




# Web Security

# Browser and Network





February 12, 2002

## Microsoft Issues New IE Browser Security Patch

By Richard Karpinski

- Microsoft has released a security patch that closes some **major holes** in its Internet Explorer browser
- The so-called "cumulative patch" fixes six different IE problems
- Affected browsers include Internet Explorer 5.01, 5.5 and 6.0
- Microsoft rated the potential security breaches as **"critical"**



# Fixed by the February 2002 Patch

- ◆ Buffer overrun associated with an HTML directive
  - Could be used by hackers to **run malicious code** on a user's system
- ◆ Scripting vulnerability
  - Lets an attacker **read files** on a user's system
- ◆ Vulnerability related to the display of file names
  - Hackers could misrepresent the name of a file and **trick a user into downloading an unsafe file**
- ◆ ... and many more

On April 13, 2004, MS announced 20 new vulnerabilities



# October 12, 2004

## Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-038

If a user is logged on with administrative privileges, **an attacker** who successfully exploited the most severe of these vulnerabilities **could take complete control of an affected system**, including installing programs; viewing, changing, or deleting data; or creating new accounts with full privileges. [...] Microsoft recommends that customers install the update immediately.

Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) Heap Memory Corruption Vulnerability	Critical
Similar Method Name Redirection Cross Domain Vulnerability	Critical
Install Engine Vulnerability	Critical
SSL Caching Vulnerability	Moderate
<b>Aggregate Severity of All Vulnerabilities</b>	<b>Critical</b>



# December 13, 2005

## Microsoft Security Bulletin MS05-054

If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, **an attacker** who successfully exploited the most severe of these vulnerabilities **could take complete control of an affected system**. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. [...] We recommend that customers apply the update immediately.

File Download Dialog Box Manipulation Vulnerability	Moderate
HTTPS Proxy Vulnerability	Moderate
COM Object Instantiation Memory Corruption Vulnerability	Critical
Mismatched Document Object Model Objects	Critical
Memory Corruption Vulnerability	
<b>Aggregate Severity of All Vulnerabilities</b>	<b>Critical</b>



# January 7, 2007

## Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07-004

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the **Vector Markup Language (VML) implementation** in Microsoft Windows. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page or HTML e-mail that could potentially allow remote code execution if a user visited the Web page or viewed the message. **An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system.**

**Maximum Severity Rating:** **Critical**

**Recommendation:** Customers should apply the update immediately





# How about NOW?

<http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms11-feb.mspx>

Why ???





# HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

- ◆ Used to request and return data
  - Methods: GET, POST, HEAD, ...
- ◆ **Stateless** request/response protocol
  - Each request is independent of previous requests
  - Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications
- ◆ Evolution
  - HTTP 1.0: simple
  - HTTP 1.1: more complex



# HTTP Request

Method




File



HTTP version



Headers



GET /default.asp HTTP/1.0

Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, \*/\*

Accept-Language: en

User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible;MSIE 2.0;Windows 95)

Connection: Keep-Alive

If-Modified-Since: Sunday, 17-Apr-96 04:32:58 GMT

Blank line

Data – none for GET



# HTTP Response

HTTP version

Status code

Reason phrase

Headers

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 1996 02:20:42 GMT
Server: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/html
Last-Modified: Thu, 18 Apr 1996 17:39:05 GMT
Content-Length: 2543
```

Data

