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MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL STIGMATIZATION: IDENTITY WORK IN A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE

PAUL TRACEY
University of Cambridge

NELSON PHILLIPS
Imperial College London

In this inductive study, we shift the focus of stigma research inside organizational boundaries by examining its relationship with organizational identity. To do so, we draw on the case of Keystone, a social enterprise in the East of England that became stigmatized after it initiated a program of support for a group of migrants in its community. Keystone's stigmatization precipitated a crisis of organizational identity. We examine how the identity crisis unfolded, focusing on the forms of identity work that Keystone's leaders enacted in response in order to reframe the meaning that organizational members attached to the stigma. Interestingly, we show not only that the internal effects of stigmatization on identity can be managed, but also that they may facilitate unexpected positive outcomes for organizations.

Organization theorists have shown that stakeholder evaluations exert a powerful influence on organizational identity (Corley, Cochran, & Comstock, 2001; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Martins, 2005; Scott & Lane, 2000). In particular, this work has highlighted that changes in how an organization is viewed externally can act as a "destabilizing force" on identity that requires "members to reconstruct and revisit their organizational sense of self" (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000: 67). These destabilizing forces are especially apparent when an organization is evaluated negatively, as members may feel that criticism of their employing organization reflects upon them and who they are (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).

This suggests that when an organization experiences stigma—an extreme kind of social disapproval defined as "a collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization" (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009: 157)—the effects on organizational identity will be especially significant because accepted constructions of identity may be fundamentally challenged. When an organization's core sense of self is questioned in this way, organizational effectiveness is likely to be seriously damaged, not only due to the "cognitive distress" experienced by organizational members, but also because members may openly question or even undermine the organization's leadership and strategic direction (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996: 467).

At the same time, why is it that some stigmatized organizations survive, and indeed thrive, despite the apparent stain associated with their stigmatization and the attendant identity problems that this creates? For example, many arms manufacturers, abortion clinics, and tobacco firms—all of which experience high levels of stigmatization from salient stakeholders—excel in achieving their objectives despite extreme negative evaluations on the part of some stakeholder groups. This puzzle suggests that stigmatization has consequences that have not yet been systematically uncovered by organizational researchers. In particular, we know very little about how organizations seek to manage and contain the effects of stigma on their identities, and the possible outcomes for these organizations.

Thus, in this paper we shift the focus of stigma research inside organizational boundaries by examining the relationship between stigma and identity.

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We do so in the context of an organization that became stigmatized as a result of its association with a stigmatized group in its community. Specifically, our study seeks to answer the following research questions: *What are the effects of stigmatization on organizational identity? How can these effects be managed?* and *What are the outcomes for organizations?*

To answer these questions, we conducted an in-depth case study of Keystone, a social enterprise located in the rural town of Thetford in the East of England. This part of the U.K. has experienced a significant influx of migrants over the past decade, mainly from Eastern Europe. Keystone was one of the few organizations in the area to set up a dedicated program of support for the migrant population. This initiative led to parts of the established population in the town reassessing their perceptions of Keystone and ultimately stigmatizing it. In other words, there was a transfer of stigma (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009) from the migrants to the organization. For Keystone, this triggered a crisis of organizational image, which in turn precipitated a crisis of organizational identity that Keystone sought to address through identity work. Intriguingly, we also show that becoming stigmatized subsequently facilitated a series of positive outcomes that led Keystone to deepen its association with the migrants.

In developing our arguments, our study makes three contributions. The first contribution is our conceptualization of the internal consequences of stigmatization for organizations, which have largely been ignored by researchers to date (cf., Carberry & King, 2012; Durand & Vergne, 2015; Vergne, 2012). We find that the external dynamics of organizational stigmatization can be mirrored or echoed inside organizational boundaries in some circumstances, which can foster deep internal schisms that challenge prevailing constructions of organizational identity. Indeed, the effects of stigmatization may fundamentally transform some members' perception of, and relationship with, their employing organization.

Second, we develop a model of the management of effects of organizational stigmatization. Specifically, we build a framework that considers how organizations confront challenges to their identities in these situations through distinct forms of identity work. Interestingly, we show that organizations can reframe the meaning that organizational members attach to the stigma so that it is viewed in an alternative—and more constructive—light.

Finally, we offer a theoretical explanation for why stigmatization may lead to positive, as well as negative, outcomes for organizations. As noted above, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the literature has focused on the harm that stigmatization and other forms of negative evaluation can inflict on organizations. Our study supports existing findings that stigmatization can damage organizations, but also extends recent evidence that it can lead to unexpected benefits (Helms & Patterson, 2014).

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Stigma and Organizations

Much social scientific analysis of stigma is based in the work of Goffman (1961, 1963), who conceptualized it as a collective label imposed on individuals or groups. His work precipitated a wave of sociological research that considers how people experience and cope with stigmatization, as well as the motivations of those who stigmatize others (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Within management research, an emerging body of work has begun to consider stigma at the organizational level. While multiple definitions of organizational stigma have appeared in the literature (e.g., Pozner, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008), they generally share the idea that organizations are stigmatized when they become profoundly discredited in the eyes of one or more stakeholders.

A number of different types of organizational stigma have been identified. Some researchers have focused on event stigma. From this perspective, an organization can be stigmatized as a result of "discrete, anomalous, episodic events" (Hudson, 2008: 253), which lead to it being negatively evaluated by stakeholders regardless of the category to which the organization belongs. For example, bankruptcy (Sutton & Callahan, 1987), the adoption of disreputed accounting practices (Carberry & King, 2012), and the use of sweatshop labor (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012) have been shown to profoundly discredit specific organizations across many different categories.

Other researchers have posited that organizational stigma may be rooted not in actions or events, but in a process of labeling and attribution that "links an organization to a negatively evaluated category of organizations" (Devers et al., 2009: 157). Examples of stigmatized categories include nuclear power stations (Eyles & Fried, 2012) and firms in the arms industry (Vergne, 2012). From this perspective, all organizations that belong to these categories are

stigmatized in the eyes of particular stakeholders. In other words, an organization may be "core-stigmatized" because of "who it is, what it does, and whom it serves" (Hudson, 2008: 253).

Third, organizations can become stigmatized through stigma transfer. Hudson and Okhuysen's (2009) study of gay bathhouses in the United States was designed to examine how core-stigmatized organizations manage stigmatization. Interestingly, the authors' analysis also illuminated how customers, suppliers, and regulators can themselves become stigmatized simply by associating with a bathhouse. This transfer of stigma had profound implications for the bathhouses, as some partners were fearful of being seen by others to be linked with them.

Organizational Stigmatization: Reputation, Image, and Identity

As noted above, organizational stigmatization is rooted in extreme negative evaluations on the part of one or more audiences. This suggests that two partly overlapping concepts are especially salient to it: organizational reputation and organizational image (Gioia et al., 2000). Organizational reputation is commonly defined as collective judgments by actors external to the organization that are based on "signals about firms' activities, achievements, and prospects" (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990: 234). These judgments are considered to be relatively stable and durable, and to represent an overarching "objective" assessment of the attributes others ascribe to an organization (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Organizational reputation is both comparative and evaluative (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). In other words, it comprises an assessment of an organization based on audiences' expectations of it in relation to others (Foreman, Whetten, & Mackey, 2012).

The related concept of organizational image has been "the subject of many different conceptualizations and definitional debates" (Gioia et al., 2000: 65). Indeed, multiple types of organizational image have been identified in the literature; some of these overlap and others partially conflict. We follow Dutton and Dukerich (1991) by defining organizational image as insiders' perceptions of how others view the organization to which they belong. This form of image has also been labeled construed external image (Dutton et al., 1994) to distinguish it from projected image, which is a deliberately constructed view of the organization that is articulated to stakeholders (Bernstein, 1984), and desired future image, which is an idealized future perception of how organizational members would like others to view it (Gioia & Thomas, 1996).

It is apparent from the literature that a stigmatized organization will have a sullied reputation (Durand & Vergne, 2015) and image (e.g., Sutton & Callahan, 1987) among some stakeholder groups, and that this is likely to profoundly shape its relationships with these stakeholders. However, while the external effects of stigmatization with respect to organizational reputation and image have been examined in some depth, the internal effects remain much less clear. In particular, researchers have documented in detail how external stakeholder evaluations can cause organizational members to question or reframe an organization's identity (Corley et al., 2001; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Martins, 2005). We find it surprising, therefore, that the effects of stigma on organizational identity have largely been glossed over. Indeed, because organizational stigmatization represents an extreme kind of evaluation (Hudson, 2008), its consequences for organizational identity may be highly significant.

A number of perspectives have been used to study organizational identity (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013), but in general they share the idea that identity refers to the characteristics of an organization that are viewed by members as (1) central to its nature, (2) distinctive vis-à-vis other organizations of a similar type, and (3) exhibiting a degree of temporal continuity (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Our conceptualization of organizational identity falls within the social construction perspective. From this standpoint, organizational identity is a "self-referential concept defined by the members of an organization to articulate who they are as an organization to themselves as well as outsiders" (Gioia et al., 2013: 126–127). In other words, it captures the perceptions of insiders with respect to the distinguishing characteristics of their organization as indicated by the labels and meanings used by organizational members (Corley, 2004).

