Lec 05: x86 Assembly

CSED415: Computer Security
Spring 2024

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Administrivia



- Lab 01 is due this Sunday
 - Focus on today's lecture if you are struggling!
- Team forming is also due this Sunday
 - 2 students per team, six teams
 - Check "Find your Teammates" board on PLMS
- Jeongjin (TA) is taking a leave of absence
 - Please do not send him emails
 - Use PLMS Q&A board for questions

Recap




- Secure coding is necessary to build secure computer systems
- However, code-level mitigation may not be enough
 - We cannot trust anything that we did not create ourselves
 - e.g., Thompson compiler
- Binary analysis, like it or not, is required
 - We want to find out whether a system is secure or not
 - Analyze exactly what gets executed on the CPU



BIN


ARY

Recap: Compiler 101




Executable binary (ELF-formatted file)

POSTECH



- ELF (Executable and Linkable Format)
 - ELF header
 - Program header
 - Segments
 - Contains Sections

Executable binary




ELF header

- Always at the beginning of an ELF file
- Contains magic number, architecture info, entry point address, ...

```
lab01@csed415:~$ readelf -h ./target
ELF Header:
 Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     ELF32
 Class:
                                     2's complement, little endian
  Data:
                                     1 (current)
 Version:
 OS/ABI:
                                     UNIX - System V
  ABI Version:
                                     EXEC (Executable file)
  Type:
                                     Intel 80386
 Machine:
  Version:
                                     0x1
 Entry point address:
                                     0x8049110
 Start of program headers:
                                     52 (bytes into file)
  Start of section headers:
                                     14328 (bytes into file)
  Flags:
                                     0x0
                                     52 (bytes)
  Size of this header:
 Size of program headers:
                                     32 (bytes)
 Number of program headers:
                                     11
                                     40 (bytes)
 Size of section headers:
 Number of section headers:
  Section header string table index: 28
```


Executable binary



Program header

- Contains segment information
 - Offset and size of each segment (code segment is size bytes from offset)
 - Virtual memory address each segment should be loaded
 - Permission of each segment

Executable binary




Segments

- Logical groups of sections
- Each segment is loaded onto one or more virtual memory areas at runtime
- Code segment (text segment)
 - Includes program instructions and read only data (e.g., string literals)
- Data segment
 - Includes static variables, uninitialized variables, ...

Loader turns a binary image into a process

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ELF loader workflow

POSTECH

- Read the ELF Header, which is always located at the very beginning of an ELF file
- 2. Read the program headers. These specify where in the file the program segments are located, and where they need to be loaded into memory
- 3. Parse the program headers to determine the number of program segments that must be loaded

ELF loader workflow




- 4. Load each of the loadable segments
 - a. Allocate virtual memory for each segment, at the address specified by the p_vaddr member in the program header
 - b. Copy the segment data from the ELF file offset specified by p_offset to the virtual memory address specified by p_vaddr
- 5. Read the executable's entry point from the ELF header
- Jump to the executable's entry point in the newly loaded memory

A process in memory


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- ELF segments + heap + stack
 - Heap
 - Dynamically allocated memory (e.g., using malloc)
 - Grows towards higher (larger) addresses
 - Stack
 - Contains runtime call stack
 - More on this later!
 - Grows towards lower (smaller) addresses




Exercise: Examine Lab 01's target in GDB

POSTECH



Exercise: Examine Lab 01's target in GDB


POSTECH



A process contains instructions and data

POSTECH

- Q1) Which component of a computer executes instructions? → CPU
- Q2) How does that component keep track of which instruction to execute next?
 - → Using instruction pointer (special register)
- Q3) How does that component keep track of program execution states?
 - → Using general purpose registers



x86 Registers

x86 architecture




- Developed by Intel in 1985
- 32-bit address space
 - Theoretically 2³² = 4GB of virtual memory can be used

One of the most common architectures


CPU executes a program





CPU executes a program using registers

POSTECH




x86 registers

POSTECH

- General purpose registers (GPR)
 - EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
- Pointers
 - ESI, EDI
- Stack pointers
 - ESP, EBP
- Special purpose registers
 - EIP, EFLAGS

History of Intel/AMD processors


POSTECH



x86 registers are extended from 16-bit registers

POSTPCH


AL, AH, AX, and EAX are accessiable



(Same applies to other general purpose registers)

Q) Can you draw RAX for x86_64?

x86 size convention: Word is 16 bits



RAX: Quad Word (QWORD)

x86 Assembly

Basic format of x86 instructions

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- x86 instructions have 0, 1, or 2 operands
 - 0 operand: ret

- 1 operand: inc eax operand 1
- 2 operands: mov eax, ebx operand 1

operand 2

Basic semantics

Operand 1 (usually) stores the result


```
mov eax, ebx // eax = ebx  sub esp, 0xc // esp = esp - 0x8  inc eax  // eax = eax + 1
```

