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SDN AND SECURITY:

Why Take Over the Hosts When You Can Take Over the Network

SESSION ID: TECH0R03

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What are the SDN Security Challenges?

Vulnerability of Central Control

Trust Model Changes

Virtualization of Network Topology

IT Organizational Changes

Presentation Outline

Software Defined Networks Overview

SDN Hype and Production Deployments

SDN Security Challenges

SDN Security Solutions

Q & A

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An abstract graphic featuring a thick, light blue ribbon that loops and swirls across the left side of the image. The background is a dark blue map of the United States, overlaid with a dense network of white dots and lines, representing a software-defined network. The overall color scheme is monochromatic, using various shades of blue and white.

Software Defined Networks Overview




SDN Basic Idea

- Separation of Network Control and Data Planes
 - Well-defined vendor-independent OpenFlow API between the two
- Operation of the network is defined in software outside of the forwarding path
 - a.k.a. Software Defined Network
- Centralized Network Control on standard servers



Motivation for SDN

- Creation of high-level network policies
 - Move away from current management approaches like SNMP/CLI
 - Apply policies uniformly across Routers, Switches, Optical, Virtual Networks, etc.
- Mix and match of vendors
 - Packet Forwarding and Control planes
 - Hardware and Software

Mainframes to PCs



Switches/Routers to SDN



SDN Architecture

Control Plane




Northbound API




Southbound API (OpenFlow)

Data Plane



Components

- Application Programs
 - Implement network specific policy
- Controller
 - Provides high-level view of Network to control programs
 - Deploy policy to Routers/Switches via OpenFlow
- Routers/Switches
 - Controlled by state injected by Controller



How It Works

- Controller presents logical map of network to Application Programs
- Switches/Routers are Flow based
 - Process known flows autonomously
 - If new flow arrives, ask Controller what to do
 - Controller installs new flow state in Switch/Router
 - Flow state consist of <Match, Action> pairs
- Controller pushes state to Switch/Router with OpenFlow

SDN Architecture

Control Plane


Applications Applications Applications

Northbound API


Controller

Southbound API (OpenFlow)



Data Plane



Flow Table Entry (OpenFlow 1.0)



Lots of Activity



Impact to Current Networking

- Utilizes most existing protocols
 - IPv4/IPv6, TCP/UDP, Ethernet, VLANs, etc.
- Hosts don't change
- Routing Protocols run in the Controller
- Big change to management and configuration protocols
 - Centralized vs. current distributed
- This is an incremental solution not a “clean slate”



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Production SDN Deployments

Google OpenFlow Network



- OpenFlow SDN in Google's worldwide internal Inter-Data Center Network
- Centralized traffic engineering service
- Google built their own network switches using merchant silicon and Open Source routing software
- Rumors that Facebook, Microsoft, etc. are looking at similar SDN traffic engineering deployments

<http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/04/going-with-the-flow-google/all/1>



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Other SDN Production Deployments

- Data Center deployments using Nicira/VMware NSX
- Data Center / Virtualization is a very active SDN area
 - Network virtualization doesn't require SDN, but can be helped by it
- There are many University / Research SDN Projects
 - NSF is providing a lot of funding

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A man in profile, wearing glasses and a suit, is shouting into a megaphone. A thick, light blue ribbon graphic loops around the megaphone and extends towards the top left of the frame. The background is a solid blue color.

SDN Hype

The Hype

“SDN is emerging as one of the most promising and disruptive networking technologies of recent years. It has the potential to enable network innovation and create choice, and thus help realize new capabilities and address persistent problems with networking. It also promises to give network operators more control of their infrastructure, allowing customization and optimization, therefore reducing overall capital and operational costs.”


Open Networking Summit, April 2012

SDN Hype

- SDN is a threat to many vendors' business models
 - Many large vendors are describing “SDN like” solutions that will lock in customer
 - Proposing very complex proprietary solutions
- Vendors are using SDN to describe any legacy products that use software to control hardware

SDN Adoption

Inflated Expectation



SDN Issues / Challenges

- Scaling properties uncertain
 - Flow entries could get very, very large
 - Flows supported by switches is still limited
- Outages / Bugs
 - Unclear how well it deals with network outages that require rerouting
 - How do you debug software and hardware problems?
- Security (the rest of the talk)

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
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The background of the slide is a blue-tinted photograph of a person rock climbing. The climber is positioned on the right side, facing right, and is reaching up with their right arm. A large, thick, light-blue ribbon graphic starts from the top left, loops around, and extends towards the center of the slide. The text 'SDN Security Challenges' is written in white, bold, sans-serif font in the center-right area.

SDN Security Challenges

Vulnerability of Central Control

- SDN Applications and Controller have complete control of the network
- Controllers/Applications are built on general purpose computing platforms
 - We all know all about the vulnerabilities of these platforms
- If Controller or Application is compromised, the whole Network is compromised



Why Take Over the Hosts When You Can Take Over the Network

Effects of SDN Controller Compromise

- ◆ Route flows around security devices
- ◆ Controller subverts new flows
- ◆ Send traffic to compromised nodes
- ◆ “Man in the Middle” attacks
- ◆ Modify content
- ◆ Insert malware
- ◆ Monitor traffic
- ◆ Subvert DNS responses
- ◆


Was SDN Designed for the NSA?

Central control makes it easy to control the whole network

SDN makes it very easy to control where traffic flows




Current Security Model



Security policy enforced by physically forcing traffic to flow through Security Devices



SDN Changes Security Model



- Flow Rules control when or if traffic goes through Security Device
- Network Topology is now virtual

SDN Changes the Trust Model

Security cannot be enforced by physical topology

Requires complete Trust in SDN Applications and Controller

We don't understand the consequences

SDN Changes Organization Model

- Today most IT organizations have a
 - Network Group
 - Security Group
- SDN requires a great deal of cooperation between these groups
- All network staff will be responsible for Security Policy





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SDN Security Solutions

It's Not All Bad

Uniform SDN Security Policy

Security Everywhere

Control Security Treatment Traffic Receives


Isolate Compromised Hosts



Uniform SDN Security Policy

Security Application


- Couple Security Policy to SDN policy/rules and validate SDN flows against the security policy
- Ensure that Security Policy is implemented for all traffic
- Maintain regulatory and compliance requirements



Security Everywhere

Security Application


- All Routers and Switches have Security capabilities
- Security Application can take advantage of this and push rules to all network devices



Control Security Treatment Traffic Receives


Range of Security Control

- Full Firewall
- ACL style filtering
- No filtering



Isolate Compromised Hosts

- Once compromised host is detected
- Host can be isolated



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Summary

The background is a deep blue. On the left, a light blue, three-dimensional ribbon-like shape curves upwards and then loops back down. On the right, a faint, dark blue network diagram is visible, consisting of numerous small dots connected by thin lines, forming a complex web-like structure.

Summary

- SDN has a lot of promise
 - Many of its capabilities are very powerful
- SDN Security issues are real for many organizations
 - Another case of build it and worry about Security later?
- We will all need to get beyond the “hype phase” to see what is real and achievable



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Thank You