





CENTRIS: A Precise and Scalable Approach for Identifying Modified Open-Source Software Reuse

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GOAL

Identifying Open-source software (OSS) components in the target software


Motivation

- Open-source software is reused extensively in software development
- Reusing OSS without <u>proper management</u>
 - Vulnerability propagation
 - **License violation**
 - Supply chain attack

- Previous approaches cannot precisely identify OSS components
 - Modified OSS reuse
 - The cause of <u>false negatives</u> in component identification
 - Nested OSS components
 - The cause of <u>false positives</u> in component identification


Modified OSS reuse

- Modified reuse patterns
 - Partial reuse, <u>structure-changed</u> reuse, <u>code-changed</u> reuse



```
/* inflate.c -- zlib decompression
* Copyright (C) 1995-2005 Mark Adler
* For conditions of distribution and use, see copyright notice in zlib.h
*
* Based on zlib 1.2.3 but modified for the Linux Kernel by
```

- Modified OSS reuse
 - Modified reuse patterns
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


Simple thresholdbased approach




Many false negatives

Nested components



Nested components




Correct answers

- PHP reuses PCRE
- MongoDB reuses PCRE

Wrong answers

- MongoDB reuses PHP
- PHP reuses MongoDB

Nested components



CENTRIS


- CENTRIfuge for Software
 - The first approach to precisely and scalably identify modified OSS components
 - Key techniques

S1. Redundancy elimination


For high scalability

S2. Code segmentation

For high accuracy




Version update in an OSS




A naively generated OSS signature


function *k* : compared 3+ times




A naively generated OSS signature



A redundancy eliminated signature for an OSS



A redundancy eliminated signature for an OSS




The unique part of the software


- Non-reused code parts
- Self-developed code

Non-unique part of the software


- Reused code parts
- Cause of false alarms




How to segment an OSS?



Detecting functions belonging to the borrowed code part of S



Detecting functions belonging to the borrowed code part of S



$$G = \{ f \mid (f \in (S \cap L)) \land (birth(f, L) \leq birth(f, S)) \}$$

1) Measure similarity between S and L

$$\phi(S, L) = \frac{|G|}{|L|}$$

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2) Check whether G is included in the borrowed code part of S


If $\phi \ge \theta$ then:

1) Measure similarity between S and L


$$\phi(S, L) = \frac{|G|}{|L|}$$

2) Check whether G is included in the borrowed code part of S

If $\phi \geq \theta$ then :



or



3) Remove G from S

$$S = (S \setminus G)$$


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$$\phi(S, L) = \frac{|G|}{|L|}$$


2) Check whether G is included in the borrowed code part of S

If $\phi \geq \theta$ then:

Remove G from S



or



Repeat this process for all OSS in the component DB

=> Only the application code of S remains

Component identification in the target software

Comparing T with the application code part of the collected OSS



$$\Phi(T,S) = \frac{|T \cap S_A|}{|S_A|}$$

=> if $\Phi(T,S) \ge \theta$, then S is the component of T


- Dataset
 - Popular C/C++ OSS projects from (GitHub (April, 2020)
 - #Stars >= 100
 - A total of 10,241 projects, 229,326 versions, and 80 billion lines of code (LoC)
- Parameter
 - $\theta = 0.1$

1) Accuracy

- Cross-comparison experiments (10,241 vs 10,241)
- 91% precision and 94% recall
 - Modified components account for 95% of the detected components!

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Scalability ☐☐☐ SourcererCC ☐☐☐ CENTRIS (first exp.) CENTRIS (nth exp.) 800 Time (in hours) The limitation of 600 98 hours SourcererCC (first exp.) due to memory error 400 A minute 200 $(n^{th} exp.)$ 1M 10M 100M 1B 5B

Dataset (LoC)


3) Identification speed

• Takes ≤ 1 min to identify components in the 1 M LoC target software

1) Accuracy

- Cross-comparison experiments (10,241 vs 10,241)
- 91% precision and 94% recall
 - Modified components account for 95% of the detected components!

2) Scalability



4) vs. DejaVu (OOPSLA 2017)

- Code-duplication detection tool
- Using four target software programs
- DejaVu showed only 10% precision

	DejaVu	CENTRIS
Precision	10%	95%
Recall	40%	100%

3) Identification speed

• Takes ≤ 1 min to identify components in the 1 M LoC target software

CONCLUSION

- 95% of detected components were reused with modification
 - Modified components, not likely to be identified, have more chances to pose security threats
 - Management for supply chains considering modified components is required

- CENTRIS can be the first step towards addressing problems arising from unmanaged OSS components in practice
 - With the information provided by CENTRIS, developers can mitigate security threats
 - e.g., they can update old-and-vulnerable components

Q&A

Thank you for your attention!

- CENTRIS repository (https://github.com/wooseunghoon/Centris-public)
- CENTRIS at IoTcube (https://iotcube.net/Centris)

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