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Escaping the Ellipsis of Diversity: Insider Activists' Use of Implementation Resources to Influence Organization Policy

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Abstract

Researchers have explored in depth how social movement actors strive to pass laws to change organizations exogenously or to demand that they make commitments or policy changes. But ensuring that organizations implement such commitments or policies is challenging. Insider activists may be influential for implementation processes, and I explore how they can increase that influence. I contend that insider activists influence such processes by offering their organizations implementation resources, such as free and ready-to-use content and model programs that reflect changes the activists want to see. To develop this argument, I explore how, starting in the mid-2000s, LGBT activists developed resources to ensure that diversity policies were increasingly relevant for sexual minorities in France. Many diversity policies at the time expressed commitment to "gender, disability, age . . ." Activists contended that nothing was done for the minorities who were not named—those left in the ellipsis (. . .) of diversity. Using web archives and interviews, I show that LGBT rights activists increased their influence on French organizations by developing implementation resources that corporations could readily use to flesh out their diversity commitments and implement diversity programs to promote the inclusion of LGBT employees. I demonstrate how insider activists used these implementation resources to denounce organizations' superficial commitments or employees' homophobic practices, thereby compelling organizations to change.

Keywords: diversity, organization theory, social movements, implementation

Scholars have extensively studied how social movement actors fight to pass laws intended to change organizations exogenously (e.g., Soule and King, 2006; Amenta et al., 2010; King and Pearce, 2010) or to change organizations from the top down by demanding pro-social commitments or private

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regulations (e.g., Baron, 2001; Bartley, 2007, 2010; Mena and Waeger, 2014). Yet implementing new policies, walking the talk of a previous commitment or private regulation, or complying with a law is at least as challenging as passing new laws or policies (Dobbin, 2009; Kellogg, 2011; Talesh, 2015; Edelman, 2016). Laws and policies can remain unenforced because they are toothless or do not provide a clear blueprint for action (Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Chuang, Church, and Ophir, 2010; Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam, 2010). The literatures on decoupling (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bromley and Powell, 2012), non-performative commitments (Ahmed, 2006, 2007, 2012), discretionary implementation (e.g., Munnell, Browne, and Mceneaney, 1996; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2018; Talesh and Pélisse, 2019), and symbolic compliance (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001; Silbey, 2013; Edelman, 2016) all speak to the challenges of ensuring that laws, policies, or commitments are followed by organizational actions. Understanding how social movement actors influence this implementation process in organizations is therefore instrumental to understanding their impact.

Different literatures within social movement theory and organization theory have investigated how actors promote change in organizations. Yet they have not shown how such actors get involved in the processes of implementing laws and policies, which is theorized as a major space in which organizations can depoliticize and erode their legal mandates (Dobbin, 2009; Ahmed, 2012; Berrey, 2015; Edelman, 2016). I contend that insider activists act on the implementation processes of laws, policies, or commitments by offering their organizations implementation resources: they develop content and prefigurative programs that their organizations can freely use.[1] To develop this argument, I focus on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) activists in France who developed diversity-related resources for their organizations starting in the mid-2000s. These activists increased their influence by developing implementation resources that their corporations could readily use to flesh out their diversity commitments and implement diversity programs to promote the inclusion of LGBT employees. Activists designed content for awareness campaigns, charters with blueprints for new human resources (HR) processes, guidelines for action, language elements, and hotline and monitoring systems, and they volunteered to organize events, mediations, training, and workshops. By taking on the task of developing full content for a proper implementation of anti-homophobia and anti-transphobia policies and offering it as a mostly free service to organizations that outwardly touted themselves as being committed to diversity, insider activists put themselves in an advantageous position to influence the scope and depth of organizations' diversity programs.

Using a processual approach to this movement's strategy and incremental success, I examine the different mechanisms through which these activists leveraged implementation resources to advance more substantive commitments to diversity. Insider activists designed their implementation resources as a way to redefine endogenously the scope of their company's

[1] "Prefigurative" here is a reference to the social movement literature on prefiguration as a strategy to produce the changes that activists want to see created in the world. Yates provided a definition of "prefiguration" as the "attempted construction of alternative or utopian social relations in the present, either in parallel with, or in the course of, adversarial social movement protest" (Yates, 2015: 1).

diversity commitment. If their organizations' leaders resisted these readily useable resources, they used that resistance to denounce the shallowness of the organizations' commitment to diversity. And if implementation of these resources led to homophobic reactions from other employees, activists could demonstrate the lingering homophobia in their organizations, which might otherwise be difficult to prove. Showing how insider activist networks used small wins as part of an incremental strategy to elicit progressive change in organizations, I discuss different mechanisms activists can use to scale up, recouple, expand, or delegate back to the company the prefigurative programs they want to be implemented.

CHANGING ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE INSIDE OUT

Existing Theories and Limitations

Organization theory has prompted many questions about how organizations operate as polities—''collectives where groups with diverse views pursue various goals within the constraints of formal and informal systems of authority'' (Weber and Waeger, 2017: 886). Curiosity about these groups' strategies and their impact on organizations has spurred significant research at the crossroads of social movement and organization theory (Zald and Berger, 1978; Zald, 2005; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; Weber and Waeger, 2017). To explore the strategies internal actors use to elicit organizational change, scholars have developed theory around the concepts of insider activists (e.g., Scully and Segal, 2002; Bell et al., 2003; Buchter, 2019; DeCelles, Sonenshein, and King, 2019), issue sellers (e.g., Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Bansal, 2003; Howard-Grenville, 2007), and institutional intrapreneurs in organizations (Heinze and Weber, 2015; Alt and Craig, 2016; Waeger and Weber, 2017).[2] While this literature has explored in depth some of the tactics these actors use (i.e., discursive tactics and strategies of mobilization), further research could conceptualize how insider activists leverage the material dimensions of organizations (e.g., their accountability systems or their legal requirements) to gain power despite their subjugated position, as well as how they use the strategic design of resources to conduct bottom-up change.

First, these bodies of literature primarily examine discursive strategies (claims, contestation) and discursive changes in organizations. They explore discursive strategies ranging from how legitimating accounts are used to favor policies against the discrimination of minorities in the workplace (Creed, Scully, and Austin, 2002; Creed and Scully, 2011) to how framing strategies (Snow et al., 1986; Raeburn, 2004: 20) or ''packaging moves'' (Dutton et al., 2001: 721) are used to sell specific issues to management (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 2001; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Alt and Craig, 2016). The social movement literature has looked at how insider activists challenge the diversity commitments of their hiring corporations (Scully and Segal, 2002:

[2] ''Insider activists'' refers to employees who try to challenge practices of the organizations for which they work to achieve their own social agenda; as ''employees of the target organization, [they] have certain advantages and disadvantages when compared with 'outsider' activists who are members of independent social movement organizations'' (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016: 671). Dutton and colleagues (2001: 716) described issue sellers as players ''who use a repertoire of moves to sell issues and affect top-level decision makers' attention.''

142), choosing to voice concerns (Hirschman, 1970) with the current issues of discrimination in organizations and to ''capitalize on apparent hypocrisies to urge change'' (Scully and Segal, 2002: 161), and how they urge organizations to ''walk the talk'' of their overbroad commitments around diversity (Meyerson and Scully, 1995: 595; Raeburn, 2000: 75, 2004: 49). Social movement scholars have studied how sexual minorities devise strategies to be included in companies' diversity programs (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Raeburn, 2000, 2004; Scully and Segal, 2002; Briscoe and Safford, 2008). Yet the literature on the adoption and diffusion of specific policies (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Chuang, Church, and Ophir, 2010; Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner, 2015) has often remained focused on the level of discursive claims and discursive changes, primarily concerned with how policies are passed and commitments are secured. I instead follow Ahmed's (2004, 2006, 2007, 2012) perspective that if policies are not followed by concrete changes in practices, organizational routines, close monitoring, or sanctions, they remain non-performative and therefore purely discursive in nature. As I discuss more in the next section, diversity is typically a domain in which corporations promptly claim to be committed. But if an organization claims to be already sold on an issue, how do activists leverage its discursive commitments to compel actual changes?

Second, this literature extensively investigates the different strategies for mobilizing actors within existing organizations. Scholars studying insider activists have examined the dynamics of internal mobilization in great depth, showing that recruitment could be easier within the defined walls of a company (Scully and Segal, 2002: 126) or, on the contrary, made more challenging by employees' dependence on the organization for resources (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). Kellogg (2009: 702; see also 2012) has also examined how mobilization could be facilitated by the development of ''relational spaces'' that allow for both isolation and the ''inclusion of workers from all the different work positions involved in the practice targeted for change.'' Scholars have emphasized how the different status of the people mobilized can affect success (Kellogg, 2012; Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014; Waeger and Weber, 2017: 353) and the impact of hierarchy on ''involvement moves'' to enroll other organizational actors to sell specific issues (Dutton et al., 2001: 724). While the mobilization of individuals is crucial to understanding how issue sellers manage to promote change in organizations, I hope to show—following Kellogg's (2011: 483) lead—that these mobilizations rely on the use of not only ''cultural toolkits'' aimed at mobilizing people but also ''political toolkits'' that are ''composed of material elements such as accountability systems, staffing systems, and evaluation systems.''

Thus one goal of this study is to expand our understanding of how employees can use the creation of material resources (Dutton et al., 2006; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Sonenshein, 2013) as a strategic tool for promoting organizational change. While the literature on insider activists mentions the resources they create, scholars have theorized such creation of resources as an outcome or achievement—Meyerson and Scully (1995: 595) used the term ''small win''—rather than as a strategic tool used to bring about change. For instance, Raeburn (2004: 33) mentioned the creation of an ''internal AIDS hotline'' as the origin of an LGBT network but did not highlight the strategic dimension of such a creation. Scholars have mentioned activists' production of resources and programs, such as ''designing events and speaker programs for

black history month,'' ''developing a more effective college recruiting program,'' ''creating an informal mentoring program,'' ''creating and distributing . . . T-shirts'' (Scully and Segal, 2002: 157), holding a ''train-the-trainer workshop,'' and ''set[ting] up information tables and pass[ing] out 'safe place' magnets as part of a new awareness program'' (Raeburn, 2004: 90, 192). Yet they have labeled the design of such resources and programs as ''accomplishments'' (Scully and Segal, 2002: 157), as part of an ''experiment with local change efforts'' (Scully and Segal, 2002: 143), or at most as a strategy ''to heighten the visibility of their allies'' (Raeburn, 2004: 20). The strategic dimension of such design of resources thus seems undertheorized. How are these resources leveraged when interacting with corporate managers or HR professionals? What do they bring to the networks implementing them? The perspective of issue-selling scholars further emphasizes the strategic use of producing resources and designing programs, such as by conceptualizing them as a form of ''resourcing'' (Howard-Grenville, 2007: 562) or as a way to ''sel[l] issues with solutions'' (Alt and Craig, 2016: 794). I instead emphasize how these resources can also be used to implement, deepen, monitor, or substantiate preexisting commitments.

I also wish to expand the ways in which these literatures analyze power dynamics in organizations. Recent scholars working on issue selling have acknowledged that this literature relies on a ''limited conceptualization . . . of power and resistance in organizational contexts. Without a sense of the resistance issue sellers face and their capacity to overcome this resistance, an understanding of their moves and the evolution of these over time is incomplete'' (Howard-Grenville, 2007: 562). The literature on insider activists, by contrast, emphasizes power relationships but is mostly focused on how insider activists have to manage career risks, because they deploy claims related to marginalized minorities in their hiring organizations (Taylor and Raeburn, 1995; Bernstein, 1997, 2005; Raeburn, 2004; Creed and Scully, 2011; DeCelles, Sonenshein, and King, 2019). Research on insider activists has questioned how people who are dependent on their target organization could gain leverage to compel change in that organization (e.g., Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Bell et al., 2003; Morill, Zald, and Rao, 2003). Scholars have argued that, because of this resource dependency, insiders cannot use disruptive, extra-institutional tactics (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016: 678), such as boycotts or public shaming, to pressure corporations to change (King, 2008; King and Pearce, 2010; Bartley and Child, 2014) and might be immobilized by anger (DeCelles, Sonenshein, and King, 2019). Thus insider activists may be engaged in ''tempered radicalism'' (Meyerson and Scully, 1995: 586) and ''limited to incremental changes'' because of the high liability of being too radical or disruptive in one's own workplace (Scully and Segal, 2002: 127). I look at another facet of power in these issue-selling moves: based on their inner knowledge of organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), insider activists have leverage to bring about change. Understanding this leverage could show how—despite a subjugated position and the reliance on mostly nondisruptive tactics—these actors help to enact change in organizations.

