TUTORIAL 3

Week 4

Problem 1: The Household's Problem

Consider a representative consumer whose preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$U(C, l) = \ln(C) + \theta \ln(l)$$
,

where *C* is consumption, *l* is leisure, and $\theta > 0$ is a parameter.

Let w be the hourly wage, and assume that the government levies a lump sum tax T and a proportional tax on labour income $\tau \in (0,1)$. Finally, let π be the amount of profits (or dividends) that the consumer receives from a firm that he owns, and assume that h is the total hours that the household distributes between leisure and labour.

- 1. Write the consumer's budget constraint.
- 2. Write the consumer's optimisation problem.
- 3. Show that at the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between l and C equals the $w(1-\tau)$. Interpret.
- 4. Suppose $\pi T > 0$. Draw the budget constraint on the (l, C) plane, and a typical optimal choice for consumption and leisure.
- 5. Find the optimal (l^*, C^*) bundle as a function of the parameters of the household's problem.
- 6. Suppose that the government increases the proportional $\tan \tau$. Would the household work more or less than before? Explain by making reference to income and substitution effects.

Problem 2: Fixed Hours

Modify the standard problem of the consumer studied in class as follows. Suppose that the consumer must choose between working q > 0 hours or not working at all. Suppose that dividend income is zero, and that the consumer pays a tax T if she works, and receives an unemployment benefit in the amount b if she doesn't work.

- 1. Derive the optimal decision rule for hours worked. Show it in a diagram with w on the horizontal axis.
- 2. Suppose that the wage rate increases. How does this affect the consumer's hours of work?
- 3. Suppose that unemployment insurance *b* increases. How does this affect hours of work? Explain the implications of this fact for the design of unemployment insurance programs.