## Microeconomics Diagrams


## Joel Pointon

## June 2020

All graphs in this document were created by Joel Pointon and can be found on GitHub. Note that graphs are displayed in alphabetical order.

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To make them indifferent between plan  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$  in graph 1, the firm must offer the prices above, leading to a CS of B. This is assuming that, if indifferent, the lower D will choose  $Q_1$  and the higher D will choose  $Q_2$ . For panel 2, the firm offers  $Q_3$  units (note  $Q_3 < Q_1$ ) and  $Q_2$  units at the prices above. Here, there CS is reduced at B which is less than the area of B in panel 1.

Figure 1: Second degree price discrimination




Figure 2: Third degree price discrimination and the optimum bundles for the firm




Figure 3: The aggregation of firms' supply curves with heterogeneous cost functions




Figure 4: The effect of an increase in the price of good x on the optimal consumption bundle




Figure 5: The Bertrand Competition equilibrium where firms have identical (constant) marginal costs




Figure 6: Incentives to cheat under Bertrand competition




Figure 7: Compensating variation using the Hicksian measure




Figure 8: Consumer surplus




Figure 9: Best Response Functions and the Cournot equilibrium




Figure 10: Cournot equilibrium and the outcome under collusion




Figure 11: The effect of a reduction in Firm A's marginal costs on the Cournot equilibrium




Figure 12: Comparing Cournot profits to A's profits as a monopolist




Figure 13: The efficient outcome given an endowment in an exchange economy




Figure 14: Deriving an Engel curve




Figure 15: A vertical game tree



Figure 16: The features of various market structures grouped by type - created with Dr Anthony Savagar and adapted from this post




Figure 17: The various outcomes under a natural monopoly




Figure 18: The long run industry supply curve from a finite amount of homogeneous firms




Figure 19: A perfectly competitive firm's supply curve in the short and long run




Figure 20: Indifference curves for perfect complements




Figure 21: Aggregating the agents' Willingness to Pay (WTP) for a public good




Figure 22: The effect of a change in income on quasi-linear preferences




Figure 23: Moving from a Cournot to Stackelberg equilibrium




Figure 24: Total surplus split into multiple sections