MUNQSMUN '17

*"**Rise** above the **Rest**"*

United Nations Disarmament Commission
Background Guide

“Countering illicit trade of WMDs and their means of delivery with emphasis on strengthening nonproliferation regimes and export control mechanisms”

Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the simulation of yearly session of United Nations Disarmament Session at the MUNQSMUN 2017. The UNDC at this MUN will be discussing "Countering illicit trade of WMDs and their means of delivery with emphasis on strengthening non proliferation regimes and export control mechanisms" as the agenda for the course of the three days. We encourage you to debate holistically keeping all perspectives of the agenda in mind. The Executive Board will be welcoming of any suggestions by the delegates for conduction of debate. We see this as an opportunity for co-creation of meaning of important phenomena from the viewpoint of policy-making. It is a platform where we, in our individual capacity, can ensure that we actively make a difference to this theme.

We see this opportunity as a chance to sensitize each other with our respective thoughts and enable a shared learning environment. We also see this as an experience where each one of us would be able to question our biases towards these words. We believe that this simulation will end up facilitating decision making in an individual life's and affecting everyday experiences as well. It would help us all to reflect and realize the deep-rooted nature of our thoughts and the intensity with which we hold them true. At the end of three days, we all wish to see you a step ahead of what you were few days before. Our focus on the committee will be debate which includes but is not limited to understanding of the problem, articulation, solution and etc. We shall also be taking into account your manner and method alongside your matter. Success or failure of the committee does not depend on passing of a document. Cooperation to understand each other and accommodate viewpoints is what ensures quality. We humbly ask you for your support to make these three days a memorable learning experience for all of us. Feel free to contact us anytime.

Regards

Executive Board of UNDC

Suggested Pattern for Researching

- Researching and understanding the United Nations and the Committee/Council being simulated – Its Mandate, including understanding historical work done on the agenda.
- Research on the allotted country. Understanding its polity, economy, military, culture, history, bilateral relations with other countries, ideological position on various other relevant issues related to the agenda etc.
- Comprehending the Foreign Policy of the allotted country. It includes understanding the ideology and principles adopted by the country on the agenda. It further includes studying past actions taken by the country on the agenda and other related issues –specifically analyzing their causes and consequences.
- Reading the background guide thoroughly.
- Researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc.
- Understanding policies adopted by different blocs of countries (example: NATO, EU etc.) and major countries involved in the agenda. Including their position, ideology and adopted past actions.
- Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and statements on them. It is the same as preparing topics for the moderated caucuses and their content.
- Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions can be adopted on the issue as per your country's policies.
- Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are going to use in committee and keeping your research updated using various news sources, especially news websites given in the proof/evidence section.

Lastly, we would request all the delegates to put sincere efforts in preparation and research for the simulation and work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all. Feel free to contact if you have any queries or doubts.

About the United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly which is mandated to consider and make recommendations on various disarmament related issues and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special sessions devoted to disarmament held so far.
The Disarmament Commission was re-established at the first Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1978 to succeed an earlier Disarmament Commission, which ceased to convene after 1965. It consists of all Member States and holds its substantive yearly sessions in New York (usually in late spring) for approximately three weeks. The Commission reports annually to the General Assembly.

Since 1978, the Disarmament Commission has dealt with numerous disarmament related questions, both nuclear and conventional, and has submitted guidelines and principles on various subject items, including guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures, guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, and guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters

In 1952, the General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952, created the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) under the Security Council with a general mandate on disarmament questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959.
https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8798444.27108765.html
In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament established a successor Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, composed of all Member States of the United Nations. It was created as a deliberative body, with the function of considering and making recommendations on various issues in the field of disarmament and of following up on the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session. It reports annually to the General Assembly.
Guidelines and Recommendations
A/51/182
A/51/182/Rev.1
A/54/42

In the light of its function, the UNDC focuses on a limited number of agenda items at each session. In 1989, to allow for in depth consideration, it decided that its substantive agenda should be limited to a maximum of four items. From 1993, it has, in practice, dealt with two or three items, each of which has usually been considered for

three consecutive years. In 1998, by its decision 52/492, the General Assembly decided that the UNDC's agenda, as of 2000, would normally comprise two substantive items per year from the whole range of disarmament issues, including one on nuclear disarmament.

