

## Team 2

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### Team Member Contribution Breakdown

Github: <https://github.com/ppoplawska/EnterpriseDefenseFirewall>

Adeel Qureshi	Task 1, Task 2, Task 3
Patrick Poplawska	Task 1, Task 2, Task 3
Edward Tischler	Task 2, Task 4
Christine King	Task 1, Task 4a, 4b
Troy Gittelmacher	Task 1, Task 2

### Citations:


<http://askubuntu.com/questions/532305/using-ufw-to-block-outgoing-traffic-to-website>

<https://workaround.org/squid-acls/> (task 4)

## Task 1: Using the Linux Firewall (ufw / iptables )


The first task involves using the linux program ufw, which is a front facing application for iptables functionality in the linux kernel. This allows users to use simple rules to create fairly powerful restrictions.

The first rule we implemented (actually a set of two ) was to prevent telnet connections between the two machines. The screenshot provided demonstrates this restriction in action. Machine A (left) cannot telnet into Machine B (right) and the converse is also true.



## Task 1 continued:

The third restriction involved using ufw to block access to a ip address. We chose to block the ip address associated with cise.ufl.edu. The screenshot shows Machine A timing out when attempting to connect to cise.ufl.edu



## Task 2: How Firewall Works

We implemented the following (5) required rules.

1. Restricted / Disallowed access from Machine A to Machine B (via Telnet).
2. Restricted / Disallowed access from Machine B to Machine A (via Telnet)
3. Block Access to ufl.edu ( ip: "128.227.9.48")
4. Block Access to cise.ufl.edu ( ip:"128.227.248.40")
5. Block Access to yahoo.com ( ip:"206.190.36.45")
- 6.

The firewall code we are running is known as task2.c the source code is provided for your convenience.

```
//task2.c
#define __KERNEL__
#define MODULE
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
//sd
static struct nf_hook_ops netfilter_ops;
//static unsigned char *ip_address = "\xC0\xA8\x00\x01";
static unsigned char *ip_address1 = "\x80\xE3\x09\x30";
//0x80E30930 ufl.edu
static unsigned char *ip_address2 = "\x62\x8A\xFD\x6D";
//0x628AFD6D belongs to yahoo.com
static char *interface = "lo";
unsigned char *port = "\x00\x17";

//FOR TCP STUFF
unsigned int src_port;
```

```

unsigned int dest_port;

struct sk_buff *sock_buff;
struct udphdr *udp_header;
struct tcphdr *tcp_header;

unsigned int main_hook(unsigned int hooknum,
                        struct sk_buff *skb,
                        const struct net_device *in,
                        const struct net_device *out,
                        int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff*))
{

    printk(KERN_INFO "main hook\n");

    sock_buff = skb;

    //get ip header info
    struct iphdr *ip_header = (struct iphdr
*)skb_network_header(sock_buff);

    char* UFL_EDU = "128.227.9.48";
    char*   YAHOO_COM = "206.190.36.45";
    char*   CISE_UF = "128.227.248.40";

    char* VM2 = "10.0.2.4";
    char* self = "10.0.2.15";
    //get source address

    if(!sock_buff){
        printk(KERN_INFO "socket buffer is empty\n");
        return NF_ACCEPT;
    }

    if(!ip_header){
        printk(KERN_INFO "no ip header in the socket buffer!\n");
        return NF_ACCEPT;
    }

```

```

// get ip and analyze

int ipSize = 15;
char * str[ipSize];

snprintf(str, ipSize, "%pI4", &ip_header->saddr);

if(!strcmp(str, UFL_EDU) || !strcmp(str, YAHOO_COM) ||
!strcmp(str, CISE_UF) ) // if we wanted to make this dynamic,
register each of the banned IPS to an array

// figure out how to get user input for dynamic execution
(piping mostlikey)
{
    printk(KERN_INFO "Found blacklisted IP [ %s ] Dropping
packet...\n", str);
    return NF_DROP; //drop it
}

//block incoming telnet
if(!strcmp(str, VM2))
{
    if(ip_header->protocol == 6) //we got a TCP packet,
proceed to further anaylise
    {

        //we have the possible telnet connection b.w host and
VM2

        tcp_header= (struct tcphdr *)((__u32 *)ip_header+
ip_header->ihl); //this fixed the problem //figure our the port
        int telnet = 23; //port to block (23 defaulted for
telnet)

        unsigned int dport = htons((unsigned short int)
tcp_header->dest);
        //snprintf(port_string, pSize, "%s",
&tcp_header->dest); //extracting readable port info
        printk(KERN_INFO "Found TCP packet from blacklisted
IP [ %s : %u ]..analyzing further \n" , str, dport);

