© *Academy of Management Journal*
2014, Vol. 57, No. 2, 541–562.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.1000

TURNKEY OR TAILORED? RELATIONAL PLURALISM, INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION OF MORE OR LESS CUSTOMIZED PRACTICES

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We examine how the organizational adoption of new practices is influenced by relational pluralism, i.e., an organization's multiple ties to actors inside and outside its industry. We theorize that institutional mechanisms of practice diffusion underlying relational networks and filtered by organizational characteristics influence the adoption of practices that are more customized (tailored) or less customized (turnkey). We hypothesize, first, that organizations participating in extra-industry professional networks will, through normative conformity, be more likely to adopt turnkey practices; second, that the normative pressure of professional networks will interact with the mimeticism of industry peers such that organizations will be more likely to adopt tailored practices; and third, that organizational filters will affect adoption of all practices. Using unique survey data from 161 Fortune 500 organizations, supplemented by archival and qualitative data, we focus on two corporate social responsibility practice variants. We find significant support for our first two hypotheses and mixed support for our third: Organizational infrastructure and identity significantly affect practice adoption, albeit in different ways, but only marginal support for leadership and elite organizational status. Our results point to how a complex web of relational ties affects the organizational adoption of practice variants that differ in their degree of customization.

In the diffusion and adoption of new practices, interorganizational relational ties are critical carriers of information, learning, and resources for the adopting organization (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). An organization's "relational setting"—i.e., the pattern of relationships within an institutional context among cultural, economic, social, and political actors, practices, and meanings (Emirbayer, 1997)—is influential in the organizational adoption of a wide range of practices that include civil service reforms (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), global stock exchanges (Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009), total quality management (TQM) (Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997), affirmative action offices (Edelman, 1992), quality circles (Lawler & Mohrman, 1985), poison pills (Davis & Greve, 1997), corporate contributions (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989), and stock option pay (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007).

That relational ties matter in practice adoption has been demonstrated by a legion of researchers, but *how* relational ties matter and *how* they may matter differently for different types of practice has received little attention, in spite of calls for such work (e.g., Westphal et al., 1997). Through the multiple, heterogeneous, and complex relational ties that embed organizations, new practices diffuse but also expose organizations "to multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional demands . . . [however] existing research makes no systematic predictions about the way organizations respond to such

We are grateful for the insights and thoughtful advice of Associate Editor Andrew Shipilov and three anonymous reviewers, as well as our colleagues Royston Greenwood, Michael Lounsbury, Mae McDonnell, Andras Tilcsik, and the organizers of the ABC Research Network Organizing Institutions conferences and the Harvard Business School Conference on Organizations, Society, and Innovation (COSI). We are also thankful for support from the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship, especially Katherine Smith and Bea Boccalandro. Finally, we recognize the generous financial support of the Boston College Winston Center for Leadership and Ethics and the Joseph F. Cotter Professorship.

conflict" (Pache & Santos, 2010: 455). The varied interorganizational networks that connect organizations create relational pluralism such that "a focal entity (whether a person, a team, or an organization) derives its meaning and possibility of action from relations with other entities" (Gulati, Kilduff, Li, Shipilov, & Tsai, 2011).

We investigate the impact of relational pluralism on the organizational adoption of new practices, focusing on an organization's ties to two different sets of actors—professional associations and industry peers—and two practice variants, which differ in their degree of customization. Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150), we theorize that two types of interorganizational relational ties are particularly influential in the diffusion and adoption of new organizational practices: *interindustry professional networks* associated with a focal practice, which "may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational behavior" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152); and *industry peers* who share comparable skills and capabilities, and serve "as a convenient source of practices that the borrowing organization may use" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 151). Although both of these networks exert institutional pressures on organizations to conform to taken-for-granted practices, they differ in terms of the underlying isomorphic mechanisms that drive adoption and in the touchstone practices that they diffuse.

Professional networks associated with a practice serve as a "vehicle for the definition and promulgation of normative rules about organizational and professional behavior," and thus create normative pressures for organizational conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). Because professionalization organizes practices into readily available bundles of interchangeable behavioral units and personnel positions, procedures and structures become normatively sanctioned, legitimated, and appropriated across a wide variety of contexts. As a result, practices can diffuse rapidly across different organizations and industries. Thus interindustry professional networks tend to diffuse practices that are fairly standardized and in need of less customization.

A different institutional mechanism is associated with industries or organizational fields: mimetic isomorphism. Because organizations within an industry confront similar kinds of environmental, technological, or regulatory challenges and ambiguities, they tend to imitate their more successful or legitimate organizational counterparts. Here, practices that organizations adopt tend to be customized to fit the particular industry context; as a result, diffusion occurs primarily within an industry.

Our discussion of these relational networks suggests that different types of relational ties may tend to diffuse different types of practice, which are associated with more or less customization. Rather than specifying particular routines, practices often represent "an integrated management philosophy . . . rather than a clearly defined technology or set of techniques," such that the "appropriate question may not only be whether organizations adopt but how they adopt" (Westphal et al., 1997: 370). In their study of U.S. hospitals adopting TQM practices over time, Westphal et al. (1997: 370) found that practice customization differed over the course of diffusion: Early adopters customized TQM practices "to the hospital's unique needs and capabilities," but later adopters opted instead for "standard and accepted approaches." This work demonstrates the role of time in practice customization; our work builds on, and extends, their findings to reveal how organizations' relational settings affect adoption of practices and how these practices may be more or less customized.

The practice that we study is the employee volunteering program (EVP), a corporate social responsibility (CSR) activity designed to encourage organizational employees to offer their time and skills in service to the community (Wild, 1993). We focus on two EVP practice variants: *day of service* (DOS) and *skills-based volunteering* (SBV). The DOS practice has been implemented across a variety of organizations, in different industry contexts, and is readily available as an "off the shelf" template that can be quickly and easily implemented by almost any kind of organization. An example of a DOS is when employees volunteer to beautify their local elementary schools by painting classrooms and planting flowers (Marquis, Rangan, & Comings, 2009). Given their low degree of customization, DOS practices tend to be similar and relatively standardized; thus we treat DOS as a *turnkey practice*.

By contrast, SBVs tend to be more complex, challenging to implement, and customized to fit both the organization's particular capabilities and the needs of the community served, such that they are "built to order." Examples include pro bono practices in law and consulting firms, the staffing of free health clinics by medical professionals, and consulting firms placing employees on overseas

sabbaticals to use business skills to advance the technology capabilities of developing countries (Marquis & Kanter, 2010). In spite of the greater efforts required to customize and implement SBVs, these practices can be advantageous in cultivating a favorable or distinctive organizational reputation; thus we treat SBV as a *tailored practice*.

Our study uses survey data that we collected from 161 Fortune 500 (F500) organizations, about half of which adopted some type of EVP practice. Researchers have bemoaned the limited data on employee volunteerism (Brudney & Gazley, 2006), making our survey unique in offering a window on the organizational adoption of EVPs by those active in this process. We supplement the survey data with archival and qualitative data, which were collected via interviews, focus groups, and conference observations.

We proceed as follows. First, we offer an overview of the CSR practices that we study, i.e., EVPs, and two variants: the turnkey DOS practice and the tailored SBV practice. Second, we advance and test hypotheses on the differential influences of relational pluralism on types of practice adoption. Finally, we discuss our findings, generalizing from these results to articulate a broader conceptual framework on how relational pluralism matters in practice adoption.