The literature on insider activists and issue sellers has focused primarily on how these actors seek to mobilize new constituencies in an organization and how they use different discursive strategies to make claims or contest existing policies. Working with the concept of implementation resources, I seek instead

to analyze a repertoire of actions through which they attempt to enact existing—but often vague and merely symbolic (Edelman, 2016; Buchter, 2019)—policies. I explore how insider activists go beyond discursive strategies and changes, such as making claims, securing a symbolic commitment, or helping to pass a policy. Building on the literature on power relationships in organizations, I focus next on how activists create implementation resources to have some leverage to bring about social change in organizations.

Creating Implementation Resources to Avoid Decoupling and Depoliticization

On paper, the issue of diversity is often already ''sold'' to many organizations (Dobbin, 2009). At the level of discourse and symbols, most large organizations non-performatively declare that they adhere to the value of diversity and anti-discrimination (Ahmed, 2006, 2012; Dobbin, 2009; Edelman, 2016). But declaring and doing are quite different. Research has examined ''prosocial claims'': an ''indirect, impression management tactic that . . . firms use to defend their public image'' (McDonnell and King, 2013: 388). A growing body of research has analyzed corporate social responsibility (CSR), diversity management, and similar social or environmental programs as symbolic devices meant to neutralize social and environmental movements' criticisms and to superficially respond to the ensuing new regulations (e.g., Baron and Diermeier, 2007; Soule, 2009; Locke, 2013; Edelman, 2016; Balsiger, 2018). The terms ''greenwashing'' (Laufer, 2003; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Mahoney et al., 2013; Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016), ''discrimination laundering'' (Green, 2016), and ''symbolic civil rights'' (Edelman, 2016) all speak to the ways in which organizations use impression management tactics to demonstrate their innocence and pay lip service to social causes. Organizations seek to preserve themselves from social movement criticisms and reputational threats (McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015), as well as from legal and judicial threats, through a process of managerialization of the law (Dobbin, 2009; Edelman, 2016). Through these means, organizations co-opt their environment and redefine what compliance with different social and environmental mandates means, often eliminating the initial political ideal behind the mandates (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001; Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam, 2010; Buchter, 2020). According to the legal endogeneity theory, these cooptation mechanisms—which often lead to depoliticization and decoupling—are so powerful that they can even redefine what laws mean, because the new meanings granted to regulations within corporations can influence the ways in which courts assess a company's compliance with the law (Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam, 2010; Edelman et al., 2011; Edelman, 2016).

If the mechanisms at play in the design of symbolic structures in organizations are powerful tools to resist changes and blunt the meaning of the law, then we need further research on how social movements mobilize inside organizations to interfere in the design of organizational policies. McDonnell and colleagues (2015: 659) laid the groundwork to theorize how activists could leverage these symbolic commitments—that they called social management devices—to ''enhanc[e] corporate social responsiveness by instituting and enabling independent monitors, which better equip social activists to hold a

firm accountable for problematic social behaviors.'' They theorized that a program ''which may be initially intended merely as symbolic gestures, changes the relationship between an organization and activist stakeholders, concomitantly shaping firms' commitments and character'' (McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015: 673). This theory unearths a power play that is not much analyzed in issue-selling and insider activist theories: organizations have a stake in sustaining their image as being committed to prosocial issues (McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015). Symbolic compliance and non-performative commitments can function only to the extent that they are not debunked publicly, and—when faced with challenges from social movements—firms adopt defensive strategies that can alter their ''internal political agenda such that the firm becomes more receptive to future activist claims'' (McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015: 655). Yet McDonnell and colleagues' analysis of such mechanisms focused on external stakeholders. The role of insider activists in holding firms accountable for their previous commitments and the specific strategies that they use to do so require further empirical investigation.

The bulk of the literature on issue sellers and insider activists preceded the consolidation of the literature on diversity and CSR described above. As a result, it did not engage with its concepts, notably the theories on legal endogeneity and the managerialization of the law (Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam, 2010) and the theory that activists could leverage corporations' symbolic commitments (McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015).[3] Recent scholarship has challenged the idea that ''organizational elites [are] the primary conduits for internalizing elements of the environment'' (Weber and Waeger, 2017: 899) and has proposed more complex analysis of implementation, pointing at ''jurisdictional voids''—tasks not claimed—that could impede the implementation of preexisting policies (Kellogg, 2014: 934). To our knowledge, though, these works do not look at insider activists' engagement with legal endogeneity or implementation resources as a strategic way to bring about change. Yet if the structures implemented in organizations enable them to resist politicization and ensure that they do not have to substantively implement tools to fight against discrimination (Ahmed, 2012; Edelman, 2016; Bereni, 2018), looking at insider activists' repertoires of action targeting implementation processes should enable us to better understand the dynamic interplay between symbolic programs and insider activism.

I argue that insider activists intervene in these legal endogeneity processes by giving organizations implementation resources: model or prefigurative programs that correspond to what activists want organizations to implement. To develop this argument, I rely on a theory from political science that argues that lobbies influence regulators through ''policy resources'' (Hertel-Fernandez, 2014: 586) or ''legislative subsidy'' (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: 74). These scholars acknowledged the complexities of the political process to argue that one way to influence legislation is to give legislators the resources to optimize

[3] For instance, the words ''law'' and ''legal'' do not appear in the seminal articles from Scully, Segal, and Meyerson, except to mention a legal theorist (Scully and Segal, 2002: 161) and an ''African American Law Student'' (Meyerson and Scully, 1995: 588). Raeburn does take the role of state legislation in mediating the impact of LGBT rights activists in the workplace more seriously but mostly relied on the theory of legal isomorphism (Raeburn, 2000: 154–155, citing Edelman and Suchman, 1999; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

their chance of passing a law, providing ''the material to formulate proposals, make arguments, offer amendments, insert report language, plot strategy, or otherwise help the legislator take self-interested actions to produce outcome-improving policies or promote the probability of their passage'' (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: 74). Similarly, I acknowledge the complexities of the implementation process, arguing that one way to influence how organizations implement their prosocial regulations or commitments is through giving them the resources to optimize their chance of implementing—in a more recoupled, performative, or substantive way (Santoro and McGuire, 1997: 507; Spicer, Alvesson, and Kärreman, 2009; Hallett, 2010; Edelman, 2016)—existing policies or laws. While the concept of policy resources seems to focus mostly on discursive resources to shape the letter of the law, the concept of implementation resources invites us to take a closer look at the material dimension of implementation to influence how the spirit of the law is upheld. What accountability system is set in place? Which event is supporting the policy, and how and when is it organized? Which resources are being mobilized? Which steps are taken to mainstream this policy within the organization? The concept of implementation resources is both a way to analyze insider activists' interference in processes of legal endogeneity—as previous scholarship mostly looked at the involvement of managers (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001), compliance professionals (Edelman, 2016), or HR professionals (Dobbin, 2009)—and a way to further examine insider activists' role in holding firms accountable for their symbolic commitments.

RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS

Diversity and the Fight Against Homophobia and Transphobia in French Workplaces

Diversity management emerged in the early 2000s in France, promoted by ''diversity entrepreneurs'' (Bereni, 2011: 13) who imported the North American model from transnational firms in large French corporations (Bereni, 2011; Doytcheva, 2015) and in the public sector (Calvès, 2005; Sénac, 2012, 2015; Bereni and Epstein, 2015).[4] This model—supported by a national diversity charter, a large professional association of diversity managers, and a state-sponsored diversity label (Bereni and Epstein, 2015; Bereni, 2018)—quickly gained momentum in large French organizations and offered an alternative to the more politically and legally threatening language of fighting against discrimination (Doytcheva, 2010; Sénac, 2012). Yet this new framework to address workplace inequalities soon showed limitations: scholars analyzed how ''à la carte'' diversity programs developed in French organizations, all of them related to the ''disability, sex, age, and ethno-racial categories'' (Doytcheva, 2009). These turned out to be the categories in which French organizations were forced to take action by the most prescriptive laws (Bereni, 2011: 17). While formal and direct discrimination were prohibited in the workplace around a large number of criteria—including sexual orientation and gender identity—additional measures to ensure substantive equality were imposed for only some minorities, notably women, people with disabilities, and seniors (Borrillo, 2002).

[4] The author completed all translations from French sources and scholarly articles.

As a result, the development of diversity policies rarely took into account sexual orientation or gender identity in the 2000s (Doytcheva, 2009). The plasticity and vagueness of the category ''diversity'' enabled organizations to deceptively claim that they were committed to diversity across the board while they took concrete steps only to be in compliance with the law, adopting what Doytcheva (2015: 94) called a ''corner strategy'' to developing diversity policies. More than half of employees belonging to a sexual minority reported having trouble coming out in their companies, and studies demonstrated that LGBT employees wished for more direct protections through the proactive work of labor unions and through visibly engaged CEOs and colleagues (Falcoz, 2004, 2008; Falcoz and Bécuwe, 2009).

Insider activists' role in the progressive development of LGBT-specific policies in French organizations is a compelling case study because the diffusion of sexual minority rights in French organizations is an ongoing process, having spread mostly to the largest companies and public organizations to date, and is still underway in the organizations I studied.[5] By 2018, 110 French companies had signed an LGBT rights charter for providing equal rights in corporations, same-sex couples had secured paid parental leave, and many companies had developed communication explicitly focused on supporting LGBT minorities in the workplace. Additionally, several LGBT groups relied on publishing material online and using press releases as part of their strategy to pressure organizations to change through reputation-mediated tactics—a common strategy of activists targeting private organizations (King, 2016). I was able to collect longitudinal web-based archives of these organizations' publications between 2001 and 2018, tracing their actions, claims, strategies, successes, and challenges over 17 years.

Case Study and Methods

This article is based on a longitudinal study of five LGBT internal networks (IN, so networks IN1 to IN5) since their creation in the mid-2000s. These LGBT internal networks took the form of nonprofits that developed at the initiative of activist employees inside their hiring organizations (two in large private companies, three in French nationwide public services) to promote the protection and inclusion of sexual minorities in these organizations. I conducted an inductive longitudinal analysis of their web archives, as all five posted important quantities of texts online. Most of the texts dealt with discrete events and were focused on conveying one specific message, such as announcing the network participation in a gay pride parade, the organization of an awareness day, a reaction to a homophobic act in the organization, or a celebration of the organization's involvement with LGBT rights. Other types of documents—such as historical sections on their websites, annual reports, and an anniversary blog post taking stock of their previous achievements—offered syntheses of what the LGBT advocacy groups did in the past. These latter documents provided more comprehensive narratives of an internal network's perceived impact and

[5] The role of LGBT networks in promoting the diffusion of LGBT-related policies (partner health benefits) and inclusive programs for LGBT employees was studied earlier in the U.S. (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Scully and Segal, 2002; Raeburn, 2004; Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Chuang, Church, and Ophir, 2010), as such programs emerged earlier there.

also offered their interpretation of ongoing trends inside their organization. I collected the archives from these organizations manually and systematically. I analyzed organizations that published over 70 text entries since their inception (see Table 1) to make sure that I had enough data points to see the processes of designing strategies, making claims, and facing challenges or successes unfold through the data and to have comparable longitudinal case studies. Overall, I collected more than 600 text entries across the five networks. Although I also collected data about outsider nationwide nonprofits and conducted in-depth interviews with some key actors in those fields, the bulk of my analysis is based on the longitudinal data collected on the websites of these LGBT internal networks; see the Online Appendix (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0001839220963633). Table 1 summarizes the profiles of each internal network and the data I collected.

