

# Evaluating (In)Experience in Congressional Elections

**Rachel Porter\***, University of Notre Dame

**Sarah A. Treul**, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

## Abstract

From the 1980s to the mid 2010s, three-quarters of newly elected members to the U.S. House of Representatives had previous elected experience; only half of freshmen elected from 2016 to 2020 held prior office. In this paper, we investigate emergence- and success-driven explanations for the declining proportion of experienced officeholders entering Congress. In our analyses, we find that the advantages traditionally afforded experienced candidates are waning. First, we show that inexperienced candidates' emergence patterns have changed; amateurs are increasingly apt to emerge in the same kinds of contests as their experienced counterparts. We then show that experienced candidates have lost their fundraising edge, and that—for certain kinds of candidates—the value of elected experience itself has declined. Lastly, we identify other kinds of candidate characteristics as strong predictors for success in modern elections. We demonstrate that these electorally advantageous identities overwhelmingly belong to candidates who lack elected experience.

**Word Count:** 9,318

---

\*Corresponding Author. Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2057 Jenkins Nanovic Halls, Notre Dame, IN 46556, rachel.porter@nd.edu.

After Elizabeth Esty (D-CT) announced she would not seek reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2018, two women emerged to run in the Democratic primary for Connecticut’s 7<sup>th</sup> hoping to replace her as the district’s next representative. Mary Glassman had the kind of political pedigree one would expect from a competitive office-seeker. Glassman had served eight-terms as first selectman (a mayor-like position) for Simsbury, CT and during her tenure the town was named one of the “Top 100 Best Places to Live in America” for three consecutive years (Stoller, 2015). Glassman built her campaign narrative around her political background, telling voters that: “We need someone who is ready to work for the people of the district on the first day. We need a candidate with experience, a proven track record of winning...I am that candidate” (Pazniokas, 2018). Having prior elected experience also meant that Glassman had ready access to a campaign infrastructure and a long list of potential donors to call on the moment she jumped into the race to replace Esty. These kinds of political connections allowed Glassman to raise an impressive \$100,000 within her campaign’s first thirty days.

In contrast, Jahana Hayes had never held nor run for a seat in public office prior to throwing her hat in the ring for the Democratic nomination in Connecticut’s 7th. Hayes had a notable record as an educator—she was recognized as the “National Teacher of the Year” in 2016—but she lacked Glassman’s political bona fides. Yet, rather than treating her inexperience as a weakness, Hayes made her newcomer status a cornerstone of her campaign; she implored voters to consider the perspective she would bring to office as a Black woman, additionally noting her background as a teenage mother and someone who had experienced homelessness. Hayes went as far as to tell voters: “My greatest gift to you is my lack of political experience because when I go to Washington I will work for you and for no one else” (Ryser, 2018a).

Theories of congressional candidate success would point to Mary Glassman as the likely primary election victor over Jahana Hayes. Past literature demonstrates that there are both direct and indirect benefits to previously holding elected office (e.g., Carson et al. 2007) and these benefits help experienced politicians to outperform candidates with no prior elected experience (e.g., Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989). Connecticut’s Democratic Party similarly saw value

in Glassman's elective background and gave her its backing over Hayes during the state's endorsement convention (Silber, 2018).<sup>1</sup> Even though Hayes lost out on her party's endorsement and was billed by many as a long-shot, she continued to vigorously campaign leading up to the primary—and these efforts paid off. Just two months after the endorsement convention Hayes had raised \$461,000 compared to Glassman's \$457,000 (Ryser, 2018b). On August 14<sup>th</sup>, Jahana Hayes defied expectations and defeated Mary Glassman to become the Democratic nominee for Connecticut's 7<sup>th</sup> by a vote margin of 62 to 38 percent. Hayes went on to win the general election against Republican nominee and former Meridian mayor Manny Santos, making her the first Black Democratic House member elected from Connecticut.

Jahana Hayes' election to Congress is notable, not only because she lacked elected experience, but because she won her seat by defeating opponents who possessed elected experience in both the primary *and* general election. Although Hayes' victory could be dismissed as an anomaly, this upset represents a broader shift in the relationship between political experience and success in congressional elections. In this paper, we demonstrate that *inexperienced* candidates like Hayes are being elected to Congress today at rates not seen since the widespread adoption of primaries. From the early 1980s to mid 2010s, three-quarters of members newly elected to the U.S. House of Representatives possessed previous elected experience; conversely, just half of all freshmen members elected from 2016 to 2020 held prior office.

In the analyses that follow, we investigate emergence- and success-driven explanations for the declining proportion of experienced officeholders entering the U.S. House. To evaluate campaign dynamics across time, we systematically compiled data on the political backgrounds, personal characteristics, and campaign fundraising for all available candidates who appeared on the ballot in a primary or general election for the House of Representatives between 1980 to 2020. Using these data, we first investigate whether amateurs are seeing greater success in modern elections because experienced candidates are running less often. We find no evidence, though, of any shifts in

---

<sup>1</sup>In Connecticut, prior to the primary, the parties hold endorsement conventions where delegates cast votes for candidates. The candidate gaining the most support is given the party endorsement. The endorsed candidate earns the first spot on the ballot and a special designation to signal that they are the party-backed candidate. Any candidate who receives 15 percent of the votes on the first ballot at the endorsement convention qualifies for the primary.

experienced candidates' emergence patterns across time. Instead, we show that candidates *without* elected experience are today emerging in greater numbers and more frequently running in open seats—the type of electoral context where experienced candidates emerge most often and have historically seen overwhelming electoral success (Banks and Kiewiet, 1989; Lazarus, 2008).

Given experienced candidates' consistent emergence patterns, we posit that their declining numbers in Congress must be attributable to election losses. Indeed, we show that experienced candidates are increasingly losing to amateurs in open seat primaries. To investigate *why* experienced candidates are losing open seat contests at higher rates, we model primary election success as a function of candidate characteristics and district conditions. In doing so, we find that the advantages conventionally afforded to candidates with elective experience are waning. Past research shows that experienced candidates are especially successful at fundraising; this indirect benefit of experience has contributed to experienced candidates' electoral dominance over amateurs (e.g., Squire and Wright 1990; Berkman and Eisenstein 1999). Our findings indicate that experienced candidates have lost their fundraising edge; the majority of top fundraisers in recent elections are amateurs. Other research notes that the personal reputation associated with being a public servant has traditionally benefited prior officeholders (e.g., Mondak 1995). We demonstrate that the direct effect of being a “quality” candidate no longer holds the same value it once did; other valence characteristics are increasingly predictive of electoral success. Among Republicans, more than half of recently elected, amateur lawmakers are political “outsiders” with no connection to politics—elected or otherwise. Among Democrats, female and non-white candidates are more likely to win open seat primaries than their male and white competitors. Importantly, the vast majority of female and non-white Democrats running and winning in open seats today *lack elected experience*.

By engaging in an exploratory analysis of today's changed campaign environment, this article offers a reconsideration of long-held theories regarding candidate success. In particular, we demonstrate that the direct and indirect benefits attributed to prior elected experience have subsided. This shift away from experience aligns with well-documented trends within American and comparative politics towards growing public dissatisfaction with politicians and anti-establishment sentiment

among voters (e.g., Carreras 2012; Rooduijn et al. 2016; Uscinski et al. 2021; Hansen and Treul 2021). In certain respects, what we find here indicates that the same environment that fueled the successful party nomination of President Trump in 2016 is playing out at the congressional level. Our results also align with scholarship demonstrating that the emergence of political “outsiders” in elections will increase in periods of high inter-party polarization (Buisseret and Weelden, 2020). Furthermore, our findings offer support for theories on the centrality of identity politics to modern elections. In line with work by Porter et al. (2023), we demonstrate that Democratic voters today place a premium on gender, racial, and ethnic diversity in candidate choice, especially within the context of primary elections. These identities align with social coalitions that are foundational to the Democratic Party (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Fraga et al. 2020).

Lastly, this article raises questions about the costs and benefits of electing political amateurs to Congress. Having new voices in government is important, especially if these perspectives belong to people from groups underrepresented in lawmaking. These new voices could help increase representational diversity in a chamber that skews heavily towards white men and career politicians. On the other hand, the influx of candidates who lack legislative experience may be concerning for the institution as a whole. Existing work shows that politicians with previous legislative experience are especially effective at navigating Congress’s complex policymaking environment (e.g., Volden and Wiseman 2014). By the same token, amateur politicians may be especially *ineffective* lawmakers because they lack institutional knowledge and political acumen. It is an open question whether amateurs can compensate for their political inexperience by hiring an experienced staff (Ommundsen, 2023) or through learning-by-doing on the job (Miquel and Snyder Jr., 2006). Additional work is warranted to further investigate how the recent influx of amateur legislators has affected both the quality of representation and Congress’s capacity to govern.

## **Direct and Indirect Benefits of Prior Elected Experience**

Scholars have long known incumbency to be the number one predictor of candidate success (e.g., Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974; Jacobson 2015). For non-incumbents, the principal predictor for electoral success also ties to elective experience (e.g., Jacobson 1989). Candidates with a prior

elected background—who we refer to as “experienced” candidates—enjoy some of the same direct and indirect benefits that contribute to the incumbency advantage (Carson et al., 2007). In particular, experienced candidates enjoy the direct benefits of a public service reputation (Mondak, 1995) and indirect benefits associated with having run a prior successful campaign (Hirano and Snyder Jr., 2019). We discuss each of these “experience” advantages in greater detail below.

## Indirect Benefits

Running a successful campaign for Congress often necessitates hiring pollsters, purchasing advertisements, and holding campaign events—all of which require money. Contemporary work on congressional elections consistently shows that candidate fundraising levels are highly predictive of future electoral victory (e.g., Biersack et al. 1993; Bonica 2017). Among non-incumbents, Herrnson (1992) and Berkman and Eisenstein (1999) identify candidates with previous elected experience as especially strong fundraisers. Experienced candidates’ fundraising acumen stems, in part, from their access to established campaign infrastructure and pre-existing networks of potential donors (Squire and Wright, 1990).

Candidates *without* elected experience are generally considered to be weak fundraisers. These amateurs often lack the professional and political connections needed to amass campaign contributions (Rauch and La Raja, 2017) and are not necessarily mounting serious campaigns (Canon, 1993). When amateurs *do* behave strategically, though, their fundraising disadvantage shrinks. Maestas and Rugeley (2008) find that the fundraising potential of ambitious amateurs can equal that of experienced candidates, conditional on self-selection into competitive races. Bonica (2020) similarly demonstrates that lawyers—who possess vast professional networks they can tap for fundraising—raise similar amounts of campaign contributions as experienced candidates.