THE CSR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYEE VOLUNTEERISM

"Corporate volunteering has taken organizations by storm" (Grant, 2012: 45) and has precipitated a surge in the adoption of EVPs, which can address issues of social justice, corporate governance, moral values (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007), or social problems (Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007). Beyond social benefits, EVPs can also yield organizational benefits—to the bottom line, strategic goals, brand equity, teamwork, morale, and employee recruitment (Clark, 1996)—and employee benefits. Employees report that participating in EVPs improves employees' personal profiles, reputation among colleagues, connections within the firm, and customer relations (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999; Peloza & Hassay, 2006).

Embedded in a broader philosophy of CSR, EVPs can take various forms. We focus on two: day of service (DOS) and skills-based volunteering (SBV). The DOS programs tend to be "off the shelf," turnkey activities, such as company-sponsored school revitalization initiatives, weekend park cleanups, and walk-a-thons (Gilder, Schuyt, & Breedijk, 2005); by contrast, SBVs tend to be "built to order" and utilize specific employee business skills, such as strategic planning, finance, operations, human resources, marketing, communications, or technology, for social benefit (Boccalandro, 2009; Deloitte & Points of Light Foundation, 2006). For SBVs, organizations can adapt their citizenship practices to local conditions, in a process termed "citizenship customization" (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006: 333).

Because they require such different kinds of support and expertise, organizations tend to adopt either DOS or SBV practices. Organizations can, however, adopt both types of practice; this tends to happen if they are highly committed to CSR, seek to offer employees a broader menu of volunteering opportunities, or believe the two practices can be complementary in reaching different sets of stakeholders (e.g., customers, nonprofits, government officials, new geographic markets) (Kanter, 2009; Marquis & Kanter, 2010). We describe each of the practices in detail and contrast their key features in Table 1.

Day of Service Practices

DOS practices typically consist of repeated one-day commitments by groups of organizational volunteers (and often their friends and families), who help a local charity, nonprofit, or civic initiative. Implementing DOS practices is akin to event planning, a competency that many organizations have in-house. Readily available "how to" guides for implementing DOS practices are published online, on government and community service websites, and disseminated through CSR conferences or gatherings. Most DOS practices are similar in form and implementation is comparable, regardless of the organization's business, strategic goals, skill base, or industry. The underlying logic of DOS is relatively straightforward and simple: that of CSR. In spite of its advantages in being readily available off the shelf, normatively acceptable, and easily implemented, DOS practices tend not to differentiate the adopting organization as especially unique or distinctive. DOS programs have been criticized for their lack of strategic alignment with organizational interests, such that "the goals and strategy of the corporation [are] secondary to the philanthropic interests of its employees" (Peloza & Hassay, 2006: 359). And although they have a relatively low marginal cost per employee, DOS programs tend to be offered numer-

TABLE 1
Summary of Differences in EVP Practices: Day of Service (DOS) and Skills-Based Volunteering (SBV)

	Practice dimension	Day of service (DOS): "Turnkey practice"	Skills-based volunteering (SBV): "Tailored practice"
Customization of practice	*Initial customization and coordination required to implement practice*	*Low* "Off the shelf" Templates readily available to help organizers to develop programs, regardless of industry or company Owing to higher number of employees involved, companies can develop standard protocols to manage logistics for repeated groups of volunteers	*High* "Built to order" Each program must be negotiated separately and requires significant customization Owing to unique nature of each project, companies need to negotiate and design each program differently to meet the needs of the nonprofit
	Typical reporting and measurement techniques	*Quantitative* Similar data used for all projects (e.g., number of employees involved; total number of hours completed)	*Qualitative* Unique data collected for each project (e.g., vignettes or case studies highlighting nature of work and social outcomes achieved; stakeholder interviews)
Nature of practice	*Use of work-related employee competencies*	*Low* Projects often involve basic skills requiring little previous know-how or training	*High* Projects involve specialized skills that utilize expertise or training relevant to the employee's job
	Differentiation from other companies	*Low* Most projects not designed for a specific company	*High* Only employees with skills associated with the company able to solve the complex social issue
	Potential benefits to company	*High* Outcomes achieved in a day Employee involvement across hierarchy and divisions Often used as recruiting tool	*High* Outcomes highlight nature of company's work and core competencies Employee engagement Employee can claim credit for solving complex social issue that aligns with their market-based skills
	Logics associated with the practice	*Single* Logic of corporate social responsibility (i.e., community logic)	*Hybrid* Logic of CSR (i.e., community logic) *and* industry (i.e., market logic)
Required resources	*Employee time investment per activity*	*Episodic* Usually completed in a day Projects usually designed so that employees achieve completed goal by end of activity (e.g., painting a school, finishing a walk-a-thon)	*Continuous* Usually completed over several weeks or months, depending on nature of each project Requires significant time to determine project scope, train employees, select team members, build trust with nonprofit partner (e.g., developing a strategic plan)
	Number of employees involved per project	*Many* Projects usually have no limit to number of individuals involved	*Limited* Individual-based projects, or small project teams with complementary skills
	Financial resource requirements	*Varies* Low marginal cost per employee, but organizations often conduct several per year	*Varies* High marginal cost per employee, but organizations often conduct few per year

ous times in a year, making their overall costs comparable to those of other EVPs, such as SBV.

Skills-based Volunteering Practices

SBV practices focus on deriving social benefit through the use of employee skills, expertise, or business capabilities, often over an extended period of time; examples include nonprofit board service, natural disaster relief supply chain coordination, and consulting projects using business acumen to provide aid to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries.

The goal of SBV practices is to "translate . . . [employee] talents into solutions [that solve] our most complex social problems" (HandsOn Network, 2008: 3). Their implementation demands considerable organizational skill and investment, because organizations need to match specific employee competencies to the specific needs of the community. The underlying logic of SBV is complex and hybrid, yoking the community logic of CSR to the market logic of the industry. Thus they often require significant setup and coordination costs, especially in their initial stages when the project scope is being defined and employees are being trained. However, these costs are often offset by a key benefit: a unique organizational reputation and competitive advantage that arises because they are tailored to their specific conditions. For instance, Accenture, a management consulting firm, touted its e-learning capabilities to potential for-profit clients by showcasing its pro bono work with the African Medical and Research Foundation, a program that implemented a software training program that certified 20,000 new registered nurses in Kenya (Accenture, 2007).

In recent years, several practice-based communities have formed to support a growing network of professionals. In 2009, the moderator of an online bulletin board hosted by the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship (BCCCC), with more than 1,500 registered CSR professionals, posed the question: "When it comes to volunteerism, what keeps you up at night?" The most frequent answer was "SBV practices." In a workshop description for a conference that one of the authors attended, the contrast to DOS practices was clearly evident. DOSs were characterized as "representing traditional volunteering such as park clean ups and wall paining," and SBVs as "activities that align their [employee] current skills with key strategic goals . . . often with distinct issues of measurement, operational cost, internal competition and scope creep." In focus groups conducted by the two authors, CSR practitioners summarized the differences: SBVs "require special skills we house," while DOSs "just require a set of hands and interest (which we also have)." Thus the two EVP practice variants are not only conceptually distinct, but also pragmatically distinct. Next, we theorize how the adoption of these EVP practices—the turnkey DOS and the tailored SBV—are affected by relational pluralism.

RELATIONAL PLURALISM AND PRACTICE ADOPTION

Relationality matters in practice adoption because practices are those "sets of material activities that are fundamentally interpenetrated and shaped by broader cultural frameworks such as categories, classifications, frames, and other kinds of ordered belief systems" (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007: 995–996). Organizations connect to these broader sets of meaning through relational ties with actors who can offer "guiding principles for matching the appropriate types of practices to specific problems and rhetoric accounting for why organizations should change to incorporate new practices" (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010: 846).