This dataset uniquely responds to a call from researchers to further investigate the role of temporality and explore how issue sellers ''learn how to make their moves and sense that their action (or inaction) is right'' (Dutton et al., 2001: 730), as well as the recognition that very few scholars ''have followed the evolution of issue selling over time (e.g., Bansal, 2003)'' (Howard-Grenville, 2007: 561). I used NVivo to organize this large amount of unstructured data into specific cases (the different LGBT advocacy networks) and to develop a longitudinal approach that distinguished the different weeks, months, and years of actions and postings of this web content. I used a grounded theory approach to elaborate my coding structure, inductively developing codes from my data, and then used iterative comparison across my cases to refine the codes and develop them further (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2013). This enabled me to analyze these organizations' strategies, challenges, and successes in depth and to understand how they unfolded over time.

Measuring social movements' successes or outcomes can be challenging, and ''writing[s] about how to conceptualize the outcomes of social movements are rare'' (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly, 1999: 223). Adopting a processual and interpretivist approach to social movements' actions and successes, I went against a traditional approach that solely looks at success through a positivist lens or as a binary outcome, akin to ''all-or-nothing analyses,'' and instead

Table 1. Profiles of the Organizations Studied through Web Archives*

LGBT network	Date of creation	Text entries collected	Type of host organization
IN1	2007	97	Public sector, ministry of more than 14,000 employees
IN2	2004	103	Public sector, ministry of more than 140,000 employees
IN3	2001	79	Public sector, two services linked to the same ministry, over 240,000 employees
IN4	2009	197	Private sector, telecom industry, more than 7,000 employees in France
IN5	2008	136	Private sector, telecom industry, more than 90,000 employees in France

* The main mission of each internal network was to change the organization practices of one's hiring employer to be more inclusive of LGBT employees.

looked at the successes of a movement as more of a continuous ''range'' (Amenta and Young, 1999: 28, 26). Through an interpretivist perspective (Daly, 2007), I examined how activists made sense of organizations' diversity programs, how they attempted to expand them, and what were, according to them, the successes and failures of their initiative to make diversity programs relevant to LGBT rights. My proxies for social movements' successes, challenges, or failures were what these movements framed as being a success, a challenge, or a failure, following a suggestion from Amenta and Young (1999: 22) to ''take the challenger's word for this.'' Rather than establishing a definite program crafted by the internal networks, my coding sought to capture small claims for which activists attempted to receive a positive response throughout time, which enabled me to analyze how they expanded the scope of their claims and expectations as the companies became more responsive to their actions.

My analysis of movements' strategies was also processual and interpretivist. Subscribing to the argument that ''strategies are constructed in situ in relation to various practices that enable or constrain strategy-making'' and that ''conceptions of strategies and strategy-making are reproduced and transformed over time'' (Vaara and Lamberg, 2016: 649), I coded different aspects of these movements' strategies first *in vivo* (Charmaz, 2013: 55) before developing more theoretical categories to capture what these strategies meant. I also paid close attention to the historical unfolding and sequencing of micro-strategies that appeared, thus adopting a historical approach to process organization studies to examine how changes happened in the organizations I studied (Kipping and Lamberg, 2016: 303). The fact that these groups relied on the published posts as strategic resources to compel change needs to be taken into account to make a critical assessment of those sources and their authenticity (Vaara and Lamberg, 2016: 653). The sole act of publishing these texts throughout the year is part of the activists' strategies: the texts could be a way to publicly call out an organization and try to hold it accountable for problematic practices, to congratulate the organization in order to persuade it to keep working toward certain directions, to point to room for improvement, to convey claims, or to attempt to mobilize new people (King and Pearce, 2010: 256; Bartley and Child, 2014). Therefore, when a network applauded the fact that their CEO or diversity manager directly spoke about LGBT rights, I coded it as one of the ways in which I could capture success for this network but also as a strategic framing meant to encourage more of such forms of commitment. I further discuss my epistemological approach and my coding strategies in the Online Appendix.

FINDINGS

Implementation Resources as Prefigurative Programs

One major finding that emerged from inductively coding the archives of LGBT rights activists in their workplace was that they focused a great deal of time and energy on developing strategies for producing content and providing services to their hiring companies, and—chronologically speaking—producing content and services was often one of their first strategic steps. The wide range of tactics related to producing content and providing resources is

apparent in the section of my coding structure dedicated to activists' actions and strategies; refer to Table A2 in the Online Appendix to see the full coding structure related to activists' strategies.

This emphasis on designing resources, content, and services as a strategic tool could seem surprising, as activists are often associated with strategies such as voicing concerns (Hirschman, 1970), making claims or airing grievances (Andrews, 2001; King and Pearce, 2010; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), or using antagonistic tactics, such as monitoring and denouncing organizations' practices (King, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013; Bartley and Child, 2014; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015). Yet Briscoe and Gupta (2016: 678) contended that insider activists have ''reduced incentive to voice grievances'' and a ''high barrier to deployment of disruptive tactics.'' In my data, the potentially risky strategies of airing grievances and using antagonistic tactics were present, but they appeared to make up only a small portion of the activists' strategies that I coded and also usually came up—or gained teeth—later in the unfolding process of these activists' strategies, as I will show in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

Instead, activists' communication primarily revolved around showing how they developed and diffused content to educate about sexual minorities or about designing services meant to be implemented in their hiring company. For instance, IN4, which was created at the end of 2009, posted on their blog in April 2010 an interview with their founder that was published in an LGBT advocacy magazine, in which the founder stated:

> [IN4 is] planning to distribute flyers during the International Day Against Homophobia next month, on May 17th, in front of the main [building of the company]. In the longer term, the [company] co-president admits that she would like to have a [corporate] float at the LGBT pride parade. . . . Our main goal is to have human resources commit to LGBT rights. The day when we will see posters about this topic in our corridors, this will be an absolute success!

This post shows IN4's early emphasis on creating content (flyers) as a strategic tool. The founder explicitly sets two goals here: to have the company build on and expand this initiative by creating posters (which IN4 ended up creating) and by supporting their participation in the pride parade with a corporate float.

A blog from IN5 also shows an early focus on creating content. This network's second blog post is an educational post defining some basic terms related to LGBT people in the workplace, including the words related to each letter of the LGBT acronym, ''coming out,'' ''outing,'' and types of LGBT phobias. The last sentence of this blog post reads, ''The whole team of [IN5] is at your disposal to provide you with any complementary information through our contact page.'' Creating education content was a clear line of action for this internal network. Taking a retrospective view on their actions in the historic section of their website, IN5 listed the following actions for 2009 and 2010:

> [2009] ''May: [IN5] designs, with all the union organizations of the company, a common flyer for the national day against homophobia''; ''October: large survey through e-mails targeting union representatives and dealing with sexual orientation and their union organization.''

> [2010] ''April: contribute to the design of a Q&A leaflet for managers on the topic of sexual orientation in [name of the company]''; ''May: wide poster campaign against homophobia supported by [employee representatives]''; ''June: conference at [a competing company]''; ''October: participation of [IN5] at a conference within [their company, with expert on homophobia in the workplace]; ''December: IN5 organized, with the support of [their company], a conference on the theme 'HIV, AIDS, and chronic diseases in the workplace'.''

This narrative of IN5's actions in the two years following its creation emphasizes that members designed and produced content and services: flyers, surveys, Q&A leaflets, posters, and participation in specialized conferences first outside and then inside their company. It is interesting to note that their strategy first targeted labor unions, then managers, and then the higher spheres of the company by organizing company-wide conferences. Similarly, they first communicated about their involvement in conferences outside of their company and then managed to get involved in the organization of a conference inside their company. Through developing these resources and services, they progressively sought to collaborate with more central and powerful groups in their hiring organization.

Such practices, which I coded under the theoretical categories ''making visible (awareness and education)'' and ''providing services to their hiring companies,'' were prominent strategies that insider activists used. Activists framed their development of awareness content and educational material (posters, video clips, pictures, testimonies, stickers, organization-relevant leaflets), along with their provision of services for improving workplace diversity (mediation, training, awareness campaigns, communication tools), as strategic tools to gain leverage in their organizations. For instance, producing and diffusing testimonies shows an interesting intersection between a service of diversity communication, a strategy for raising awareness (Bereni, 2018: 15), and a social movement strategy (Polletta, 1998). Recounting personal narratives was powerful to win allies, convince elites, and build a movement culture for insider activists and minorities in the workplace, and it also resonated with corporate repertoires of diversity practices (Taylor and Raeburn, 1995; Raeburn, 2000: 247). IN5, which published coming-out testimonies from its members since its inception (starting with its very first blog post), ended up recruiting LGBT employees to take part in the company's institutional movies against the discrimination of LGBT people.

Activists also expanded the reach of the programs they designed by following up with their implementation in the company. For instance, activists engaged in an ongoing effort to make their poster campaign impactful at different levels in the organization. I wrote the following memo as I coded the strategies IN5 used to make the poster campaign impactful from 2008 to 2014:

> In IN5, the first posters were made unilaterally by the LGBT activists. A first success of these activists was to have all unions support their poster project in 2009, and then have these posters sponsored and diffused by a council of worker representatives in 2011. Later on, these posters were realized by the communication service of the company and voted on by different actors, including the LGBT internal network, but also the diversity manager and the union representatives, organized as a collective task force. Having more stakeholders involved in the design and the endorsement of the poster was a significant part of their strategy—and was framed

> as a successful step for including sexual minorities in diversity programs. Beyond this, the LGBT nonprofit produced much more content around the poster. They developed explanatory notes fleshing out the meaning of each symbol in all posters, diffused those in blog posts, and offered translations in English and Spanish. They negotiated the number of prints of these posters, ensured that flyers were also present on the company's intranet, developed a Q&A document with arguments for responding to people who would resist the poster in smaller units of the company, surveyed the different negative and positive reactions to those posters (being torn down, or being applauded as an important gesture), and worked toward including the logos of the different unions of the company on the poster, and later the logo of the company itself. In 2014 . . . seeing the success of these posters, the diversity department of the organization where IN5 was implanted designed documentaries highlighting the experiences of LGBT employees in their workplace, in collaboration with IN5, who recruited the LGBT employees taking part in the films.

We can see that activists created the posters as a model or prefigurative communication of what they hoped to see developed in their hiring organization. IN5 first relied on the collaboration of labor unions to develop and legitimize their advocacy action with posters and later developed collaboration with the organization's diversity department. Beyond offering tools (posters, events, training), activists also deployed a whole repertoire of actions to ensure that these tools took root in the organization.

Not only did such actions make up the majority of these activists' communication on their activity, but they also served as leverage to secure successes (have their claims met) or to justify their antagonist- or request-based actions (such as claiming, monitoring, or denouncing). Looking at the temporal unfolding of activists' actions is useful here. In Table 2, I synthetize IN3's actions from its inception in 2001 until its first major successes in 2007 when it started offering content and proposing services to fight against homophobia and develop prevention against sexually transmitted diseases (STDs); after gaining leverage from these actions, it then denounced its organization's lack of commitment.

