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WHERE THE HEART FUNCTIONS BEST: REACTIVE–AFFECTIVE CONFLICT AND THE DISRUPTIVE WORK OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

LEE C. JARVIS
University of Queensland

ELIZABETH GOODRICK
Florida Atlantic University

BRYANT ASHLEY HUDSON
IÉSEG School of Management

We study the emotive aspect of institutional work performed by U.S. animal rights organizations (AROs) attempting to disrupt industrial practices in modern factory farming operations perceived to be abusive to animals. Drawing on an inductive, qualitative analysis of interviews with ARO advocates, as well as textual and visual archival data collected from AROs' websites, we argue that the suppression of emotion plays a critical role in AROs' disruptive work. We find that advocates are motivated to suppress their emotions by a perceived incompatibility between their reactive emotional displays and their affective commitment to institutional work, or what we label *reactive–affective conflict*. We show how two triggers of reactive–affective conflict—potential supporters' investment in the status quo and emotive norms governing institutional work—encourage ARO advocates to suppress their emotions in face-to-face interactions with audiences while attempting to elicit emotions via visuals as their strategy of disruptive work. We contribute to the literature on the strategic use of emotion in institutional work by highlighting important relationships between the characteristics of potential supporters, the nature of institutional work, and institutional workers' management of their own emotions to further their institutional projects. In doing so, we add needed nuance to extant conceptualizations of how emotion is strategically deployed as part of purposeful efforts to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions.

> Extreme sorrow and sadness. Actual physical pain inside of you, you know, to see a creature be tortured like that. That's what it is, it's just overwhelming sadness and despair. (Animal rights advocate, RF-05)

> To wear your heart on your sleeve isn't a very good plan. You should wear it inside, where it functions best. (Margaret Thatcher, interview on ABC-TV, March 18, 1987)

When thinking of animal rights organizations (AROs) and their advocates' attempts to abolish industrial practices in factory farming operations (FFOs) they feel are abusive to animals, many picture young "fanatics" on street corners screaming radical slogans at largely unreceptive crowds. No doubt, as the first quote above illustrates, advocates have strongly emotional motivations to engage in institutional work, or the "purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions" (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215). Yet, despite their reputation, whether or not to display these emotions to persons outside the animal rights movement (hereafter referred to as "potential supporters") is a difficult

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decision. Drawing on their own experiences, ARO advocates understand support for animal rights to be catalyzed primarily by strong emotions. However, as ARO advocates are often stigmatized for being fanatical, their displays of emotion can be taken as *prima facie* evidence of irrationality, causing their disruptive work to be dismissed out of hand by potential supporters.

Thus ARO advocates are presented with an apparent paradox: how do they elicit emotions from potential supporters that they themselves cannot display? The recently burgeoning literature examining the nexus of institutions and emotions has largely ignored this question (see Lok, Creed, DeJordy, & Voronov, 2017). Cumulatively, this literature has suggested that experiences of emotion can compel engagement in various forms of institutional work, and that emotional experiences and displays are often utilized as political tools in the accomplishment of work (Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014; Jarvis, 2017; Voronov & Vince, 2012; Voronov & Weber, 2016). For example, to maintain the institutional status quo, actors may attempt to strategically elicit others' shame or fear when they transgress the normative boundaries of practice, value, and belief (e.g., Creed et al., 2014; DeJordy & Barrett, 2014; Gill & Burrow, 2018; Herepath & Kitchener, 2016; Kent, Jordan, & Troth, 2014). Similarly, attempts to elicit outrage, compassion, or joy can function to recruit support for institutional change (e.g., Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Massa, Helms, Voronov, & Wang, 2017).

However, research focusing on the strategic use of emotion in institutional work is still in its infancy and has several important limitations. One of the most significant limitations is these studies' implied assumption that emotion may only have a significant role in institutional work processes when worn on the sleeve. That is, primarily through examining emotion-laden rhetorical constructions, these studies seem to suggest that the outward display of emotion by institutional workers is the primary emotive vehicle for efforts to create, maintain, or disrupt institutions (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Herepath & Kitchener, 2016; Moisander, Hirsto, & Fahy, 2016). Yet, as with AROs, displays of emotion in some circumstances can be stigmatized and may frustrate institutional workers' efforts despite their continued need to elicit emotion in potential supporters as a function of recruiting support.

Indeed, recent conceptual work has suggested that "one must . . . display emotions appropriately" (Voronov & Weber, 2016: 462) if expressions of emotion are to have their intended effects, hinting that actors might sometimes need to strategically *suppress* their emotions if they want to achieve their sociopolitical goals. However, which factors motivate institutional workers to consciously hide their experienced emotion, and how these actors simultaneously elicit the emotion integral to recruiting support for their institutional work, remains unexplored. Thus, our work seeks to answer the questions, "What motivates actors to suppress their emotions in support of institutional work?" and "How do strategies of institutional work incorporate and accommodate the suppression of emotion while still eliciting it in potential supporters?" To address these questions, we study the institutional work of six large U.S. AROs and their advocates attempting to disrupt practices believed to be harmful to animals but that remain institutionalized in modern FFOs.

Our work makes several important contributions to literature on the strategic use of emotion in institutional work. First, we find that the perceived incompatibility between displays of reactive emotion and affective commitments to institutional work, which we label *reactive–affective conflict*, motivates institutional workers to suppress their emotions in interactions with potential supporters. In exploring why advocates experience reactive–affective conflict and how the suppression of emotion is incorporated in strategies of institutional work, we also highlight important relationships between the characteristics of potential supporters, the nature of institutional work, and the emotive tactics strategically deployed by institutional workers. Specifically, we find that potential supporters' investment in the status quo and the emotive norms governing institutional work can cause institutional workers to feel as though displaying their reactive emotions would hinder their institutional project, thereby frustrating their affective commitment to that project. As a direct response, we find that ARO advocates suppress their emotions in face-to-face interactions and rely on other tactics to elicit emotions in potential supporters. We find that ARO advocates rely on visuals to elicit emotion, shielding advocates from charges of irrationality and being overly emotional, which are commonly used by potential supporters as a pretext for dismissing advocates' disruptive work. Thus, through analyzing the disruptive work of AROs, we add needed nuance to extant conceptualizations of how emotion is strategically deployed as part of purposive efforts to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions.

INSTITUTIONAL WORK AND EMOTION

Institutions encompass both "the supraorganizational patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space, and symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with meaning" (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 232). The institutional work perspective was introduced amid longstanding calls for institutional theorization that pays greater attention to the everyday lives of "rank-and-file" persons whose actions constitute institutional orders (e.g., Barley, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1997). This perspective focuses attention on "understanding how, why and when actors work to shape [such] institutions, the factors that affect their ability to do so, and the experience of these sorts of efforts for those involved" (Hampel, Lawrence, & Tracey, 2017: 558).

As part of this turn toward micro-level processes, institutional scholars have become interested in emotion. Emotional experiences, or discrete physiological feeling states that arise from a person's perception of any stimuli interpreted as important to the achievement of personal or collective goals (Elfenbein, 2007; Frijda, 1988; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), have gained significance for institutionalists for several reasons. Experiences of emotion serve as the "'glue' binding people together and generating cognitive commitments to large-scale social and cultural structures, [making them] viable" (Turner & Stets, 2005: 1). Additionally, they are to some extent socially constituted, given that individual interpretations of stimuli's importance are institutionally conditioned (Gordon, 1990; Thoits, 1989). Emotional displays, which are often decoupled from emotional experiences, are similarly conditioned by institutional norms for appropriate expression (Hochschild, 1979; Jarvis, 2017), and serve to facilitate and strengthen both communication within and boundaries around communities (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner & Kring, 1998).

However, likely the most important reason for institutional scholars' interest in emotion is its power to move persons to action. *Reactive emotions*, or acute, intense emotional experiences in direct response to highly salient stimuli in "our immediate physical and social environments" (Jasper, 2011: 287), are of particular interest to institutional theorists. That is, because they are in part or wholly "beyond the [conscious] control of those experiencing them" (Jasper, 1998: 400), reactive emotions represent sources of motivation that may lie outside institutional conditioning to some extent. Concomitantly, reactive experiences also represent a research focus that helps institutionalists escape the "cognitive miser" as a depiction of human action (Voronov & Vince, 2012). However, persons are also motivated by their *affective commitments* to institutionalized practices, values, and symbols they will work to defend if challenged (Voronov & Vince, 2012). Affective commitments are "abiding" or "more permanent feelings . . . in the context of which many specific emotional reactions can come and go" (Jasper, 1998: 402). Such commitments are "[tied less] to short-term assessments" and "more to elaborated cognitive appraisals" (Jasper, 2011: 287). That is, they are experienced as a persistent reality of institutional life rather than as an acute reaction to a specific, readily identifiable stimulus. The literature examining the nexus of institutions and emotion has revealed both reactive experiences and affective commitments to be powerful in motivating persons to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions (e.g., Delmestri & Goodrick, 2016; Fan & Zietsma, 2017; Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville, & Scully, 2010; Kisfalvi & Maguire, 2011; Massa et al., 2017; Siebert, Wilson, & Hamilton, 2017; Wright, Zammuto, & Liesch, 2017).

The Strategic Use of Emotion

While most recent research by institutionalists has focused on the motivational capacity of emotional experiences, some attention has also been paid to how actors strategically elicit emotions in others to achieve desired institutional outcomes. This approach can be seen in studies that have discussed institutional workers' emotional displays as political tools that are purposefully deployed to manage audiences' emotions, such that they begin to perform institutional work or lend material and cultural support to other actors engaged in institutional work.

This research has generally analyzed emotionally charged discourse embedded in various texts written to debate prospective institutional changes (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Moisander et al., 2016; Wijaya & Heugens, 2018), or offered during ritualized interactions directed toward reinforcing or expanding the hegemony of an institution's constituent practices, values, and beliefs (e.g., Gill & Burrow, 2018; Massa et al., 2017; Tracey, 2016). In doing so, these studies have sought to show how emotionally charged rhetorical constructions are used to influence the emotional states of others. Institutions are implied to be sustained or altered via the actions audiences do or do not take because of those emotional experiences. For example, in their study of U.K. Government inquiry reports, Herepath and Kitchener found attempts to reinforce

institutionalized norms governing patient safety practices with "highly emotive" recitations of iconic instances of patient neglect and abuse meant to shame offending healthcare providers (2016: 1126–1127). In their study describing how cool-climate wineries in Ontario induce customers to enthusiastically promote a specific slate of wine-making techniques, Massa and colleagues (2017: 486) found that ritualized performances of reverence, elation, and awe affected the "progressive immersion" of later generations of "evangelists."