```
<HTML> Some data... blah, blah, blah </HTML>
```

# HTTP Digest Authentication

client




Request URL with  
GET or POST method

- HTTP 401 Unauthorised
- Authentication "realm"  
(description of system being accessed)
- Fresh, random nonce

$H1 = \text{hash}(\text{username}, \text{realm}, \text{password})$   
 $H2 = \text{hash}(\text{method}, \text{URL})$   
 $H3 = \text{hash}(H1, \text{server nonce}, H2)$


server



Recompute  
hashes and  
verify



# Primitive Browser Session



Store session information in URL; easily read on network



# FatBrain.com [due to Fu et al.]

- ◆ User logs into website with his password, authenticator is generated, user is given special URL containing the authenticator

<https://www.fatbrain.com/HelpAccount.asp?t=0&p1=me@me.com&p2=540555758>

- With special URL, user doesn't need to re-authenticate
  - Reasoning: user could not have not known the special URL without authenticating first. That's true, BUT...

- ◆ Authenticators are global sequence numbers

- It's easy to guess sequence number for another user

<https://www.fatbrain.com/HelpAccount.asp?t=0&p1=SomeoneElse&p2=540555752>

- Fix: use random authenticators



# Bad Idea: Encoding State in URL

- ◆ Unstable, frequently changing URLs
- ◆ Vulnerable to eavesdropping
- ◆ There is no guarantee that URL is private
  - Early versions of Opera used to send entire browsing history, including all visited URLs, to Google



# Cookies





# Storing Info Across Sessions

- ◆ A **cookie** is a file created by an Internet site to store information on your computer



HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state



# What Are Cookies Used For?

## ◆ Authentication

- Use the fact that the user authenticated correctly in the past to make future authentication quicker

## ◆ Personalization

- Recognize the user from a previous visit

## ◆ Tracking

- Follow the user from site to site; learn his/her browsing behavior, preferences, and so on



# Cookie Management

## ◆ Cookie ownership

- Once a cookie is saved on your computer, the website that created the cookie can read it

## ◆ Variations

- Temporary cookies
  - Stored until you quit your browser
- Persistent cookies
  - Remain until deleted or expire
- Third-party cookies
  - Originates on or sent to another website



# Privacy Issues with Cookies

- ◆ Cookie may include any information about you known by the website that created it
  - Browsing activity, account information, etc.
- ◆ Sites can share this information
  - Advertising networks
  - [2o7.net](#) tracking cookie
- ◆ Browser attacks could invade your "privacy"

November 8, 2001:

Users of Microsoft's browser and e-mail programs could be vulnerable to having their browser cookies stolen or modified due to a new security bug in Internet Explorer (IE), the company warned today



# Austin American-Statesman

Austin American-Statesman | statesman.com - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.statesman.com/

Austin American-Statesman | states...

The website "adinterax.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information...

NEWS ENTERTAINMENT

## statesman.com

RECEIVE STATESMAN.COM NEWS VIA EMAIL

More about: [RSS](#) | [Wireless](#) | [Search](#) | [Site/Web](#) | [Yellow Pages](#) | [Archive](#) | [Member Center](#) | [Log Out](#) | Welcome, [Vitaly](#)

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→ CARS  
→ HOMES  
→ JOBS  
→ SHOPPING

**3M HALF MARATHON**  
Good day for a run

**Privacy Alert**

The website "adinterax.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?

☐ Apply my decision to all cookies from this website

[Allow Cookie](#) [Block Cookie](#) [More Info](#) [Help](#)

**Exclusive for some**  
In Central Austin, finding a home priced around \$150,000 can be difficult.

- ▶ [How neighborhoods stack up](#)
- ▶ [How Central Texas compares](#)
- ▶ [Start your home search on](#)

# The Weather Channel

weather.com - local weather forecasts, radar and reports from The Weather Channel - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.weather.com/

weather.com - local weather foreca...

Welcome. [Local weather in 1-click](#) | [Put weather on my desktop](#) | [Customize weather](#)

**The Weather Channel** weather.com

**Localweather** Enter zip or US/Intl city

[Maps](#) | [Video](#) | [News](#) | [TV](#) | [Mobile](#) | [Alerts](#)

[Home](#) | [In Season](#) | [Plan Ahead](#) | [My Neighborhood](#) | [Travel Smart](#) | [Stay Healthy](#) | [Around the Home](#)

**Privacy Alert**

The website "twci.coremetrics.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?

☐ Apply my decision to all cookies from this website

[Reinforcing arctic air bound for Plains](#)  
2:15 p.m. ET 1/28/2007


AT&T Your world. Delivered.

The website "twci.coremetrics.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information...



# MySpace

The website "insightexpressai.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie"...



# Let's Take a Closer Look...

**Privacy Alert**

The website "insightexpressai.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?

☐ Apply my decision to all cookies from this website

[Allow Cookie](#) [Block Cookie](#) [More Info](#) [Help](#)

**Cookie Information**

Name	IXAICampaignCounter558		
Domain	insightexpressai.com		
Path	/		
Expires	Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:00:00	Secure	No
Data	1		

3rd Party ☒ Yes ☐ Session ☐ No

Compact Policy CP="OTI DSP COR CUR ADMi DEVi TAI PSA PSD IVD CONi TELi OUR BUS STA"



# Storing State in Browser

## ◆ Dansie Shopping Cart

- “A premium, comprehensive, Perl shopping cart. Increase your web sales by making it easier for your web store customers to order.”