Importantly, an emerging line of inquiry is concerned with how organizations can actively manage their identity through organizational identity work, defined as the "processes in which individuals engage to create, present, sustain, share, and/or adapt organizational identity" (Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, Smith, & Kataria, 2015: 11). From this perspective, identity work is an ongoing accomplishment whereby organizational members play a key role in shaping their own and their colleagues' understanding of the organization to which they belong (Brown & Toyoki, 2013). Organizational researchers have

examined a number of different forms of identity work. These include the identity work involved in the resurrection or resuscitation of collective identity (Howard-Grenville, Metzger, & Meyer, 2012), the search for an "optimal balance" between social and professional identity in organizations (Kreiner, Hollensbe, & Sheep, 2006), and the maintenance of organizational identity over time (Anteby & Molnar, 2012). Identity work thus provides a powerful conceptual tool for considering the purposive enactment of identity in organizational settings. It is notable, however, that the role of identity work in response to organizational stigmatization has not been explicitly studied.

The Management of Organizational Stigmatization

A key strand of the organizational stigma literature, as well as related work on organizational reputation and crisis management, has focused on the strategies that organizations adopt in response to stigmatization. Collectively, this body of research has illustrated that stigmatized organizations have a range of different strategic options available to them, the outcomes of which are uncertain and context dependent (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Two responses that have been identified as particularly widespread are, on the one hand, denying or trying to conceal information that associates the organization with stigmatized practices and, on the other hand, admitting the allegations or accepting responsibility for the situation in which the organization finds itself (Coombs, 2007b; Elsbach, 1994; King, 2008; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).

However, other, more nuanced, responses have also been suggested. For example, managers may seek to decouple the organization from stigma by blaming a particular employee, team, unit, or department (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Alternatively, organizations that belong to a stigmatized category may adopt distinct boundary-management processes in order to circumvent negative attention and protect partners with which they have relationships (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). Firms can also modify their categorical associations by strategically straddling multiple categories, thereby averting stakeholder attention from the negatively evaluated categories to which they belong (Vergne, 2012). In addition, firms can engage in impression management, which may "buffer" (McDonnell & King, 2013: 407) firms against future reputational threats. Finally, organizations can incorporate and emphasize negative labels in order to boost awareness among supportive stakeholders and to remedy misperceptions among critical stakeholders (Helms & Patterson, 2014). Thus, a growing body of research has considered organizational responses to stigmatization. Again, however, it has focused on external rather than internal dynamics.

In sum, while the emerging research on organizational stigma, as well as parallel work on reputation and crisis management, has made significant headway in a relatively short time, a number of outstanding issues remain. In particular, we have very limited understanding of the internal effects of stigmatization and how organizations respond to it. Specifically, while the implications of organizational stigma for identity have been highlighted in the literature as an important area of inquiry, it is unclear how organizations go about repairing the damage to their identities following stigmatization. More broadly, understanding the internal, as well as the external, processes underpinning effective stigma management is critical to deepening our understanding of stigma in the context of organizations and to uncovering the range of outcomes it may promote. Drawing together these threads and issues from the literature, we use our rich qualitative case study to consider the effects of stigmatization on organizational identity, how stigmatized organizations can respond to these effects, and the possible outcomes for the organizations concerned.

METHODS

Between April and December 2011, the first author was based at Keystone, a social enterprise in the East of England, as part of a study on hybrid organizations. He spent three days per week at the organization, normally between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. During this period he was partially a participant and partially an observer, and was given the title of "acting director of social innovation." For the first two months, he concentrated on observation, spending time in different parts of the organization and attending staff and board meetings in an effort to learn about the core issues and challenges Keystone faced. He then began to take on specific tasks. For example, he conducted a strategic review of the Keystone businesses, helped out on projects at the main community center, and wrote a series of reports that summarized "The Keystone Approach" to supporting marginalized groups. In addition, he conducted formal interviews with a range of actors within Keystone and the community it serves, and visited local employers and two local schools. The study

was conducted openly, with Keystone staff aware of the nature and purpose of the research. The first author regularly visited Keystone and spoke to its chief executive and other staff in the three years following the end of his participant observation in order to monitor the organization's progress.

Before we began data collection, our intention was to conduct a study of the competing demands faced by hybrid organizations, focusing on how they balance social and commercial objectives simultaneously. However, after entering the organization it became clear that the issue of migration was a dominant concern for both Keystone and the town in which it is located. There were obvious and deep-rooted tensions between the established population and the recent migrants. Keystone was the only locally based organization to offer systematic support for the migrants. This led to accusations from parts of the established population that Keystone was favoring migrants at the expense of "real locals," and what we identified as a process of stigma transfer from the migrants to Keystone. Intrigued by these dynamics, we therefore switched our focus from the study of competing demands to how Keystone managed the effects of the stigmatization that it experienced.

Data Sources

Formal interviews. We conducted 70 formal interviews with a wide range of actors. Informants included members of Keystone (23 interviews); members of the local community, both migrants and established residents (40 interviews); six HR and production managers from two meat-processing companies (four interviews); two representatives from the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (one interview); a school teacher (one interview); and an academic who studies European migration (one interview). In two instances, multiple informants were interviewed together. A small number of Keystone's 30 staff declined to be interviewed formally. Moreover, because of the sensitive nature of the topics being discussed, a greater proportion of informants declined to be recorded than one might normally expect in a qualitative research project: of the 70 formal interviews, 45 were digitally recorded. Detailed notes were taken for the other 25. It was agreed that we would use the organization's real name. It was also agreed that we would use generic labels (e.g., community worker) rather than names or job titles when attributing quotations, with the exception of quotations from the chief executive, Neil Stott, in order to preserve anonymity.

Field diary. In addition to the formal interviews outlined above, dozens of informal interviews were conducted with members of Keystone and the local community. Many of these informal interviews took place in the main Keystone community center. The first author took handwritten notes that were recorded in a field diary. We found informants to be much more candid when talking informally than during formal interviews. In addition, the first author kept a detailed record of events and observations while based at Keystone. This was normally updated at the end of each day, although he also kept a notepad with him at all times in order to record key incidents, interactions, and conversations as they happened (cf., Zilber, 2002). As noted above, the first author also visited Keystone and spoke regularly to the chief executive in the three years after the formal data-collection period in order to keep abreast of relevant events. These data were also recorded in a field diary.

Print media. We searched for the term "Keystone Development Trust" using the Factiva database, which comprises the main U.K. newspapers. This resulted in 147 "hits." The local newspaper (*The Thetford and Brandon Times*) is not included in Factiva, but Keystone keeps copies of relevant press clippings from this newspaper, so we were also able to access articles from this source. These data were incorporated into the analysis, providing important information about the practices that Keystone engaged in as it sought to respond to its stigmatization.

Internal documents. Keystone keeps a "library" of archival material at its headquarters. This includes the minutes of all board meetings and key internal correspondence. We were given unfettered access to this material. Given the quantity of the material, these documents were not coded but provided important background information about Keystone's approach to the issue of migration and the internal debates that took place.

Data Analysis

Our approach to data analysis followed common prescriptions for inductive qualitative data analysis (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In the *first step,* we collated the various accounts from the interviews, internal documents, and newspaper reports in order to produce an "event history database" (Garud & Rappa, 1994). This resulted in a narrative summarizing the recent events in the town of Thetford, the resulting tensions, and Keystone's responses. We sought to ensure that the narrative was

as balanced as possible, and incorporated the different perspectives that were apparent in our data.

In the *second step,* we conducted an open coding process in which initial concepts were identified and grouped together into first-order categories. To do so, we examined each source of data (the interview transcripts, field diary, internal documents, and newspaper coverage), looking for similarities and differences between them. This was done inductively. We initially focused on the core challenges faced by Keystone in dealing with the issue of migration, but then shifted our focus to how Keystone responded to the effects of stigmatization and the implications for the organization.

In the *third step*, we relied on axial coding, a process in which first-order codes are related to one another using both inductive and deductive thinking (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This enabled us to collapse the first-order categories that we had developed into a smaller group of second-order themes, and to more fully conceptualize the patterns in our data with respect to the dynamics of stigmatization. The process was iterative rather than linear, and involved moving among the data, the relevant literature, and the emerging patterns in order to refine the data into particular conceptual categories (Eisenhardt, 1989). In particular, we found that the literature on organizational identity and on image helped us to make sense of the data, and we integrated ideas and concepts from these sources into our emerging theoretical framework. This process of axial coding led to the six second-order themes, which constitute a mix of (1) the internal effects of stigmatization, (2) specific actions taken to manage the effects, and (3) the implications of these actions for Keystone.

In the *fourth step,* we grouped the six second-order themes into overarching theoretical dimensions. This involved looking at the relationship between the first- and second-order themes, and seeking to refine them into a set of simpler and more parsimonious categories. This resulted in three overarching dimensions: (1) stigma mirroring: identity crisis, (2) identity work, and (3) positive outcomes: enhanced alignment with a stigmatized group.

In addition to these four steps, we used two techniques in an effort to ensure that our data analysis was trustworthy. First, we used "peer debriefing" (Corley & Gioia, 2004) to reduce the possibility of bias in the analysis. This involved asking a qualitative researcher to audit our data structure and the coding scheme that underpins it in order to help evaluate the dependability of the analysis, and was very helpful in clarifying our thinking and the relationship between constructs. Second, we used "member checking" (Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). In doing so, we shared the analysis with members of Keystone. This resulted in important revisions to our model, with the chief executive in particular giving extremely detailed critique and feedback. The resulting data structure is illustrated in Figure 1. Additional data supporting each second-order theme can be found in Table 1.

RESEARCH CONTEXT

Keystone Development Trust

Keystone was established in 2003 as a Development Trust, a hybrid form of organization designed to address poverty and inequality in poor communities through "enterprise." Reflecting its hybrid status, Keystone is both a registered charity and a limited company. Neil Stott was appointed as Keystone's first and, at the time of writing, only chief executive. Stott realized that the public subsidy that was flowing into Keystone in the early years was likely to be finite, so embarked on a strategy to make the organization "financially sustainable." He did so by investing in buildings and using them to grow commercial ventures including a conference center, a café, a bicycle recycling business, a consulting business, rented office space, and a food retail business selling locally produced fruit and vegetables. The surpluses generated from these ventures were combined with public money to fund a series of social projects designed to promote community wellbeing.

