




Logics in Action: Managing Institutional Complexity in a Drug Court

Administrative Science Quarterly
58 (2)165–196
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/
journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0001839213486447
asq.sagepub.com


Chad Michael McPherson¹ and Michael Sauder¹

Abstract

Drawing on a 15-month ethnographic study of a drug court, we investigate how actors from different institutional and professional backgrounds employ logical frameworks in their micro-level interactions and thus how logics affect day-to-day organizational activity. While institutional theory presumes that professionals closely adhere to the logics of their professional groups, we find that actors exercise a great deal of agency in their everyday use of logics, both in terms of which logics they adopt and for what purpose. Available logics closely resemble tools that can be creatively employed by actors to achieve individual and organizational goals. A close analysis of court negotiations allowed us to identify the logics that are available to these actors, show how they are employed, and demonstrate how their use affects the severity of the court's decisions. We examine the ways in which professionals with four distinct logical orientations—the logics of criminal punishment, rehabilitation, community accountability, and efficiency—use logics to negotiate decisions in a drug court. We provide evidence of the discretionary use of these logics, specifying the procedural, definitional, and dispositional constraints that limit actors' discretion and propose an explanation for why professionals stray from their "home" logics and "hijack" the logics of other court actors. Examining these micro-level processes improves our understanding of how local actors use logics to manage institutional complexity, reach consensus, and get the work of the court done.

Keywords: institutional logics, drug courts, ethnography, professions, institutional complexity

In recent years, there has been growing interest among organizational scholars, and especially among institutionalists, in the links between macro- and micro-phenomena. Examining the complex and mutually influential relationship between local actors and institutions, this work has generated important insights concerning the micro-level building blocks of institutions (Colyvas and

¹ University of Iowa

Powell, 2006; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Dacin, Munir, and Tracey, 2010), how local actors translate and reconstitute institutional requirements (Binder, 2007; Hallett, 2010; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010), how micro-level processes drive institutional change (Heimer, 1999; Zilber, 2002; Kellogg, 2011), and how actors draw on cultural codes to fuel the emergence of new practices and organizational identities (Benford and Snow, 2000; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008).

The study of institutional logics has been at the forefront of these efforts, demonstrating how macro-level institutions, via logics, affect organizational strategies, structures, and practices (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). Research in this area has shown, for example, how changing logics within a field influence the strategies and practices of organizations (Scott et al., 2000; Thornton, 2004), how local situations influence the logics that decision makers draw on within an organizational field (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007), and how organizations establish and transform their identities and practices as they confront logics from contending institutional spheres (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Lok, 2010; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011). This and related scholarship has led to a much better understanding of how the practices of actors are “embedded” in logical frameworks.

As Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) emphasized in their recent synthesis of the institutional logics perspective, however, previous research stops short of studying how logics are actually used on the ground. This literature currently lacks a clear, empirically based understanding of how social actors translate logics into action as they engage in everyday organizational activities or how these micro-level activities help reproduce or transform organizational structures. Importantly, this deficiency is reflective of institutional scholarship more generally (see Bechky, 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011): much more attention has been given to how institutional forces dictate individual behavior than to how micro-level activities affect the nature of these forces. More work is needed to unpack how local actors mediate institutional demands and the requirements of day-to-day organizational activity.

Moreover, particularly lacking are studies of how actors manage an organizational environment at the intersection of multiple institutional fields, fields with distinct sets of expectations. Although there is growing interest in the “institutional complexity” that accompanies multi-institutional settings (Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011), much of the research in this area has focused on organizational-level responses to these contradictory environmental pressures. As Kraatz and Block (2008) noted, there is an absence of research on how local actors experience and manage this complex terrain. Our study of how actors in a drug court balance the demands of multiple, and at times conflicting, institutional and organizational demands can provide empirical insight into how institutional complexity is handled in everyday practice and how the coexistence of competing frameworks is maintained over time as logics are invoked on the ground.

LOGICS ON THE GROUND

Although there is no consensus among organizational scholars about how to define institutional logics, or even the location and scope of logics, they are

generally understood as macro-level belief systems that shape cognitions and influence decision-making processes in organizational fields (see Friedland and Alford, 1991; Ocasio, 1997; Thornton, 2004). For those organizations within a field, these logics act as “taken-for-granted social prescriptions” (Battilana and Dorado, 2010: 1420) that define goals and expectations, legitimate activity (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2002, 2004), and often become embodied in organizational structures and practices (Thornton, 2004; Dunn and Jones, 2010).

Demonstrating how these abstract logics take on tangible qualities and assert influence is a long-standing concern within the institutional logics perspective. While theoretical statements maintain that logics are expressed by actors through vocabularies of motives, scripts, and frames (e.g., Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004), there is little direct evidence of such expressions because most research in this area focuses on the activity of collective actors and field-level processes. Meso-level accounts have examined how available vocabularies (Loewenstein and Ocasio, 2003; Ocasio and Joseph, 2005), “theorization” (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003), frames (Benford and Snow, 2000; Jones and Livre-Tarandach, 2008), and narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) influence symbolic and material elements of organizations, but none investigate how these logics are constituted and used by individual actors within organizations—that is, how they are actualized on the ground. Developing a better understanding of these micro-level instantiations is critical to the logics perspective because it is here that logics are translated into action, action that either reinforces or reconstitutes the logics themselves (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 80–82).

In this paper, we aim to develop just such a micro-level account, drilling deeper into the micro-foundations of logics to observe *how* logics are enacted at the interactional level in day-to-day organizational activity. This ground-level perspective challenges institutional theory’s conventional assumption that individuals strictly adhere to the dictates of their home group’s dominant logic. This assumption is embedded in many strands of research on institutional logics. Studies of fields that have undergone transformations in their dominant logics (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Kitchener, 2002; Lounsbury, 2007), for example, imply that the actors within these fields change their behavior accordingly. Likewise, recent theories of “embedded agency” contend that prevailing institutional logics constrain the interests, values, and strategies of actors within fields and professions (Seo and Creed, 2002; Battilana, 2006; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Even research on logical pluralism within fields and professions operates under the assumption that each logic is tied to distinct subgroups, and it is the balkanization of commitments to different logics that creates dynamic tensions within these fields (see D’Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007; Battilana and Dorado, 2010).

In contrast to this view, we propose that logics serve as tools that can be used by actors in a contested environment to influence decisions, justify activities, or advocate for change. The same logic, for example, could be used in different situations to achieve opposite goals, and the same actor may choose to employ different logics at different times depending on the perceived needs of the immediate situation. In other words, although institutional logics are decidedly extra-individual, their construction, their transmission, and their use

depend on people who themselves have interests, beliefs, and preferences (see Binder, 2007). Conceiving of logics in this way has an obvious affinity to Swidler's (1986) cultural toolkit approach in that we portray actors as having a repertoire of logics—or tools—that they can choose from when the need to influence, justify, or advocate arises. Conceiving of logics as tools reveals how they can be continuously combined, configured, and manipulated to serve the purposes of actors. In short, it shows what actors do to logics as well as what logics do to actors.

Everyday Manifestations of Logics

The lion's share of existing scholarship on logics focuses on the interrelationship between institutions and organizations, examining either how institutions and organizations mutually influence one another (e.g., Haveman and Rao, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Lounsbury, 2002) or, more commonly, how changing macro-cultural logics influence the strategies and activities of specific organizational fields (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Thornton, 2004; Murray, 2010). The result of this work is that we know a great deal about how logics influence the interactions between institutions and organizations as well as how logics are transformed as a result of competition and conflict at these macro levels of analysis. We know much less, however, about how logics become manifest, the effects of logics, and the complex interplay among competing logics at the individual level of analysis. While a few previous studies take up the macro-to-micro effects of institutional logics (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2001, 2002), this work does not explicitly address how local actors reproduce and transform logics (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 82). Further, as Lok (2010) pointed out, our understanding of how actors in complex institutional environments and organizations—the people who make everyday decisions in multi-institutional organizational environments—construct responses and manage identities in the face of institutional contradictions is rudimentary. By demonstrating how logics enter into the activities of actors, our work attempts to open the "black box" of the workings of logics on the ground, providing empirical support for the claims that social actors play a central role in mediating the relationship between logics and organizational activities.

Because our focus is on how actors translate logics at the local level, it is closely aligned with recent work that highlights the importance of social actors in institutional processes (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009). These studies demonstrate that in order to fully comprehend institutional maintenance and change, organizational scholars must pay careful attention to the ways in which institutions are negotiated, interpreted, and enacted by individuals as they interact. Thus it is through dynamic local processes that institutional logics are attached to organizational activity in symbolic and substantive ways as actors constitute and shape their meaning and relevance (Coburn, 2004; Binder, 2007; Hallett, 2010). This approach to logics, like recent scholarship on "institutional work" (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010; Bechky, 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011), highlights aspects of micro-institutional processes—such as the significance of professional attachments, the necessity of day-to-day problem solving, and the construction of shared local meanings—that are typically overlooked by macro- and meso-level studies.

METHODS

Data for this case study were derived from a fifteen-month ethnographic investigation of the drug court of Stone City (a pseudonym) during 2008 and 2009. Typically, drug courts are designed to provide an alternative judicial process for legal offenses related to drug use. The Stone City drug court team, like most drug court organizations, comprises representatives of community and regional organizations with a variety of occupational backgrounds. Members included a presiding judge, an associate judge (who presided almost as frequently as the Chief Judge of the District), a state's attorney, a public defender, a paralegal from the state's attorney's office, two county probation officers who were exclusively assigned to drug court participants, between two and four attending treatment liaisons or clinicians (specializing in substance abuse and mental health), the county's court services supervisor, a sheriff, and a clerk of the court.