A robust set of studies attests to how the spread or diffusion of new practices and innovations across organizations and industries is facilitated by interorganizational networks (e.g., Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Rogers, 1995; Tushman, 1977). Relational ties to other adopters can increase an organization's exposure to and awareness of the new practice (e.g., Rogers, 1995), intensify isomorphic pressures for conformity and social cohesion (e.g., Burt, 1987; Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993), or enable organizational learning about new practice implementation (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Attewell, 1992). We extend this line of research by investigating *how* relational ties matter in the diffusion and adoption of new practices (Westphal et al., 1997: 367). We focus on two networks—the professional network of practice and the industry network—which we propose are especially influential in practice adoption.

The Professional Network of Practice

Professionals, connecting through conferences, professional affiliations, or networks, constitute "a 'community of practice' with its own more-or-less

shared understandings (ideologies, assumptions, scripts, norms) that form a background for constructing economic strategies and goals and that determine what will count as appropriate or deviant" (Davis & Greve, 1997: 8). The influence of a network "is affected by the thickness of ties—such as conference attendance, club memberships, training programs, etc.—linking them to the field-level institutional infrastructure" (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011: 342). To the extent that organizations actively participate in these networks, their effects should be stronger.

Relational ties provide organizations with exposure to the practice itself and its normative justification (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) found that organizations are more likely to adopt CSR practices when they have some type of shared network tie among managers. In these ways, relational networks function as "institutional carriers" that transport practices over time, space, and organizational settings (Scott, 2003). These field-level relational systems introduce the organization to new forms and practices of which it may have otherwise been unaware.

Interindustry networks of professions associated with a practice develop and disseminate norms, rules, and standards that organizations can adopt and use when accounting for and implementing a new practice. They furnish ready-made templates that sanction and advance certain behaviors and management that should be aligned with the practice. Organizations conform to these normative pressures in order to secure legitimacy; as a result, the effect is homogenization or standardization across organizations and industries. Thus the professionalization of a practice diffused through these networks exerts normative pressures on organizations to conform, and customization is unnecessary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152).

This explanation for relational ties was foreshadowed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 155), who detailed the effects of organizational participation in professional networks. Formally, they argued that "[t]he greater the participation of organizational managers in trade and professional associations, the more likely the organization will be, or will become, like other organizations in its field." Because of the standardization and normative sanctioning of practices, we propose that organizational involvement in interindustry professional networks will expose and motivate organizations to adopt a turnkey practice, such as DOS. Because such turnkey practices are "off the shelf" and ready for implementation, such network exposure should be sufficient for organizational adoption. Thus we propose that the organizational adoption of turnkey practices is predicated only upon the organization's relational ties to the practice network. We expect organizations that participate in these networks, because of their exposure to and learning about the practices, and because of normative sanctioning, will increase the likelihood of turnkey practice adoption. Thus we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1. The organizational adoption of a turnkey practice will be positively affected by the organization's participation in an extra-industry network that exposes it to the practice.

Industry Peers

A firm's industry defines the peer group of organizations that occupy a similar space in the marketplace, and which confront similar environmental uncertainties and challenges (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); accordingly, successful peer firms can serve as models for emulation in practice adoption. Organizations engage in social comparison with their industry peers and look to imitate successful or legitimate ones. As a result, over time, there is homogenization among organizations within in an industry as they come to resemble each other (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): "[I]ndustry producers develop common identities and 'valuation orders' that structure the decision making and the practices of the players in a product market" (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 805). The underlying mechanism here is mimetic isomorphism, as organizations imitate each other in adopting those practices that are highly diffused within the industry (Glynn & Abzug, 2002).

Because it legitimates organizational practices, institutional isomorphism has been shown to be a significant force in the organizational adoption of innovations. Utterback (1974: 183) demonstrates that adoption is a function of the number of organizations in the industry already using an innovation. Relatedly, Kennedy and Fiss (2009) illustrate how hospitals adopted TQM practices throughout the healthcare industry, and Lee and Pennings (2002) show that institutional pressures facilitated the dissemination of new organizational structures across the accounting industry. Similarly, there is a large literature on CSR practice adoption that suggests that organizations within a similar industry may conform because of elite network ties (Burt,

1983; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989), regional economic structures (Wolch, 1995), and reputational impact (Brammer & Millington, 2005). In general, then, the extent to which other industry members adopt a practice will likely increase the probability of another organization's adoption of that practice. More specifically, however, we expect that intra-industry diffusion will be associated with the adoption of practices tailored to that industry, the organizations that comprise it, and the environmental or community circumstances that can benefit.

And yet industry homogeneity does not drive out organizational heterogeneity; rather, SBV practices can balance industry similarity with organizational differences. Financial services and accounting firms (e.g., Bank of America, Fidelity Investments, Wells Fargo) often partner with community-based nonprofits to provide financial planning or tax preparation services to marginalized populations. High-tech companies (e.g., Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, Google) offer their engineers opportunities to develop technologies that solve social problems. Consulting firms (e.g., Accenture, Bain, Deloitte, and IBM) often adopt SBV practices that resemble their for-profit consulting practices: A project team composed of consultants with specific skills is sourced from within the firm to provide strategic advisory services to a nonprofit organization. For instance, Accenture created "Accenture Development Partnerships," one of the first skills-based programs that offered employees volunteer opportunities for leadership development, by teaming with NGOs for up to a year on overseas projects. IBM developed a "Service Corps" for its employees modeled after the Peace Corps. And Deloitte devoted over $100 million in grants to support SBV projects that impacted nonprofits in the communities in which its consultants lived and worked.

Although SBV practices may be tailored to an industry, their adoption is likely also influenced by the extra-industry professional network. Together, relational ties to both practice professionals and industry peers create institutional pressures for organizational conformity to the normative order and mimetic compliance, which increases the likelihood of tailored practice adoption. The practice network exposes organizations to ready-made templates that can be customized and aligned with prevalent industry practices to enable implementation and to serve as a touchstone for legitimacy. Alone, we argue, relational ties to one or the other network (i.e., professionals or industry peers) are not sufficient for the adoption of tailored practices; rather, these relational ties reinforce each other, through normative and mimetic pressures to model how organizations tailor the practices that they adopt. Thus the adoption of a tailored (or customized) practice will be influenced by the interaction between the extent of intra-industry diffusion of the practice and organizational participation in the extra-industry professional network of practice. We hypothesize that:

> *Hypothesis 2. The organizational adoption of a tailored practice will be positively affected by the interaction between the organization's participation in an extra-industry professional network that normatively sanctions the practice and the intra-industry prevalence of the practice, which legitimates customized adaptation.*

Institutional Filters

Although relational pluralism affects practice adoption, isomorphic pressures are filtered by organizational factors such that "characteristics of the organization—its structure, ownership, governance, and identity—can make it particularly sensitive to certain [institutional] logics and less so to others" (Greenwood et al., 2011: 319). Similarly, Van de Ven (1986), Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973), and Kanter (1983) argue that, because adoption often requires adaptation at the organizational level, organizational factors are important. These organizational attributes function as mechanisms "connecting institutional processes and organizations" (Greenwood et al., 2011: 346). We investigate the effects of the four organizational filters identified by Greenwood et al. (2011): (a) organizational infrastructure, (b) governance and leadership involvement, (c) organizational identity, and (d) organizational eliteness in its field.