```

```

        if(dport == telnet)
        {
            printk(KERN_INFO "Found telnet packet (port 23)
from blacklisted IP [ %s ]", str);
            //telnet default matches incoming destination
port, drop it
            return NF_DROP;
        }
    }
}

//block outgoing telnet
// get ip and analyse

snprintf(str, ipSize, "%pI4", &ip_header->daddr);

if(!strcmp(str, self))
{
    if(ip_header->protocol == 6) //we got a TCP packet,
proceed to further analyse
    {

        //we have the possible telnet connection b.w host and
VM2

        tcp_header= (struct tcphdr *)((__u32 *)ip_header+
ip_header->ihl); //this fixed the problem //figure out the port
        int telnet = 23; //port to block (23 defaulted for
telnet)

        unsigned int sport = htons((unsigned short int)
tcp_header->source);
        //snprintf(port_string, pSize, "%s",
&tcp_header->dest); //extracting readable port info
        printk(KERN_INFO "Found TCP packet transmission to
blacklisted IP [ %s : %u ]..analyzing further \n" , str, sport);

```

```

        if(sport == telnet)
        {
            printk(KERN_INFO "Found attempted telnet packet
(port 23) transmission to blacklisted IP [ %s ]", str);
            //telnet default matches incoming destination
port, drop it
            return NF_DROP;
        }
    }
}

```

```

printk(KERN_INFO "Did not hit any firewall rules, packet
recieved...\n");
return NF_ACCEPT;
}

```

```

int init_module()

```

```

{
    netfilter_ops.hook          =    main_hook;
    netfilter_ops.pf            =    PF_INET;
    netfilter_ops.hooknum       =    NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING;
    netfilter_ops.priority      =    NF_IP_PRI_FIRST;
    nf_register_hook(&netfilter_ops);

```

```

return 0;

```

```

}

```

```


void cleanup_module() { nf_unregister_hook(&netfilter_ops); }

```



**Question 1:** What types of hooks does Netfilter support, and what can you do with these hooks? Please draw a diagram to show how packets flow through these hooks.

The netfilter framework supports 5 main hooks. Two hooks occur at the input of a packet. Pre-routing occurs before the packet has entered the network (this is good for blocking packets based on some header information). Local In, which will allow packets that have entered the system to be modified. Then we reach the forward hook, which is called whenever a packet is destined to be forwarded. Lastly we have the two hooks designed to top egress: post-routing, and local out. Local out can be used to block all network traffic, whereas post-routing can be used once information like destination have been attached to the packet.



**Question 2:** Where should you place a hook for ingress filtering, and where should you place a hook for egress filtering?

- In the diagram above from Question 1, ingress filtering should use Hook 1 or 2, the local in and pre-routing hooks. This way, we can inspect all aspects of the packet when it enter the machine and make a decision on how to deal with it accordingly. Egress filtering should use Hook 4 or 5, for local out or post routing. Similarly, we can inspect all parts of the packet (including all network layer headers) and decide if it is a packet that should be sent out, after routing has been completed so we can see where it's going.


### Question 3: Can you modify packets using Netfilter?

- Yes. You are capturing them and you have to access to the data fields such as port number, source and destination IP addresses, et cetera in a C program environment, without any kind of protection on these values to ensure their integrity (unless the intended host has a security check such as a hash or checksum), so you are quite free to modify packets at will using netfilter.

### Task 3: Evading Egress Filtering


For this task we developed a special firewall that blocks all telnet communication, and blocks ufl.edu. This firewall is located in the task3.c firewall.

#### Task 3.a: Telnet to Machine B through the firewall




As instructed we will use an SSH tunnel to bypass the firewalls restriction on telnet communication.