There is reason to believe that the fundraising environment of congressional elections has changed in such a way that a career in politics no longer gives experienced candidates a systematic fundraising advantage. The Supreme Court’s *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010) decision reversed financial restrictions placed on corporations and outside groups, which fundamentally increased the amount of money flowing into politics (Rauch and La Raja, 2017). Furthermore, in today’s digi-

tal age, social media provides an alternate means for candidates to engage with potential donors; hiring political consultants or relying on party connections is no longer necessary. Indeed, Auter and Fine (2018) show that utilizing Facebook makes under-resourced candidates more competitive in attracting contributions from donors outside their immediate networks. Porter and Steelman (2022) similarly show that political amateurs have become increasingly successful at capturing the attention of coveted out-of-district donors. This all leads us to question whether experienced politicians today still possess the same fundraising edge over amateurs they once did.

## **Direct Benefits**

Voters prefer candidates who possess traits like honesty, integrity, experience, and competence; they view politicians who possess these attributes as higher-quality potential representatives (Mondak, 1995; Fridkin and Kenney, 2011; Buttice and Stone, 2012). Literature has long regarded past political experience as a rational heuristic used by voters to simplify the task of identifying candidates who might possess these kinds of desirable traits (Fiorina, 1981; Funk, 1997; Hirano and Snyder Jr., 2019). Cues for candidate quality—like past political experience—are particularly relevant in electoral contexts where partisanship is held constant, like primary elections (Kirkland and Coppock, 2018). The relationship between previous elected background and desirable personal traits has led many to refer to experienced candidates as “quality” candidates.

Being a traditional “quality” candidate, though, may no longer hold the same value it once did. Recent work suggests that voters today see *less* value in a candidate’s political past and, instead, prefer occupational experience outside of politics (Arnesen et al., 2019). In particular, Hansen and Treul (2021) employ a survey experiment to demonstrate that voters prefer candidates who use anti-establishment rhetoric and that this message is even more powerful when delivered by an inexperienced candidate, as it is likely to be more credible. These results correlate with declining trust in and approval of politicians as well as rising anti-establishment sentiment (Sides et al., 2018; Uscinski et al., 2021). Accordingly, we suspect that voter dissatisfaction with Washington and “the establishment” could pave the way for inexperienced competitors who possess desirable valence characteristics beyond past elected experience.

## Assessing Elected Experience in Modern Elections

Today's changed electoral environment suggests a need to reevaluate—and potentially update—our understanding of the relationship between past elected experience and electoral success. In the analyses that follow, we tease out continuity and change across time in the dynamics of (1) congressional candidate emergence and (2) electoral success. To that end, we collected comprehensive data on the past elected experience for all primary and general election candidates who appeared on the ballot for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1980 to 2020 ( $N=31,106$ ).<sup>2</sup> The list of candidates included in our data was compiled from race summaries produced by American Votes and the Federal Election Commission.

Following the bulk of existing literature, we consider a non-incumbent candidate to be “experienced” if she currently holds or previously held a seat in public, elected office.<sup>3</sup> Information about each candidate’s prior elected experience was manually coded from newspaper archives, the Google News aggregator, official government biographies, online obituaries, social media profiles, and candidates’ campaign websites.<sup>4</sup> To provide confidence in our coding of candidate experience, we employed several verification strategies in our data collection process. First, we required two independent sources for information on candidate backgrounds to identify whether each candidate had past elected experience (1) or not (0). Using this approach, we successfully identified the elected backgrounds for about 92% of those candidates present in our data.<sup>5</sup> Next, as a further validation step, we compared our data on candidate experience to other independent data collections that document candidates’ elected backgrounds (Pettigrew et al., 2014; Jacobson, 2015; Thom-

---


<sup>2</sup>We do not collect information on write-ins or candidates who ran outside the regular election cycle.

<sup>3</sup>Per Hirano and Snyder Jr. (2019), “to be effective at their job, legislators are expected to have skills such as drafting bills and shepherding them through the committee system...and working with party leaders” (pg. 91). Accordingly, we could consider candidates to only possess experience if they have prior service as a state legislator or member of Congress. Employing this definition in our descriptive analysis to follow produces a similarly stark decline in the proportion of previous legislators reaching Congress in recent years. For reference, see Figure 2 of the Appendix.

<sup>4</sup>Greater detail on our coding procedure is available in Section A.1 through A.3 of the Appendix.

<sup>5</sup>We assume all candidates for whom we could not identify elected backgrounds to be inexperienced. We discuss trends in data missingness and the strength of this assumption in Section A.4 of the Appendix. Importantly, we identify the elected backgrounds for all general election winner in our data, as well as 98.5% of candidates who won primaries for open seats and 99% of candidates who won primaries where at least one experienced candidate emerged.

Figure 1: Percent of Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with Prior Elected Experience, 1980-2020



*Note:* In plotted percentages, the denominator includes all freshmen members of the U.S. House in the left panel (i.e., no incumbents), freshmen Democrats in the middle panel, and freshmen elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those newly elected members who have previously held public, elected office. Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle. LOESS regressions with 95% confidence intervals have been fit to the data to visualize time trends.

sen, 2021).<sup>6</sup> Through this approach, we identified 4,706 candidates out of 22,804 non-incumbent challengers (15%) as having previously held public, elected office.

Employing these data, we plot the percent of representatives newly elected to the U.S. House that had elective experience prior to entering Congress. Figure 1 plots the percent of all experienced freshmen MCs (left panel), Democratic experienced freshmen MCs (middle panel), and Republican experienced freshmen MCs (right panel). Per the left panel of Figure 1, the proportion of freshmen U.S. House members with prior elected experience rose throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching an apex in the early 2000s with nearly 80% of new MCs having previously held elective office. However, over the last two decades, this statistic has steadily declined with only 50% of new members today having an elected background—a thirty percentage-point plummet from the early 2000s. This decline is especially noteworthy when examined by party, depicted

<sup>6</sup>We used these data sources to check our coding of candidate prior elected experience for all general election candidates from 1980-2016 and all primary election candidates from 1980-1988 and 2000-2010. Through validation, we calculated a 96% agreement rate between our data and these other sources. Prior elected experience for all non-matching candidates was re-checked and verified across multiple sources.

in the middle and right panels of Figure 1. For much of this time series, a greater proportion of Democratic freshmen MCs possessed elected experience in comparison to Republicans. Since the mid-2000s, though, the proportion of freshmen Democrats with elected experience has decreased by about forty percentage-points, nearly double the decline seen among Republicans.

Building on this finding, our subsequent analyses investigate the correlates for experienced candidates' declining numbers among new members of Congress. Before further examining the relative success of experienced and amateur candidates at the ballot box, we descriptively and empirically evaluate the emergence patterns of these candidates. Perhaps recent changes in experienced candidates' emergence decisions can help to explain amateurs' growing electoral successes. Is it the case that amateurs today are seeing greater success at reaching Congress because experienced candidates are running less often?

## Changing Emergence Patterns

We begin by testing whether changing dynamics in candidate emergence have contributed to experienced politicians' declining numbers in Congress. We are particularly interested in assessing candidate emergence in open seats (i.e., districts with no incumbent running). Existing work demonstrates that candidates with elected experience most often emerge in open seats because this is the kind of contest that maximizes their probability of reaching Congress (e.g., Jacobson 1989; Bianco 1984; Lazarus 2008); the vast majority of newly elected House members each year enter Congress via open seats. Examinations of emergence patterns among amateurs, on the other hand, have shown that these candidates *are not* especially likely to run in open seats (e.g., Canon 1990, 1993). Amateurs view their chances of besting a slate of experienced opponents in a competitive primary election as comparable to—or perhaps even less probable than—defeating an incumbent in the general. Indeed, Banks and Kiewiet (1989) find that amateur candidates' electoral odds are maximized by challenging an opposite party *incumbent*. Changing emergence patterns among experienced candidates, though, could alter this dynamic. The resurgence of mass partisanship (Hetherington, 2001), decline of marginal districts (Jacobson and Carson, 2016), and increasing competitiveness of primary elections (Boatright, 2014) have all impacted the calculus candidates

use to determine when to run. Under these conditions, experienced candidates may be less likely to run for office (Thomsen, 2017; Hall, 2019) and inexperienced or “outsider” candidates may be more likely to emerge (Buisseret and Weelden, 2020).

We fit a series of Poisson regressions to evaluate potential shifts in the emergence rates of experienced and amateur candidates across time. The unit of analysis is a U.S. House district in an election from 1980 to 2020.<sup>7</sup> In our *Experienced Candidate* models, the dependent variable is a count of candidates with prior elected experience who ran in a district; in our *Amateur Candidate* models, the dependent variable is a count of candidates without prior elected experience who ran in a district. Counts reflect the combined number of Democratic candidates and Republican candidates who emerged in each district.<sup>8</sup> We estimate separate models for elections held in open seats and incumbent-held districts. Our main independent variable in all models is election year. If candidate emergence has declined, the relationship between candidate count and election year will be negative. If candidate emergence has increased, the relationship between candidate count and election year will be positive. To account for non-linearity in candidate emergence rates across time, we specify election year as a categorical rather than a continuous variable.<sup>9</sup> In all models, we account for institutional and electoral factors that could affect the number of candidates who emerge in any given contest, such as state primary election rules (e.g., open or closed primaries), district partisanship (i.e., Democratic or Republican-controlled district),<sup>10</sup> previous incumbent vote share, and the number of districts in the state. We also specify state-level fixed-effects to account for differences across states that may impact the number of candidates that emerge (e.g., variation in state population). Full models for candidate emergence can be found in Appendix Table A1.

---


<sup>7</sup>We exclude elections in states without partisan primary elections because the dynamics of competition in these districts are distinct. Including districts that hold non-partisan primary elections in our analysis produces nearly identical results, which can be found in Figure 3 of the Appendix.

<sup>8</sup>Running models that reflect the partisan count of experienced/amateur candidate emergence produce similar findings and can be found in Figures 4 and 5 of the Appendix.

<sup>9</sup>Specifying year as continuous produces similar results, as shown in Appendix Figure 6. In models where election year is specified as continuous, we include year-level variables that could influence candidate emergence such as presidential approval and percent real household income change (see Jacobson 1989). Year-level variables cannot be included in our manuscript models because they are perfectly identified by year fixed-effects.

<sup>10</sup>If the district has no previous incumbent, partisanship is determined using the district’s average presidential vote share for that redistricting cycle. Removing these cases from our analysis produces substantively identical results.