The UNDC, which meets for three weeks in the spring, operates in plenary meetings and working groups, the number of working groups depending on the number of substantive items on its agenda. The five geographical groups take turns assuming the chairmanship of the UNDC, while the chairmen of the working groups are selected in accordance.

Over the years, the UNDC has formulated consensus principles, guidelines and recommendations on a number of subjects, which have been endorsed by the General Assembly. However, in the past decade, it has not been able to agree on a substantial outcome.

The UNDC is serviced substantively by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and technically by the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services.

Weapons of mass destruction

A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a type of weapon that is capable of killing and bringing significant harm to human life and human- made structures. They are of mainly, 4 types:-

- Nuclear
- Biological
- Radiological
- Chemical

Important International Treaties and Conventions related to WMDs

- Partial Test Ban Treaty
- Outer Space Treaty
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT)
- Seabed Arms Control Treaty
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, has not entered into force as of 2017)
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Note-This list of important treaties and conventions is non-exhaustive and incomplete, feel free to add and research on any other treaty mentioned here.
Please research on these treaties and the weapons mentioned above.

Means of delivery of nuclear weapons

The spread of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons has a grave impact on global security but is only one side of the threat equation. To use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon, a country or a terrorist group needs to deliver it to its target. That's where ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, combat aircraft, drones and even trucks or ships come in.
Delivery systems determine how, when and against whom a country—or a non-state actor—can use these deadly and disruptive weapons.

What types of delivery systems exist?

The most common types of delivery systems for a country seeking the means for WMD delivery are ballistic and cruise missiles, combat aircraft (also known as "bombers") and unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as "drones"). Non-state actors may pursue cruder methods due to ease of access and opportunity.

Gravity bomb

Historically, the first method of delivery, and the method used in the only two nuclear weapons actually used in warfare, was a gravity bomb dropped by a plane. In the years leading up to the development and deployment of nuclear-armed missiles, nuclear bombs represented the most practical means of nuclear weapons delivery; even today, and especially with the decommissioning of nuclear missiles, aerial bombing remains the primary means of offensive nuclear weapons delivery, and the majority of U.S. nuclear warheads are represented in bombs, although some are in the form of missiles. Gravity bombs are designed to be dropped from planes, which requires that the weapon be able to withstand vibrations and changes in air temperature and pressure during the course of a flight.

Ballistic missiles

A ballistic missile is a missile that follows a ballistic trajectory with the objective of delivering one or more warheads to a predetermined target. A ballistic missile is only guided during relatively brief periods of flight (there are unguided ballistic missiles as well, such as 9K52 Luna-M, although these may well be considered rockets), and most of its trajectory is unpowered and governed by gravity and air resistance if in the atmosphere. This contrasts to a cruise missile, which is aerodynamically guided in powered flight. Long range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are launched on a sub-orbital flight trajectory and spend most of their flight out of the atmosphere. Shorter range ballistic missiles stay within the Earth's atmosphere.Missiles using a ballistic trajectory usually deliver a warhead over the horizon, at distances of thousands of kilometers, as in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Most ballistic missiles exit the Earth's atmosphere and re-enter it in their sub-orbital spaceflight.An ICBM is more than 20 times as fast as a bomber and more than 10 times as fast as a fighter plane, and also flying at a much higher altitude, and therefore more difficult to defend against. ICBMs can also be fired quickly in the event of a surprise attack.

Cruise missiles

Cruise missiles may also be launched from mobile launchers on the ground, and from naval ships.