Organizational infrastructure. The organization's infrastructure is important because it can indicate the organization's capability and readiness to implement a practice. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that "the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities," an argument that has found empirical support (e.g., Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). Consistent with this approach, Greenwood et al. (2011: 343) argue that institutional fields can penetrate organizations only when organ-

izational structures, capabilities, and actors are able to utilize channels for implementation. They argue that practices "do not just enter an organization," but must be interpreted and given meaning through interorganizational communities that may differ in receptivity to field-level pressures—a filtering process that is influenced by occupants of various internal "structural positions" within the organization (Greenwood et al., 2011: 342).

Additionally, Delmas and Toffel (2008) show that an organization's receptivity to international environmental standards increases if a practice is more widely accepted across certain functional groups, while Marquis and Lee (2012) found that organizational structure did not constrain senior managers in realizing the strategic value of CSR initiatives. Thus we propose that the presence of organizational infrastructures that enable the implementation of a practice will increase the likelihood of adoption of that practice.

Governance and leadership involvement. Studies have shown that practice adoption is predicated on leadership support (e.g., Fligstein, 1991; Kraatz & Moore, 2002; Nohria & Gulati, 1996): Organizational leaders function as carriers, who represent and interpret institutional beliefs (Pache & Santos, 2010). Organizations are more likely to adopt a practice when it is supported by individuals with higher status in the organizational hierarchy (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Tushman & Nadler, 1986): Marquis and Lee (2012) illustrate this empirically by showing how senior managers in F500 firms exert philanthropic influence. As Greenwood et al. (2011) explicate, those in power are more likely to recognize, prioritize, and determine the organization's response to institutional complexity. For example, Sanders and Tuschke (2007: 36) offer empirical evidence showing that leadership involvement has a positive effect on the organizational adoption of new compensation practices, arguing that "the values and beliefs of leaders are likely to be instrumental" for adoption decisions. Additionally, leadership involvement has also been shown to be especially salient for the adoption of CSR practices (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Waldman et al., 2006). Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan (2004) found that transformational leaders are more likely to adopt CSR practices because they are more "intellectually stimulated" to support such firm-wide activities. Thus we propose that leadership support for a practice should increase the likelihood of the adoption of that practice.

Organizational identity. An organization's identity filters perceptions about the relevance and appropriateness of practices; practices that align with the organization's identity are perceived to be more appealing and legitimate (Glynn, 2008) and, in turn, are more likely to be adopted. An organization's identity is a claim to "institutionally standardized social categories" (Greenwood et al., 2011: 346), such that a firm may classify itself as a bank, a school, or a hospital, as well as "family friendly" or "socially responsible."

Under institutional complexity, identity shapes an organization's response to pressures (Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). As Kraatz and Block (2008: 242) explain, "the broader, heterogeneous institutional environment poses multiple identities, makes these disparate demands, and thus generates persistent and deep-rooted tensions within the organization itself." Identity serves to prioritize how the "repertoires of possible responses are assessed and selected" (Greenwood et al., 2011: 347). In her study of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra strike, Glynn (2000) illustrates how identity conflicts within an organization threatened that organization's ability either to persist with, or potentially to change, its practices. Thus we propose that an organizational identity aligned with a practice should increase the likelihood of adoption of that practice; moreover, we propose that this effect will be more pronounced in tailored (rather than in turnkey) practices because organizational identity can shape customization so as to align with that identity.

Organizational elite standing in its field. Greenwood et al. (2011: 340) suggest that an organization's position in the field, particularly in terms of its size and status, can function as a filter in adoption. Considerable research has shown that large or higher status organizations are more vulnerable to institutional pressures because of their visibility and increased media attention (e.g., Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). As described by Greening and Gray (1994: 476), higher status firms are more likely to manage the media as an institutional stakeholder "creating both coercive and normative pressures for conformity to public expectations." For example, in their study of CSR-oriented firms, King and McDonnell (2013) show how large and higher status firms are more vulnerable to being targeted by activists. Similarly, Ingram, Yue, and Rao (2010) illustrate the unique challenges that Wal-Mart stores face, because of their significant market size, when

activists target them as the primary symbol of "big box" retailing in their neighborhood. Thus we propose that an organization's elite standing in its field, in terms of size and status, will increase the likelihood of its adoption of a CSR practice.

We proposed a positive, significant effect for each of the four institutional filters—organizational infrastructure, leadership, identity, and status—on practice adoption. Considering these arguments together leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. The organizational adoption of a CSR practice is positively influenced by organizational attributes that filter institutional complexity: organizational infrastructure, governance and leadership involvement, organizational identity, and an organization's elite standing in its field.

METHODS

Data Collection and Sources

We used multiple methods and independent sources of data in a concurrent triangulation strategy (Creswell, 2003) to test our three hypotheses. We collected data from: (a) the administration of a survey, (b) public archives, (c) interviews and focus groups with expert informants, and (d) observations at CSR conferences. This triangulation strategy mitigates potential biases that might be associated with the exclusive use of survey data, and is preferable to increasing sample size or conducting ex ante statistical techniques (Kemery & Dunlap, 1986). Moreover, we were able to use qualitative insights to aid in the interpretation of our quantitative survey results.

Our survey data came from a questionnaire administered by a university center dedicated to CSR research and practice. Its purpose was to gather information that would be helpful to professionals developing and implementing CSR practices. The survey focused on the types of EVP implemented by organizations, EVP governance models, formalized practices, levels of CSR integration with the business, and resource allocations. As an incentive, respondents who successfully completed the survey received a benchmarking report. Surveys were sent to the senior executive responsible for the company's CSR initiatives, who served as a key informant providing "information at the aggregate or organizational unit of analysis by reporting on group or organizational properties rather than personal attitudes and behaviors" (Phillips, 1981: 396). The advantage to surveying respondents in this role is that such fact-based questionnaires are less prone to common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003).

An additional benefit arose from the promise of anonymity and confidentially, with reports consisting of aggregate patterns not naming any individual firms; thus survey responses are less likely to be the result of the impression management techniques or influence strategies that can sometimes characterize press releases. Finally, all of the firms in our sample are members of the Fortune 500, and thus constitute an influential set of firms and an important organizational field in their own right (e.g., Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Fligstein, 1990; Glynn & Marquis, 2004).

The survey items were piloted on 15 F500 firms, not included in survey results, via phone interviews conducted prior to the survey launch in June 2008. A research team member invited every F500 firm to participate in the study via e-mail and followed up by phone with those who did not respond initially. This resulted in a sample of 161 F500 firms, representing a 33% response rate. There was considerable diversity in the sample among our independent and dependent measures. About half of the F500 organizations in our sample (54%, $n = 87$) adopted at least one type of EVP, including: DOS practices (39%, $n = 62$), SBV (21%, $n = 33$), a volunteer sabbatical program (4%, $n = 6$), a volunteer program that included retirees (22%, $n = 36$), a volunteer program that included clients or consumers (11%, $n = 18$), and a volunteer program that included nonemployees (25%, $n = 40$). Of the firms that adopted an EVP, almost twice as many adopted DOS practices as SBV, while only a small number of firms (13%, $n = 21$) adopted both.