Drug court proceedings were divided into two parts: a team-members-only meeting followed by official court proceedings. During the team meetings—from which most of our data are derived—members set out to discuss each “client” or “participant” individually, reviewing varied information about the individual's case as it pertained to his or her current status and progress in various life areas. Life areas that the team regularly assesses include, but are not limited to, legal status, adherence to strict terms of drug court probation, physical, medical, emotional and mental health, issues of addiction and treatment progress, employment matters, life skills, education opportunities, family, clients' romantic and peer relationships (and the health and standing of these partners and peers), living conditions and stability (environments conducive to “recovery” and “success”), religious matters, and the client's overall progress. In these backstage deliberations, much of the discussion involved extra-legal information: evaluation included not only clients' behavior and activities but also interpretations of their behaviors and assumptions about their motives. This is also the setting in which sanctions are negotiated and conflicting opinions are voiced. Ultimately, these backstage meetings consist of consensus building and the endorsement of positions; it is also during these meetings that court actions are most often decided upon by the presiding judge. These decisions are then formally enacted in the official court proceedings, hearings that closely resemble traditional court proceedings.

Drug courts have considerable discretion in their decisions. Participants, once admitted, have already entered pleas, waived trial, and fully consented to supervision by the drug court team. Participants are expected to adhere to all program rules and any mandates levied by the team and handed down by the judge. As such, the drug court's accountability is highly internalized. Procedures for grieving decisions made by the judge are internal, there are no appeals' courts, and participants rarely contest decisions beyond vocalizing disagreement.

The Stone City drug court, founded more than a decade ago, was the first drug court in its region. It is an established lower-level court program; many of its professionals have long-term associations with this court (some since its inception), and it is embedded in a large network of community relationships and professional ties. The court is located in a metropolitan community large enough to service a large and diverse population, a community that struggles

with significant issues of crime and addiction and in which there is a wide range of community organizations and services.

The Stone City drug court meets two days each week. The first author attended 53 days of the court's proceedings over the course of the research, splitting visits between the two days almost equally. He adhered strictly to the role of observer in its deliberations and was readily accepted by team members as someone there to learn more about drug court activities.

Our ethnographic study is best characterized as an inductive case study (Yin, 2009). The data for this study are derived from the drug court team meetings as well as informal discussions and formal interviews with team members. Field notes written up immediately after each visit provided detailed accounts of the session just attended. During the early stages of the data collection, it became evident that patterns in communication, perspectives invoked, and certain repeated phrases and keywords were used to frame team members' evaluations in the drug court meetings. Adopting a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we engaged in an iterative process of collecting and analyzing data, continually comparing existing and new data along emerging dimensions of interest. As themes emerged, we refined data collection and recording strategies to ensure efficient and accurate records of all aspects of drug court proceedings. We sorted observations into emergent categories based on the suggestions, recommendations, and opinions offered by team members during case deliberations. We eventually reached a point of theoretical saturation, such that new observations fit into the constructed framework (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

It became apparent early in our ethnography that one challenge we faced was to understand interaction and negotiation within these cases. To address this concern, we attempted to standardize the coding of information for each case processed by the drug court team as much as possible. This standardization involved identifying which professionals engaged in discussion, what each professional shared, offered, or explained, the ordering of dialogue and communication, proposals for drug court responses or action, whether communication was directed at particular parties, when and how contestation or disagreement unfolded, why disagreement occurred, the recommendation made to the judge, and the judge's communication, explanation, and eventual decision. This data coding strategy proved crucial to our case-by-case examination in that it allowed us to sample points of indecision and contestation and identify how instances of conflict affect the fates of offenders in drug court (see Morrill, 1995; Emerson, 2008; on "trouble case analysis"). More importantly, this careful tracking of case proceedings (discussed in more detail below) represents a novel approach to analyzing drug court cases in that it allowed us to develop meaningful "counts" of our qualitative data.

We deepened our contextual knowledge by consulting scholarship on drug courts, government-sponsored reports, and publications by national drug court organizations. We held focus-group-like presentations of findings and observations with drug court personnel to clarify and verify our observations. The field study was complemented by 17 interviews with eight drug court professionals. We interviewed each principal actor in the drug court workgroup at least once and five of them on multiple occasions. Finally, the first author spoke with probation officers and the clerk of the court on numerous occasions to seek

clarification on case outcomes and proceedings and to ensure that data were recorded accurately. On three occasions, the first author met with the full drug court team, each time for 30 to 45 minutes, to review observations and discuss findings; these meetings were open forums for these professionals to offer critiques, challenges, and feedback. These team meetings and presentations occurred after six months of data collection, again after approximately ten months of involvement, and finally, once all data had been collected and an earlier version of this report had been drafted. Taken together, these data provided a rich understanding of negotiations and activities of the Stone City drug court.

Count Data

The nature of our ethnographic data also allowed us to conduct counts (see Nelson and Schutz, 2007; Calarco, 2011) of institutional logic enactments or invocations throughout most of our period of observation. From just over five hundred single-spaced pages of field notes, we created individual memoranda detailing the 107 case reviews in which the team members explicitly invoked logics in the decision-making process. Each memorandum itself was a detailed account of that case review, noting case background, the dynamics of the team interaction and deliberation, explicit logic invocations, key players in discussion, the temporal order of negotiations, and case outcomes. We used each memorandum to count the number of times logics were invoked, who invoked them, to what end, and whether adopted actions supported the arguments advanced by logics and their enactors. We use these counts to supplement our ethnographic data.

In an attempt to gauge the effectiveness of employing logics, we used these count data to assess whether logics influenced the severity of sanctions imposed on drug court participants. To do so, we compared the actual decisions of the judge in cases in which logics were invoked to estimates of the "default decision" that would typically be handed down, given the circumstances. This comparison between the expected and actual decisions is possible only because of the predictability of case outcomes. We estimated the "default decisions" using information from the United States Department of Justice (2003) guidelines for drug courts, Stone City's own records of probable sanctions for specific violations, and references to "normal procedure" during case reviews. While these estimates are indeed estimates, we reviewed them with several drug court actors, who confirmed their validity; team members confirmed that normal cases are quite formulaic and adhere to a rubric of violations and sanctions that most can readily recite. To test their reliability, we compared our estimates with the outcomes of the 353 cases in which logics were not invoked. Our estimates were correct in 343 of these cases. In the ten non-conforming case reviews, sanctions deviated only slightly, such as when a participant was expected to receive three days in jail and received four or when a participant was predicted to be jailed for a weekend but received only one day in jail. Confident in our estimates of default decisions, we were able to assess the relationship between invocations of logics and the severity of sanctions.

THE ENACTMENT OF LOGICS ON THE GROUND

Available Logics

Our first goal was to identify the logical “tools” available in everyday interactions in this setting, which involved identifying real logics on the ground and then explaining how they are distinct in practice. As Weber (2005) pointed out, existing research rarely specifies the logics or, in his terms, “cultural registers” that are available to actors in organizational settings. Distinguishing among these logics requires an in-depth qualitative approach like the one adopted here. We found that four distinct institutional logics were invoked with regularity in Stone City drug court: the logic of criminal punishment, the logic of rehabilitation, the logic of community accountability, and the logic of efficiency. Table 1 summarizes the identifying characteristics of each logic.

The logic of criminal punishment. The logic of criminal punishment—traditionally the default logic of judicial response to crimes related to drug abuse—represents the field-level manifestation of the logic of the state (see Dobbin et al., 1988; Dobbin, 1994; Thornton, 2004) in the legal realm. This logic extols the virtues of just incarceration and formal social control, the markers of traditional punitive legal enforcement strategies. In drug court, the logic focuses the cognitive attention of the drug court professionals on participants’ obedience, respect for authority, and adherence to rules and expectations. While drug courts are designed to expand the scope of the court’s responses beyond formal punitive sanctions, criminal punishment remains a powerful logic in this setting (Belenko, 2000; Nolan, 2001) in part because the drug court must maintain its associations with traditional court practices in order to be taken seriously as part of the correctional system. As a state’s attorney explained in reference to another county’s distaste for the drug court, “They think we’re soft. A lot of folks do. Sometimes it’s hard to convince people that the best solution involves being patient and understanding. They want us to just lock them up” (field notes, 1/8/09). The use of criminal punishment, then, helps to mitigate perceptions of softness by legitimizing the drug court’s practice in the eyes of other court entities and state correctional organizations. Of the array of professionals represented in drug court, the actors most closely aligned with—and therefore most expected to invoke—the logic of criminal punishment are the probation officers and sheriffs.