The Expression and Suppression of Emotion in Disruptive Institutional Work

As with the studies reviewed above, the institutional literature has generally suggested that workers' displays of emotions are an integral component of wide-ranging, well-planned strategies of institutional work (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Herepath & Kitchener, 2016; Moisander et al., 2016). Empirical research has not yet considered the competing idea that the suppression of emotion by institutional workers might play a role in implementing strategies of institutional work, or the related notion that expressions of emotion might hinder the success of an institutional project (for an example of workers attempting to suppress potential supporters' emotions, see Moisander et al. [2016]). However, as we learn from research on emotion regulation, organizational strategies often prescribe both the expression and suppression of emotion. Tracing back to Hochschild's (1983) seminal study of flight attendants, organizational scholars have long been interested in the way employees regulate their displays to better conform to organizational demands of their emotive demeanor. Much of this research has focused on the suppression of negative emotion associated with service work, depicting organizations' strategies as imposing (mostly, but not exclusively) oppressive emotive requirements on employees (see Grandey, Rupp, & Brice, 2015; Lindebaum, 2017), often at significant psycho-emotional costs (see Bono & Vey, 2005; Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011; Zapf, 2002).

The insight that organizational strategies are not one-sidedly *expressive* in their prescriptions for emotive behavior seems particularly important for those studying institutional work. That is, it seems that successful institutional work—especially disruptive work—could hinge on not just the expression, but also the suppression, of emotion. Research has documented that persons' desire to engage in disruptive work is often driven by experiences such as outrage and sadness at either one's own or others' marginalization and shame over perpetuating or benefiting from such inequity (e.g., Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Gutierrez et al., 2010; Maguire et al., 2004). However, emotional displays can and often are stigmatized as evincing "illogical, biased, and weak" (Elfenbein, 2007: 348) bases for decision making and action—not just in the workplace, but in social life generally and even in academic perspectives on emotion (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Elfenbein, 2007; Elster, 2004; Meyerson, 1998).

To wit, despite some scholars' recent recognition that emotion can "lubricate, rather than impair, rationality" (Fineman, 2000: 11), emotional experience and display are still widely trailed by a reputation of being "feminine, private, and irrational," maladaptive and counterproductive in the "rational world" of both work and social action (Hatcher, 2008: 154). Thus, although strong emotional experiences can compel persons to engage in disruptive work, those leading disruptive efforts in some contexts may find *expressing* these emotions to those they hope to mobilize to be dysfunctional, as potential supporters dismiss their emotions as irrational, setting the stage for an apparent paradox. That is, workers must elicit emotion without displaying it.

As institutionalists have yet to explore empirical contexts characterized by such a paradox, they have little insight into when and why the suppression, rather than the expression, of emotion might be strategically deployed by institutional workers. Relatedly, institutionalists also have not considered how strategies of institutional work might incorporate and accommodate the suppression of emotion by those performing work while still eliciting emotion on behalf of those they hope to mobilize. Thus, through studying the disruptive work of AROs, we seek to address the following questions: "What motivates actors to suppress their emotions in support of institutional work?" and "How do strategies of institutional work incorporate and accommodate the suppression of emotion while still eliciting it in potential supporters?"

METHODS

Animal Rights Organizations in the United States[1]

The modern form of AROs can be traced back to the late 1970s, following the publication of Peter

[1] Our summary of AROs' history was compiled from chronologies provided by Beers (2006), Finsen and Finsen (1994), Guither (1998), and Jasper and Nelkin (1992).

Singer's (1975) *Animal Liberation*, a work widely considered to be the Bible of the animal rights movement. While societies for the protection of animals had existed in the United States since the 1860s, until the latter half of the twentieth century they were for the most part loose coalitions of persons reacting to egregious, public cases of cruelty (e.g., scandals involving inhumane animal vivisection for research, the mistreatment of carriage horses, domestic pet overpopulation and abandonment). Through the mid-twentieth century, these societies were characterized by a generalized belief that animal cruelty came largely from "poorly educated or abusive individuals, not from the systematic activities" (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992: 5) characterizing societal institutions (such as food manufacturing). Thus, their advocacy was not focused on challenging the dominant "instrumentalist" conception of the relationship between persons and animals, but on shaming individuals who failed to treat animals humanely, even if animals were properly thought of as tools to be used toward human ends. However, by the end of the 1970s, cultural shifts brought about by the civil rights, feminist, and environmentalist movements had helped reorient advocates' objections to the systemic abuses of animals suffusing society.

In addition to the changes in cultural consciousness brought about by the movements of the 1960s, the industrialization of animal agriculture was a significant catalyst in transforming the animal rights movement. Specifically, the proliferation of railroads and refrigerated cars (easing the shipment of animal carcasses) in the late nineteenth century, industrial machinery and techniques in the early twentieth century, and vitamin treatments facilitating the raising of livestock on cheap food in tight confinement in the mid-twentieth century all worked to fundamentally change U.S. agriculture. The industry transitioned from one dominated by small- and medium-sized farms using animal husbandry as a guiding philosophy (entailing a symbiotic relationship between farmer and livestock) to one dominated by large, industrial feedlots and slaughterhouses treating livestock as input resources to be processed as efficiently as possible (Imhoff, 2010; Rollin & Thompson, 2011). Critics contend that the increasing importance of efficiency engendered the institutionalization of a plethora of inhumane practices among FFOs, including debilitating selective breeding, extreme confinement, mutilation, excessive use of hormones and antibiotics, and malnutrition, among other forms of abuse (see Table 1 for other prominent examples).

Given the confluence of salient cultural sensitivities and FFOs operating at a scale unprecedented in U.S. history, animal rights advocates began to reject the instrumentalist belief that animals were properly regarded as mere tools in favor of the notion that animals are sentient beings with the ability to suffer and a concomitant right to live free of subjugation and harassment. Thus, in the 1970s AROs began to adopt a mission to abolish or curtail practices infringing upon these rights, and to reeducate the public about abusive FFO practices. These practices are the predominant focus of modern AROs, given that "[a]gricultural uses of animals constitute the most extensive and extreme exploitation of animals in America today," although abolishing them "clearly [poses] a formidable challenge" (Finsen & Finsen, 1994: 119–120) given the size and power of modern FFOs. Indeed, the last 50 years have seen dramatic increases in the consumption and production of animal products, and in the influence of agricultural lobbyists (Noble, 2010; Schlosser, 2010). As a consequence, critics have contended that the few legislative attempts to foster humane rearing and slaughter methods are rarely enforced by regulators and often ignored by FFOs (Pachirat, 2011; Tomaselli & Niles, 2010).

Despite this bleak backdrop, however, AROs persist and often succeed in disrupting FFO practices. The efficacy of their disruptive work can be seen in, for example, the 2002 Florida ballot initiative campaign to outlaw the use of gestation crates (Tonsor, Wolf, & Olynk, 2009). Primarily organized by the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and Farm Sanctuary, thousands of animal advocates engaged in a grassroots campaign to collect petition signatures and educate Floridians regarding the use of gestation crates among industrial sow farms. Thanks largely to these efforts, over 500,000 Florida residents signed petitions and over 2.6 million (54.8% of the voting public) voted to amend the state constitution, limiting "the cruel and inhumane confinement of pigs during pregnancy" (Florida Const. art. X, § 21). This amendment so radically changed the regulatory structure of sow farming that hog farms utilizing gestation crates in the state shut down their operations after consulting with Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services about the cost of upgrading their facilities to comply with the amendment.

Such disruptive work is complicated, however, by the normativity of (at least indirect) participation in FFO practices via consumption of animal products. Historians of the animal rights movement have

TABLE 1
Exemplar Institutionalized FFO Practices Opposed by AROs

Practice	Description	Prevalence	Effects
Gestation crates (stalls)	"the gestation stall is a pen designed to encompass the sow's static space requirements—that is, the space occupied by a sow when standing or lying on her sternum. Stalls are typically constructed of tubular metal frames with a feed trough and drinker at the front, and are about 2.2. m long, 0.6 m wide and 1.0 m high . . . Within the stall, the sow is unable to turn around and simple movements such as standing up or lying down may be difficult if the sow is large . . . Most stalls are situated within fully-enclosed, climate-controlled buildings with no bedding; slatted floors allowing [sic] urine and feces to pass through into a slurry pit under the floor." (Marchant-Forde, 2010)	Among facilities with 500 or more hogs, 76.8% of gestating sows are kept in total confinement (United States Department of Agriculture, 2012) for the entirety of their 112–115 day pregnancies (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2006)	Physical problems such as "reduction in muscle weight and bone strength, . . . higher basal heart rates, . . . soreness and injuries from rubbing against the bars of their enclosures or from standing or lying on barren flooring, . . . higher rates of urinary tract infections." Psychological problems such as "repeated coping attempts, frustration, and/or brain dysfunction" causing "bar-biting . . . and sham-chewing. . . . [C]rated sows tend to become unresponsive over time, a behavioral disorder scientists have linked to depression." (HSUS, 2008a)
Battery cages	A small barren cage usually holding 5–10 birds. "A typical U.S. egg farm contains thousands of cages, lined in multiple rows, stacked 3-5 tiers high. Industry guidelines stipulate that each caged hen may be afforded 432.3 cm^2 (67 in^2) per bird, an amount of floor space equivalent to less than a single sheet of letter-sized paper." (HSUS, 2008b)	Of the 280 million laying hens currently housed in the United States, "94% of commercial egg production . . . [is] derived from caged layers." (United Egg Producers, 2015)	Lack of ability to perform instinctual behaviors such as "nesting, perching and roosting, scratching and foraging, dustbathing, . . . wing-flapping and preening, exercising, and exploring" causes frustration, distress, weaker bones, abnormal feather pecking and cannibalistic behavior, and increased risk of various diseases, disorders, and parasites. (Shields & Duncan, 2009)
Tail docking	"Tail docking in cows in the dairy industry—the partial amputation of up to two-thirds of the tail—is a procedure typically performed without anesthetic and is accomplished by the application of a tight, rubber ring that restricts blood flow to the distal portion of the tail, which atrophies and detaches or is removed with a sharp instrument." (HSUS, 2012)	Over 80% of dairy farmers use tail docking on at least some of the cows. (Fulwider, Grandin, Rollin, Engle, Dalsted, & Lamm, 2008)	Reduced ability to "switch away biting insects," sometimes prolonged discomfort, distress, and pain, possible "clostridial disease, including gangrene and tetanus." (HSUS, 2012)

observed that potential supporters have proven uniquely immune to disruptive tactics successfully deployed in other movements, such as "protests, sit-ins, or direct confrontations" (Finsen & Finsen, 1994: 120)—tactics suffused with displays of moral outrage by advocates. Yet ARO advocates also widely believe that engendering emotional responses in potential supporters plays a large role in mobilizing grassroots support for their institutional work (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). The tension between the emotions ARO advocates try to elicit in order to mobilize support for their disruptive work and their seeming inability to express their emotions to potential supporters makes ARO advocacy an excellent context in which to study the suppression of emotion specifically, and the emotive dynamics of institutional work generally. In the remainder of this manuscript we explore the strategy AROs have adopted in response to this seemingly paradoxical situation, their motivations for doing so, and the important role of emotional suppression in implementing this strategy.

