

# Vulnerability Assessment

November 2021



Source: <https://wilsoncgrp.com/vulnerability-assessment>

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>3</b>
Major Findings	3
Key Recommendations	3
<b>Methodology</b>	<b>4</b>
linkedin.com: Employee Information	4
abc.com.sg: Front-facing website	4
abc.dyndns.org: Firewall to access Virtual Office	4
<b>Risk Assessment</b>	<b>5</b>
High Risk	6
Employee Credentials leaked	6
Credentials inputted on WordPress login pages in clear text	7
Brute Force attack possible to login to WordPress website	8
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)	10
Email interception	12
Medium Risk	13
Hostsg server hosts multiple WordPress domains with similar vulnerabilities	13
<b>Summary</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Appendix</b>	<b>16</b>

Note: Any sensitive data such as the client company name and client employee names have been removed or replaced by fake names.

## Executive Summary

The team has identified a total of 5 high risk and 1 medium risk vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been discovered by conducting research on people working in ABC company, on abc.com.sg (WordPress website) and on abc.dyndns.org (Firewall).

Most of the vulnerabilities found pertain to the abc.com.sg domain. We could not find any vulnerabilities found for abc.dyndns.org and no actions are needed for it.

### Major Findings

1. **People:** Credentials owned by two ABC people have been leaked and are publicly available.
2. **abc.com.sg:** 5 vulnerabilities exist for the WordPress website due to misconfiguration on the WordPress website as well as misconfiguration on the server that hosts the abc.com.sg domain.

### Key Recommendations

Website administrator(s) for abc.com.sg should quickly remediate any vulnerabilities found below by installing relevant plugins and upgrading software versions to the latest versions. ABC accounts with leaked credentials should have their passwords changed on all websites and services that use the leaked credentials.

## Methodology

The team was given the <https://abc.dyndns.org/> domain to work with and was tasked with finding any other vulnerabilities that may exist. We searched the web for any other websites and servers that may be linked to ABC Company. We found three key websites that would serve as our focuses for the vulnerability assessment.

### **linkedin.com:** Employee Information

To understand more about the people working in the company, we referred to ABC group's LinkedIn (<https://www.linkedin.com/company/abcgroup/>). We used tools that are publicly available to find any leaked credentials for the people listed in the link above. (See Appendix A)

### **abc.com.sg:** Front-facing website

abc.com.sg appears to be the "front-face" of ABC Company. We used scanning tools to check if there are any vulnerabilities related to the WordPress website, and the server that is hosting the website. (See Appendix A)

### **abc.dyndns.org:** Firewall to access Virtual Office

abc.dyndns.org seems to be the gateway to access IT resources for ABC Company. Like abc.com.sg, we used scanning tools to check if there are any vulnerabilities related to the login page, and the server that is hosting the firewall login page. (See Appendix A)

## Risk Assessment

The team has identified a total of 6 vulnerabilities. They are categorised into high, medium and low risk as below.

Risk Level	Count
High	5
Medium	1
Low	0

fig. 1 Number of vulnerabilities categorised by risk category

**High risk** vulnerabilities cause severe damage to ABC Company. ABC Company may lose access to important resources as the server is not well configured. Sensitive information has also been leaked.

**Medium risk** vulnerabilities may cause considerable damage to ABC Company. Usernames can be enumerated that allows hackers to potentially gain access to ABC's resources when used with other methods.

**Low risk** vulnerabilities may cause damage to ABC Company. No vulnerabilities have been found that are low risk.

## High Risk

### 1. Employee Credentials leaked

#### Impact

John ABC and Jane ABC's credentials have been leaked and are publicly available. Hackers may use their credentials to access services owned by John and Jane if they have not changed their password since the leak.

