

FROM PROTEST TO PRODUCT: STRATEGIC FRAME BROKERAGE IN A COMMERCIAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

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Social movement organizations that engage directly in commercial activities face the particular challenge of mobilizing movement activists and commercial actors simultaneously. In a seven-year case study of a Sicilian anti-racket social movement organization that uses commercial activities to combat Mafia racketeering, we show how strategic framing enables such dual mobilization. Our findings show that original anti-racket social movement frames were modified through a process of strategic frame brokerage that incorporated, through interaction, the distributed interpretations of tourists, tourism service providers, and anti-racket activists. As a result of this process, original social movement frames were retained, transformed, or managed through selective referral. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on processes of frame development, social enterprise, and commercialization as a “mobilizing technology” for social movements.

On the streets of Palermo, the Sicilian capital, it is common to see groups of tourists wearing the brightly colored T-shirts of Addiopizzo Travel (AT), an organization founded in 2009 to advance the goals of the local anti-racket movement. Specifically, AT aims to end Mafia extortion of protection money (called the “*pizzo*”) that has historically affected more than 90% of Sicilian businesses (Santino, 2010). AT offers tours of Sicilian hotels, shops, and restaurants that publicly pledge to defy the *pizzo*, and thereby mobilizes tourists to support these businesses’ resistance of Mafia power. While AT has come to be viewed as an important innovation both

within the anti-racket movement and within the responsible tourism industry, it initially struggled to convey the meaning of its commercial activities to these diverse audiences. As an extension of the anti-racket movement, AT presented its offerings as a part of the movement’s combative approach to fighting racketeering, but this framing often left tourists and other tourism businesses feeling confused or threatened. Yet, AT’s attempts to recast itself to fit tourist expectations met resistance from anti-racket activists concerned that such changes violated the movement’s values. AT’s founders therefore asked themselves, “How can we meet the demands of the market without betraying the anti-racket movement?” (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

Past research documents “private politics” (Baron, 2003) by which social movements apply political pressure in order to influence business practices (Hiatt, Grandy, & Lee, 2015). Movements contest the practices and policies of specific businesses (McDonnell, King, & Soule, 2015; van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004) and entire industries (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; King & Pearce, 2010) through framing and contentious tactics such as organization of product boycotts (King, 2008; McDonnell & King,

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2013), coordination of shareholder resolutions (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999), and organization of employee activism (Briscoe & Safford, 2008). Movements may also provide political and institutional support to firms favorable to their causes (Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008).

Alternatively, some social movement organizations eschew such indirect political action to *directly* sell goods or services that enact movement ideology (Akemu, Whiteman, & Kennedy, 2016). For instance, anti-poverty activists have founded fair-trade organizations to sell agricultural products grown by farmers in the developing world and delivered according to anti-poverty principles (Davies, Doherty, & Knox, 2010). Similarly, Grange activists entered insurance with products that espouse agrarian ideology (Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008), and environmental activists have created “green” products in fields such as banking (Almandoz, Lee, & Marquis, 2017) and construction (York, Vedula, & Lenox, 2018).

Such commercial social movement organizations face the challenge of appealing to customers and other actors in the industries they enter (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003) while also preserving support within the social movements whose goals they share (Benford & Snow, 2000). Social movement organizations frame their activities strategically to align with the frames of potential supporters (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Yet, the extant frames applied within commercial industries and social movements are likely to lead to differing interpretations, which may impose conflicting pressures: products and services framed to align with the social movement frames may be perceived as inconsistent with industry frames, and vice versa. In which case, how might a social movement organization entering an existing industry best frame its commercial activities?

We explored this question through a case study of AT and its shifting commercial offerings and framing strategies, drawing on interviews, observations, and archival data from 2009 to 2016. Our results suggest that commercial activities may be framed to resonate simultaneously with movement activists and industry actors through strategic frame brokerage by leaders of the social movement organization: in our study, interactions between AT leaders and multiple supporter groups surfaced symbolic constraints that AT leaders incorporated in subsequent changes to original social movement frames. Our analysis further identified three pathways by which original social movement frames were brokered vis-à-vis

commercial actors: some frames were retained, others transformed, and still others were selectively referred to other parts of the social movement for education and mobilization. Frames resulting from this brokerage process were subsequently enacted in the development of new commercial activities.

Our paper contributes to three specific areas of research. First, our work advances research on processes of frame development, which has typically described frame development either as a “top-down” process, dependent on the independent perception and foresight of strategic framing actors (e.g., Snow et al., 1986), or as a “bottom-up” process of frame emergence through interaction (Gray, Purdy, & Ansari, 2015). Our model shows how strategic framing actors incorporate interactions in frame development by eliciting and integrating meanings via interaction with multiple supporter groups. We believe our model is an important contribution to understanding the role of interaction in the study of strategic framing (Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006).

Second, our findings contribute to research on social enterprise and hybrid organizations (Battilana & Lee, 2014) by identifying how social enterprises interact with broader social movements that share their goals. While previous work has typically characterized social enterprises’ social missions as the enactment of higher-level institutional logics (Pache & Santos, 2013), such social enterprises are also likely to be influenced by social movements’ existing frames and ideologies as they attempt to establish commercial activities. Our findings suggest that the multiple, potentially conflicting pressures faced by social enterprises depend on interpretive frames, and offer insight into how resulting challenges such as mission drift (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015) may be managed through strategic framing. In so doing, our research responds to repeated calls for research that makes use of social movement concepts to examine into the functioning of social enterprises (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey 2011; York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016).

Third and finally, our research sheds new light upon direct commercial activity as a “mobilizing technology” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004) that supplements traditional social movement repertoires (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Whereas the social movement literature has generally emphasized mobilization based on ideological alignment (Snow & Benford, 1988), our study illustrates the capacity of commercial social movement organizations to mobilize support among supporters that may be

unfamiliar with movement ideology. We discuss potential limits of commercial mobilization, as well as consequences of commercialization for activism in general.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Strategic and Interactional Framing Processes in Social Movement Organizations

A social movement organization is a “complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement . . . and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218). In doing so, social movement organizations mobilize tangible and intangible resources, such as labor, money, and legitimacy, from supporters (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Early studies of social movement organizations explained resource mobilization as resulting from the structure of incentives that accrue to supporters when a movement’s goals are realized (Jenkins, 1983; see also Olson, 1965). Mobilizing incentives may include both material and non-material benefits: a movement might simultaneously gain the support of an aggrieved group that will materially benefit from realization of the movement’s goals (Morris, 1981) as well as “conscience constituents” who do not materially benefit but are nonetheless support the movement on the basis of ideology (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

Beginning in the 1980s, the attention of researchers studying mobilization shifted from incentives to interpretive processes, and specifically the interpretive frames by which potential supporters make sense of social movement organizations and their activities (Snow et al., 1986). Frames are “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974) that draw potential supporters’ attention toward certain elements of situations (Williams & Benford, 2000), thus “demarcating and punctuating” these elements as meaningful (Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006). Effective frames satisfy multiple functions in the psychology of mobilization, or core “framing tasks,” each associated with a stage of the interpretive process: diagnosis of a social problem and its causes; prognosis of possible solutions, including actions and tactics by which these solutions might be achieved; and motivation to act to bring about these solutions (Snow & Benford, 1988). Achievement of complex social movement goals frequently requires broad support, requiring “collective action frames” capable of mobilizing a diverse coalition of supporters (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Snow & Benford, 1988).

Due to the central role of framing in mobilization, a central question is how collective action frames develop (Snow et al., 1986). Previous studies of framing processes have followed two main perspectives. First, strategic framing theorists emphasize the agency of social movement organization leaders (Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988) to strategically frame their activities to resonate with potential supporters and thus elicit support (Benford & Snow, 2000). To achieve resonance, movement organization leaders modify existing movement frames to fit the existing interpretive frameworks of desired supporters, through various frame alignment processes: strategic amplification of existing movement frames, extension of these frames to encompass supporter interests, linkage of these frames to the frames held by supporters, and the transformation of existing frames into novel frames (Snow et al., 1986). Some strategic framing researchers argue that mobilization success is significantly determined by the skillful implementation of these processes (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Snow et al., 1986).

While the “top-down” strategic framing perspective is prevalent in framing research (see Cornelissen & Werner, 2014), a second, interactionist perspective emphasizes “bottom-up” processes by which frames are socially constructed through interaction among multiple actors (Benford, 1997; Gray et al., 2015). The interactionist approach builds on symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1971) to portray frame development as emerging from repeated interaction among collective actors (Collins, 2004). Frames arise and change through processes of “keying” and “lamination” (Goffman, 1974): *keying* consists of the reinterpretation of activities originally associated with existing collective frames, leading to the assignment of new meanings to these activities, which may subsequently be *laminated* to existing frames (Goffman, 1974), resulting in the transformation of existing frames into new ones (Gray et al., 2015; Snow & Benford, 1988). For instance, the practice of vegetarianism was initially conceived as resistance to the exploitation of animals, but when this practice was recognized (keyed) as a way of managing one’s health, this additional meaning was laminated upon the original meaning, thus transforming the meaning of the practice (Maurer, 2002). Changes in a social movement organization’s activities or supporters may also occasion new keyings and laminations, and thereby accelerate the processes by which collective action frames are transformed (Gray et al., 2015).

The Framing Challenge of Social Movement Organizations Engaged in Commercial Activities

Social movement organizations may engage in the direct sale of products or services that enact movement ideology as a means to broaden movement participation (Zald & Denton, 1963). Strategic framing poses a special challenge to commercial social movement organizations (Akemu et al., 2016; Sine & Lee, 2009), because the collective action frames must reconcile how their activities are interpreted by the social movement and its activists on the one hand and industry actors on the other. Past research suggests that it may be difficult to gain favor from both groups simultaneously, while these conflicting pressures can pose a substantial threat to the organization's viability (McInerney, 2014).

Potential supporters are likely to view a social movement organization's commercial activities through the prevailing frames in their respective domains. Social movement activists are likely to interpret movement activities in terms of the existing frames used by the social movement to compel collective action (Benford & Snow, 2000). By contrast, customers, partners, and other industry actors interpret commercial activities in terms of industry field frames, or "social structures of meanings and resources that underpin and stabilize practices and social organization" within an existing industry (Lounsbury et al., 2003: 71). Interpretations of commercial activities through existing industry field frames and collective action frames are almost certain to differ (Khaire & Wadhvani, 2010).