Data Sources and Collection

To gain insight into the emotive dynamics of AROs' disruptive work, three sources of data were collected and analyzed: semi-structured interviews with ARO advocates, textual archival data, and visual archival data.

Semi-structured interviews. We conducted 29 semi-structured interviews with 30 ARO advocates between February and August of 2015, with two advocates requesting to be interviewed in tandem. Twenty-four participants were female and six were male, ranging in age from their thirties to their eighties, all identifying as members or volunteers of AROs for at least a decade. Interviews were conducted by phone, recorded, transcribed, and member checked (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013). They lasted on average 45.17 minutes, yielding 321 pages of single-spaced text when transcribed. Three types of ARO advocate were interviewed: "rank-and-file" advocates, administrators, and undercover investigators.

Rank-and-file advocates are those ARO members who participate in street-side petition drives and leafleting events, and therefore represent the on-the-ground, interactive front of AROs. At a typical event, booths are set up in heavily trafficked public spaces with various combinations of pamphlets, newsletters, and documentary DVDs, all intended to provide basic information regarding FFO practices and vegan or vegetarian lifestyles (see Figure 1). Rank-and-file advocates stand close by, handing out leaflets to potential supporters, often accompanied by a small television powered by a car battery playing a documentary or mini documentary of footage from undercover investigations into FFOs on a loop to draw attention to the booth. Most people pass by without paying attention to the booth or advocates, while those who do stop generally stay for only one or two minutes to watch the documentary, ask a quick question of the advocates, or pick up some educational materials. Rank-and-file advocates were identified by contacting an ARO administrator with a large, national U.S. ARO, who provided access to the contact information of the most successful signature gatherers for a large ballot initiative petition drive in a southeastern state. Potential participants were first contacted by phone, after which a follow up email

FIGURE 1
Example of a Booth for a Public Leafleting Event



was sent. Nineteen rank-and-file volunteers responded to these solicitations, with one unwilling to participate, resulting in 17 interviews with 18 advocates.

Administrators are those ARO members who coordinate the activities of the rank-and-file advocates, lobby legislators, and, most importantly here, construct and administer training for rank-and-file advocates intended to increase the efficacy of their interactions with potential supporters. Administrators self-identified as such when they were contacted as part of the sampling described above, resulting in seven interviews.

Undercover investigators are those advocates who apply for entry-level positions at industrial feedlots or slaughterhouses, often using their real identifying information. If hired, the investigator wears a hidden recording device during the workday to capture videographic and photographic evidence of abusive practices, unsanitary conditions, or unfair treatment of other workers. Investigations can last anywhere from a couple of weeks to several months, and often entail working schedules comprised of 12 to 15 hour days, sometimes six or seven days a week. To solicit undercover investigators for interviews, we first contacted the Director of Investigations at a U.S. ARO, who connected us with a retired investigator. Through snowballing (Creswell, 2012) via the first investigator, interviews from a total of five retired investigators were collected.[2]

The interview protocol was designed to elicit narratives regarding both advocates' own decisions to support AROs and their attempts to get others to do the same. When interviewing investigators, the protocol also included the emotional impact of their investigations, along with AROs' aims in collecting undercover footage. For all interviews, Chell's (2004) critical incident method was used, whereby advocates were asked both to discuss their experiences in animal advocacy in general and to identify especially significant or memorable events. This method can help respondents recall events even in the distant past, and, given that the most experienced participants had identified as members of AROs for several decades, such an interview tactic was warranted here. This approach was also particularly useful in revealing advocates' perceptions of why AROs and their advocates used specific strategies, given that recitations of particularly salient events from their experiences in advocacy often threw the reasoning behind their approaches to advocacy into high relief.

Textual archival data. The websites of six large U.S. AROs were mined for texts relevant to the AROs' attempts to disrupt industrial practices in FFOs. These organizations were identified by interview participants as the AROs they had the most experience working for, and included Compassion Over Killing, Farm Sanctuary, HSUS, Mercy For Animals, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), and Vegan Outreach. Textual data included mission statements, white papers on the effects of FFOs' practices on animals or the environment, blog posts, e-newsletters, online magazines, leaflets, and training materials for new advocates. These data comprised 852 items averaging about 1.5 pages of text each.

Visual archival data. Visuals are an integral mechanism through which AROs attempt to disrupt institutionalized FFO practices, as well as an increasingly important source of data for organizational scholars generally (see LeBaron, Jarzabkowski, Pratt, & Fetzer, 2018; Meyer, Höllerer, Jancsary, & Van Leeuwen, 2013). Given the role of visuals in AROs' disruptive institutional work, we analyzed both videos posted to AROs' websites and still images embedded in ARO educational materials and posted to AROs' websites. The majority of the videos were "mini documentaries" resulting from undercover investigations into FFOs, while the remainder included celebrity endorsements, dietary advice, recipes, and skits, all of which attempted to promote a vegan or vegetarian diet. Still images covered much the same subject matter and were most often coupled with texts that took the place of dialogue embedded in the videos. In total, we coded 211 videos averaging 3.67 minutes in length, as well as several hundred still images.

Data Analysis

A grounded approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) was adopted whereby we conducted an inductive, thematic analysis of our interview transcripts and archival material (Miles et al., 2013; Saldaña, 2015). Digital copies of all interview transcripts, textual archival documents, videos, and still images were imported into NVivo 11 Pro

[2] Given the nature of their work, investigators are almost universally concerned with maintaining anonymity lest their identities be circulated to FFOs, precluding them from participating in further investigations. We were told several times by retired investigators that it was very unlikely we would be able to solicit an active investigator to participate, and this limited the number of willing participants among ARO investigators.

qualitative data analysis software, which allows the researcher to easily sort statements by themes and higher-order theoretical categories manifesting in the data. NVivo 11 Pro also allows the researcher to sort salient sections of videos into categories, and take still frames from videos to be used as exemplars. Following a grounded approach the constant comparative method was employed, which entails iterative interplay between collected data and consequent rounds of theorizing until data saturation, or the point at which data yield "diminishing returns," with no new insights added to theorizing (Bowen, 2008: 140). Specifically, the first author iterated between open-coding data, discussions with the second and third authors, and consultation with the extant literature focusing on institutional work incorporating emotions, a process that directed our collective attention to the prominent role of emotional display—or, significantly, the lack thereof—in ARO advocacy.

Following Pratt, Rockmann, and Kaufmann (2006) and other recent inductive work, the results of this interplay were organized into three nested analytical categories (Pratt, 2009; Saldaña, 2015). Figure 2 is the visual representation of our coding process, which moved from first-order codes comprised of commonly themed statements, to second-order theoretical categories derived from those statements, to third-order aggregate theoretical dimensions. For interview and textual archival data, first-order codes were gleaned using Charmaz's (2006, 2008) "line-by-line" coding method, which differs from general qualitative coding in that it generates first-order codes that already suggest interconnections between categories, rather than being purely descriptive, easing the aggregation of first-order codes into theoretical categories.

For visual archival data, we employed a semiotic analysis following Rose's (2016) well-known compendium of visual methodologies. First, we watched the videos or viewed the still images, taking note of their salient characteristics (e.g., color, sound, spatial organization). Subsequently, we came to collective interpretations of what AROs meant to signify about the conditions that FFO animals live in, the forms and severity of abuse that they endure, the regularity of that abuse, and the role FFO employees play in perpetuating that abuse to audiences using color, sound, spatial organization, and other compositional characteristics (see Phillips & Hardy, 2002; van Leeuwen, 2005). For example, as illustrated in Figure 3 and Table 3, one video of footage from an undercover investigation of a Butterball turkey farm included a shot depicting a close-up of several turkey heads poking out of small cages with a large number of similar cages lined up behind the focal turkeys (see Figure 3, image 3). We interpreted the primary semiotic purpose of this image to be signifying both a type of abuse (i.e., inhumane confinement of sentient turkeys) and the scale on which that abuse was being perpetrated (i.e., an industrial scale). As with this example, analyzing what ARO visuals were intended to signify was key to our understanding of the strategic purpose of visuals in the context of AROs' disruptive work and, as will be explored below, how these visuals are intended to elicit emotion in potential supporters.

In the next section we present our analysis and findings on the emotive dynamics surrounding AROs' disruptive work. We begin by exploring the emotional experiences of ARO advocates that drove them into the animal rights movement: reactive experiences of moral shock, anger, and sorrow, and affective experiences of compassion for animals. We then explain why advocates believe the suppression of these emotions in interactive settings to be important to the success of AROs' disruptive work. In doing so, we outline both advocates' motivations for suppressing emotion as part of their institutional work, and the strategic responses adopted by AROs, showing the dynamic interplay between the suppression of emotion and attempts to elicit emotion in potential supporters via visuals.

THE EMOTIVE DYNAMICS OF AROs' DISRUPTIVE WORK

Advocates' Emotional Experiences

> I was bullied as a kid . . . I mean, I had a great family upbringing, wonderful parents and all that, [but] you know how life is. . . . Yet we had . . . this little cairn terrier named Scotty, and Scotty was always my best friend. So even if everyone else was either a jerk to me or beat me up or whatever, and then all of my so-called friends would do nothing to stand up for me, well, Scotty was always doing that, right? . . . As I [learned more about FFOs], I realized that I most empathized with animals . . . because they were the most defenseless. (UNCI-26)[3]

[3] Interview responses are associated with generic identifiers (e.g., UNCI-27) indicating a participant's role within his/her ARO along with a number indicating the sequence in which participants were interviewed, which was arbitrary. "UNCI" corresponds with an undercover investigator, "ADM" with an administrator, and "RF" with a rank-and-file member. Gendered pronouns used to refer to quotes from interviewees are random.