We identified the logic of criminal punishment through the use of keywords and phrases, the significance of which are easily recognized by all team members. A drug court participant, for example, might be described as a “criminal,” “prisoner,” or “felon.” Other keywords noted in team discussions included “punishment,” “rules,” “obedience,” “law,” and “control.” When enacting the logic of criminal punishment, actors also attempted to frame the nature of the drug court in a particular way: “our job is to monitor”; “we are corrections”; the central task of the drug court is “control [of participants].” In the midst of one case review in which a violation was characterized as unworthy of sanctions, the state’s attorney, incensed, remarked, “Let me remind everyone, we’re in the business of probation and monitoring . . . we’re no different than other courts” (field notes, 7/3/08). These types of statements contain institutional proscriptions for what the organization should be; here the state’s

Table 1. Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in the Stone City Drug Court

Characteristic	Logic of criminal punishment	Logic of rehabilitation	Logic of community accountability	Logic of efficiency
Sources of organizational legitimacy	Drug courts as intensive legal and correctional supervision	Drug courts as the legal supervision of treatment and counseling by social service and community organizations	Drug court as responsive public entity, protecting and serving community interests & fulfilling public's perception of community well-being	Drug court as solution to social costs of substance abuse and criminality, a rational and economically feasible entity
Target of legitimacy pursuits	American judicial system traditionalists, polity and bureaucracy invested in state-sanctioned social control	Social service and treatment organizations & lobbyists, families, medical & health professionals, persons being served	The public or populace, concrete local community interests, community power-brokers, media interests	State and federal legislators, funding agencies, the wider judiciary (as a means of distinction), taxpayers
Basis of organizational mission	Supervision, rehabilitate the willing and worthy, punish the unrepentant and non-compliant, reprogram negative moral identities	Provide a means for participant rehabilitation, reinforce positive moral identities, provide legal backing for treatment	Build/maintain a court responsive to community problems and community-desired solutions; restore community harmony	Build/maintain a court that integrates and promotes cost-effective practices and makes economically justified decisions
Basis of organizational attention	Law-abiding conduct, compliance and adherence to rules, regulations and expectations; focus on concrete behaviors and actions	Progressive change, progress defined/ informed by attending to life-sphere reconstitution, focus on participants' motivations	Other-focused, community's satisfaction with services provided, selling legitimacy in wider environment & to a public that is indirectly harmed	Other-regarding, directed toward relation between participant costs and organization/ state/federal costs
Basis of strategy	Procedural rules, legal playbook, and traditional negative sanctions (and threat thereof), correctional punishment and control	Appropriate care, identifying needs, providing resources, cooperative supervision, encouragement, & less punitive/more creative sanctions	Increase perceptions of court as other-focused; court responses depend on impact (and perceptions thereof) on community	"Rational" utility-maximizing solutions, more or less punitive sanctions depending upon response as a function of organizational costs
Primary associated actors	Probation officers	Treatment liaisons and clinicians	Public defenders	State's attorneys

attorney made an entreaty to the court's obligation to address legal violations, suggesting that breaking the law warranted a stronger response given the participant's lack of accountability and willingness to take responsibility for the violation (the entreaty was successful—the court eventually adopted a harsher verdict).

The logic of rehabilitation. The logic of rehabilitation represents a relatively new cultural view of how the legal system should address issues of substance abuse. The rehabilitation logic is a specific field-level manifestation of the logic of professions (see Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Murray, 2010; Dunn and Jones, 2010). The emergence of the medical model of addiction (Nolan, 2001) coupled with political pressure for the judiciary to acknowledge community and social service success with this population have resulted in increasing acceptance of rehabilitative strategies in the legal system (Belenko, 1993, 2000). The rehabilitative logic, steeped in the virtues of self-reconstitution and the capacity of individuals to enact change, is tightly linked to treatment or therapy (Wexler, 1990; Olson, Lurigio, and Albertson, 2001). When enacted, the logic of rehabilitation directs the cognitive attention of team members toward the “whole person,” encouraging consideration of the participant’s background and a nuanced understanding of his or her current situation. Proponents of this logic—in this court, clinicians and treatment liaisons—contend that not all participants can be treated with the same expectations and according to a uniform set of evaluative criteria; strategies and solutions should be individually tailored.

Representative examples of keywords employed to invoke the logic of rehabilitation include “self-change,” “commitment,” “capacity for change,” “taking ownership” or “taking responsibility,” “working an honest program,” and “making progress.” The most common enactments of this logic occurred through appeals to the drug court’s identity and its institutional embodiment. Verbal appeals included phrases like “in terms of recovery,” “our job is to . . . reconstruct shattered lives” (field notes, probation officer, 4/8/08), “promote progress not perfection” (field notes, counselor, 4/16/09), “facilitate rehabilitation” (field notes, probation officer, 4/9/09), “drug court is supposed to be therapeutic, not punitive” (field notes, public defender, 5/6/08), and “progress should be our hallmark” (field notes, judge, 9/9/08).

The logic of community accountability. The logic of community accountability is oriented to the interests of “the public.” According to this version of a shareholder’s logic (e.g., Fligstein, 2001), or the community logic at the societal level (see Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; O’Mahony and Lakhani, 2011), the drug court is accountable to the community at large, widening the scope of a team’s considerations. This logic, like the rehabilitative logic, stems from the drug court’s emergence as a response to cultural shifts favoring less incarceration (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998, 2000) and the public belief that courts should be community oriented (Tiger, 2011). As representatives of the public’s interests, public defenders (the legal counsel) are most closely aligned with the logic of community accountability and are most likely to draw on it to frame considerations. When invoked, this logic directs the cognitive attention of drug court actors away from the participants and toward the interests of the community.

Community accountability is rhetorically enacted through words such as “community,” “public,” “media,” and “families.” Most generally, this logic directs drug court actors to consider the interests of parties not present in the drug court but whose voice the court is perceived to represent. The logic of community accountability was invoked through phrases such as “promising the world productive members of society,” “commitment to the community” and

“community enhancement,” “community interests,” “betterment of the public,” and “protecting innocent folks.” Importantly, the logic directs the team’s attention toward community stakeholders over the welfare of participants. As the sheriff shared, “. . . we can’t treat these people like they exist in a black box. People want to know that we recognize our participants affect the community . . . if we’re true to our name, we’ll make decisions with a lot of people in mind” (informal interview, 4/10/09).

The logic of efficiency. Finally, actors in the Stone City drug court frequently discussed the pressures they face to “get results.” In particular, the drug court is motivated to produce outcomes through process-efficiency improvements and realized savings, distinguishing it from other court forms (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998; Sanford and Arrigo, 2005). The logic of efficiency directs attention toward maximizing utility and following a rational business model. The logic of efficiency is the field-level manifestation of the logic of the corporation (see Fligstein, 1985, 1990; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton, 2004). The actors most instrumentally tied to the emergence of the drug court in Stone City—state’s attorneys and the judges—are also most closely aligned with the logic of efficiency and thus most likely to appeal to it in decision-making processes.

When invoking this logic, actors often draw on principles of economic efficiency. Common frames and keywords include “sound investments,” “pay-offs,” “financial justifications,” “use of resources,” and “rational justifications.” Referencing the organization’s identity, actors said things like “We can’t fulfill our duty without assessing our costs and benefits for acting” (field notes, 1/13/09), “Unlike Judge Stern’s [pseudonym] court across the hall, we’ve got to be cognizant of resource allocation regardless of the circumstances” (field notes, 3/10/09), and “This is a business, so evaluating brass tacks had better factor into your calculations” (field notes, 7/1/08). Importantly, this logic directs attention away from the participants and their circumstances, inviting team members to consider the drug court itself and to keep in mind how their actions measure up to standards of economic efficiency.

The Invocations of Logics

Analyzing the discussions of cases in team meetings enabled us to measure the frequency with which the aforementioned logics were used and to what ends. Over the 53 days of observation, the team reviewed 460 cases. Case reviews provide the team with opportunities to evaluate and assess participants’ progress in a variety of life areas, discuss perceived problems, and negotiate consensus around particular strategies and solutions, including sanctions (see Appendix for a description of the outcomes or sanctions). Approximately 25 percent of the time (in 107 of 460 cases), external logics were invoked in discussions of cases, and it is to this subset of the cases that we directed our attention. The remainder of the case reviews (353 in total, approximately 75 percent of our sample) primarily consisted of formalized and mundane procedures; they generated no substantive debate, and there was consensus across parties about the appropriate action to take. These latter cases could be interpreted as situations in which a “default” or “master” logic of the drug court

holds sway. Many of these cases were reviews in which no transgressions had taken place and no concerns about the participant's progress were raised. These positions were often indicated through the use of phrases such as "they're good to go," "our work's done here," "there's nothing further we need to discuss, she's holding steady." In some of these cases, the participant had violated drug court rules, but the response of the court was standard, and no debate ensued. For example, after reviewing evidence presented by the probation officers and the sheriff of one participant's recent violation, the state's attorney stated, "Well, it's cut and dried, she was charged, we've got witnesses, that's enough. It's a week [in jail]" (field notes 10/23/08); the judge agreed and there was no discussion or dissent. No matter how these cases are labeled, what is most important to our analysis is that no external logics were explicitly invoked.

Our qualitative data suggest that actors employed logics when there was uncertainty or disagreement about the actions that the drug court should take. In these situations, there were almost always divergent perspectives on how the participant's behaviors and motives should be interpreted. This lack of consensus usually involved cases that lacked precedence in terms of the team's past responses, cases in which evidence was ambiguous, and cases in which participants either egregiously violated or exemplified the norms of a particular institutional perspective. For example, in one case the norms of one logic were perceived to be violated egregiously. After a participant had been admitted to the drug court program and released from incarceration, the team discovered that this person—who wanted to get out of jail to spend time with his ill elderly mother—had boasted to others that his admission to the program was a ticket out of jail. Some team members looked at the participant's reason for involvement as unrelated to a more desirable and expected motive: to "get better" or "recover." Angered by the participant's covert incentives for lobbying the court to participate, the probation officer exclaimed, "Let's not forget, this is a prisoner here, that's how he ended up with us." She then portrayed the participant as demonstrating a "prison mentality" by attempting to manipulate the program's provisions in an effort to simply "get out of jail." The probation officer labeled the recently admitted participant as "unworthy," a conclusion eventually adopted by the drug court team (field notes, 4/8/08). Despite resistance from other actors, the probation officer was able to reassert the importance of the criminal punishment logic by framing considerations in terms of the participant's criminal status ("prisoner") and imputing a certain type of motivation. In doing so, the probation officer had the person terminated from the drug court program even though there was no evidence of explicit legal violations.