Table 2 features 25 discrete events occurring over six years, which I reconstituted based on a qualitative analysis of the IN3 archives. Of the 25 events, 15 are related to the production of content and the fight for its diffusion (notably posters to communicate and raise awareness against homophobia; T1, T2, T3, T6, T16, T22, and T25) and to the creation of services: designing different training formats to educate civil servants against homophobia and chairing a departmental commission to help create awareness and prevention events (T5, T7, T13, T14, T17, T18, T23, and T24).[6] Several events are related to raising visibility for LGBT employees in this organization, such as through participating in the pride parade, securing official endorsement from their organization when doing so, and responding to homophobic backlash to such participation (T3, T4, T11, T15, and T20). In total, 19 of the 25 events are related to strategies articulated around the question of production and diffusion of content, services, or efforts to make sexual minorities and LGBT-phobia more visible. These far outnumber events related to making claims on other aspects of LGBT rights (T3 and T12) or other mechanisms of pressure, such as

[6] I labeled events "T" because they correspond to events that are temporally discrete in time. Based on the archives, the events occurred in the order shown in Table 2.

Table 2. IN3 from 2001 to 2007: From Creation to Recognition

Date	Empirical description by time unit	Analytical categories
2001	T0: Creation of the organization.	
2002	T1: First poster campaign suggested to raise awareness against homophobia.	Strategy: design content (posters)
	T2: A delegation meets with the person in charge of discrimination at the ministry level to present their project of a poster-based campaign, which does not receive a positive response.	Strategy: promote content (poster) Failure: ignored
	T3: IN3 claims that there should be a circular restating the fight against homophobia and that there should be LGBT points of contact in different local units, a place for the nonprofit to meet inside the walls of the organization, and the authorization to march at the pride parade with a car from their organization to make visible LGBT in their public service.	Strategy: make claims + visibility
2003	T4: Negative responses from the organization: no car related to the organization for the pride parade.	Failure: rejection
	T5: New annual priority for IN3: develop actions (content and services) against homophobia and for its penalization.	Strategy: provide services (project)
	T6: Design posters for an awareness campaign—employees with a picture of their same-sex partner in their locker, next to the same scene with heterosexual partner—and try to have it be supported by their organization (which will refuse fully until 2006).	Strategy: produce content Failure: rejection
	T7: Adapt a two-hour awareness training on homophobia designed by a national LGBT advocacy nonprofit to attempt to implement it in their hiring organization. (The organization will resist implementing this training until 2006.)	Strategy: design training Failure: rejection
	T8: IN3 contributes to structuring a federation of internal LGBT networks to share resources and increase their impact to develop common resources (posters, communication strategies).	Strategy: alliance
	T9: IN3 changes its statutes to extend to other related public services and recruit more members.	Strategy: expansion
2004	T10: IN3 contributes to the creation of a European network of LGBT internal associations specifically for their type of public services.	Strategy: alliance
	T11: Following the network's participation in the pride parade, one member of the LGBT network finds his locker covered with homophobic slurs. The LGBT network is proactively involved to make sure that the case is not closed. As there is not yet penalization of homophobic slurs per se, the policeman responsible for the slurs is convicted for ''insult to a public servant.''	Strategy: making visible, court Failure: backlash (homophobic slurs)
	T12: IN3 writes an open letter to the minister to claim that homophobic slurs should be penalized by law.	Strategy: open letter (denounce + claim)
	T13: IN3 applies to and gets nominated to a seat in a departmental (county-level) institutional commission and is tasked with two commissions (health prevention and medicine, and housing commission), which they see as ''a major step in their integration'' in their public service.	Strategy: provide services (sit on commission)
2005	T14: Through their mandate in an institutional departmental commission, IN3 gets the authorization to organize a day of training and prevention on AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases for all the public servants of their ministry in the county (''during their working time''). After this first action, they offer to develop prevention days on tobacco addiction and baby blues.	Strategy: provide services (AIDS awareness day and other prevention days)
	T15: The network participates in pride events in other regions with insignia from their organization.	Strategy: making visible
	T16: The dominant union in their public service writes a two-page article about the LGBT network, denouncing the challenges they face in the ministry, and diffuses their poster on their union bulletin board in many local units of the organization.	Success: diffuse content (posters) through union

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

Date	Empirical description by time unit	Analytical categories
2006	T17: IN3 is excluded from the departmental commission through which they designed health prevention awareness days.	Backlash: excluded from commission
	T18: The network contributes, with other nonprofits, to the creation of a crisis cell against homophobic aggression and distributes flyers to help victims of homophobic aggression navigate public services safely.	Strategy: provide services (design crisis cell)
	T19: IN3 writes an open letter denouncing how a director at the county level compared, in a meeting with the network, homosexuality with zoophilia. This director is moved to another city and promoted.	Strategy: denounce
	T20: After IN3's participation in the pride parade, a representative from the National Assembly condemns the participation in the pride parade of individuals wearing their public servant attire. This time, the network is defended by their hierarchy in a public speech.	Strategy: making visible Failure: backlash Success: garner support
	T21: IN3 votes and approves to be able to bring civil action in cases of homophobia or transphobia in their public services.	Strategy: pressure (possibility of civil action)
	T22: IN3 is allowed to have a bulletin board in local units of their public service.	Success: space for content diffusion
	T23: The training designed by IN3 in 2003 is accepted and officially included in the curriculum of formation of the civil servants from this specific organization. Yet this training is waived the first year, eliciting vocal complaints from IN3. After media coverage, the training becomes an opt-in module that local schools could include or not in their curriculum. IN3 members facilitate training whenever a school wants to implement it.	Success: service accepted Failure: partially only lip service Strategy: denounce
	T24: The network refashions their training for an adjacent public service, which agrees to systematically include it in all curriculum the same year. (IN3 uses this best practice as leverage to make claims about their public service.)	Success: their training is diffused in all formations of a public service
2007	T25: Several successes for the LGBT network: Bulletin board for IN3 in all local sites of the public service. Their organization diffuses a circular emphasizing the illegal nature of homophobic acts. The organization develops a complaint procedure against homophobic practices available through their intranet. The organization grants same-sex couples equivalent benefits to heterosexual couples (moving fees, reduction of transportation).	Success: content diffusion Endogenous action from their service: circular, internal complaint, rights

denunciation or filing a lawsuit (T11, T12, T19, and T21), which came later in activists' strategies.

This sequence of events shows not only the predominance of activities related to producing and diffusing content and services but also how developing such content and services, and striving to diffuse them, gives LGBT activists many types of leverage in their workplace. As IN3 produced and diffused more implementation resources, it first experienced increased backlash, such as the exclusion of its members from a health prevention commission, homophobic slurs, and pushback against its members wearing their public servant attire while taking part in the pride parade. Later, it saw an increasing number of positive responses from the organization, such as the acceptance of training, a seat on the awareness commission, and the diffusion of a circular restating LGBT rights. Gaining recognition and active acceptance from their organizations was a slow process for all the networks I studied. In each case,

the training and awareness events they coordinated became levers to gain more legitimacy and recognition. LGBT networks first developed ready-made content and actions that organizations tolerated (e.g., leafleting in front of the organization) so as not to appear to be explicitly rejecting them or else passively endorsed (e.g., accepting the setup of an awareness booth near the organization's canteen) as a stepping-stone to developing more involved collaborations. The creation of resources that could benefit the organization enabled more collaboration between the internal network and the organization, as the following interview excerpt with the president of IN3 in July 2015 shows:

> [*What is your relationship to your hierarchy?*] This has been very challenging for years. We had a very hard time making them understand our message because 15 years ago people were telling us that this was proselytism. The word that kept coming back was ''communitarianism,'' and we kept explaining that we were not here to ask for favored treatments for gays but for equality of rights. But it was very long to have them understand that. . . . Now our relationships are more peaceful. There is more trust. We just passed a convention with [name of the ministry] that gives us paid days off to do awareness events within schools [to train public servants related to this ministry] and within our services. This was a powerful act because before that we were taking days off from our vacation. Now if I am organizing an awareness event or a training, this is a day paid by the ministry, so officially I am working. . . .

This person notes that the value of the training offered by IN3 eventually led to increased trust and collaboration with their hiring organization. This collaboration later included the co-writing of a circular restating LGBT rights and describing measures to take in case of discrimination. Importantly, Table 2 shows that these better relationships led to a progressive implementation of IN3's programs in the organization. From this longitudinal analysis of IN3, I contend that the use of strategies related to producing content and services, as well as making LGBT employees visible more generally, first helped make salient the organization's resistance to LGBT visibility and the homophobic backlash to communication of such visibility (T13, T14), which then created opportunities for the network to request more proactive protection of LGBT employees.[7] The internal network also gained recognition by developing awareness programs not directly related to homophobia or transphobia but related to AIDS and other STDs and then offering to organize other prevention and awareness events on postpartum depression and tobacco addiction (T13–14), which positioned them as a viable group for organizing awareness and prevention events more generally.

While other scholars have noted such practices among LGBT insider activists, the strategic use of designing resources and content by insider activists in the context of organizations seems to be undertheorized. Briscoe and Gupta (2016: 693) discussed how ''insider activists face an interesting tension between utilizing resources made available through the target organization . . . and the risk of becoming co-opted by the organization'' but did not

[7] Examples are T2 (request for visibility ignored), T4 (the organization's refusal to associate their symbols and car with a pride parade with LGBT employees), T6 (refusal to diffuse the poster created by the LGBT organization), and T7 (refusal to implement anti-homophobia training). This argument is developed for other cases in the next section.

examine how insider activists also produced their own organizational resources and services in relation to LGBT inclusion. And in one of the most comprehensive surveys of insider activists' tactics, Sully and Segal's (2002: 155) data showed that activists relied heavily on designing programs, events, and producing content, but the researchers conceptualized these programs as ''activist accomplishments,'' not as part of their strategic repertoire of action. I next examine how such programs made visible organizations' resistance to substantive efforts to address homophobia and set the stage for homophobic backlash from employees.

Implementation Resources as Litmus Tests for Lip Service and Opportunities for Blunders

I next analyzed how activists combined providing free resources to organize awareness events with reputation-mediated strategies (King, 2016). Volunteering to design and organize LGBT-related awareness events, poster campaigns, or trainings against homophobia and transphobia allowed activists to show that organizations resisted a proactive approach to the inclusion of LGBT employees. The internal networks used these implementation resources to make salient that organizations actually did not want to endorse such events openly, demonstrating their passivity. In more extreme cases, the organization of awareness events elicited homophobic or transphobic backlash, which highlighted that such sentiments still existed in their organization even if they were not always visible. This explains why—as shown in Table 2 but also in the upcoming Tables 3 and 4—strategies of providing services and designing prefigurative programs chronologically came before more disruptive strategies.

One goal of the activists I studied was to make sure that companies stopped ''glossing over'' discrimination against LGBT minorities. As some LGBT internal networks put it, they wanted to take sexual minorities ''out of the ellipsis of diversity,'' meaning to address topics of homophobia and transphobia directly through specific official discourses and concrete actions.[8] Activists particularly denounced the rhetoric that LGBT inclusion was already achieved and that the organizations had no problems with homophobia or transphobia. They leveraged their organizations' general diversity commitment to attempt to compel them to take sexual minorities into account, as we can see in the following interview excerpt from July 2015 with the founder and then president of IN4:

> In 2009, [my company] was a candidate to get a ''diversity label,'' a stupid thing started by Sarkozy, and so I thought, ''Well, that must mean that the company is no longer shut down to hear about diversity, and within diversity, there are all the criteria of discrimination, hence sexual orientation.'' So, I met with a gay man who was also really eager to mobilize, and we went on to create the nonprofit and file the statutes. We didn't say anything to the company at first, but the tagline of the nonprofit was

[8] This expression refers to the idea that organizations communicate about their commitment to diversity by saying, ''We are committed to diversity: gender, disability, age . . .'' The activists contend that nothing is done for the minorities left in the ellipsis (. . .) of diversity. This metaphor was first used in 2009 by IN4 in my data and then spread to IN5. This metaphor appears several times in the collected archives from 2009 through 2015. It aligns with scholars' analyses of how diversity programs might water down the protection aimed at ensuring equality for specific minorities (Laufer, 2009: 48; Junter and Sénac-Slawinski, 2010: 177; Edelman, 2016).