Although social movement organizations are motivated to strategically frame their activities to resonate with both groups, frames strategically chosen to align with one group may lead to incomplete or undesirable interpretations by the other. By focusing on the frame development process of a commercial social movement organization, this study aims to understand how such organizations strategically develop frames to mobilize industry actors while retaining the support of the social movements whose goals they share.

METHODS

We conducted an in-depth, longitudinal case study (Langley, 1999) of AT, a social movement organization founded in 2009 by a group of anti-racket activists to enter the tourism industry. AT designed, sold, and delivered tourism services that exclusively patronized anti-racket businesses, and thereby sought to incentivize other businesses to adopt

anti-racket policies and to advance the movement's goal of eradicating Mafia racketeering. During its founding process, AT faced simultaneous pressures to adopt the frames of the anti-racket movement and the industry field frames of the responsible tourism industry. In the following sections, we briefly describe the characteristics of the movement from which AT emerged and the responsible tourism industry into which it entered. We then detail our research methodology.

Empirical Context: The Anti-racket Movement and the Responsible Tourism Industry

The Sicilian anti-racket movement. Criminal organizations worldwide practice racketeering and extortion to extract financial resources and control territory (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). The Sicilian Mafia, the most powerful and pervasive criminal organization in the Italian region of Sicily (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2005), has historically exercised control through a system of extortion, called the *pizzo*, that decreased business profits and reinforced Mafia power (Lodato, 2007). A Sicilian anti-racket movement initially emerged in the early 1990s, before which few business owners resisted the *pizzo* (Forno & Gunnarson, 2009). Yet movement efforts to draw attention to the *pizzo* and prosecute Mafia members failed, and in some cases whistleblowers suffered violent retribution at the hands of Mafia agents (Santino, 2010). Such events reinforced the view among business owners that defiance of the *pizzo* was prohibitively dangerous. In the early 2000s, almost 90% of Sicilian entrepreneurs continued to pay the *pizzo* (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2005).

A more organized anti-racket social movement emerged in the early 2000s in Palermo, the Sicilian capital. The renewed movement mobilized a network of anti-racket entrepreneurs, business owners, and customers based on the rationale that organized mass resistance could protect local entrepreneurs against violence and give them confidence to resist Mafia pressure (Santino, 2010). In 2005, the movement introduced an anti-racket certification called "Addiopizzo" (literally, "goodbye, protection money"): Sicilian firms and shopkeepers that refused to pay the *pizzo* could publicly signal their support for the movement by obtaining the Addiopizzo certification. Anti-racket activists began to call on civil society and consumers to support shops with Addiopizzo certification, while also physically protecting these businesses from Mafia retaliation

(Santino, 2010). To mobilize these civil society and consumer supporters, the anti-racket movement framed its activities in terms of a strongly defined set of values—"desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives" (Schwartz, 1996: 2; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). The values used as frames by the anti-racket movement are summarized in Table 1.

The anti-racket movement's value-based framing proved highly effective in mobilizing collective action among members of Sicilian society (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015), and the movement achieved early success in organizing resistance to the *pizzo*. At the end of 2006, one year after the introduction of the Addiopizzo certification, the movement had received public declarations of support from hundreds of activists, 12 nonprofit associations, 136 certified *pizzo*-free businesses, and 8,269 responsible consumers who explicitly declared their willingness to buy only from certified *pizzo*-free shops and firms. The movement grew quickly, and, by 2009, 419 businesses held the Addiopizzo certification and the movement had received public support from thousands of activists, 18 associations, and 9,972 responsible consumers. The anti-racket movement also maintained partnerships with the Sicilian police, the local chamber of commerce, schools, universities, and industry associations. Broad support for Addiopizzo led to an increased belief among Sicilian businesses, particularly in Palermo, that refusal to pay the *pizzo* was a viable option (Santino, 2010).

TABLE 1
Values the Anti-racket Social Movement Used to
Frame Its Activities

Anti-racket values	Sources
Dignity	Forno and Gunnarson (2009), Santino (2010)
Legality	Gunnarson (2014)
Freedom	Santino (2010), Vaccaro and Palazzo (2015)
Critical consumption	Forno and Gunnarson (2009), Partridge (2012)
Honor	Lodato (2007), Vaccaro and Palazzo (2015)
Security	Partridge (2012)
Unity	Santino (2010), Vaccaro and Palazzo (2015)
Community	Forno and Gunnarson (2009), Partridge (2012)
Justice	Gunnarson (2014)
Denunciation	Santino (2010)
Solidarity	Gunnarson (2014), Partridge (2012)

Despite the high visibility of their political organizing and certification efforts, members of the anti-racket movement viewed its influence as limited by the local scope of its supporters. In 2009, a group of anti-racket activists launched AT as a new social movement organization with the specific objective of mobilizing the responsible tourism industry to support businesses in the anti-racket network and thus expand the base of support for their cause.

The responsible tourism industry. The responsible tourism industry is composed of tourism companies—tour operators, travel agencies, hotels, B&Bs, and restaurants—that provide tourism services and initiatives that, while being enjoyable and pleasant, also aim at the protection and development of host communities and their cultural and environmental heritage (Stanford, 2008). In 2002, the Cape Town Conference on Responsible Tourism in Destinations issued a declaration that is now widely accepted as the founding document of the industry worldwide. It defined responsible tourism as a field that would responsibly manage tourism's economic, social, and environmental impacts, favoring positive and meaningful interactions between responsible tourists and local communities. The responsible tourism industry has grown significant larger in recent decades (Lee, Jan, & Yang, 2013). As in other countries, in Italy, it has developed as a branch of the traditional tourism industry, mainly focusing on initiatives such as ecotourism and community-based tourism that prioritize cultural preservation and environmentalism (Del Chiappa, Grappi, & Romani, 2016).

Data Collection

To address our research question, we conducted a seven-year field study. We learned of plans for the creation of AT in July 2009, a few months before AT's official founding, at which time we began collecting data. We continued through to September 2016. At different points in our study timeline, we conducted 73 semi-structured interviews of AT's entrepreneurs, responsible tourism actors (tourists and tourism service providers such as travel agents, hoteliers, and restaurateurs), and anti-racket movement activists. We focused on these external actors because of their critical role in influencing AT communication strategy. While activists, motivated by social movement frames, pressured AT to communicate its activities in terms of the movement's goal to eliminate the *pizzo*, customers and tourism service providers

pressured AT to present its initiatives as enjoyable and meaningful, in accordance with responsible tourism industry frames. We also engaged in 41 days of naturalistic observation of actors, events, and activities of AT and of the anti-racket movement. We supplemented our interview and observational data with data on the internal and external communications of AT (224 documents) and the anti-racket movement (443 documents), previous scholarly accounts of the anti-racket movement (15 documents), and reports produced by AT tourists (42 documents). Table 2 provides further detail on our data sources.

Semi-structured interviews. Our semi-structured interviews with AT entrepreneurs, responsible tourism industry actors, and anti-racket activists each lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. When possible, interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. We interviewed all six AT entrepreneurs, including the three founders and three who joined later, as well as five anti-racket activists not formally affiliated with AT. Finally, we conducted phone interviews with actors from the responsible tourism industry: five tourism service providers

with longstanding partnerships with AT and seven tourists selected from AT's database.

Our interviews followed an initial protocol reflecting our research question (Alvesson, 2003) that we adapted to the characteristics of different informants and to the theoretical constructs that emerged over the course of our research. In our first stage of data collection, the protocol focused on investigating the main challenges AT faced in attempting to develop business activities that would simultaneously satisfy both the responsible tourism industry and the anti-racket movement. The key role of responsible tourists, tourism service providers, and AT's communications to these groups emerged at this stage, leading us to collect additional data focused on these themes. In particular, we noticed that tourists and tourism service providers had a common understanding and similar expectations regarding AT's activities, and that AT communicated about its activities similarly with both. We therefore adapted our interview protocol to ask AT's entrepreneurs to reflect and comment on (a) *how* they communicated their activities to render them meaningful to tourists and tourism service

TABLE 2
Sources of Information

Source of information		Use of information collected (between 2009 and 2016)
<i>Addiopizzo Travel (AT)</i>		
Interviews with AT entrepreneurs	40 interviews	a. Characterization of AT activities and objectives pursued over time
Internal documents	56 documents	b. Characterization of the frames used by AT to make sense of its activities with industry actors and anti-racket activists over time
Communication to media	51 documents	c. Characterization of the interaction of AT with industry actors and anti-racket activists
Advertising	31 documents	d. Characterization of visibility and impact achieved by AT over time
Media coverage	86 documents	e. Understanding of the rationale beyond the choice to retain, transform, and selectively refer frames
Direct observation	41 days	
<i>Responsible tourism industry</i>		
Interviews with tourism players	11 interviews	a. Characterization of the frames held by industry actors
Interviews with tourists	7 interviews	b. Characterization of the reactions of industry actors to the framing strategies of AT
Tourists' reports	42 documents	c. Characterization of the nature of interactions between AT and industry actors
<i>Anti-racket movement</i>		
Interviews with activists	15 interviews	a. Characterization of the ideology and goals of the social movement
Books and scientific articles	15 documents	b. Development of historical account of the evolution of the movement in Sicily and its impact
Communications of anti-racket movement	122 documents	c. Characterization of the strategies used by the movement to motivate entrepreneurs, consumers, and civil society to rebel against the Mafia
Media coverage	321 documents	d. Characterization of the frames held by anti-racket activists
		e. Characterization of the interactions of the anti-racket movement with AT
		f. Characterization of the reaction of the anti-racket movement to the framing strategy of AT

providers, and (b) *how* and *why* they changed their communication over time. We also interviewed tourists, tourism service providers, and anti-racket activists to understand the expectations they had before working or traveling with AT and how they interacted with AT.

Naturalistic observation. We also collected observational data during key events of the anti-racket movement in Sicily and the evolution of AT. One of the authors participated periodically in anti-racket movement events and meetings in Sicily beginning in the early 2000s, and, prior to the founding of AT, attended formal and informal meetings with the entrepreneurs who were discussing whether to establish the organization and its provisional strategy. After AT's founding in 2009, two of the authors observed AT activities during board meetings, office hours, and tours. These observations provided us with a richer understanding of the context for the evolution of AT.

Archival data. To increase internal and external reliability of our analysis, we used data from archival sources such as records provided to us by AT, media articles, and snapshots of the AT website captured over time.

Data Analysis

Consistent with the tenets of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), we analyzed the data following an inductive and interactive approach that included three recursive steps (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).