The basic model developed by Stott in the early stages of the venture, and the core goals of Keystone, have remained intact. Specifically, the organization aims to: (1) improve the quality of life for local people; (2) support those in the community who experience disadvantage or social exclusion; (3) encourage all parts of the community to participate in local civic life; and (4) be economically self-sufficient. At the time of the study, Keystone employed around 30 full-time staff and had about 15 volunteers.

The Town of Thetford

Keystone is based in Thetford, a rural market town in the county of Norfolk in the East of England. Thetford comprises some of the least affluent areas in England. Both the town and the surrounding region are characterized by a low-skill and low-wage economy with pockets of high unemployment. The main industries are agriculture and meat processing.

FIGURE 1
Data Structure



Two key events have shaped the recent history of Thetford. The first began in 1959 when it was designated a London overspill town. Introduced in the 1930s, the London overspill policy was an initiative that involved the creation of new towns and the expansion of existing ones to address an acute shortage of housing in London. Between 1959 and 1969, the population of Thetford tripled from around 5,000 to 15,000 as more and more Londoners moved to the area. Most were placed in the "West Thetford Estates," social housing schemes located away from the town center and with few amenities. As a member of Keystone told us: "It was like importing inner-city London poverty to rural Norfolk." The legacy of the London overspill policy continues to be felt in the town, with much of Keystone's work taking place on these estates.

The second key event to shape contemporary Thetford was a sustained wave of migration from the European Union (EU). This began in 2001, with several thousand migrants from Portugal arriving to work on the farms surrounding the town, many of whom settled permanently in the area (Taylor & Rogaly, 2004). The pace of migration intensified in 2004 when the "A8" accession countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) joined the EU. The United Kingdom was one of only three existing member states that offered people from the A8 countries the right to live and work. The result was a very large influx of Eastern European migrants to the United Kingdom, estimated at around 1.4 million between 2004 and 2010 (Whitehead, 2011). Because of migration from Portugal and the A8 countries, the population of Thetford is estimated to have swelled from around 22,000 in 2001 to approximately 32,000 in 2011.

Migrant Stigmatization

Tensions between parts of the established and migrant populations first became evident when Portuguese

TABLE 1
Additional Supporting Data for each Second-Order Theme

1. Secondary stigmatization	They [a group of regular users of the community center] keep on getting at us because we want everyone [i.e., migrants and established residents] to use the community center. (Comments made by Keystone community worker)
	Community worker X was finding it difficult because she's being bullied by people [community members] on the estate. (Extract from field diary)
2. Empathy with stigmatizers	We had another one [an Eastern European migrant] who got a house, a free house, and they went and turned it down, even though it's free. And the reason they turned it down was it wasn't in Thetford and they wanted to live in Thetford. That's cheeky. They shouldn't be so picky. They should be lucky that they've got one [a place to live]. (Comments made by Keystone community worker noted in field diary)
	. . . [Keystone is] now seen as the focus for migrant workers in the area, the funding is there but it still isn't enough. . . [It takes] double, treble [what Keystone is already spending], to do the job properly. . . They [META] don't add anything to help the infrastructure [by which he meant the capacity of Keystone] to grow and that's what you need. All the while. . . Keystone's own budget is being dipped and dipped and dipped. . . and there is not enough there for the other things it tries to do. (Interview with Keystone member)
3. Advocacy	Board Member X said in today's meeting that Keystone needs to bear in mind that two generations of Londoners were brought up in the town and that there are still West Ham United [soccer team based in the East of London] supporters to be found on the Thetford Estates. He said that some people think the migrants have it easy, but that the "problems finding a house are the same if you've come up from London or traveled across from Poland." (Extract from field diary)
	We have tried. . . to get the message across that migrants were invited here because they are doing jobs British people don't want to do and local companies would struggle to cope without them. (Interview with Keystone manager)
4. Valorization	A lot of people have remarked, well yes as you've said, META, the immigrant workers. . . that seems to occupy Keystone's time. And as a member, as a trustee, I have to say well they are part of the E.U., they choose to work here, they've got to have somewhere that they can coordinate things. (Interview with Keystone Board Member).
	I mean to drop it [META] would be a huge disservice to the number of people who still come, so it's not really an option. It's not a money spinner. It's never going to really be a money spinner because if they [the migrants] could afford to pay for that kind of stuff, well, it probably wouldn't be here in the first place. (Interview with former community worker who set up META).
5. Identity affirmation	We've had our backs to the wall on several occasions, but we've been very brave [focusing on the issues Keystone believes in] and given ourselves time to see how things pan out. (Interview with Keystone staff member)
	I say I work for a Development Trust, the largest one in the eastern region. . . You know I say we are focused on community regeneration which means we work in a number of different areas that can all be seen to [be] improving and regenerating communities and how we are going to do more. That means we have projects that meet different community needs such as migrant workers, such as the voluntary sector, support in enabling others to also drive change in the community, you know, sort of very good business examples and exciting enterprises. (Interview with Keystone staff member)
6. Resource augmentation	META is a defining project for Keystone. You've seen how hard it is to get in [to deliver services] to local authorities. We've been able to use META to show that we can deliver. (Conversation with Neil Stott, Keystone Chief Executive, noted in field diary)
	META got a lot of publicity because it was seen to be newsworthy, but it's only a tiny, tiny bit of what they [Keystone] do. (Interview with former community worker who helped set up META, now a Keystone Board Member)

arrived in the town in significant numbers around 2000. In 2004, the first Eastern European migrants arrived, which exacerbated the friction. Some British residents began to complain that their way of life was under threat. The most commonly expressed concerns were that migrants were taking jobs and housing that would otherwise be allocated to British people. The hostility was also evident in racially motivated crime, which increased sharply (Taylor & Rogaly, 2004).

More generally, there was a deep sense of anger among many British residents about the "invasion" of migrants in the town. For example, one person we interviewed, a woman in her 60s, told us the following:

> There's a lot of problems with drinking and the migrants. People feel intimidated. In the town all the shops are theirs. It used to be a lovely place this, but now it's changed. It's not fair and it's got out of control. It's disgusting what's happening. There's rubbish everywhere, and our council tax is going up to pay for them.

Thus, the Eastern and Southern European migrants in Thetford had become stigmatized by parts of the established population. This form of stigmatization is certainly not unique to the East of England. In arguably the most important analysis of contemporary Eastern European migration in the United Kingdom to date, Fox, Moroşanu, and Szilassy (2012) found evidence of the widespread and deep-rooted stigmatization of migrant workers from Eastern Europe. Summarizing the results of the research, the lead author concluded:

> The evidence to date from the UK suggests that shared "whiteness" offers few protections against racism. Like earlier generations of Irish migrants to the UK and US, East European Jews a century ago, and more recently East European Roma, this new generation of East European migrant workers has been subjected to various forms of racism, racial discrimination, and racial stigmatization. (http://www.bris.ac.uk/news/2012/8737.html)

Stigma Transfer and Image Crisis

As a community organization designed to help marginalized groups, Keystone's senior management decided that supporting the new migrant population should be a strategic priority. Many newcomers were vulnerable, often arriving with little or no English and limited knowledge of the U.K. system of housing, employment, or welfare. As a result, some became victims of exploitation, with unscrupulous employers taking advantage of newcomers' vulnerabilities by, for example, offering squalid accommodation as part of their remuneration. Senior staff at Keystone believed that the new migrants were "falling between the cracks" of the existing government-funded support structures. At a relatively early stage, Keystone began to use volunteers to initiate projects to support migrants. Minutes of a 2003 Board Meeting stated that the aim was to "integrate minority ethnic communities more fully into the local community, enabling improved access to jobs and services."

In 2005, funds were obtained to formalize the support being offered. The initiative moved to Keystone's headquarters, with the volunteers becoming paid Keystone employees. The project was called Mobile Europeans Taking Action (META), to emphasize that it was "migrant led." META offered a number of core services, which are summarized in Table 2. While Keystone's work was well received within the migrant population, its efforts to support migrants had profound implications for how it was viewed by parts of the established population. Indeed, it quickly became apparent that some local people were deeply unhappy that Keystone was supporting an "unwelcome" group. Specifically, some British residents took exception to the fact that Keystone resources were being used to support non-U.K. nationals. Others believed that the support offered by Keystone acted as a magnet that attracted migrants from across Europe to the region. The first author encountered hostility toward Keystone from British residents on several occasions. Indeed, at an early stage in the research process he came to the conclusion that Keystone had become stigmatized.

Thus, because of its support for the migrant population, the stigma experienced by that group was transferred to Keystone, "marking" it in the eyes of parts of the British population. While it is difficult to be precise about the proportion of the established population who stigmatized Keystone, our interviews with staff and Thetford residents led us to believe that Keystone's stigmatization was widespread, although concentrated in the social housing estates in which Keystone did much of its community work. In other words, it was very often the Thetford residents whose roots could be traced to the London overspill policy of the 1960s who evaluated the organization in a particularly negative light. This had major implications for Keystone, whose staff believed that parts of the established population came to associate it with META and its support for migrants in the town, and to discount or ignore the other work that it performed. Thus, the perception of Keystone among some established residents shifted from that of a community organization whose role was to improve the quality of life of local (i.e., British) people, to an organization that existed to help the migrants.