FIGURE 2
Overview of Data Structure



> Growing up with dogs, spending time with geese and ducks and cows at a friend's farm … just getting to witness for myself how intelligent and three-dimensional animal personalities can be, it struck me as being a "worthy" issue. (UNCI-23)

These anecdotes recalling childhood relationships with animals were used by two undercover investigators to capture the process by which they developed an affective commitment to alleviating the suffering of animals and compelling them to engage with AROs' disruptive work. Of the multiplex motivations propelling ARO advocates as a group into their disruptive work, the one widely cited among interviewees as most important was the

FIGURE 3
Still Frames Taken from Exemplar Undercover Video[4]

experience of compassion for the animals subjected to abusive FFO production processes. Compassion, as normally used by emotion scholars, is a label referring to "a family of [emotional] states that centers upon a concern for ameliorating the suffering of another" (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010: 352). In our context, advocates' compassion was derived largely from emotional bonds with animals, which, as illustrated above, were widely characterized by feelings of love for and awe of animals in their personal biographies.

While it is perhaps unsurprising that animal advocates are motivated by an abiding, compassionate commitment to animals, what is particularly noteworthy about our participants' recollections of their motivations to join AROs' disruptive work was the juxtaposition of these long-standing affective bonds against their intense reactive experiences of moral shock, anger, and sorrow upon learning about the production practices institutionalized in FFOs:

> I was shocked at the level of abuse. I was extremely sad, and my heart just broke for these animals. (ADM-21)

> Disgust, shock, horror. It's all of them. It touches my heart; it breaks my heart every time to this day. I've gotten . . . to the point where I just have to hit delete, delete, delete [on emails regarding animal abuse] for my own well-being. (RF-06)

Several even recalled highly stressful epiphanies representing inflection points in their transitions into active proponents of AROs' disruptive work:

> I got behind [a truck transporting chickens], and I could see the bird on the side, I could see their eyes looking out, I could see the feathers blowing off the truck, I could see wings or legs poking out, and I was horrified. I just pulled over on the side of the road and I lost it. I had a break down on the side of the road that had nothing to do with car mechanics. I just . . . had a meltdown. (RF-14)

Advocates commonly mentioned a direct relationship between such reactive experiences and

[4] Originally published in: Mercy For Animals, ***Hidden camera: Butterball Turkey Abuse (Mercy for Animals)***. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sj-4wuDaQao. Reproduced with permission from Mercy For Animals.

their emerging commitment to animal wellbeing, often suggesting that their motivations were, as one respondent stated, "strongly . . . emotional":

> I saw footage of animals being butchered while still conscious. . . . I just thought I wouldn't want that to happen to [another] animal [because of me], so to eliminate the chance, I will never eat another animal whether that's healthy or not for me. (UNCI-26)

Another alluded to anger as his motivation, saying, "I got really angry and wanted to do something about it" (UNCI-27).

It is significant that, although allusions to the direct relationship between reactive emotions and participation in work were common, interview data suggested that advocates' mobilization into disruptive work was not wholly a function of either affective commitments or reactive emotion. Taken as a whole, our data suggest that affective commitment to animals—and concomitantly AROs' disruptive work—served as an emotional milieu that oriented ARO advocates' reactive emotions toward FFO practices as they began to learn more about them. That is, as indicated by the prevalence of anecdotes from advocates' biographies regarding their relationships with animals (see Table 2 for additional supporting data), advocates felt that the intensity of their reactive experiences of shock, anger, and sorrow could only make sense against the backdrop of a deep, abiding compassion for animals. Thus, both affective and reactive experiences are implicated in the motivation to participate in AROs' work, a facilitative relationship one administrator outlined explicitly:

> We had all grown up loving our pets and that was kind of what I had envisioned [farming was like]. When she gave me this book, . . . it was my first introduction to factory farming, and I felt like I'd been punched in the stomach. I was just shocked and dismayed that this was not on the front page of the newspaper every single day. It was absolutely stunning to me that this kind of cruelty was so commonplace. So I started getting involved, I started learning more. (ADM-22)

Reactive–Affective Conflict and AROs' Emotive Tactics of Disruptive Work

The above quotes illustrate advocates' acknowledgment that both reactive experiences and affective commitments worked as mutually reinforcing catalysts propelling them into AROs' disruptive work. However, we found that AROs' strategy of disruptive work does not center on advocates' displays of emotion either in rhetoric or ritual. To the contrary, AROs' strategy leans heavily on advocates' ability to *suppress* their emotions in interactive, face-to-face settings.

Our analysis suggested that advocates' need to suppress their emotions was based on their experience of what we label *reactive–affective conflict*; i.e., a perceived incompatibility between displaying reactive emotions in interactions with potential supporters, and pursuing their affective commitments to the wellbeing of animals and AROs' disruptive work. In exploring why advocates perceived reactive displays and affective commitments to be at odds, our data describe two triggers of reactive–affective conflict, each coupled with unique emotive tactics AROs strategically deploy in an attempt to resolve the conflict. AROs respond to the first trigger, which advocates identified as *potential supporters' investment in the status quo*, by both (1) *suppressing emotion to plant "seeds"* with potential supporters and (2) *eliciting emotion in potential supporters using visuals*.

Trigger: Potential supporters' investment in the status quo. As an institutional project mediated primarily through grassroots appeals to potential supporters, the success of AROs' disruptive work hinges in large part on the efficacy of advocates' interactions with potential supporters during streetside petition drives and leafleting events. However, advocates suggested that most potential supporters are too cognitively and emotionally invested in their everyday status quo to meaningfully consider AROs' disruptive work. This deep cognitive and emotional investment, according to advocates, generates both an apathy and an active resistance to AROs' disruptive messages, rendering emotional displays ineffective as recruitment tactics.

Indeed, many advocates suggested that potential supporters do not know—and do not really want to know—about abusive FFO practices. According to advocates, potential supporters "don't know the truth. . . . People keep eating meat because they are unaware of the suffering that goes on" (RF-12), and although "every human being has that seed . . . of compassion [for animals] in them" (RF-13), FFO practices are just "not what people are thinking about" (RF-04). Advocates widely believe this ignorance and apathy emerge from a sense that consuming animal products is what "everybody does." This gives (at least indirect, unintended) support for FFO practices a self-evident or taken-for-granted character that persons are reluctant to cognitively revise. One administrator, in recounting his own reticence to acknowledge his contribution to perpetuating

TABLE 2
Additional Quotes by Theoretical Category

Theoretical Category	Exemplars from the Data
Reactive emotions	When I found out about certain atrocities, I would get extremely upset, extremely. [When] I was home alone . . . I could scream if I wanted to, I could use profanity—which I don't use outside—because it was so horrific that I had to express myself somehow. And . . . because of my fury I said, "I am going to do something about this." (RF-01)
	I would say horrified. I just couldn't believe that this is what was going on. I was sad that I was contributing to this all these years by eating meat, and I would say horrified was probably the best [description of] how I felt. (RF-03)
	Well I think I am still sad. It was sadness, it was shock, it was horror, it was disbelief, and that carried me into the animal rights movement. . . . It weighs on me continuously how unbelievable screwed up we have become as a species. (RF-08)
Affective commitment	There is also [animals'] emotional lives [which drove me into advocacy]. Growing up around cows, my dad would take us out to feed them hay or apples, . . . and you could see different personalities in them. Even my dad [had] his favorite. . . . [We would get] to see their babies in spring, when the moms had their little calves, and [we would] watch them running around this place. It's just kind of having their own lives out there. (RF-14)
	[I had a] love for animals from childhood. I always had cats and dogs and took in every little bird I found, tried to nurse it back [to health], everything. I was always a big animal lover. So once I made that [food–animal] connection, I had no choice but to go vegetarian, to live in alignment with my values. I valued the lives of animals. (RF-09)
	The reason why [my advocacy] all started . . . I started to make the connection between the animals that I grew up with and other animals in [FFOs], and there wasn't really a . . . moral difference between them. Why wouldn't I be compassionate to them and other animals? That fuels my [advocacy]. (UNCI-27)
Reactive–affective conflict	I don't [engage with potential supporters] with a [high-pitched] voice, or if I do a demonstration, I am never rabid, I don't scream. I don't tell people, "you are bad because you are not doing something about this," "you are part of the problem," all that kind of stuff. My philosophy is to win friends, don't make enemies, and keep my eye on the goal. That's what I tell people all the time, because some people are so strident that they turn people off. . . . They are not helping animals, they are venting, they are expressing what they feel but not thinking about how they can help animals. (RF-01)
	I think [in the case of] approaching strangers, [you need a] pleasant demeanor. It's critical [not to be] pushy or obnoxious about it, because nothing turns people off more than a militant vegan. (RF-06)
	I believe that the movement is in general moving away from being emotional and sensational . . . and more toward being more logical and clean cut. But there's always going to be those young emotional people. [It's] the worst thing, the most destructive thing [advocates can do for FFO animals] is something that is based on . . . catharsis for [advocates] and not necessarily [for the movement]. (UNCI-26)
Suppressing emotion to plant "seeds"	[The best approach] is usually really friendly, usually with a big silly grin on my face. . . . Rarely [would it be beneficial to interact] in a confrontational manner. I have to think [that] is the worst approach because people just put their defenses up a little bit more and they are generally not willing [to listen] if they are the person being targeted. . . . [Their] reaction is to defend themselves [and] whatever their beliefs or feelings might be. (RF-17)
	People who might be new to the movement . . . might be still in a very angry stage . . . because, in the beginning, when we are all kind of horrified ... we are desperate to get that information out to people . . . You are mad at them when they don't understand, and it's easy to get frustrated and perhaps unleash some of that anger on them which turns out not to be effective. (RF-14)

TABLE 2
(Continued)