Another case provides an illustration of an actor invoking a logic because he believed a case exemplified the values of a particular institutional perspective and thought that this perspective should therefore be given more weight in the decision-making process. In this instance, several drug court team members interpreted a participant's actions as constituting grounds for dismissal from the program, but the public defender drew attention to the logic of rehabilitation's tenet that behavior be considered in terms of the "whole person": "Wait a second here, are we evaluating issues relating to deviance, or is this about the whole character of people?" (field notes 6/3/08). The tenor of the debate turned on this remark, and after some discussion, the team agreed to retain the participant in the program. The invocation of the rehabilitation logic changed

the team's decision. These decisions matter greatly for participants, as discharge can—and would have in this case—result in an extended jail term or prison sentence.

These are just two of many cases in our data that exemplify how drug court actors use logics as tools to influence drug court decisions. By employing logics in targeted situations, the logic's invoker attempts to influence how the team organizes evidence, the problems or considerations to which the team attends, and the details that should be considered core to the responsibilities of the drug court team. Engaging in a type of institutional sensemaking (Weick, 1995), drug court actors use logics to frame the problem at hand, thereby creating situational understandings that will influence the decisions of the court.

The Effects of Logic Use

The examples discussed above demonstrate ways in which actors used logics in drug court interactions, and in both instances the decision of the court appeared to be influenced by the invocation of logics. But how representative are these cases? To address this question, we drew on our count data from the case reviews we tracked in the court.

In the 107 cases in which logics were invoked, logics were used 195 times by team members. In 51 of these cases, a single logic was invoked in discussions of a case; multiple logics were invoked during discussions of the other 56. In all 107 cases, logics were invoked temporally prior to any decisive court actions, supporting our claim that logics are actively used tools—employed to direct attention, order considerations, and shape decisions—rather than post-hoc justifications for actions. In addition, each of the four institutional logics we identified above was invoked with regularity. The logic of rehabilitation was invoked on 69 occasions, the logic of criminal punishment was invoked 44 times, the logic of community accountability was used on 26 occasions, and the logic of efficiency was enacted 56 times. These counts support the argument that each logic was available to influence decision making.

As we discussed in the methods section, we constructed estimates of default decisions from existing resources. We first tested our estimates on the 353 cases in which logics were not invoked, and our estimates correctly predicted the severity of sanctions in 343 (97 percent) of these cases. By comparison, the severity of sanctions deviated from the estimated default decision in 87 of the 107 cases in which logics were invoked. Depending on the context, logics were effective in moving court decisions to be both more or less punitive. In 40 of these 87 case reviews, the enactment of logics corresponded to more severe sanctions, such as a jail sentence, a longer term in jail, or even discharge from the program (which would lead to a prison sentence). In the other 47 case reviews, the enactment of logics corresponded to less severe sanctions, for example, a shorter jail term, a more lenient sanction, or no sanction at all. These data indicate that the invocation of logics is strongly associated with deviations in court decisions.

The links between the use of logics and court outcomes become even clearer when we examine the relationship between the recommendations of the person using the logic and the specific ways in which decisions change. According to our argument, institutional logics are tools used purposefully to push the court's decisions in desired directions. Thus drug court actors do not

appeal to logics without explicitly connecting them to proposed recommendations for how the team should respond to a given consideration (i.e., whether the decision should be more or less punitive). Thus a “match” between logics and adopted court responses refers to whether the eventual court actions parallel the recommendations advanced by those who invoke logics.

In cases in which a single logic was invoked, there was an obvious correlation between case outcomes (the official response by the judge) and the course of action—i.e., a more or less severe punishment—pursued by the actor who invoked this anchoring logic. In these single-logic cases, the eventual outcome adopted by the presiding judge mirrored the proposed solution advocated by the logic’s enactor on 43 of 51 occasions (85 percent). This result was consistent across logics: recommended actions were adopted 16 of 19 times when the rehabilitation logic was invoked, 5 of 5 times for criminal punishment, 10 of 11 times for community accountability, and 12 of 16 times for the logic of efficiency. This analysis provides evidence that logics used as tools produce tangible consequences when employed by actors to influence organizational decisions. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these logics in and of themselves are only cultural frameworks. As such, they require individuals to actively take them up and apply them for them to be effective, and actors have some discretion in how they use them.

Agency in Action: Discretion in the Use of Logics

Conventional accounts of institutional logics might lead one to predict that actors in a complex institutional environment would closely adhere to the logics of their own institutions or professions. Probation officers would draw on arguments from the criminal punishment perspective, counselors would adhere to the logic of rehabilitation, and so on. One of the most striking findings of our data, however, is the degree of discretion actors in this setting had when they used logics on the ground. Rather than being employed mechanically—by this, we mean in ways that closely conform to the commitments of the particular institutions from which the actors originate—we see that particular logics are often used by actors whom we might not expect to use them, and these logics are used to support unexpected positions. In this sense, the comparison of logics to tools seems apt: logics very much resemble implements that can be used by whoever picks them up and used in ways that suit the purpose at hand. We observed a number of different ways in which logics were adapted as they were employed in the drug court.

We observed frequent deviations between the institutional background of actors and the types of logics they invoked. Table 2 presents counts of how often actors in each drug court position invoked each of the four institutional logics. The data in the table show that although actors tend to favor their own professional logics over others, each at times employs the full array of institutional tools. At one extreme, probation officers were adept at invoking all of the logics: they invoked criminal punishment 28 times, rehabilitation 25 times, community accountability 7 times, and efficiency 11 times. At the other extreme, clinicians stuck more closely to their “home” logic of rehabilitation on 33 occasions but did still invoke 2 other logics on different occasions. While it is true that actors are more likely to invoke the logics that best conform to their institutional backgrounds (see Battilana and Dorado, 2010), our data show that actors

Table 2. Institutional Logics Invoked by Drug Court Actors in Professional Positions*

Drug Court Actor	Institutional Logics Invoked				Total Times Invoked
	Criminal punishment	Rehabilitation	Community accountability	Efficiency	
Probation officers	28	25	7	11	71
Clinicians/ treatment liaisons	0	33	1	1	35
Public defender	4	6	9	14	33
State's attorneys	11	4	6	23	44
Other†	1	1	3	7	12
Total no. of times each logic invoked	44	69	26	56	195

* Counts reflect the total number of cases (N = 107) in which logics were invoked.

† "Other" category collapses invocations by adult court services supervisor, sheriffs, and clerks of court.

were surprisingly fluid in their use of available logics to solve the practical problems of the court.

Not only were logics available for use by almost all actors, but each logic was also used to argue for more or less severe sanctions: the same logics could be used toward different ends. The logic of rehabilitation was adopted on 35 occasions to argue for less severe sanctions, but—and more surprisingly—it was also invoked on 14 occasions to argue for more punitive sanctions. Likewise, the logic of criminal punishment was employed to argue for more severe sanctions on 20 occasions, but it was also used 4 times to make a case for a more lenient outcome. The logics of efficiency and community accountability showed even greater ambivalence: efficiency was invoked 25 times in arguments for more severe decisions and 17 times for less severe; community accountability was employed for these proposed ends 10 and 4 times, respectively. As these numbers indicate, not only were logics used by different people, they were also used for different purposes depending on how they were translated by the professionals enacting them. Importantly, these different uses of logics—arguing for either more or less severity in punishment—cannot be attributed to the varying predilections of actors from particular institutional backgrounds, for example, correctional officers who argue for more severe sanctions exclusively using criminal punishment.

Table 3 displays counts of successful invocations by the main or central drug court professionals, excluding, for clarity, the 12 invocations of peripheral actors such as the sheriffs and court services supervisor, whose rate of successful invocations did not vary from that of the main actors. As the table shows, just as logics are used flexibly to argue for more or less punitive sanctions, the evidence suggests that drug court actors used each of the logics we have discussed to argue for varied ends. The same actor will argue for both more and less severe sanctions, and in different circumstances that actor will employ different logics to craft such arguments: clinicians used the logic of rehabilitation 7 times to argue for more severe punishments and 13 times to argue for less severe; the state's attorney invoked the logic of efficiency 13 times to argue for more severe punishments and 6 times arguing for less severe punishments; probation officers cited the logic of criminal punishment 17 times to argue for more severe sanctions and 2 times to argue for less severe

Table 3. Main Actors' Successful Invocations across Logics by Change in Severity (N = 136)*

Actors	Severity change	Criminal punishment	Rehabilitation	Community accountability	Efficiency
Probation officers	+ 2	6 times	0	0	2 times
	+ 1	11 times	4 times	3 times	2 times
	No change	0	0	1 time	1 time
	-1	2 times	14 times	3 times	5 times
	-2	0	3 times	0	1 time
Clinicians	+ 2	0	3 times	0	0
	+ 1	0	4 times	0	0
	No change	0	1 time	1 time	0
	-1	0	13 times	0	1 time
	-2	0	0	0	0
Public defenders	+ 2	1 time	1 time	0	3 times
	+ 1	2 times	0	4 times	5 times
	No change	0	1 time	1	0
	-1	0	3 times	2 times	4 times
	-2	0	1 time	0	0
State's attorneys	+ 2	2 times	1 time	1 time	6 times
	+ 1	1 time	1 time	3 times	7 times
	No change	2 times	0	2 times	2 times
	-1	2 times	1 time	0	4 times
	-2	0	0	0	2 times

* Severity change marked by + 1 or + 2 indicates more severe and significantly more severe sanctions than those predicted using our default estimates; - 1 and - 2 serve to indicate less severe and significantly less severe sanctions than those predicted using our default estimates. Statistics in bold reflect the severity of outcomes in cases in which professionals adopted their home logics.

punishments, and they employed the logic of rehabilitation 4 times to argue for more severe sanctions but 17 times to argue for less severe sanctions.

Taken together, these examples illustrate the agency of actors on the ground to use logics as they deem appropriate. Although local actors consistently favor their home logics, their institutional background does not at all determine the type of argument they will make nor which logic they will use to make it. Individuals actively mediate the transmission of logics, adapting the use of these tools to the demands of the situation. Logics are extra-individual phenomena, but their construction, transmission, and effectiveness depend to a great degree on the actors who employ them.