Cruise missiles, even with their lower payload, have a number of advantages over ballistic missiles for the purposes of delivering nuclear strikes:

Launch of a cruise missile is difficult to detect early from satellites and other long-range means, contributing to a surprise factor of attack.

That, coupled with the ability to actively maneuver in flight, allows for penetration of strategic anti-missile systems aimed at intercepting ballistic missiles on calculated trajectory of flight.

Partially for those reasons, nuclear-armed cruise missiles are amongst the least deployed of all nuclear weapons, as their deployment is restricted by treaties such as SALT II.

Other delivery systems

Other delivery methods included artillery shells, mines such as the Medium Atomic Demolition Munition and the novel Blue Peacock, nuclear depth charges, and nuclear torpedoes. An 'Atomic Bazooka' was also fielded, designed to be used against large formations of tanks. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (erroneously referred to as suitcase bombs), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty to combine sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles are a new potential method of nuclear delivery. They can be potentially combined with ICBM MIRVs such as RS-28 Sarmat.

WMD and their delivery system proliferation

Six conventions, two treaties, one protocol, one regime, one arrangement, one code, one initiative and ten regional or zone treaties have been instituted since 1925 to control these instruments of mass murder. Most of the accords require only passive agreement and are trumped by influence-peddling, profit-seeking and ideology-spreading considerations. As a result the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise, too.

Countries have spurred proliferation of every WMD category since the 1950s. Figure 1 shows major patterns of WMD proliferation. Disseminating the weapons, relevant technologies and dual-use materials remains a surefire way for not only rogue states and terrorist organizations but even superpowers to sway other nations, make quick profits or destabilize foes. Not surprisingly, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research concluded: “The non-proliferation treaties lack effective mechanisms to enforce compliance. The less formal export control regimes suffer from the same lack and have limited membership.”

Mustard gas was used extensively during World War I. Negative public reaction led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Yet Italy in 1936, Japan from 1937 to 1945, Egypt from 1963 to 1967 and Iraq in the 1980s all deployed chemicals against military and civilian targets. Owing to the transfer of materials and technologies, 23 countries stockpile or have chemical WMD capability: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, United States and Vietnam.



Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1950s, 1960-1989.

Syria, for example, began receiving material and technological assistance from Egypt in the early 1970s and from Iraq in the 1980s to establish its facilities and arm SCUD missiles with chemical warheads. Pakistan served as another source of dual-use technologies and raw materials for the Assad regime. Iran too added to Damascus' stockpiles.

Nuclear WMD began as an offensive tool dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The horrific results meant that no rational, civilized state could use them again. Those weapons shifted toward defensive deterrent and emblems of power. So, other nations followed the path laid out by the US. The Soviet Union proliferated technology and hardware widely. China supplied Pakistan with highly enriched uranium for a bomb in 1982. Presently nine countries possess nuclear warheads: Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the US.

The number of nations tempted by nuclear WMD is growing. Iran's nuclear program, having drawn upon Chinese, North Korean and Pakistani expertise, has fissile material for at least five warheads. China has benefited by receiving several billion dollars in revenue, securing access to crude oil, and strengthening its foreign footprint. Iran could

even buy a nuclear weapon off the shelf from China or North Korea – the next stage in proliferation. So a broader nuclear acquisitions cascade is building as Sunni Arab nations like Saudi Arabia seek to neutralize both their Shiite neighbor's might and Israel's WMD program.



Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1990-2000

Biological WMD are popularly considered the most taboo of offensive capabilities. Nonetheless the Imperial Japanese Army from 1939 to 1940 and the Rhodesian Army in the 1970s deployed typhoid, bubonic plague, anthrax, botulism and cholera against Chinese and Africans, respectively. Several nations did relinquish biological WMD capability after acceding to international accords: the US in 1972, Britain, France, Germany and Canada by the late 1980s, the former Soviet Union/Russia in 1992. China signed the BTWC in 1984; however, the US suspectsBeijing maintains capability plus provides assistance to Pyongyang and Tehran.