Name	
Email	
Username	
Hashed Password	
Phone	

fig. 2 John's leaked credentials

Email	
Username	
Hashed Password	

fig. 3 Jane's leaked credentials

#### Recommendations

On any services that are using the credentials highlighted above, change your password to a secure password (At least 12 characters long; Use a mix of characters; Avoid personal information<sup>1</sup>) and if possible, add two factor authentication.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/32040>

## High Risk

### 2. Credentials inputted on WordPress login pages in clear text

#### Impact

Hackers can obtain credentials to both <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/> and <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/> if hackers are in the same network as ABC people through an attack called the Man in the Middle attack. This means that if a ABC personnel accesses <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/> in Starbucks and a hacker happens to be running an attack on the Starbucks network, the hacker can obtain the credentials that the personnel inputted. An example of such an attack is shown below using a set of mock username and password.




fig. 4 Network traffic can be captured using Wireshark to capture credentials

#### Areas Affected

- <http://abc.com.sg/>
- <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/>
- <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/>

#### Recommendations

Apply for an AlphaSSL Certificate from HostSG to encrypt traffic through the affected websites<sup>2</sup>. This ensures that all information sent and received is encrypted and undecipherable by hackers conducting a Man in the Middle attack.

<sup>2</sup> Link: <http://www.hostsg.com/solutions/ssl-certificate.php>

## High Risk

### 3. Brute Force attack possible to login to WordPress website

We ran a WordPress scan and found that the XML-RPC feature is enabled. This feature is vulnerable to CVE-2020-28035<sup>3</sup> (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures).

```
[+] XML-RPC seems to be enabled: [REDACTED]
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%
| References:
| - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access/
```

fig. 5 XML-RPC is enabled

#### Impact

Hackers can run a brute force attack on <http://abc.com.sg/xmlrpc.php> to determine login credentials to access the abc.com.sg WordPress website. Additionally, if any credentials that were leaked are used as the login to the WordPress website, the brute force attack will be easier to conduct for hackers. This may lead to defacement of the website and even loss of access to the WordPress website. This attack is possible as the link above is publicly available.

The example below shows a mock brute force attack using only one username and one password.

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login) > exploit
[*] 203.175.174.67:80 :/xmlrpc.php - Sending Hello ...
[+] 203.175.174.67:80 - XMLRPC enabled, Hello message received!
[*] Starting XML-RPC login sweep ...
[-] 203.175.174.67:80 - Failed: 'admin:admin'
[!] No active DB -- Credential data will not be saved!
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

fig. 6 Brute Force attack example

<sup>3</sup> Link to CVE: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28035>



## Areas Affected

- <http://abc.com.sg/>
- <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/>
- <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/>

## Recommendations

Navigate to Plugins > Add New section from your WordPress dashboard. Search for, and install the **Disable XML-RPC** plugin<sup>4</sup>. This disables the XML-RPC plugin and prevents hackers from exploiting the vulnerable XML-RPC feature.




fig. 7 Disable XML-RPC plugin<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Source: <https://www.hostinger.com/tutorials/xmlrpc-wordpress>

## High Risk

### 4. Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)

As above, from the WordPress scan we found that the XML-RPC feature and the WP-Cron feature is enabled. This causes the WordPress website to be vulnerable to DDOS.

```
[+] The external WP-Cron seems to be enabled: [REDACTED]
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 60%
| References:
| - https://www.iplocation.net/defend-wordpress-from-ddos
| - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/issues/1299
```

fig. 8 WP-Cron is enabled

## Impact

Hackers can run a Distributed Denial of Service attack on <http://abc.com.sg/xmlrpc.php> and <http://abc.com.sg/wp-cron.php> to slow down and potentially, bring down the WordPress website. This attack leverages on the same principles as the brute force attack above. The key difference is that for a DDOS attack, instead of using a list of credentials, the attacker will use multiple servers to send requests to the links above. If the server is not able to process all the requests, it will crash.

## Areas Affected

- <http://abc.com.sg/>
- <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/>
- <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/>

## Recommendations

### To disable XML-RPC:

Navigate to Plugins > Add New section from your WordPress dashboard. Search and install the **Disable XML-RPC** plugin<sup>5</sup>. This disables the XML-RPC plugin and prevents hackers from exploiting the vulnerable XML-RPC feature.




fig. 9 Disable XML-RPC plugin<sup>6</sup>

### To disable WP-Cron:

Update your wp-cron.php file to include `define('DISABLE_WP_CRON', true);` following the line `define('DB_COLLATE', '');` (This is typically found in public\_html)<sup>6</sup>.