```
<FORM METHOD=POST
```

```
ACTION="http://www.dansie.net/cgi-bin/scripts/cart.pl">
```

```
Black Leather purse with leather straps<
```

Change this to 2.00

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=name VALUE="Black leather purse">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=price VALUE="20.00">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=sh VALUE="1">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE="p" >
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=custom1 VALUE="Black leather purse  
with leather straps">
```

Bargain shopping!

```
<INPUT TYPE=SUBMIT NAME="add" VALUE="Put in Shopping Cart">
```

```
</FORM>
```



# Shopping Cart Form Tampering

<http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/4621>

- ◆ Many Web-based shopping cart applications use hidden fields in HTML forms to hold parameters for items in an online store. These parameters can include the item's name, weight, quantity, product ID, and price. Any application that bases price on a hidden field in an HTML form is vulnerable to price changing by a remote user. **A remote user can change the price of a particular item they intend to buy, by changing the value for the hidden HTML tag that specifies the price, to purchase products at any price they choose.**

- ◆ **Platforms Affected:**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| - 3D3.COM Pty Ltd: ShopFactory 5.8 and earlier     | @Retail Corporation: @Retail Any version             |
| - Adgrafix: Check It Out Any version               | Baron Consulting Group: WebSite Tool Any version     |
| - ComCity Corporation: SalesCart Any version       | Crested Butte Software: EasyCart Any version         |
| - Dansie.net: Dansie Shopping Cart Any version     | Intelligent Vending Systems: Intellivend Any version |
| - Make-a-Store: Make-a-Store OrderPage Any version | McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 2.6          |
| - McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 3.0      | pknutsen@nethut.no: CartMan 1.04                     |
| - Rich Media Technologies: JustAddCommerce 5.0     | SmartCart: SmartCart Any version                     |
| - Web Express: Shoptron 1.2                        |  |



# Storing State in Browser Cookies

- ◆ Set-cookie: price=299.99
- ◆ User edits the cookie... cookie: price=29.99
- ◆ What's the solution?
- ◆ Add a MAC to every cookie, computed with the server's secret key
  - Price=299.99; HMAC(ServerKey, 299.99)
- ◆ But what if the website changes the price?






# Web Authentication via Cookies

- ◆ Need authentication system that works over HTTP and does not require servers to store session data
  - Why is it a bad idea to store session state on server?
  - Address fooling, storage problem
- ◆ Servers can use cookies to store state on client
  - When session starts, server computes an authenticator and gives it back to browser in the form of a cookie
    - Authenticator is a value that client cannot forge on his own
    - Example:  $\text{hash}(\text{server's secret key}, \text{session id})$
  - With each request, browser presents the cookie
  - Server recomputes and verifies the authenticator
    - Server does not need to remember the authenticator

# Typical Session with Cookies



Authenticators must be **unforgeable** and **tamper-proof**

(malicious client shouldn't be able to compute his own or modify an existing authenticator)





# WSJ.com in 1999

[due to Fu et al.]

- ◆ Idea: use `user,hash(user,key)` as authenticator
  - Key is secret and known only to the server. Without the key, clients can't forge authenticators.
- ◆ Implementation: `user,crypt(user,key)`
  - `crypt()` is UNIX encryption function for passwords
  - `crypt()` truncates its input at 8 characters
  - Usernames matching first 8 characters end up with the same authenticator
  - No expiration or revocation
- ◆ It gets worse... This scheme can be exploited to extract the server's secret key (chosen plaintext)



# Better Cookie Authenticator

Capability

Expiration

Hash(server secret, capability, expiration)

Describes what user is authorized to do on the site that issued the cookie

Cannot be forged by malicious user; does not leak server secret

- ◆ Main lesson: **don't roll your own!**
  - Homebrewed authentication schemes are often flawed
- ◆ There are standard cookie-based scheme



# Web Applications

- ◆ Online banking, shopping, government, etc. etc.
- ◆ Website takes input from user, interacts with back-end databases and third parties, outputs results by generating an HTML page
- ◆ Often written from scratch in a mixture of PHP, Java, Perl, Python, C, ASP
- ◆ Security is the main concern
  - Poorly written scripts with inadequate input validation
  - Sensitive data stored in world-readable files
  - Recent push from Visa and Mastercard to improve security of data management (PCI standard)