Figure 2: Predicted Count for Experienced & Amateur Candidate Emergence in Congressional Districts, 1980-2020



*Note:* Quantities of interest are predicted counts of the number of candidates with elected experience (top panels) and without elected experience (bottom panels) who emerged to run in incumbent-held districts (left panels) and open seats (right panels) for the U.S. House from 1980 to 2020. Counts represent the total number of Democratic and Republican candidates who ran in a given congressional district. Predicted counts are simulated with observed data used to estimate models in Appendix Table A1. LOESS regressions have been fit to the data to visualize time trends.

Based on these models, Figure 2 plots predicted counts of candidates running in open seats and incumbent-held districts by year from 1980 to 2020. The top row of plots in Figure 2 depicts predicted counts of experienced candidates who emerged in incumbent-held districts (left panel) and open seats (right panel). Following expectations, experienced candidates ran in open seats more often than in incumbent-held districts. A predicted count of three experienced candidates emerged in U.S. House elections for open seats compared to less than one candidate in incumbent-held districts. Importantly, we find no noteworthy shift in the number of experienced candidates running in open seats across time. This finding fits with descriptive trends observed in the data; from 1980 to 2020 over 95% of open seats saw at least one experienced candidate emerge.

The bottom row of plots in Figure 2 depicts amateur candidate emergence in incumbent-held


districts (left panel) and open seats (right panel) from 1980 to 2020. Following extant findings, rates of amateur candidate emergence in open seats and incumbent-held districts are relatively similar throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Since the mid-2000s, though, amateur candidate emergence rates across district contexts have diverged. The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates a slight increase in the number of amateurs running in incumbent-held districts for recent elections, from about three candidates to about four candidates. The right panel of Figure 2 depicts a much more notable increase in amateurs' emergence rates in open seats. Predicted counts for amateurs running in open seats have increased from about four candidates per district in the early 2000s to about five candidates in 2016, six candidates in 2018, and eight candidates in 2020. These increases are statistically distinct from emergence rates in prior decades.

In summary, our findings here offer no indication that experienced candidate emergence rates have declined across recent elections. Instead, our findings indicate that the number of *amateur* candidates running in open seats has increased irrespective of experienced candidates' continued emergence. Recall, open seats have historically seen modest amateur emergence because these races attract higher numbers of experienced candidates who, at least in the past, enjoyed greater electoral success due to the direct and indirect benefits of a prior elected background. Growing amateur emergence in open seats could perhaps indicate a change in perceptions regarding experienced candidates' electoral edge. In other words, more amateurs may be running in recent elections because they see their chances of beating experienced opponents as greater today than in the past. Accordingly, we next turn to a series of descriptive and empirical evaluations to determine whether the electoral advantages historically attributed to experienced candidates are diminishing,

## Shifting Dynamics of Candidate Success

Given experienced candidates' consistent emergence patterns, their declining numbers in Congress must be attributable to election losses. To investigate *why* experienced candidates are losing at higher rates than in the past, we must first identify the kinds of elections where they are increasingly likely to lose. Figure 3 plots the proportion of general elections and primary elections where

Figure 3: Percent of Elections Where Candidates with Prior Elected Experience Emerged & Won, 1980-2020



*Note:* In plotted percentages, the denominator includes all all contested general elections (left panel), primary elections (middle panel), and open seat primaries (right panel) where at least one experienced candidate emerged to run. The numerator in each panel includes the number of elections where a candidate who previously held public, elected office won. LOESS regressions with 95% confidence intervals have been fit to the data to visualize time trends.

experienced candidates emerged and won. As depicted in the left panel of Figure 3, experienced candidates' win rates in general elections have remained largely unchanged; if anything, they have increased slightly over time. Where experienced candidates seem to be losing more often is in *primary elections*. The middle panel of Figure 3 depicts a twenty-five percent-point decrease over the past two decades in the proportion of primaries where experienced candidates emerged and won. This decline is especially pronounced in election years 2016, 2018, and 2020.

The declining success rate for experienced candidates is especially stark when solely examining primary elections in open seats. Per the right panel of Figure 3, experienced candidates have traditionally dominated in open seat primaries, winning about 80% of contests where they emerged. Over the past ten years, however, this success rate has plummeted by about thirty percentage-points. Open seat primaries are an especially strategic electoral context in modern elections given that the vast majority of congressional districts are safely partisan; in these races, winning the primary may be a candidate's only major obstacle to attaining office. Experienced candidates, though,

are failing to gain their party's nomination in safely partisan open seats and, instead, are losing to amateurs who go on to win uncompetitive general elections. Accordingly, 70% of amateurs today are elected to Congress via open seats.

To understand why experienced candidates are no longer besting amateurs as often as they once did, we model candidate success in open seat primaries from 1980 to 2020.<sup>11</sup> We are particularly interested in assessing the extent to which the direct and indirect benefits of prior experience still afford candidates the electoral advantages they once did. In our models, the unit of analysis is a candidate who ran in a contested primary election for an open seat.<sup>12</sup> We exclude candidates running in top-two or blanket primaries.<sup>13</sup> The dependent variable is whether or not a candidate won the primary election. To account for dependencies across observations, models are estimated with standard errors clustered by year and district. Independent variables include candidate characteristics and electoral conditions that may influence electoral success. We estimate separate models by decade to capture changes in the relationship between these variables and electoral success across time.<sup>14</sup> We estimate an additional model for contests that occurred in 2016, 2018, and 2020 because amateurs were especially likely to emerge and win in open seats for these recent elections. Finally, we estimate models by party to account for partisan differences in the kinds of candidate characteristics that might be predictive of success.

To measure the indirect benefits of prior elected experience, we include a predictor in our models for the total amount of campaign contributions (in 2020 dollars, logged) garnered by a candidate prior to their primary election.<sup>15</sup> To measure the direct benefits of prior elected experience, we in-

---

<sup>11</sup>Estimating our models with all non-incumbent primary elections (i.e., incumbent-held races as well as open seats) produces substantively similar results. These are available for review in Appendix Table A2.

<sup>12</sup>Uncontested primaries are excluded because the dynamics of competition in these races are uninformative for determining the kinds of candidate characteristics that are related to electoral success.

<sup>13</sup>We exclude candidates who ran in elections with top-two or non-partisan blanket primaries (i.e., California, Louisiana, Washington, and Alaska) because the dynamics of competition in these types of elections are systematically distinct from conditions in partisan primaries.

<sup>14</sup>Election years included in our 1980s model occurred from 1980-1988, election years included in our 1990s model occurred from 1990-1999, election years included in our 2000s model occurred from 2000-2009, and election years included in our 2010s model occurred from 2010-2020.

<sup>15</sup>Pre-primary fundraising includes totals garnered from individual contributions, political action committees, and personal contributions. We find that pre-primary fundraising is a good proxy for overall fundraising ability; candidates' pre-primary and post-primary fundraising correlate at 0.73. Data are collected from candidates' quarterly and pre-election filing reports to the Federal Election Commission. In select instances during the 1980s and 1990s, candidates'

clude a dichotomous indicator for whether or not a candidate has previously held public office. Having controlled for strategic emergence and fundraising ability, this variable should capture the unique effect that prior public service has on success. In our models, we additionally control for other candidate characteristics that may influence success, such as gender (male vs. female),<sup>16</sup> race (non-Hispanic white vs. non-white),<sup>17</sup> and ideological extremity as estimated by Bonica (2016). We also control for district conditions that may affect candidates' electoral fortunes, including district partisanship (same-party safe, other-party safe, or competitive), state primary election rules (open vs. closed rules), the percent non-white population in the district, and the number of experienced opponents in the election.

Model results are presented in Table 1. We find that campaign fundraising is still an apt predictor for electoral success, but that the fundraising gap between experienced and inexperienced candidates (i.e., the indirect benefit of prior experience) has declined across time. Next we show that the personal reputation associated with being a public servant (i.e., the direct benefit of prior experience) no longer holds the same value it once did, particularly among Republicans. Each of these components are discussed and explored in greater detail below.

## Indirect Benefit: Campaign Fundraising

Turning first to candidate fundraising, Table 1 demonstrates that there is a positive association between pre-primary fundraising and electoral success across all models. To illustrate this rela-

---

mid-year reports do not align with primary election dates. In these cases, pre-primary fundraising was imputed by dividing the total fundraising amount reported by the number of days covered in the report; this daily amount was then multiplied by the number of days in the reporting period that occurred prior to a candidate's primary.

<sup>16</sup>Gender was determined using pronouns found in candidate biographies as well as media coverage of elections. In the few instances where pronoun data was unavailable, gender was determined using exclusively candidate names. These data have been validated using other independently collected sources for data on candidate gender produced by Bonica (2016) and Hassell (2018).

<sup>17</sup>Fine-grained data on candidate race and ethnicity were collected, however discretizing individuals into more specific ethnoracial categories produced candidate subsets that were too small to effectively model. Data on candidate race was generously provided for primary election candidates running from 2018-2020 by Porter et al. (2023) and primary candidates running from 2008 to 2012 by Grumbach and Sahn (2020). The authors coded candidate race/ethnicity for primary election candidates running from 2000-2006 as well as in 2016. We follow the approach laid out by Grumbach and Sahn (2020) to code candidate racial/ethnic backgrounds and, when data was unavailable, employ the latest version of the *wru* package proposed by Imai et al. (2022) to impute candidate race. Imputations were made for candidate race/ethnicity for less than 10% of candidates in our sample, with most of these candidates running in elections during the early 2000s. Due to coverage issues and data limitations, we limit our coding of race and ethnicity to elections held over the last two decades.