> ''the LGBT association of [name of the company],'' so the company was really named into our tagline. Then, we went to see the human resources director of the company and we told her, first so that she knew, and then because we wanted a communication outlet on the intranet for the group. So, they were applying for the label— which would be a nice showcase for the company—but at the same time, they couldn't imagine dealing with our questions. Of course they would tackle disabilities, because they were mandated to do so by the law. Of course they would ''address'' gender inequalities (while not doing much really), and from time to time, they would talk about seniors. But sexual orientation, religious facts, ethnic origins, of course not! Too controversial! But we came at the right time.

Here, the internal network leveraged its organization's increased sensitivity to scrutiny because it was applying for a diversity label. IN4 activists aimed to compel the company to acknowledge sexual minorities among its employees. Research has shown that using press releases to express discontent with the internal implementation of diversity policies, including a company not taking some minorities into account, constitutes a reputation-mediated strategy to influence corporate practices (Carpenter, 2010; McDonnell and King, 2013). In this case, IN4 relied on a reputational threat that could harm both the company's public relations and its ability to obtain the diversity label.

In addition to denouncing corporate diversity programs' lack of acknowledgement of sexual minorities, activists also denounced diversity commitments they saw as superficial. (To see the range of challenges discussed by activists that I coded in the data, refer to Table A3 in the Online Appendix.) To demonstrate how diversity could appear as mere lip service, one strategy was to leverage activists' internal knowledge of their organization to publicly reveal the exact scope of the diversity program it designed. This press release published in reaction to an organization having obtained a diversity label offers an example:

> Acquisition of the diversity label. On a daily basis, it translated into:
>
> —On [our intranet], a link to the ''Diversity'' webpage of [the ministry] and an article published on the 3rd of December celebrating the international day for people with disabilities.
>
> —Putting ''Diversity'' stickers on the doors of the different sites from the ministry.
>
> —Starting training about ''fight against discrimination'' for the employees and managers of the ministry.
>
> Efforts remain to be done in order to manage to create the conditions for real equality between all the public servants: the working conditions and the career advancement remain easier for a white Christian able-bodied heterosexual without any long-term chronic illness. (Press release, IN2, December 2010)

This press release reflected a chilly response to the ministry's actions for diversity, tempering the potential reputation gain that the ministry might have expected from obtaining the label. This short and sober review of the ministry's actual actions was used to demonstrate that such commitments remained fairly superficial. Similarly, other internal networks denounced the fact that their organizations were giving themselves credit for actions they had not yet implemented and for programs activists designed that had been rejected prior

to implementation. The following press release excerpt reacts to a barometer tool that positively assessed a ministry for the promises of actions that it had not taken—actions that the network had offered to implement for several years without receiving any positive response (cf. Table 2, which shows the actions of IN3 between 2001 and 2007):

> [IN3] got acquainted with the barometer initiated by [governmental committee] aimed at assessing the level of involvement of the government in the fight against homophobia and transphobia in different ministries. In this barometer, we were surprised to see our ministry [name] in the third position with an implication deemed intermediate. According to this committee, this assessment would be justified by the new promises of the ministry to engage in several measures such as the implementation of a national survey on homophobic violence in France, a training plan against homophobia and transphobia for all [public servants from this ministry], the appointment of anti-homophobia referees in all the [local units] in France, and last, the development of a hotline against homophobic and transphobic violence on the internet. IN3 notes that the criteria chosen to assess each administration were the projects announced by these ministries during the International Day Against Homophobia. . . . IN3 does not question the impact that the implementation of all these measures would have, but regrets the eagerness of the committee to grant credit in face of these promises, while, in the meantime, IN3 has the hardest time having their claim for the implementation of such programs heard. (Press release, IN3, May 2011)

In this case, IN3 had been lobbying since 2003 for the implementation of the anti-homophobia training they designed, had reported cases of discrimination in their ministry since 2004, had developed a crisis cell for homophobia in 2006 (see Table 2, T17, T11, and T18), and had used their past communication as a tool to demonstrate their organization's empty words. The internal network could clearly demonstrate the organization's lip service by showing it had not collaborated with them to develop these programs. Designing implementation resources that organizations could simply accept or endorse to show their commitment to the inclusion of sexual minorities was a way—in this context—to prove organizations' resistance to addressing questions of discrimination directly and to expose their lip service.

In some cases, the LGBT network even started organizing awareness events before receiving approval from their organization. All the networks I studied implemented at least two awareness days yearly: one for the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT) on May 17, and one related to AIDS awareness on December 1. The home organizations had virtually no cost for putting these programs in place because the programs were already prepared; the organizations could just acknowledge or publicly endorse them. This was therefore a way to show if an organization was not supporting the fight against homophobia and transphobia and actually resisted addressing it directly, as the following excerpts from press releases from two LGBT networks show:

> [IN4], the LGBT association of the [name of the company], is surprised not to appear in any of the communication currently aired by [name of the company] on the theme: ''Diversity, we all benefit from it!'' Indeed, the [name of the company] aims at gaining the Diversity Label. Since its creation, in 2009, [IN4] met several times with the HR director. Yet, at no point has the topic of LGBT been officially addressed by [name of the company]. The LGBT employees feel secluded, abandoned in the ellipsis of

> diversity as it is understood by [name of the company]. [Our network] developed several awareness actions against LGBT discrimination in the workplace. . . . (Press release, IN4, June 2010)

> For [IN3], raising awareness and developing training for civil servants on the laws related to homophobia is crucial. Hence, after meeting [the president of a national LGBT advocacy group], initial designer of an awareness workshop on homosexuality and homophobia, [IN3] re-appropriated this project, taking charge of updating it to rework it and adjust it to the needs of [civil servants from their ministry]. [IN3] presented this project to several directors from the ministry, but had a hard time sparking any implementation. (Press release, IN3, 2008)

Both organizations leveraged the fact that they worked on different projects (awareness actions, training customized for public servants from a specific ministry) that could easily be implemented by their hiring organizations to highlight how little support they received from these organizations and point to the lack of organizational engagement to address homophobia.

In more extreme cases, the organization of awareness events was followed by homophobic backlash in firms. In this excerpt from a 2012 press release, IN4 described homophobic responses to the distribution of LGBT-friendly stickers, highlighting the fact that homophobia was still present:

> The association notably distributed 5,000 stickers with a rainbow flag and the text ''I am gay-friendly'' so that everyone could show their solidarity against homophobia in their office. Unfortunately, as homophobia is still inventive, some have torn these stickers to keep only the section ''I am gay'' and stick it under the pictures of collaborators on internal institutional posters. This is the proof—if proof was still necessary—that some still see themselves as authorized to adopt such attitudes without any sanction in their workplace. This homophobia is insidious and cowardly, anonymous, and sure to be hurtful.

By making the backlash against anti-discrimination campaigns visible, the internal networks had leverage to show both homophobic attitudes in the workplace and also their hiring organizations' lack of support when companies did not respond to these acts. In other cases, however, companies did react. IN2 published the following statement in a May 2013 press release after describing an anti-homophobia action that IN2 co-organized with the ministry in which it was implanted:

> In a very tense social context, we are outraged by the homophobic acts that happened today at the [name of the ministry]:
>
> —Disassembling of the exhibition of posters in the [name of the hall] and sticking of a note with homophobic messages on the bulletin board of [IN2]
>
> —Rejection or irritated behaviors during the distribution of quiz [on AIDS awareness]
>
> —Inappropriate comments on a direction forum
>
> We thank the General Secretary and the directors of the [name of the ministry] for the organization this day, and we count on their reactivity in the face of such unacceptable behaviors.

This denunciation of homophobic backlash happened in a context in which the collaboration between the internal LGBT network and the ministry directors was already established; the homophobic actions strengthened the preexisting collaboration between the directors and the internal network. It helped to accelerate their collaboration and fostered the signature of a ten-point commitment against homophobia stating that sanctions would be taken against homophobic acts in this ministry. (In Table 4, I show that IN2 discussed this as a success in a press release from 2015.)

I found multiple examples of such homophobic and transphobic backlash to events organized by LGBT internal networks. A local director at IN3's organization compared homosexuality with zoophilia to push back against the organization of an onsite awareness event. Higher-up public figures denounced the use of their organizations' logo or insignia to indicate their participation in a pride parade (IN1, IN3). Posters promoting the inclusion of LGBT employees were torn down in some sites (IN2, IN3, IN5). Opponents wrote homophobic slurs on internal network members' lockers or desks (IN3, IN4). When I interviewed diversity managers, they reacted positively to these internal alerts of homophobic and transphobic events. The diversity manager of the company in which IN5 is implanted told me in August 2015:

> We [the diversity manager and IN5] work together for the 17th of May every year, for IDAHOT. We organize a campaign, and they organize the posters campaign. We managed to get them a subvention [grant]. . . . Hence, we have a very healthy and cordial relationship; we support each other. They scratch us from time to time when there is a case on the ground of homophobic people, such or such, they ask for sanctions which are very legitimate, so we answer their request. [*I feel like the LGBT network has a pretty strong relationship with your company.*] Yes, but this is also related to individuals. The successive presidents of IN5 are people who are constructive, who are not systematically criticizing us.

This excerpt illustrates a collaborative approach that developed between corporate representatives and insider activists acting as whistleblowers in cases of discrimination.[9] This diversity manager explained that the collaborations he developed with the insider network on other occasions such as IDAHOT, when they "support each other," laid the groundwork to enable collaborations when homophobic cases emerged in the company.

Designing and volunteering to organize events on behalf of organizations' diversity programs was a way for activists to demonstrate the shortcomings of organizations' approaches to LGBT inclusion. The homophobic backlash against awareness events and the potential blunders of organizations that failed to respond to these discriminatory practices or "buried the case," such as by offering a transfer to a director displaying homophobic behaviors, could be publicized to show that organizations' claims of not having problems with homophobia reflected lip service. While Jasper and Poulsen (1993: 642) explored how "blunders" were tactical errors made by organizations "responding to the

[9] It might seem unsurprising that a diversity manager supports such initiatives, given their function in the organization, but the practice of denouncing homophobia runs counter to their role of upholding a positive image of the firm (Dobbin, 2009; Edelman, 2016; Bereni, 2018). Other interviews showed that the relationships between diversity managers and insider activists are not always as positive as described here and could be strained (notably in earlier years for IN3 and IN4).

attacks by protestors,'' the blunders here happened in response to the creation of implementation resources by activists. Insider activists gained leverage when—after providing a service to the organization meant to promote the visibility or inclusion of sexual minorities—they faced backlash that revealed covert homophobia in the workplace. In this way, implementation resources can be thought of as ''evidence-based tactics,'' which Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner (2015: 304) defined as ''the provision of information and/or material evidence to enhance the credibility of activists and the practices they seek to bring about.'' Activists also favor the ''articulation of new frames for naming injustices, and an expanded repertoire of tactics for securing change'' (DeJordy et al., 2020: 31). Here, facing backlash demonstrates that programs against homophobia and transphobia are necessary in organizations. Bad publicity generated by such ''buried cases'' sometimes led to an increasing degree of collaboration between insider activists and the diversity managers in their companies.

Implementation Resources as Means to Elicit Progressive Change in Organizations

The five internal networks studied here all progressively gained a steadier endorsement and acceptance within their host organizations. Throughout this process, they sought to incrementally develop their reach in the organizations. In this section, I highlight three mechanisms by which these networks reinforced their ability to influence diversity programs: developing claims and services for new causes, expanding the reach of the programs they developed (either through scaling up or recoupling), and promoting more endogenous actions from their target organizations.