If you are currently relying on cron jobs, please refer to the following link:

<https://blog.cpanel.com/how-to-configure-a-cron-job/>

<sup>5</sup> Source: <https://www.hostinger.com/tutorials/xmlrpc-wordpress>

<sup>6</sup> Link: <https://medium.com/@thecpanelguy/the-nightmare-that-is-wpcron-php-ae31c1d3ae30>

## High Risk

### 5. Email interception

We ran an nmap scan on 203.175.174.67 and found that The SMTP service uses Exim smtpd 4.94.2 and is vulnerable to CVE-2021-38371<sup>7</sup>.

```
465/tcp    open      ssl/smtp    Exim smtpd 4.94.2
587/tcp    open      smtp        Exim smtpd 4.94.2
1025/tcp   open      smtp        Exim smtpd 4.94.2
```

fig. 10 SMTP service uses Exim smtpd 4.94.2

### Impact

Hackers can intercept emails sent through the webmail server and change the contents of the email, including the recipients receiving the email, the body of the email. This means that hackers can use the abc.com.sg domain to send phishing emails to unsuspecting parties and also block any emails from being sent to intended parties.

An example of such an attack is shown in the image below. Note that hackers are able to intercept any emails sent and change the recipients who will receive them.

```
name=Mario&email_from=mario%40mario.com
%0a%0dRCPT%20TO:%20testsmtp@mario.com&m
essage=This+is+a+test+message.
```

fig. 11 Example of email interception<sup>8</sup>

### Areas Affected

- <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/>

### Recommendations

As this attack can only be done by hackers in your local network, only send emails when in a trusted network, such as at your office<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Link to CVE: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38371>

<sup>8</sup> Source: <https://jagskap.blogspot.com/2019/06/smtp-injection.html>

<sup>9</sup> Additional information on vulnerability: <https://vuldb.com/?id.180505>

## Medium Risk

### 1. Hostsg server hosts multiple WordPress domains with similar vulnerabilities

We conducted a DNS lookup on abc.com.sg and found the IP address linked to it. Based on the domain name of the server, we concluded that abc.com.sg is hosted on a hostsg server.




fig. 12 DNS lookup result on abc.com.sg

## Impact

The server that hosts abc.com.sg hosts 213 other WordPress websites<sup>10</sup>, all with similar vulnerabilities to the vulnerabilities highlighted above. This presents more opportunities for hackers to access and/or crash the server. For example, a hacker would not need to target ***http://abc.com.sg/xmlrpc.php*** to run a DDOS attack. Instead, they can target ***http://1011audit.com.sg/xmlrpc.php***, and potentially, 212 more links to run a DDOS attack to bring down the server.

<sup>10</sup> Source: <https://hackertarget.com/reverse-ip-lookup/>




fig. 13 XML-RPC is enabled on other WordPress websites hosted on hostsg



fig. 14 Sample list of domains that are hosted on the same server that hosts abc.com.sg

### Areas Affected

- <http://abc.com.sg/>
- <http://cpanel.abc.com.sg/>
- <http://webmail.abc.com.sg/>

### Recommendations

Consider other hosting services to host the WordPress website.

## Summary

abc.com.sg is vulnerable due to misconfiguration on both the WordPress website and the hosting server. In the short term, website administrators can quickly remediate vulnerabilities that are accessible on the WordPress administrator's dashboard. In the long term, we recommend ABC Company to consider other hosting sites as its default configuration for WordPress websites are insecure.

abc.dyndns.org is secure and we could not find any vulnerabilities associated with the firewall.

Overall, all risks are associated with ABC Company's public profile. In comparison, ABC Company's key IT resources are secure.

## Appendix

### Appendix A: Tools used for Vulnerability Assessment

#### Tools to find any leaked credentials for people in ABC

- LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/abcgroup/>
- have I been pwned: <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>
- dehashed: <https://dehashed.com/>
  - Full results can be found in included file "Dehashed.docx"
- pwndb (dark web website): [www.pwndb2am4tzkvold.onion](http://www.pwndb2am4tzkvold.onion)

#### Tools to scan WordPress website

- nmap: <https://nmap.org/>
  - Full results can be found in included file "website\_nmap.txt"
- WPscan: <https://wpscan.com/>
  - Full results can be found in included file "website\_wpscan.txt"

#### Tools to scan firewall

- nmap: <https://nmap.org/>
  - Full results can be found in included file "firewall\_nmap.txt"



## Appendix B: Analysis on OSINT conducted on ABC employees

### OSINT on LinkedIn

The team first conducted Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) on ABC employees found from LinkedIn<sup>11</sup>. Even though the company listed 9 employees, we found that 6 of these employees work in a separate ABC company that is based in India.