Step 1: Empirical themes In the first step of data analysis, we performed open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 61) to identify key empirical themes that described how AT communicated its activities and interacted with external actors. In particular, we noticed that AT initially designed and communicated its tourism offerings to the responsible tourism industry (i.e., tourists and tourism service providers) relying extensively on some values used by the anti-racket social movement as frames—"security," "dignity," "denunciation," and "community." Table 3 shows how the anti-racket movement used these frames to mobilize support.

We further noticed that, over time, certain of these original anti-racket values progressively disappeared from AT communication, while others—"environmentalism," "sustainability," and "beauty"—began to emerge. For instance, "security" was extensively used in AT's early communication, between 2009 and 2010, and then

disappeared. Instead, from 2013 onward, AT began using "sustainability" to explain to tourists the impact of the *pizzo* on local businesses and the role that AT and responsible tourists could have in addressing it.

Through open coding of our data, we also noticed that changes in framing seemed to be associated with interactions between AT and either responsible tourism industry actors or anti-racket movement activists. In these interactions, AT appeared acutely aware of whether their present communications resonated with these two groups, and reacted strongly to apparent failures to resonate. However, at this stage of analysis, it was still not clear how to make theoretical sense of our empirical themes and, more broadly, of AT's communication strategy. Hence, we entered into a second stage of data analysis aimed at organizing the empirical themes we identified into more theoretically anchored conceptual categories. Our aim was to deepen our theoretical understanding of (a) AT communication, and (b) how and why it changed over time.

Step 2a: Conceptual categories—characterizing AT communication. In this second stage of data analysis, we adopted a more abductive approach, moving back and forth between our data and research on framing in social movements (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Snow & Benford, 1988) and, specifically, on frame analysis (e.g., Creed, Langstraat, & Scully, 2002; Goffman, 1974). Frame analysis led us to recognize that the values used by AT to communicate about its activities—security, dignity, sustainability, beauty, environmentalism, denunciation, and community—could be coded as "frames"; that is, as unifying concepts that hold together and give coherence to a package of integrated *idea elements* that compose a text (Creed et al., 2002). To identify connections among different idea elements that characterized the texts AT produced, we followed the frame identification methodology introduced by Gamson and Lasch (1983) and further developed by Creed and colleagues (2002). Following this approach, we constructed a signature matrix to sort different idea elements into the following eight categories: metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences, and appeals to principles (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Table 4 shows the signature matrix for the values AT used as frames.

For example, we applied frame analysis to the following statement on the AT website advertising a tour in Corleone, a small village well known as the hometown of some Mafia bosses:

TABLE 3
Anti-Racket Movement's Adoption of Security, Dignity, Denunciation, and Community to Frame Its Activities

Value	Security	Dignity	Denunciation	Community
Definition and adoption of the values by the movement	Security means guaranteeing the protection of those who resist the practice of paying protection money, their families, and their business assets (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015)	Dignity is the quality of being worthy of honor and respect for having the courage to rebel against the Mafia (Lodato, 2007; Santino, 2010)	Denunciation is defined and applied by the movement as reporting extortionists to the police (Santino, 2010)	The movement works to build a network of entrepreneurs, consumers, and activists who rebel against the Mafia and the practice of the <i>pizzo</i> (Anti-racket movement website)
Anti-racket movement adoption	"Thanks to the work of the movement, the police, and many institutions, anti-racket businesses can now defy the <i>pizzo</i> and report extortionists without risk of retaliation" (Anti-racket movement, July 2013)	"The citizens of Palermo now have the responsibility to take a stand against extortionists and get their dignity back" (Press release, December 2016)	"Denunciation is now possible: Next March 9–10, two associations of the movement will meet with locals to talk about the <i>pizzo</i> and explain how to denounce extortionists" (Anti-racket movement press release, March 2012)	"Libero Grassi [one of the first entrepreneurs who reported an extortionist to the police] was killed because he was left alone" (AT activists, on an Italian TV show)
	"For many years, a lack of security has been a good reason and sometimes a good excuse to refuse to report extortionists to the police. That's why we work to guarantee the security of those who fight against the Mafia" (Anti-racket activist, interview)	"The anti-racket activists of Barcellona [a village] have recently organized a protest to prompt local entrepreneurs and business owners to join them in a journey of legality and dignity" (Anti-racket press release, May 2009)	"The Mafia myth is challenged because of the thousands of denunciations by local entrepreneurs. It is time to denounce. It is time to rebel against the Mafia: now or, maybe, never" (Anti-racket movement website, December 2016)	"Everybody should take a stand against extortionists. We believe that the Mafia can be defied only if it is challenged by a large network that involves citizens, institutions, and professionals" (Free professional associations, 2009)
	"Lack of protection is one of the main reasons why businesses have always paid the <i>pizzo</i> " (AT activists, interview)	"A population that pays the <i>pizzo</i> is a population without dignity" (Anti-racket movement motto)	"Business owners do not denounce because they are used to the racketeers: they seem normal to them" (Anti-racket movement website, 2009)	"Victims of extortion can't defeat the Mafia if they are alone. They ask for our support" (Anti-racket movement press-release, March 2010)
Objective	To compel local supporters to guarantee the safety of anti-racket activists and people who denounce extortionists	To compel local entrepreneurs, citizens, activists, and consumers to rebel against the Mafia	To motivate entrepreneurs to find the courage to denounce the Mafia	To motivate activists, entrepreneurs, citizens, police, and consumers to communicate and collaborate

Surprising Corleone: Discover this picturesque village in the middle of Sicily. . . its green hills that stretch out as far as the eye can see and the warm hospitality of local people who fight the racketeers. . . The name of this village is sadly linked to Mafia violence. We invite you to discover the real Corleone, beyond clichés and stereotypes. The guided tour will show you the real beauty of Corleone: the anti-Mafia efforts of locals and its astonishing landscapes. (AT website, 2015)

Frame analysis enabled us to code beauty as the frame underlying the idea elements contained in six categories presented in the text. Beauty is the

overarching concept holding together metaphors (astonishing landscapes), exemplars (locals who fight against the Mafia), catchphrases (Corleone beyond clichés), roots (racketeers' violence), consequences (Corleone trapped in a negative cliché), and depiction (the warm hospitality of local people who fight the Mafia) associated with the *pizzo* problem.

With frame analysis, we also realized that AT used the frames to (a) characterize the *pizzo* as a problematic issue, (b) articulate a proposed solution to it, and (c) expose a rationale for engaging in corrective action. In other words, AT used categories and underlying frames to accomplish three framing tasks: (1)

TABLE 4
Signature Matrix Used to Code Frames

	Security	Dignity	Denunciation	Community	Beauty	Environmentalism	Sustainability
<i>Metaphors</i> (rhetorical devices to highlight, by resemblance, some characteristics of the principal subject)	Metaphorical representation of "heroes" as useless in the fight against Mafia	Anti-racket entrepreneurs who refuse to pay the <i>pizzo</i> high	Denunciations are like breathing for the movement	The growing anti-racket family	Astonishing Sicilian landscapes and breathtaking countryside	Cycling as an environmentally friendly transportation system	AT's achievements as a metaphor for the sustainability of the organizations involved
<i>Exemplars</i> (representative events/people of the past/present)	Show Sicilian markets where anti-racket entrepreneurs can safely run their businesses	Stories of people who accepted having to pay and became slaves of the Mafia without dignity	Meetings with people who denounced racketeers to the police	Stories of activists and entrepreneurs who collaborate to build a Mafia-free economy	Stories of anti-racket activists and entrepreneurs who protect(ed) Sicilian cultural, historical, and environmental heritage	Tours of organic farms holding the anti-racket certificate	Stories of financially sustainable and environmentally friendly Sicilian businesses
<i>Catchphrases</i> (slogans and statements summarizing the package)	"Refusing the <i>pizzo</i> should be a safe choice"	"An entire population who pays the <i>pizzo</i> is a population without dignity"	"Tourists can also play a role in denouncing the <i>pizzo</i> "	"The more we are, the stronger we are: join us!"	"Discover the real beauties of Sicily beyond clichés"	"Discover Sicily in an environmentally friendly way"	"We want to leave a better Sicily"
<i>Depictions</i> (characterizations of subjects)	Activists and business owners who rebel against the <i>pizzo</i> are normal people	Anti-racket entrepreneurs are worthy of respect. Racketeers are not	Whistleblowers as good citizens	Tourists and tourism players as members of the anti-racket network	AT entrepreneurs love Sicily and want to show what it has to offer	Mafia racketeers are criminals destroying the Sicilian environment	AT and other anti-racket businesses as organizations that can thrive without paying the <i>pizzo</i>
<i>Visual images</i> (icons and visual images that suggest the core of the frame)	Image of the anti-racket certification	Images of smiling and proud anti-racket activists	Images of whistleblowers on AT website	Images of groups of tourists and activists together	Images of activists and Sicilian landscapes	Images of cyclists	Images of AT entrepreneurs as successful and realized
<i>Roots</i> (explanation of the causes underlying the events)	Lack of security explains why Sicilian entrepreneurs pay the <i>pizzo</i>	Sicilians have accepted the <i>pizzo</i> as unavoidable	Racketeers are powerful because nobody reports them to the police	Racketeers enforced the payment of protection money by isolating entrepreneurs	Racketeers are powerful because people do not protect the beauty of Sicily	Racketeers should be challenged because they destroy the Sicilian environment	The <i>pizzo</i> is the main cause of the lack of sustainability of many Sicilian businesses
<i>Consequences</i> (effects of different policies)	Protection enables entrepreneurs to defy racketeers	Accepting the <i>pizzo</i> implies losing self-esteem	Not reporting racketeers to police will override any effort to challenge the <i>pizzo</i>	A large and diversified network can defeat the Mafia	Racketeers have destroyed Sicilian beauty	Responsible tourists can protect the Sicilian environment	Tourists can guarantee the sustainability of anti-racket enterprises
<i>Appeals to principle</i> (general precepts)	The goal is to protect anti-racket entrepreneurs	Give dignity back to Sicily	Extortionists should be reported to the police	The <i>pizzo</i> is not only a Sicilian issue	Beauty in all its forms must be protected	The environment must be protected	Businesses should be sustainable

diagnostic framing—“identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality”; (2) *prognostic framing*—“not only to suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics and targets”; and (3) *motivational framing*—“elaboration of a call to arms” (Snow & Benford, 1988: 200–202). For example, AT’s framing of the Corleone tour diagnoses the problem as the Mafia creating a negative image of Corleone that obscures the beauty of the village. The prognostic framing is that the support of local entrepreneurs who fight against the racketeers might reverse this negative image. The motivational framing is that tourists can visit Corleone to discover the real beauty of the village.