Establishing a SSH Tunnel from VM A to VM B




Within the SSH Tunnel, establish a telnet connection from B to C (which is then forwarded to A). We observe through Wireshark that telnet traffic is being forwarded from B to A through the tunnel.




### Task 3.b: Connecting to “Facebook” aka Ufl.edu using SSH Tunnel.

The screenshot demonstrates ufl.edu being blocked using our task 3.c firewall.



You can see that when we refresh the page our kernel log is being populated with ip address rejections with are coming from our netfilter based firewall. The page will not refresh and therefore the ip-address is blocked.

We then proceed to modify firefox settings in order to change the default port it is listening on (its new target will be the SSH port).



We can now finally bypass the task 3.c firewall. Wireshark shows the packets running from C to B and then through our SSH tunnel back to A



**Question 4:** If ufw blocks the TCP port 22, which is the port used by SSH, can you still set up an SSH tunnel to evade egress filtering?


- Yes. All you have to do is modify the SSH configuration to use another port other than Port 22. These port values chosen as the accepted port for certain traffic can be thought more of as guidelines than rules- you could just as easily send this traffic over a different port to the same effect, so long as you have the means to configure which port SSH connects to on your machine. In Linux machines, the file is typically located in `/etc/ssh/sshd_conf`. If you use a text editor on this file and change the port from 22 to another value and then save and restart to apply the changes.




## Task 4: Web Proxy (Application Firewall)


### Task 4.a: Setup

After the initial Squid setup was complete, I attempted to visit websites through VM A's browser. All websites were blocked. The two following screenshots show the proxy blocking google.com and the Wireshark packets.





The following screenshot of squid.conf shows the rules that have caused all external websites to be blocked. The default rule is “http\_access deny all”.



By adding “http\_access allow all” under the rules in squid.conf, all websites will be allowed. The edited squid.conf file and the Wireshark packets connecting to aol.com and google.com are shown in the two following screenshots.

ed [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Machine View Devices Help

squad.conf (/etc/squid3) - gedit

File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help

Open Save Undo Cut Copy Paste Find

squad.conf

```
#
# Recommended minimum Access Permission configuration:
#
# Only allow cachemgr access from localhost
http_access allow manager localhost
http_access deny manager
#
# Deny requests to certain unsafe ports
http_access deny !Safe_ports
#
# Deny CONNECT to other than secure SSL ports
http_access deny CONNECT !SSL_ports
#
# We strongly recommend the following be uncommented to protect innocent
# web applications running on the proxy server who think the only
# one who can access services on "localhost" is a local user
#http_access deny to_localhost
#
# INSERT YOUR OWN RULE(S) HERE TO ALLOW ACCESS FROM YOUR CLIENTS
#
http_access allow all
#
# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt localnet in the ACL section to list your (internal) IP networks
# from where browsing should be allowed
http_access allow localnet
http_access allow localhost
#
# And finally deny all other access to this proxy
http_access deny all
#
# TAG: adapted_http_access
#     Allowing or Denying access based on defined access lists
#
#     Essentially identical to http_access, but runs after redirectors
#     and ICAP/eCAP adaptation. Allowing access control based on their
#     output.
#
#     If not set then only http_access is used.
#Default:
# none
#
# TAG: http_reply_access
#     Allow replies to client requests. This is complementary to http access.
```