In the Middle East, Egypt weaponized anthrax, botulism and plague in the 1970s with Soviet aid. Israel followed suit with poorly-documented offensive and defensive capabilities. Iran commenced its biological WMD program at Damghan, after experiencing Iraqi chemical WMD, with technical assistance from Russian scientists. Iraq appears to have possessed biological weapons capability under Saddam Hussein, but there is no evidence of the program's continuation. Likewise Syria is suspected of exploring biological weapons development. Again Russia, China and North Korea appear to be abettors.



Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 2001-Present

WMD proliferation usually focuses on technology and materials like precursor chemicals, biological agents, toxins and uranium. Yet delivery devices, projectile weapons, launch platforms and guidance systems are essential components. The Israelis sell those technically non-WMD items to the Chinese who resell to the North Koreans who then resell to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the UAE and Pakistan. As countries like North Korea and Iran collaborate on missile development, the WMD one develops could fit the other's delivery systems.Many deals are conducted covertly with countries like Malaysia and Dubai serving as third-party transfer venues. Equally unsettling for global security, WMD trades for profit and ideology have taken place though private outlets such as Pakistan's former atomic chief A. Q. Khan. Materials siphoned from Russia and the Ukraine also continue fueling the nuclear black market.Indeed the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise. Since 2001 Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sought WMD capability. During Syria's civil war some sarin, mustard gas and cyanide from government depots reportedly have fallen into illicit hands. The possibility of Islamists wresting materials from Pakistan's WMD facilities increases as that nation's political instability grows. Iran for its part appears to have transferred some technologies to regional militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Nuclear Terrorism

When we talk of violent non-state actors in the context of nuclear violence, the term almost becomes synonymous to ‘Nuclear terrorism’. Many countries have their own definition of nuclear terrorism and what acts it consists of, but the 2005 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism defines it as an offense committed if a person unlawfully and intentionally “uses in any way radioactive material…with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act”

Violent-Non-State actors : How do they spread this nuclear terrorism and what consists of it?

Such groups mostly conducted well-coordinated proliferation and trafficking of nuclear material usually stolen by government sites which lack on proper safety of nuclear material. They may later misuse this material to establish devices like “Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs)” or “Dirty Bombs” and other such radiological weapons.

A dirty bomb is a speculative radiological weapon that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives. The purpose of the weapon is to contaminate the area around the dispersal agent/conventional explosion with radioactive material, serving primarily as an area denial device against civilians.

Constructing and obtaining material for a dirty bomb In order for a terrorist organization to construct and detonate a dirty bomb, they must acquire radioactive material by stealing it or buying it through legal or illegal channels. Possible RDD material could come from the millions of radioactive sources used worldwide in the industry, for medical purposes and in academic applications mainly for research. Of these sources, only nine reactor produced isotopes stand out as being suitable for radiological terror: americium-241, californium-252, caesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium-192, plutonium-238, polonium-210, radium-226 and strontium-90, and even

Export controls

A number of export control regimes and related arrangements that contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery have been established. These include the following

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.

The NSG Guidelines also contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation Principle,” adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.

The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (PG) in accordance with its national laws and practices.
Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.

The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The aim is also to prevent the acquisition

of these items by terrorists.

Participating States apply export controls to all items set forth in the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Munitions List, with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or re-transfers of those items.

To assist in developing common understandings of transfer risks, Participating States regularly exchange information of both a general and a specific nature. Participating States are required to report their arms transfers and transfers/denials of certain dual-use goods and technologies to destinations outside the Arrangement on a six-monthly basis. In some cases, shorter reporting time-frames apply.

In fulfilling the purposes of the Arrangement as described above, Participating States have, inter alia, agreed to a number of guidelines, elements and procedures as a basis for decision-making through the application of their own national legislation and policies.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.
The Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary is the decision-making body of the Arrangement. It is composed of representatives of all Participating States and normally meets once a year, usually in December. The position of Plenary Chair is subject to annual rotation among Participating States. In 2016 the Plenary Chair was held by Finland, and in 2017 the Chair is held by France. All Plenary decisions are taken by consensus.