Step 2b: Conceptual categories—how and why AT changed its communication over time. The comparison of our data with existing literature on strategic (Snow et al., 1986) and interactional (Gray et al., 2015) approaches to framing in social movements (Snow & Benford, 1988) led us to recognize that AT changed the frames it used in its communication following a process of search and validation that involved the engagement of responsible tourism actors—tourists and tourism service providers—and anti-racket activists. Through interaction with these different audiences, AT validated its frames’ resonance with activists and industry actors, and at times searched for new frames that could more effectively resonate with its audiences. A frame’s resonance and consequent validation with anti-racket activists depended on its perceived consistency with the social movement ideology—that is, with its central claims and values. With tourists and tourism service providers such as tour operators, travel agencies, and hoteliers, resonance depended on three mechanisms: (1) narrative fidelity, (2) consistency with social movement organizations’ activities, and (3) empirical credibility. We identified a frame’s *narrative fidelity*—the consistency of a frame with the dominant narratives of a domain (Benford & Snow, 2000)—when industry actors perceived the frame as coherent with the narrative of the responsible tourism industry. For instance, the community frame achieved narrative fidelity with tourists and tourism service providers because this frame was consistent with the dominant narrative that responsible tourism should empower and strengthen local communities. The second mechanism explaining the degree of resonance of a frame with industry actors is its *consistency with social movement organizations’ activities*—the perceived congruence between a social movement organization’s claims and its actions (Benford & Snow, 2000). So, we identified that

security lacked consistency with AT’s activities because most tourists and commercial partners perceived that there was a contradiction between AT’s claims to guarantee physical security to anti-racket businesses and its activities, which were instead designed to emphasize short-term, temporal interactions and pleasurable experiences. The third mechanism explaining the resonance of a frame with industry actors is *empirical credibility*, or the “apparent fit between the framings and the events in the world” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 620). We identified this mechanism when industry actors perceived that they could empirically verify the claims advanced by AT through its frames. For instance, tourists found the sustainability frame “empirically credible” because they saw “they could tangibly help anti-racket business financial viability with their purchasing choices” (report of a student, 2011).

Frame search followed two distinct but connected processes identified by previous interactionist research: *keying* (Goffman, 1974) and *lamination* (Gray et al., 2015). Keying is the process whereby “a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of primary frameworks, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by participants to be something quite else” (Goffman, 1974: 43–44). Thus, keying may surface new meanings associated with a particular activity that diverge from the connotations of prevailing frames (Goffman, 1974). Given this definition, we identified keying when AT entrepreneurs involved tourists, tourism service providers, and activists in a systematic process of reinterpretation of its activities that generated the emergence of new meanings associated with AT’s activities that were different than those intended by AT’s original frames. For instance, whereas AT originally framed visits to certified anti-racket businesses using the security frame, because of the physical safety such visits provided to these businesses, we identified keying when AT entrepreneurs, tourists, tourism service providers, and activists came to interpret this same activity in terms of the financial benefit provided to the businesses.

Lamination follows keying, as it is the process of adding upon an original frame a new interpretation that has emerged through keying (Goffman, 1974; see also Gray et al., 2015), leading to frame transformation (Goffman, 1974: 82). We therefore identified lamination whenever AT layered a new interpretation of an activity that resulted from keying upon an original frame related to that activity. For instance, referring to patronage of anti-racket

businesses, AT performed lamination when it transformed security into sustainability, as the latter frame added the newly keyed interpretation of financial support upon the original security frame, thus transforming it.

Step 3: Aggregate dimensions and process model development. Once a complete set of conceptual categories was developed, we moved to more deliberate theorizing intended to aggregate categories in an empirically grounded model (Gioia et al., 2013) that explained the emergence of frames for AT's activities and AT's role in this process. We realized that AT first operationalized some frames they had *transposed* directly from the anti-racket movement. Then frames were revised through cycles of *search* and *validation* involving direct interaction with actors from the anti-racket movement and the responsible tourism industry. As a result, AT *retained* some frames, *transformed* other frames, and *selectively referred* to some other frames. Figure 1 shows the data structure.

FINDINGS

The Founding of AT as a Responsible Tourism Travel Agency

The anti-racket activists who founded AT envisioned it as an "extension of the anti-racket movement in the business and tourism sector" (AT entrepreneur #3, interview). They hoped it would advance the goals of the movement by attracting tourists to Sicily and guiding them to support businesses that defied the *pizzo*. This would create opportunities for anti-racket businesses within the responsible tourism industry:

Dear friends, you are all invited to the launch of AT: a new tour operator that organizes ethical tours to support those who say "No to the Mafia." ... This "*pizzo*-free" tourism initiative is another instrument to support anti-racket businesses. (AT inaugural press release, 2009)

AT believed that its offerings would appeal most strongly to tourists who were already predisposed to seek positive interactions with local communities, and therefore it positioned itself as part of the responsible tourism industry:

Our offering targets the responsible tourism sector: this is a growing market and we want to attract those responsible tourists who want something more than a relaxing holiday. (AT entrepreneur #3, Italian TV show interview, 2010)

To serve these customers, AT also attempted to partner with responsible tourism service providers—Sicilian restaurateurs and hoteliers, as well as other Italian and international travel agencies and tour operators—whom they expected to be attracted to AT's social objectives. As one AT entrepreneur recalled:


A traditional tour operator would never work with us. The same for hotels and bed & breakfasts ... We are not a traditional travel agency that simply sells products and services on behalf of a supplier. We are an outgrowth of the anti-racket movement. Our partners have to accept this and the idea that, when they work with us, it is not just about a commercial transaction but also about trying to drive a change in society. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

AT's main tourism offerings were tours of Sicily, conducted in collaboration with other anti-racket activists and businesses that defied the *pizzo*. Customers included both independent tourists and tourist groups arranged by educational institutions. To explain their offerings to others, AT entrepreneurs initially transposed frames from the anti-racket movement—community, security, dignity, and denunciation—that had been developed and used successfully to mobilize participation in anti-racket movement activities.

However, AT discovered that these frames, applied to its tourism offerings, failed to resonate with potential tourists and tourism service providers, who instead interpreted AT's offerings according to the alternative, and sometimes inconsistent, frames of the responsible tourism industry. This led AT entrepreneurs to engage in a process of strategic frame brokerage that resulted in the development of new frames that resonated with industry supporters while also remaining consistent with the ideology of the movement. The frame brokerage process involved AT entrepreneurs, anti-racket movement activists, tourists, and tourism service providers, and led to three different framing strategies: first, AT *retained* the community frame as it was transposed from the movement; second, it *selectively referred* to the original anti-racket denunciation frame; third, AT *transformed* the original anti-racket frames of security and dignity into sustainability and beauty, respectively.

By the end of 2015, six years after AT's founding, a stable set of frames resonated with responsible tourists and tourism service providers and therefore mobilized their support for its commercial activities. The resulting frames also were perceived by the

FIGURE 1
Data Structure



Note: SMO = social movement organization.

anti-racket movement as consistent with movement ideology. AT was commercially viable and was a point of reference in the responsible tourism industry “for all the tourists who want to contribute to the fight against racketeering while visiting Palermo” (Laccarino, 2015: 136). Below, we describe the process of frame brokerage.

An Interactive Model of Strategic Frame Brokerage

Our analysis shows that the process of frame brokerage performed by AT involving activists and industry actors followed five stages: (1) transposition and operationalization in commercial activities of the original anti-racket frames, (2) validation of transposed frames, (3) (eventual) search for new frames, (4) validation of new frames, and (5) final frame operationalization.

Anti-racket frames transposition and operationalization. The AT entrepreneurs viewed AT as an extension of the anti-racket movement and initially used the frames of the movement to make sense of their initiatives and efforts. They therefore transposed existing movement frames—particularly community, security, dignity, and denunciation—to initially characterize their activities:

As Sicilians and members of the movement, we want to make a contribution to the cultural change advanced by the social movement . . . When we launched AT, we thought we wanted to contribute to the growth of the anti-racket *community*, providing *secure*, *pizzo*-free opportunities to local entrepreneurs . . . We wanted to show the *dignity* of Sicilian people by showing that many of us work for a better Sicily and *denounce* extortions. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

AT operationalized these frames to design their tourism services. For instance, in 2009–2010, AT designed offerings that built on the community frame, to enable tourists to actively participate in the Sicilian anti-racket community:

Mafia-free tourism is a way for the responsible traveler to be involved in the fight against the Mafia. Even if you don't live in Italy, by travelling with us, you can help the fight for an economy without corruption. (AT website, 2010)

During the same period, AT also applied the security frame in the design and communication of their tours. The anti-racket movement understood its role as providing physical security to businesses that defied the Mafia, and the first AT tours were

intentionally designed to bring crowds of tourists to occupy the storefronts of these businesses, thus using tourists as a resource to replicate a common tactic of the movement:

If we know there is a business owner who is exposed to the Mafia, we try to be sure to organize our tours in such a way that we take tourists to their business . . . In this way, we try to contribute to guaranteeing the security of the entrepreneur. (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

Finally, AT designed tours to places that symbolized the dignity of locals who had publicly rebelled against the Mafia and reported extortions to the police, thus operationalizing the dignity and denunciation frames transposed from the anti-racket movement:

With our tours, we show you the more authentic Sicily: a region of people who resist and hold their heads high against the Mafia . . . On the fourth day (of the Capaci–Partinico–Cinisi tour), the tour stops in Caccamo [a village] to visit the local castle and have lunch in a *pizzo*-free restaurant to hear the story of the owners who denounced extortionists. (AT website, presentation of educational tours, 2010)

Validation of transposed frames. While applying the anti-racket movement frames of community, security, dignity, and denunciation in its activities, AT validated them with its multiple audiences, testing whether they (a) would resonate with tourists and tourism service providers (tour operators, hoteliers, and restaurateurs) and thus would favor their engagement in AT's initiatives, and (b) were consistent with the ideology of the anti-racket movement. Of the original anti-racket frames, only the community frame resonated with tourists and tourism service providers. By contrast, the security, dignity, and denunciation frames resonated only partially with industry actors.