Plain Text • Tab Width: 8 • Ln 836, Col 2 • INS

The screenshot displays the Wireshark 1.6.7 interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Devices, and Help. The title bar indicates the capture is on 'eth12' with a filter of 'Wireshark 1.6.7'. The packet list on the left shows a series of packets, with packet 1298 selected. The packet details pane on the right shows the structure of the selected packet, including Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 4, and Hypertext Transfer Protocol. The packet bytes pane at the bottom shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
69	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	216.58.192.102	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	431	Application Data
70	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	216.58.192.102	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	432	Application Data
71	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	216.58.192.102	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	184	Application Data
72	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.77	10.0.0.36	216.58.192.102	HTTP	1356	GET http://b.aol.com/ping?ts=1449371461386&www.aol.com&v=4
73	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	10.0.0.77	216.58.192.102	TCP	60	ndL-aas > 60565 [ACK] Seq=1291 Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
74	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	149.174.149.1	10.0.0.77	HTTP	1417	GET /ping?ts=1449371461386&www.aol.com&v=4&g=1453&js.p
75	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.77	10.0.0.36	216.58.192.102	HTTP	587	GET http://portal.aolcdn.com/g.aolcdn.com/fonts/fawhik.js.p
76	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	10.0.0.77	216.58.192.102	TCP	60	ndL-aas > 60565 [ACK] Seq=1442 Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
77	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	23.14.84.161	10.0.0.36	HTTP	546	GET /g.aolcdn.com/fonts/fawhik.js.pagedjsd.js.xbwdq5B5A
78	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	10.0.0.36	216.58.192.102	HTTP	60	http > 51347 [ACK] Seq=1442 Win=1023 Len=0
79	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	52.22.82.201	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	808	Application Data
80	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	162.208.20.166	10.0.0.36	HTTP	547	GET /v1/err/6836259/3866103/1054356/-/15820947/ver.1/ennv.p
81	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	162.208.20.168	10.0.0.36	HTTP	532	GET /d/depix/6836259/3866103/54356/cdp-grLzjpmM0v33EEL
82	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	54.192.5.105	10.0.0.36	HTTP	570	GET /P/x-lx.gif?interval=100&extra=15820947&ns=10512606310
83	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.36	162.208.20.166	10.0.0.36	HTTP	546	GET /v1/err/6836259/3866103/1054356/-/15820947/ver.1/ennv.p
84	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	216.58.192.102	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	185	Application Data
85	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	31.13.73.12	10.0.0.36	TCP	1464	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
86	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	31.13.73.12	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	973	Application Data
87	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.77	162.208.20.166	10.0.0.36	HTTP	539	GET /v1/err/6836259/3866103/1054356/-/15820947/ver.1/ennv.p
88	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	54.192.5.105	10.0.0.36	HTTP	678	GET /P/x-lx.gif?event=complete&extra=15820947&ns=10512606310
89	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	74.125.127.95	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	254	Application Data
90	2015-12-05 19:11:01.561000.0.9	74.125.127.95	10.0.0.36	TLSv1.2	106	Application Data
91	2015-12-05 19:11:01.662001.400:1668:2211:1	2601:883:c000:41cb:9c:TCP	1298	[TCP Retransmission] http > 44048 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1	44048	Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
92	2015-12-05 19:11:01.662001.400:1668:2211:1	2601:883:c000:41cb:9c:TCP	1298	[TCP Retransmission] http > 44048 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2031	44048	Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
93	2015-12-05 19:11:01.662001.400:1668:2211:1	2601:883:c000:41cb:9c:TCP	1298	[TCP Retransmission] http > 44048 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2031	44048	Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
94	2015-12-05 19:11:01.662001.400:1668:2211:1	2601:883:c000:41cb:9c:TCP	1298	[TCP Retransmission] http > 44048 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2031	44048	Win=331 Len=0 TSval=242
95	2015-12-05 19:11:01.6610.0.0.77	10.0.0.77	216.58.192.102	TCP	1272	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
96	2015-12-05 19:11:01.6610.0.0.77	10.0.0.36	216.58.192.102	TCP	66	60555 > ndL-aas [ACK] Seq



To only allow access to google.com and no other websites, the following lines were added to squid.conf:

```
acl google_domain dstdomain .google.com
```

```
http_access allow google_domain
```



```
ed [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
Machine View Devices Help
squid.conf (/etc/squid3) - gedit
File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
Open Save Undo Redo
# Only allow localhost access from localhost
http_access allow manager localhost
http_access deny manager
# Deny requests to certain unsafe ports
http_access deny !Safe_ports
# Deny CONNECT to other than secure SSL ports
http_access deny CONNECT !SSL_ports
# We strongly recommend the following be uncommented to protect innocent
# web applications running on the proxy server who think the only
# one who can access services on "localhost" is a local user
http_access deny to_localhost
#
# INSERT YOUR OWN RULE(S) HERE TO ALLOW ACCESS FROM YOUR CLIENTS
#
acl google_domain dstdomain .google.com
http_access allow google_domain
# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt localnet in the ACL section to list your (internal) IP networks
# from where browsing should be allowed
http_access allow localnet
http_access allow localhost
# And finally deny all other access to this proxy
http_access deny all
#
TAG: adapted_http_access
# Allowing or Denying access based on defined access lists
#
# Essentially identical to http_access, but runs after redirectors
# and ICAP/eCAP adaptation. Allowing access control based on their
# output.
#
# If not set then only http_access is used.
#Default:
```