Table 1: Candidate Success in Open Seat Primary Elections, 1980-2022

	Republican Candidates						Democratic Candidates			
	1980s		1990s		2000s		1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Prior Elected Experience	0.797* (0.286)	0.905* (0.220)	1.160* (0.241)	0.171 (0.191)	0.178 (0.252)	0.397 (0.282)	1.104* (0.262)	1.127* (0.340)	0.567* (0.263)	0.729* (0.356)
Ideological Extremity	0.257 (0.275)	0.603* (0.234)	0.425 (0.300)	0.436 (0.227)	0.381 (0.295)	1.287* (0.233)	1.387* (0.270)	1.176* (0.393)	0.168 (0.217)	-0.134 (0.339)
Female	-0.405 (0.389)	0.360 (0.317)	0.182 (0.351)	-0.535* (0.265)	-0.283 (0.351)	-1.010* (0.449)	-0.399 (0.319)	-0.105 (0.405)	0.570* (0.258)	0.666* (0.312)
Non-White			-1.081* (0.772)	0.278 (0.340)	-0.033 (0.401)			0.811 (0.437)	1.156* (0.327)	0.972* (0.400)
Pre-Primary Fundraising (logged)	0.273* (0.139)	0.664* (0.216)	0.564* (0.240)	0.909* (0.157)	1.011* (0.238)	0.098 (0.054)	1.119* (0.120)	0.898* (0.162)	1.031* (0.106)	0.960* (0.129)
Other-Party Safe (ref. Competitive)	-0.219 (0.453)	0.823* (0.216)	1.037* (0.392)	2.122* (0.516)	3.408* (0.856)	0.398* (0.161)	1.070* (0.282)	1.413* (0.412)	2.340* (0.368)	2.544* (0.491)
Same-Party Safe (ref. Competitive)	-0.908* (0.246)	-0.278* (0.132)	-0.016 (0.138)	-0.243 (0.156)	-0.399 (0.211)	-0.310 (0.217)	-0.530* (0.180)	-0.488 (0.273)	-0.182 (0.218)	-0.229 (0.245)
State Rules: Open Primary	-0.053 (0.148)	0.153 (0.143)	-0.025 (0.139)	0.038 (0.133)	-0.035 (0.162)	0.212 (0.177)	0.259 (0.177)	0.103 (0.221)	-0.056 (0.198)	0.065 (0.255)
District % Non-White Population			-0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)			-0.005 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.009)
Experienced Opponents	-0.650* (0.105)	-0.571* (0.089)	-0.682* (0.094)	-0.306* (0.071)	-0.207* (0.102)	-0.580* (0.088)	-0.600* (0.083)	-0.617* (0.137)	-0.504* (0.078)	-0.368* (0.113)
Constant	-2.662 (1.558)	-8.982* (2.816)	-8.195* (3.248)	-12.597* (2.271)	-14.737* (3.294)	-1.409* (0.691)	-15.612* (1.598)	-12.613* (2.261)	-15.103* (1.767)	-14.632* (2.234)
Fixed Effects: Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	353	570	441	884	481	343	531	354	612	385
Log Likelihood	-195.165	-279.106	-204.902	-350.289	-183.494	-188.342	-223.875	-147.280	-236.799	-146.122

Note: Results are from logistic regressions from 1980 to 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the district and year level. \* p<0.05

tionship further, Figure 4 plots the marginal effect of fundraising on the predicted probability that a candidate wins her primary.<sup>18</sup> For ease of interpretation, logged fundraising has been transformed to real dollars (in tens of thousands) on the x-axis.<sup>19</sup> To place candidate fundraising in context across time, shaded areas represent the 25<sup>th</sup> through 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of fundraising among candidates for each decade.

Per the top left panel of Figure 4, Democrats running in the 1980s who fell in the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of campaign fundraisers—garnering \$344,315 in pre-primary receipts—had a 24% greater predicted probability of primary election victory than did candidates who did not fundraise, holding all else constant. Per the top right panel of Figure 4, Democrats running in the 2010s who fell in the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of campaign fundraisers—garnering \$928,162 in pre-primary receipts—had a 59% greater predicted probability of victory. A similar relationship can be seen among Republicans in the bottom row of plots in Figure 4. Per the bottom left panel of Figure 4, Republicans running in the 1980s who fell in the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of campaign fundraisers—garnering \$430,090 in pre-primary receipts—had a 44% greater predicted probability of primary election victory than did candidates who did not fundraise. Per the bottom right panel of Figure 4, Republicans running in the 2010s who fell in the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of campaign fundraisers—garnering \$916,765 in pre-primary receipts—had a 53% greater predicted probability of victory. Although the volume of fundraising has increased in recent elections, we *do not find* that the marginal effect of fundraising on success has changed. In Figure 9 of the Appendix, we demonstrate that, since the 1990s, the relationship between fundraising and success has not significantly increased for either party.<sup>20</sup>

We next evaluate whether experienced candidates still out-perform their amateur counterparts in raising campaign funds. To assess fundraising success across candidate types, we calculate the proportion of top fundraisers who possess past elected experience for each election year. Following the findings presented above, we consider a candidate to be a top fundraiser if their pre-primary


---

<sup>18</sup>Plots depicting the marginal effect of fundraising on primary election outcomes for 2016-2020 follow trends observed in Figure 4 and can be found in Figure 7 of the Appendix.

<sup>19</sup>Plots employing logged total fundraising along the x-axis are presented in Figure 8 of the Appendix.

<sup>20</sup>To assess the changing value of pre-primary fundraising across time, we fit regressions by party where candidate fundraising is interacted with a categorical variable for election decade. These models are presented in Table A3. Yearly comparisons for the marginal effect of pre-primary fundraising over time are presented in Figure 9.

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Pre-Primary Fundraising on the Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections




*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of pre-primary fundraising on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table 1. Pre-primary fundraising is varied across the observed minimum to maximized value for each decade. Shaded areas represent the 25<sup>th</sup> through 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of fundraising among candidates for each decade. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

campaign receipts fell in the top 25% of all candidates running in that decade.<sup>21</sup> Top fundraising Democrats met or exceeded the following fundraising amounts: \$344,315 (1980s), \$526,069 (1990s), \$896,119 (2000s), and \$928,162 (2010s). Top fundraising Republicans met or exceeded the following fundraising amounts: \$430,090 (1980s), \$456,666 (1990s), \$1,010,232 (2000s), and \$916,765 (2010s). For reference, the marginal effect of fundraising on success for top fundraisers would fall to the right of the shaded areas for plots in Figure 4.

Plotted proportions for top fundraisers broken down by past elected experience are presented in Figure 5. Per the left panel of Figure 5, from the 1980s to early 2010s about 70% of top fundraising Democrats had a prior elected background. Conversely, from 2016 to 2020, less than 35% of top Democratic fundraisers possessed previous elected experience. A similar trend holds for Republicans, presented in the right panel of Figure 5. From the 1980s to early 2010s, about half

<sup>21</sup>Replicating this approach such that top fundraisers were considered to be those candidates that met or exceeded the fundraising potential of the top 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of primary election winners (rather than all fundraising candidates) produces results with the same substantive takeaways. These are presented in Figure 10 of the Appendix. Greater amateur fundraising in recent elections is also evident when assessing the total number of amateurs who met or exceeded the fundraising potential of experienced candidates. These findings are presented in Figure 11 of the Appendix.

Figure 5: Percent of Top Fundraisers with Prior Elected Experience, 1980-2020



*Note:* In plotted percentages, the denominator includes all Democratic (left) and Republican (right) top fundraisers for open seat primary elections. The numerator in each panel includes the number of top fundraisers who previously held public, elected office. We define top fundraisers as candidates who fell in the top 25% of all candidates who fundraised in the primary. LOESS regressions with 95% confidence intervals have been fit to the data to visualize time trends.


of top Republican fundraisers had prior elected experience; for 2016 to 2020, this figure dropped to 25%. Taken together, these results indicate that experienced candidates' fundraising edge has attenuated significantly in recent elections. Today, amateurs outperform experienced candidates as competitive fundraisers in open seat primaries.

## Direct Benefit: Prior Experience

Regression outputs presented in Table 1 demonstrate that, for many decades, past elected experience has served as a consistent, statistically significant predictor for primary election success. Figure 6 plots the marginal effect of prior elected experience on success in open seat primaries for models present in Table 1.<sup>22</sup> Values falling above the horizontal line indicate that past elective experience has a positive, statistically significant relationship with electoral success in open seat primaries. Per the left panel of Figure 6, experienced Democrats in the 1990s and 2000s were at least 15% more likely to win an open seat primary than were amateurs, holding all else equal. For Democrats running over the last decade, the marginal effect of elected experience on primary

<sup>22</sup>Plots depicting the marginal effect of prior elected experience on primary election outcomes for 2016-2020 follow trends observed in Figure 6 and can be found in Figure 12 of the Appendix.

Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Prior Elected Experience on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections



*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of possessing past elected experience on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table 1. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

success was about 7%.<sup>23</sup> Turning to the right panel of Figure 6, experienced Republicans in the 1980s through 2000s were about 18% more likely to win an open seat primary than were amateurs, holding all else equal. However, in elections today, there is no statistical relationship between elected experience and success for Republicans. In Figure 13 of the Appendix, we show that this decline in the marginal effect of elected experience is statistically significant.

## Moving Beyond Elected Experience

Having explored the direct and indirect benefits traditionally afforded to candidates with prior elective experience, we look to other valence characteristics that may offer electoral advantages to candidates today. Following results presented in Table 1, we specifically examine whether a political “outsider” identity has benefited Republicans in recent elections and whether descriptive identities tied to race and gender have benefited Democrats in recent elections.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup>The left panel of Figure 13 in the Appendix demonstrates that this decrease in the marginal effect of past elected experience on electoral success is not statistically significant.

<sup>24</sup>Following results in Table 1, we do not find a candidate’s ideological extremity (i.e., CFscore) to be a statistically significant predictor for success in recent elections. We explore candidate ideology further in Appendix Figure 14 and demonstrate that, while new MCs have become more extreme over time, there is no notable difference in the extremity of experienced and inexperienced freshmen MCs. For these reasons, we do not explore ideological extremity further in this analysis.

## Political Outsiders

Our findings in Table 1 indicate that prior elected experience no longer provides Republican candidates with a direct electoral benefit. This result *suggests* that candidates without political experience may today gain an electoral advantage, but does not explicitly demonstrate such a relationship. Investigating this question presents somewhat of a challenge with available data. Many amateurs who emerge in congressional elections do not run to win but, rather, emerge for their own purposes. Some run to draw attention to a particular issue or policy (Maisel, 1986), others are clearly “hopeless” (Canon, 1990), and still others are seeking experience for a future electoral bid (Canon, 1993; Roberds and Roberts, 2002). For empirical analyses, separating out these “hopeless” amateurs from those who are mounting a strategic run for office is crucial. Prior work has identified “ambitious” amateurs as those candidates who defeat an experienced primary opponent (e.g., Maestas and Rugeley 2008), but this would be endogenous for our purposes.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, recent work identifies particular *kinds* of amateurs as preferential in modern elections—specifically those without a background in politics (Arnesen et al., 2019; Hansen and Treul, 2021)—but not all amateurs are political “outsiders.” Roberds and Roberts (2002) demonstrate that many amateurs possess explicit or implicit ties to politics (see also Bonica 2017). Identifying the political histories for all candidates in our data—especially for those who ran in earlier decades—is impractical.