From a theoretical standpoint, Keystone suffered an *image crisis* (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). In this respect, Keystone was arguably a victim of its own success. As Stott noted, "META probably accounts for about 7 per cent of what we do, but 90 per cent of the publicity we get." Keystone engaged in image work in an attempt to improve its image among the established population. Specifically, it built strategic alliances designed to provide services to migrants in order to normalize support for this group and to diffuse the stigma Keystone faced across multiple partners. The organization also sought to reduce the stigma experienced by migrants through various projects in an attempt to lessen the stigma transfer from the migrants to Keystone. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these image-management initiatives. Many staff felt that the organization's image remained tarnished among segments of the established population for the duration of the study.

As we examined our data, we came to believe that the really interesting aspect of our case was not so much the relationship between Keystone and its community, but rather the internal organizational dynamics pertaining to Keystone's identity that were triggered by its stigmatization. In the findings that follow, we therefore focus on the damage to Keystone's identity that occurred due to the trauma of

TABLE 2
Summary of META's core activities

1. A "drop-in" advice center to provide information to migrants about aspects of life in the United Kingdom including housing, employment rights, and healthcare in a range of languages.
2. A translation service to help people with forms and correspondence related to, for example, healthcare and housing.
3. Training courses (e.g., forklift truck training, basic business training) to help migrants improve their skills.
4. A Credit Union to allow migrants access to basic financial services.
5. English language classes to help community integration and improve employment prospects.

stigmatization, the efforts of Keystone to heal the wounds, and the organizational outcomes that ensued.

FINDINGS

Our analysis revealed three central findings. First, the image crisis described above precipitated a crisis of organizational identity, with a version of the ongoing dynamics and tensions in the community replicated inside our focal organization. Second, Keystone invoked two distinct types of identity work to manage this crisis of organizational identity. Third, benefits accrued to Keystone following its stigmatization that led it to deepen, rather than to reduce, its association with the migrant population.

Stigma Mirroring: Identity Crisis

The fact that stigmatized organizations face a crisis of identity is not particularly surprising. However, the internal processes that underpinned the identity crisis in our case were intriguing: our analysis suggests that stigmatization creates divided loyalties in organizations, with some members sympathetic to those who are stigmatizing it, despite being treated badly by them, and "blame" attributed to leaders for associating the organization with a stigmatized group. The result is that organizations can become reflections of their environments. In other words, the stigmatization processes that are played out externally are echoed inside organizational boundaries.

Specifically, at Keystone we observed an internal mirroring of the dynamics that characterized the relationship between the migrant and established populations in Thetford as a whole. Yet, Keystone was a charitable organization set up to support vulnerable members of the community. The migrants were evidently among the most vulnerable, and by distancing itself from the migrant population Keystone risked undermining its core purpose. The result was conflict and ambiguity about what the organization actually stood for; i.e., a crisis of identity. We found that two dynamics underpinned this identity crisis in our focal organization: (1) *secondary stigmatization*, with the stigma transmitted from the organization as a whole to its individual members, and (2) *empathy with the stigmatizers* of the organization on the part of some members.

Secondary stigmatization. It became clear that hostility toward Keystone on the part of the established population was sometimes translated into hostility toward individual Keystone employees. Thus, there was a second form of stigma transfer in the case, namely from Keystone as an organization to Keystone's staff, which tested, and in some cases fundamentally undermined, members' identification with the organization. A group of (British) Keystone employees complained that they had become *marginalized by parts of the established community* (first-order category A), with some staff subject to verbal abuse at work. This was particularly the case in Keystone's main community center, which was located in an estate where tensions between the established and migrant populations were high.

The first author witnessed this on several occasions. For example, one morning he arrived at the community center to find one of the community workers very upset. The following is an extract from the conversation that followed. The background to the exchange was that tension had been building between Keystone staff and local (British) people about migrants using the facilities in the community center:

> Community worker: Some of them think that the community center is for them—they want to use it for [their] kids' parties and stuff and to stop others from coming in.
>
> Researcher: You mean they want to keep it just for their friends?
>
> Community worker: Yeah, they basically act like they own the place... They really don't like it when the migrants come in and use the cafe. They are so rude to them and me and they make them feel really unwelcome.

Researcher: That sounds really difficult. . .

Community worker: . . . to be honest I've just about had it. I can't handle this anymore. Last week there was a stand up row between [local person who used the community center a lot] and [community worker's family member]. It's getting out of hand and it's got to the stage where I'm not sleeping at night. I'm seriously thinking about handing in my notice to Neil.

From the perspective of the staff concerned, incidents such as these were linked directly to the image problems that Keystone had suffered as a result of its support for the migrant population. According to one member of staff:

They don't like it because we encourage everyone to use the community center. . . and they get really unpleasant when they [migrants] come in and they can be incredibly rude and abusive. . . and take it out on us.

From our perspective, it was sometimes difficult to connect specific incidents definitively with Keystone's support for the migrants. As Stott remarked many times, "community work is not for the faint-hearted," and some of the tensions with the community may have been part and parcel of what he called the "rough and tumble" of community-based organizing. Nonetheless, there was a perception among Keystone staff that the "migrant issue" was at the root of the problems they had experienced, and it was this perception that, in our view, drove the dynamics we observed.

For Keystone's migrant staff, the situation was more complicated. It could be argued that they experienced a kind of double stigmatization—for being part of the migrant population and for being part of Keystone. It was more difficult for us to get a clear sense of how migrant staff felt about life at Keystone because they were less willing to talk openly about it. On the one hand, it was apparent that the META staff were driven by a strong vocation—they believed passionately in its role and purpose. On the other hand, they were aware of the friction inside Keystone connected to their work.

Our interpretation of the dynamics we observed was that tensions over Keystone's image created *social distance* (first-order category B) between some of its British employees and the staff from the migrant population who worked in META, which fostered internal division and misunderstanding. For example, according to one META employee, some members of Keystone felt resentment toward META staff because there was an unfounded perception that their pay and conditions were better:

Interviewee: Sometimes they [Keystone staff] look at people like me and they say that everything is easy for us. . . [in our role as] migrant advisor or stop smoking advisor—so many jobs [roles] that I have had or have at the moment. Some people look at me and they say oh you earn a lot of money you do lots of jobs [have multiple roles] but it is not so true sometimes, so people have these wrong ideas about how much we earn, but. . . it is not like how people think. Sometimes they look at me and think it is easy for us. . . but it is not so true.

First author: Do you feel welcomed here?

Interviewee: Sometimes we feel welcome, sometimes not really welcomed. It depends where we are. So, you know it is very complicated everywhere and at work [by which we understood that s/he meant both in the community and at Keystone]. At work all the time competition between workmates, all the time very complicated. With workmates, it is very complicated.

Our perception of the social distance between the two groups was reinforced by the observations of the first author, who, during the early part of his time at Keystone, frequently noted that there were boundaries between staff drawn from the established and migrant populations. For example, the first staff meeting that he attended was described as follows:

Interesting that people from META all sat together in one part of the room. None of the META people spoke at all at the meeting—they seemed to be in their own little group. Neither group [META and non-META staff] seemed particularly interested in mixing.

Caution is needed not to overstate the divisions in this regard—we also observed many instances of Keystone's British and non-British employees working extremely well together. Nonetheless, it was clear to us that Keystone's stigmatization, and particularly the secondary transfer of the stigma to Keystone staff, had created tensions inside the organization that were at the heart of the identity crisis it faced. These tensions are explored in more detail in the following subsection.

Empathy with stigmatizers. Despite the fact that parts of the established community made life difficult for those who worked at Keystone, some staff appeared to agree with two of the key allegations made by the stigmatizers: (1) that migration was a "bad thing" for the town, and (2) that Keystone should cease, or at least cut back on, its support for the migrant population. With regard to the idea that *migration was adversely affecting the community*

(first-order category C), some staff clearly had concerns about the effects of the movement of large numbers of Eastern and Southern Europeans to Thetford. Consider the following extract from the first author's field diary:

> I was totally gobsmacked today when speaking with [a Community Worker]. We were speaking about my visit to the local primary school and without warning she blurted out "I'd never send [my daughter] to that school." I said "but why not, it seems really nice?" To which she replied "the kids can hardly speak English and it would just hold her back." But she went further, "I think they need to go to their own school where they can be with other kids who speak the same language." I just looked at her in amazement. She is an amazing community worker and I've seen her working with the migrants and helping them—I'm pretty shocked that she could think like that.

This particular example features a member of staff who was clearly uncomfortable about migration, but continued to work hard to deliver services to migrants and who had good relations with Keystone staff drawn from the migrant community. Other staff were less subtle in how they talked about migration, and openly echoed or mimicked the sort of views that were expressed by some British people on the social housing estates. For example, a community worker who was advising migrants on housing services said the following:

> We had three of them [migrants] in the morning who pretended to be homeless cause they wanted a council house. And we phoned the council and we found out that they'd already been housed [by a private-sector landlord]. It's unbelievable!

Some staff went further and openly claimed that *Keystone should focus on British people* (first-order category D). For example, one interviewee was concerned that Keystone had become excessively focused on supporting migrants, which risked undermining its standing in the community as a whole:

> Actually, I don't think it [Keystone] should specialize in that way [on migrants] because I, I think it's a strength to say that we do all of this for all of the community because that enables us, when we get the time. . . to buy in the support of the whole community.

A related concern was that Keystone's support for the migrants, and more specifically the image problems it engendered, was undermining its other activities in both the for-profit and non-profit parts of the organization. Some even advocated cutting META all together. The following is an extract from an interview between the first author and a member of Keystone, who complained that META was starving Keystone of resources:

> Researcher: What about the migrant worker issue. . . Neil was saying the other day that. . . even though META is only a small proportion of what Keystone does, a lot of people think that Keystone is META.
>
> Informant: It is that yes, because it [the community] sees the trail of people up and down there and through the front door. And there has been money in the META budget for events, [but] Keystone hasn't got any of its own money for events. So events that are put on in the town are usually META events. . . and therefore it promotes the idea that Keystone is META.
>
> Researcher: Yes, it's a difficult one. . .. I mean there must be several thousand [migrants] in the town, out of 30,000. . .
>
> Informant: . . . I mean you can't walk down the street without seeing more migrant workers, more Portuguese and Poles than British people.