Developing claims and services for new causes. Internal networks progressively expanded the scope of their actions, service provisions, and claims to new causes, as Figure 1 shows. This figure synthesizes the evolutions of the causes about which LGBT internal networks communicated in their archives between 2006 and 2018 (see the Online Appendix, which elaborates on this figure). The first peak—culminating in 2010—synthesizes all the claims related to having LGBT issues be explicitly included in the diversity programs of their hiring organizations. The second, which culminates in 2011, is related to developing awareness about AIDS and STDs in the workplace. The third peak relates to claim about rights for same-sex couples (such as same-sex parental leave and benefits for same-sex couples) and coincided with the larger societal debates around same-sex marriage in France, which became legal on May 17, 2013. The last wave is related to the rights of trans people in the workplace and also coincided with important social mobilization for trans rights. In the workplace, this mobilization manifested as support and mediation around people transitioning in their workplace, the collection of trans employees' testimonies to raise awareness, and support and diffusion of a charter specifically related to trans people in the workplace.

Beyond making claims, insider activists thus embedded each new claim in implementation resources and prefigurative programs. In IN5, the desire to make trans inclusion a new direction for their network coincided with nominating a trans person to their board and developing several actions for visibility: proactively participating in a trans march, collecting testimonies of trans

Figure 1. Evolution of Causes in All LGBT Internal Networks



employees in the company, reflecting on a charter for trans people's rights and signing a charter for trans people in sports, organizing a roundtable about transitioning in companies, and developing mediation resources in cases of transphobia. Many of the internal networks I studied proposed mediation in cases of discrimination and acted on the company's behalf to handle cases of discrimination or tension in a work team, as described in the following excerpt from an interview with the president of IN3 in July 2015:

> We had a case in a [public service unit outside of Paris], where we had a request from the department head to intervene with all the colleagues and explain why their male colleague wanted to become a woman, and why she was engaged in this process of sexual transition. Her colleagues could not understand, they did not understand a lot of things, the rationale behind changing sex, but it went even further: they didn't understand the support from the department head to support her through the transition, and grant her to come with her feminine attributes such as earrings and lipstick. They felt like he was granting her everything she wanted, and the head of the department could not understand the misunderstanding from her colleagues. There was a—not a jealousy—but a deep miscommunication. So, we had an intervention for three hours. We came out exhausted but very happy.

The development of claims for trans people, such as the ability to change a name and gender identity more easily in a company's databases, occurred in parallel with services provided to the organization such as mediation. In some cases, these groups' expertise was even explicitly valued by their companies' diversity managers, as this interview excerpt shows:

> We work with nonprofits advocating for transgender people, and fortunately they are here, because we don't know how to handle these questions internally. Those are

> very specific questions, so these associations are helping us . . . along with IN5, because we had quite a lot of cases to handle. And the new cases, those are not just persons who are doing the full transition, but people who want to come dressed as women, transvestites. This begs a lot of questions because we have a hard time making people understand that they don't go through the whole process [of transition]. Because someone who wants to go all the way to surgery, we understand him very well, he feels bad in his body. But someone who does not want to go through the whole process—who just wants to dress as a woman—begs a lot of questions. So, we need to assist the employees, and on top of that, they often have exuberant personalities, they overdo it, and it makes everyone uneasy, so we need support. (Interview, diversity manager in the company where IN5 is implanted, August 2015)

This diversity manager clearly acknowledged the importance of the expertise of LGBT groups, both trans advocacy groups and the internal network of LGBT employees in his company. His speech highlights his diversity department's lack of expertise on trans issues and the subsequent discomfort felt around cases of transphobia. The strategy of providing resources to help organizations act on these questions was therefore useful to have the claims of the internal network heard.

Expanding the reach of the programs they developed. A second strategy for incremental success was to scale up or recouple at the local level some of the programs designed by these internal networks. The initial organizing unit of an LGBT internal network is often the headquarters of the company. LGBT networks organized by working closely with diversity managers, HR directors, and communication services, all of which may be aware of questions of homophobia but also may be disconnected from global trends within the companies themselves (Rivera, 2012). Therefore, the first process of diffusion consisted of being present in different branches of the company outside of the Parisian region or the headquarters site. All networks strived to make sure that their actions also had an impact at the local level—that posters would be diffused, that the hotline they developed could collect cases of discrimination in any local units, that the pride events organized in smaller cities would not end up in backlash against LGBT coworkers, etc. The following interview excerpt from July 2015 shows how the president of IN4 sought to extend the involvement of her company's diversity mission to one of the company's service providers:

> Yesterday, I received a young man who works for one of the service providers of the company, on a site outside of Paris. And we have a company with a diversity policy, so it is normal that this company takes care of implementing its principle to its service providers. So this young man had his desk covered with homophobic slurs in his workplace. . . . So yes, I am working on this case, and I am pressuring the diversity director so that they do something about it, that she finds who did it. Otherwise, same as usual, I will do a press release and all that. This is bad publicity.

These recoupling strategies at the more local level of an organization—making sure that smaller branches and service providers, who often offer less protection than employers in broader organizations (Briscoe, Wardell, and Sawyer, 2011), also implement the larger organization's policies—were commonly used to keep influencing the implementation process of diversity programs. IN5 relied on the same rhetoric to require that their hiring organization boycott

homophobic customers and marketing platforms, such as several media producers who created homophobic content including on a TV show. They also developed a map of countries with homophobic laws and death penalties to inform the strategic choices of their organizations' expansion, stating, ''We will remain vigilant on the situation of LGBT people where the group is present, and remind with strength to our direction that the commitments taken in France in favor of LGBT rights should also be spearheaded in all the countries where our subsidiaries are located.'' In a 2014 press release, IN5 additionally demanded that its company:

> —Stop all marketing [of the company] in international media discriminating openly and threatening the LGBT population
>
> —Protect and support our LGBT colleagues in countries that are still homophobic
>
> —. . . [Make] public statements on the risks for LGBT and for the economy of the [country] following these attacks on human rights

This last example shows how LGBT internal networks also leveraged their organization's scope to scale up their impact. Scaling up is a significant strategy for many social movements (Whiteman and Kennedy, 2016: 426), and again, the role of implementation resources was crucial in several scaling-up strategies. IN3 expanded by providing anti-homophobia and anti-transphobia services outside of its ministry to double its scope in 2006. IN1, which was implanted within a ministry with international purview, used the organization's scope as a way to seek to influence LGBT rights worldwide, well beyond the scope of their host ministry.

Promoting more endogenous actions from their target organization. Lastly, LGBT internal networks sought to go beyond asking their host companies to merely endorse and accept their actions. Taking temporal processes into consideration is important here, because internal networks' claims and subjective successes evolved over time, building on one another; see Table A4 in the Online Appendix for a full overview of my coding of these subjective successes. Often, an organization's support for a program promoted by an internal network was one of the first forms of success that internal network achieved. That first success operated as a springboard to ask new things from the organization, such as publicly acknowledging the internal network, co-creating a project, or even autonomously developing some LGBT-friendly content or programs (refer to Tables 3 and 4). One significant form of success occurred when organizations increasingly incorporated internal network services as part of ''their'' diversity efforts. Most internal networks expressed demands that their hiring organizations endogenously develop actions following the blueprints laid out by activists. For instance, IN4 sought to have their hiring organization take more responsibility in raising awareness about AIDS, as we can see in the following press release from November 30, 2011:

> The HR Director took this opportunity [of IN4 organizing action against AIDS discrimination] to convey a message through IN4 on its own action for the 1st of December [AIDS awareness day]. The company chose to make it known that ''a seropositive employee can require to be acknowledged as a disabled worker,'' which would

> enable them to benefit from the policies set forth in the disability collective agreement (workplace accommodation, schedule accommodation . . .). IN4 feels like they are being, in some respect, the spokesperson of [name of the company] when the company still remains hesitant, apparently, to openly communicate about the taboo topic of HIV. IN4 expects that the company will show their commitment by officially addressing the topic themselves.

This excerpt shows that internal network members demand that their company take more direct action to communicate about AIDS awareness; they are leveraging their services to pave the way for an autonomous action from the company. By analyzing press releases, I can trace how the struggle for recognition transformed into an invitation to develop endogenously organizational programs for LGBT individuals. Table 3 traces these evolutions for IN4 from 2010 to 2014.

The first step for IN4 was to have their awareness events accepted within the organization (T1–T3) and have their services acknowledged by their host organization (T3, T6). But as soon as some of the services they offered were accepted in the organization (e.g., AIDS awareness day in T4 and LGBT awareness day in T5), IN4 started to make broader claims about what the organization should do in its design of diversity programs. In T6, they condemned the fact that their organization did not take into account sexual orientation in its diversity training and did not involve IN4 in the design of such programs. In T7, they requested that companies take more ownership of the design and organization of AIDS awareness events. As their service grew in scope and expanded to other regions (several Parisian sites in T5 and other French regions in T10), they developed more claims for equal rights (same-sex parental benefits, discussed since T5 and secured in T9). A turning point was the presence of the secretary of the Ministry for Women's Rights at events that IN4 created (T11). IN4 used this political opportunity to make several claims to the company's CEO. After this exposure, the internal network reported several successes in their press releases: the company directly spoke about LGBT rights (T12), the company and IN4 co-organized an LGBT-related conference (T13), and their relationship became more about collaboration than confrontation, as the company acknowledged ''the benefits of being openly gay-friendly'' as stated by IN4's president in an interview.

I can reconstitute from IN4's archives that, within five years (2010–2014), their hiring company went from rejecting LGBT awareness events within their walls to organizing conferences on the topics of LGBT rights in collaboration with IN4. This clearly shows that insider activists could influence corporate endogenous development of diversity programs. While scholars have often noted how companies endogenously develop their structures for compliance with anti-discrimination laws (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001; Edelman, 2016) or design their equal opportunity arsenal of practices (Dobbin, 2009), they have not analyzed how insider activists may model and shape such programs. The activists I studied saw endogenous LGBT-friendly actions in their companies as a paramount sign of success, which is in line with organizational theorists' findings about the pitfalls of constraining diversity programs: ''It's more effective to engage managers in solving the problem'' than it would be to constrain them to take action (Dobbin and Kalev, 2016: 54).

Another way to compel more endogenous action supporting LGBT employees was to promote organizations' implementation of endogenous

Table 3. IN4 from 2010 to 2014: From Tolerance to Endogenous Action from the Company

Date	Empirical description by time unit	Analytical categories
2010	T1: IN4 communicates about their organization of awareness days about homophobia and transphobia, distributing flyers and posters in front of different sites of their hiring company.	Strategy: design their own awareness day for LGBT-phobia (outside of the company)
	T2: Members compare their actions with those of other LGBT networks that were accepted inside their company headquarters.	Strategy: compare with more-open organizations
	T3: In a press release, they denounce their organization's lack of acknowledgement of their actions and their network, especially when the organization communicates about its commitment to diversity.	Strategy: use their creation of awareness days as leverage to criticize their lack of acknowledgement and involvement in diversity programs
	T4: IN4 organizes an STD and AIDS awareness day in the company headquarters; this time, the action is accepted within the walls of the organization.	Strategy: design AIDS awareness day (inside company)
2011	T5: IN4 communicates about managing to organize LGBT awareness days at 3 of 8 major Parisian sites of the company; during this LGBT awareness day, a lesbian asks them for support to secure same-sex parental leave.	Strategy: spread to new sites of the organization
	T6: IN4 issues a press release to ask why they were not invited to the discussion table during a day-long training about raising awareness about diversity and anti-discrimination in their company; the topic of sexual orientation was disregarded during this training.	Strategy: use awareness days as leverage to criticize lack of acknowledgement of their efforts
	T7: Following their organization of a second edition of the AIDS awareness day, they ask their organization to take ownership when addressing homophobia and the stigma of having AIDS by publicly endorsing these causes.	Strategy: require company to endogenously address questions of discrimination
	T8: They ask the company to officially acknowledge IN4's existence and actions to fight against discrimination, following their encounter with the CEO during the AIDS awareness day. This request appears in a somewhat humorous press release from December titled '' 'Yes, I know IN4,' declared the CEO of [name of the company] on December 1st, 2011.'' The press release requests an official acknowledgment and points implicitly to small steps taken by the company, claiming that the CEO also agreed to meet with the board of IN4 to hear their claims.	Strategy/claims: ask for recognition of their actions
2012	T9: IN4 secures same-sex couple paid parental leaves (this press release made headlines in French nationwide newspapers).	Success: access to rights for LGBT workers
	T10: They start to organize awareness days in other regions of France.	Strategy: spread to new sites of the organization
2013	T11: During their organization of an awareness day against homophobia, they receive a visit from the secretary of the French Ministry for Women's Rights in their headquarters to acknowledge IN4's work against homophobia and transphobia.	Success: recognized by a government official
	The network uses this opportunity to make claims to the CEO of the company, asking for an official recognition of LGBT people in diversity efforts, training related to this topic for all managers, and an official speech from corporate executives on the topic.	Strategy: make claims for recognition, training, and official speech for LGBT rights
	T12: They applaud the company's direct communication against homophobia and transphobia on its intranet.	Success: the company spoke against LGBT phobia
	T13: IN4 and its parent company co-organize a conference on the topic of homophobia and transphobia with nationwide experts.	Success: co-organize a conference on homophobia
From 2014 onward	T14: The collaboration between this nonprofit and its parent company seems rather positive.	Success: collaboration and endogenous commitments from the firm
	The non-profit celebrates the company's multiple commitments to LGBT diversity.	