With the above rule, all websites except google.com are blocked. The Wireshark screenshot below shows access to aol.com being blocked by Squid.

ed Clone [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Machine View Devices Help

eth12 [Wireshark 1.6.7]

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
10	2015-12-05 19:28:26.6110.0.0.9	23.205.120.106	TCP	60	15406 > http [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=2 Win=16425 Len=0	
17	2015-12-05 19:28:26.6110.0.0.9	10.0.0.9	TCP	60	http > 15392 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=62 Len=0	
18	2015-12-05 19:28:26.6472.30.2.182	10.0.0.9	TCP	60	http > 15392 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0	
19	2015-12-05 19:28:26.6472.30.2.182	10.0.0.9	TCP	60	http > 15392 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0	
28	2015-12-05 19:28:31.1610.0.0.77	10.0.0.36	HTTP	672	GET http://www.google.com/ HTTP/1.1	
32	2015-12-05 19:28:31.2610.0.0.36	10.0.0.77	TCP	66	nd1-aas > 60624 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=607 Win=331 Len=0 TSval=505227	
34	2015-12-05 19:28:31.262601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	TCP	94	47078 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14400 Len=0 MSS=1440 SACK_PERM=1		
35	2015-12-05 19:28:31.262607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	TCP	94	http > 47078 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=28560 Len=0 MSS=1410 S		
36	2015-12-05 19:28:31.262601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	TCP	86	47078 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=14464 Len=0 TSval=505243 TS		
37	2015-12-05 19:28:31.262601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	HTTP	765	GET / HTTP/1.1		
39	2015-12-05 19:28:31.322607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	TCP	86	http > 47078 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=680 Win=29952 Len=0 TSval=1555129		
42	2015-12-05 19:28:31.362607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	HTTP	582	HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html)		
43	2015-12-05 19:28:31.362601:883:c000:41cb:9c2607:f8b0:4006:80f::2:1	TCP	86	47078 > http [ACK] Seq=688 Ack=497 Win=15488 Len=0 TSval=50526		
44	2015-12-05 19:28:31.3610.0.0.36	10.0.0.77	HTTP	705	HTTP/1.0 302 Moved Temporarily (text/html)	
45	2015-12-05 19:28:31.362601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	752	Application Data, Application Data		
46	2015-12-05 19:28:31.4610.0.0.77	10.0.0.36	TCP	66	60624 > nd1-aas [ACK] Seq=607 Ack=648 Win=1282 Len=0 TSval=457	
50	2015-12-05 19:28:31.462607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	86	https > 35425 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=667 Win=569 Len=0 TSval=37054064		
51	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
52	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=1206 Win=849 Len=0 TSval=45756		
53	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
54	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=2411 Win=849 Len=0 TSval=45756		
55	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
56	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=3616 Win=842 Len=0 TSval=45756		
57	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
58	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=4821 Win=849 Len=0 TSval=45756		
59	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
60	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=6026 Win=842 Len=0 TSval=45756		
61	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
62	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=7231 Win=849 Len=0 TSval=45756		
63	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:12601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TLSv1	1291	Application Data		
64	2015-12-05 19:28:31.452601:883:c000:41cb:242607:f8b0:4006:80a::2:1	TCP	86	35425 > https [ACK] Seq=667 Ack=8436 Win=842 Len=0 TSval=45756		

Frame 28: 672 bytes on wire (5376 bits), 672 bytes captured (5376 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: CadmusCo\_e8:30:88 (08:00:27:e8:30:88), Dst: CadmusCo\_e8:30:88 (08:00:27:e8:30:88)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.77 (10.0.0.77), Dst: 10.0.0.36 (10.0.0.36)

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 60624 (60624), Dst Port: nd1-aas (3128), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 606

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

## Task 4.b: Using Web Proxy to evade Firewall

The ufw firewall can be evaded by using the web proxy. I chose to block access to Ultra.com (72.32.99.232) (I could not block all the IPs belonging to Facebook). I turned off the proxy on VM A, and enabled ufw and created the rule to deny out from the IP (see first screenshot).