Hijacking Logics

One reason for the willingness of drug court team members to use the logics from other institutional realms is that this type of usage is effective. For example, as shown in table 4, of the 183 times that logics were invoked in drug court negotiations by central professionals, home logics were used 93 times, and non-home logics—what we call “hijacked” logics—were used 90 times. While using logics of any type was generally successful, using the logics of others was noticeably more so: hijacked logics influenced the decision of the presiding judge in 78 of these 90 instances (87 percent of the time), whereas home logics only did so in 68 of the 93 instances (73 percent). As these numbers suggest, and as is demonstrated qualitatively in our field notes, hijacking the logics

Table 4. Professional Actors’ Use of Home and Non-home Logics (N = 183)*

Professionals	Total uses of logics	Non-home logic uses	Home logic uses
Probation officers	71 (58/71 = 81.69%)	43 (39/43 = 90.7%)	28 (19/28 = 67.86%)
Clinicians	35 (23/35 = 65.71%)	2 (2/2 = 100%)	33 (21/33 = 63.64%)
Public defenders	33 (28/33 = 84.85%)	24 (21/24 = 87.5%)	9 (7/9 = 77.78%)
State’s attorneys	44 (37/44 = 84.09%)	21 (16/21 = 76.19%)	23 (21/23 = 91.3%)

* Numbers in parentheses reflect the rate of success, measured as successful usages divided by total usages.

of others is an effective way of building consensus around proposed solutions. Much like the Nixon-in-China effect documented by Briscoe and Safford (2008), adopting positions not directly associated with one’s institutional allegiances and interests, even if done strategically, helps to create support for one’s position in these group interactions.

As table 4 illustrates, there is a great deal of variation in *who* hijacks the logics of others. Probation officers, for example, hijacked the logics of others on 43 occasions and were successful in 39 of those cases (91 percent of the time). By contrast, they successfully influenced the judge’s decision in only 19 of the 28 cases in which they invoked their home logic. Clinicians, by comparison, hijacked the logic of others only twice, even though they were successful on both of these occasions, but invoked their home logic 33 times. This difference in the ability of some actors to hijack the logics of others is further reflected in the fact that probation officers hijacked the logic of clinicians 25 times (and did so successfully in 21 cases), while clinicians did not attempt to hijack the criminal punishment logic of probation officers even once. These differences serve as reminders that, despite the flexibility we have described, actors are not free to use logics in any way that they choose. There are structural constraints that limit how logics can be employed, and these constraints are more restrictive for some than for others, as we discuss below.

DISCUSSION

A key assumption of institutional theory is that actors affiliated with a professional or organizational group will closely adhere to that group’s primary logic. Our findings challenge this assumption by showing that actors pragmatically and creatively invoke available logics in order to manage everyday work, often employing the “competing” logics of other drug court team members. We showed that logics in this local context are comparable to tools—shared instruments that can be “picked up” by actors and used to achieve individual or organizational goals—and that actors use these tools to affect court decisions. In addition, we showed that actors commonly exercise a great deal of discretion in their use of tools, employing logics, sometimes their own and sometimes those of others, for surprising purposes. Demonstrating actors’ discretion in their employment of logics provides a better foundation for understanding the

mediating role of actors in translating logics into action in local settings. This approach contributes to the institutional logic perspective by showing how actors use logics strategically to influence organizational outcomes. Tracing the influence of abstract logics down to the level of interaction also provides empirical support for theoretical claims about the tangible effects of logics in everyday activity while demonstrating the value of the logics framework for studying the macro-micro link between organizations and extra-local environments. In addition, this close examination of how actors use logics contributes to recent micro-institutional inquiries into the ways in which actors both manage institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and maintain institutional arrangements (Powell and Colyvas, 2008). Most generally, these findings speak to how broad cultural forces come to exert influence on ground-level organizational behavior.

Finally, this work provides a novel perspective on how institutional theory can improve our understanding of lower-level court activities and the decision making within them. Recent research at the intersection of law and organizations has focused almost exclusively on the implementation and effects of law outside of legal settings. As such, organizational analysis has been largely absent from the study of legal settings and, especially, lower courts. We show the value of using institutional analysis and the logics framework for understanding internal legal processes by demonstrating the ways in which extra-legal institutions and culture influence the activity and decisions of lower-level courts.

To this point we have documented how logics are used on the ground, emphasizing the discretion exercised by actors in their use of these logics. Having established the flexible use of logics in this setting, however, it is important to address two issues related to this flexibility: (1) why participants adopt the logics of other professionals, and (2) what structural factors limit the agentic use of the logics we have described thus far. While our answers to these questions are necessarily tentative, our data do allow us to develop frameworks for addressing them.

Why Logics Are Used

In the case at hand, actors used logics to manage the complexity inherent in a multi-institutional setting. The creative use of logics helps balance the often-conflicting obligations of one's institutional background and the local organizational setting. Strictly adhering to one's own institutional framework would not only violate the expectations for collaboration in this context, it would also interfere with the court's ability to function efficiently. To get the practical business of the drug court done, actors must recognize that other frameworks are sometimes more salient or appropriate.

But, as we showed, actors in the drug court do more than simply defer to the logics of others; instead, they actively adopt these other logics in discussions of cases. There are two compelling pragmatic explanations for this. First, and most directly, actors use logics flexibly because doing so is effective in influencing outcomes. As our data show, the use of logics is strongly correlated with deviations from typical sanctions and—more importantly to the point at hand—hijacking logics is even more effective than employing one's home logic. There is strong evidence, then, that the use of logics helps actors shape court

decisions. Second, the use of the tools of others publicly endorses the legitimacy of competing frameworks in a way that might be beneficial in future discussions and negotiations. As we discussed above, there is evidence that hijacking the logics of others strengthens the persuasiveness of arguments (see also Safford and Briscoe, 2008) and increases the likelihood of their success. More subtly, hijacking logics also seems to generate goodwill by creating alliances and demonstrating a willingness to collaborate. This goodwill may be something actors can trade on in the future.

These pragmatic interpretations, however, are incomplete. Actors not only show flexibility in the logics they choose to invoke, but they also apply logics flexibly in their recommendations of action. If probation officers always argued for more punitive measures or counselors always argued for less punitive measures, as their respective backgrounds might suggest, this pragmatic explanation would be more satisfactory. But the absence of evidence of this kind of single-mindedness leads us to speculate that there is a ritualistic component to these flexible invocations in the Durkheimian sense that the flexible use of logics by participants fosters cohesion among group members. A varied use of the available tools perpetually reinforces the validity and relevance of these multiple logics and, more generally, the drug court itself, strengthening the cognitive legitimacy of the court's practices, strategy, and multi-institutional structure. If this is the case, we would expect to see more flexible use of logical tools as well as more hijacking of logics in organizational settings that require cross-institutional collaboration to function efficiently. Likewise, we would expect actors to be more likely to adopt the institutional frameworks of others in settings in which they must contend with multiple layers (i.e., institutional, professional, local organizational) of conflicting normative obligations.

Structural Constraints on the Use of Logics

As scholarship on how organizational actors use cultural resources has shown, there are limits to the flexibility by which cultural frameworks, such as logics, can be employed (e.g., Heimer, 1999; Albiston, 2005; Hardy and McGuire, 2008). Even if there is a great deal of flexibility in the use of logics, actors cannot effectively draw on any logic in any situation; application is constrained by norms, situational circumstances, interpersonal skill, and even the nature of the invoked logics. In our data, we see three prominent types of constraints—procedural, definitional, and positional—on the use of logics in the drug court. Following the tool analogy, these types represent limitations on (1) the situations in which tools are able to be used, (2) the purposes for which the tools can be employed, and (3) who is allowed to use them. Examining these constraints helps us develop a more nuanced understanding of the availability and manipulability of logics on the ground.

Procedural constraint pertains to the way in which the use of logics is determined by the formal rules and norms of the drug court. Procedural guidelines established through national associations, for example, provide broad norms of conduct, and when case information falls squarely into easily interpreted categories, drug court actors are expected to cede to the guidelines, provisions, and existing procedural standards regarding how the court should respond. When there is a clear fit between the circumstances of the case and standardized practices, the use of external logics is considered unnecessary and even

inappropriate. Logical tools are rendered useless when the structural or procedural dictates can be directly applied. This was the situation in the majority of cases in which no external logic was invoked. If actors attempted to use logics in these contexts, they would almost certainly be unsuccessful, and they would also risk losing their credibility.

While in the field, the first author observed numerous instances in which procedural constraints explicitly limited opportunities for professionals to offer interpretations. These were often demonstrated through subtle language cues, from a state's attorney's comment that "there's nothing here to discuss" to a probation officer's quip that "the rules say two days in jail . . . so it's two days in jail," to several actors' use of the phrase "they're good to go." There is no interpretation or proposed solution to be offered: clear case circumstances have clear responses.

Definitional constraint, by contrast, concerns the characteristics of the logics themselves and how logics can be applied. Just as specific tools are sometimes better suited for certain tasks, some logics appear to be more effective for achieving particular results. How logics were used in relation to the harshness of recommendations for sentencing serves to illustrate. The logic of criminal punishment, for instance, was employed much more often to petition for more severe than less severe punishment (23 to 4), and the rehabilitation logic was used far more often to argue for less severe than more severe sanctions (36 to 14). Conversely, the community accountability and efficiency logics were less constrained in this way. While both logics were used somewhat more often to argue for more severe sanctions (10 to 4 and 25 to 17, respectively), they were more open to being used to serve varied ends. Here we see how the very nature of tools themselves can constrain whether and how they are employed in deliberations.