The F500 firms in our sample represented a diverse set of industries, including: services (16%), retail (16%), financial (15%), utilities and transportation (14%), manufacturing (12%), wholesale trade (7%), and other (20%). DOS and SBV adoption occurred in every industry group. Pearson's chi-squared tests indicated the lack of a significant relationship between industry group and DOS adoption ($\chi^2(8) = 10.18$, $p = .25$), but suggested an association between industry and SBV adoption ($\chi^2(8) = 15.48$, $p = .05$), which is consistent with our theorization of the skill-specific customization required for this practice. Further investigation revealed that SBV adoption was not confined to a single industry: three of the seven industry groups (retail, financial, services) had equivalent SBV

adoption rates and accounted for 76% of total SBV adoption in the sample. In addition to the survey data, we used several archival sources to develop our empirical measures, as we describe below.

Dependent Variables

We created three dummy variables, coding adoption as 1 and 0 otherwise: *employee volunteering program* (EVP), reflecting the adoption of any type of EVP practice; *day of service* (DOS), reflecting the adoption of a turnkey practice; and *skills-based volunteering* (SBV), reflecting the adoption of a tailored practice.

Independent Variables

Industry diffusion. This measure reflects the prevalence of a particular practice among organizations in the same industry; as such, it is an operationalization of the strength of mimetic isomorphic pressures for adoption (e.g., Glynn & Abzug, 1998; Ingram, 1996; Knoke, 1982). We calculated industry prevalence for each of the three dependent variables (EVP; DOS; SBV) using the percentage of organizations within the firm's two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code—identified using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) online database—that adopted the same practice. We mean-centered the measure to mitigate potential multicollinearity.

Practice network. This measure indicates firm participation in one (or both) of the core CSR conferences held each year for companies interested in CSR-related practices, activities, and emerging trends. We obtained the list of firms that participated in the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP) and the BCCCC annual conferences during the time of the survey, and matched these to the firms in our sample. We measured conference participation because it was a robust and clear objective indicator of firms' involvement in the network. Conference participation offers opportunities to attend CSR workshops or sessions on EVP, DOS, SBV, and other practices, and to learn and to interact alongside other CSR practitioners.

We selected these two conferences because of their importance and centrality to the CSR field. Both conferences address broad issues related to CSR, but neither had an explicit focus on any particular EVP practice; however, both conferences held breakout sessions relating to employee volunteering. The CECP is the only international forum in which senior business executives and CSR professionals focus exclusively on philanthropy, and the BCCCC is the largest organization of its kind in the world, providing information and training to companies about community involvement. Including both conferences gave us confidence that we had captured organizations' relationships with the CSR community of practice. Approximately a quarter of our F500 sample (24%, $n = 38$) participated in the CECP conference, and more than one third (37%, $n = 59$) participated in the BCCCC conference; far fewer participated in both conferences (12%, $n = 20$). Overall, nearly half of the firms in our sample (48%, $n = 77$) participated in at least one conference.

Institutional filters. Following Greenwood et al. (2011), we assessed the impact of four filters: organizational infrastructure, governance and leadership involvement, organizational identity, and eliteness in the field. Our measure of *organizational infrastructure* was a scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.72) consisting of four items asking respondents whether they had written processes and standards in place for: (a) employees to contribute to CSR activities, (b) nonprofit board involvement, (c) managing asset allocation to nonprofits, and (d) facilitating agreements with nonprofits. Responses to each item were coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no) and then summed to index the extent to which the organizational infrastructure was ready to implement EVP practices.

To examine the robustness of our scale, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses by excluding each of the four items, one by one, and then testing the remaining three items for internal consistency. We found that no single item reduced Cronbach's alpha below 0.66, suggesting minimally acceptable levels (DeVellis, 2003), and that no single item unduly reduced scale reliability. Furthermore, we examined the open-ended survey responses that pertained to CSR activities and found that respondents treated the item broadly, as a measure of the firm's CSR processes and standards for a wide variety of activities, including employee engagement, sustainability, and philanthropy programs; these were not specifically related to either DOS or SBV practices. For example, respondents' answers included providing support for the homeless, granting wishes to children in hospitals, and paycheck deduction programs for charity. Accordingly, we retained the original four-item scale to operationalize *infrastructure*.

To measure *governance and leadership involvement*, we used responses to a behaviorally based survey item (coded 1 for agreement, 0 otherwise) asking whether at least 30% of individuals in the top two levels of the company (chief executive and direct reports) had publicly participated in a company-sponsored CSR event within the last year. To measure the organization's *elite standing in its field*, we used the Fortune online database, coding 1 if the firm was a member of the Fortune 100 (F100) in 2008 (the time of the survey) and 0 otherwise.

To measure *organizational identity*, we used a robust indicator: participation in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011). We downloaded the online list of all companies that adopted the GRI (http://www.globalreporting.org), and coded 1 for GRI reporting firms and 0 otherwise. The GRI is the most widely used reporting framework in the world, and requires companies to demonstrate commitment to sustainability, community impact, human rights, and gender equality (https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx). Prior research has shown that "GRI adoption is an example of a corporate identity strategy . . . by demonstrating belongingness to a group (socially responsible organizations committed to accountability through standardized principles), which increases the legitimacy quotient" (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011: 140). Owing to the extensive breadth and depth of the reporting standards, companies that complete the GRI often expend substantial resources, make operational changes to reach compliance levels, and obtain third-party audit verification to certify that they have met the standards. Thus this measure reflects not only the organization's claim to identity, but also the legitimation of that claim by sanctioning agents. Almost one third of the firms in our sample completed a GRI report (29%, $n = 47$).

Control Variables

We included three control variables in our analyses. The first assesses the *organizational motivation for adopting a CSR practice*. Because companies vary in the extent to which they align CSR with perceived direct business benefits (Aguilera et al., 2007; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999), we included a survey item asking whether the CSR practice "had an explicit business connection," coding yes as 1, 0 otherwise. The second is *organizational age*. Because practice adoption can be affected by liabilities of newness or obsolescence (e.g., Henderson, 1999), as well as by potential imprinting based on founding date (e.g., Mezias, 1990), we controlled for organizational age. Using a survey item, we coded 1 if the firm indicated that it had been in business for more than 10 years, and 0 otherwise. The third variable is the organization's *geographic location*. Because geography may play a role in CSR adoption (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 1991; Marquis et al., 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008), and because geography may be associated with a particular CSR model, e.g., Anglo-American in the United States, and Continental in Europe and Asia (Aguilera et al., 2007), we coded 1 if the firm's EVP practices were based only within the United States and 0 otherwise.

Analyses

As an initial, independent check on the validity of our measures, we sought feedback from 24 CSR practitioners. We interviewed 12 individuals: eight corporate officers involved in CSR adoption decisions and four members of the center that administered the survey. In addition, we led a focus group discussion with 12 community involvement program directors from different firms who were participating in a CSR executive education program and who had not completed our survey. Our purpose was to ascertain whether our empirical measures resonated with their experience and had validity. In particular, we queried them about the extent to which the survey measured what we sought to measure (face validity) and tapped into the domain of practice that we sought to capture (content validity), as a way of gauging "representativeness" (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973: 459). The interviews and group discussion affirmed our measures, as well as our approach.

To test our hypotheses, we used STATA 12 and ran a series of logit regression analyses, separately modeling the three dependent variables, EVP, DOS, and SBV. We ran several diagnostic tests to check the robustness of our models and to ensure that multicollinearity was not a threat. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) across all of the models was < 1.40, well below the suggested threshold of 10, indicating that multicollinearity was not a serious concern.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in our models.