AT applied the original movement frames to its commercial activities, using them for diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational purposes (Snow & Benford, 1988). For instance, AT used community to diagnose the *pizzo* problem by suggesting that the lack of a strong community of people who rebelled against the Mafia was essential to its continued power:

The Mafia is stronger when people are left alone. They can intimidate or kill one entrepreneur, one activist, but they are powerless against a community because they can't intimidate a mass of people.” (AT entrepreneur #4, video during a tour, 2011)

In the same period, AT also used the original movement frames for prognosis of how AT's activities would advance the goals of the movement. For example, AT used the security frame when explaining to tourists that, by physically occupying the businesses of local business-owners, they would provide physical protection from the Mafia:

We knew there was a bar owner the Mafia was intimidating and we decided to contribute to his security by modifying our Palermo tours to stop by his bar and have lunch there. . . . We explained to our tourists that it was a way to help the entrepreneur because leaving him alone could have been dangerous. (AT entrepreneur #2, interview)

Finally, AT extensively used the anti-racket frames to motivate the responsible tourists and tourism service providers to work with AT. AT promoted its tours as a way for tourists to become involved in the anti-racket community and discover the dignity of activists and entrepreneurs who had rebelled against, and denounced, Mafia extortionists. In 2011, AT entrepreneurs also interacted formally and informally with activists, tourists, and tourism service providers with the deliberate purpose of understanding their reactions to this framing of their activities. Activists expressed acceptance of AT frames, which they perceived as *consistent with the movement's ideology*:

One of the main issues for the movement is to grow, and AT is making its contribution through tourists. . . . If you participate in AT tours, you really see that people get a sense of our community of entrepreneurs who fight against the racket and guarantee their protection. (Anti-racket activist, interview)

AT received negative feedback, however, from tourists, tour operators, and business owners. Of the four frames transposed from the anti-racket movement, only the community frame resonated with tourists and tourism service providers and motivated them to travel and collaborate with AT. The community frame was effective for diagnostic framing of the *pizzo* problem because of its *fidelity to the narrative* of the responsible tourism sector, which also suggested that responsible tourists should empower and strengthen local communities. Tourists therefore readily accepted the framing of AT tours as contributing to the local community, accepting that, in the Sicilian context, prosperity required the existence of a strong anti-racket community:

We contacted AT because we were looking for a different trip to Sicily, we wanted to know more about the locals fighting against the Mafia and to be engaged in their activities. . . . With AT, we discovered the importance of community. (German tourists, interview)

The community frame was also effective for prognostic purposes, because tourism service providers saw it as *consistent with AT's activities*, given that AT "could help the anti-racket community to grow by involving tourists" (Hotelier, interview). Finally, community was effective also for motivational framing because it was *empirically credible* for tourists, who could visibly observe how their actions would advance the anti-racket community:

If we are together we can destroy the Mafia, because they cannot kill all those who fight against them. This is the most important takeaway of my trip with AT. This is what I learned: we can challenge the Mafia if we all give our—even small—contribution. (Report of a student to AT, 2011)

Unlike the community frame, the security, dignity, and denunciation frames generally failed to resonate with tourists and tourism service providers. In contrast with the community frame, when used to diagnose the problem of the *pizzo* these frames lacked *fidelity to the narrative* of the responsible tourism sector. For instance, the dignity frame was not meaningful to tourists and tour operators, who did not see dignity as relevant to responsible tourism:

Dignity for a Sicilian is something very important, but a tourist or a student doesn't fully understand its meaning. We always had to explain [dignity], but, in this way, it lost its power. (AT entrepreneur #2, interview)

The anti-racket movement frames of security, dignity, and denunciation were also viewed as *inconsistent with AT's activities* when used for prognostic framing. For instance, the security frame had been effectively used in the past to explain the benefits of extended, deep anti-racket movement campaigns that mobilized local businesses and citizens. But tourists questioned whether tourism activities, which emphasized short-term interactions, pleasurable experiences, and cultural exploration, were a suitable way to ensure the physical security of business owners. One AT entrepreneur recalled:

The truth is we can't pretend we guarantee the security of anybody. . . . Our tourists spend a few days, one week maximum, in Sicily. In order to guarantee security [of anti-racket businesses], we would need to adopt the same strategy as the [anti-racket] movement: bring people outside and inside the business and stay there all day long. (AT entrepreneur #3, interview)

Third and finally, the security, dignity, and denunciation frames were also ineffective for motivational framing because tourists and tourism service providers perceived the anti-racket frames as lacking *empirical credibility* with respect to tourism activities. Far from meeting the expectation that responsible tourism should provide opportunities for enjoyable and positive interactions with locals, the original anti-racket frames evoked images of adversarial interactions and furthermore conveyed sentiments of danger and fear. The use of these frames thus decreased the motivation of both tour operators and tourists to collaborate with AT. This mechanism is shown well by tourists' resistance to the denunciation frame:

Honestly, I was a bit afraid to go to Sicily with AT. I did not want to end up in trouble with this story of denouncing extortions: I called AT to request clarification before signing up for the tour. (German tourist, interview)

In sum, AT's early interactions with tourists, B&Bs, and tour operators revealed the failure of its framing strategy to directly transpose frames from the anti-racket movement. The community frame resonated sufficiently with industry actors to be retained, but activities framed in terms of security, dignity, and denunciation were viewed by responsible tourism industry actors as confusing and unappealing. This was clear to AT entrepreneurs:

Between 2010 and 2012, we contacted many potential partners, and we went to these tourism and responsible tourism exhibitions in Italy and Europe to present our initiatives. Most were interested in our business, but then we always struggled to convert their overall interest into real collaborations. A German tour operator we work with told us the reason was that our image and communication was too aggressive and strong. We looked more like a group of activists than a travel agency. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

This reaction of tourists, tour operators, and other tourism service providers led AT entrepreneurs to begin to consider modifying their framing strategy. As one AT entrepreneur recalled:

We realized the social movement can—I would say must—stress the negative impacts of the Mafia and of the *pizzo* to wake up Sicilians. . . . As a tour operator, we should be capable of finding a positive twist to add to the movement's activities and message. This is the only way to appeal to tourists, tour operators, and B&Bs. . . . Community worked because responsible tourists, in a sense, were already looking for opportunities to join a community that is a driver of a positive change. . . . But people already think Palermo is dangerous because of the Mafia. When we talk about security and denunciation, we risk reinforcing this idea, and we don't want that, both because it could discourage tourists to come to visit Sicily and because it could reinforce the stereotype that Palermo is a dangerous city. . . . One of our objectives is to refute stereotypes like this. (AT entrepreneur #3, interview)

Failed frame search (through interaction with responsible tourism industry actors). Following the failure of the original anti-racket frames to resonate with tourists and tourism service providers, AT entrepreneurs deliberately searched for new, alternative frames by soliciting comments from tourism service providers and observing tourist reactions to AT's offerings. By observing these industry actors' interpretations, they came to realize that activities originally framed by AT in terms of security were instead being perceived by industry actors according to their effects on the natural environment. This keying of the new meaning of "environmental protection" was subsequently laminated by AT entrepreneurs upon the original security frame, thus transforming it into environmentalism. However, this frame did not resonate with activists, who perceived it as inconsistent with the movement's core ideology.

In observing the reactions of tourists in order to understand their interpretations, AT entrepreneurs observed that tourists frequently viewed tours according to their impact on the natural environment, particularly in visits to anti-racket businesses, which AT had framed according to the original anti-racket frame of security:

I remember we brought some German tourists to this famous pub here in Sicily that was one of the first to defy the *pizzo*. We explained to them that, by going there, we were supporting the business—you know, our story. Tourists listened, and, at the end, they asked us why they had to eat with plastic dishes. . . . They told us that of course it was remarkable that the owner had refused to pay protection money; that was certainly an ethical choice. But what about the environment? Why didn't the owner use recyclable dishes? (AT entrepreneur #2, interview)

AT similarly identified alternative interpretations of its activities through interaction with responsible tour operators and service providers. Upon AT entrepreneurs' request, these industry actors suggested that AT visits to anti-racket entrepreneurs should also aim to protect the natural environment through waste management and reduction of water consumption and pollution, these being standard expectations for responsible tourism. An AT entrepreneur recalled:

We did not have experience in the responsible tourism sector, so we started to participate in its events and meet other tour operators, talk with owners of B&B and entrepreneurs of the sector. . . . They saw us as a strange type of responsible tourism player that designed tours to protect entrepreneurs but not the environment. But environmental issues are key components of responsible tourism and of what a tour operator is supposed to offer. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

The systematic interaction with tourists and tourism service providers led AT entrepreneurs to begin understanding their visits to anti-racket businesses in terms of environmental protection goals. One AT entrepreneur recalled:

When we bring tourists to local businesses, we protect them [those businesses]. . . . but, in doing so, we can also push them to embrace more environmentally friendly initiatives. (AT entrepreneur #3, interview)

By late 2011, this new interpretation of AT activities motivated AT entrepreneurs to transform the original security frame into environmentalism, by laminating the meaning of "environmental protection" that had emerged through interaction with industry actors upon the original security frame:

The idea of the movement is to protect Sicilian entrepreneurs from the Mafia to make Sicily a better, Mafia-free place. Protecting the environment is another way to protect Sicily and make it a better place So we thought that the overall idea was the same: making Sicily a better place to live. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

AT entrepreneurs immediately attempted to validate the resonance of the environmentalism frame with industry actors and activists. As they did when validating the original anti-racket frames, AT used environmentalism for diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation when interacting with industry actors and anti-racket activists. As AT entrepreneurs expected, tourists and tourism service providers reacted positively. Environmentalism was perceived as

having *fidelity to the narrative* of the responsible tourism industry. So, AT could effectively use this frame to diagnose the problem of the *pizzo*:

When we visit some coasts that would be beautiful but are covered by rubbish, I explain that this is the responsibility of the Mafia. . . . I also say that, as they destroy our beautiful beaches with rubbish, they also destroy our businesses asking them to pay the *pizzo*. I can see that people are shocked. (AT entrepreneur #2, interview)

Activists from the anti-racket movement, however, were openly dissatisfied with AT's increasing emphasis on environmentalism. In several meetings in late 2011, activists openly suggested that the environmentalism frame deviated from the social movement's ideology and purpose. The following exchange occurred during one such meeting:

ACTIVIST #1: Don't get me wrong, I also care about the environment, but is it what really characterizes our movement? . . . What's the purpose of these bike tours: do we want to protect the environment or entrepreneurs?

