UNIT- III

UNITED NATIONS, N.P.T AND C.T.B.T

**UNITED NATIONS- ORGANISATION, WORKING**

**Introduction**

The name "United Nations", coined by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt was first used in the [Declaration by United Nations](http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1942-declaration-united-nations/index.html) of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War, when [representatives of 26 nations](http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail/313/0031319.html) pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.

In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the [United Nations Conference on International Organization](http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-francisco-conference/index.html) to draw up the [United Nations Charter](http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html). Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at [Dumbarton Oaks](http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945-dumbarton-oaks-and-yalta/index.html), United States in August-October 1944.

The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States.

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and by a majority of other signatories. [United Nations Day](http://www.un.org/en/events/unday/) is celebrated on 24 October each year.

**Main Organs:**

The main organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat.  All were [established in 1945](http://wss1.un.org:8082/node/156296) when the UN was founded.

#### General Assembly

The [General Assembly](http://www.un.org/en/ga/) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All [193 Member States](http://www.un.org/en/members/) of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the only UN body with universal representation.  Each year, in September, the full UN membership meets in the General Assembly Hall in New York for the annual General Assembly session, and [general debate](http://gadebate.un.org/), which many heads of state attend and address. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority.  The General Assembly, each year, elects a [GA President](http://www.un.org/pga/) to serve a one-year term of office.

#### Security Council

The [Security Council](http://www.un.org/en/sc/) has primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.  It has 15 Members ([5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members](http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/)). Each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.  The Security Council has a [Presidency](http://www.un.org/en/sc/presidency/), which rotates, and changes, every month.

* [Daily programme of work of the Security Council](http://www.un.org/en/sc/programme/)
* [Subsidiary organs of the Security Council](http://www.un.org/en/sc/subsidiary/)

#### Economic and Social Council

The [Economic and Social Council](http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/) is the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as implementation of internationally agreed development goals. It serves as the central mechanism for activities of the UN system and its specialized agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies.  It has [54 Members](http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/members.shtml), elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. It is the United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on [sustainable development](http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/).

#### Trusteeship Council

The [Trusteeship Council](http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/trusteeship.shtml) was established in 1945 by the UN Charter, under [Chapter XIII](http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xiii/index.html), to provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories that had been placed under the administration of seven Member States, and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government and independence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence.  The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994. By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required -- by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.

#### International Court of Justice

The [International Court of Justice](http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php?lang=en) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six principal organs of the United Nations not located in New York (United States of America). The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.

#### Secretariat

The [Secretariat](http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/secretariat.html) comprises the [Secretary-General](http://www.un.org/sg/) and tens of thousands of international UN staff members who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the General Assembly and the Organization's other principal organs.  The Secretary-General is [chief administrative officer](http://www.un.org/sg/sg_role.shtml) of the Organization, appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. UN staff members are recruited internationally and locally, and work in duty stations and on peacekeeping missions all around the world.  But serving the cause of peace in a violent world is a dangerous occupation. Since the founding of the United Nations, hundreds of brave men and women [have given their lives](http://www.un.org/en/memorial/) in its service.

# Maintain International Peace and Security

# The United Nations came into being in 1945, following the devastation of the Second World War, with one central mission: the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN does this by working to prevent conflict; helping parties in conflict make peace; peacekeeping; and creating the conditions to allow peace to hold and flourish. These activities often overlap and should reinforce one another, to be effective. The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. The General Assembly and the Secretary-General play major, important, and complementary roles, along with other UN offices and bodies.



UN Photo/Pasqual Gorriz

An Indian UNIFIL peacekeeper watches over the "Blue Line", which demarcates the border between Israel and Lebanon, from the town of Shab'a, Lebanon, in 2012.

#### Security Council

The [Security Council](http://www.un.org/en/sc/) takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. Under [Chapter VII](http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html) of the Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures range from economic sanctions to international military action. The Council also establishes UN [Peacekeeping Operations](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/) and [Special Political Missions](http://www.un.org/undpa/in-the-field/overview).

#### General Assembly

The [General Assembly](http://www.un.org/en/ga/) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. Through regular meetings, the General Assembly provides a forum for Member States to express their views to the entire membership and find consensus on difficult issues. It makes recommendations in the form of General Assembly Resolutions. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority, but other questions are decided by simple majority.

### How does the UN maintain international peace and security?

#### Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation

The most effective way to diminish human suffering and the massive economic costs of conflicts and their aftermath is to prevent conflicts in the first place.  The United Nations plays an important role in [conflict prevention](http://www.un.org/undpa/), using  [diplomacy](http://www.un.org/undpa/diplomacy-mediation), [good offices](http://www.un.org/undpa/in-the-field/overview) and [mediation](http://peacemaker.un.org/).  Among the tools the Organization uses to bring peace are [special envoys and political missions in the field](http://www.un.org/undpa/in-the-field/overview).

