

# My Pet Set Theory: AST+NWF

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## Abstract

In this note we present a variant of Ackermann Set Theory (AST) with easy construction of non-well-founded sets (NWF). Motivations for using up our time for this are also laid out.

## 1 The Theory

We will now describe a variant of Ackermann Set Theory [1] we denote as AST+NWF. AST+NWF is formulated in first-order logic with equality and with a constant  $V$  which is interpreted as the set universe, and a binary relation  $\in$  which is interpreted as the usual membership relation.

**Definition 1.1** (Super-Completeness of  $V$ ). *Let  $SC(V)$  be the statement*

$$\forall x, y (x \in V \wedge (y \in x \vee y \subseteq x) \rightarrow y \in V)$$

where  $\subseteq$  is the usual subset relation, defined as  $x \subseteq y \leftrightarrow \forall z (z \in x \rightarrow z \in y)$ .

Now here are the axioms of AST+NWF( $V$ ):

1. Axiom of Extensionality  $\text{Ext}(V)$ :

$$\forall x, y (x \in V \wedge y \in V \wedge \forall z (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \rightarrow x = y).$$

2. Ackermann Schema  $\text{Ack}(V)$ : Let  $\phi(y, z_0, \dots, z_{n-1})$  be any unary first-order formula where the all the free variables  $z_0, \dots, z_{n-1} \in V$  and  $\neq V$ . Then

$$(SC(V) \rightarrow \forall y (\phi(y, \dots) \rightarrow y \in V)) \rightarrow \exists x (x \in V \wedge \forall y (y \in x \leftrightarrow \phi(y, \dots))).$$

3. **Non-well-founded** Ackermann Schema  $\text{NWFAck}(V)$ : Let  $p$  be a *new*  $(m+1)$ -ary predicate. Let

$$\phi(y, z_0, \dots, z_{m-1}, z_m, \dots, z_{(m-1)m-1}, z_{(m-1)m}, \dots, z_{m^2-1}, a_0, \dots, a_{n-1})$$

be any unary first-order formula where all the free variables (all except  $y$ ) are  $\in V$  and  $\neq V$ , and there are  $m$  *different*<sup>1</sup> instances of  $p$  in  $\phi$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & p(y, z_0, \dots, z_{m-1}) \\ & p(y, z_m, \dots, z_{2m-1}) \\ & \vdots \\ & p(y, z_{(m-1)m}, \dots, z_{m^2-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Then if

$$\forall x \left( \bigwedge_{i=0}^{m-1} p(x, z_{im}, \dots, z_{(i+1)m-1}) \rightarrow x \in V \right) \rightarrow (SC(V) \rightarrow \forall y (\phi(y, \dots) \rightarrow y \in V))$$

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<sup>1</sup>For all  $i, j \in \{0, \dots, m-1\}$  with  $i \neq j$ , it is not the case that  $z_{im} = z_{jm} \wedge \dots \wedge z_{(i+1)m-1} = z_{(j+1)m-1}$ .

then

$$\bigwedge_{i=0}^{m-1} \left( \exists! x (p(x, z_{im}, \dots, z_{(i+1)m-1})) \right. \\ \wedge \forall x (p(x, z_{im}, \dots, z_{(i+1)m-1}) \rightarrow (x \in V \wedge \forall c_0, \dots, c_{m-1} (\bigvee_{j=0}^{m-1} c_j \neq z_{im+j} \rightarrow \neg p(x, c_0, \dots, c_{m-1}))) \\ \left. \wedge \bigwedge_{j=0}^{m-1} p_j^{-1}(z_{im+j}, x) \right)$$

where  $p_j^{-1}$  are *new* binary predicates that “retrieve” the parameters of  $p$ , and

$$\forall x (\forall y (y \in x \leftrightarrow \phi(y, \dots)) \leftrightarrow p(x, z_{m-1}, \dots, z_{m^2-1})).$$

## 2 Motivations

There are several motivations for the “design” of the theory.

The first motivation is the focus on *set constructions* instead of sets and/or proper classes. Because of this, we decided to:

- Adopt AST in the first place. The Ackermann schema captures the idea that “natural”/“uncontroversial” set constructions are 1) definable as a first-order sentence (hence, are “finite”), and 2) “universe-agnostic” (since those do not mention  $V$ ). This reminds us while studying infinities that our “full” descriptions of objects are always finite.