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variable	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. EVP	0.54	0.50																
2. DOS	0.39	0.49	0.73															
3. SBV	0.21	0.41	0.47	0.26														
4. Industry diffusion (EVP)	0.00	20.86	0.22	0.16	0.16													
5. Industry diffusion (DOS)	0.00	11.12	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.90												
6. Industry diffusion (SBV)	0.00	10.27	0.20	0.15	0.27	0.64	0.67											
7. Practice network	0.48	0.50	0.46	0.32	0.38	0.27	0.27	0.19										
8. Infrastructure	0.82	1.19	0.45	0.39	0.49	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.33									
9. Governance & leadership	0.23	0.42	0.44	0.33	0.34	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.27	0.46								
10. Identity	0.29	0.46	0.32	0.19	0.32	0.17	0.21	0.22	0.34	0.15	0.20							
11. Elite field position	0.11	0.31	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.01	−0.02	0.02	0.28	0.19	0.29	0.14						
12. Business benefit	0.32	0.47	0.40	0.33	0.34	0.15	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.50	0.41	0.23	0.11					
13. Age	0.01	0.11	−0.01	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.12	0.00	0.06	−0.06	−0.07	−0.04	−0.08				
14. Geography	0.34	0.47	0.21	0.14	−0.03	0.22	0.20	0.11	0.16	0.02	−0.04	0.04	0.06	0.21	0.04			
15. Industry (EVP) × Practice	2.85	10.08	0.15	0.08	0.26	0.52	0.50	0.41	0.30	0.20	0.04	0.18	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.11		
16. Industry (DOS) × Practice	1.50	5.78	0.17	0.16	0.27	0.46	0.55	0.40	0.27	0.22	0.14	0.22	0.02	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.89	
17. Industry (SBV) × Practice	0.97	6.36	0.20	0.17	0.39	0.32	0.34	0.63	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.63	0.61

Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the tests of our three hypotheses for each of our three dependent variables: EVP, DOS, and SBV. Each dependent variable has nine models, with Model 1 consisting only of the control variables, Models 2–8 presenting the main effects for each variable, and Model 9 presenting the one hypothesized interaction effect (Hypothesis 2). Models 1–7 are presented primarily for informational purposes. Model 8 is the full model with all of the main effects, which we use to test Hypotheses 1 and 3. Model 9 introduces the interaction effect to test Hypothesis 2.

Tests of Hypotheses

Effects of relational ties (Hypotheses 1 and 2). As a baseline, we first examined the predictors of organizational adoption of any type of EVP practice. Table 3 shows that organizational participation in the CSR practice network positively affects EVP adoption ($p < .01$, Model 8), and does not interact significantly with industry to affect EVP adoption (Model 9).

Hypothesis 1, predicting that the organizational adoption of the turnkey practice (DOS) will be positively affected by the organization's participation in the practice network, was supported: Model 8 in Table 4 shows a significant and positive effect ($p < .05$) for network participation. We note that industry effects were not significant. Thus, in the adoption of a turnkey practice, which does not require extensive customization, exposure to and learning about the practice via the professional network is sufficient to motivate adoption, as predicted.

Hypothesis 2, predicting an interaction effect of network exposure and industry diffusion for the adoption of a tailored practice (SBV), was supported: Model 9 in Table 5 shows a significant, positive effect ($p < .05$) for the interaction between the practice network and industry isomorphism. Thus, relational pluralism was consequential for the organizational adoption of a tailored practice. In the absence of relational pluralism, i.e., when an organization does not participate in the practice network, then adoption does not occur. We note that Model 9 in Tables 3 and 4 shows nonsignificant interaction effects for the adoption of any EVP practice and a turnkey practice, DOS, respectively. Thus relational pluralism, operationalized in terms of the interactive influences of the professional network and the industry, significantly affected the organizational adoption of a tailored practice.

Effects of institutional filters (Hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 3, predicting positive effects for four institutional filters—organizational infrastructure, governance and leadership involvement, organizational identity, and organizational elite standing—found partial support: see Model 8 in Tables 3 (EVP), 4 (DOS), and 5 (SBV). The influence of *organizational infrastructure* was significant for all three variables ($p < .05$ for all), indicating that having an organizational infrastructure for practice implementation made the adoption of any practice more likely.

The influence of *governance and leadership involvement* was significant for EVP adoption ($p < .01$), but not DOS or SBV adoption, suggesting that governance and leadership were likely significant for other types of EVP (e.g., sabbatical programs or programs involving retirees, clients or consumers, or nonemployees, listed on the survey).

TABLE 3
Logit Regression Models Predicting Organizational Adoption of Employee Volunteering Program (EVP), All Types

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Relational factors									
Industry diffusion		0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Practice network			2.01***	2.01***	1.77***	1.56***	1.36**	1.46**	1.43**
			(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Institutional filters									
Infrastructure					0.68**	0.45*	0.49*	0.55*	0.55*
					(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Governance & leadership						2.33**	2.45**	2.76**	2.80**
						(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.89)	(0.91)
Identity							1.10*	1.19*	1.19*
							(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Elite field position								−1.20+	−1.19+
								(0.84)	(0.84)
Industry × Practice									0.01
									(0.03)
Controls									
Business benefit	1.86***	1.81***	1.98***	1.98***	1.41**	1.08+	0.93+	0.90	0.91
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Age	0.25	−0.01	0.16	0.16	−0.57	−0.23	0.02	−0.08	−0.09
	(1.45)	(1.45)	(1.57)	(1.57)	(1.98)	(1.69)	(1.66)	(1.70)	(1.72)
Geography	0.66+	0.50	0.29	0.29	0.47	0.67	0.76	0.86+	0.87+
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Constant	−0.58**	−0.51*	−1.42***	−1.42***	−1.63***	−1.73***	−1.96***	−2.01***	−2.02***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Observations	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161
LR ratio chi-squared	30.26	34.08	61.18	61.18	70.39	81.40	86.33	88.39	88.46
Prob > Chi-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo *R*-squared	0.14	0.15	0.28	0.28	0.32	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.40

Note: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Tests are one-tailed for hypothesized, two-tailed for controls.
+ $p < .1$
* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

The influence of *organizational identity* was significant for the organizational adoption of SBV practices ($p < .05$), but not DOS, suggesting that identity has greater salience when the practice requires greater customization for the adopting organization. We also note that identity was significant for EVP ($p < .05$), perhaps capturing the effects for SBV, as well as some of the other types of EVP listed on the survey. The influence of the *organization*'s *eliteness in field position* was not significant for the adoption of any of the practices, indicating that F100 membership did not differentially affect practice adoption. Finally, we note that none of the control variables were significant in any of the full models (Model 9) for any of the dependent variables.

Overall, we found strong support for the main (Hypothesis 1) and interactive effects (Hypothesis 2) hypothesized: For turnkey practices (DOS), organizational adoption was predicted only by participation in the professional network (and not industry diffusion); for tailored practices (SBV), however, organizational adoption was predicted not only by participation in the practice network, but also by its interaction with industry diffusion. Thus adopting more complex and customized practices depended significantly on the effects of relational pluralism arising from both the professional network and industry. We found mixed results for institutional filters (Hypothesis 3): Having a ready organizational infrastructure affected the adoption of any type of EVP practice, but organizational identity had a significant effect only on the adoption of tailored practices. No significant effects of governance and leadership involvement or elite standing were found in the adoption of the turnkey or tailored practice variants.