Theoretical Category	Exemplars from the Data
	[A] little bumper sticker got me started on the journey to discover all of the things that go on behind the scenes in the meat production industry . . . So once your eyes are open and you see that, just walking in the grocery store and buying that piece of meat, you are directly contributing to all that horror that goes on behind closed doors. (RF-09)
Suppressing emotion to gather evidence	I mean, when I was in the barn, my personal experience as an investigator [was that] you are in "worker mode." So there are a lot of things that shock you, but it doesn't quite register until you get home and you're uploading your footage, reviewing what you've done that day and you sort of get the outsider perspective. (UNCI-23)
	The emotional [suppression] is really the toughest part—being able to be in those conditions and not break down and cry and grab all the animals and run out. Of course you have the feeling that you want to do that, but obviously that wouldn't help the situation. (UNCI-25)
	You have to accept at some point as an investigator that you make a greater impact by [doing investigations] . . . If you want to do [investigations], then you have to be able to desensitize yourself. . . . At the last job, I was killing maybe 200 birds a day, and it just didn't affect me in the way that original experience did. (UNCI-27)
Potential supporters' investment in the status quo	I think that people don't want you to present them with information that makes them uncomfortable about the way they live their life. Because most people . . . in this country love dogs and cats, and I think most people who learn about animals being tortured would feel like that wasn't right. But on the other hand, if you feel that that's not right, then you have to admit to then changing your life to continue living your life in a way that it feels comfortable. So I think that people react because they don't want to be presented with information that is going to make them uncomfortable about their choices, and they just put it all on you, "Don't guilt me, don't make me feel guilty, don't try to convert me." (RF-04)
	You're brought up [to believe] that there's a difference: you have your pets and then you have your farm animals and . . . of course they are different, that's what they are there for. So you grow up with these beliefs. And then as you get older you start being exposed [to new information] . . . [Consuming FFO products] wasn't hard to shake. It . . . was something I never thought about. . . . When you grew up it was just a normal thing that the animals lived . . . on the farm and they were raised for this. (RF-05)
	I don't know what your family is like, but mine are all meat eaters, so it makes family get-togethers difficult. I know when I first became a vegetarian and vegan, I wouldn't go home for Thanksgiving, because I don't want to be confronted with that. And I still don't go for Thanksgiving . . . So it makes it uncomfortable. This is what you grew up with, this is people you love. You have to see that they can't see what you see. I guess that's the hardest thing. Why can't they see what I see? . . . Changing someone's lifestyle is the hardest thing you can ever do. They grew up with it. You're talking about their moms, their dads. [Advocates must keep] in mind that you are asking them to change something they grew up with. (RF-09)
Emotive norms governing institutional work	It was my first factory farming case. We had to pull crippled sows out of the barns and then hold them so someone could tie a chain around their necks and then hang them to death . . . and I'm thinking . . . "obviously, if I say 'no,' I won't get the evidence and someone else will [have to] do it." (UNCI-26)
	One of the main things that . . . people don't really always understand [is] all the standard practices that go on at these farms and slaughterhouses—you know, castrating, debeaking, killing animals—these are all things that [investigators] need to do because that is part of the job . . . and if [you don't] do them, you are fired, and that is really the only way we can collect evidence. (UNCI-24)
	Certainly if you could save the animal's life by taking the animal to a vet and helping the animal out, that would probably be the moral thing to do rather than just killing the animal right there . . . . But you can't steal the animal, and you can't blow your cover. . . . For me, I think the hard part was that I felt that I had done and not done so many things that I always felt that I had to do another case to make it up to the animals. (UNCI-26)

TABLE 3
Semiotic Interpretations of Visuals Presented in Figure 3

Characteristics of the visuals	Semiotic interpretation
• Depicts several forms of abuse, including farm employees hitting turkeys with hands and metal implements, kicking turkeys, throwing turkeys by their wings, roughly shoving turkeys into small transport cages • Narrator describing the abuse in graphic detail; also references another investigation at a Butterball turkey farm that found similar abuse • Close-up framing used to give the audience clear access to acts of abuse, living conditions, and maladies or illnesses the turkeys may be enduring (see images 2 and 4)	Signifies the types, severity, and pervasiveness of abuses typical of FFOs
• Depicts turkeys with several severe injuries (e.g., broken wings and legs) and maladies (e.g., eye infection causing eye to decay out of socket, see image 4) • Workers answering investigator's questions in ways that indicate indifference to turkeys' living conditions, injuries, or maladies (e.g., investigator: "that's all the way through [the turkey's] skin"; worker: "oh, hell yeah. We've seen them with maggots in them before"; investigator: "maggots!"; worker: "hell yeah!")	Signifies the near total neglect of turkeys' health and wellbeing typical of FFOs
• Depicts industrial hanger filled with rows containing many thousands of turkeys all feeding from the same trough (see image 3) • Wide-shot framing used to emphasize the industrial scale of Butterball's operations (see image 3)	Signifies the industrial scale on which FFOs operate
• Several clips are of "grainy" quality and are only in black and white (see image 2)	Signifies that the footage was being taken clandestinely as part of undercover investigation and simultaneously that other employees would be unaware of the camera and thus act as they normally would
• Video opens with bright yellow and blue Butterball logo juxtaposed against a "stencil" font, all caps, "ABUSE" (see image 1)	Signifies that the image projected by Butterball (manifest in the color and font of its logo) contrasts starkly with the findings of the investigation
• Generally emphasized the dark conditions the turkeys found themselves in	Signifies that the animals spent the majority of their lives confined indoors

abusive FFO practices, discussed the power of the self-evident, taken-for-granted character of consuming animal products:

> Before I [got] into animal protection, I didn't know, and so I was [consuming FFO products] because part of me [was saying] that's the way society is, and everybody does it . . . . I wasn't feeling pressured to do it, it was just, "it's normal" and "that's what I do." (ADM-22)

Many advocates suggested that this cognitive investment is exacerbated by animal products' deep entanglement with emotionally charged social relationships. Allusions to the way in which animal products serve as vital components of rituals that families, friends, lovers, and religious groups use to animate and consecrate their bonds to one another were common. Thus, potential supporters interpret advocates' efforts to change their behavior as *de facto* threats of debasing these bonds:

> Making love and eating are the two most intimate things we do, and they affect us very viscerally, and I think a lot of animal rights activists way underestimate the expectation that they are putting on society at large . . . . I think we need to be really sensitive to the generations of people that have come before us . . . that have bequeathed recipes and traditions all centered around food, and we are asking people to change that. Like, we are asking people to change the trajectory of their family tradition, and that is a really big deal. (RF-18)

According to advocates, there exists a direct relationship between this investment in the status quo and society's tendency to take advocates' displays of reactive emotion (i.e., shock, anger, sorrow) during

public events as *prima facie* evidence that AROs are extremist or irrational. This allows society to view advocates' disruptive work as illegitimate and rightfully dismissed without meaningful consideration. One advocate suggested such displays make advocates "easier to marginalize. . . . 'These are extremists, [these] are radicals, they don't understand the issue, and they are driven purely from a place of emotion. . . . They don't possess the facts and they aren't reasonable'" (ADM-28). In an instructional essay directed at new advocates, one ARO veteran similarly suggested that overly emotional advocacy "guarantees that veganism[5] won't be considered—let alone adopted—on a wide scale. . . . [When I started in advocacy, my] anger and self-righteousness gave many people a lifetime excuse to ignore the realities hidden behind their food choices" (Ball, 2013).

However, advocates believe that this out-of-hand, *ad hominem* dismissal is often not the result of a well-considered appraisal of the moral merit of AROs' disruptive work. Rather, the stigmatization of advocates' reactive emotional displays allows potential supporters to avoid cognitively and emotionally confronting "the realities hidden behind their food choices." Advocates recalled several anecdotes of potential supporters responding to AROs' institutional project with attitudes such as, "'I don't want to have to know this.' So I get that mixed reactions—people are like, 'thank you for doing this, but this sucks, because now I have to change my life'" (ADM-02). Another similarly suggested that,

> I hear constantly from people, "I don't want to hear that," "I don't want to see that," "I can't look at that," and they just sort of [say], "if I turn . . . a blind eye, then it's going to go away, it's not going to really be there." (RF-05)

Given this level of investment in continuing to consume FFO products, ARO advocates acknowledge that change in the behaviors and beliefs undergirding FFO practices can only take place over a prolonged period of reflection and reconsideration:

> It's not something that necessarily happens overnight. I know most people don't go from huge carnivore to vegan overnight. It's a process. But people start making those choices . . . I think it makes people feel better about themselves. (ADM-29)

The essay aimed at nascent advocates echoed the sentiment, suggesting that "effective advocates understand [the] evolution of people's views, and, furthermore, recognize they can't change anyone's mind [for him or her]" (Ball, 2013). Advocates widely believe that attempts to elicit a "conversion on the road to Damascus" (RF-10) in a potential supporter—i.e., using aggressive reactive emotional appeals to prompt an immediate commitment to make significant changes to diet or lifestyle—can only hinder the goals of AROs' disruptive work and leave FFO animals worse off:

> When I first became a vegan . . . I wanted to beat everyone into becoming a vegetarian or a vegan, to force them to share my horror and outrage. I am now convinced that this is not the most effective way to convince people to change their behavior. (Friedrich, 2013)

From the above we gleaned that potential supporters' cognitive and emotional investment in the status quo triggers a perceived conflict between advocates' reactive displays and affective commitments in the context of street-side advocacy. That is, ARO advocates see strong expressions of reactive emotion as undermining their affective commitments to AROs' disruptive work, not because they believe displays of emotion are inherently ineffective, but because potential supporters are heavily invested in the status quo advocates are attempting to disrupt.

Emotive tactic: Suppressing emotion to plant seeds. In consideration of such deep cognitive and emotional investment, advocates' aim in street-side leafleting is simply to plant "seeds" with potential supporters. These seeds, embodied in ARO educational materials such as the leaflets, newsletters, and documentary DVDs available at street-side events and in the articles, newsletters, and video clips posted to AROs' websites, comprise mutually reinforcing combinations of rhetoric and imagery. Advocates hope that these materials and visuals will pique potential supporters' interests such that they seek additional information regarding FFO practices and begin to meaningfully reconsider their indirect support of FFO practices.

