



# Improving the validity of brain-behavior associations



Russ Poldrack  
Stanford University

# What does a brain-behavior association mean?



# What does a brain-behavior association mean?





# What does a brain-behavior association mean?




# What does a brain-behavior association mean?



# What does a brain-behavior association mean?






brain

cognition



observed



fMRI

behavior

latent




brain

cognition



# fMRI

## behavior

## observed



## latent



# brain

## cognition

observed


fMRI

behavior

latent

brain

cognition



Assuming this model is true, what kinds of neural differences could give rise to cognitive differences?

# “Brain efficiency”

“A series of investigations in normal subjects indicate an inverse relationship between brain glucose metabolic rate and psychometric measures of intelligence. . . These studies have been interpreted as evidence for a *brain efficiency model of intelligence*:

Intelligence is not a function of how hard the brain works but rather how efficiently it works.” (Haier et al., 1992)

# “Brain efficiency”


“A series of investigations in normal subjects indicate an inverse relationship between brain glucose metabolic rate and psychometric measures of intelligence. . . These studies have been interpreted as evidence for a *brain efficiency model of intelligence*:

Intelligence is not a function of how hard the brain works but rather how efficiently it works.” (Haier et al., 1992)”

Is this really an explanation?

# Efficiency: A thought experiment

- A Prius and a Porsche both drive from San Francisco to Los Angeles via the same route at the same speed.
- The Prius uses half as much fuel as the Porsche. How do we explain this?




# Efficiency: A thought experiment


1. The Prius has a gas-electric hybrid engine (which uses surplus engine power to generate electricity which is then turned back into drive power) and regenerative braking (which captures energy that would otherwise be lost as heat).
2. The Prius is more efficient.

# Explaining brain-behavior associations


- “Efficiency” is a non-explanation
  - It simply renames the phenomenon
- What kinds of neural differences might actually explain these associations?
  - Different intensity of neuronal activity
  - Different duration of neuronal activity



# Difference in intensity of neural activity




# Difference in duration of neural activity




Changes in rate vs. duration of neural firing are  
indistinguishable in fMRI


# Same duration, different amplitude



# Same amplitude, different duration



# The effects of amplitude and duration are indistinguishable in the fMRI signal




# The response time paradox



- In cognitive psychology, differences in RT are the measure of interest
  - Thus, nearly all task comparisons will exhibit a difference in RT

# The response time paradox

- From the standpoint of fMRI, these same RT differences reflect a potential confound
  - We can't tell whether the differences in activation are truly due to differences in neural computation, or simply




# Response time correlates in fMRI are very strong




# What about brain-behavior associations?

- Under the standard analysis approach (ignoring RT), if there are:
  - differences in the overall BOLD response (regardless of condition) across people
  - variability in the RT difference between conditions across people
- This can induce an artifactual correlation



# Spurious brain-behavior correlations

- When overall BOLD response (across all conditions) differs by some subject feature (e.g. age), then this can lead to spurious brain-behavior associations with that feature
  - Even when there is no true relationship between age and activation (condition differences) or RT!



# Can it be fixed by regressing out RT at the group level?

- No!
  - Simulations show that regressing RT out at the group level could actually *increase* the size of the spurious effect.

Without RT regressor in group model:

	t	p
Age	2.698	0.008

With RT regressor in group model:

	t	p
Age	7.163	0.000

# Solution: Model RT at the first level

Model name	Unconvolved regressor	Duration	Modulation
1 Constant Duration, no RT <b>(ConsDurNoRT)</b>		.1s	None
		.1s	None
2 RT Duration <b>(RTDur)</b>		RT	None
		RT	None
3 Constant Duration, RT <b>(ConsDurRT)</b>		.1s	None
		.1s	None
		.1s	RT*


The standard model

The Grinband et al. (2008) model


The Mumford et al. model

The Constant Duration + RT model allows quantification of the unique contributions of time on task and condition differences

# Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater?



Activation for Stroop effect disappears after removing RT effect




# With sufficient power, we can find specific effects even after removing RT

Without RT modeling

With RT modeling

# Modeling RT at the first level prevents spurious relations with RT and other correlates of BOLD response



Without first-level RT modeling:

	$t$	$p$
Age	2.698	0.008

With first-level RT modeling:

	$t$	$p$
Age	0.562	0.575

# Confound modeling is not a magic balm

- There is a general sense evident from brain-behavior association studies that regression can magically cure all that ails us
- Simply adding regressors will not fix many problems, and can cause others
  - Collider bias
    - When a confound regressor is a common effect of X and Y variables
  - Measurement error (Westfall & Yarkoni, 2016)



# Conclusions

- Response time is a major potential confound for all task fMRI studies
  - Without adjustment, it is impossible to determine whether activations simply reflect time on task
- If response time effects are not modeled at the first level, they can result in spurious brain-behavior associations

# Acknowledgments


## The Poldrack Lab



## Jeanette Mumford



## Funding



<https://poldrack.github.io/talks-BrainBehaviorAssociation/>