For example, the Managing Director for ABC Company lives in Gurugram/Gurgaon, India, the same city that the Indian ABC Group is based in. We thus focused our research on James ABC, John ABC and Jane ABC.




fig. 15 Not all people listed actually work in ABC

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/abcgroup/>

## Finding leaked credentials (Related vulnerability: Employee Credentials leaked)

We used pwndb<sup>12</sup> to find any leaked credentials associated with abc.com.sg and found that there are no leaked credentials on pwndb. We then turned to dehashed<sup>13</sup> and found leaked credentials for John and Jane. All credentials found can be found in the file Dehashed.docx.

The image displays five sequential screenshots of the Dehashed search interface, illustrating the process of finding leaked credentials. Each screenshot shows a search input field on the left and a results panel on the right.

- Top Screenshot:** The search input field contains a redacted domain. The results panel shows a header "What's DeHashed and those results?" followed by a description of the service. Below this, there are input fields for "Email" and "Password", both of which are redacted.
- Second Screenshot:** The search input field contains a redacted domain. The results panel shows a header "Email" and a "Hashed Password" field, both of which are redacted.
- Third Screenshot:** The search input field contains a redacted domain. The results panel shows a header "Email" and a "Hashed Password" field, both of which are redacted.
- Fourth Screenshot:** The search input field contains a redacted domain. The results panel shows a header "Email" and a "Password" field, both of which are redacted.
- Bottom Screenshot:** The search input field contains a redacted domain. The results panel shows a header "Request entry removal" and a list of fields: "Name", "Email", "Username", "Hashed Password", and "Phone". The "Name" field is redacted, and the "Email" field is also redacted. The "Username" field is redacted, and the "Hashed Password" field is redacted. The "Phone" field is redacted.

<sup>12</sup> Link: [www.pwndb2am4tzkvold.onion](http://www.pwndb2am4tzkvold.onion)

<sup>13</sup> Link: <https://dehashed.com/>




fig. 16 Leaked credentials for John and Jane

This is also verified by <https://haveibeenpwned.com/> for john@abc.com.sg whose email has been pwned in 11 data breaches .




fig. 17 john@abc.com.sg has been pwned

## Appendix C: Analysis on abc.com.sg

### WordPress website uses http protocol

On first entering the website, we immediately noticed that the website uses the http protocol which means that information sent and received on the website is in clear text.




fig. 18 abc.com.sg uses http protocol

Key information that hackers may obtain on this website are leasing enquiries and emails who subscribe to their newsletter.

A screenshot of a contact form on a website. At the top, there is a grey rectangular placeholder. Below it is a dropdown menu with a double arrow icon. The form contains three input fields, each with a label to its left: "First Name:", "Last Name:", and "Contact Number". Each label is followed by a white rectangular input box with a thin grey border.

fig. 19 leasing enquiries may be intercepted



fig. 20 Emails may be intercepted

This issue is made even more glaring as abc.com.sg does not support https.





fig. 21 abc.com.sg does not support https protocol

**Subdomains also use http protocol** (*Related vulnerability: Credentials inputted on WordPress login pages in clear text*)

To find subdomains related to abc.com.sg, we conducted a DNS lookup<sup>14</sup> as well as a certificate search<sup>15</sup>. The key subdomains found are cpanel.abc.com.sg and webmail.abc.com.sg. Through this search, we also found that abc.com.sg is hosted on hostsg.com, at IP address 203.175.174.67. This IP address would later be used for an nmap scan.