TABLE 4
Logit Regression Models Predicting Organizational Adoption of a Turnkey Practice: Day of Service (DOS) Program

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Relational factors									
Industry diffusion		0.03+	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Practice network			1.21***	1.21***	0.95**	0.84*	0.77*	0.78*	0.78*
			(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Institutional filters									
Infrastructure					0.44**	0.37*	0.38*	0.38*	0.38*
					(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Governance & leadership						0.79*	0.78+	0.79+	0.80+
						(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Identity							0.26	0.26	0.27
							(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Elite field position								−0.05	−0.05
								(0.62)	(0.62)
Industry × Practice									−0.00
									(0.04)
Controls									
Business benefit	1.39***	1.32***	1.33***	1.33***	0.84+	0.64	0.60	0.60	0.59
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Age	0.91	0.56	0.76	0.76	0.32	0.44	0.51	0.51	0.51
	(1.44)	(1.45)	(1.50)	(1.50)	(1.63)	(1.57)	(1.57)	(1.57)	(1.56)
Geography	0.34	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.32	0.43	0.45	0.45	0.45
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Constant	−1.08***	−1.04***	−1.64***	−1.64***	−1.75***	−1.81***	−1.85***	−1.86***	−1.85***
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Observations	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161
LR ratio chi-squared	18.38	20.80	31.84	31.84	37.76	40.47	40.84	40.85	40.86
Prob > Chi-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo *R*-squared	0.09	0.10	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

Note: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Tests are one-tailed for hypothesized, two-tailed for controls.
+ $p < .1$
* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

DISCUSSION

Building on prior research that has revealed how network ties are critical in practice diffusion and adoption (e.g., Burt, 1987; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), we demonstrate how relationship pluralism, and commensurate institutional pressures arising from extra-industry professional networks and intra-industry diffusion, significantly affects practice adoption. Moreover, these effects were different, dependent on the degree of customization required of the practice: For a less customized or turnkey practice (DOS), organizational participation in extra-industry professional networks was necessary and sufficient; for a more customized or tailored practice (SBV), organizations needed not only to participate in these professional networks, but also to model the prevalent practice of their industry peers.

Thus organizational adoption of turnkey (DOS) practices was a fairly straightforward process, as predicted in Hypothesis 1: Organizational participation in networks of CSR professionals seemed to give organizations the exposure and the normative push to implement the "off the shelf" practice, requiring little customization. There were no significant industry effects. For a less customized practice, simply learning and normatively conforming to what other organizations were doing—regardless of industry—predicted adoption.

A different scenario emerged, however, for the adoption of more customized practices. The extent to which an organization's industry adopted a tailored SBV practice, along with an organization's participation in professional networks, made it more likely that an organization would adopt a "built to order" tailored practice. As institutional-

TABLE 5
Logit Regression Models Predicting Organizational Adoption of a Tailored Practice: Skills-Based Volunteering (SBV) Program

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Relational factors									
Industry diffusion		0.08**	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**	0.07**	0.07*	0.07*	−0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Practice network			2.23***	2.23***	1.84***	1.77**	1.55**	1.59**	1.37*
			(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.67)
Institutional filters									
Infrastructure					0.57**	0.55**	0.61**	0.61**	0.63**
					(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Governance & leadership						0.44	0.36	0.39	0.04
						(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.63)
Identity							0.94*	0.93*	1.13*
							(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.59)
Elite field position								−0.22	−0.18
								(0.73)	(0.76)
Industry × Practice									0.16*
									(0.07)
Controls									
Business benefit	1.96***	1.85***	1.91***	1.91***	1.20*	1.09+	0.92	0.92	1.18+
	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.66)
Age	2.37	1.57	1.95	1.95	1.36	1.47	1.73	1.71	2.19
	(1.48)	(1.49)	(1.89)	(1.89)	(2.30)	(2.23)	(2.20)	(2.22)	(3.00)
Geography	−0.72	−0.64	−0.80	−0.80	−0.60	−0.56	−0.50	−0.49	−0.41
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.57)
Constant	−2.02***	−2.17***	−3.54***	−3.54***	−3.68***	−3.70***	−3.91***	−3.91***	−4.02***
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.66)	(0.69)
Observations	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161
LR ratio chi-squared	21.96	32.57	52.55	52.55	59.35	59.97	63.00	63.10	68.23
Prob > Chi-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo *R*-squared	0.13	0.20	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.37	0.39	0.39	0.42

Note: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Tests are one-tailed for hypothesized, two-tailed for controls.
+ $p < .1$
* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

ists would predict, organizations imitate the behavior of other organizations in the same field (or industry) as practice adoption diffuses and normative pressures increase. However, our findings reveal the complications that attend the adoption of tailored or customized practices: Adoption is predicated not simply upon mimeticism with industry peers, but also upon compliance with the normative order of the professional network; thus the effect is multiplicative, as the different relational ties reinforce each other. Industry diffusion is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the adoption of a tailored practice. Thus relational pluralism has a positive effect on the adoption of customized practices and seems to enable more complex adaptations in organizational adoption. The converse seems to be true as well: Simple turnkey practices, requiring only adoption of readily available and acceptable "off the shelf" templates, require not relational pluralism, but relational singularism. Organizations' participation in relevant professional networks seems sufficient to foster the adoption of turnkey practices.

Our findings complement and extend existing theorizations of diffusion (e.g., Davis & Greve, 1997) to incorporate not only mimeticism, but also the normative influence of networks of professionals or practitioners (Shipilov et al., 2010). Although we have treated the institutional mechanisms associated with professionalization and industry diffusion as conceptually distinct, they may, in practice, be more connected (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimetic and normative mechanisms can diffuse through organizational fields simultaneously and

interactively; the effect may be to amplify diffusion and adoption processes, along the lines that we theorize. We can speculate that different types of relational ties function as carriers of different kinds of resources: Industries diffuse and legitimate practices, while practitioner networks expose organizations to information and experience.

Although relational factors are significant in affecting practice adoption, they do not tell the whole story. We found some support for the assertion by Greenwood et al. (2011: 339) that "pressures arising from institutional complexity do not affect all organizations equally." We examined four organizational characteristics that filter institutional pressures. Although neither leadership nor elite status was significant for turnkey or tailored practices, we did find significant effects for organizational infrastructure overall, and for identity in the case of tailored practice adoption. Organizational infrastructure (or organizational preparedness to implement the practice) was significant for the adoption of any kind of EVP practice (including turnkey and tailored practices), while organizational identity was a significant filter for tailored practices only. Our findings speak to the importance of existing organizational systems, structures, routines, and resources in adopting a new practice (e.g., Amabile, 1988; Tushman & Anderson, 1997). As Ansari et al. (2010: 85) put it, "the adoption and diffusion of new corporate practices often requires significant amounts of adaptive as well as interpretive effort." Our findings align with their arguments and highlight that organizational infrastructure is a salient filter of the institutional complexity that can impinge on practice adoption. Although our measure for infrastructure specifically examined whether the organization had the resources, processes, and systems in place to support the new practice, one might speculate that such organizational structures, because they relate people within the organization to each other in terms of authority and responsibilities (Nohria, 1992; Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979), can arguably be thought of as another relational factor impacting on practice adoption. Thus these findings, as well as those on network effects, suggest the play of relational structures that are both internal and external to the firm. More generally, we point to how a broad pattern of pluralistic relational structures may affect practice adoption.

