




# Detection Lifecycle – from a hypothesis to remediation in a DevOps style

ISSA Polska – Stowarzyszenie ds. Bezpieczeństwa  
Systemów Informacyjnych,

Lech Lachowicz  
Dyrektor ds. Profesjonalnego Rozwoju

# Disclaimer



## **Who am I:**

IT Security freak with decent background in dev  
Threat Defense lead responsible for detections, hunting, automation and breach simulation  
Big fan of opensource and automation

## **Who I'm not:**

NOT a full time Developer  
NOT A DEVOPS  
NOT Alfa and Omega, you can actually do it differently

## **What is it going to be about:**

Better SECURITY

## **What is it not going to be about:**

Software development  
Writing code  
I won't give you the ultimate recipe... just hints and ideas

# Agenda

- The basics
- Detection Lifecycle
- Automating stuff
  - Transforming
  - Testing
  - Deploying

# The basics

## detection

/dɪˈtɛkʃ(ə)n/

*noun*

the action or process of identifying the presence of something concealed.  
"the early detection of fetal abnormalities"

Synonym: observation noticing noting discernment perception spotting ▼

- the work of a detective in investigating a crime.  
plural noun: **detections**  
"modern technology is essential to crime detection"

Synonym: discovery uncovering unearthing rooting out exposure revelation ▼

In Cyber it's usually a **search** executed in an analytical platform (SIEM typically) or a more complex **set of rules and searches** that work together to discover adversary and trigger Incident.





# Questions without answers




What are we looking for?

How well are we doing?

How should we prioritize?

# The pyramid of pain




Posted 1st March 2013 by [DavidJBianco](#)


Source: <https://detect-respond.blogspot.com//the-pyramid-of-pain.html>

# Mitre Att&ck Framework

The ATT&CK matrix provides a framework for identifying tactics and techniques used by threat actors




# The detection lifecycle






# The detection lifecycle



# Lets start with OSINT


Recently hot topic – Solorigate: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop

Source: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/>



- 1 Not worth bothering
- 2 Better but will be FP prone if used without process name
- 3 Now that's something – wscript as debugger... no thanks!
- 4 We'll get wscript run every time dllhost.exe is spawned. This will cut the process ancestry here!

# The detection lifecycle



# Option 1 – use the SIEM language

## Splunk Security Content

Open sourced and yaml based

Contains a lot more than just the search

Splunk optimized, fits EnterpriseSecurity and Core perfectly

Well documented with a lot of content and app ecosystem to support analyst

IMHO – still work in progress....

```
1 name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers
2 id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1
3 version: 1
4 date: '2017-09-12'
5 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
6 type: batch
7 datamodel:
8   - Authentication
9 description: The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized
10 as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that
11 have not been seen before in the last 30 days.
12 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest
13 latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router
14 by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),
15 "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` `security_content_ctime(latest)`
16 | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`'
17 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network
18 router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You
19 must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating
20 to routing infrastructure.
21 known_false_positives: Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
22 references: []
23 tags:
```

[https://github.com/splunk/security\\_content](https://github.com/splunk/security_content)

## Elastic EQL

Open sourced and yaml based, but... requires Enterprise

Good documentation

Elastic optimized, wont work with anything else

Not too many examples and out of box detections

Uses [ECS](#) – Elastic Common Schema

```
{
  "query": ""
  sequence
    [ process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" ]
    [ file where stringContains(file.name, "scrobj.dll") ]
  ""
}
```

<https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/ecs/1.9/index.html>

# Option 2 – use SIGMA

Quote: “Sigma is for log files what **Snort** is for network traffic and **YARA** is for files.”



Yaml based and open sourced  
Great documentation  
Extensible  
Flexible  
Soooo many examples!

Good enough but not perfect...  
Good for detections  
but not right for lifecycle tracking


Source: <https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma>




# How to use SIGMA




# The detection lifecycle



# What for?




# Breach/Attack/adversary Simulation platforms



 SafeBreach

 CYTHE




  
CYMULATE  
BREACH & ATTACK SIMULATION

ATTACKIQ®

# Building test environment - Splunk


[https://github.com/splunk/attack\\_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range)






# Building test environment - HELK

<https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK>



No attack simulation platform ready out of box. Will have to add it ☺.

# Atomic Red Team



**Atomic Red Team** allows every security team to test their controls by executing simple "atomic tests" that exercise the same techniques used by adversaries (all mapped to Mitre's ATT&CK).

<https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team>

# Atomic Red Team

## Atoms – test description

### Atomic Test #1 - Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution

Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.

Supported Platforms: Windows


Inputs:

Name	Description	Type	Default Value
filename	Name of the local file, include path.	Path	PathToAtomsFolder\T1218.010\src\RegSvr32.sct

Attack Commands: Run with `command_prompt` !

```
regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:#{filename} scrobj.dll
```


## Execution Framework



# Atomic Red Team - demo




# The detection lifecycle





# GIT as Detection Catalog




# So, what's so hard about it?

- We set it up and forget
- Some are complex to create and test
- It's a “fingers crossed” approach – we hope it works
- Many tweaks by multiple analysts
- Changing datasets
- Changing technologies
- We need to track the effectiveness




# That's where DevOps kicks in

- Provides interoperability of software and operations to ensure the maximal data access, knowledge dissemination, and automation
- Bridges the siloed operations and development teams
- Leverages semi autonomous technologies to facilitate data driven development and communication
- Complex tasks are handed off to the machine automation to mitigate the burden of distraction and context switching
- Addresses the challenge of managing and maintaining the software development process and tools




# Shifting Left – Testing Earlier in the Process



Integrate automated unit, functional, API, performance, and security testing into your CI process.

Exploratory testing before the code is finished.

# Shifting Right – Testing in Production




Integrate monitoring of the live application into your testing process.

Include system monitoring and metrics as well as input from customer support and the business.



# CI/CD – automatically test and deploy




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# CI/CD tools




# Detection CI/CD pipeline



# Questions





# Thank you

Lech Lachowicz

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