The Plenary establishes subsidiary bodies for the preparation of recommendations for Plenary decisions and calls ad hoc meetings for consultations on issues related to the functioning of the Wassenaar Arrangement. At present, the main Wassenaar Arrangement subsidiary bodies are: the General Working Group (GWG) dealing with policy-related matters, and the Experts Group (EG) addressing issues related to the lists of controlled items. Once a year, a Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting (LEOM) is held.

Vienna Points of Contact (VPOC) are called for periodic meetings under the Plenary Chair to facilitate intersessional information flow and communications between/among Participating States and the Secretariat.

The Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR) is a multilateral export control regime. It is an informal and voluntary partnership among 35 countries to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying above 500 kg payload for more than 300 km.

Since its inception, the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR.3 The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.

Yet, the regime has its limitations. Iran, India, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to advance their missile programs. All four countries, with varying degrees of foreign assistance, have deployed medium-range ballistic missiles that can travel more than 1,000 kilometers and are exploring missiles with much greater ranges. India is testing missiles in the intercontinetal range. These countries, which are not MTCR members except India, are also becoming sellers rather than simply buyers on the global arms market. North Korea, for example, is viewed as the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation in the world today. Iran has supplied missile production items to Syria.

Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them from the annex through consensus decisions.

The annex is divided into two separate groupings of items, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.
Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Approval for Category I exports is supposed to be rare. The regime's guidelines, which set out criteria for weighing possible exports, instruct members that "there will be a strong presumption to deny" Category I transfers. No exports of production facilities are to be authorized. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category also have civilian uses. Members, however, are still asked to exercise caution in making such deals. No member can veto another's exports.

The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items:

1. Whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
2. The purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient's missile and space programs;
3. The potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient's development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;
4. The credibility of the intended recipient's stated purpose for the purchase; and
5. Whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty.

MTCR members are asked to obtain an assurance from the intended recipient that it will only use the export for the purpose claimed when requesting the deal. Members are also to secure a pledge from the intended recipient that it will not transfer the requested item or any replicas or derivatives to a third party without permission.

Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However, U.S. law mandates that Washington sanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to U.S. security. Sanctions may also be levied if the United States judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, Washington prohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the U.S. government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.

Several countries have pledged to abide by the MTCR without joining it. Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have all committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

After several years of the U.S. curtailing its sale of missiles and missile technologies, China announced in November 2000 that it would not help other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Beijing, which was a key contributor to Pakistan's missile development, and has in the past provided sensetive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran, also pledged that it would issue a comprehensive list of controlled items requiring government approval before export. That list, however, was not published until August 2002. In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledged to follow the regime's export control guidelines. Although China no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export controls, its membership was rejected due to concerns that

Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea.

In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines, since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in the regime. India's announcment was made shortly before the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted an exemption to India. New Dehli continues to develop its own ballistic missile program. In June 2015, India formally applied for membership in the regime, but Italy blocked consensus on its application during the October 2015 plenary. Nine other countries applied as well in 2015, none of which were admitted into the regime. India was later admitted in June 2015.

MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible. The aim of the initiative is to establish a norm against missiles that could be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. As part of the initiative, participating countries are to annually exchange information on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, as well as provide advance notice of any launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles. The Hague Code of Conduct has 138 member states, including all MTCR members except Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its space program

Zangger Committee

Another tool that has supplemented NPT treaty is the so-called Zangger Committee formed in 1971. By interpreting and implementing article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT, the Zangger Committee helps to prevent the diversion of exported nuclear items from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and thereby furthers the objectives of the Treaty and enhances the security of all States. (ZanggerCommittee.org) It creates and updates the list of controlled items, offers guidance to all parties of the treaty and commits them to the use of the IAEA safeguards mechanisms.