AT ENTREPRENEUR #1: If we want to attract tourists to Sicily, we need to find a way to appeal to a new audience of tourists who do not really know what we do [as a social movement].

ACTIVIST #2: This is true, but I still believe this message is completely disconnected from our purposes and goals. (Field note)

Both AT and anti-racket activists described these interactions as uncomfortable. Some activists began to question "the real objective of AT, whether they [AT] were just exploiting the movement for economic purposes or if they really wanted to remain true to [the movement's] goals and values" (Anti-racket activist, interview). Negative feedback from activists caused AT entrepreneurs to again reconsider their role as an extension of the anti-racket movement. They determined that, while working to customize their offerings to the responsible tourism industry, they would also need to more explicitly connect their frames to the anti-racket movement's ideology if they were to avoid further tensions:

We started to adopt environmentalism because this is a key element of the responsible tourism market in which we compete. . . . But the truth is that we are a special case of responsible tourism because our priority is supporting anti-racket businesses. This is the purpose of the social movement, so it must be central in everything we do. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

New frames search (through interaction with responsible tourism industry actors and anti-racket activists). After activists rejected the environmentalism frame, AT changed its approach to frame development in late 2011 by proactively engaging both activists and responsible tourism industry actors in frame search. This time, the keying process led by AT entrepreneurs generated a systematic and consensual reinterpretation among all three groups (AT entrepreneurs, responsible tourism actors, and activists) of AT activities originally framed in terms of security and dignity. New meanings were subsequently laminated by AT entrepreneurs on its original frames, leading to frame transformation. In particular, “security” was transformed into “sustainability,” and “dignity” was transformed into “beauty.” By contrast, “denunciation” was not similarly transformed, as resistance from anti-racket activists to changes to the denunciation frame led AT to instead manage denunciation through selective referral.

Between 2011 and 2012, while still using the original anti-racket frames, AT entrepreneurs strategically interacted with tourists and tourism service providers in the context of daily activities in search of new frames that could replace security, dignity, and denunciation. For example, while searching for an alternative framing, AT entrepreneurs noted in early 2012 that tourists judged tours not only in terms of their environmental impact but also as providing financial support to anti-racket businesses:

When we arrived, we stopped at a pub whose owner refused to pay the *pizzo*. What can we do to help a brave entrepreneur like him? We can contribute by being sure to buy products and services from “clean” shops and businesses. (Report of a student, 2011)

In the same period, AT entrepreneurs also solicited the interpretations and reactions of tourism service providers to the new framing strategy. They noticed that industry players also viewed visits to anti-racket businesses as sources of revenue and financial support, thus keying a new meaning to AT activities that had been originally framed in terms of security:

When I talk with new potential partners [hoteliers and owners of B&Bs], I always start the conversation by explaining that they can work with us only if they have the anti-racket certification, which guarantees protection . . . but they immediately switch the discussion to the business opportunity we can generate for them. . . . This is what they see and is what motivates most of them to contact us. (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

A similar pattern of keying emerged in the case of the dignity frame. In late 2011 to early 2012, AT entrepreneurs solicited the views of tourists and tourism service providers about tours initially framed as opportunities to visit places that symbolized the dignity of locals who had rebelled against the Mafia. In this way, they realized that tourists interpreted these tours more broadly as an opportunity to enjoy pleasant and meaningful visits to the beautiful Sicilian villages, countryside, and seaside while also contributing to the efforts of local anti-racket entrepreneurs. This keying associated these activities with meanings familiar to responsible tourism:

I met beautiful people and listened to amazing stories of people who resist the Mafia. But I also enjoyed the cultural and “gastronomic” part of the tour: the visit to Monreale [a small town famous for its cathedral]. Sicily is all this together: brave people, beautiful landscape, and good food. (Report of a student, 2011)

Regarding denunciation, observing tourists reactions, AT entrepreneurs realized that they generally interpreted AT activities that were originally associated with the denunciation frame, such as meetings with local entrepreneurs who had denounced racketeers, as demonstrations of honesty that helped drive positive change in Sicily. This new honesty meaning was more consistent with the idea that responsible tourism would enable meaningful connections with local communities:

Thanks to AT, we have discovered the stories of people who put their lives at risk to rebel against the Mafia and denounce extortionists. . . . This experience has been fundamental to understanding that a deep sense of legality and honesty motivates anti-racket entrepreneurs who decide to denounce. (Report of a student, 2011)

As with environmentalism, the meanings advanced by tourists and tourism service providers gradually influenced AT entrepreneurs’ understanding of their own activities. As one AT entrepreneur recalled:

We came to understand that what distinguishes us from the movement and the value we can add is that we can give business opportunities to local entrepreneurs who resist the *pizzo* . . . This is possible because we show the most authentic Sicily. We show it is not only the Mafia. There are many people who fight against the Mafia because they love Sicily and its historical, cultural, and environmental heritage. Our role is to make this Sicily visible. (AT entrepreneur #2, interview)

As new meanings began to emerge through strategic interaction with tourists and tourism service providers, AT entrepreneurs also involved anti-racket activists in the process of reinterpretation of their activities, hoping to thereby avoid the sort of backlash they had experienced earlier, when trying to transform the security frame into environmentalism. Activists were willing to reinterpret activities initially associated with security and dignity, but their resistance to reinterpreting denunciation led AT to stop seeking alternative interpretations of this frame.

In 2012, in formal and informal meetings with activists, AT entrepreneurs began to describe activities that had been originally framed in terms of security in terms of the financial support they provided to entrepreneurs, a meaning introduced by responsible tourism actors:

We give business opportunities to anti-racket entrepreneurs, in this way showing that [defiance of the *pizzo*] is economically advantageous. Initially, there were some resisters within the movement, but we addressed them, showing that, with our work, we can scale the impact of the movement by providing a different type of support [beyond the physical protection guaranteed by the movement]. (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

Subsequently, anti-racket activists also began to interpret the benefits of AT visits to anti-racket entrepreneurs in terms of financial support, as illustrated by the following exchange during a meeting between AT and anti-racket activists:

ACTIVIST #1: Security is a central, key element in what we do, because we can't ask people to be heroes and denounce without being sure they will be protected.

AT ENTREPRENEUR #2: We [AT] cannot guarantee physical security: it is outside our capabilities. But we get [anti-racket businesses] money, and we bring them tourists.

ACTIVIST #1: You are right. . . . I think it is equally important. It is a different kind of security, but still security, no? (Field note)

We found a similar pattern of interaction with anti-racket activists regarding dignity. In 2012, AT began to describe to anti-racket activists how AT's activities and tours could expose tourists to Sicily's cultural, historical, and environmental heritage, in addition to its dignified spirit. Anti-racket activists consequently began to interpret AT tours as important for expressing the dignity and efforts of the anti-racket movement in an aesthetically appealing and pleasant way:

My idea is that AT should show that, beyond the Mafia activities, there is much more here in Sicily: there are astonishing places, beaches, and landscapes, and people who fight the Mafia. Showing all of this is a way to show the "real" Sicily and not only the Mafia. (Anti-racket activist, interview)

While activists participated in the keying of activities originally framed in terms of security and dignity, thus enabling the emergence of shared meanings, they expressed concerns about "even thinking to modify" denunciation (Field note, 2012). In 2012, AT entrepreneurs attempted to re-frame activities initially associated with denunciation as advancing a broader culture of honesty. However, activists viewed denunciation as so central to the anti-racket ideology that they interpreted any potential modification as a betrayal of the movement's purpose. An activist recalled this resistance as follows:

Speaking with [the AT entrepreneurs], I told them many times that denunciation is the pillar of this entire story [of the social movement], because, by speaking about and supporting denunciation to the police, we go against the Mafia culture, at its heart. (Anti-racket activist, interview)

Upon observing the importance assigned by activists to denunciation, AT entrepreneurs halted the keying of activities originally framed in terms of denunciation:

We discussed this issue many times . . . and we all [social movement activists and AT entrepreneurs] agree that the core of the anti-racket movement is that, thanks to the movement's efforts, now people know they can and must denounce extortionists [to the police]. If we lost this—if we didn't support this with our activities—we would betray the core idea of the movement. This is a milestone for the movement: it exists, and we exist [as AT], to make it possible to denounce. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

Following these interactions with tourists, tourism service providers and activists, AT entrepreneurs redefined their framing strategy, transforming security into sustainability and dignity into beauty, while selectively referring to denunciation.

First, AT transformed the security frame into sustainability and the dignity frame into beauty. In the case of sustainability, by 2012, AT entrepreneurs came to view this frame as potentially effective for laminating the meaning of financial support to anti-racket entrepreneurs upon the original security and environmentalism frames. Notably, the possibility to

transform security into the sustainability frame emerged during informal meetings with activists:

Talking about our initiatives, an activist told us that our efforts to organize environmentally friendly initiatives in the context of anti-racket activities aimed at financially supporting anti-racket entrepreneurs had a name: sustainability. (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

AT entrepreneurs also laminated the newly keyed interpretation of AT anti-racket activities as appealing and aesthetically pleasing upon the original dignity frame, thus transforming dignity into beauty:

It became clear to us that what we can do through our business initiative is to give the tourist the opportunity to see Palermo and Sicily from a completely different perspective. Thanks to our contacts with anti-racket associations and activists, we can show what the traditional tourists would never see: the beautiful stories of the people who live in these beautiful places and fight against the oppression of the Mafia every day. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

Second, AT entrepreneurs decided to manage the denunciation frame through selective referral. Since denunciation did not resonate with tourists and tourism service providers, but activists resisted changes to its meaning, in 2012, AT entrepreneurs decided to *selectively refer* to this frame. Selective referral took two forms: (1) using denunciation only for diagnostic framing (but not for prognostic and motivational framing), and (2) putting tourists in contact with anti-racket activists to observe how *other* anti-racket movement activities enacted denunciation. In this way, AT entrepreneurs aimed to raise awareness about the denunciation frame:

We cannot ask [tourists and tourism service providers] to engage in denunciation, but, without denunciation, extortionists remain powerful, so we decided to say this in our tours and to always mention that the anti-racket movement takes care of denouncing extortionists. (AT entrepreneur #4, interview)

Validation of new frames. In 2012–2013, following development of the selective referral approach to the original anti-racket denunciation frame, and the transformation of dignity and security to beauty and sustainability, AT validated its overall framing strategy with activists and responsible tourism actors. By using denunciation selectively for diagnostic framing only, and by introducing tourists to other anti-racket activists to observe denunciation activities, AT hoped to circumvent earlier challenges

of *consistency* and *empirical credibility* that had limited the denunciation frame's resonance with tourists and tourism service partners while still raising awareness of the importance of denunciation to the movement. AT fully adopted beauty and sustainability frames for diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing to mobilize support.