The empathy exhibited by these organizational members toward the views of the stigmatizers was initially puzzling to us, given the abuse that some members had experienced at the stigmatizers' hands. At first, we thought that these dynamics represented a form of Stockholm Syndrome, with members of Keystone developing emotional ties with their stigmatizers. We quickly came to realize, however, that many Keystone employees were drawn from the same working class communities that were most affected by migration. Thus, there was a clear conflict between their identification with that community (and the friendship and kinship networks it encompassed) and their identification with Keystone, because each was underpinned by a very different set of attitudes toward people from other countries.

Identity Work

To an extent, Stott could understand the position of the staff who resisted Keystone's support for the migrant population—they were operating at the "coalface" between the organization and the local community, and often found themselves in difficult situations as a result of Keystone's stance on migration. However, he repeatedly said that these attitudes represented an existential threat to Keystone, and that the organization needed to "knock this on the head" if it was to have a viable future. He was also clear that any attempt to marginalize META was unacceptable. We saw that he and his management team

deliberately and strategically sought to manage the organization's identity in order to limit the damage inflicted by the internal tensions. Specifically, the analysis of our field notes and interviews suggests that Keystone's leadership responded to the identity challenges it faced by engaging in two discrete forms of identity work: *advocacy* and *valorization*.

Advocacy. Stott and his senior team believed that Keystone needed to explain more effectively to organizational members why Keystone had been stigmatized. To do so, they felt that they needed to change the way that organizational members perceived the migrant population; in other words, to advocate on their behalf.

From the perspective of the senior management at Keystone, the tensions in the community were rooted partly in a broader cultural narrative about migration. In the United Kingdom, a powerful strand of the popular press has taken a strong anti-immigration stance, with Eastern Europeans a particular target. For example, *The Daily Mail*, one of Britain's best-selling newspapers, ran the headline "Eastern European immigrants carry out tenth of crime," (Hickley, 2006) while another high profile tabloid, *The Daily Express*, led with "Jobless up 92,000 as Poles flood in" (Daily Express, 2006).

Senior staff at Keystone became increasingly concerned about the effects of this societal-level narrative, pushed through the media, not only on cultural tensions in the town but on attitudes within Keystone itself. In response, they decided to adopt a different way of talking about people who had migrated to Thetford and the surrounding area. The narrative that Stott and senior staff constructed, and which we saw being presented by several members of Keystone on many occasions, comprised three core elements. First, it highlighted that *Thetford is a town of migrants* (first-order category E), albeit British ones, because many current residents have their roots in the London overspill policy of the 1960s. For example, according to a Keystone Board member:

> You see in the 60s when we had the Greater London Council. . . [we] had the influx from London, there was resentment then. . . And it was sort of a very similar scenario to what we have now towards the European workers. We had people come from London, this is home, their children were born here. They're Thetfordians. We had Polish here during the war. We had Ukrainians here during the war. And they stayed, married English girls and stayed here. So why can't we do this now? Why do people get resentful towards them? We can go to Poland. We can go to Portugal. We can go to Spain. . . So, I don't know whether they have a META in those countries for all the English!

In a similar vein, Stott said the following in an interview:

> We need to help the migrant community because they have come here to work hard and build a better life. In the 1960s people came from London to try and get on. People have short memories. When the Londoners arrived there was a lot of resentment, a lot of tension over exactly the same issues. The experience of the Portuguese and the Eastern Europeans is the same in many ways.

In these data, we see a powerful articulation of the empathy for migrants that the Keystone leadership sought to foster. Put simply, Keystone's management tried to draw on the idea of a shared experience of migration in order to build a connection between the established population and the new migrants, and to persuade organizational members that the support that Keystone offered should be based on the needs of particular individuals, rather than their place of origin.

Second, Keystone emphasized that *migration is good for the economy* (first-order category F). A government agency produced a report in 2007 which claimed that migrant workers contributed £360 million to the economy of the East of England, a statistic that Stott and his team used to support their claims. For example, Stott said the following at a Keystone meeting attended by the first author:

> Who else [other than migrant workers] is going to do the packing, plucking, and picking? Employers need migrants to work in the field and in the factories. You know how difficult it is for employers to find people. British people don't want to work there. They don't last a week and they get out of there.

At the same meeting, this element of the narrative was nuanced slightly by another Keystone manager, who stressed that many migrants were highly qualified graduates who were underemployed:

> Remember that a lot of the migrant community in England have degrees and are doing manual work. That's maybe because their English isn't good enough, or their qualifications aren't recognized over here, or they face discrimination. We should be asking migrants to raise their aspirations and not to just accept factory work.

The narrative also stressed that migrants were *essential to the public services* (first-order category G) on which the community depends. A member of the Keystone Board, who was also a senior figure in the National Health Service in the region, emphasized to staff that the local health services were particularly

reliant upon people from other countries, providing them with "much-needed workers" in addition to "adding to the diversity of our communities." Stott highlighted that the key message that Keystone sought to convey was that migrants are essential to many public organizations and services. The aim was to shift the perception of migrants from users to providers of public services. The following quotation from Stott was articulated in a management team meeting that the first author attended:

> The fact is, and this is what people conveniently forget, is that most people who come to the U.K. are young. They want to work—they don't want to be a burden to the state. A lot of them are cleaners, porters, nurses, teachers. Think about the British people that go to Spain—they go to retire, they use lots of public services and healthcare. The migrants that come here are the ones who contribute to maintaining our public services.

Our interpretation of these data are that the Keystone leadership sought to create an affinity with the stigmatized group, and to explain why this group was deserving of help in spite of the possible negative consequences for the organization's image. In other words, they sought to blur the distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders" so that people who belonged to the migrant and established populations were seen as one community, to which Keystone had a uniform obligation.

Valorization. Although relatively small, Keystone is a complex enterprise. It has six core businesses and a diverse range of community projects, with each part of the organization run relatively autonomously. Senior mangers said that they believed that Keystone's identity problems were exacerbated by the fragmented nature of the organization, which obscured the "big picture" with respect to its core aims. From their perspective, the staff were focused too narrowly on the goals of the part of Keystone in which they worked; they wanted to change the way organizational members viewed Keystone, and to stress the core mission of the organization as a whole.

To do so, the senior management sought to narratively reconstruct the organization's purpose—to provide an explanation of what Keystone does and how it fits into the community. They accomplished this form of identity work in two ways. First, they sought to clarify that *Keystone cares about social justice for all* (first-order category H) community members, irrespective of national origin. This involved instilling a sense of social justice and responsibility among Keystone staff. The senior team communicated this message through both informal and formal channels. For example, the following statement was included prominently within Keystone's revised strategic plan:

> Community development is about enhancing participatory democracy and recognises the need to celebrate diversity and difference and actively confront oppression however manifested.

Managers also tried to explain the founding vision of Keystone and to develop a clear and simple statement that encapsulated the organization's core mission:

> Keystone was created to improve the quality of life and opportunities for people who live and work locally. Working closely with partner organisations and community groups, Keystone aims to ensure that the area is safe, healthy, inclusive, and socially and economically vibrant.

This statement was printed on leaflets and all staff were encouraged to use it as a way of talking about the aims of the organization. Stott and his senior team repeatedly sought to reinforce this message across Keystone, both its non-profit and for-profit parts. Stott said the following in a Board meeting:

> I've been very clear about Keystone's role in promoting social justice. As I've said before, one of the things about being a third-sector organization is that we can speak our minds. The issue of migration is a social justice issue. If we don't push for social justice for migrants, who else is going to speak up?

This position was reinforced in an interview with the first author:

> People have suggested on a number of occasions that we should step back, but I have advised the Board not to, frankly. You don't give in on something just because of what other people think. What we're about is social justice. It's a key social justice issue basically. . . I'll keep saying it till I'm blue in the face. I'll say it to the council, I'll say it to staff, anyone who'll listen.

But the Keystone leadership wanted to go further. Specifically, they believed that *Keystone should be proud of and celebrate its achievements* (first-order category I) in supporting the migrants. Their view was this would embed into the organization's identity the idea that Keystone was designed to tackle difficult social issues. In doing so, they tried to convey that the organization's stigmatization should not necessarily be seen in negative terms, and that tackling controversial issues was part of what made Keystone such a distinctive and important organization.

One of the stories that we heard told at Keystone was that in its early days the organization had struggled against both (1) the established population who did not want Keystone to support the migrants, and (2) factions within the migrant population who were exploiting and gaining financially from their compatriots by acting as "middlemen" between local employers and new arrivals from Eastern Europe, who spoke little English and had limited knowledge of the local context. The following extract from the first author's field diary describes comments from a member of staff who was discussing Keystone's precarious position in the local community:

> He [the Keystone member] said that Keystone faced a lot of resistance from migrants who were benefiting from the lack of support available and making a lot of money from the information asymmetries amongst the migrants. He said it was a lonely place to be because you had powerful people in the migrant community lobbying against Keystone as well as the resistance from local [British] people.