# JavaScript

- ◆ Language executed by browser
  - Can run before HTML is loaded, before page is viewed, while it is being viewed or when leaving the page
- ◆ Often used to exploit other vulnerabilities
  - Attacker gets to execute some code on user's machine
  - Cross-scripting: attacker inserts malicious JavaScript into a Web page or HTML email; when script is executed, it steals user's cookies and hands them over to attacker's site



# Scripting

```
<script type="text/javascript">  
  function whichButton(event) {  
    if (event.button==1) {  
      alert("You clicked the left mouse button!")  
    }  
    else {  
      alert("You clicked the right mouse button!")  
    }  
  }  
</script>  
...  
<body onMouseDown="whichButton(event)">  
...  
</body>
```

Script defines a  
page-specific function

Function gets executed when some event  
happens (onLoad, onKeyPress, onMouseMove...)



# JavaScript Security Model

- ◆ Script runs in a "sandbox"
  - Not allowed to access files or talk to the network
- ◆ Same-origin policy
  - Can only read properties of documents and windows from the same server, protocol, and port
  - If the same server hosts unrelated sites, scripts from one site can access document properties on the other
- ◆ User can grant privileges to signed scripts
  - UniversalBrowserRead/Write, UniversalFileRead, UniversalSendMail





# Risks of Poorly Written Scripts

- ◆ For example, echo user's input

`http://naive.com/search.php?term="Britney Spears"`

search.php responds with

`<html> <title>Search results</title>`

`<body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET[term]?>... </body>`

Or


`GET/ hello.cgi?name=Bob`

hello.cgi responds with

`<html>Welcome, dear Bob</html>`



# Stealing Cookies by Cross Scripting





# MySpace Worm (1)

<http://namb.la/popular/tech.html>

- ◆ Users can post HTML on their MySpace pages
- ◆ MySpace does not allow scripts in users' HTML
  - No `<script>`, `<body>`, `onclick`, `<a href=javascript://>`
- ◆ ... but does allow `<div>` tags for CSS. K00L!
  - `<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`
- ◆ But MySpace will strip out "javascript"
  - Use "java<NEWLINE>script" instead
- ◆ But MySpace will strip out quotes
  - Convert from decimal instead:  
`alert('double quote: ' + String.fromCharCode(34))`



# MySpace Worm (2)

<http://namb.la/popular/tech.html>

- ◆ *"There were a few other complications and things to get around. This was not by any means a straight forward process, and none of this was meant to cause any damage or piss anyone off. This was in the interest of..interest. It was interesting and fun!"*
- ◆ Started on "samy" MySpace page
- ◆ Everybody who visits an infected page, becomes infected and adds "samy" as a friend and hero
- ◆ 5 hours later "samy"  
has 1,005,831 friends
  - Was adding 1,000 friends per second at its peak





# Preventing Cross-Site Scripting

- ◆ Need to prevent injection of scripts into HTML. This is difficult!
- ◆ Preprocess any input from user before using it inside HTML
  - In PHP, `htmlspecialchars(string)` will replace all special characters with their HTML codes
    - ' becomes `&#039;`;
    - " becomes `&quot;`;
    - & becomes `&amp;`;
  - In ASP.NET, `Server.HtmlEncode(string)`



# Inadequate Input Validation

- ◆ <http://victim.com/copy.php?name=username>
- ◆ `copy.php` includes

Supplied by the user!

```
system("cp temp.dat $name.dat")
```

- ◆ User calls

```
http://victim.com/copy.php?name="a; rm \*"
```

- ◆ `copy.php` executes

```
system("cp temp.dat a; rm *");
```



# URL Redirection

- ◆ <http://victim.com/cgi-bin/loadpage.cgi?page=url>
  - Redirects browser to **url**
  - Commonly used for tracking user clicks; referrals
- ◆ Phishing website puts  
[http://victim.com/  
cgi-bin/loadpage.cgi?page=phish.com](http://victim.com/cgi-bin/loadpage.cgi?page=phish.com)
- ◆ Everything looks Ok (the link is indeed pointing to victim.com), but user ends up on phishing site!