In 2012, AT continued to use denunciation to diagnose the *pizzo* problem, explaining, for instance, "that extortionists are powerful because, for many years, victims haven't denounced" (AT entrepreneur #1, interview). But, rather than attempt to engage tourists directly in denunciation, AT referred tourists who expressed an interest in further engagement to other parts of the anti-racket movement. AT thus retained the denunciation frame but referred to it only selectively:

We explain that denunciation is an important instrument to challenge the Mafia ... and that denouncing extortionists is technically complex, so the process is run by the social movement, and, if they have any questions, [tourists and business owners] can contact them. (AT entrepreneur #3, interview)

In the same period, AT entrepreneurs used beauty and sustainability for diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational purposes. For instance, during tours, they emphasized that "racketeers are parasites that have transformed Sicily from the most beautiful place in the world into the most awful place to live in" (Field note, AT entrepreneur's speech during a tour, 2012), thus connecting beauty to the *pizzo* problem. They also used these frames for prognosis, by elaborating the role AT and other tourism service providers could play to challenge the Mafia and the *pizzo*:

Our "*pizzo*-free" booking service is a service we offer to our "*pizzo*-free" partners. With this service, we want to invest in building sustainable, ethical, and *pizzo*-free businesses in Sicily. (Advertising for the launch of AT's e-booking service, 2013)

Finally, AT entrepreneurs used beauty and sustainability to motivate tourists and tourism service providers to purchase tours from, and partner with, AT. The following example shows how they used beauty to accomplish motivational framing:

Discover the many beauties of Sicily, its artistic heritage, landscapes, and the enthusiasm of those who say "NO" to the Mafia. By traveling with us, you will discover all this beauty and support the entrepreneurs and associations that rebel against the Mafia every day. (AT website, advertising for the Pizzo-Free Sicily tour, 2012)

AT's audiences reacted positively to the AT's new framing strategy. In 2013, selective referral to denunciation raised awareness among tourism service providers of the broader activities of the anti-racket movement, beyond AT:

With AT, the relationship is mainly business oriented. . . . They put me in contact with the anti-racket movement: I contacted them [anti-racket activists], and they clarified for me what denunciation means in practice. (Owner of an hotel in Palermo, interview)

It also raised awareness among tourists:

AT ENTREPRENEUR #4: Did you meet the activists yesterday?

TOURIST: Yes, [my boyfriend and I] went there and spoke with a couple of them. . . . They also explained to us what they do to support anti-racket businesses who report extortionists to the police. . . . We stayed there all evening. . . . It is amazing what they do. (Field note on AT tour)

Selective referral to denunciation also helped to resolve activists' earlier concerns that AT was behaving in ways that were inconsistent with movement ideology. They came to see AT activities as "important because they give us the opportunity to talk about denunciation to people we would barely be in contact with otherwise" (Anti-racket activist, interview).

Interaction with responsible tourism actors and activists validated that both beauty and sustainability resonated with both groups and thus mobilized their support. The beauty frame provided *fidelity to the narrative* of the responsible tourism industry—that requires tourist initiatives to be both pleasant and meaningful—thus proving effective for diagnosing the *pizzo* problem to tourists, as shown below:

Beautiful seaside, countryside, the warm sun and the small, beautiful Corleone village: when you see all of this in Sicily, you can't help but ask yourself how one man can deprive another man of the chance to enjoy all this beauty. (Tourist's message to AT, 2012)

Beauty was also used effectively for prognostic and motivational purposes, due to its empirical credibility. Indeed, tourists perceived activities explained using this frame as exciting and meaningful, in contrast to the connotations of danger and fear associated with the original dignity frame:

The travel has been a dip into the history, the beautiful countryside, and the extraordinary people of Sicily. . . . We will bring with us the contagious desire to struggle together to build a *pizzo*-free economic system! (Tourist's message to AT, 2012)

Like beauty, the sustainability frame resonated with tourists and service providers because it credibly laminated meanings associated with AT anti-racket efforts along with environmentalism. The sustainability frame was effective for framing the impacts of AT activities on the *pizzo* problem because it was *empirically credible*. Tourists were open to interpreting AT tours as sustainable, and were motivated to positively impact both the natural environment and the economic welfare of Sicily:

Thanks to Fabio [an AT guide], we have understood that, in Sicily, sustainability means not only protecting the environment *but also* supporting anti-racket businesses. (AT tourist, interview)

AT's transformations of dignity into beauty and of security into sustainability was also accepted by activists. Both of the newly constructed frames were perceived by activists as adding a new meaning to anti-racket activities while remaining consistent with the movement's ideology. Activists saw beauty as representing the underlying meaning of dignity, but without its negative and frightening connotations:

This idea of beauty they have come out with is nothing more than the application of dignity to the Sicilian cultural and environmental heritage. Discussing and showing the beauty of Sicily is a way to associate Sicily and its people with something antithetical to the Mafia. This is [AT's] way to give dignity back to Sicily. (Anti-racket activist, interview)

Activists interpreted sustainability as scaling the impact of the original security frame by laminating financial support as an additional type of security guaranteed to anti-racket entrepreneurs:

At the beginning, I also asked myself whether this idea of sustainability was consistent with what we do as a social movement. . . . As a social movement, we work to guarantee the physical security of anti-racket entrepreneurs; the next stage is to guarantee their economic security. This is what [AT] does. (Anti-racket movement activist, interview)

Final frames operationalization. The preceding phases of validation and search resulted in the retention of the community frame from the anti-racket

movement, the selective referral of denunciation, and the transformation of security into sustainability and dignity into beauty. After identifying and validating its frames, AT operationalized them by using them to design and launch new tour offerings and initiatives. While in the validation stage, existing activities were reframed; in the operationalization stage, AT entrepreneurs developed new activities guided by the frames of community, sustainability, and beauty. AT also intentionally designed tours that put tourists and tourism service providers in contact with the anti-racket movement to raise awareness about denunciation through selective referral.

For instance, from 2012 onward, AT operationalized the community frame through new collaborations with anti-racket associations to exploit non-commercial mobilization opportunities for the movement at large, beyond AT's commercial tours:

AT will participate in an event to celebrate the opening of the "Eco-Village," a newly opened organic farmhouse managed by a social enterprise on one of the lands confiscated from the Mafia. . . . We will be there. (AT advertising flyer, 2014)

Beginning in 2013, AT entrepreneurs also operationalized the sustainability and beauty frames, by leveraging them to design and advertise new tourism products:

Sicily by Bike: Cycle along coastlines, country roads devoid of traffic, trails that give way to stunning panoramas and cycle lanes engulfed in greenery, often following the tracks of abandoned railroads. . . . All of the accommodation, from the *agriturismi* (Italian farms) to the hotels, is certified as Mafia-free. . . . Discovering Sicily, you will also support the fight of Sicilian entrepreneurs against the Mafia. (AT flier, 2014)

The "Corleone tour" is an extraordinary opportunity to visit a village that is now an icon of the anti-Mafia movement and to support the activities of the local anti-Mafia associations while experiencing the beauty of the Sicilian countryside. (AT web advertising, 2015)

Finally, AT operationalized denunciation through selective referral. For instance, AT entrepreneurs encouraged tourists to meet with local activists who had denounced extortionists, to create opportunities to expose tourists to denunciation without linking it directly to AT's activities. One AT entrepreneur recalled:

During the tours in Palermo, we try to stop to a bar which is behind the City Cathedral: some years ago, the owner of this pub denounced the *pizzo* to the police. . . . We always close our tours at the "Focacceria San Francesco" because it is the first restaurant that denounced the *pizzo*. When we stop there, we say owners of these places were among the firsts to denounce and that they are always available to speak with tourists. (AT entrepreneur #1, interview)

While AT primarily operationalized community, sustainability, and beauty to mobilize the responsible tourism industry through commercial activities, selective use of denunciation made tourism service providers aware of the importance of denunciation:

They [AT] asked me to have the anti-racket certification, and I know I have their support in case I need it [if a Mafia extortionist demands the *pizzo*], but that's it. This is not the reason why I work with them; the reason is that my revenues have increased significantly since I have been working with them. (Tourism service provider, interview)

Moreover, the opportunity to visit the beautiful locations of Sicily and be embedded in the anti-racket community also met tourists' expectations of a relaxing but also meaningful responsible tourism experience:

What's better than visiting Palermo, and discovering its beauty and at the same learning more of the history of the anti-Mafia movement and of its heroes? (Review posted by an Italian tourist on Tripadvisor.com, 2014)

AT's operationalization of its frames was also well accepted by anti-racket activists. They positively assessed the efforts of AT to use community, beauty, and sustainability to show Sicily under a new, more positive perspective, in this way attracting tourists to the region while trying to advance the denunciation frame that was core to the anti-racket movement ideology:

AT's position is clear—I understand it. They can't be as proactive as [the anti-racket movement] in denouncing unethical behaviors because they have their business objectives. Their role is to show the beauty of Sicily, and that this beauty lies in the activists and in the anti-racket entrepreneurs. . . . Doing this, they support local entrepreneurs financially, something we can't do but which is fundamental to challenging the Mafia. . . . I also appreciate what they do to advance denunciation, because it is at the core of everything we do. It is important that [AT] make their contribution. (Anti-racket activist, interview)


DISCUSSION

Our findings show a process of strategic frame brokerage by which a commercial social movement organization may develop frames that resonate with both commercial actors and movement activists. We identify three possible outcomes of frame brokerage, beginning from original movement frames. Movement frames that resonate with industry field frames and successfully mobilize industry actors may be *retained*, as we observed with the “community” frame. Movement frames that do not resonate with industry actors may be *transformed* to incorporate industry actors’ interpretations, as we observed in the transformation of “dignity” into “beauty” and “security” into “sustainability.” Finally, movement frames that do not resonate with industry actors, but are so central to movement ideology that they cannot be transformed, may be *selectively referred* to other parts of the movement. As we observed with the denunciation frame, selective referral allows a commercial social movement organization to maintain ideological consistency with the movement while avoiding framing its own activities in a way that does not resonate with industry actors. Figure 2 shows the

five phases of strategic frame brokerage: transposition and operationalization of a social movement frame, validation of a transposed frame, frame search and transformation, new validation, and final frame operationalization.