We, instead, descriptively evaluate the political backgrounds of general election winners. We calculate the percent of newly elected, amateur MCs who possessed no background in politics (elected or otherwise) prior to entering Congress. Following Roberds and Roberts (2002), we consider amateur MCs to possess non-elected, political experience if they served as an appointed official (e.g., gubernatorial cabinet member) or had a career explicitly connected to politics or government (e.g., lobbyist, political organizer, or congressional aide).<sup>26</sup> Following the terminology

---

<sup>25</sup>Repeat runs for office has also been used as an indicator for amateur quality, but these results have produced mixed findings (see Mack 1998).

<sup>26</sup>A full list of occupational backgrounds included in our coding are available in Table A4 of the Appendix. Following existing literature, we consider lawyers to have an expressly political occupation. Treating lawyers as non-political amateurs produces similar results, available for review in Appendix Figure 15. In our data collection, we also identified whether an amateur had political family ties. Including these individual as political amateurs produces substantively identical results, available for review in Appendix Figure 16.

Figure 7: Percent of Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with No Political/Elected Experience (i.e., Outsiders), 1980-2020



*Note:* In plotted yearly percentages, the denominator includes all newly elected, freshmen members of the U.S. House of Representatives (i.e., no incumbents) in the left panel, newly elected Democrats in the middle panel, and newly elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those newly elected members who have no previous elected or political experience. Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

of Canon (2010) and Buisseret and Weelden (2020), we refer to candidates who possess no elected or political experience as “outsiders.” To compile political histories on all newly elected MCs from 1980 to 2020 ( $N=1,326$ ), we relied on member biographies provided by the Office of the Historian for the U.S. of Representatives, personal profiles from the media, and other biographical summaries (e.g. obituaries). Among amateurs identified as having no political ties, common occupations were business owner/executive (46%), military officer (25%), and medical professional (19%).<sup>27</sup>

Figure 7 plots the percent of all freshmen MCs (left panel), Democratic freshmen MCs (middle panel), and Republican freshmen MCs (right panel) who entered Congress *without* elected or political experience. Put differently, this plot depicts the percent of political outsiders elected to Congress across time. As shown in the left panel of Figure 7, the percent of new MCs without a political background has steadily increased. Until the mid-2000s, only about 10% of new members entered Congress without any elected or political experience. In recent elections, though, about a quarter of new MCs entering Congress were outsiders. Per the middle and right panels of Figure 7,

<sup>27</sup>These categories are not mutually exclusive.

this increase has been chiefly driven by newly elected Republicans. For Democrats, the percent of newly elected MCs without political ties has increased modestly from about 10% to 15%. Conversely, nearly 30% of new Republican members since 2010 were outsiders, compared to about 15% in the past. Among Republicans in the last decade, the majority of newly elected, amateur MCs have lacked political ties.<sup>28</sup>

These descriptive results contribute to a nascent body of work documenting the rising electoral success of political outsiders. In particular, Buisseret and Weelden (2020) propose a formal model which demonstrates that outsiders will be especially likely to reach office in periods of intense inter-party polarization via electorally advantageous primary elections. Our results are remarkably consistent with their conclusions. Moreover, our findings for asymmetric outsider preferences by party line up with work by Canon (2010) and Enders and Uscinski (2021), who note that anti-establishment attitudes tend to be more closely linked to Republicanism/conservatism.<sup>29</sup> Taken together, the results presented here seem to suggest that conditions in modern elections are ripe for outsider candidates to thrive, especially among Republicans.

## Racial & Gender Identity


Turning again to Table 1, we identify candidate race and gender as descriptive identities that are today associated with elevated electoral success, but only for Democrats. To illustrate this, Figure 8 plots the marginal effect of possessing a female or non-white identity on a candidate's predicted probability of winning an open seat primary for elections held in the 2010s. Plots depicting marginal effects for all other decades are available in Figure 18 of the Appendix. The left panel of Figure 8 demonstrates that moving from a male to female identity increases a Democrat's predicted probability of primary election victory by nearly 8%, holding all else constant. Moving from a white to non-white identity increases a Democrat's predicted probability of primary election victory by 15%. Turning to the right panel of Figure 8, possessing a female identity *decreases* a Republican's probability of primary election victory by about 7%. Republicans possessing a

---

<sup>28</sup>The plotted yearly percentages for the number of amateur MCs without political experience out of all newly elected amateurs can be found in Figure 17 of the Appendix.

<sup>29</sup>Importantly, anti-establishment orientations are distinct from left-right orientations (see Uscinski et al. 2021).

Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Descriptive Identities on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections




*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of female and non-white identities on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats for Democrats (left panel) and Republicans (right panel). Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table 1. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

non-white identity were not any more likely to win an open seat primary. These asymmetric results align with extant work demonstrating that the Democratic Party is more closely aligned with descriptive identities related to race and gender (e.g., Kitchens and Swers 2016; Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Elder 2021).

Given our preceding analyses, we are additionally interested in the intersection between past political experience and candidate gender, race, or ethnicity. A wide body of literature has developed documenting the fact that women and racial/ethnic minorities feel they must accrue substantial experience before running for elected office (e.g., Lawless and Fox 2012; Pearson and McGhee 2013; Carey Jr. and Lizotte 2019). Accordingly, Figure 9 plots the number of female (left panel) and non-white (right panel) Democrats running in open seat primaries from 2000 to 2020, conditional on prior elected experience. Several notable patterns emerge. First, the number of female and non-white Democrats emerging in open seats over the past two elections has more than doubled; increases in candidate emergence are most notable in 2018 and 2020. Second, this recent increase in female/non-white candidate emergence among Democrats is principally driven by candidates who *lack* elected experience. Importantly, inexperienced female and non-white Democrats are not only running more often, they are also being elected to Congress more often. During the 2000s, 70% of newly elected, female Democrats possessed prior elected experience. In 2018 and

Figure 9: Number of Female/Non-White Democrats Running in Open Seat Primaries by Past Political Experience, 2000-2020



Note: Bars represent the number of female (left panel) and non-white (right panel) candidates running in open seat primaries from 2000 to 2020. Dark bars include female/non-white Democrats who had no elected experience before running for Congress. Light bars include female/non-white Democrats who had elected experience.

2020, over 70% of newly elected, female Democrats possessed *no prior elected experience*.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, during the 2000s, about 80% of newly elected, non-white Democrats possessed prior elected experience; today, the majority of non-white Democrats elected to Congress are amateurs.<sup>31</sup>

## Conclusion

Historically, candidates who have previously held public, elected office have outperformed candidates with no prior experience in office. These candidates' electoral advantage has been attributed to the direct (e.g., Mondak 1995) and indirect (e.g., Herrnson 1990) benefits associated with prior elective history. Accordingly, countless studies have employed prior elected experience as an observable indicator for candidate viability (e.g., Squire and Wright 1990; Maestas et al. 2006; Lazarus 2008; Thomsen 2014; Bonica 2020). In this article, we seek to renew the scholarly conversation surrounding elected experience. Today, having an elected background is no longer the consistent predictor for success that it once was. Indeed, we demonstrate that, in modern elections,

<sup>30</sup>These rates are plotted in the left panel of Figure 19 the Appendix.

<sup>31</sup>These rates are plotted in the right panel of Figure 19 of the Appendix.

inexperienced candidates are elected to Congress at rates similar to experienced candidates.

Our primary analyses investigate the factors associated with inexperienced candidate success in today’s electoral environment. In the past, amateur success was largely considered to be the product of exceptional electoral circumstances (Canon, 1990, 1993). We find that, in elections today, some amateurs’ campaigns have begun to more closely resemble those of “high-quality” experienced candidates. We go on to identify other valence characteristics beyond prior elected experience as electorally advantageous in today’s elections and, importantly, demonstrate that these desirable identities overwhelmingly belong to candidates who lack elected experience. In other words, the attributes that set *inexperienced* candidates apart from their experienced counterparts help to explain amateurs’ increasing electoral success.

It is still the case that many candidates running in elections today have little to no chance of success, and these “hopeless” contenders disproportionately lack elected experience (Canon, 1993; Thomsen, 2022). However, prior office-holding is no longer the reliable metric for candidate viability that it once was—with increased frequency, amateurs are mounting credible and successful campaigns for Congress. Researchers should carefully consider our findings when investigating questions that center upon candidate quality.

We are hopeful that this initial, exploratory analysis spurs future scholarly research assessing the causes and consequences of amateurs’ increased presence in Congress. Open questions remain regarding the origins of amateur candidates’ growing success. For one, is today’s growing trend towards amateur candidate success the product of elite support for these candidates, or mass preferences? What is the relationship between candidate valence characteristics and out-of-district fundraising support (Gimpel et al., 2008)? Furthermore, what are the consequences of electing more amateur legislators to Congress? Additional work is warranted to better understand the relationship between political amateurism and today’s changed electoral landscape.

## References

- Arnesen, S., Duell, D., and Johannesson, M. P. (2019). Do citizens make inferences from political candidate characteristics when aiming for substantive representation? *Electoral Studies*, 57:46–60.
- Auter, Z. J. and Fine, J. A. (2018). Social media campaigning: Mobilization and fundraising on facebook. *Social Science Quarterly*, 99(1):185–200.
- Banks, J. S. and Kiewiet, D. R. (1989). Explaining patterns of candidate competition in congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4):997–1015.
- Berkman, M. and Eisenstein, J. (1999). State legislators as congressional candidates: The efefct of prior experience on legislative recruitment and fundraising. *Political Research Quarterly*, 52(3):481–498.
- Bianco, W. T. (1984). Strategic decisions on candidacy in u.s. congressional districts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 9:351–64.
- Biersack, R., Herrnson, P. S., and Wilcox, C. (1993). Seeds for success: Early money in congressional elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 18(4):535–551.
- Boatright, R. G. (2014). *Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of Congressional Primary Challenges*. The University of Michigan Press.
- Bonica, A. (2016). Database on ideology, money in politics, and elections.
- Bonica, A. (2017). Professional networks, early fundraising, and electoral success. *Election Law Journal*, 16(1).
- Bonica, A. (2020). Why are there so many lawyers in congress? *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 45(2):253–289.
- Buisseret, P. and Weelden, R. V. (2020). Crashing the party? elites, outsiders, and elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(2):356–370.
- Buttice, M. K. and Stone, W. J. (2012). Candidates matter: Policy and quality differences in congressional elections. *Journal of Politics*, 74(3):870–887.
- Canon, D. T. (1990). *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress*. Chicago University Press.
- Canon, D. T. (1993). Sacrificial lambs or strategic politicians? political amateurs in u.s. house elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(4):1119–41.
- Canon, D. T. (2010). The year of the outsider: Political amateurs in the u.s. congress. *The Forum*, 8(4).
- Carey Jr., T. E. and Lizotte, M.-K. (2019). Political experience and the intersection between race and gender. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 7(2):243–266.
- Carreras, M. (2012). The rise of outsiders in latin america, 1980–2010: An institutionalist perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(12):1451–1482.
- Carson, J. L., Engstrom, E. J., and Roberts, J. M. (2007). Candidate quality, the personal vote, and the incumbency advantage in congress. *American Political Science Review*, 101(2):289–301.
- Crowder-Meyer, M. and Cooperman, R. (2018). Can't buy them love: How party culture among donors contributes to the party gap in women's representation. *Journal of Politics*, 80(4):1211–1224.
- Elder, L. (2021). *The partisan gap: Why democratic women get elected but republican women don't*. NYU Press.
- Enders, A. M. and Uscinski, J. E. (2021). The role of anti-establishment orientations during the