Problem loading page

www.ultra.com

Most Visited Getting Started Seed Labs

**Unable to connect**

Firefox can't establish a connection to the server at www.ultra.com.

- The site could not be reached
- If you are unable to connect, you may need to check your network connection.
- If your computer's firewall settings are blocking the connection, you may need to change them.
- Firefox is permitted to access your network.

Try Again

Terminal

```

Rule deleted
[12/06/2015 11:29] seed@ubuntu:~$ sudo ufw status verbose
Status: active
Logging: on (low)
Default: allow (incoming), allow (outgoing)
New profiles: skip

To Action From
--
Anywhere DENY OUT 72.32.99.232


[12/06/2015 11:29] seed@ubuntu:~$ sudo ufw deny out to any from 72.32.99.232
Skipping adding existing rule
[12/06/2015 11:29] seed@ubuntu:~$ sudo ufw status verbose
Status: active
Logging: on (low)
Default: allow (incoming), allow (outgoing)
New profiles: skip

To Action From
--
Anywhere DENY OUT 72.32.99.232

[12/06/2015 11:30] seed@ubuntu:~$

```

6/12/15 - 11:30:11 am



In squid.conf, I added the rule “http\_aceess allow all” to allow all websites. I re-enabled the proxy and was able to connect to Ulta.com even though ufw was blocking it.

**Question 5:** If ufw blocks the TCP port 3128, can you still use the web proxy to evade the firewall?

Yes, it is still possible to use the web proxy to evade the firewall even if ufw blocks port 3128. This is done by changing the port in squid.conf from 3128 to some other port.

#### **Task 4.c: URL Rewriting/Redirection**


**Please describe what the above program does (e.g. what URLs got rewritten and what your observations are).**

- First, the program above does not work. The script is supposed to send someone using the proxy that attempts to connect to [www.cis.syr.edu](http://www.cis.syr.edu) to [www.yahoo.com](http://www.yahoo.com). However, [www.cis.syr.edu](http://www.cis.syr.edu) does not exist anymore so it does not quite work. However, changing the site to one that exists causes the script to work.

**Please modify the above program, so it replaces all the Facebook pages with a page that shows a big red stop sign**


- Facebook is not an http website anymore. Facebook uses https so it does not work with the url\_rewriter. Instead we blocked [www.runescape.com](http://www.runescape.com) which is equally still solves the same task that is meant to be completed.





Please modify the above program, so it replaces all the images (e.g. .jpg or .gif images) inside any page with a picture of your choice. When an HTML web page contains images, the browser will identify those image URLs, and send out an URL request for each image. You should be able to see the URLs in your URL rewriting program. You just need to decide whether a URL is trying to fetch an image file of a particular type; if it is, you can replace the URL with another one (of your choice).

- As the picture below shows. We successfully blocked jpg images on ufl.edu. If using the proxy and attempting to connect to a website with jpg images you will now only see stop signs.



**Question 6:** We can use SSH and HTTP protocols as tunnels to evade the egress filtering. Can we use the ICMP protocol as a tunnel to evade the egress filtering? Please briefly describe how.

- Yes, ICMP protocol can be used for tunnelling to evade egress filtering. A computer may inject data into an ICMP echo packet and send it to the intended recipient. The recipient can similarly send a ping reply with the reply data attached. Effectively, a client-proxy connection is established that can bypass firewall rules. Most firewalls will not block ICMP traffic, so cleverly using echos/pings to store requests of arbitrary length and receive packets of arbitrary length achieves tunneling as SSH and HTTP did. This is all possible due to IEEE RFC 792, which allows for the arbitrary length of data to be attached to an ICMP packet of type 0 (echo reply) or type 8 (echo message). Had that RFC restricted data size, this method would not work.