

# The Panel Complexity of Sortition: Is 12 Angry Men Enough?

**Tomek Ponitka**

Tel Aviv University

Joint work with



**Johannes Brustle**  
Sapienza University of Rome



**Simone Fioravanti**  
Sapienza University of Rome



**Jeremy Vollen**  
University of New South Wales

# What Is Sortition?

Delegating decisions to **randomly** selected panels.



Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016–2018): A 100-member panel proposed changes to abortion laws, culminating in a successful national referendum.

# Why Use Sortition?

Elected parliaments fail to **represent** the population.



In the U.S. Congress (2023), nearly 50% of members are millionaires, compared to about 8% of the overall U.S. population.

# Research Direction

## ***Part 1: Definition of Representativeness***



How to measure how well a panel represents the population?

## ***Part 2: Panel Complexity***

What panel size is needed to make good decisions on behalf of the population?


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**Wasserstein distance** measures similarity between two probability distributions.

It captures **representativeness** for a given **feature** (such as age or income).

Properties of Wasserstein distance are central to our **panel complexity** analysis.

# Part 2: Panel Complexity

What **panel size** is needed to make **good decisions** on behalf of the population?



In the U.S., juries typically have 12 members. But why 12?

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


The judge and 12 jurors are mirroring Jesus and the 12 apostles.

# One (Representative) Theorem

*Social Choice Setting:*

Consider a **participatory budgeting** problem with **Lipschitz utilities**.



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*Social Choice Setting:*

Consider a **participatory budgeting** problem with **Lipschitz utilities**.

*Goal (Population Guarantee):*

We want the expected **social welfare** to be within **additive  $\epsilon$**  of optimum.

*Assumption (Deliberation Guarantee):*

Assume the panel allocates budget to maximize **welfare of panel members**.

*Theorem (Panel Complexity):*

It suffices to draw a **uniformly random** panel of size  $\tilde{\Theta}\left((1/\epsilon)^2 \cdot \#\text{categories}\right)$ .

# Open Problems

*Open Problem #1:* Study **panel complexity** for other **social choice settings** and other **deliberation/population guarantees**.

*Open Problem #2:* Analyze **panel complexity** for **non-uniform** panel selection methods.

*Open Problem #3:* Improve **panel complexity bounds** for **small population size**.

Thank you!