Significantly, advocates suggested that suppressing their emotions during such street-side events is integral to piquing potential supporters' interests. However, this is not to suggest that advocates did not

[5] While most advocates understand AROs' disruptive work as aimed in the short term at changing the treatment of farmed animals in FFOs, rather than institutionalizing veganism—i.e., a diet completely devoid of meat, poultry, dairy, or other animal products—"vegan(s)" and "veganism" are terms often used among ARO members as shorthand for advocates and the goals of ARO advocacy, respectively.

want to express their emotions in performing AROs' disruptive work. Much of our data suggest that advocates' natural inclination in their approach toward disruptive work is to express their reactive experiences of shock, anger, and sorrow when attempting to elicit the same emotions in potential supporters in response to FFO abuses (see Table 2 for additional supporting data). However, many advocates believe that indulging this inclination is the reason society writ large has stereotyped AROs and their advocates as irrational or fanatical:

> Society's stereotype of animal advocates and vegans is a significant roadblock to widespread change. . . . Unfortunately, the word [vegan] is often used as shorthand for someone young, fanatical, and antisocial. . . . Regrettably, the "angry vegan" image has some basis in reality. Not only have I known many obsessive, misanthropic vegans, I was one myself. (Ball, 2013)

As the above makes clear, the "fanatical" display of reactive emotion is not simply society's pernicious "stereotype" of how "vegans" go about recruiting potential supporters to AROs' disruptive work. Most advocates acknowledged knowing several "angry vegans," and some admitted that they themselves at one point fit and perpetuated the stereotype:

> When you first hear about these cruelties and this heinous abuse . . . it's a very, very common experience to get really angry. [But] not everyone's at that same place, and so I recognize that more now than I did when I [started]. (ADM-22)

Suppressing these emotions, therefore, was universally acknowledged as a necessary (although not sufficient) prerequisite for planting seeds with potential supporters:

> The same principles apply, whether it be knocking on doors asking for money, asking for a signature, asking [legislators] for a vote on a bill. . . . You have to be polite, you have to be friendly to everyone, whether they say no or yes or they're rude or hostile, you have to be friendly. (ADM-21)

> I don't want people to berate me or make me feel guilty, [and] I don't want to do that to anybody else. [I'm] just a source of information. . . . I'm not going to make you feel bad for not making these changes, and certainly [not] for not making them immediately. (RF-03)

Thus, advocates widely suggested that, disarmed by their emotional neutrality, potential supporters are rendered more amenable to ARO appeals—i.e., more likely to interact with advocates at public events, take and read educational materials, and meaningfully consider the merit of AROs' disruptive project.

Consistent with their emotive demeanor in face-to-face interactions, much of the rhetoric embedded in educational materials provided at petition and leafleting events evinced the same emotionally neutral approach. Our interview and archival data contain many references to finding "common ground" (ADM-22) with potential supporters, finding where potential supporters "are coming from" (RF-03; RF-14) and what they "are responding to" (RF-01), essentially taking a "whatever sticks" attitude (RF-16). Thus, much of the educational material provided at public events attempts to rationalize withdrawing support from FFOs via appeals to the more practical concerns of persons with diverse interests. These appeals use a discursive approach unlikely to elicit many strong emotions in potential supporters: figures and statistics, "cold" statements of fact, and everyday tips on adopting a vegan or vegetarian lifestyle were common. Examples of such appeals are illustrated in an untitled Farm Sanctuary pamphlet discussing the effects of FFOs' practices on both animals and the environment:

> According to the United Nations, animal agriculture generates 18 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, including 9 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, 37 percent of methane emissions and 65 percent of nitrous oxide emissions.

Another leaflet, titled *The Compassionate Athlete*, similarly appeals to athletes who worry about the negative health effects of adopting a vegan or vegetarian diet via a testimonial offered by bodybuilder Robert Cheeke:

> I became a vegan when I was a skinny teenager. Over the next decade following a vegan diet, I gained 75 pounds and became a 2-time natural bodybuilding champion. Clearly, no meat was no problem for me.

Supporting AROs' intent to plant seeds, these materials often conclude by directing readers to further educational resources they might consult should they want to learn more about the negative effects of FFO practices on animals, the environment, or FFO workers, or how to integrate veganism or vegetarianism into their daily lives. In aptly summarizing AROs' emotive tactic with regard to public advocacy events, one advocate recommended to others, "Find common ground, stay rational, know your subject well and present it well. And don't

blame. If you turn them off, then you are done" (RF-08).

Emotive tactic: Eliciting emotion via visuals. While advocates' interactive demeanor and much of AROs' educational material is emotionally neutral, advocates emphasized the crucial importance of eliciting from potential supporters the emotional experiences that drove them into animal advocacy: reactive experiences of moral shock, anger, and sorrow. To this end, AROs rely largely on videos and still images playing on small televisions at their street-side events and embedded in their educational materials and websites.

For example, videos playing during leafleting events often depict graphic acts of abuse that are hard to ignore (e.g., Figure 4, see Table 4 for semiotic interpretation), usually accompanied by audio that is intentionally obtrusive for audiences. Shrill, high-volume screams of pain from sows, or the near-deafening cumulative noise created by tens of thousands of laying hens clucking simultaneously in a crowded, concrete industrial hanger, are intended to reinforce the apparent cruelty depicted in the imagery.

As illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 (see Table 5 for semiotic interpretation), many of the still images embedded in ARO educational materials or websites are close-up frames that allow the audience to clearly distinguish any resultant injuries, scars, or maladies (e.g., swollen udders on dairy cows caused by mastitis, pale eyes on laying hens caused from lack of access to sunlight). Also prevalent are visuals utilizing zoomed-out framings that pan over the expanses of industrial farming operations. These framings emphasize not only the size of FFOs, but the squalor that farmed animals (and workers) endure, the lack of access to sunlight, and the claustrophobic conditions within industrial farms. These images are commonly coupled with photos of animals at play, resting peacefully on farms, or being petted or rubbed by human companions, juxtaposing what life could be for farmed animals against the reality of life as an FFO input resource.

Our data suggested that visuals' most important function in AROs' disruptive work is to decouple the process of eliciting emotion from the advocates performing the work, mitigating potential supporters' ability to dismiss AROs' work as irrational or extremist. That is, whereas human advocates are more vulnerable to charges of irrationality due to emotional biases, visuals are not. Visuals impose the responsibility of making moral judgments regarding FFO practices directly on potential supporters, effectively removing propagandizing on the part of "extremist" advocates as a cogent explanation of what is being witnessed through videos and images. As one advocate suggested, "People need to see validation [of cruelty], they need to do more than just hear it. . . .Otherwise it's just a rumor" (ADM-17).

Once decoupled from the advocates themselves, visuals can better lend emotional force to seeds, making advocates' rhetoric more immediate, visceral, and salient: "They simplify the issue. . . .You see an animal confined like that, biting on the cage bars, it immediately evokes some concern and sympathy" (RF-10). That is, while advocates' terse, emotionally neutral presentation during public events will likely fail to resonate on an emotional level with potential supporters, visuals more readily catalyze the reactive experiences, rendering those messages more memorable and increasing the likelihood a potential supporter will cognitively revisit AROs' arguments later. As one advocate reflecting on the role of visuals in AROs' work suggested,

> On some level . . . they've now taken in this knowledge . . . I think that once you see that image or you have that thought, it's a little bit hard to shake the next time you eat . . . it's hard to erase that out of your mind. (RF-14)

We also observed the mutually reinforcing coupling of text and imagery in many of the ARO educational materials we collected. Texts in ARO educational materials often lend clarity to the abuses depicted in accompanying images by describing in minute detail what conditions or maladies the animal is suffering from (e.g., "The [farrowing] crates, meant to separate the mother from the piglets to avoid crushing, are restrictive to the point that the mother pig can only stand and lie down—she cannot even turn around to see her piglets"; see Figure 6, image 4) and reinforcing the emotional impact of visuals though explaining other abuses not depicted in the visuals the text is directly coupled with (e.g., "When chickens get sick, they can be clubbed on the head with a metal rod or left to suffer to death"; see Figure 5, image 6). Facts and statistics are often used to legitimize the visuals as symptoms of a systemic disregard for the well-being of farmed animals, rather than aberrations present at one point in time or on one FFO (e.g., "There were more than 5.8 million pigs used for breeding in the United States in 2011, most of whom were confined to gestation crates, typically lined up row after row in large sheds"; see Figure 6, image 2).

FIGURE 4
Exemplar Still Frames from Video used by AROs in Planting Seeds[6]

Trigger: Emotive norms. We found that emotive norms governing the performance of institutional work constituted a second trigger of reactive–affective conflict for ARO advocates. Specifically, in order to maintain their cover, undercover investigators felt pressure to adhere to norms for emotional expression governing normal FFO employees. The need to behave like normal FFO employees created tension between investigators' reactive emotions in response to the everyday work of FFO employees and their affective commitment to advance the wellbeing of animals. This tension, we discovered, constitutes the most salient and acutely stressful aspect of their function within AROs' disruptive work. Highlighting the taken-for-granted nature of the practices ARO advocates hope to disrupt, investigators indicated that an integral component of maintaining their cover as normal FFO employees is to participate in practices investigators view as grossly abusive to animals without expressing the emotions that would identify them as out of place among other employees who perform these tasks as an everyday occupation. These include industry-standard practices such as beak-trimming female chicks without anesthesia, discarding male chicks in large bins to suffocate or starve, castrating piglets without anesthesia, and euthanizing piglets by hitting them against concrete floors, as well as putatively discouraged or illegal practices that investigations indicate are nonetheless common on industrialized farms (e.g., beating "downer" or nonambulatory animals, hanging cows or sows by forklifts):

> Yeah, I think every investigator would [have to participate in cruelty]. It's a tough world to be in . . . when you're working there with these people, day in and day out, and you're the only one not hitting the animals . . . it might stick out a little bit. . . . You have to do things that you disagree with in order to get footage out of [investigations] to help create change. (UNCI-25)

As might be expected, participating in these practices is emotionally turbulent in the extreme for

[6] Originally published in: Mercy For Animals, ***Burger King cruelty: Video exposes horrific animal abuse at a Burger King dairy supplier***. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lN_YcWOuVqk. Reproduced with permission from Mercy For Animals.

TABLE 4
Semiotic Interpretations of Visuals Presented in Figure 4

Characteristics of the visuals	Semiotic interpretation
• Depicts several forms of abuse, such as employees contorting cows' legs and tails, kicking and hitting cows, hitting cows with what appear to be rubber or metal tools (see image 3), jumping on cows' backs, dragging a nonambulatory cow by a chain wrapped around its neck (see image 1) • Various forms of abuse as well as injuries and maladies are shown in quick succession, meant to signify that there is ample evidence of the cows' poor living conditions • Several instances of abuse are shown before the Burger King logo appears, in an attempt to shock the audience (see images 1 and 2)	Signifies the types, severity, and pervasiveness of abuses typical of FFOs
• Depicts several injured cows that appear to be nonambulatory (attempting to move without standing fully upright); several cows appear to have swollen udders, others appear to have injured legs (limping while walking, dragging hind legs)	Signifies the near total neglect of cows' health and wellbeing typical of FFOs
• Color palette generally muted or dull; shades of gray and brown predominate	Signifies the industrial scale and quality of the farm on which cows are kept
• Video opens with bright yellow, red, and blue Burger King logo juxtaposed against a "stencil" font, all caps, "CRUELTY: INSIDE A BURGER KING DAIRY SUPPLIER"; meant to imply the image projected by Burger King (manifest in its logo) contrasts starkly with the findings of the investigation (see image 2)	Signifies that the image projected by Burger King (manifest in the color and font of its logo) contrasts starkly with the findings of the investigation
• Many shots focus on cows' eyes (see image 4)	Signifies the cows' sentience and their ability to experience shock, fear, and pain when undergoing abuse

investigators driven into advocacy by an abiding compassion for animals and intense experiences of moral shock, anger, and sorrow in response to those same practices. One investigator recalled being unable to control his sorrow at the plight of a hen who had been beaten with a metal rod on his first investigation. He had started to cry while attempting to euthanize the bird by breaking her neck, something he had to do clandestinely, as the other employees were throwing birds with similar injuries into a metal bin to starve to death, bleed out, or suffocate under other discarded birds. Reflecting on the situation, he said, "I was luckily far away enough from my manager there that he didn't see that I had started to cry. I was just getting so overwhelmed and felt so terrible that I was causing this animal so much pain" (UNCI-27).

