference 5 - 0.05% Coverage

The theft of intellectual property threatens national competitiveness

Reference 6 - 0.11% Coverage

Cybersecurity threats can even endanger international peace and security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into cyberspace~

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

interests

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

threats

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

threats

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

threats

Reference 11 - 0.02% Coverage

serves national interests

Reference 12 - 0.03% Coverage

because of a few nations’ political interests~

Reference 13 - 0.02% Coverage

and appropriate deterrence~

Reference 14 - 0.08% Coverage

increasing evidence that governments are seeking to exercise traditional national power through cyberspace~

Reference 15 - 0.02% Coverage

deny criminals safe havens,

Reference 16 - 0.02% Coverage

national security interests,

Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

Dissuading

Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

Deterring

Reference 19 - 0.09% Coverage

The United States will defend its networks, whether the threat comes from terrorists, cybercriminals, or states and their proxies

Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

dissuade

Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

deter

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

threaten

Reference 23 - 0.11% Coverage

We will do so with overlapping policies that combine national and international network resilience with vigilance and a range of credible response options~

Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

dissuading

Reference 25 - 0.02% Coverage

deterring malicious actors,

Reference 26 - 0.06% Coverage

eserving the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate~

Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

Dissuasion

Reference 28 - 0.06% Coverage

Protecting networks of such great value requires robust defensive capabilities~

Reference 29 - 0.10% Coverage

The United States will continue to strengthen our network defenses and our ability to withstand and recover from disruptions and other attacks~

Reference 30 - 0.16% Coverage

For those more sophisticated attacks that do create damage, we will act on well-developed response plans to isolate and mitigate disruption to our machines, limiting effects on our networks, and potential cascade effects beyond them~

Reference 31 - 0.02% Coverage

early warning capabilities~

Reference 32 - 0.02% Coverage

incident response capabilities

Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

Deterrence

Reference 34 - 0.10% Coverage

The United States will ensure that the risks associated with attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh the potential benefits~

Reference 35 - 0.10% Coverage

We fully recognize that cyberspace activities can have effects extending beyond networks; such events may require responses in self-defense

Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

borders~

Reference 37 - 0.03% Coverage

hreaten our national and economic security,

Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

domestic deterrence

Reference 39 - 0.07% Coverage

the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country~

Reference 40 - 0.10% Coverage

certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners~

Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

our interests~

Reference 42 - 0.05% Coverage

we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can

Reference 43 - 0.06% Coverage

will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction

Reference 44 - 0.04% Coverage

confront threats emanating from within their borders

Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

threaten

Reference 46 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 47 - 0.01% Coverage

threaten

Reference 48 - 0.15% Coverage

As we continue to build and enhance our own response capabilities, we will work with other countries to expand the international networks that support greater global situational awareness and incident response

Reference 49 - 0.02% Coverage

We will expand these capabilities

Reference 50 - 0.05% Coverage

focusing on preventing crime and catching and punishing offenders

Reference 51 - 0.09% Coverage

Deny terrorists and other criminals the ability to exploit the Internet for operational planning, financing, or attacks.

Reference 52 - 0.04% Coverage

Preventing terrorists from enhancing capabilities

Reference 53 - 0.01% Coverage

interests

Reference 54 - 0.01% Coverage

threatened,

Reference 55 - 0.06% Coverage

the United States has a compelling interest in defending its vital national assets,

Reference 56 - 0.03% Coverage

confront potential threats in cyberspace.

Reference 57 - 0.13% Coverage

Such military alliances and partnerships will bolster our collective deterrence capabilities and strengthen our ability to defend the United States against state and non-state actors~

Reference 58 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities,

Reference 59 - 0.02% Coverage

leverage capabilities

Reference 60 - 0.03% Coverage

deter malicious activities in cyberspace

Reference 61 - 0.04% Coverage

supporting national capabilities for incident management;

Reference 62 - 0.01% Coverage

Criminal threats

Reference 63 - 0.01% Coverage

threaten,

Reference 64 - 0.02% Coverage

address real cyberspace threats,

Files\\2011 Case Study\\Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\QDR as of 29JAN10 1600 - § 52 references coded [ 0.65% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Roles of Military Power

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Deter

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Defeat Aggression

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

Prevent Proliferation

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

Reference 6 - 0.02% Coverage

The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nation’s interests.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

renewed efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban

Reference 8 - 0.03% Coverage

Above all, the United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world.

Reference 9 - 0.03% Coverage

First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

military power

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

prevent harmful arms races.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

direct physical threat to the United States

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

require armed forces with unmatched capabilities

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

prevent

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

deter conflict

Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

prepare to defeat adversaries

Reference 18 - 0.03% Coverage

These priorities shape not only considerations on the capabilities our Armed Forces need but also the aggregate capacity required to accomplish their missions now and in the future.

Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

defeat

Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

defeat

Reference 21 - 0.05% Coverage

Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries’ objectives

Reference 23 - 0.02% Coverage

We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.

Reference 24 - 0.02% Coverage

the Department’s prevent-and-deter activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States;

Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

and deterring other potential major adversaries

Reference 26 - 0.05% Coverage

In the future, as our forces transition into a period of lessintensive sustained operations, the Department’s force planning assumes an ability to undertake a broader and deeper range of prevent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.

Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

Prepare to defeat adversaries

Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

adversaries challenge our interests with the threat

Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

use of force,

Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

supporting a response to an attack

Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

defeating aggression by adversary states

Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

deterrence

Reference 34 - 0.01% Coverage

Enhance capabilities for domain awareness

Reference 35 - 0.01% Coverage

Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities

Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

Enhance domestic capabilities

Reference 37 - 0.02% Coverage

Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance;

Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

critical capabilities

Reference 39 - 0.05% Coverage

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.

Reference 40 - 0.04% Coverage

In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.

Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems;

Reference 42 - 0.06% Coverage

Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

Reference 43 - 0.01% Coverage

The security environment demands improved capabilities to counter threats in cyberspace.

Reference 44 - 0.01% Coverage

DoD must actively defend its networks.

Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 46 - 0.02% Coverage

U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations,

Reference 47 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 48 - 0.03% Coverage

Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility, and multimission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities.

Reference 49 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities

Reference 50 - 0.01% Coverage

capabilities,

Reference 51 - 0.01% Coverage

recommendations regarding capability development

Reference 52 - 0.01% Coverage

the need for enhancements to key capabilities across a wide range of missions