DNS Servers		
ns2.hostsg.com.	103.14.244.188 ns2.hostsg.com	SGGS-AS-AP SG.GS Singapore
ns.hostsg.com.	103.14.246.1 ns.hostsg.com	SGGS-AS-AP SG.GS United Kingdom
ns3.hostsg.com.	103.14.244.188 ns2.hostsg.com	SGGS-AS-AP SG.GS Singapore

MX Records ** This is where email for the domain goes...		
		MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK South Korea

TXT Records ** Find more hosts in Sender Policy Framework (SPF) configurations		
"v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.smtp2go.com include:asp-spf1.yardi.com include:asp-spf2.yardi.com -all"		




  

Host Records (A) ** this data may not be current as it uses a static database (updated monthly)		
	203.175.174.67 svr07.cpanel.hostsg.com	SGGS-AS-AP SG.GS Singapore
HTTP: Apache FTP: 220- Welcome to Pure-FTPD privsep TLS -220-You are user number 3 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now		
	203.175.174.67 svr07.cpanel.hostsg.com	SGGS-AS-AP SG.GS Singapore
HTTP: Apache FTP: 220- Welcome to Pure-FTPD privsep TLS -220-You are user number 3 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now		

fig. 22 DNS lookup result from dnsdumpster

<sup>14</sup> Link: <https://dnsdumpster.com/>

<sup>15</sup> Link: <https://crt.sh/?q=abc.com.sg>

Criteria    Type: Identity   Match: ILIKE   Search: 'jmd.com.sg'						
crt.sh ID	Logged At ↑	Not Before	Not After	Common Name	Matching Identities	
<a href="#">5605560760</a>	2021-11-14	2021-11-14	2022-02-12			<a href="#">C=US, ST=TX, L=Hol</a>

fig. 23 Certificate search from crt.sh

Both cpanel.abc.com.sg and webmail.abc.com.sg use the http protocol. This presents a severe vulnerability as all credentials inputted will be shown in clear text and hackers can easily extract these credentials through a Man in the Middle attack.




fig. 24 cpanel and webmail uses http protocol

## Hosting server hosts 214 vulnerable WordPress websites *(Related vulnerability: Hostsg server hosts multiple WordPress domains with similar vulnerabilities)*

We further conducted research on hostsg.com and found that their main website also uses the http protocol. This does not inspire confidence on the security hostsg brings to the domains that are hosted on their servers.




fig. 25 hostsg uses http protocol

Using a reverse IP lookup<sup>16</sup>, we found that 214 WordPress websites are hosted on the same server as abc.com.sg. All the WordPress websites have the same vulnerabilities abc.com.sg and this presents more attack surfaces that hackers can target to access the server.

### WEB APPLICATION

WordPress	214
CKEditor	5
Magento	4
Joomla	2

fig. 26 hostsg server hosts 214 WordPress websites

<sup>16</sup> Links: <https://hackertarget.com/reverse-ip-lookup/> & <https://www.zoomeye.org/searchResult/report?q=203.175.174.67&t=web>



## WordPress scan on abc.com.sg overview

After enumerating potential attack surfaces, we scanned for vulnerabilities. We first used WordPress scan<sup>17</sup> to scan for any WordPress related vulnerabilities. Through the scan, we found two vulnerable services, XML-RPC and WP-Cron are enabled.

```
[+] XML-RPC seems to be enabled: [REDACTED]
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%
| References:
|   - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
|   - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner/
|   - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos/
|   - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login/
|   - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access/
```

fig. 27 XML-RPC is enabled

```
[+] The external WP-Cron seems to be enabled: [REDACTED]
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 60%
| References:
|   - https://www.iplocation.net/defend-wordpress-from-ddos
|   - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/issues/1299
```

fig. 28 WP-Cron is enabled

---

<sup>17</sup> <https://wpscan.com/wordpress-security-scanner>

### Privilege Escalation through XML-RPC (*Related vulnerability: Brute Force attack possible to login to WordPress website*)

The first vulnerability that is relevant to the features enabled is privilege escalation through XML-RPC (CVE-2020-28035<sup>18</sup>). This vulnerability is present for WordPress versions before 5.5.2 and the current version installed on abc.com.sg is 4.9.18.

```
[+] WordPress version 4.9.18 identified (Latest, released on 2021-05-13).  
| Found By: Rss Generator (Aggressive Detection)  
| - [REDACTED], <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.18<  
| - [REDACTED], <generator>https://wordpress.org/?
```

fig. 29 WordPress version 4.9.18 < 5.5.2

This feature enables POST requests to be made to the endpoint. If correct credentials are provided, data will be given back in response, else, the endpoint will respond with “Incorrect username or password”. This allows brute force attacks to test for the correct credentials through this endpoint. The following examples show example responses from the endpoint when correct and incorrect credentials are provided<sup>19</sup>.