Stories such as this one highlighted and reinforced the idea of Keystone standing alone in the face of considerable pressures to abandon its migrant support initiative. This created the sense of Keystone as a valiant organization that was supporting a vulnerable group because it was "the right thing to do." In one particularly memorable speech at Keystone's Annual General Meeting, attended by the first author, Stott said the following:

> What would Thetford be like without Keystone? A lot of vulnerable people have really been helped by us. There is no shortage of social need. We've been very entrepreneurial, particularly how we've helped the migrant community and the long-term unemployed through the work clubs.

Other managers also drew on the theme of Keystone as an organization that does the "right thing." For example, when Keystone was considering moving services for migrants into a community center on a social housing estate where there were community tensions, it generated some concern in the organization. A member of staff asked a Keystone manager if she thought this was a good idea. She responded:

> We need to think about the signal we're sending if Keystone can't run these services side by side. This could be a really good way of actually getting people in the same place and talking to each other.

Some staff did not welcome the Keystone leadership's unequivocal approach, especially those in the Keystone business units who were concerned about the impact of negative publicity on sales. For example, one of the staff members we spoke with said her view remained that Keystone should play down its work with the migrant population and focus instead on the important activities it organized for other (i.e., British) members of the community:

> . . . Neil was going, oh no, sometimes we've just got to be unpopular, but we don't ... it's not like, you know, well. . . I don't think we need to shout about it if. . . the perception is already that all Keystone do is for migrants, I just don't think we're ready to hammer that message home particularly. I think the other stuff on work clubs and whatnot must. . . really do a lot more good.

Nonetheless, and despite some resistance, through valorization Keystone sought to assert the core mission of the organization by promoting the idea that social justice and community cohesion were at the core of what it stood for. As noted above, there had been significant tensions inside Keystone, with some organizational members lobbying for a reduction or withdrawal of the support offered to migrants. By reframing the criticism that Keystone received for providing this support into something that was positive and, while acknowledging the difficult position in which staff were placed, attributing heroic qualities to Keystone and celebrating the organization's achievements in addressing local injustice, the Keystone leadership aimed to build an alternative identity that changed how members felt about its tarnished image in the community. Thus, rather than dissolve or rid Keystone of its stigma, advocacy and valorization helped organizational members to view that stigma in a new, more progressive, light.

Positive Outcomes: Enhanced Alignment with a Stigmatized Group

Because of the problems Keystone faced, it might have been expected that the organization would look to play down its involvement with, or even disassociate itself from, the group that was the cause of its stigmatization. Intriguingly, however, we found that Keystone progressively deepened, rather than diluted, its association with the migrant population in Thetford. Our analysis suggests that this was because the stigmatization contributed ultimately to two unexpected positive organizational outcomes—*identity affirmation* and *resource augmentation*—which meant that it made strategic sense for Keystone to build close ties with the migrant population even

though it resulted in its ongoing stigmatization in the eyes of parts of the established population.

Identity affirmation. While the identity crisis that Keystone experienced was traumatic, our data indicate that confronting it helped Keystone affirm its identity as an organization designed to promote social justice and protect vulnerable members of the community. There were two specific ways in which Keystone's identity work appeared to facilitate identity affirmation. First, it fostered *clarity of purpose* (first-order category J) that allowed for a shared understanding of the organization and its reason for being to emerge. More specifically, it helped build a clear commitment to Keystone's social and community activities, and a broad acceptance that support for the migrant population should form a core strand of its activities.

Our analysis suggests that Keystone's focus on social justice in general, and support of the migrant population in particular, became more widely held and deeply rooted over time. Through his discussions with staff, the first author increasingly came to the view that Keystone had become more confident in its mission and less concerned about what others thought of it. Consider the following conversation between the first author and a member of staff, as noted in the first author's field diary. The background to the conversation was that this person had previously expressed significant concerns about the effects of META on Keystone's position in the community:

> Researcher: Sometimes I wonder if people understand what Keystone is for.
>
> Informant: It's all about getting people together. Keystone is not about gain. It's about helping people back on their feet and integrating them into society. I think it does a good job in helping the community. It helps a lot of people develop through the social enterprises. Keystone is keen to help people. They give people a chance and they help people communicate.
>
> Researcher: Do you think that's what other people think about Keystone?
>
> Informant: In the town no one talks to me about Keystone. People have different ways of seeing things. People talk about Keystone without having the full picture. Keystone is in a very difficult situation—it's operating in a tough environment.

We found it interesting that this particular member of staff had shifted from being critical of Keystone's support of the migrants and empathizing with the stigmatizers, to defending the organization and extolling the importance of community integration. Indeed, although she did not explicitly mention migration, our interpretation of this exchange is that it represented a tacit acceptance that supporting community cohesion and healing community divisions was a key element of Keystone's activities.

A clearer sense of purpose appeared to have instilled many organizational members with a sense of confidence in their ability to tackle difficult issues, which facilitated Keystone's engagement with other stigmatized groups. For example, Keystone began to provide support for the long-term unemployed, a group that carried the stigma of being "scroungers" in the eyes of part of the community. Stott also believed that the organization had a greater confidence in the future, even though the circumstances that Keystone confronted were arguably getting tougher:

> We face some real challenges. We're now in a situation where you've one in five people saying they're going to vote UKIP [the U.K. Independence party, a political party that advocates limits on immigration], you've got the Romania and Bulgaria situation [a new wave of migration from 2014]. So it's not easy to be an organization that supports migrants. But my feeling is that there's a real optimism about the future and our ability to thrive in this environment. I think you've seen that for yourself.

In addition, our data suggest that Keystone's identity crisis and its subsequent identity work helped create a sense of *solidarity* (first-order category K) among many organizational members. This is not to say that the internal tensions disappeared; moreover, not everyone was happy about the sharper focus on social justice and community cohesion. Indeed, in the course of the identity crisis, several staff members left the organization because they no longer identified with it—some could not accept that the interests of the whole community drove Keystone's strategy.

These tensions notwithstanding, it appeared that Keystone came to function with a much stronger degree of cohesion. In particular, staff in the Keystone businesses began to take a closer interest in the community projects that Keystone ran. Moreover, we observed that the division between META and the other parts of the organization, which had been of particular concern to the senior management, appeared to have narrowed. The interpretation of the researchers was that Keystone had become much more at ease with itself and its role in the community, even though its image remained "marked" in the eyes of some residents. According to a Keystone member:

> Neil's really changed the whole culture of the organization and made META a central part of Keystone, which is not an easy thing to do, bringing together people with lots of different cultures with lots of different languages who don't communicate that well.

Keystone staff talked more and more of the importance of integrating their projects so that they benefitted all parts of the community, rather than providing services specifically for migrants or non-migrants. According to a community worker:

> . . . it is a very multicultural society now in Thetford, it's about community cohesion and including people rather than that's just for Portuguese, that's just for English people, that's just for Lithuanians. We need to do more. . . you know [to] incorporate in different projects. . . benefit for everybody.

This sense of solidarity also generated pride in the organization and its values. Organizational members increasingly articulated both a sense of satisfaction in helping vulnerable members of the community, and admiration that Keystone had stayed true to its values in spite of the image problems it suffered. Consider the following quotations from members of Keystone:

> It's been really difficult to get the confidence of the community because of all the factions. . . We've gotten flak. People believe what they want to believe, don't they? That's just an organization helping migrants blah, blah, blah. But I think Keystone has done a huge amount in Thetford.

> Throughout all its [META's] changes, I think it's . . . still quite a brave thing to be doing. I mean to drop it would be a huge disservice to the number of people who still come, so it's not really an option. It's not a money spinner. It's never going to really be a money spinner because if they [migrants] could afford to pay for that kind of stuff, well, it probably wouldn't be here in the first place.

Thus, our analysis suggests that Keystone's identity work helped to increase confidence in the organization's purpose; as Keystone reevaluated its core characteristics, the organization built a clearer *raison d'être* and a stronger sense of togetherness. As a result, many organizational members came to reinterpret the meaning they attributed to Keystone's image crisis in the community from something that was very negative, to something that was part of what made the organization distinctive. Analogous to the concept of posttraumatic growth at the individual level, our analysis suggests that a traumatic event can force an organization to engage in fundamental existential questions and enact a series of changes that not only allows it to survive, but to attach alternative meanings to past events and establish renewed shared purpose going forward.

In proposing this interpretation of our data, we do not wish to imply that Keystone existed in binary states—that at one point in time everyone at Keystone wanted to cease the services it provided to the migrant population, while at another point in time everyone at Keystone was clamoring to work more closely with migrants regardless of the consequences for its image. As with much organizational behavior, we are concerned with shades of gray. However, our analysis suggests a distinct and empirically observable shift in the identity dynamics of Keystone, from a position in which there was widespread concern about its work with migrants, to a position of widespread support for its work with migrants. While, given the nature of our data, we cannot show causation between Keystone's identity work and the affirmation of its identity, we do believe that our data show a connection between the two.

Resource augmentation. As noted above, Keystone suffered an image crisis, with some members of the established community in Thetford unhappy with the help that Keystone was providing to the migrant population, and even attributing the increased number of migrants in the town to the support services that Keystone offered. Keystone sought to manage its image in an effort to address these problems, but the effectiveness of its image management was unclear: Keystone staff felt that deep divisions in parts of the community remained and that Keystone's image problem endured among segments of the established British population in Thetford.

Interestingly, however, staff reported that the organization's image had improved markedly among other stakeholders, most notably charities, social enterprises, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helping migrants, as well as local and national government bodies. In other words, it developed a kind of split image—seen as a villain by some in the community, but endowed with very positive qualities by other social-purpose organizations. Our analysis suggests that this had two main implications for Keystone. First, a series of high-profile organizations at the national level picked up on and began to talk about the work that Keystone was doing to support the migrant community. The *publicity and enhanced profile* (first-order category L) that these organizations

provided for Keystone generated significantly greater attention than might be expected of a small social enterprise in rural England.