- trump presidency. *The Forum*, 19(1).
- Erikson, R. S. (1971). The electoral impact of congressional roll call voting. *American Political Science Review*, 65(4):1018–32.
- Fiorina, M. P. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. Yale University Press.
- Fraga, B. L., Shah, P., and Juenke, E. G. (2020). Did women and candidates of color lead or ride the democratic wave in 2018? *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 53(3):435–439.
- Fridkin, K. L. and Kenney, P. J. (2011). The role of candidate traits in campaigns. *Journal of Politics*, 73(1):61–73.
- Funk, C. L. (1997). Implications of political expertise in candidate trait evaluations. *Political Research Quarterly*, 50(3):675–697.
- Gimpel, J. G., Lee, F. E., and Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2008). The check is in the mail: Interdistrict funding flows in congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):373–394.
- Grossmann, M. and Hopkins, D. A. (2016). *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats*. Oxford University Press.
- Grumbach, J. M. and Sahn, A. (2020). Race and representation in campaign finance. *American Political Science Review*, 114(1):206–221.
- Hall, A. B. (2019). *Who Wants to Run? How the Devaluing of Political Office Drives Polarization*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hansen, E. R. and Treul, S. (2021). Inexperienced or anti-establishment? voter preferences for outsider congressional candidates. *Research and Politics*, July-September:1–7.
- Hassell, H. J. (2018). *The Party's Primary: Control of Congressional Nominations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Herrnson, P. (1990). Reemergent national party organizations. In Maisel, L. S., editor, *The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns*. Westview Press.
- Herrnson, P. S. (1992). Campaign professionalism and fundraising in congressional elections. *Journal of Politics*, 54(3):859–870.
- Hetherington, M. (2001). Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3):619–631.
- Hirano, S. and Snyder Jr., J. M. (2019). *Primary Elections*. Cambridge University Press.
- Imai, K., Olivella, S., and Rosenman, E. T. (2022). Addressing census data problems in race imputation via fully bayesian improved surname geocoding and name supplements. *Science Advances*, 8(49):1–10.
- Jacobson, G. C. (1989). Strategic politicians and the dynamics of u.s. house elections, 1946-86. *American Political Science Review*, 83(3):773–793.
- Jacobson, G. C. (2015). It's nothing personal: The decline of the incumbency advantage in us house elections. *Journal of Politics*, 77(3).
- Jacobson, G. C. and Carson, J. L. (2016). *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 9th edition.
- Jacobson, G. C. and Kernell, S. (1983). *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*. Yale University Press, 2nd edition.
- Kirkland, P. A. and Coppock, A. (2018). Candidate choice without party labels. *Political Behavior*, 40:571–591.
- Kitchens, K. E. and Swers, M. L. (2016). Why aren't there more republican women in congress? gender, partisanship, and fundraising support in the 2010 and 2012 elections. *Politics and Gender*, 12(4):648–676.

- Lawless, J. L. and Fox, R. L. (2012). *It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lazarus, J. (2008). Why do experienced challengers do better than amateurs? *Political Behavior*, 30(2):185–198.
- Mack, W. (1998). Repeat challengers: Are they the best challengers around. *American Politics Research*, 26(3):308–343.
- Maestas, C. D., Maisel, L. S., Fulton, S. A., and Stone, W. J. (2006). When to risk it? institutions, ambitions, and the decision to run for the us house. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):195–208.
- Maestas, C. D. and Rugeley, C. R. (2008). Assessing the "experience bonus" through examining strategic entry, candidate quality, and campaign receipts in u.s. house elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(3):520–535.
- Maisel, S. L. (1986). *From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary*. University of Tennessee Press.
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.
- Miquel, G. P. I. and Snyder Jr., J. M. (2006). Legislative effectiveness and legislative careers. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 31(3):347–381.
- Mondak, J. J. (1995). Competence, integrity, and the electoral success of congressional incumbents. *Journal of Politics*, 57(4):1043–1069.
- Ommundsen, E. C. (2023). The institution's knowledge: Congressional staff experience and committee productivity. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 48(2):273–303.
- Pazniokas, M. (2018). Mary glassman edges jahana hayes for ct-5 endorsement.
- Pearson, K. and McGhee, E. (2013). What it takes to win: Questioning "gender neutral" outcomes in us house elections. *Politics and Gender*, 9(4):439–462.
- Pettigrew, S., Owen, K., and Wanless, E. (2014). U.s. house primary election results (1956-2010).
- Porter, R. and Steelman, T. (2022). No experience required: Early donations and amateur candidate success in primary elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.
- Porter, R., Treul, S. A., and McDonald, M. (2023). Changing the dialouge: Descriptive candidacies & position-taking in campaigns for the u.s. house of representatives. *Journal of Politics*.
- Rauch, J. and La Raja, R. J. (2017). Re-engineering politicians: How activist groups choose our candidates—long before we vote.
- Roberds, S. C. and Roberts, J. M. (2002). Are all amateurs equal? candidate quality in the 1992–1998 house elections. *Politics and Policy*, 30(3):482–501.
- Rooduijn, M., van der Brug, W., and de Lange, S. L. (2016). Expressing or fuelling discontent? the relationship between populist voting and political discontent. *Electoral Studies*, 43:32–40.
- Ryser, R. (2018a). Glassman wins dems' 5th district nod.
- Ryser, R. (2018b). Hayes pulls ahead of glassman in fundraising for dems 5th district primary.
- Sides, J., Tesler, M., and Vavreck, L. (2018). *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton University Press.
- Silber, C. (2018). A heated review of a chaotic end to a congressional convention.
- Squire, P. and Wright, J. R. (1990). Fundraising by nonincumbent candidates for the u. s. house of representatives. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 15(1):89–98.
- Stoller, K. (2015). Simsbury ranked 9th in money magazine's national 'best places to live'.
- Thomsen, D. M. (2014). Ideological moderates won't run: How party fit matters for partisan polarization in congress. *Journal of Politics*, 76(3):786–797.

- Thomsen, D. M. (2017). *Opting out of Congress: Partisan polarization and the decline of moderate candidates*. Cambridge University Press.
- Thomsen, D. M. (2021). Money and candidate exit in u.s. house elections. Presented at the 2021 Center for Effective Lawmaking Conference at the University of Virginia.
- Thomsen, D. M. (2022). Competition in congressional elections: Money versus votes. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–17.
- Uscinski, J. E., Enders, A. M., Seelig, M. I., Klofstad, C. A., Funchion, J. R., Everett, C., Wuchty, S., Premaratne, K., and Murthi, M. N. (2021). American politics in two dimensions: Partisan and ideological identities versus anti-establishment orientations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(4):877–895.
- Volden, C. and Wiseman, A. E. (2014). *Legislative Effectiveness in the U.S. Congress: The Law-makers*. Cambridge University Press.

# **Evaluating (In)Experience in Congressional Elections**

Appendix & Supplementary Information

# **Contents**

<b>A Elective Experience Codebook</b>	<b>2</b>
A.1 Definition of Experienced Candidate . . . . .	2
A.2 Identifying Candidates with Previous Elected Experience . . . . .	3
A.3 Public Office: Elected or Appointed? . . . . .	4
A.4 Data Missingness . . . . .	4
<b>B Supplemental Tables and Figures</b>	<b>5</b>

# A Elective Experience Codebook

## A.1 Definition of Experienced Candidate

We consider a non-incumbent candidate to be “experienced” if she currently holds or previously held a seat in public, elected office. We acknowledge that some work conceptualizes “experience” as broader (e.g., Roberts and Roberds, 2002) or narrower (e.g., Hirano and Snyder, 2019) than this definition. Given that the bulk of extant literature uses previous elected office-holding to define experience, and that this paper offers a reassessment of previous findings, we choose to use this common definition.

Individuals who have served in a state legislature (state house or senate) or previously served in the U.S. Congress are almost always considered to be experienced candidates. The exception here is an individual who served in a federal or state legislature by appointment. In some instances of a federal or state legislative vacancy, another elected official (e.g., state governor) or party entity (e.g., state party committee) will select a temporary representative to serve until an election is held. Instances where a representative serves by appointment rather than election are well-documented in biographies by the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, or noted on state legislature websites. Many appointed legislators run in the subsequent election for their appointed seat. Of the 2,585 candidates identified as previous legislators in our data, only 2 served as a legislative representative by appointment without every having won an election.

Candidates who served in any other state or local elected office are also considered to be experienced. A near-exhaustive list of these position titles are presented below:

- Governor
- Lieutenant Governor
- Secretary of State
- State Treasurer
- Attorney General
- Mayor
- First Selectman
- District Attorney
- Judge
- City Councilperson
- Alderman
- Commissioner
- Local Board Member
- Sheriff

Importantly, there is variation by state as to whether the positions listed above are publicly elected or appointed. For example, the Secretary of State is elected in Georgia and appointed by the state governor in Texas. We discuss our process for identifying offices as either elected or appointed in the text to follow. Individuals who served in non-publicly elected positions (e.g., Chair of the California Democratic Party) are not considered experienced in our coding schema.

## A.2 Identifying Candidates with Previous Elected Experience

To identify whether a candidate had previous elected experience before running for the U.S. House, we employed myriad sources for candidate information including newspaper archives, the Google News aggregator, official government biographies, obituaries, social media profiles, and candidates' campaign websites. In concert with the rise of digital media, the availability of online information about candidates expanded across time. Therefore, in the text below, we discuss our data collection procedure separately for past decades (1980s-1990s) and recent decades (2000s-2010s). We go on to discuss other additional coding considerations, in particular highlighting our process for determining whether a candidate who held a political office was elected or appointed.