---

<sup>18</sup> <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28035>

<sup>19</sup> Source:  
<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/honeypot-alert-wordpress-xml-rpc-brute-force-scanning/>

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
  <fault>
    <value>
      <struct>
        <member>
          <name>faultCode</name>
          <value><int>403</int></value>
        </member>
        <member>
          <name>faultString</name>
          <value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value>
        </member>
      </struct>
    </value>
  </fault>
</methodResponse>

```

fig. 30 Incorrect username/password given

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
  <params>
    <param>
      <value>
        <array><data>
          <value><struct>
            <member><name>isAdmin</name><value><boolean>1</boolean></value></member>
            <member><name>url</name><value><string>http://xxxxxxxx</string></value></member>
            <member><name>blogid</name><value><string>1</string></value></member>
            <member><name>blogName</name><value><string>xxxxxxxx</string></value></member>
            <member><name>xmlrpc</name><value><string>http://xxxxxxxx/xmlrpc.php</string></value></member>
          </struct></value>
        </data></array>
      </value>
    </param>
  </params>
</methodResponse>

```

fig. 31 Correct username/password given

**Distributed Denial of Service through XML-RPC and WP-Cron** (*Related vulnerability: Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)*)

The second vulnerability that is relevant to the features enabled is Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) through XML-RPC and WP-Cron. As mentioned above, the endpoint allows for POST requests to be sent to an endpoint. Hackers may use multiple servers to send POST requests simultaneously to the same endpoint, putting stress on the server. Additionally, this vulnerability is made worse as 214 vulnerable WordPress websites are hosted on the hostsg server, increasing the likelihood of a DDOS attack.

Additionally, wp-cron.php does not actually function like a typical cron job. Its default behaviour is to piggyback on incoming requests. Thus, WordPress generates an additional request from itself to the wp-cron file, doubling the number of requests to the server<sup>20</sup>.

---

<sup>20</sup> <https://medium.com/@thecpanelguy/the-nightmare-that-is-wpcron-php-ae31c1d3ae30>

## Nmap scan on hosting server overview

Finally, we ran an nmap scan on 203.175.174.67 that is the IP address of the server hosting abc.com.sg. While there are many open ports, the SMTP service was the only service that was vulnerable. An additional point of interest is that the https port is filtered, that explains why we could access `http://abc.com.sg` but not `https://abc.com.sg`.

**443/tcp**    **filtered** **https**

fig. 32 port 443 (https) is filtered

## Vulnerable SMTP service (*Related vulnerability: Email interception*)

The SMTP service uses Exim smtpd 4.94.2 and is open on ports 465, 587 and 1025. This version is vulnerable to response injection (buffering) during MTA SMTP sending (CVE-2021-38371<sup>21</sup>). Thankfully, the attack needs to be done on a local network and neither technical details nor an exploit are publicly available<sup>22</sup>.

Additionally, the SMTP service is linked to the webmail.abc.com.sg domain. After searching through the cpanel changelogs, the latest version of cpanel is still using Exim smtpd 4.94.2<sup>23</sup>. This means that updating cpanel will not make a difference and users will have to ensure that they only send emails from the domain on trusted networks.

97.9999.109

## 2021-07-13

- Fixed case COBRA-13083: Fix WHM's zone-reset logic to handle single-line SOA records.
- Fixed case COBRA-13088: Don't try creating service subdomains when resetting system-owned zones.
- Fixed case CPANEL-37745: Update cpanel-exim to 4.94.2-4.cp1198.

fig. 33 cpanel still uses Exim smtpd 4.94.2

<sup>21</sup> Link: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38371>

<sup>22</sup> Source: <https://vuldb.com/?id.180505>

<sup>23</sup> Source: <https://docs.cpanel.net/changelogs/>