In the first phase, the social movement organization transposes an existing social movement frame and operationalizes it into commercial activities aimed at mobilizing support. In the second phase, the social movement organization validates the resonance of the transposed frame through interaction with both industry actors and activists. The social movement organization uses frames to accomplish the basic diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation required for industry actors to participate in movement activities (Snow & Benford, 1988), then interacts with industry actors and social movement activists to assess the resonance of these frames in both contexts. When this reveals that the original movement frame resonates with both audiences and can mobilize their support—as was the case for the community frame in our study—the social movement organization retains and operationalizes it through the design of new business initiatives that enact this frame.

FIGURE 2
Process of Strategic Frame Brokerage



Note: SMO = social movement organization.

If validation of the transposed frame fails, the social movement organization engages in further interaction with supporter groups in search of a new frame. In this third phase of frame search, the social movement organization engages industry actors and movement activists in a *keying* process by which activities associated with the original frame are reinterpreted, then transforms the original movement frame by *laminating* these keyed interpretations upon the original frame, thereby transforming it (Snow & Benford, 1988). Transformed frames are tested for their resonance with both supporter groups in a fourth phase of validation. In a fifth and final phase of operationalization, validated frames guide the design of new business initiatives (as observed in AT's operationalization of beauty and sustainability).

Finally, either industry actors or social movement activists may resist a frame's transformation, as was the case for the denunciation frame for AT. In this circumstance, the commercial social movement organization may selectively refer to the frame to characterize the social issue, and to enable interaction with other parts of the movement, but not use it to frame its own activities.

Contributions

Strategy and interaction in frame development.

Commercial social movement organizations face the unique strategic framing challenge of achieving alignment with both industry field frames (Lounsbury et al., 2003) and the collective action frames and ideology of the broader social movement (Rao, 1998). Our model of strategic frame brokerage builds on research on strategic framing (Snow & Benford, 1988) by incorporating an interactionist approach (Gray et al., 2015) to show how social movement entrepreneurs use interactions strategically to develop mutually resonant frames. While mutually resonant frames might also emerge organically through interaction, our findings suggest that commercial social movement entrepreneurs compel frame development by proactively soliciting and integrating audience interpretations of their activities.

Our work builds on previous research that has pointed to the distinctive challenges of finding shared meaning among disparate groups of movement supporters (Rao, 1998), particularly when these groups are motivated, respectively, by commercial and non-commercial goals (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; O'Mahony & Bechky, 2008).

Collective action frames mobilize diverse groups of supporters in part by binding together multiple meanings (Gray et al., 2015) into "scavenger ideologies" (Mosse, 1985; Snow, 2004) that may enable cooperation even if supporter groups understand movement activities differently (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986; Zilber, 2002). Past research has largely explained this synthesis as the strategic, independent work of individual movement leaders. For instance, McAdam (1996) partially attributed Martin Luther King Jr.'s leadership success to his personal ability to blend many abstract religious and political themes in his rhetoric (see also Snow, 2004). Our work shows how movement leaders may also depend on interaction and social construction in the framing process (Gray et al., 2015).

Our model of frame brokerage is relevant to other types of collective action in which multiple supporter groups interact with a single social movement organization, but have few if any *direct* interactions with one another. Past studies suggest that the organic emergence of new frames requires thick and repeated interactions through which actors may directly observe and test new meanings with one another (Collins, 2004). Yet, collective action increasingly occurs in settings where supporter groups are geographically distributed (Orlikowski, 2002) and organized across multiple physical and virtual spaces (Perkmann & Spicer, 2014), limiting opportunities for such interaction. In such settings, the brokerage role of social movement entrepreneurs is likely to be particularly important to frame development.

Framing, social movement organizations, and social enterprise. Our study also contributes to research on social enterprises that pursue a social mission while also engaging in commercial activity (Akemu et al., 2016; York et al., 2016). Past research suggests that social enterprises may struggle to manage their plural external environments, requiring specialized symbolic management (Pache & Santos, 2013) and socialization in hybrid professional roles (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Our study contributes to this literature by noting that some social enterprises are also social movement organizations, their social goals being identified with those of a broader social movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Social enterprises working independently on complex social problems often struggle to make significant progress, as such problems can often be addressed only through collective action among many organizations (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi,

2016). Working within a broader social movement may allow social enterprises to complement other movement activities, as we observed in our findings related to security: while other anti-racket organizations provided physical security, AT was uniquely positioned to also provide them financial security, and both were important to the advancement of anti-racket movement goals. However, as we observe in our findings related to denunciation, commitment to the ideology of movements can also constrain social enterprise strategies.

Our study also shows how movements may influence the development of social enterprises' social purposes or missions. Prior research suggests that social missions are relatively fixed and strongly determined by institutional logics (Pache & Santos, 2013). By contrast, our findings illustrate how social missions operate through interpretive processes, and are therefore malleable through processes such as strategic framing. If the social mission of a social enterprise is subject to interpretation, so too are unintended shifts in organizational mission, or "mission drift," that may be objectionable to ideologically oriented supporters (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). Our findings suggest that mission drift may be anticipated and circumvented through strategic framing that bends to the frames of ideologically oriented supporters. In the case of AT, for example, use of the environmental frame was perceived by activists as mission drift, whereas the later sustainability frame, which incorporated activist interpretations in its development, effectively avoided such concerns.

Our work also speaks to the specific challenge of managing "integrated" social enterprises in which both social and financial impact are viewed as emanating from the same activities, versus "differentiated" social enterprises, in which these goals are pursued through separate activities (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Some scholars have noted advantages of integrated social enterprises, suggesting that they will require fewer resource allocation dilemmas (Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015) and be less prone to mission drift (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Yet, the pursuit of multiple goals through integrated activities may complicate the development of clear and consistent meanings for those activities, and mission drift is possible even within an integrated hybrid (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Whereas a differentiated hybrid might have been more easily allowed different frames for its commercial and pro-social activities, the integrated nature of AT's activities necessitated

the development of mutually resonant frames for those activities.

Commercial transactions as a "mobilizing technology." Finally, our study advances understanding of how social movement organizations use commercial transactions to advance movement goals. The sale of products and services provides an alternative "mobilizing technology" (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004) alongside more conventional, political social movement repertoires. Direct participation in markets offers advantages over political tactics, including the ability to design new products and services and to directly select employees, customers, investors, and other actors. Yet, as our study demonstrates, commercial social movement organizations also experience drawbacks and constraints unique among social movement organizations, including resource dependence on non-adherents of the movement. While our study suggests that the latter challenge may be partially addressed through strategic frame brokerage, building and operating a successful commercial operation is also likely to require skills and repertoires that differ from those possessed by many activists (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Future research should therefore consider other skills and strategies needed to successfully transition from collective action to commerce.

Future research may also consider how direct commercial activity fits alongside other specialized social movement organizations. As our findings suggest, commercial social movement organizations may cooperate with other parts of the same movement (Schneiberg et al., 2008), yet they may also encounter intra-movement competition for resources and attention (Soule & King, 2008). Our study suggests that framing provides one basis for coordination between commercial social movement organizations and activists, yet other forms of coordination among social movement organizations remain an important topic for future research. Also deserving of further research is the relationship between resource providers' commercial and non-commercial mobilization: for example, would an individual's participation in traditional forms of environmental activism increase or decrease his or her likelihood of also consuming environmentally friendly products?

Direct engagement in commercial activity also suggests a need to reconsider models of mobilization, which traditionally suggest that alignment of supporters with movement ideology is a necessary stepping-stone to mobilization. McCarthy and

Zald's (1977) classic resource mobilization typology defined adherents as those actors who believe in the goals of a social movement, whether due to shared identity or shared ideology (Klandermans, 2004), and constituents as those who provide resources to the movement. In this view, ideological alignment is a natural precedent to mobilization: "At one level, the resource mobilization task is primarily that of converting adherents into constituents and maintaining constituent involvement. . . . At another level, the task may be seen as turning non-adherents into adherents" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1221).

Our findings suggest that mobilization via commercial activities may not always require that supporters be ideological adherents per se. Through transformation of movement frames to incorporate the interpretations of industry actors, social movement organizations elide ideological alignment as a necessary condition for mobilization. Because the benefits of participation in commerce are material as well as ideological, social movement organizations can potentially mobilize a broader pool of supporters (Klandermans, 2004). Yet, mobilization of consumers may also involve a different type of interpretation, more resembling "marketing and resonating" than the "education and thinking" that typically underpins political support (Oliver & Johnston, 2000). Movements built on this sort of mobilization may therefore more closely resemble an ongoing flow of temporary constituents rather than the durable coalitions commonly studied by social movement scholars. Consideration of commercial activity goes beyond traditional organizing repertoires, thereby broadening our understanding of the social technology by which movements seek to mobilize diverse constituents (Ganz, 2002).

Limitations and Future Directions

Our paper has several limitations and boundary conditions worth noting. First, an important boundary condition is the existence of well-established interpretive frames within both the social movement and the commercial industry into which the social movement organization enters. In situations that lack established frames, interactional processes might be expected to give way to more heavy-handed strategic framing on the part of the social movement organization. Of particular interest, under such circumstances, is the prospect that social movement organizations might influence the frames of supporter groups. For instance, if a social

movement organization were to enter a nascent market category, it might be able to shape this category, or, alternatively, commercial activities within a relatively new social movement might meet less ideological resistance, and even shape the trajectory of the movement. We believe that both of these situations are interesting opportunities for further research.

Moreover, strategic frame brokerage between activists and industry actors may not always find common ground, and business entrepreneurship is not likely to succeed in all social movements, which vary in the flexibility of their interpretations of the issues they address (Snow & Benford, 1988). Therefore, not every movement may be amenable to commercial transactions as a mobilizing tactic, irrespective of interpretive frames. Furthermore, frame brokerage is costly in terms of time and attention, and the benefits of mutually resonant frames may not always outweigh these costs. We did not observe such negative consequences in our study, but we believe that understanding the potential limits of multivalent frames, as well as "delaminating" processes by which the meanings associated with frames might decay and become more specific, are important areas for further study.

CONCLUSION

Our study develops a model of how commercial social movement organizations strategically reconcile the competing meaning systems of movements and markets. In our "movement society" (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), ideological organizing is increasingly commonplace and movements are poised not only to influence markets from the outside but also to occupy them from within. As our research demonstrates, direct participation by movements in markets presents novel opportunities for organizing, as well as new material and symbolic entanglements for organizational research to identify and resolve.

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