We also observed only marginal effects for leadership involvement on turnkey practices (Model 9 in Table 4), but found significant effects for the adoption of any EVP practice (Model 9 in Table 3). This offers some support for previous work (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), attesting to the importance of leadership in the adoption of organizational practices. In addition, it might reflect the relative nascence of employee volunteering as an organizational practice and perhaps leaders' unfamiliarity with the particulars of its variants. We can speculate that it is the general value of such practices that is being reinforced by leaders' involvement, rather than any specific practice. This interpretation accords with research showing that executives and board members can be carriers of information and new practice ideas across organizations (Strang & Soule, 1998). Future researchers might address the reasons why leaders play a role in practice adoption, teasing out the effects of different types of role, such as knowledgeable practice champions (Tushman & Nadler, 1986) or figureheads whose symbolic involvement is meant only to legitimate the practice (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).

Further, we found that the organizations claiming a CSR identity (via GRI reporting) were more likely to adopt a tailored practice; interestingly, identity had no effect on the adoption of a turnkey practice. These findings are consistent with work highlighting the influential role of the organization's identity in the emergence of new practices (Navis & Glynn, 2010) or making strategic decisions (Glynn, 2000). We extend this research and find that identity is especially important in adopting customized practices. Organizations with strong CSR identities may have activated those identities in practice adoption or may have had reasons to adopt tailored practices as part of their identity as a bona fide (and institutionally sanctioned) corporate citizen. Under such conditions, identity may extend beyond the boundaries of the firm to signal core attributes, as well as the constraints often associated with institutions (Glynn, 2008: 413).

Finally, we found marginal support for organizations' elite standing in their field for our baseline dependent variable, EVP (Model 9 in Table 3), but no support for the turnkey and tailored variants (Tables 4 and 5). The marginal support for EVP provides an interesting counterintuitive finding that field position may have a negative relationship with practice adoption. One might assume that higher status organizations would be more likely to seek out new forms of practices given that external actors (e.g., social activists, financial analysts) often pay closer attention to them as a result of their size and impact on the market (Perrini, Russo, & Ten-

cati, 2007). An alternative explanation may be that firms at the very top of the field's status ordering actually benefit from "halo effects" (Fombrum, 1996) among stakeholders, and therefore are not as worried about adopting incipient practices. Since there is still debate about the net financial benefits of CSR practices to the firm (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), higher status organizations may already receive reputational benefits from their status hierarchy and prefer to adopt less risky status quo programs (Fligstein, 1996; Friedland & Alford, 1991).

We should note that the lack of significance for elite standing on adoption of the turnkey and tailored practices may result from the competing explanations that Greenwood et al. (2011) make. On one hand, higher status organizations may be more vulnerable to the pressures of institutional complexity and feel greater pressures to conform owing to their high visibility; on the other hand, elite organizations may be better able to deflect institutional pressures. Perhaps the dual pressures cancel each other out, in effect. To sort out these effects, future researchers might operationalize elite status in ways that go beyond revenue, by using, for example, subjective or qualitative rankings, such as the Fortune "Most Admired Companies" or "Best Places to Work" lists.

The findings for some of the institutional filters in practice adoption extend existing research on institutionalism to show how micro-level conditions (i.e., at the organizational level) have a bearing on macro-level conditions (i.e., at the environmental level). We offer empirical evidence on how pressures arising from institutional complexity do not blanket organizations uniformly to elicit standardized responses (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010), but rather are filtered at the organizational level to influence organizational adoption differentially. Perhaps it is the complexities in the institutional environment that give organizations some slippage in response and in adopting variants of practices, as other researchers have suggested (Lounsbury, 2007).

Theoretical implications. Our theoretical contributions extend extant research on relational pluralism, practice adoption, and institutional complexity. At a basic level, our results point to a complex web of interactions that affect the organizational adoption of more or less customized practices. In explaining practice adoption by organizations, existing theoretical explanations have tended to focus on particular sets of influences that reside at a single level of analysis: Institutionalists have shown the power of isomorphism in eliciting organizational conformity, network researchers have attested to the power of networks in diffusing practices, and innovation researchers have focused on the organizational conditions for adoption. Our findings are consistent with each of these streams, but go beyond them to show how their influences are complex and sometimes interactive in affecting practice adoption.

In addition, mapping the antecedents of practice variation, particularly in terms of customization, adds nuance to understanding the role of relational pluralism in practice adoption. Our work reveals how organizations, when faced with choices about customization in practice adoption, respond. We offer an explanation in terms of two sets of factors: relational ties, inside and outside the industry; and institutional filters. The most significant contribution of our research may be to show how organizational embeddedness in multiple fields (i.e., practice and industry), an aspect of relational pluralism, helps an organization to adopt more complex, tailored practices. Finally, we examined how institutional complexity, an outgrowth of the potentially competing demands arising from a plurality of relational ties, is filtered at the organizational level.

Future research. One way of building on our findings is to attend explicitly to the role of temporality in practice diffusion and adoption. Practice diffusion may occur in multiple waves that are affected by the organization's network contacts and its own history of experience (Shipilov et al., 2010). Thus using time series data to examine temporal patterns of practice adoption might illuminate how different kinds of variables—relational ties and institutional filters—exert leading or lagging effects. For instance, given the robust significance of organizational infrastructure, perhaps it functions as a perceptual lens through which organizations first view potential practices and industry patterns. Conversely, we can also imagine how broader patterns of practice adoption are selectively viewed through the filter of organizational identity: Identity-consistent practices might be more easily identified and implemented. For example, the identity literature has remained relatively silent on how internal and external audience perceptions of an organization's identity may influence the adoption of new practices or innovations (for a notable exception, see Tripsas, 2009). Our findings, relating identity to relational pluralism and institutional

complexity, hint at the need for more work that bridges the field of organizational identity and that of innovation and practice adoption. A particularly interesting bridge might be one that examines the perceptions of internal and external actors in construing the organization's identity; this might build on the work of Dutton and Dukerich (1991) and Navis and Glynn (2010) in illuminating how such perceptions can affirm or contest an identity and practice adoption that reflects that identity. Moreover, understanding how the organization's identity functions as strategic resource (e.g., Glynn, 2000) or symbolic meaning (e.g., Glynn & Abzug, 2002) in affecting practice adoption could be a fruitful path of investigation.

Another path for future research might extend our findings beyond the field of F500 firms. Although the Fortune 500 may serve as a "critical mass which justifies the acquisition of particular innovations" (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981: 699), we may find different patterns of practice adoptions for smaller, younger, or less prestigious firms. Organizational size and status can have an inverse relationship with new practice adoption. For example, Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King (1991) illustrate how new practice innovations were first introduced in the radio industry by smaller firms, on the periphery of the industry, prior to their adoption in larger ones. In addition, the partial significance found for elite positions within an organizational field may illustrate an unexplored negative relationship between elite status hierarchy and new practice adoption. As such, more fine-grained measures of organizational field positions, as well as investigations into organizational fields other than the Fortune 500, might shed more light.

Managerial implications. Our results have implications for CSR practitioners who often struggle with the rapid growth of the field and the abundance of practices that are emerging. Typically, researchers have focused practitioners on those organizational capabilities and resources that enable adoption (what we labeled "institutional filters"), to the neglect of influences in the broader environment beyond the organization. Practitioners can benefit from recognizing that the adoption of CSR practices is subject to influences both internal and external to the organization. Our results show that organizational involvement in conferences or events with the CSR community of practice had a positive impact on the adoption of the EVP practices; yet only half of the firms in our study participated in these. One implication of our work is to highlight the importance of managers' active involvement in these professional communities of practice. Knowing when to adopt a new practice, and when to devote precious organizational resources to it, is one of the most difficult and important tasks of any CSR professional. We hope that this research provides new insights to aid businesses and society in this worthwhile endeavor.

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