# User Data in SQL Queries

- ◆ set UserFound=execute(  
    SELECT \* FROM UserTable WHERE  
    username=' ' & form("user") & " ' AND  
    password=' ' & form("pwd") & " ' " );
  - User supplies username and password, this SQL query checks if user/password combination is in the database
- ◆ If not UserFound.EOF  
    Authentication correct  
else Fail

Only true if the result of SQL query is not empty, i.e., user/pwd is in the database



# SQL Injection

- ◆ User gives username ' OR 1=1 --
- ◆ Web server executes query

Always true!

```
set UserFound=execute(  
    SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE  
    username=' ' OR 1=1 -- ... );
```

Everything after -- is ignored!

- ◆ This returns the entire database!
- ◆ UserFound.EOF is always false; authentication is always "correct"



# It Gets Better

- ◆ User gives username
  - ' exec cmdshell 'net user badguy badpwd' / ADD --
- ◆ Web server executes query
  - set UserFound=execute(  
SELECT \* FROM UserTable WHERE  
username=' ' exec ... -- ... );
- ◆ Creates an account for badguy on DB server
- ◆ Fix: always escape user-supplied arguments
  - Convert ' into \'



# Uninitialized Inputs

```
/* php-files/lostpassword.php */
```

```
for ($i=0; $i<=7; $i++)
```

```
    $new_pass .= chr(rand(97,122))
```

```
...
```

```
$result = dbquery("UPDATE ".$db_prefix."users
```

```
    SET user_password=md5('$new_pass')
```

```
    WHERE user_id='".$data['user_id']."'");
```

In normal execution, this becomes

```
UPDATE users SET user_password=md5('????????')
```

```
WHERE user_id='userid'
```

Creates a password with 7 random characters, **assuming \$new\_pass is set to NULL**

SQL query setting password in the DB



# Exploit

User appends this to the URL:

`&new_pass=badPwd%27%29%2c`

`user_level=%27103%27%2cuser_aim=%28%27`

This sets \$new\_pass to  
`badPwd'), user_level='103', user_aim=('`

SQL query becomes

`UPDATE users SET user_password=md5('BadPwd')`

`user_level='103', user_aim=('????????')`

`WHERE user_id='userid'`

... with superuser privileges

User's password is  
set to 'badPwd'



# SQL Injection in the Real World

- ◆ "A programming error in the University of Southern California's online system for accepting applications from prospective students left the personal information of as many as 280,000 users publicly accessible... **The vulnerability in USC's online Web application system is a relatively common and well-known software bug, known as database injection or SQL injection**"
  - SecurityFocus, July 6, 2005





# ActiveX

- ◆ ActiveX controls are downloaded and installed
  - Compiled binaries for client's OS
- ◆ ActiveX controls reside on client's machine
  - Activated by HTML object tag on the page
  - Run as binaries, not interpreted by browser
- ◆ Security model relies on three components
  - Digital signatures to verify the source of the binary
  - Browser policy can reject controls from network zones
  - Controls can be marked by author as "safe for initialization" or "safe for scripting"

Once accepted, installed and started, no control over execution!

# Installing Controls



If you install and run, no further control over the code

In principle, browser/OS could apply sandboxing, other techniques for containing risks in native code



# ActiveX Risks

## ◆ From MSDN:

- “An ActiveX control can be an extremely insecure way to provide a feature. Because it is a Component Object Model (COM) object, **it can do anything the user can do** from that computer. It can read from and write to the registry, and **it has access to the local file system**. From the moment a user downloads an ActiveX control, the control may be vulnerable to attack because **any Web application on the Internet can repurpose it**, that is, use the control for its own ends whether sincere or malicious.”

## ◆ How can a control be “repurposed?”

- Once installed, control can be accessed by any page that knows its class identifier (CLSID)



# IE Browser "Helper Objects"

- ◆ COM components loaded when IE starts up
- ◆ Run in same memory context as the browser
- ◆ Perform any action on IE windows and modules
  - Detect browser events
    - GoBack, GoForward, and DocumentComplete
  - Access browser menu, toolbar and make changes
  - Create windows to display information (or ads!!)
  - Install hooks to monitor messages and actions
- ◆ There is no protection from extensions
  - Spyware writers' favorite!
  - Try running **HijackThis** on your computer