In our data collection, we employed a two-source verification strategy. To determine a candidate's elective background, we required two independent sources for information (e.g., two different newspaper articles) that matched up in identifying a candidate as having previously held elected office (1) or not (0),

### Data Collection: 1980s-1990s

When searching for information on candidates running in the 1980s and 1990s, we principally relied on Newspapers.com—the largest online repository for national, state, and local newspapers. For each candidate, we conducted an advanced search to reduce the number of newspaper pages returned in our search query. On Newspapers.com, this involved searching for a candidate's name and then filtering the search to only include newspapers from a specific location [state of candidate's district] in a specific year [year of and year prior to the election]. If this still produced too many search results, we further narrowed our search window by including the words "Congress" and "election" in our search query with the candidate's name. Search results on Newspapers.com are filtered by relevance. We began by reading the first newspaper result and would continue reading subsequent results until two sources verifying a candidate's political or professional background could be ascertained.

If inadequate information was available on Newspapers.com, we turned to a Google search. This involved searching the following query: “[candidate name]” [election year] [state] [district number] Congress. The use of quotations around the candidate's name in our Google query forces an exact phrase search. Similar to Newspapers.com, Google search queries are sorted by relevance. We began by reading the first query result and would continue reading subsequent results until adequate information on a candidate could be ascertained. Information sources identified through our Google search included bios from the Office of the Historian for the U.S. of Representatives, obituaries, LinkedIn profiles, and Wikipedia articles. If a Wikipedia article was used to identify a candidate's past experience, the actual specified reference source was read to ensure Wikipedia accurately represented a candidate's background.

### Data Collection: 2000s-2010s

When searching for information on candidates running in the 2000s and 2010s, we principally relied on Google News—the world's largest news aggregator. For each candidate, we conducted an advanced search to reduce the number of newspaper pages returned in our search query. On Google News, this involved searching for a candidate's name and then filtering the search to only include sources from a specific year [year of and year prior to the election]. If this still produced too many search results, we further narrowed our search window by including the word "Congress" and "election" in our search query with the candidate's name. Search results on the Google News

aggregator are filtered by relevance. We began by reading the first source result and would continue reading subsequent results until two sources verifying a candidate’s political or professional background could be ascertained.

If inadequate information was available on Google News, we turned to a Google search. This involved searching the following query: “[candidate name]” [election year] [state] [district number] Congress. The use of quotations around the candidate’s name in our Google query forces an exact phrase search. Similar to Google News, Google search queries are sorted by relevance. We began by reading the first query result and would continue reading subsequent results until adequate information on a candidate could be ascertained. Information sources identified through our Google search included bios from the Office of the Historian for the U.S. of Representatives, obituaries, social media profiles, business profiles, campaign websites, and Wikipedia articles. If a Wikipedia article was used to identify a candidate’s past experience, the actual specified reference source was read to ensure Wikipedia accurately represented a candidate’s background.

### A.3 Public Office: Elected or Appointed?

In most instances, discerning a candidate’s status as an elected or appointed politician was straightforward; biographical accounts often clarified that a candidate was elected or appointed to a previous office (e.g., the candidate was elected/appointed to the position of Secretary of State in 2018). In cases where appointment versus election was unclear (e.g., the candidate “served” as the Secretary of State from 2018 to 2020), an extra step was necessary. If there was any ambiguity as to whether a candidate’s position was elected or appointed, we turned to state constitutions to determine the nature of the political position. These documents could be easily accessed online.

### A.4 Data Missingness

If two sources for information on a candidate’s background could not be identified, then the candidate was coded as having incomplete information (99). For our purposes, we assume candidates without sufficient information to be inexperienced. We could not find adequate information on the past elected experience for 2,781 (8%) of those candidates present in our data. We discuss trends in data missingness below.


#### Time Trends in Missingness

As noted above, in concert with the rise of digital media, the availability of online information about candidates has expanded across time. Furthermore, in our data for elections held from 2016 to 2020, information about candidates was collected contemporaneously with the election itself. These two factors produce the declining rate of data missingness visually depicted in Figure 1. For all but one election since 2000, missingness in elective information was reported for fewer than 100 candidates per cycle. Importantly, for those years where we find increasing rates of amateur candidate success, we have the lowest reported rates of data missingness. From 2016-2020, we reported a total of 106 candidates as having insufficient data to identify elective experience—this equates to 2% of all major-party candidates across those three election cycles. In sum, Figure 1 should provide confidence that trends in amateur candidate emergence identified in the body of this manuscript are not a product of time trends in data missingness.

#### Missingness Among Winners

In our collection, missingness in candidate data on past elective experience is relatively infrequent among election winners. We successfully identified the past elected backgrounds for all general

Figure 1: Number of Candidates with Insufficient Information on Elected Backgrounds, 1980-2020




*Note:* Units of analysis include all major-party candidates for whom there was insufficient information about a past elective background (i.e., did not meet two-source verification).

election winners in our data. We also identified the past electoral backgrounds for 98% of all candidates who won primaries in open seats. Finally, we identified the elected backgrounds for 99% of those candidates that bested an experienced competitor in a primary election.


## B Supplemental Tables and Figures

Figure 2: Percent of Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with Prior Legislative Experience, 1980-2020




*Note:* In plotted yearly proportions, the denominator includes all newly elected, freshman members of the U.S. House of Representatives (i.e., no incumbents) in the left panel, newly elected Democrats in the middle panel, and newly elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those newly elected members who have previously held legislative office (i.e., served as state House or state Senate member). Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

Figure 3: Predicted Count for Candidate Emergence (Including Non-Partisan Primaries)




*Note:* Quantities of interest are predicted counts of the number of candidates with elected experience (top panels) and without elected experience (bottom panels) who emerged to run in incumbent-held districts (left panels) and open seats (right panels) for the U.S. House from 1980 to 2020. Counts represent the total number of Democratic and Republican candidates who ran in a given congressional district and includes districts which employ non-partisan primaries. Predicted counts are simulated with observed data and presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Predicted Count for Experienced & Amateur Democrats Emergence




*Note:* Quantities of interest are predicted counts of the number of Democratic candidates with elected experience (top panels) and without elected experience (bottom panels) who emerged to run in incumbent-held districts (left panels) and open seats (right panels) for the U.S. House from 1980 to 2020. Counts represent the total number of Democratic candidates who ran in a given congressional district. Predicted counts are simulated with the observed data and are presented with 95% confidence intervals. State-level fixed effects have been dropped due to over-fitting.

Figure 5: Predicted Count for Experienced & Amateur Republicans Emergence




*Note:* Quantities of interest are predicted counts of the number of Republican candidates with elected experience (top panels) and without elected experience (bottom panels) who emerged to run in incumbent-held districts (left panels) and open seats (right panels) for the U.S. House from 1980 to 2020. Counts represent the total number of Republican candidates who ran in a given congressional district. Predicted counts are simulated with the observed data and are presented with 95% confidence intervals. State-level fixed effects have been dropped due to over-fitting.

Figure 6: Predicted Count for Candidate Emergence as a Function of Linear Time




*Note:* Quantities of interest are predicted counts of the number of candidates with elected experience (top panels) and without elected experience (bottom panels) who emerged to run in incumbent-held districts (left panels) and open seats (right panels) for the U.S. House from 1980 to 2020. Counts represent the total number of Democratic and Republican candidates who ran in a given congressional district. Predicted counts are simulated with the observed data and are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Pre-Primary Fundraising on the Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections



*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of pre-primary fundraising on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table A1. Pre-primary fundraising is varied across the observed minimum to maximum value for each decade. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Pre-Primary Fundraising (Logged) on the Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections



*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of pre-primary fundraising on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table A1. Pre-primary fundraising is varied across the observed minimum to maximized value for each decade. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Table A1: Number of Experienced and Amateur Candidates Running in Elections for the U.S.  
House of Representatives, 1980-2020

	Experienced Candidate		Amateur Candidate	
	(Incumbent-Held)	(Open)	(Incumbent-Held)	(Open)
Inc. Vote in Election Prior	-3.546* (0.213)	0.259 (0.200)	-0.350* (0.059)	0.040 (0.153)
Partisan Control: Republican	-0.103* (0.044)	-0.002 (0.050)	-0.059* (0.015)	0.010 (0.039)
# of Congressional Districts	0.015* (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.013* (0.003)
District Boundaries Redrawn	0.147 (0.127)	0.051 (0.124)	0.005 (0.042)	-0.075 (0.105)
Primary Election Rules: Open	0.094 (0.334)	0.064 (0.394)	-0.041 (0.118)	-0.419 (0.374)
Election Year: 1982	0.021 (0.173)	0.036 (0.194)	-0.095 (0.062)	-0.244 (0.159)
Election Year 1984	-0.291* (0.133)	0.131 (0.175)	0.001 (0.045)	-0.357* (0.150)
Election Year: 1986	-0.342* (0.137)	0.089 (0.158)	-0.056 (0.045)	-0.459* (0.129)
Election Year: 1988	-0.361* (0.139)	0.030 (0.177)	-0.118* (0.045)	-0.229 (0.135)
Election Year: 1990	-0.524* (0.149)	0.053 (0.164)	-0.122* (0.045)	-0.448* (0.144)
Election Year: 1992	0.254 (0.169)	0.069 (0.188)	0.125* (0.060)	-0.121 (0.153)
Election Year: 1994	-0.197 (0.127)	0.070 (0.152)	0.002 (0.044)	-0.074 (0.111)
Election Year: 1996	-0.008 (0.124)	0.097 (0.150)	0.050 (0.044)	-0.075 (0.112)
Election Year: 1998	-0.458* (0.124)	0.169 (0.150)	-0.213* (0.044)	-0.192 (0.112)

*Continue on the next page*

Table A1: Number of Experienced and Amateur Candidates Running in Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-2020 (cont.)