A final type of constraint, positional constraint, relates to how positional differences enable or limit the use of logics. As we have shown, for example, probation officers use logics *and* hijack the logics of other institutional realms much more often than actors in other positions, primarily because of their position. Both our observational and interview data indicate that a primary reason for this is that the probation officers are the most embedded, both in terms of communication structure and familiarity with the logics in play in the drug court, of any of the drug court professionals. Probation officers occupy the central location in the network of the drug court because they mediate the transmission of information between the other drug court professionals and, in doing so, develop closer working relationships with the other professions. Further, because it is their responsibility to present status updates and case reviews at the beginning of each group discussion, they typically initiate conversations and are seen as gatekeepers of case information. Reminiscent of Padgett and Ansell's (1993) "robust actors" or Burt's (2004) "brokers," who are able to use their network position to develop multifaceted approaches that appeal across alliances, these probation officers use their structural position to become especially familiar with other institutional logics.

By contrast, actors in other positions were more limited in their usage, a difference that was attributable to their position rather than to personal characteristics. Factoring in how often different actors of a given profession were present for drug court proceedings, there is almost no interpersonal difference in the usage of logics. For example, each of the two probation officers

(different persons, personalities, and styles) attended all of the days we observed drug court, and each of them used logics with almost the exact same frequency. Although clinicians sometimes attended different days of drug court, and did not tend to hijack logics, different clinicians invoked their home logic with an almost equal frequency. Counselors again serve as a stark counter-example to probation officers: in a position that affords them much less frequent contact with other team members outside of the courtroom (counselors communicate information solely to the probation officers), counselors hardly ever attempted to hijack the logics of others and invoked logics only half as often as probation officers. Their relative lack of embeddedness in the court is a good explanation of this. As one clinician explained in a formal interview, “. . . sometimes I am on an island. I am the last one to know about stuff, unless of course the client comes to me first.” Following a drug court staffing in which a clinician expressed surprise when the probation officer and state’s attorney recommended the termination of a participant, the clinician confided, “I felt submarined in there. Nobody told me in advance that we were going in this direction. This is my client. I couldn’t even think of a way to advocate for them.”

Public defenders and state’s attorneys sit somewhere in the middle, invoking logics at about the same rate as counselors, but attempt to hijack logics much more often. While they do not serve as the hub of communication like the probation officers, they are much more central to the general legal functioning of the court. They are present at all court hearings, have considerable access to the judge, and generally sign off on decisions as representatives of their respective legal sides. Like the health care professionals Heimer (1999) studied, whose constant presence allowed them to wield a great deal of influence in neonatal intensive care units, state’s attorneys and public defenders are able to capitalize on their central legal roles, feeling empowered to adopt the logics of others when they see fit.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that although all drug court actors know the language of the available institutional logics, some are more fluent in this language than are others. Centrally embedded actors such as probation officers have more frequent communications with a wider variety of other professionals, giving them more information and more opportunities to become familiar with existing institutional frameworks. In short, position in the local structure can constrain or enable the free use of logics.

CONCLUSION

Institutional logics have been variously described as the engines of institutional influence (Jepperson, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), “belief systems that furnish the guidelines for practical action” (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003: 796), and the big ideas that define the rules of the game in organizations (Jackall, 1988). Because the work performed by logics—the generating, the guiding, the defining—must be enacted at the individual level, it is important to understand the ground-level processes that make logics relevant and consequential. In this article, we have attempted to shed light on these important micro-processes by closely examining a setting in which multiple organizations and institutions come together. In doing so, we provide novel empirical evidence of how four distinct logics, through their strategic employment by local

actors, become tangible in everyday activity and decisions. We show that when logics are employed on the ground, they are more than extra-local dictates: they are tools that can be brought out to resolve conflicts, frame solutions to practical work problems, or legitimate calls for different courses of action. Moreover, our findings show that logics are tools that can be wielded with a surprising degree of discretion by local actors, both in terms of which logics they employ and the purposes for which they employ them.

Although an ethnographic case study has limitations, our findings nevertheless have more general significance. In particular, they contribute to micro-institutional and institutional logics scholarship, are relevant for other theoretical and empirical settings, and have implications for the study of courts as organizations. In discussing these contributions, we use our findings to develop hypotheses that might direct future research on micro-institutional processes and the study of logics.

Contributions to Micro-Institutional and Logics Scholarship

The drug court, which entails a multiplicity of active institutional demands, is a compelling setting for the study of the management of logics. Drug court professionals creatively use their own logics and incorporate the logics of others to manage organizational complexity at the intersection of several institutions. This adaptability of professionals encourages us to rethink standing assumptions about the dynamics among competing logics. Instead of seeing conflict at the intersection of multiple frameworks (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Dunn and Jones, 2010), we see negotiation as actors exploit available resources to solve the problems at hand. Nor do we see the processes of replacement, blending, and segregation of frameworks often documented in this literature. Rather, we observe a steady coexistence of multiple frameworks without signs of threat to the integrity of any. One way in which actors manage institutional complexity is by collectively drawing on a shared toolkit of logics.

Similarly, while existing micro-institutional scholarship has focused almost exclusively on how ground-level processes lead to organizational change (see Powell and Colyvas, 2008), our work shows how the ability and willingness of actors to draw on resources from other institutional backgrounds contributes to the maintenance of the existing organizational and institutional structures. Doing so validates these perspectives as legitimate and helps to stabilize what would otherwise be a precarious equilibrium. Once again, the need to meet the pressing demands of the local organization (e.g., the drug court) overrides more remote professional and institutional differences.

Recognizing that actors at times prioritize immediate obligations to their local workgroups over their more general professional orientations challenges an implicit but key assumption of institutional theory and the logics perspective: that actors affiliated with a professional or organizational group will closely adhere to that group's primary logic. Previous scholarship posits that "at any one moment, professions exhibit a temporary consensus" in logical orientations (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002: 62; see also Battilana and Dorado, 2010).

We find something more akin to the jurisdictional fluidity described by Abbott (1988). Professional jurisdictions are negotiated on the ground as actors

seek to exercise authority by drawing on multiple domains of knowledge and expertise. Mirroring recent work on professions and boundaries (Bechky, 2003; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Long Lingo and O'Mahony, 2010), future scholarship might examine the micro-level processes, practices, and structures that afford or discourage this fluid negotiation of professional jurisdictions.

Finally, this work contributes to micro-institutional scholarship's longstanding interest in the relationship between culture and organizations (Jackall, 1988; Kunda, 2006; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Zilber, 2012). Our analysis of logics as tools provides a unique opportunity to show how culture is brought to bear on organizational activity and illustrates the interaction of culture, agency, and structure within an organization. By showing how actors use logics as tools and the consequences of these uses, we demonstrated how cultural beliefs—through the invocation of logics—have tangible consequences on decision making.

Applications to Other Settings

By demonstrating how logics enter into the day-to-day practices of a drug court, how they affect case outcomes, and how they are purposively negotiated by actors, we have provided a foundation for more extensive investigations of the manifestations of logics at the micro level of analysis. Like recent scholarship that points to the significant influence that local actors have on shaping institutional processes (e.g., Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009; Hallett, 2010), we find that it is through these actors—and specifically through their use of logical tools—that logics are constituted on the ground. This conclusion suggests that more attention be paid to how actors use available logics at other sites where multiple institutions or organizations come together. Are the tools of all the institutions available for use? Are actors able to use these tools effectively? Which actors are most dexterous in the use of these tools? Based on our data, we would hypothesize that the more varied the composition of the site in terms of professional and institutional domains, the more likely it is that logics will be used in micro-level interactions to achieve local organizational goals. Similarly, our findings lead us to believe that organizational settings that are characterized by greater institutional complexity—indicated, for example, by the existence of actors from varied institutional backgrounds or a greater frequency of actors' exposure to other backgrounds—will also foster more flexible use of logics among the actors within them.

More generally, it would be valuable to examine whether logics are used in comparable ways in fields and organizations that work within a dominant logical framework (Kitchener, 2002; Reay and Hinings, 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Our findings lead us to predict that in these contexts, actors are likely to employ logics as tools much like we describe here, but they would do so to negotiate the meaning and enactment of elements of the dominant logic rather than negotiate across different logics. Comparative study of the use of logics in "settled" environments could improve our understanding of how such usage might maintain or transform dominant logics and the structures that correspond to them.

Similarly, we believe that the insights we have developed about how logics are used on the ground can be applied profitably to the closely related study of

professional logics. While there is a growing body of scholarship examining the intersection and contestation of professional logics in overlapping fields (Edelman, 2007; Evans and Kay, 2008), hybrid professional settings (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005; Haveman and Rao, 2006), and boundary organizations (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008), none of this work focuses on the micro-level processes that actors use to negotiate the various demands of competing professional cultures (see Anteby, 2010, for an exception). The present research would indicate that actors in these environments will draw on available cultural tools to craft arguments and further their interests rather than, as most current research in this area implies, closely adhering to the familiar scripts of their home professions. These findings suggest that close studies of individual-level negotiation would be a useful complement to examinations of the interaction of logics at higher levels of analysis (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Murray, 2010).

Institutional Approaches to Courts

A final contribution of our research is that it enriches the relationship between institutional theory and socio-legal scholarship. First, our work expands the scope of institutional theory by demonstrating a new way in which it can inform our understanding of law and legal processes. While there has been a great deal of scholarship on the construction of law in organizations outside legal settings (Edelman, 1992; Sutton et al., 1994; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 1999; Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; Dobbin and Kelly, 2007), we currently know little about how institutional processes affect activity and the mobilization of law *inside* legal settings (see Albiston, 2005, for an exception). We show how actors use the schematic character of institutional logics to make sense of offenders' actions, to interpret which legal considerations are relevant, and to decide how the law is applied. Our focus on logics shows how the endogeneity of law matters inside the courtroom just as others have shown its importance outside of it (see Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 1999; Albiston, 2005) and—by drawing attention to how cultural proscriptions enter into the interpretation, construction, and enactment of law—makes a strong case for how institutional theory can help us better understand “law in action” as well as “law on the books” (Seron and Silbey, 2005; Silbey, 2010).