Investigators often alluded to the way in which such emotional turbulence threw the incompatibilities between their reactive emotions in response to FFO practices and affective commitment to animals into high relief. One investigator juxtaposed his reactive anger against his commitment to improve FFO sows' wellbeing as such:

> So my only options are that … I document what happens or I attack everyone on the farm. Those are my two options. There's no other way to get [evidence of abuse]. … I'm so fucking sick of people that call me a hero …. I absolutely guarantee you, to the sows on that farm, I was no hero. (UNCI-26)

Another investigator aptly summarized the situation that investigators find themselves in, which she described as an emotional "catch-22":

> So it's really a "catch-22." … It's really difficult because the people who are going to be the best at this job are the ones who have the most passion [for] animals, and if you have the most passion [for] animals, then obviously it's going to be really difficult to perform some of those standard [FFO] practices. … Honestly that passion … is really the only thing that will drive you through [investigations]. (UNCI-24)

Recent developments in undercover investigations seem to suggest this catch-22 will not become any easier for investigators to navigate in the near future. As undercover investigations have become more prominent, some FFOs have responded by instructing employees to be vigilant for signs that one of their coworkers may be an undercover advocate. If discovered as such, the advocate may be "blacklisted"—i.e., have their identifying information circulated to other FFOs in the area preventing them from obtaining employment at another facility. FFOs have also lobbied state legislators for "ag-gag" bills, or laws that criminalize video

FIGURE 5
Attempts to Elicit Emotion via Visuals Embedded in an ARO Pamphlet[8]

recording on the premise of an industrial animal operation or misrepresenting oneself on an employment application to an FFO, or impose strict fines on or criminalize failure to turn over evidence gathered during an undercover investigation almost immediately.[7] This increased scrutiny by FFOs has caused undercover investigators to become evermore vigilant of their emotive demeanor when on the job, which we explore below.

Emotive tactic: Suppressing emotion to gather evidence. As with rank-and-file advocates engaged in street-side advocacy, investigators responded by suppressing their emotions, enabling them to continue gathering evidence of FFO transgressions. Advocates universally articulated the imperative to suppress emotion as a direct function of maintaining cover and continuing to pursue their affective commitment to AROs' disruptive work, a skill that was honed over careers encompassing multiple investigations. Thus, for example, references stressing the importance of "quieting" their reactive responses to participating in abusive FFO practices were common:

> She picked up the second [piglet to be castrated without anesthesia] and handed it to me and said, "Your turn." You know, the person I was for all the years leading up to that would never do such things under any circumstances. To keep the job . . . you have to quiet that part of yourself. (UNCI-23)

> [T]hat . . . is the only way of getting through those situations . . . you know, [by] just shutting everything off so that you can do your job, you can [collect] the evidence and . . . not let those things in. (UNCI-25)

Advocates often discussed this skill through references to the process of "desensitizing" themselves over their careers:

> You just have to accept . . . as an investigator . . . that someone has to record their stories so you can show it to the public. If you want to do that, you have to be able to desensitize yourself. . . . At my last job, I was killing

[7] AROs generally believe the purpose of these bills to be a chilling effect on undercover investigations. Many of the bills imposing them have been successfully challenged on First Amendment (i.e., free speech) grounds and either died in state legislatures or been struck down by state courts as unconstitutional. To date, ag-gag bills have passed into law in six states and been proposed—but failed—in 15 states.

[8] Originally published in: Vegan Outreach, ***Compassionate choices***. Retrieved from http://www.veganoutreach.org/cc.pdf. Reproduced with permission from Vegan Outreach.

FIGURE 6
Attempts to Elicit Emotion via Visuals Embedded in an ARO Website[9]

> maybe 200 birds a day, and it just didn't affect me the way [it originally did]. (UNCI-27)

Although allusions to desensitization might be taken to mean that investigators ceased feeling a strong affective commitment to animal wellbeing, investigators clarified that this was not the case. Desensitization, as it turned out, was temporary, and for most investigators the true psycho-emotional costs of working in FFOs built up over the course of multiple investigations was released in climactic episodes of emotional outpouring:

> I had just total emotional burnout. . . . One of the final [investigations], I was driving to [it], and I just pulled off the side of the road and started to break down crying. . . . I think I touched a little bit of hell, and sometimes it comes out in spurts. . . . You bottle it all up when you're there. It's not just having to perform the job duties, it's not just seeing the abuse, . . . sometimes [it's] just walking on the factory farm [and] seeing the vastness of it, how many animals are just sitting there in gestation crates or battery cages, just the hopelessness in their eyes. . . .There [are] so many things that kind of build up. (UNCI-24)

Thus, for investigators, suppression via (at least temporary) desensitization was an emotive coping mechanism allowing them to blend in better with other FFO employees, perpetuating their investigations and allowing them to continue gathering evidence of FFOs' abusive practices.

DISCUSSION

Exploring the Emotive Dynamics of Disruptive Work

We wanted to understand the emotive dynamics inhering in the institutional work of U.S. AROs directed toward disrupting industrial practices institutionalized

[9] © 2016 Farm Sanctuary, Inc. Originally published in: Farm Sanctuary, ***Pork production on factory farms***. Retrieved from http://www.farmsanctuary.org/learn/factory-farming/pigs-used-for-pork/. Reproduced with permission from Farm Sanctuary.

TABLE 5
Semiotic Interpretations of Visuals Presented in Figures 5 and 6

Characteristics of the visuals	Semiotic interpretation
• Depicts several forms of abuse, most commonly inhumane confinement; given their static nature, there is more difficulty in depicting other forms of abuse with still images (see Figure 5, images 1 and 6; Figure 6, images 1, 2, 4, and 5) • Close-up framing used to give the audience clear access to acts of abuse, living conditions, and maladies or illnesses the cows may be enduring	Signifies the types, severity, and pervasiveness of abuses typical of FFOs
• Depicts several injuries that leave readily apparent scars or maladies (see Figure 5, images 4 and 5)	Signifies the near total neglect of animals' health and wellbeing typical of FFOs
• Depicts several images of farmed animals being pampered, at play, or with human or animal companions (see Figure 5, image 3; Figure 6, image 3) • Images depicting pampering or companionship generally characterized by brighter color scheme, emphasizing bright blues or greens associated with the outdoors (see Figure 6, image 3) • Images depicting pampering or companionship also used close-up framings, but to emphasize the contentment and happiness of animals or their human companions	Signifies what the quality of life could be like for these animals if they were not industrially farmed in FFOs
• Many shots focus on animals' eyes as an attempt to draw attention to their sentience and their ability to experience shock, fear, and pain when undergoing abuse (see Figure 5, image 2; Figure 6, images 1, 3, and 4)	Signifies the animals' sentience and their ability to experience shock, fear, and pain when undergoing abuse

in modern FFOs that are believed to be harmful to animals (see Figure 7 for a schematic representation of these dynamics). Contrary to our expectations at the outset of our study, and the institutional literature to date (see Lok et al., 2017), we found the interactive suppression of emotion, rather than its expression, to be an integral component of AROs' strategic institutional work. Our data on the institutional work of six large U.S. AROs and their advocates suggest that workers are motivated to suppress their reactive emotions when they feel their expressions of emotion somehow undermine or frustrate their affective commitment to an institutional project. This perceived incompatibility between expressions of reactive emotion and affective commitment—what we label *reactive–affective conflict*—was triggered by different conditions of the institutional work being performed that, in turn, encouraged the adoption of certain emotive tactics.

We found two conditions of institutional work to trigger reactive–affective conflict: the characteristics of potential supporters and the emotive norms governing the performance of institutional work. Specifically, potential supporters' cognitive and emotional investment in the status quo amplified their defensiveness and apathy to emotionally-charged change messages, rendering overt displays of emotion by institutional workers ineffective as recruitment tactics. Additionally, our data suggest that institutional workers may feel displays of reactive emotion transgress norms for emotional display in spaces where work must be performed, frustrating their affective commitment to their work if they are expressed.

In response to perceived reactive–affective conflicts, we found that several mutually reinforcing emotive tactics of institutional work were adopted that rely largely on the suppression of emotion. Specifically, institutional workers may suppress their emotion when in interaction with potential supporters to make them more receptive to seeds of rhetoric and visuals meant to pique their interest and catalyze a likely prolonged transition into an actual supporter of an institutional project. To this end, we also found visuals play an integral role as an emotive tactic that decoupled the process of eliciting emotion from the advocates performing the work, minimizing the likelihood that defensive or apathetic potential supporters could dismiss them and their work out of hand. Finally, we found the generation of these visuals—depicting moral transgressions generally hidden from potential supporters—was only possible through the interactive suppression of emotion by institutional workers going undercover to gather evidence of the negative externalities produced by institutions targeted for disruption.

Theoretical Contributions

Our work makes several important contributions to the literature on the role of emotion in institutional work through highlighting the relationship between the characteristics of potential supporters, the emotive norms governing the performance of institutional work, and strategic uses of emotion and emotional display by institutional workers. Assumed but not theorized in

FIGURE 7
The Triggers of Reactive–Affective Conflict and the Emotive Tactics Adopted in Response



much of the research on the use of emotional displays in institutional work is the idea that specific deployments of emotion by workers are strategies formulated with an eye toward the audience (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Gill & Burrow, 2018; Massa et al., 2017; Moisander et al., 2016). Following scholars who have alluded to the crucial importance of institutional workers' ability to articulate their institutional projects in ways that resonate with potential supporters (see Fligstein, 1997; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992), our study is one of the first to explicitly illustrate this insight in the context of strategic uses of emotion and emotional display. In exploring ARO advocates' motivations for suppressing their emotions to advance their disruptive project, we add to the institutional work literature through showing that workers can understand when and how to deploy emotional displays by critically evaluating potential supporters' defining characteristics—in our case potential supporters' cognitive and emotional investment in their everyday status quo. Thus, our research reinforces the small body of literature that stresses the importance of "emotional resonance" in mobilizing support for an institutional project (e.g., Giorgi, 2017; Tracey, 2016) by unpacking the process through which resonance is achieved when the interactive display of emotion is likely to hinder institutional work.