policies to support them. IN2 applauded the fact that their hiring organization signed a list of ten commitments they would take in support of LGBT employees:

> The nonprofit IN2 is happy to announce that the [name of their hiring organization] displayed ''ten commitments to fight against homophobia in the workplace.'' After two years of reflection with employee representatives, these ten commitments show a real willingness to inscribe the fight against LGBT-phobia within the ministry policies for professional equality. . . .
>
> (2) All the human resources services ensure that all rules and processes do not allow any discrimination related to sexual orientation or gender identity.
>
> (3) The directors take appropriate measures that could include sanction against any discriminatory behavior, verbal or physical assault, insulting word, or harassment related to sexual orientation or gender identity.
>
> (4) As managers have a crucial role in the fight against discrimination, they are trained to learn good practices and appropriate behaviors for managing without discrimination related to sexual orientation and gender identity. . . .
>
> (8) A partnership is implemented between the ministries and the nonprofit IN2.
>
> (9) The effective implementation of these commitments is reviewed through qualitative and quantitative surveys.
>
> (10) The monitoring of these ministry commitments, supervised by top-level managers, will be the object of annual reviews with employees' representatives. (Excerpts from an IN2 press release, 2015)

The list of commitments shows that this organization took charge of training managers and changing HR processes but also sealed a partnership with IN2 and submitted willingly to annual monitoring wherein IN2 and other employee representatives would be central stakeholders. These ten points did not come out of a vacuum; the list was built on 11 years of past actions (and, according to IN2's press release, two years of collaboration on this document), starting with IN2 first designing awareness programs and then seeking to actively engage their hiring ministry in developing actions to support LGBT employees.

Table 4 shows that IN2 spent a long time providing services and implementation resources until the company autonomously took over the design of resources and events to raise awareness about LGBT-phobia and created commitments to better include LGBT employees. It took more than five years for IN2 to move from providing services to denouncing the hiring ministry's lack of endogenous action (T1). IN2 first leveraged the fact that their organization prided itself on obtaining a diversity label to denounce its lack of initiative for LGBT employees (T2), and their hiring organization responded positively by developing more collaborations with IN2 (T2, T3). After this, IN2 positioned themselves as expert and useful, building on their (often highlighted) years of service provision (T3, T9) and frequently congratulating their hiring ministry for its incremental progress in collaborating with IN2 (T3, T4, T5) and for developing increasingly endogenous programs for LGBT awareness (T4, T5, T7, T10, T13). IN2 kept emphasizing their own role as designing resources and awareness campaigns (T3, T8, T12). They sought to expand their scope of action through developing regional referees (T9) or by supporting other internal networks, such as IN3, in the hope that IN2 would soon develop such

Table 4. IN2 from 2004 to 2015: Providing Implementation Services until the Company Takes Over

Date	Empirical description by time unit	Analytical categories
Since 2004	T1: Since their inception in 2004, IN2 commits to: Organize yearly events for AIDS awareness day on December 1 (and develop early collaboration with the health insurance providers from their hiring organization to organize these yearly events). Organize yearly awareness day against homophobia on May 17.	Strategy: provide services and implementation subsidies, develop collaboration, organize awareness campaigns for 6+ years
2010	T2: When the organization obtains a diversity label, IN2 calls it out in a press release for having few concrete actions to fight homophobia and transphobia, after which IN2 develops more collective actions with the hiring organization.	Strategy: call out lip service and superficial commitments when the hiring ministry secures a diversity label Success: growing engagement from the ministry
2012	T3: IN2 designs a new website and takes stock of changes in the past few years on a blog post; they are now ''better acknowledged'' in the ministry and have fruitful interactions with the organization's health insurance, labor union, and internal nonprofits. They design their mission as follows: Fight against homophobia and transphobia. Conduct awareness campaigns to fight against AIDS and the discrimination of those who have been touched by the virus. Raise awareness among top managers of the organization, partners from labor unions, mutual benefit society, and nonprofit actors. Help break the glass ceiling for LGBT employees. Favor time for exchanges through debates and convivial events.	Strategy: communicate about their provision of service and expertise to claim to expand their purview in the company (e.g., awareness events for managers)
	T4: In the context of debates on same-sex marriages, IN2 makes a series of claims about actions that their hiring organization could take to better acknowledge and include LGBT employees in the workplace.	Strategy: make more explicit claims (against the glass ceiling for LGBT employees and how to better include them in the workplace)
	T5: IN2's organization communicates on its intranet about the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT). IN2 communicates about this initiative as a new success for their collaboration.	Success: collaboration, more direct involvement of their hiring organization in raising awareness Strategy: communicate about this successful collaboration
	T6: IN2 communicates appreciation that the ministry mentioned them and their actions in official communication.	Success: acknowledgement from their hiring organization Strategy: communicate about this increased collaboration
	T7: IN2 and IN3 co-sign a press release that communicates about the organization of a breakfast against homophobia and transphobia with the head of the hiring ministry of IN2. This press release laments that such actions are still not occurring within the ministry of IN3.	Success: increased collaboration Strategy: support less successful internal networks by communicating about the gap of commitment between different organizations
	T8: IN2 designs a quiz on AIDS and HIV to raise awareness about STDs and, together with the health insurance services from this organization, distributes quizzes and condoms at the exit of the organization's main restaurant.	Strategy: provide services, raise awareness about STDs
2013	T9: After a board meeting, IN2 communicates their new strategic actions: Take part, as experts, in the ministry's working group on LGBT-phobia Make ''more visible actions'' for IDAHOT and AIDS awareness day Develop regional referees	Strategy: position IN2 as an expert and expand (e.g., regional referees)

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

Date	Empirical description by time unit	Analytical categories
	T10: IN2 communicates about and prides itself for the actions taken by their ministry to address homophobia and transphobia for IDAHOT. Actions mentioned in the press release include posters, communication on the intranet, diffusion of a quiz, and an LGBT breakfast with top executives from the ministry.	Success: more endogenous action from their hiring organization Strategy: communicate positively about this increased commitment
	T11: There is homophobic backlash against the more visible actions jointly organized by IN2 and their hiring ministry. A press release from IN2 denounces the backlash. IN2 thanks the ministry for their commitment and requires them to take action against this backlash.	Failure: backlash from employees Strategy: communicate about this backlash requesting reaction against manifest homophobia
	T12: IN2 communicates about their tenth year of organizing a yearly AIDS awareness day in partnership with the health insurance service from their hiring organization.	Strategy: communicate about ongoing service provision to the organization
2014	T13: IN2 issues a press release congratulating their hiring ministry for its ongoing and increasing mobilization for LGBT rights. Actions mentioned include posters, communication on the intranet, organization of a conference and debate, presentation of short movies directed internally on LGBT-phobia, and the invitation of LGBT speakers for a large audience.	Strategy: communicate about the ongoing and increasing communication of their hiring organization
2015	T14: The organization releases a ten-point commitment to fight homophobia and transphobia. IN2 is instituted as a partner of this organization, and the organization commits to issue a yearly report on its actions.	Success: endogenous commitment from the hiring organization Success: yearly reports and positioning of IN2 as a partner
	T15: IN2 publishes on their website a letter signed by the French minister from this ministry stating that all ''agents from the ministry'' will be exposed to awareness events during the 2015 IDAHOT.	Success: acknowledgment at the highest level + commitment to take responsibility in raising awareness about LGBT-phobia

collaborative actions with their own hiring ministry (T7). A turning point occurred when an awareness event jointly organized by IN2 and their hiring ministry received substantive backlash, and IN2 leveraged this event to require that the organization take more action against blatant forms of homophobia (T11). After that, IN2 mostly communicated about successes, as their ministry endogenously developed its ten-point commitment (T14), and the minister from their organization signed a letter stating that all agents from the ministry should be educated about homophobia and transphobia (T15).

This example shows a shift from the internal network initiating actions through implementation resources to seeing more autonomous and endogenous commitments from their hiring organization. Table 4 also highlights how internal networks strategically promoted such change: through congratulating their organization for taking more endogenous steps, emphasizing their role as expert and long-term service providers, and using some key events (e.g., diversity label, backlash) as leverage to make requests for more engagement. Comparing the longitudinal Tables 2, 3, and 4 also highlights the central role of key events—either backlash against LGBT networks or organizational attempts to ''shine'' for their commitment to diversity—as moments when different internal networks gained leverage to influence their hiring organizations' actions. In Table 2, T17 to T20 seem to be the key turning points when organizational backlash is denounced strongly enough that the organization changes its attitude toward IN3. In Table 3, the minister's visit in support of IN4's action

shifts their hiring company's attitude and makes it more attentive to IN4's claims at T11. In Table 4, T2 is a moment when IN2 denounces the superficial commitment of their ministry, which just secured a diversity label, and T11 is a time of heightened backlash, which seals the collaboration between IN2 and the ministry.

The ministry's ten-point commitment described in T14 in Table 4 showed a real engagement with changing practices related to LGBT employees. Other organizations developed—in collaboration with their internal networks—similar guidelines through an "official circular" (IN3) and an internal charter (IN1) specifying actions that they committed to take in support of LGBT employees. IN4 and IN5 instigated a similar change by promoting inside their organization an LGBT charter designed by a nationwide LGBT advocacy network, which was signed by IN5 and elicited collaboration between the organization of IN4 and this advocacy group.[10] This evidence shows that after activists initially took responsibility for supporting sexual minorities in their workplaces and designing related content, internal networks later developed and diffused guidelines to encourage companies to take back ownership of supporting the inclusion of LGBT employees.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this article, I contend that scholars should pay more attention to the different strategies activists use when seeking to influence the implementation process after a given prosocial law or policy is passed. Scholars have often focused their work on how activists seek to influence laws or voluntary corporate commitments. Yet the ways in which activists strive to influence what happens next in organizations is key as these organizations attempt to comply with a law or walk the talk of their commitments. While the literature on insider activists and issue sellers discusses in depth the role of discursive or mobilization tactics, I highlight how activists use implementation resources—the strategic design of content and resources meant to comply with specific policies or commitments—to influence the scope and performativity of diversity programs implemented in organizations.