On the contrary, consider the Axiom of Choice (AC), a well-known axiom independent to ZF. The sets it constructs are not unique, hence it is said to postulate existence of sets without defining it, unlike other ZF (set construction) axioms [2, Chapter 5]. However, if we just permit “lengths” of any ordinal to  $\phi$  in Ackermann Schema, AC can now “produce” unique sets again! To see this, let  $S$  be a set of sets, then an appropriate  $\phi$  for AC would simply be

$$y = a_0 \vee y = a_1 \vee y = a_2 \vee \dots$$

where  $a_0 \in s_0, a_1 \in s_1, a_2 \in s_2, \dots$  and  $S = \{s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots\}$ . Nevertheless, stronger axioms like Choice can be added to our theory via relativization to  $V$  wherein every instance of  $\forall x \varphi$  in the statement is replaced by  $\forall x (x \in V \rightarrow \varphi)$  and every instance of  $\exists x \varphi$  is replaced by  $\exists x (x \in V \wedge \varphi)$ .

- Remove the Class Construction Schema for our AST+NWF. Note that Class Construction Schema *is* Separation Schema for  $V$  and that Separation Schema immediately follows from Ackermann Schema by setting  $\phi$  to  $y \in a \wedge \varphi$  for  $a \in V$ .

The next motivation is to make the universe(s) “as closed as possible”. Because of this, we decided to:

- Restrict Extensionality to sets ( $x \in V$ ) only.
- Put super-completeness inside Ackermann schemas instead of it being an axiom on its own. This is done so that when we work on multiple universes  $V_0 \subset V_1 \subset \dots$  where  $\text{AST-NWF}(V_0) \wedge \text{AST-NWF}(V_1) \wedge \dots$ , no additional sets in  $V_0$  will be shown to exist through the higher universes  $V_1, \dots$ , and *not* through Ackermann schemas for  $V_0$ .

Now the Non-well-founded Ackermann Schema is formulated for easy construction of non-well-founded sets (obviously), but it *is* a beast! Nevertheless, the intuition is actually simple:

If potential non-well-founded sets (the instances of  $p$  in  $\phi$ ) are used to successfully construct another version of  $p$  (via  $\phi$ , in Ackermann Schema sense) *assuming that those are all sets*, then those are indeed sets, and *no other version of  $p$  should ever be equal to those*.

For example, to construct a set such that  $x = \{x, a\}$  where  $a \in V$ , the  $m$  of  $p$  is simply 1 (as in  $p(y)$ ), and  $\phi(y, \dots)$  is simply  $p(y) \vee y = a$ .

The last highlight in the above quote, the statement “no other version of  $p$  should ever be equal to those”, needs explanation. Our main motivation for this is the “intuitive” set-theoretic definition of ordered pair  $(x, y) = \{(0, x), (1, y)\}$ . For this to satisfy the ordered pair property  $(x_0, y_0) = (x_1, y_1) \leftrightarrow x_0 = x_1 \wedge y_0 = y_1$  in our theory, the newly proved non-well-founded sets  $(0, x)$  and  $(1, y)$  should *always* be unequal. Since by the nature of non-well-founded sets we cannot “view inside”  $p$ , there is freedom on equalities between the newly proved non-well-founded sets. Hence the statement can be seen as either a “cheat”, or the most natural generalization of the always inequality between  $(0, x)$  and  $(1, y)$ .

Lastly, still in NWF Ackermann Schema, the motivation behind restricting to  $m$  instances of  $p$  in  $\phi$  and the usage of  $z_{m-1} \dots z_{m^2-1}$  in  $p$  in the final clause is also the above definition of ordered pair. We are still not fully satisfied with the axiom schema, but we hope that this is enough for now.

## References

- [1] Wilhelm Ackermann. Zur axiomatik der mengenlehre. *Mathematische Annalen*, 131(4):336–345, Aug 1956.
- [2] Thomas Jech. *Set Theory: The Third Millennium Edition*. Springer, 2003.