More than exploring how workers critically evaluate potential supporters, however, our study contributes to the institutional work literature by showing how the norms dictating appropriate expression of emotion in the spaces where actors perform their institutional work can significantly influence institutional workers' strategic deployments of emotion. While organizational psychologists have long been interested in the ways emotive demeanor is influenced by norms governing work in (particularly service) occupations (Hochschild, 1983), institutionalists have largely neglected how institutional workers might manage their own emotions in response to norms governing the spaces in which they work. Recent conceptual work has hinted that participating in a particular field involves at least tacit acceptance of and conformity with institutional norms for the appropriate display of emotion (see Voronov & Vince, 2012; Voronov & Weber, 2016). Our study is the first to reinforce this notion by showing that institutional workers account for the norms that determine the appropriateness of their emotional displays through strategically hiding emotional expressions deemed transgressive.

Most importantly, our study contributes to the institutional work literature on emotions by theorizing why and how institutional workers respond to critical evaluations of both potential supporters and the emotive norms governing their work. In addressing why, we build on Jasper's (1998, 2011) distinction between reactive emotions and affective commitments in conceptualizing *reactive–affective conflict* as the experiential mechanism that, in our context, motivated ARO advocates to adopt a specific spate of mutually reinforcing emotive tactics of disruptive work. In doing so, we show there to be a third sense in which "people use emotions as agentic resources" in institutional engagement, adding to the two posited by Lok and colleagues (2017: 606). While they suggested that emotions act to "animate and fuel" engagement with

institutional work, and that workers will "strategically use emotions in others" (2017: 606), we show that workers can be reflexive about their own emotional experiences. To wit, they can juxtapose their acute, intense reactive experiences against their long-standing affective commitments to a particular form of institutional work to inform how they go about strategically managing their own and others' emotions.

Relatedly, we add to the institutional work literature on emotions through balancing its predominant focus on workers' attempts to manage potential supporters' emotions (e.g., Gill & Burrow, 2018; Massa et al., 2017; Moisander et al., 2016) with analysis that unpacks how workers go about managing their own emotions. In studying how workers respond to critical evaluations of potential supporters and emotive norms, we find that suppression of emotion plays an integral role in a package of mutually reinforcing emotive tactics of institutional work. This finding is consistent with research on emotion regulation showing how directives for employees' emotive demeanor are often integral components of organizations' strategies (Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983). However, contrary to emotion regulation research depicting the suppression of emotion as a mostly alienating coping tactic employees use to conform to oppressive organizational rules (see Bono & Vey, 2005; Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011), we show that the suppression of emotion can be an invaluable emotive tool in the political navigation of institutional arrangements. In doing so, we problematize institutionalists' assumption that emotion must be worn on the sleeve by institutional workers to have a significant role in affecting institutional dynamics (see Lok et al., 2017).

Additionally, our study extends organizational scholars' recent recognition of the importance of visuals (see LeBaron et al., 2018; Meyer et al., 2013) to the literature on institutional work and emotion. We show that when the interactive suppression of emotion is perceived to be strategically advantageous to institutional workers, they may find other ways of eliciting emotions to mobilize potential supporters. In particular, we find that when workers' emotions are likely to be stigmatized as irrational (Fineman, 2000; Hatcher, 2008), visuals can work to decouple the process of eliciting emotions from the human agents performing the work, mitigating potential supporters' ability to dismiss institutional work out of hand. This stems from the fundamentally different ways in which visuals enable and constrain meaning making for an audience (see Meyer, Jancsary, Höllerer, & Boxenbaum, 2018; Toraldo, Islam, & Mangia, 2018). In the context of AROs' disruptive work, we found that visuals are unique in their ability to signal "'objective' representation and 'facticity'" (Meyer et al., 2018: 399) regarding the conditions animals endure in FFOs to audiences. They do so by giving abusive FFO practices "tangibility and shape in the concrete materiality of people, objects, and events in a way that verbal text is unable to do" (Meyer et al., 2018: 399), giving audiences the impression that their emotions are in response to objective reality rather than a biased, subjective portrayal of reality.

In sum, our study contributes to the institutional work literature through bringing into sharp focus the need to begin conceptualizing not just what types of emotion are experienced as part of institutional work, but why and when emotions are displayed and, just as importantly, why and when they are not. In the context of institutional studies that have, to date, been primarily concerned with how emotions motivate and regulate institutional engagement and strategic expressions of emotion by institutional workers (e.g., Creed et al., 2014; Gill & Burrow, 2018; Moisander et al., 2016; Voronov, 2014; Voronov & Vince, 2012), such research is necessary to provide a fuller understanding of emotion's role in purposive efforts to create, maintain, or disrupt institutions.

Future Research

While our study was not focused on examining tactics and counter-tactics in the institutional "battle" (DiMaggio, 1983) between AROs and FFOs, their relationship is characterized by such reciprocal polemics. Advocates often mentioned the ways in which FFOs use rhetorical appeals of their own to obfuscate the negative externalities of FFO practices, stigmatize AROs' disruptive work, and bolster audiences' cognitive and emotional investment in FFO products. Our data collection focusing on AROs and their advocates gave us insight into both the emotional experiences motivating their disruptive work and the emotive tactics deployed by AROs. While this collection procedure necessarily resulted in data containing a single perspective on the moral worth of FFOs and their practices, the omission of other perspectives in our data creates two opportunities for future research.

First, future researchers might look to both sides of the institutional "battlefield" for data, specifically to gauge how certain emotive tactics are countered by supporters of institutions targeted for disruption by actors such as AROs. Such strategic responses could include questioning the authenticity of change agents' emotional neutrality, publicizing those change agents who do express "fanatical" emotions, or lobbying for

legislation that impedes disruptive work (e.g., "ag-gag" legislation). Examining such tit-for-tat polemics and political action could yield significant insight into when and under what circumstances emotional expressions are likely to be successful in the context of institutional work. Second, future researchers might concern themselves with audiences' reception of certain emotive tactics deployed toward institutional dynamics. Institutionalists have already alluded to the importance of audiences' judgments regarding the authenticity of emotional displays and their alignment with institutionalized standards for emotional expression (Jarvis, 2017; Voronov & Weber, 2016). Such conceptual work has suggested that potential supporters of an institutional project might have numerous responses to various emotive tactics of institutional work. While the success or failure of emotive tactics was not our primary focus, a study investigating the efficacy of emotive tactics would constitute a meaningful extension of our contributions.

Additionally, our study raises questions regarding the potential importance of gender in influencing the emotive dynamics of institutional work. Researchers have often suggested that standards for the display of emotion and emotional labor are importantly influenced by gender (Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Putnam & Mumby, 1993), and that the stigmatization of displayed emotion is based in some part on their specifically "feminine" nature (Hatcher, 2008: 154). While our interviewees were predominantly female, mirroring the demographic composition of the animal rights movement at large (see Kruse, 1999; Wrenn, 2016), we found no differences between men and women in their perception of the stigma associated with displaying their emotions to potential supporters. However, the primary purpose of our study was not to evaluate differences between subgroups of advocates in the reception of their emotional displays. Future researchers might draw on, for example, a purposive sample with equal representation of male and female animal advocates or a comparative case study of movements with different demographic compositions (e.g., the predominantly female animal rights movements versus the predominantly male gun rights movement) to understand whether there are differences in how audiences perceive the emotional displays of men and women performing the same institutional work.

Finally, our research on disruptive work aimed at inhumane food production practices in the U.S. can be conceptualized as contributing to the recent stream of research addressing institutional work aimed at societal "grand challenges" (see George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016; Hampel et al., 2017). Certainly, strong emotional reactions are an inherent byproduct of seemingly intractable societal issues such as the Middle Eastern refugee crisis, the HIV and AIDS crisis, or the degradation of political discourse in the West. Indeed, our analysis highlights how understanding emotion and emotive demeanor are integral to a fuller understanding of institutional work targeting such grand challenges. However, our study also raises questions about how emotion might be strategically deployed in the context of institutional work aimed at grand challenges that are very different from inhumane food production. While we have focused on institutional workers' emotions and others have focused on the emotions of those holding the resources necessary for successful work (e.g., Moisander et al., 2016), the emotions of third-party victims of grand challenges who, in some cases, lack the means to perform institutional work on their own behalf (e.g., refugees, those suffering from HIV or AIDS in Africa) have gone unaddressed. Future research might consider, for example, how victims' emotional experiences of their own marginalization are marshaled by third parties to advance or hinder work on their behalf.

CONCLUSION

Through empirically exploring AROs' disruptive work aimed at deinstitutionalizing putatively inhumane FFO practices, we illustrate the need to begin conceptualizing the strategic uses of emotion in institutional work in more nuanced ways. Our exploratory study focused on inductively generating theory regarding the role of suppression in disruptive work from an empirical setting with a unique set of characteristics. However, we believe the dynamics we observed would generalize to other highly institutionalized contexts with change efforts coming from the margins of the institutional arrangement. The hiding of negative externalities associated with institutionalized practices and beliefs is not idiosyncratic to FFOs (e.g., recent scandals in the financial services sector or the Catholic Church), and the same applies to the use of emotive tactics, such as suppression while gathering visual evidence during undercover investigations to bring visibility to these negative externalities (e.g., recent investigations into abortion clinics, political rallies). Indeed, these examples—as well as our own research—attest to the commonplace nature of some of the emotive tactics adopted by AROs. Acknowledging both of these emotive tactics and the nuances of the emotive dynamics inhering in institutional work will become increasingly important in producing more complete models of emotion's role in institutional enactment.

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Lee C. Jarvis (lee.jarvis@uq.edu.au) is a lecturer in strategy and entrepreneurship at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. He received his PhD in business administration from Florida Atlantic University's College of Business. His research interests include institutional microfoundations, emotions, individual identity construction, organizational stigma, and social movement organizations.

Elizabeth Goodrick (goodrick@fau.edu) is a professor in the health administration program at the Florida Atlantic University College of Business, United States. She received her PhD in organizational behavior and theory from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She studies health care professionals and organizations from a neo-institutional perspective.

Bryant Ashley Hudson (b.hudson@ieseg.fr) is a professor at the IÉSEG School of Management in Paris, France. He received his PhD in management from the Jindal School of Business at the University of Texas at Dallas. His research expertise includes organizational stigma, stigmatized emotions and institutional processes, and knowledge taboos.