META came to the attention of some key audiences relatively early on in its existence. For example, the Polish Consul General visited Keystone in 2007 and called for META to be replicated across the United Kingdom:

> [This] is a wonderful project that caters for the needs of the migrant communities and has the full support of. . . my office. . . However, it seems very unique and it is strange that there are not more of these throughout Britain and it would be wonderful to have more. (Eastern Daily Press, February 3, 2007)

But it was when three national commissions—the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, the Audit Commission, and the Commission for Rural Communities—each identified Keystone's approach to supporting migrants as one of the best of its kind and presented it as a template for other community organizations to follow that Keystone's profile was transformed among other non-governmental and governmental organizations. This led some stakeholders to begin to describe Keystone as a "best-practice" model for supporting migrants, and, as a result, it attained nationwide recognition as a "leading entrepreneurial community organization" (Blackmore, 2011).

Further validation for Keystone's strategy came when Oliver Letwin, minister of state for policy and "part of the Prime Minister's inner circle of influential decision makers" met with Stott in April 2011 in order to learn about Keystone's approach to promoting community development and cohesion (Gough, 2011: 9). Following on from this, a group of Members of the European Parliament from the United Kingdom, Poland, and Germany "travel[led] to Thetford's Keystone Innovation Centre to hear the reality of how migration is being managed locally and find out how Europe. . . can ensure greater fairness as migrant workers come from other European countries seeking. . . work" (Howitt, 2013).

Second, Keystone's enhanced profile opened up *revenue-generating opportunities* (first-order category M). Specifically, the organization's image with respect to its local government partners was strengthened considerably, which helped it earn contracts to deliver a range of community projects and services, many of which were unconnected to its support for the migrant community. For example, Keystone won a series of contracts to deliver "work clubs" on the social housing estates, which were designed to help the long-term unemployed find jobs. It also won a series of contracts to support teenagers who had been identified by their high schools as at risk of becoming "NEET" (not in education, employment, or training). With regard to the work clubs, the first author pitched for (and won) one of the contracts at a meeting of the council. His sense during the meeting was that the credibility of Keystone had been bolstered by the success of META, and that this had played an important role in the awarding of the contract. In addition, Keystone's consulting business benefitted considerably from the increased attention and profile, which also boosted revenues. Its image with national government was strengthened as well; for example, Keystone was chosen as one of 11 host organizations to pilot Prime Minister David Cameron's community organizer program, a flagship government policy designed to promote the welfare of communities. This provided four full-time members of staff for 18 months, a significant augmentation in resources for an organization of Keystone's size.

In sum, Keystone's stigmatization appeared to result in increased resource flows: as the profile of the organization increased, other stakeholders rewarded it for helping the migrants. Our interpretation of what happened here is that Keystone benefitted from a kind of positive image transfer or spillover; in other words, other organizations publicized Keystone's work, and where possible an affiliation with Keystone, in order to share in a small way in its success and to show that they were aligned with Keystone's values. Keystone, in turn, was able to leverage this desire for reflected glory on the part of others into concrete opportunities for revenue generation by claiming competence in areas unconnected to its support for the migrants.

MANAGING IDENTITY IN STIGMATIZED ORGANIZATIONS: A MODEL

Our findings, summarized in Figure 1, outline the internal effects of being stigmatized, the main organizational responses, and the outcomes of these responses. In this section, we draw on the concepts we have identified to present a model of the management of identity in stigmatized organizations, showing how the process unfolds and the relationship between the key concepts. Our model is shown in Figure 2.

Our model begins at the point that an organization becomes stigmatized, which is assumed to trigger acute consequences for that organization. First, it

FIGURE 2
Managing Identity in Stigmatized Organizations: A Model



Notes: Three of the constructs that appear in the model—stigma transfer, image crisis and image work—did not feature in our analysis. Rather, they formed part of our case overview and were described in our empirical context section.

may lead to an image crisis with respect to one or more stakeholders, which precipitates image work on the part of the organization in an effort to manage how it is perceived externally. An image crisis may also be a catalyst for organizational members to reevaluate their understanding of, and relationship with, their employing organization.

Specifically, an image crisis can have two distinct implications for organizational members (Figure 2, box A). First, it may both lead to and reinforce secondary stigmatization, with the stigma that is directed toward the organization also directed toward its individual employees, which can be a traumatic experience for them. Second, it may result in organizational members empathizing with the views of the stigmatizers, particularly if both groups have overlapping social networks. Where a subset of organizational members experience secondary stigmatization and empathize with the views of the stigmatizers, stigma mirroring may happen, with the dynamics of stigmatization that are evident in an organization's environment replicated internally. In these circumstances, an organization experiences a full-blown identity crisis.

In the face of these crises, one possible path for an organization is to disassociate itself from the stigmatized group in an effort to reverse the transfer and remove the stigmatization, as indicated by the vertical dotted arrow connecting box A and box B (see Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Alternatively, as happened in our case, an organization can engage in identity work in an effort to manage the identity crisis (box B). The two types of identity work we highlighted are (1) advocacy—the organization seeks to build internal support for the stigmatized group in order to cast that group in a more progressive light and justify the organization's alignment with it; and (2) valorization—the organization seeks to reframe the reasons for its stigmatization and imbue members with a sense of pride in its values.

Organizations may need to undergo several cycles of identity work, as indicated by the dotted arrow linking box B with box A. Indeed, if the identity work is unsuccessful and the identity problems that result from stigmatization are not contained, our model assumes organizations will remain trapped in an identity crisis and that no positive outcomes will flow to it. If, however, the identity work is successful (i.e., the organization's identity is sufficiently repaired), then benefits may accrue to an organization that experiences stigmatization (box C). Specifically, identity work may lead members to reflect upon and validate the reasons for its existence, and ultimately to reevaluate what it means to be stigmatized so that a tarnished image among a key stakeholder group is viewed more positively.

With a clearer sense of what it stands for, the organization may also be able to find and exploit other opportunities, setting the stage for the possibility of resource augmentation. This is because a stigmatized organization is likely to come to the attention of other organizations that share the same values, raising its profile and enhancing its image among them. A stigmatized organization's increased profile may also be influenced by image work, as indicated by the vertical dotted arrow connecting the "image work" box to the "resource augmentation" oval in Figure 2. It is important to note, however, that our model does not assume that image work needs to be successful for positive benefits to materialize. Indeed, a key finding of our study is that an organization's image may remained "stained" among a core stakeholder group, but if organizational members come to re-evaluate what it means to have a tarnished image among that group, then they are able to come to terms with and accept their organization's stigmatization.

As a result of these benefits, a stigmatized organization may choose to enhance, rather than dilute, its alignment with a stigmatized group. However, at the same time, this strategy involves continued identity work in order to combat the ongoing potentially negative effects of stigmatization, as indicated by the dotted arrow joining box C with box B. Thus, responding strategically to stigmatization can be theorized as an ongoing process, rather than one with clear beginning and end points.

DISCUSSION

We believe that our findings have important implications for organizational theory by: (1) illuminating the internal effects of organizational stigmatization on organizational identity and identification; (2) conceptualizing the role of identity work in the management of stigma; and (3) explaining how stigmatization may have positive, as well as negative, consequences for organizations. In this section, we consider each of these findings in turn.

The Internal Effects of Organizational Stigmatization

We noted earlier that research on organizational stigma, reputation, and crisis management has focused on the effects of stigmatization outside the boundaries of organizations. This was an obvious place to begin and has moved the field decisively forward. However, the internal implications of organizations that experience extreme negative social evaluation are also important (Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008)—yet they have been largely overlooked.

The relationship between stigma and organizational identity has been highlighted in the literature as a potentially interesting one (Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008). Hudson (2008) addressed this issue directly as part of his theoretical model of core-stigmatized organizations. Interestingly, he argued that "[w]hile insiders are likely aware of the perceptions of outsiders... the fundamental identity held by them is likely to remain the same" (256). One of the few empirical studies of this relationship is by Dutton and Dukerich (1991). These authors found that the "negative fallout" (532) surrounding the New York Port Authority's approach to addressing homelessness had an adverse effect on the organization's identity, which ultimately forced the organization to change its conception of its responsibilities toward homeless people in its jurisdiction.

Our study suggests that the internal effects of stigmatization can be very significant indeed. Specifically, we found that stigmatization may negatively impact an organization's identity to the extent that members may begin to question its very purpose. Moreover, we show that stigmatization can affect the connection between organizational members and their employing organization regardless of formal position: organizational stigma may actually be felt most keenly by employees at the "front line," as it is they who interface directly with stakeholders and who are therefore most likely to experience what we term secondary stigmatization (see Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).

The fundamental insight here is that organizations can come to reflect or mirror internally the dynamics of stigmatization that are evident in their environments. Thus, they become microcosms of their larger contexts, which can foster debilitating internal social divisions that challenge shared conceptions of organizational identity. These dynamics are likely to be exacerbated when some organizational members are part of a stakeholder group that is stigmatizing the organization, leading them to experience conflict between their identification with a community and their identification with their employing organization. Indeed, some organizational members may even come to empathize with the views of the stigmatizers. As we saw in our study, this may lead some individuals to "disidentify" (Bhattacharya & Elsbach, 2002; Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001) with

the organization because they cannot reconcile these competing pressures. In other words, when an organization is stigmatized, the process of identification may become untenable for some members, leading them to exit the organization.

It is important to note that the speed of stigmatization may be an important factor influencing the extent of organizational members' disidentification. In organizations that experience a slower stigmatization process, the relationship between stigma and disidentification may be closer to an inverted-U, with both increasing steadily, peaking, then decreasing as the effects of selection and retention policies are felt. Nonetheless, a core implication of our study is that when one or more stakeholders evaluate an organization very negatively, this can have significant ramifications for organizational identity and identification in ways that have been neglected in the literature.