• Operand can be register, memory, or constant

Size directives – motivation

POSTECH

high addr



Size directives — motivation

[ebx], 2 mov

> ebx = 0x804c0a0→ 0x804c0a0

> > 0x804c0a8

- Q) Correct behavior?
- 1. Overwrite a byte from 0x804c0a0 as 2
- 2. Overwrite 4 bytes from 0x804c0a0 as 2

Virtual memory

 0×02 0xff 0xff 0xff Oxff Oxff Oxff Oxff 0x804c0a4 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff

low addr

high addr

Size directives – motivation

POSTECH

mov [ebx], 2

 $ebx = 0x804c0a0 \longrightarrow 0x804c0a0$

0x804c0a4

0x804c0a8

- Q) Correct behavior?
- 1. Overwrite a byte from 0x804c0a0 as 2
- 2. Overwrite 4 bytes from 0x804c0a0 as 2

Virtual memory

low addr

high addr

Size directives – motivation

POSTECH

mov [ebx], 2

ebx = 0x804c0a0 \longrightarrow 0x804c0a0 0x804c0a4

0x804c0a8

Q) Correct behavior?

- 1. Overwrite a byte from 0x804c0a0 as 2
- 2. Overwrite 4 bytes from 0x804c0a0 as 2
- A) Both are incorrect. The instruction leads to an error due to ambiguity.

Virtual memory

low addr

0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff

0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff


0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff


high addr

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Size directives: BYTE/WORD/DWORD PTR


POSTECH





Endianness

POSTECH




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Endianness: How a sequence of bytes is stored in memory

MSB (most significant bit) (1)(2) [ebx], 0xdeadbeef mov low addr LSB (least SB) ← ebx = 0x804c0a0→ 0x804c0a0 0xde 0xef 0x804c0a1 0xad 0xbe VS. (1) is correct if Big Endian 0x804c0a2 0xbe 0xad The MSB goes to the 0x804c0a3 0xef 0xde lowest address (2) is correct if Little Endian The LSB goes to the Q) Which is correct? lowest address high addr

Endianness: x86 uses Little Endian (LE)



mov instruction syntax w/ exercise

POSTECH

Legal

```
1. mov reg, reg
```

- 2. mov reg, mem
- 3. mov mem, reg
- 4. mov reg, const
- 5. mov mem, const

Illegal

- mov mem, mem
- mov const, const

mov instruction syntax w/ exercise

```
    Legal

  1. mov
           reg,
                  reg
  2. mov
           reg,
                 mem
  3. mov
           mem,
                  reg
  4. mov
           reg,
                 const
```

```
eax, ebx
                      Legal (R to R)
mov
      al, bl
mov
                      Legal (R to R)
      [eax], ebx
mov
                      Legal (R to M)
      eax, [ebx]
                      Legal (M to R)
mov
      eax, [ebx + edx * 4] Legal (M to R)
mov
      al, BYTE PTR [esi] Legal (M to R)
mov
      eax, 16 Legal (C to R)
mov
      [ebx], 16 Legal (C to M)
mov
      [eax], [ebx] ILLEGAL (M to M)
mov
```

Illegal

5. mov


- mov mem, mem
- const, const mov

mem, const

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
lea: Load effective address

POSTECH



lea: Load effective address

POSTECH



mov vs. lea

```
mov esp, [ebp-0x8]  
// esp = value that address 0xffffd1450 points to i.e., esp = *(ebp - 0x8);

lea esp, [ebp-0x8]  
// esp = 0xffffd1450  
i.e., esp = (ebp - 0x8);

ebp = 0xfffd1458
```

Stack operations

POSTECH

• esp points to the top of the stack

Virtual memory low addr stack high addr

 $esp = 0xfffd1404 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1404$

Stack operations: push

POSTECH

push enlarges the stack

push eax

push [eax]

push 0xdeadbeef

 $esp = 0xfffd1404 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1404$

Push the value eax holds

Push the value at the address eax points to

Push constant value

Virtual memory low addr stack high addr

Stack operations: push

POSTECH

push enlarges the stack

push eax

push [eax]

push 0xdeadbeef

xdeadbeef | Push constant value


Push the value

Push the value at the

address eax points to

eax holds

 $esp = 0xfffd1400 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1400$ 0xfffd1404




Stack operations: push

POSTECH

push equivalence

 $esp = 0xfffd1400 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1400$ 0xfffd1404



Stack operations: pop

POSTECH

pop shrinks the stack


pop eax

pop [eax]

Pop the stack top into eax

Pop the stack top into the memory pointed to by eax

$$esp = 0xfffd1400 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1400$$
$$0xfffd1404$$