Second, our work renews efforts to apply organizational perspectives to understanding lower-level courts. While scholars once productively applied organizational perspectives to studies of court activities (for example, see Clynych and Neubauer, 1981; Conley and O'Barr, 1987), the use of organizational constructs is nearly absent in socio-legal scholarship today (see Ostrom et al., 2007, for an exception). This has been the case despite the emergence of frameworks, like institutional theory, that are well equipped to generate new insights into lower-level court activity. Our findings remind us that court decisions are not made in legal vacuums and that focusing on standardized procedures and roles can only take us so far in explaining how legal decisions are constructed. Informal aspects of deliberations, especially the professional and institutional considerations in which the court is embedded, influence decision making and the severity of outcomes. How justice is enacted depends on the interests and outlooks of varied professionals who make informed interpretations rather than professionals carrying out the “letter of the law.” Our work

thus highlights a new mechanism through which extra-legal considerations influence court processes and outcomes.

We would predict that these same ground-level phenomena would be influential in the enactment of law in other specialized courts, such as juvenile, domestic violence, mental health, and family planning courts. Wakeham's (2012) ongoing study of juvenile courts lends support to this claim, and future research could further specify the variations and constraints in how actors employ competing institutional frameworks. More broadly, exploring these negotiations in organizational contexts that bring together actors from contending institutional spheres outside of the legal setting would enrich our understanding of how logics are used in practice.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Gabriel X. Abend, Timothy Hallett, Kate Kellogg, Brayden King, Jean Littlejohn, Christopher Marquis, Amit Nigam, and Cat Turco for their insights and criticisms, as well as participants of the University of California–Davis Conference on Qualitative Research, the MIT Economic Sociology Working Group, and the University of Iowa's Theory Workshop. We are also very much indebted to the three anonymous ASQ reviewers and Martin Ruef for their incisive feedback and guidance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in Atlanta, Georgia.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, A.**
1988 *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Albiston, C.**
2005 "Bargaining in the shadow of social institutions: Competing discourses and social change in workplace mobilization of civil rights." *Law and Society Review*, 39: 11–50.
- Anteby, M.**
2010 "Markets, morals, and practices of trade: Jurisdictional disputes in the U.S. commerce in cadavers." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55: 606–638.
- Battilana, J.**
2006 "Agency and institutions: The enabling role of individuals' social position." *Organization*, 13: 653–676.
- Battilana, J., and S. Dorado**
2010 "Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations." *Academy of Management Journal*, 53: 1419–1440.
- Battilana, J., B. Leca, and E. Boxenbaum**
2009 "How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship." *Academy of Management Annals*, 3: 65–107.
- Bechky, B.**
2003 "Object lessons: Workplace artifacts as representations of occupational jurisdiction." *American Journal of Sociology*, 109: 720–752.
- Bechky, B.**
2011 "Making organizational theory work: Institutions, occupations, and negotiated orders." *Organization Science*, 22: 1157–1167.
- Belenko, S.**
1993 "Crack and the evolution of anti-drug policy." *Contributions in Criminology and Penology*, 42: 13–15.

Belenko, S.

2000 *Drugs and Drug Policy in America: A Documentary History*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Benford, R., and D. Snow

2000 "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611–639.

Binder, A.

2007 "For love and money: Organizations' creative responses to multiple environmental logics." *Theoretical Sociology*, 36: 547–571.

Briscoe, F., and S. Safford

2008 "The Nixon-in-China effect: Activism, imitation, and the institutionalization of contentious practices." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 460–491.

Burt, R. S.

2004 "Structural holes and good ideas." *American Journal of Sociology*, 110: 349–399.

Calarco, J. M.

2011 "'I need help!' Social class and children's help-seeking in elementary school." *American Sociological Review*, 76: 862–882.

Clynn, E., and D. Neubauer

1981 "Trial courts as organizations: A critique and synthesis." *Law and Policy Quarterly*, 3: 69–94.

Coburn, C.

2004 "Beyond decoupling: Rethinking the relationship between the institutional environment and the classroom." *Sociology of Education*, 77: 211–244.

Colyvas, J., and W. W. Powell

2006 "The remaking of boundaries between public and private science." In B. M. Staw (ed.), *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 27: 305–353. New York: Elsevier/JAI.

Conley, J., and W. O'Barr

1987 "Fundamentals of jurisprudence: An ethnography of judicial decision making in informal courts." *North Carolina Law Review*, 66: 467–507.

Dacin, M. T., K. Munir, and P. Tracey

2010 "Formal dining at Cambridge colleges: Linking ritual performance and institutional maintenance." *Academy of Management Journal*, 53: 1393–1418.

D'Aunno, T., R. I. Sutton, and R. H. Price

1991 "Isomorphism and external support in conflicting institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units." *Academy of Management Journal*, 34: 636–661.

Dobbin, F.

1994 *Forging Industrial Policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Dobbin, F., L. Edelman, J. Meyer, W. R. Scott, and A. Swidler

1988 "The expansion of due process in organizations." In L. Zucker (ed.), *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment*: 71–98. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Dobbin, F., and E. Kelly

2007 "How to stop harassment: Professional construction of legal compliance in organizations." *American Journal of Sociology*, 112: 1203–1243.

Dobbin, F., and J. R. Sutton

1998 "The strength of a weak state: The rights revolution and the rise of human resources management divisions." *American Journal of Sociology*, 104: 441–476.

Dunn, M. B., and C. Jones

2010 "Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55: 114–149.

Edelman, L. B.

1992 "Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation of civil rights law." *American Journal of Sociology*, 97: 1531–1576.

Edelman, L. B.

2007 "Overlapping fields and constructed legalities: The endogeneity of law." *Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Dynamics of Capital Market Regulation*: 55–90. London: World Scientific.

Edelman, L. B., C. Uggen, and H. Erlanger

1999 "The endogeneity of legal regulation: Grievance procedures as rational myth." *American Journal of Sociology*, 105: 406–454.

Emerson, R.

2008 "Responding to roommate troubles: Reconsidering informal dyadic control." *Law and Society Review*, 42: 483–512.

Evans, R., and T. Kay

2008 "How environmentalists 'greened' trade policy: Strategic action and the architecture of field overlap." *American Sociological Review*, 73: 970–991.

Fligstein, N.

1985 "The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919–1979." *American Sociological Review*, 50: 377–391.

Fligstein, N.

1990 *The Transformation of Corporate Control*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fligstein, N.

2001 "Social skill and the theory of fields." *Sociological Theory*, 19: 105–125.

Friedland, R., and R. Alford

1991 "Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions." In W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*: 232–263. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Glaser, B., and A. Strauss

1967 *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction.

Greenwood, R., M. Raynard, F. Kodeih, E. Micelotta, and M. Lounsbury

2011 "Institutional complexity and organizational responses." *Academy of Management Annals*, 5: 317–371.

Greenwood, R., and R. Suddaby

2006 "Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The Big Five accounting firms." *Academy of Management Journal*, 49: 27–48.

Greenwood, R., R. Suddaby, and C. R. Hinings

2002 "Theorizing change: The role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields." *Academy of Management Journal*, 45: 58–80.

Hallett, T.

2010 "The myth incarnate: Recoupling processes, turmoil, and inhabited institutions in an urban elementary school." *American Sociological Review*, 75: 52–74.

Hallett, T., and M. Ventresca

2006 "Inhabited institutions: Social interactions and organizational forms in Gouldner's *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*." *Theoretical Sociology*, 35: 213–236.

Hardy, C., and S. McGuire

2008 "Institutional entrepreneurship." In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson, and R. Suddaby (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*: 198–217. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Haveman, H. A., and H. Rao

1997 "Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: Institutional and organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry." *American Journal of Sociology*, 102: 1606–1651.

Haveman, H. A., and H. Rao

2006 "Hybrid forms and the evolution of thrifts." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49: 974–986.

Heimer, C.

1999 "Competing institutions: Law, medicine, and family in neonatal intensive care." *Law and Society Review*, 33: 17–66.

Jackall, R.

1988 *Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jepperson, R.

1991 "Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism." In W. W. Powell, and P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*: 143–163. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jones, C., and R. Livne-Tarandach

2008 "Designing a frame: Rhetorical strategies of architects." *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 29: 1075–1099.

Kellogg, K.

2011 *Challenging Operations: Medical Reform and Resistance in Surgery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kitchener, M.

2002 "Mobilizing the logic of managerialism in professional fields: The case of academic health centers mergers." *Organizational Studies*, 23: 391–420.

Kraatz, M., and E. Block

2008 "Organizational implications of institutional pluralism." In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson, and R. Suddaby (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*: 243–275. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Kunda, G.

2006 *Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lawrence, T., and R. Suddaby

2006 "Institutions and institutional work." In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. Lawrence, and W. Nord (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Studies*: 215–254. London: Sage.

Lawrence, T., R. Suddaby, and B. Leca

2011 "Institutional work: Refocusing institutional studies of organization." *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 20: 52–58.

Loewenstein, J., and W. Ocasio

2003 "Vocabularies of organizing: How language links culture, cognition, and action in organizations." *Social Science Research Network Working Paper*, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=813344>.

Lok, J.

2010 "Institutional logics as identity projects." *Academy of Management Journal*, 53: 1305–1335.

Long Lingo, E., and S. O'Mahony

2010 "Nexus work: Brokerage on creative projects." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55: 47–81.

Lounsbury, M.