Using the case of LGBT rights activists in France, I analyzed how different internal networks progressively gained recognition and support from their hiring organizations by designing themselves many of the programs that diversity managers could have designed to promote the fight against homophobia and transphobia. They set up awareness campaigns, developed trainings, crafted communication tools such as posters and movie clips, and created hotline and whistleblower systems to denounce discrimination. All the networks initially designed these resources voluntarily and for free, and then they sought to have them endorsed or supported by their hiring organizations. Diversity managers' increasing commitment to support these networks' initiatives was a strong symbolic signal and often led to resources being secured for internal networks to further develop their own approaches to LGBT inclusion. In interviews,

[10] This charter specifically spelled out LGBT-related actions that companies could take to promote the inclusion of LGBT employees in 2012 and appeared to be a way to resubstantiate the commitment of organizations to LGBT-specific diversity. The charter designed by this organization is now signed by 110 companies, and activists there position themselves as support for helping with the charter's implementation elsewhere.

activists mentioned having policies passed specifically for LGBT rights, being sponsored for participating in pride parades, being compensated for organizing awareness days, and having the resources to develop visual campaigns against homophobia. This increased collaboration also facilitated the role these LGBT networks filled as whistleblowers in cases of discrimination. Here I highlight four distinct ways in which implementation resources were strategically aimed to change organizational practices, and see Model 1 in the online appendix for a visual representation of these mechanisms.

Co-opting the Co-optation: Using Implementation Resources to Prefigure What Diversity Programs Should Look Like

The design of implementation resources seems to have two initial purposes: compelling organizations to performatively comply with their preexisting symbolic commitments or to expand their initial prosocial commitments. First, implementation resources may change corporate practices if insider activists design these resources and frame them as the optimal way to walk the talk of preexisting corporate commitments. In this sense, activists act as service providers and design a ''recipe for compliance'' (Kellogg, 2014: 914) that better corresponds to their own social and political ideal of what diversity should look like on the ground. While organizations in this study often claimed to prevent the discrimination of LGBT people—as required by law—the design of hotline systems to collect cases of discrimination and bring them to the attention of HR services was fundamental in actually implementing this preexisting commitment. Activist-produced implementation resources expand on new perspectives on organizations as ''polities,'' which ''points to the limits of classic chain-of-command accounts that assume implementation of decisions made by corporate elites to be relatively unproblematic'' (Weber and Waeger, 2017: 899).

Second, activists may use implementation resources to expand the organization's preexisting prosocial commitments. Some organizations in this study claimed their commitment to diversity but did not mention the inclusion of sexual minorities in their commitment. In this sense, implementation resources appear as a prefigurative strategy: one way to elicit the adoption of new prosocial practices (e.g., prevention efforts against homophobia and transphobia) is to invent prefigurative diversity programs relevant to preexisting corporate commitments that are ready to use and relatively costless for the organization. This process could be described as ''co-opting the co-optation'': Edelman et al. (2011) described how organizations co-opted the law to redefine what it means for them to comply with it. I propose to look at how activists co-opt this co-optation process by examining how they seek to redefine what the implementation of policies and compliance with legal mandates and preexisting commitments means in practice.

Conducting the Litmus Test: Using Implementation Resources to Reveal Merely Symbolic Policies or Non-performative Commitments from Organizations

A second mechanism is that, if organizations resist implementation resources, insider activists can use the resistance itself to reveal the shallowness of

corporate commitments to diversity. In this sense, implementation resources can serve as a litmus test to reveal whether existing corporate commitments are merely symbolic or non-performative. The idea of a litmus test was partly present in Meyerson and Scully's (1995: 595) theory of small wins: "As experiments, small wins act as a system diagnostic. With relatively minor visibility, risk, and disruption, small wins can test the boundaries of an organization's capacity for change." Yet their work does not elaborate much on how activists leverage such diagnostics to call out resistant organizations and compel change. Similarly, Howard-Grenville (2007: 572) analyzed how the "evaluations of experiences of resistance, failure, or success during interaction can be used by sellers to adjust their moves for future selling efforts." Building on this approach, I argue that organizational resistance may also reveal superficial or merely symbolic commitments and that activists could articulate these diagnoses of resistance with reputation-mediated strategies such as denunciation or increased monitoring (King, 2008, 2016; McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015). This appears very clearly in Tables 2, 3, and 4, which show how criticisms of the organizations got teeth when IN2, IN3, and IN4 demonstrated how unresponsive their organizations were—despite their supposed commitment against homophobia—to the awareness services they offered for free.

Setting the Stage for Blunders: Using Implementation Resources to Expose Veiled Discriminatory Practices

One of the benefits of vague diversity commitment is that it can show ceremonial compliance with antidiscrimination laws without getting into specifics that might elicit outcries from some employees. As Kellogg has argued (2009, 2012: 1548), different actors might contribute to "thwarting institutional pressure for change—top managers, middle managers, and frontline workers," and these actors could buffer or block changes at different levels within organizations. Stating that an organization is in favor of diversity is too unspecific to generate outcries. Applying this principle to create a prayer room for Muslim workers or design awareness campaigns to favor the visibility of LGBT employees might be more controversial. By developing concrete implementation resources and offering them as ways to substantiate preexisting commitments, internal activists not only compel firms to develop more substantive action but also set the stage to notice homophobic and transphobic backlash. This could generate homophobic "blunders" (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993) that activists then leverage to demonstrate that homophobia still exists in corporations and that an organization's passivity—such as by burying a discrimination case—has enabled discrimination in the workplace. This aligns with scholars' recent analysis that "thwarted activism" creates opportunities for change (DeJordy et al., 2020: 25).

Building on "Small Wins": Implementation Resources as an Incremental Strategy to Elicit Change

This study helps make a broader point about how "small wins" (Meyerson and Scully, 1995: 595) and the dynamic interplay between implementation resources and organizational responses to these resources actually lead to ongoing, incremental, and additive changes in organizations. Two different

mechanisms are at play here. First, internal networks in this study used setbacks—negative responses to the resources they developed—as a tool to demonstrate the importance of their prefigurative programs. If an organization resists developing actions against homophobia and transphobia, this is proof that its commitment is superficial (it fails the litmus test). If a program fighting LGBT-phobia elicits backlash from employees, it shows that there is still latent homophobia in the organization, which often does not respond to it (evidence of blunders). I have shown how these initial failures could, over time, be turned to the internal networks' advantage and elicit more direct, hands-on cooperation with their hiring organizations—because these failures are tangible proof that organizations are merely paying lip service to their commitment to diversity. Second, I show different ways through which insider activists leveraged their small wins (e.g., receiving endorsements, being cited by diversity managers) to encourage deeper change in their organizations. In the findings section, I discussed how they could use strategy to scale up the changes already implemented—to recouple them on the ground at more-local levels. I also showed that activists encouraged more and more autonomous action from their hiring organizations on these topics, moving from initiating the programs to having the organizations develop them endogenously, with activists then taking advisory or expert roles. Last, I have shown how the scope of their claims deepened over time to include more actions supporting transgender employees as the programs focused on addressing homophobia were increasingly accepted. These different processes feed into an analysis of success as being gradual and ongoing rather than binary (Amenta and Young, 1999). This article shows that setbacks and reputational stakes were instrumental to secure future successes and that activists built on the small wins they obtained to secure bigger ones.

The elaboration of implementation resources was a significant part of insider activists' repertoire of action and often preceded more disruptive types of actions, such as denouncing, monitoring, and calling out the organization for not walking the talk of its preexisting commitments. It is worth further exploring why this is the case and what the scope conditions are that explain why I observed such phenomena in this context that have not been highlighted in many other cases. First, I would argue that developing implementation resources was a strategic way to navigate the ambivalence of the status of being an insider activist (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Taylor and Raeburn, 1995; Scully and Segal, 2002; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). As Briscoe and Gupta (2016: 678) stated, the high resource dependency on the targeted organization led insider activists to face ''reduced incentive to voice grievances'' and a ''high barrier to deployment of disruptive tactics.'' In this sense, the design of implementation resources might be a weapon of the weak particularly suited for actors who have little leeway to use disruptive tactics but who have good internal knowledge of organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) and defend a prosocial claim publicly valued by organizations (here, the commitment to diversity). This weapon of the weak seems to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, these implementation resources gave activists leverage to hold firms accountable for their preexisting commitments, similar to what McDonnell and colleagues (2015) described for external stakeholders. On the other hand, this strategy relies on insider activists providing a lot of free labor to organizations (e.g., mediating conflicts, handling discrimination cases, building resources) and

is therefore costly and time-consuming, which might have negative consequences for the careers of the activists involved.

Limitations, Contributions, and Future Research

This article's limitations could be stepping-stones for future research projects. First, selecting internal networks that posted enough content online for longitudinal analyses means that I probably excluded cases of failure that might exist among other internal networks, which would help us further understand the impact of different strategies used by these networks. Also, the choice to focus on this type of data—blog posts used as a strategic tool—limited my ability to capture the pitfall of such strategies, such as how costly it was for insider activists to deploy implementation resources as free services to organizations. A recent study through long-term participant observation gave more-nuanced perspectives about a case of failure and the related exhaustion and strain involved in designing resources for a nonresponsive organization (Gaide and Kam, 2019). Second, this article focused on the role of insider activists, therefore underexploiting the collected data about outsider, nationwide organizations (refer to the Online Appendix). Future research could further analyze the interplay and articulation between outsider organizations and insider activists to develop such resources.

This research develops new perspectives about how issue sellers or insider activists could get involved in the interpretation of policies or legal mandates. While the research on insider activists and issue sellers offers crucial insights into how organizational change emerges from within organizations, it focuses primarily on selling issues or passing policies (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Dutton et al., 2001; Scully and Segal, 2002; Raeburn, 2004; Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Alt and Craig, 2016; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). This overemphasis on early-stage claims tells us little about how the meaning of issues or policies can be blunted in organizations. Bringing insights from the law and society literature (Dobbin, 2009; Ahmed, 2012; Edelman, 2016), I note that scholars have shown that existing policies might be interpreted in an organization in a way that buffers their initial political and social goals. Thus it seems crucial to analyze, beyond the passing of a policy or commitment, how insider activists ensure substantive compliance with the said policy or symbolic commitment. Exploring the ways in which activists produce content and ready-to-use implementation resources to leverage more performative, in-depth, and relevant change in an organization helps expand our understanding of change in organizations.

This research also contributes to the organizational and law and society research that explores how the meaning of the law gets reinterpreted within organizations (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001; Dobbin, 2009; Edelman et al., 2011; Edelman, 2016). While scholars have analyzed how organizations endogenously develop their compliance structures to anti-discrimination laws (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001; Edelman, 2016) or draw on the HR professionals' arsenal to invent their equal opportunity practices (Dobbin, 2009), they have failed to analyze how insider activists could develop counterstrategies to prefigure and shape relevant programs. As Zanoni and Janssens (2015: 1478) put it, ''The meaning of diversity is never the monopoly of actors in formal positions of authority warranting voice, such as managers

and diversity experts.'' My research conceptualizes how activists attempt to position themselves as assets for organizations to influence the implementation of their diversity programs.

This research also contributes to the literature on CSR and social movements by exploring how insider activists are well-positioned to call out organizations on their lip service and to leverage symbolic commitments to bring about change. The framework of McDonnell and colleagues (2013, 2015) that reveals the ways in which external stakeholders can monitor and hold firms accountable could be applied to insider activists, who—despite challenges in their own positioning as dependent on the targeted organization (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016)—are very well-located to know and grasp the vague and merely symbolic commitments of organizations and to offer resources to effect change. This further answers a recent call from scholars to ''examine how institutional insiders might be able to shift tactics or otherwise somehow effectively cope with the fear of potential costs of advocating for issues in their organizations'' (DeCelles, Sonenshein, and King, 2019: 30), as I portray implementation resources as a ''weapon of the weak'' suited to actors in a subjugated position but with important internal knowledge of their organization (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). While my analysis is focused on how activists used implementation resources to incorporate actions against homophobia and transphobia in the diversity programs of French companies, I assume that similar mechanisms could be observed about other aspects of diversity policies (e.g., disability policies, gender policies), as well as organizations' environmental commitments or any other CSR commitments that activists could find too vague, ceremonial, or symbolic. If these groups provide free programs that organizations are expected to create, they may use this leverage to claim recognition, support, and resources and to compel increasing involvement from their organizations.

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Supplemental Material

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