	Experienced Candidate		Amateur Candidate	
	(Incumbent-Held) (0.139)	(Open) (0.164)	(Incumbent-Held) (0.048)	(Open) (0.132)
Election Year: 2000	-0.356* (0.141)	-0.049 (0.171)	-0.161* (0.048)	-0.151 (0.129)
Election Year: 2002	-0.609* (0.190)	0.013 (0.197)	-0.218* (0.062)	-0.213 (0.160)
Election Year: 2004	-0.178 (0.130)	0.058 (0.174)	-0.132* (0.045)	-0.376* (0.138)
Election Year: 2006	-0.290* (0.134)	0.227 (0.162)	-0.097* (0.044)	-0.086 (0.128)
Election Year: 2008	-0.192 (0.129)	0.070 (0.165)	-0.096* (0.045)	-0.300* (0.134)
Election Year: 2010	0.005 (0.122)	0.058 (0.160)	0.208* (0.042)	-0.050 (0.117)
Election Year: 2012	-0.092 (0.176)	-0.007 (0.196)	0.100 (0.061)	-0.112 (0.158)
Election Year: 2014	-0.429* (0.141)	0.188 (0.156)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.333* (0.134)
Election Year: 2016	-0.177 (0.134)	0.139 (0.161)	0.034 (0.046)	0.056 (0.117)
Election Year: 2018	-0.299* (0.141)	0.030 (0.146)	0.318* (0.043)	0.213* (0.105)
Election Year: 2020	-0.222 (0.132)	0.112 (0.161)	0.292* (0.043)	0.468* (0.110)
Fixed Effects: State	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,589	742	7,589	742
Log Likelihood	-4,964.9	-1,269.1	-12,549.3	-1,640.7

Table A2: Candidate Success in Non-Incumbent Seat Primary Elections, 1980-2022

	Republican Candidates				Democratic Candidates					
	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1980s-2020	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	2016-2020
Prior Elected Experience	0.514* (0.242)	0.685* (0.199)	1.078* (0.219)	0.496* (0.181)	0.234 (0.249)	0.398 (0.221)	1.252* (0.211)	1.102* (0.259)	0.485* (0.244)	0.797* (0.345)
Ideological Extremity	0.002 (0.195)	1.194* (0.292)	0.296 (0.254)	0.402* (0.162)	0.448* (0.227)	1.251* (0.218)	1.323* (0.232)	0.536 (0.287)	0.440* (0.219)	0.229 (0.283)
Female	-1.090* (0.504)	0.152 (0.307)	-0.097 (0.345)	-0.316 (0.250)	-0.370 (0.328)	-0.193 (0.367)	-0.132 (0.282)	0.208 (0.372)	0.638* (0.258)	0.733* (0.319)
Pre-Primary Fundraising (Logged)	0.014 (0.058)	0.864* (0.207)	0.442* (0.221)	1.072* (0.141)	1.077* (0.246)	0.222* (0.100)	0.246 (0.180)	0.486* (0.215)	0.909* (0.103)	0.983* (0.129)
Other-Party Safe (ref: Competitive)	-0.867 (0.593)	0.624* (0.230)	1.214* (0.377)	1.860* (0.449)	2.971* (0.806)	0.441* (0.156)	0.633* (0.272)	0.539 (0.272)	1.535* (0.310)	2.031* (0.460)
Same-Party Safe (ref: Competitive)	-1.004* (0.275)	-0.275 (0.181)	-0.263 (0.156)	-0.430* (0.159)	-0.438* (0.208)	-0.474 (0.260)	-0.570* (0.168)	-0.389* (0.198)	-0.019 (0.222)	-0.196 (0.298)
State Rules: Open Primary	0.002 (0.189)	0.095 (0.156)	-0.048 (0.148)	0.079 (0.137)	-0.172 (0.195)	0.512* (0.197)	0.397* (0.133)	0.629* (0.218)	0.339 (0.197)	0.571* (0.291)
Experienced Opponents	-0.352* (0.120)	-0.329* (0.097)	-0.484* (0.095)	-0.211* (0.078)	-0.247 (0.132)	-0.470* (0.100)	-0.387* (0.076)	-0.574* (0.135)	-0.456* (0.091)	-0.374* (0.150)
Constant	0.747 (0.682)	-12.427* (2.703)	-6.797* (3.089)	-15.232* (1.928)	-14.986* (3.460)	-3.280* (1.136)	-4.975* (2.265)	-7.284* (2.891)	-12.876* (1.482)	-14.665* (1.962)
Fixed Effects: Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	348	629	480	1,068	523	425	575	376	634	386
Log Likelihood	-199.883	-280.562	-218.328	-385.236	-191.917	-236.349	-267.258	-165.392	-234.803	-134.874


Note: Results are from logistic regressions from 1980 to 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the district and year level. Candidate race is omitted due to lack of coverage in our manual collection of candidate race and ethnicity. \* p<0.05

Figure 9: Differences in Marginal Effect of Pre-Primary Fundraising on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections, By Decade




*Note:* Quantities of interest are differences in marginal effects for pre-primary fundraising on predicted probabilities of primary election victory. Positive values indicate that the first decade in the contrast had a greater marginal effect; negative values indicate that the second decade in the contrast had a greater marginal effect. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table A3. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 10: Percent of Top Fundraisers with Prior Elected Experience, 1980-2020




*Note:* In plotted yearly proportions, the denominator includes all top fundraising Democratic (left) and Republican (right) candidates who ran in open seat primary elections. The numerator in each panel includes the number of those candidates who previously held public, elected office. LOESS regressions with 95% confidence intervals have been fit to the data to visualize time trends. Here we define top fundraisers as candidates who met or exceeded the fundraising potential of the top 25% of primary election winners. Top fundraising Democrats met or exceeded the following fundraising amounts: \$510,351 (1980s), \$734,676 (1990s), \$1,437,529 (2000s), and \$1,413,037 (2010s). Top fundraising Republicans met or exceeded the following fundraising amounts: \$651,896 (1980s), \$639,130 (1990s), \$1,274,113 (2000s), and \$1,261,635 (2010s).

Figure 11: Number of Amateurs Meeting or Exceeding Median Fundraising of Experienced Candidates, 1980-2020




*Note:* Counts include all candidates who met or exceeded the median fundraising of experienced candidates. The median fundraising amounts for experienced Democrats were \$189,972 (1980s), \$286,765 (1990s), \$564,499(2000s), and \$432,739 (2010s). Top fundraising Republicans met or exceeded the following fundraising amounts: \$224,693 (1980s), \$325,907 (1990s), \$513,460 (2000s), and \$364,536 (2010s).

Figure 12: Marginal Effect of Prior Elected Experience on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections




*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of possessing past elected experience on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table 1. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 13: Differences in Marginal Effect of Prior Elected Experience on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections, By Decade



*Note:* Quantities of interest are differences in the marginal effect of prior elected experience on the predicted probability of primary election victory. Positive values indicate that the first decade in the contrast had a greater marginal effect; negative values indicate that the second decade in the contrast had a greater marginal effect. Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table A3. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 14: Average Ideological Extremity (CFscore) of Newly-Elected MCs, 1980-2020



*Note:* Units of analysis include all newly-elected members of the House of Representatives for whom a CFscore (Bonica, 2016) was generated. Points reflect the average CFscore for all newly elected Democrats (top row) and Republicans (bottom row) broken down by past political experience (left and right columns).


Table A3: Candidate Success in Open Seat Primaries (with interaction), 1980-2020

	Republican Candidates	Democratic Candidates
Prior Elected Experience	0.772* (0.245)	0.451 (0.263)
Election Decade: 1990s	-5.763* (1.511)	-11.168* (1.632)
Election Decade: 2000s	-4.492* (1.522)	-8.924* (1.566)
Election Decade: 2010s	-7.634* (1.352)	-9.945* (1.155)
Female	-0.107 (0.162)	0.014 (0.146)
Ideological Extremity	0.413* (0.133)	0.735* (0.126)
Other-Party Safe (ref: Competitive)	0.894* (0.174)	0.842* (0.166)
Same-Party Safe (ref: Competitive)	-0.278* (0.133)	-0.236 (0.155)
State Rules: Open Primary	0.003 (0.111)	0.229 (0.125)
Pre-Primary Fundraising	0.235* (0.075)	0.090 (0.049)
Experienced Opponents (#)	-0.519* (0.055)	-0.593* (0.057)
Prior Experience × Decade: 1990s	0.094 (0.323)	0.590 (0.351)
Prior Experience × Decade: 2000s	0.376 (0.341)	0.622 (0.393)
Prior Experience × Decade: 2010s	-0.640* (0.308)	0.151 (0.351)
Pre-Primary Fundraising × Decade: 1990s	0.863* (0.124)	0.887* (0.130)
Pre-Primary Fundraising × Decade: 2000s	0.644* (0.120)	0.669* (0.125)
Pre-Primary Fundraising × Decade: 2010s	0.732* (0.108)	0.756* (0.093)
Constant	-3.377* (0.909)	-1.722* (0.591)
Observations	2,272	1,851
Log Likelihood	-1,067.198	-845.096

Note:


\*p<0.05 15

Figure 15: Percent of Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with No Political Experience (Lawyers Excluded), 1980-2020




*Note:* In plotted yearly proportions, the denominator includes all newly elected, freshmen members of the U.S. House of Representatives (i.e., no incumbents) in the left panel, newly elected Democrats in the middle panel, and newly elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those newly elected members who have no previous political experience (excluding lawyers). Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

Figure 16: Percent of Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with No Political Experience (Including Family Ties), 1980-2020




*Note:* In plotted yearly proportions, the denominator includes all newly elected, freshmen members of the U.S. House of Representatives (i.e., no incumbents) in the left panel, newly elected Democrats in the middle panel, and newly elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those newly elected members who have no previous political experience (including immediate family political ties). Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

Figure 17: Percent of Amateur Freshmen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with No Political Experience, 1980-2020




*Note:* In plotted yearly proportions, the denominator includes all newly elected amateur members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the left panel, newly elected Democrats in the middle panel, and newly elected Republicans in the right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those freshmen, amateur MCs who have no previous political experience. Proportions do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

Figure 18: Marginal Effect of Descriptive Identities on Predicted Probability of Winning Open Seat Primary Elections



*Note:* Quantities of interest are marginal effects of female (left panels) and non-white (right panels) identities on the predicted probability of primary election victory in open seats for Democrats (top panels) and Republicans (bottom panels). Marginal effects are estimated using model coefficients presented in Table 1. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 19: Percent of Freshmen Female/Non-White Democrat Members of the U.S. House of Representatives with No Political Experience, 2000-2020



*Note:* In plotted yearly percentages, the denominator includes all newly-elected, female Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the left panel, and newly elected non-white Democrats in right panel. The numerator in each panel includes those freshmen Democratic MCs who have no previous political experience. Percentages do not include new members who won special elections caused by vacancies outside of the regular election cycle.

Table A4: Prior Occupational Backgrounds of Candidates Coded with Political Experience

Type	Example Position
Appointees	Federal, state, or local appointment (e.g., U.S. Attorney, Governor's Cabinet)
Non-Elected officials	Positions not publicly elected (e.g. state or local party executive)
Government employment	Federal, state, or local (e.g., congressional aide, presidential advisor)
Lawyers	Individuals who currently or in the past were practicing lawyers
Other Political Employee	Employment with expressed ties to government or influencing policy (e.g., CEO of Heritage Foundation, policy advisor at think-tank, lobbyist on Capitol Hill)