The Management of Organizational Stigmatization: The Role of Identity Work

Our study also sheds new light on management of the effects of organizational stigma. As noted above, a number of researchers in the fields of stigma, reputation, and crisis management have explored this issue, and in doing so have developed some significant insights. For example, impression management (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; McDonnell & King, 2013), concealment (King, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987), defiance (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012), boundary management (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009), and the strategic cooptation of negative labels (Helms & Patterson, 2014) have been identified as potentially effective strategies.

Our findings resonate with aspects of the existing literature, but also extend them to include strategies to manage the internal effects of stigmatization on organizational identity—which has been largely ignored by researchers studying stigma, organizational reputation, and crisis management. Specifically, we identified distinct types of identity work designed to affirm an organization's core purpose and heal the internal trauma that results from stigmatization. This may involve valorizing the organization's relationship with a particular stigmatized group and advocating on its behalf. It could be argued that this is simply a kind of impression management designed to change surface perceptions in an organization (see Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). However, the concept of impression management captures neither the objective nor the motivation of this form of work, which requires a fundamental assessment of why the organization exists and what it means to be stigmatized.

Indeed, we show that organizations may choose to increase their alignment with stigmatized groups, which reinforces its stigmatization in the eyes of some stakeholders. This resonates with the "defiance" response to negative evaluation as outlined by Lamin and Zaheer (2012: 54). However, such a strategy goes far beyond mere defiance or "questioning the questioner." In fact, it may lead organizations to actively seek out and deliberately strengthen links with the group that is the source of its stigmatization; perhaps ironically, this implies that engagement with a particular stigmatized group may become a more important strategic priority after stigmatization than before it happens. This implication of our study represents a radical departure from current thinking, much of which emphasizes the need to placate or modify the views of the stigmatizers.

We think this is important because it suggests that for some organizations being stigmatized can become a source of pride instead of a stain to be expunged. Thus, rather than change their image in the eyes of a stigmatizing stakeholder group, which in practice may be extremely difficult, organizations can alter the meanings that members attach to the negative labels that are attributed to it by this group. This challenges, but also adds nuance, to an important finding in identity research, which is that organizations strive to align their identity and image so that they are consistent (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Gioia et al., 2000; Gioia & Thomas, 1996). The process of meaning reconstruction may become easier if organizations can point to other stakeholders that evaluate them positively (i.e., the organization's image is split between positive and negative evaluations). However, if the labels used by the stigmatizing stakeholder group resonate with organizational members, or at least some members, more strongly than those used by the positively evaluating stakeholder group, this remains a formidable task.

The Advantages of Organizational Stigmatization

Implicit in organizational research on stigma is the assumption that organizations that are subject to very negative evaluation by stakeholders will suffer significant adverse consequences. For example, Warren (2007: 481) argued that "The outcomes of

organizational stigma can be devastating for a firm. . . [and] can spark a chain of events involving financial difficulties, bankruptcy and death." Similarly, Hudson (2008: 255) stated that organizational stigmatization may lead "social audiences. . . [to] withdraw their social support," which, according to Sutton and Callahan (1987: 406), leaves organizations in a life-threatening "predicament." Work on reputation and crisis management has relied on a parallel set of assumptions. This literature has gone into more detail about how different types of organizational crises carry with them varying levels of reputational risk (Dowling, 2001). Nonetheless, regardless of the nature of the crisis and the capacity of organizations to assign responsibility to others, there is strong agreement that "a crisis is negative" (Coombs, 2007a: 136) for organizations because it undermines their standing among stakeholders.

While in many cases it is apparent that stigmatization and the associated reputational or image crises do indeed have significant negative consequences that jeopardize an organization's future, our study indicates that stigmatization may also have positive consequences for organizations. This possibility was also raised by Paetzold et al. (2008). In a similar vein, Mishina and Devers (2012) drew on research in social psychology to propose that being stigmatized could be perceived as a "mark of distinction" (Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000: 31). Moreover, a recent paper by Helms and Patterson (2014) investigated how organizations use stigmatization to "correct" misperceptions about how they are viewed, and gain broader acceptance among those who stigmatize them. These insights are consistent with work in sociology which has suggested that the stigmatization of individuals or groups may lead to respect or even adulation.

Our study extends this emerging set of ideas on the positive outcomes of stigmatization, but illustrates a quite different set of dynamics. Specifically, our study indicates that stigmatization forces organizations to reevaluate their *raison d'être*. This process of introspection may result in increased confidence in the organization's identity, a clearer sense of its core purpose, and (for those who remain part of the organization) stronger organizational identification.

Moreover, we further suggest that becoming stigmatized in the eyes of one stakeholder may mark out an organization in the eyes of other stakeholders. This, in turn, may increase the organization's profile, providing opportunities for it to augment resource flows. In other words, the withdrawal of support by a stakeholder group because the organization is considered by that group to possess a fundamental flaw that discredits and deindividuates it may be more than compensated for by increased support from other stakeholder groups that perceive the organization to represent a set of values that they seek to uphold or promote.

As noted above, our theory assumes that the positive outcomes of stigmatization with respect to resource acquisition will only accrue to an organization if and when the harmful effects of stigma on its identity have been contained. It is interesting to consider briefly what might happen if an organization was unable to sufficiently repair its identity—would some of the positive outcomes still occur, or would they dissipate? We believe that in these circumstances few, if any, positive outcomes would materialize. This is because while stigmatization may lead, in itself, to an enhanced profile that renders the organization more likely to be noticed by others that share the same values, it will be unable to capitalize on any resulting opportunities unless it first comes to terms with, or even embraces, the reasons for its stigmatization. To do so, it needs to change members' understanding of what it means to be stigmatized (i.e., its identity) so that they are comfortable belonging to an organization whose image is tarnished among a core stakeholder group.

Transferability Beyond Keystone

We believe that Keystone constitutes an excellent setting for generating new theory about organizational stigma. A particularly interesting aspect of our study is that prior to the stigmatization Keystone experienced, the organization enjoyed the strong support of the stakeholder group that ultimately stigmatized it. As such, it represents an "extreme" (Patton, 2002) setting that offers an especially powerful example of stigmatization. At the same time, it raises questions about the transferability of our theory. Put simply, is our case so unique that the theory applies only to Keystone? While caution is always necessary with single-case studies, we believe that our framework can be "transferred" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) beyond our focal organization. Specifically, we propose two important characteristics that define the boundaries of transferability with respect to our model.

First, our model applies specifically to organizations that experience the kind of sudden stigmatization that happened at Keystone; it is partly

the speed of the switch (from being evaluated in a highly positive manner to a highly negative manner) that is likely to trigger the image and identity crises that we observed, and to raise awareness among other stakeholders. This means that the applicability of our model may to be confined to organizations that experience stigma transfer (i.e., stigmatization through alignment with a stigmatized group or organization). Our model is unlikely to apply directly to core stigmatized organizations (i.e., organizations that belong to stigmatized categories) such as abortion clinics, strip clubs, or arms manufacturers, because these organizations are usually stigmatized from inception. It may apply partially to event-stigmatized organizations, such as BP following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, because here the switch to stigmatization is likely to be rapid, but the strategies for managing event stigma are likely to be different from the of kinds work outlined in our model.

Second, the positive outcomes that we identify in our model with respect to resource acquisition are likely to be limited to circumstances in which there is significant diversity in the values held by salient stakeholders; where all of an organization's key stakeholders hold similar value sets and react in similar ways to an organization's alignment with a particular group, the positive outcomes that we outline in our model are unlikely to materialize. For example, when a group of NGOs tried to defend the practices of companies that employed children on the grounds that such practices provided important sources of income to poor families (i.e., the NGOs aligned themselves with a group of companies that had become highly stigmatized), the reaction from salient stakeholders around the world was uniformly negative, which meant that the NGOs were forced to back down, with damaging implications for them and arguably the children concerned (Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007).

CONCLUSION

Goffman's (1961) ethnography of a psychiatric hospital revealed how patients were socialized into behaviors that reaffirmed the labels used by hospital staff to categorize them as chronically mentally ill, and stripped them of the skills and confidence needed to cope with straightforward social situations. In doing so, he offered a compelling account of the constructed and self-reinforcing nature of stigmatization. Goffman's analysis is particularly harrowing because of the vulnerable nature of the patients concerned. Most organizations do not face the overwhelming powerlessness and desperation experienced by the patients in Goffman's *Asylums* (1961). Indeed, organizational environments, however challenging, may offer possibilities that allow organizations to address aspects of their stigmatization and turn the stigma into something positive. By highlighting the positive outcomes of organizational stigmatization in some circumstances, we do not seek to gloss over or downplay the negative implications. However, we believe that our findings regarding the internal effects, management, and outcomes of stigmatization constitute important contributions. We hope that other researchers will find our model useful as they augment thinking in this important area of inquiry.

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Paul Tracey (p.tracey@jbs.cam.ac.uk) is professor of innovation and organization and academic director of the Centre for Social Innovation at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School. Between 2011 and 2013 he was an Economic and Social Research Council mid-career fellow. His research interests include social innovation, regional innovation, and institutional change. He received his PhD from the University of Stirling.

Nelson Phillips (n.phillips@imperial.ac.uk) is the Abu Dhabi chamber chair in innovation and entrepreneurship and associate dean of faculty and research at Imperial College Business School. His research interests include various aspects of organization theory, technology strategy, innovation, and entrepreneurship, often studied from an institutional theory perspective. He also has an interest in discourse analysis and related textual research methods. He received his PhD from the University of Alberta.