Stack operations: pop

POSTECH

pop shrinks the stack


pop eax

pop [eax]

Pop the stack top into eax

Pop the stack top into the memory pointed to by eax

 $esp = 0xfffd1404 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1404$ eax = 0xdeadbeef




Stack operations: pop

POSTECH

pop equivalence

pop eax == mov eax, [esp]
add esp, 4

 $esp = 0xfffd1404 \longrightarrow 0xfffd1404$ eax = 0xdeadbeef




Subroutine instructions: call

POSTECH

- call <label>
 - push the address to return to
 - perform unconditional jmp to <label>
 - e.g., in main() of lab01's target

```
eip => 0x080494d3: call 0x8049385 <phase_one>
    0x080494d8: call 0x8049352 <phase_two>
```



Subroutine instructions: call

POSTECH

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 - e.g., in main() of lab01's target

```
eip => 0x080494d3: call 0x8049385 <phase_one>
    0x080494d8: call 0x8049352 <phase_two>
```

low addr 0x080494d8 stack high addr

Virtual memory

esp =>


Subroutine instructions: call

POSTECH

- call <label>
 - push the address to return to
 - perform unconditional jmp to <label>
 - e.g., in main() of lab01's target

```
0x080494d3: call 0x8049385 <phase_one>
0x080494d8: call 0x8049352 <phase_two>
```

```
eip => 0x08049385: push ebp
    0x08049386: mov ebp, esp
    ...
```



Subroutine instructions: ret

POSTECH

ret

pop stack top into eip

• e.g., in main() of lab01's target

0x080494d3: call 0x8049385 <phase_one>
0x080494d8: call 0x8049352 <phase_two>


<phase_one>

0x08049385: push ebp

 0×08049386 : mov ebp, esp

• • •


0x08049482: ret



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Subroutine instructions: ret

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Branches in assembly

• Implemented using cmp + conditional jump

```
if (eax == 0xdeadbeef) {
      eax, 0xdeadbeef
cmp
                               goto addr;
je
      addr
                             if (eax != 0xdeadbeef) {
      eax, 0xdeadbeef
cmp
                               goto addr;
      addr
jne
                             if (eax >= 0xdeadbeef) {
      eax, 0xdeadbeef
cmp
                               goto addr;
      addr
jge
```

Q) Where does cmp store the result??


x86 registers

POSTECH

- General purpose registers (GPR)
 - EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
- Pointers
 - ESI, EDI
- Stack pointers
 - ESP, EBP
- Special purpose registers
 - EIP, EFLAGS ← This guy!

EFLAGS register stores status / control / system flags

POSTECH



- S Indicates a Status Flag
- C Indicates a Control Flag
- X Indicates a System Flag

Conditional jumps and their conditions



Instruction Mnemonic	Condition (Flag States)	Description
Unsigned Conditional Jumps		
JA/JNBE	(CF or ZF) = 0	Above/not below or equal
JAE/JNB	CF = 0	Above or equal/not below
JB/JNAE	CF = 1	Below/not above or equal
JBE/JNA	(CF or ZF) = 1	Below or equal/not above
JC	CF = 1	Carry
JE/JZ	ZF = 1	Equal/zero
JNC	CF = 0	Not carry
JNE/JNZ	ZF = 0	Not equal/not zero
JNP/JPO	PF = 0	Not parity/parity odd
JP/JPE	PF = 1	Parity/parity even
JCXZ	CX = 0	Register CX is zero
JECXZ	ECX = 0	Register ECX is zero
Signed Conditional Jumps		
JG/JNLE	((SF xor OF) or ZF) = 0	Greater/not less or equal
JGE/JNL	(SF xor OF) = 0	Greater or equal/not less
JL/JNGE	(SF xor OF) = 1	Less/not greater or equal
JLE/JNG	((SF xor OF) or ZF) = 1	Less or equal/not greater
JNO	OF = 0	Not overflow
JNS	SF = 0	Not sign (non-negative)
JO	OF = 1	Overflow
JS	SF = 1	Sign (negative)

Summary: With assembly, we can

POSTECH

- Move data around
 - Load/store data from/to data and registers
 - Compute pointer addresses
 - Use stack as a buffer (push, pop)
- Perform arithmetic operations
 - add, sub, and, xor, ...
- Call and return from functions
 - Push return address on call, pop that on ret
- Control execution flow
 - cmp followed by conditional jump family

Turing complete!

Given enough time and memory, can solve any computational problem

Exercise: reading lab01's target

POSTECH

- Focus:
 - mov operation
 - push and pop
 - Function call and return
 - cmp and jumps

Summary



- Do not get intimidated by assembly code!
 - They ARE human-readable

Coming up next

POSTECH

- Writing malicious assembly code
- Exploiting buffer overflow to alter program's execution flow

Questions?