Other relevant efforts in the field of disarmament and export control

The Secretary-General's five point proposal on nuclear disarmament

First, I urge all NPT parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon-states, to fulfil their obligation under the treaty to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.
They could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations. Upon the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia, I have circulated to all UN member states a draft of such a convention, which offers a good point of departure.

The nuclear powers should actively engage with other states on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The world would also welcome a resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation aimed at deep and verifiable reductions of their respective arsenals.
Governments should also invest more in verification research and development. The United Kingdom's proposal to host a conference of nuclear-weapon states on verification is a concrete step in the right direction.

Second, the Security Council's permanent members should commence discussions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on nuclear disarmament. Non-NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-weapon capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments.

My third initiative relates to the "rule of law." Unilateral moratoria on nuclear tests and the production of fissile materials can go only so far. We need new efforts to bring the CTBT into force, and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately, without preconditions. I support the entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I encourage the nuclear-weapon states to ratify all the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I strongly support efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. And I

urge all NPT parties to conclude their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to voluntarily adopt the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol. We should never forget that the nuclear fuel cycle is more than an issue involving energy or non-proliferation; its fate will also shape prospects for disarmament.

My fourth proposal concerns accountability and transparency. The nuclear-weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing to pursue these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. I invite the nuclear-weapon states to send such material to the UN Secretariat, and to encourage its wider dissemination. The nuclear powers could also expand the amount of information they publish about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements. The lack of an authoritative estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons testifies to the need for greater transparency.

Fifth and finally, a number of complementary measures are needed. These include the elimination of other types of WMD; new efforts against WMD terrorism; limits on the production and trade in conventional arms; and new weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons. The General Assembly could also take up the recommendation of the Blix Commission for a “World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction”.

Some doubt that the problem of WMD terrorism can ever be solved. But if there is real, verified progress in disarmament, the ability to eliminate this threat will grow exponentially. It will be much easier to encourage governments to tighten relevant controls if a basic, global taboo exists on the very possession of certain types of weapons. As we progressively eliminate the world’s deadliest weapons and their components, we will make it harder to execute WMD terrorist attacks. And if our efforts also manage to address the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that aggravate terrorist threats, so much the better.

Non-proliferation treaty

The NPT is the center-piece of global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of nuclear disarmament. It entered into force in 1970. With over 190 Parties, it is the treaty most widely adhered to in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.
While the IAEA is not a party to the Treaty, it is entrusted with key responsibilities. The IAEA has a specific verification role under Article III of the Treaty as the international safeguards inspectorate. The IAEA also serves as a multilateral channel for facilitating transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful applications to its Member States in accordance with its statue.

The NPT represents a balance of rights and obligations for States, differentiating between non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) and nuclear-weapon States (NWSs) (defined as States that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967, i.e. China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America).

Under the NPT, the NWSs committed, inter alia, not to transfer to any recipients nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWSs to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Each NNWS is required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA to enable the IAEA to verify the fulfillment of the State's obligation under the Treaty. The five NWSs have concluded voluntary offer safeguards

agreements covering some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Three States that are not party to the NPT have concluded item-specific agreements with the IAEA.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously for all Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. An ad-hoc committee (known as 1540 committee) for an initial mandate of 2 years under the Security Council charging the examination on the implementation of this resolution was established under paragraph 4 of the resolution.

Note- This agenda and this issue has non-exhaustive scope and information available on the web. The information given in the Guide is to just to brief you what the situation is and facilitate thought process in you all. Don't restrict your thoughts to this Guide. Feel free to explore the depth and the breadth of the agenda.

I don't believe in giving things on a platter, so that's the reason you don't have questions to consider or links for further researching.
Just to help you all look for academic papers and trusted sources for reading things. Read everything carefully and try to ask and answer as many questions you can.

All the best!

Hope to see you all at the conference.

Happy Researching. ;)

Regards
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