2002 "Institutional transformation and status mobility: The professionalization of the field of finance." *Academy of Management Journal*, 45: 255–266.

Lounsbury, M.

2007 "A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the professionalizing of mutual funds." *Academy of Management Journal*, 50: 289–307.

Lounsbury, M., and M. A. Glynn

2001 "Cultural entrepreneurship: Stories, legitimacy and the acquisition of resources." *Strategic Management Journal*, 22: 545–564.

Marquis, C., M. A. Glynn, and G. F. Davis

2007 "Community isomorphism and corporate social action." *Academy of Management Review*, 32: 925–945.

Marquis, C., and M. Lounsbury

2007 "Vive la résistance: Competing logics and the consolidation of U.S. community banking." *Academy of Management Journal*, 50: 799–820.

Morrill, C.

1995 *The Executive Way: Conflict Management in Corporations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Murray, F.

2010 "The oncomouse that roared: Hybrid exchange strategies as a source of distinction at the boundary of overlapping institutions." *American Journal of Sociology*, 116: 341–388.

Nelson, M., and R. Schutz

2007 "Day care differences and the reproduction of social class." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 36: 281–317.

Nolan, J.

2001 *Reinventing Justice: The American Drug Court Movement*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ocasio, W.

1997 "Towards an attention-based view of the firm." *Strategic Management Journal*, 18: 187–206.

Ocasio, W., and J. Joseph

2005 "Cultural adaptation and institutional change: The evolution of vocabularies of corporate governance, 1972–2003." *Poetics*, 33: 163–178.

Olson, D., A. Lurigio, and S. Albertson

2001 "Implementing the key components of specialized drug treatment courts: Practice and policy considerations." *Law and Policy*, 23: 171–196.

O'Mahony, S., and B. Bechky

2008 "Boundary organizations: Enabling collaboration among unexpected allies." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 422–459.

O'Mahony, S., and K. Lakhani

2011 "Organizations in the shadow of communities." In C. Marquis, M. Lounsbury, and R. Greenwood (eds.), *Communities and Organizations*, 33: 3–36. Bingley, UK: Emerald.

Ostrom, B., C. Ostrom, R. Hanson, and M. Kleiman

2007 *Trial Courts as Organizations*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Pache, A.-C., and F. Santos

2010 "When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands." *Academy of Management Review*, 35: 455–476.

Padgett, J., and C. Ansell

1993 "Robust action and the rise of the Medici, 1400–1434." *American Journal of Sociology*, 98: 1259–1319.

Powell, W. W., and J. Colyvas

2008 "Microfoundations of institutional theory." In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson, and R. Suddaby (eds.), *The Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*: 276–298. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Purdy, J., and B. Gray

2009 "Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields." *Academy of Management Journal*, 52: 355–380.

Rao, H., P. Monin, and R. Durand

2003 "Institutional change in Toqueville: Nouvelle cuisine as an identity movement in French gastronomy." *American Journal of Sociology*, 108: 795–843.

Rao, H., P. Monin, and R. Durand

2005 "Border crossing: Bricolage and the erosion of categorical boundaries in French gastronomy." *American Sociological Review*, 70: 968–991.

Reay, T., and C. R. Hinings

2005 "The recomposition of an organizational field: Health care in Alberta." *Organization Studies*, 26: 351–384.

Sanford, J. S., and B. Arrigo

2005 "Lifting the cover on drug courts: Evaluation findings and policy concerns." *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 49: 239–259.

Scott, W. R., M. Ruef, P. Mendel, and C. Caronna

2000 *Institutional Change and Healthcare Organizations: From Professional Dominance to Managed Care*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Seo, M.-G., and W. E. D. Creed

2002 "Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A dialectical perspective." *Academy of Management Review*, 27: 222–247.

Seron, C., and S. Silbey

2005 "Profession, science, and culture: An emergent canon of law and society research." In A. Sarat (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Law and Society*: 30–60. Oxford: Blackwell.

Silbey, S.

2010 "Legal culture and cultures of legality." In J. Hall, L. Grindstaff, and M. Lo (eds.), *Handbook of Cultural Sociology*: 470–479. New York: Routledge.

Sutton, J., F. Dobbin, J. Meyer, and W. R. Scott

1994 "The legalization of the workplace." *American Journal of Sociology*, 99: 944–971.

Swidler, A.

1986 "Culture in action: Symbols and strategies." *American Sociological Review*, 51: 273–286.

Thornton, P.

2001 "Personal versus market logics of control: A historically contingent theory of the risk of acquisition." *Organization Science*, 12: 294–311.

Thornton, P.

2002 "The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: Conflict and conformity in institutional logics." *Academy of Management Journal*, 45: 81–101.

Thornton, P.

2004 *Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational Decisions in Higher Education Publishing*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Thornton, P., and W. Ocasio

1999 "Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990." *American Journal of Sociology*, 105: 801–843.

Thornton, P., W. Ocasio, and M. Lounsbury

2012 *The Institutional Logics Perspective: A New Approach to Culture, Structure, and Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tiger, R.

2011 "Drug courts and the logic of coerced treatment." *Sociological Forum*, 26: 169–182.

Tracey, P., N. Phillips, and O. Jarvis

2011 "Bridging institutional entrepreneurship and the creation of new organizational forms: A multilevel model." *Organization Science*, 22: 60–80.

U.S. Department of Justice

1998 *Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts*, Report no. NCJ 171140. Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project.

U.S. Department of Justice
2000 "About the Drug Courts Program Office." Fact sheet, 1–2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. Department of Justice
2003 Supporting the Drug Court Process: What You Need To Know for Effective Decisionmaking and Program Evaluation. Bureau of Justice Assistance Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Wakeham, S.
2012 "Caught on the boundary? Institutional co-creation across conflicting logics in social movement-corporate relationships." Working paper, Department of Sociology, Harvard University.

Weber, K.
2005 "A toolkit for analyzing corporate cultural toolkits." *Poetics*, 33: 227–252.

Weber, K., K. Heinze, and M. DeSoucey
2008 "Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the movement for grass-fed meat and dairy products." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53: 529–567.

Weick, K. E.
1995 Sensemaking in Organization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Wexler, D.
1990 Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Yin, R.
2009 Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: Sage.

Zietsma, C., and T. Lawrence
2010 "Institutional work in the transformation of an organizational field: The interplay of boundary work and practice work." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55: 189–221.

Zilber, T.
2002 "Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meanings, and actors: The case of a rape crisis center in Israel." *Academy of Management Journal*, 45: 234–254.

Zilber, T.
2012 "The relevance of institutional theory for the study of organizational culture." *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 21: 88–93.

APPENDIX: Possible Outcomes or Sanctions, from Least to Most Punitive (460 cases)

Sanction	Example of situation befitting sanction	Rate of occurrence/ total no. of cases
No sanction	No identified or perceived concerns, issues, or violations.	55%
Verbal reprimand in court or mandated assignment (no jail)	Keeping a journal documenting applications to a specified number of jobs over a defined time period; writing an apology letter to the court for lying; requiring documented proof of attending a specified number of self-help or support group meetings (various kinds) in specified time frames.	2%
Community service (no jail), fines, or higher frequency of monitored urinalyses tests*	Mandated to complete a specified number of community service hours over a specified duration of time for offenses such as violating rules prohibiting contact with particular other persons, such as known criminal offenders/substance abusers.	3%

(continued)

APPENDIX (continued)

Sanction	Example of situation befitting sanction	Rate of occurrence/ total no. of cases
One day in jail	Admitted use of chemical substances (without recent history of considerable relapse and use); missing a required drug court or treatment meeting without an excuse deemed valid or justified.	10%
Two days in jail (or weekend in jail)	Denial of substance use despite a positive urinalysis test; missing multiple days of treatment or drug-court-mandated meetings; undue termination from employment; multiple recent and acknowledged substance usages.	12%
Three to four days in jail	Similar violations as those above, potentially more severe; oftentimes this sanction is used when violations are more severe and when the participant doesn't have a job or has no children to care for.	5%
7 days in jail	Multiple recent chemical usages and recent history of relapse (& instability); multiple denials of usage despite evidence otherwise; minor criminal activity (shoplifting); missing several treatment sessions or mental health appointments; quitting one's job without authorization; engaging in sustained deception (violating no-contact orders with ex-significant others or drinking at bars).	4%
Two weeks to one month in jail (or more)	More severe criminal activities (domestic violence, theft or burglary); significant recent history of chemical substance usages (episodes of use); refusing to follow program rules or comply with treatment or mental health recommendations; leaving residential treatment without authorization; as a result of the totality of several recent violations and an unstable history.	2%
Unsuccessful discharge, termination from program, potential required prison term fulfillment	History of inability to comply with program expectations; track record of unwillingness to abstain from chemical substances; more severe criminal offenses (violent or otherwise).	7%

* Only reflects punishment of fines or increased frequency of urinalyses tests conducted *without* other sanctions. More often, especially when a judge mandates more frequent urinalysis tests, this punishment occurs in conjunction with other sanctions, such as jail time.

Authors' Biographies

Chad Michael McPherson is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Iowa, W424 Seashore Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242 (e-mail: chad-mcpherson@uiowa.edu). His research interests include the influence of institutional demands on local organizational decision making, how extra-local culture affects interactions and practices, and how organizations manage institutional complexity and competing institutional demands. His dissertation examines the influence of trustees of nonprofit colleges and universities, investigating what it means to "govern" in higher education over time and the ways in which environmental pressures bleed into higher education through trustees' decision making.

Michael Sauder is an associate professor in sociology at the University of Iowa, W140 Seashore Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242 (e-mail: michael-sauder@uiowa.edu). His current research focuses on the interaction of organizational status hierarchies and the effects of third-party assessments on organizations. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from Northwestern University.