#### Peacekeeping

[Peacekeeping](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/) has proven to be one of the most [effective tools](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml) available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate political processes, [protect civilians](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml), assist in the [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml) of former combatants; support constitutional processes and the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the [rule of law](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw.shtml) and extending legitimate state authority. Peacekeeping operations get their mandates from the UN Security Council; their troops and police are contributed by Members States; and they are managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and supported by the Department of Field Support at the UN Headquarters in New York. There are 16 UN peacekeeping operations currently deployed and there have been a total of 69 deployed since 1948.

#### Peace Building

United Nations peace building activities are aimed at assisting countries emerging from conflict, reducing the risk of relapsing into conflict and at laying the foundation for sustainable peace and development. The UN peace building architecture comprises the [Peace building Commission](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/), the [Peace building Fund](http://www.unpbf.org/) and the [Peace building Support Office](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/). The Peace building Support Office assists and supports the Peace building Commission with strategic advice and policy guidance, administers the Peace building Fund and serves the Secretary-General in coordinating United Nations agencies in their peace building efforts.

#### Countering Terrorism

The United Nations is being increasingly called upon to [coordinate the global fight against terrorism](http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/index.shtml). Eighteen universal instruments against international terrorism have been elaborated within the framework of the United Nations system relating to specific terrorist activities.  In September 2006, UN Member States adopted the United Nations [Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.](http://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy) This was the first time that Member States agreed to a common strategic and operational framework against terrorism.

#### Disarmament

The General Assembly and other bodies of the United Nations, supported by the [Office for Disarmament Affairs](http://www.un.org/disarmament/), work to advance international peace and security through the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the regulation of conventional arms.

## What is peacekeeping?

United Nations Peacekeeping helps countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace.

Actor George Clooney speaks of UN Peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most [effective tools](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml)available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.

Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates.

UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peace building support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace.

UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles:

* Consent of the parties;
* Impartiality;
* Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

Peacekeeping is flexible and over the past two decades has been deployed in many configurations. There are currently [16 UN peacekeeping operations](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml) deployed on four continents.

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, [protect civilians](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml), assist in the [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml) of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the [rule of law](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw.shtml).

Success is never guaranteed, because UN Peacekeeping almost by definition goes to the most physically and politically difficult environments. However, we have built up a demonstrable record of success over our 60 years of existence, including winning the [Nobel Peace Prize](http://www.un.org/aboutun/nobelprize/1988/).

Peacekeeping has always been highly dynamic and has evolved in the face of new challenges. Recently, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon [established](http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151) a 17-member High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations to make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, and the emerging needs of the future.

## *Principles of UN peacekeeping*

There are three basic principles that continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security.

These three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing:

* [Consent of the parties](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml#consent)
* [Impartiality](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml#impartiality)
* [Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml#noforce)

### *Consent of the parties*

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.

In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace.

The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems.  Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.

### *Impartiality*

Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.

Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation.

Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.

### Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under [Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter](http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml).

* Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.
* By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.

A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances.

Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission.

# United Nations Disarmament Commission

In 1952, the General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952, created the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) under the Security Council with a general mandate on disarmament questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959.

In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament established a successor Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, composed of all Member States of the United Nations. It was created as a deliberative body, with the function of considering and making recommendations on various issues in the field of disarmament and of following up on the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session. It reports annually to the General Assembly.

In the light of its function, the UNDC focuses on a limited number of agenda items at each session. In 1989, to allow for in depth consideration, it decided that its substantive agenda should be limited to a maximum of four items. From 1993, it has, in practice, dealt with two or three items, each of which has usually been considered for three consecutive years. In 1998, by its decision [52/492](http://undocs.org/A/INF/52/4/Add.1), the General Assembly decided that the UNDC’s agenda, as of 2000, would normally comprise two substantive items per year from the whole range of disarmament issues, including one on nuclear disarmament.


The UNDC, which meets for three weeks in the spring, operates in plenary meetings and working groups, the number of working groups depending on the number of substantive items on its agenda. The five geographical groups take turns assuming the chairmanship of the UNDC, while the chairmen of the working groups are selected in accordance

Over the years, the UNDC has formulated consensus principles, guidelines and recommendations  (see below)  on a number of subjects, which have been endorsed by the General Assembly. However, in the past decade, it has not been able to agree on a substantial outcome.

The UNDC is serviced substantively by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and technically by the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services.

## *Atomic Energy Commission*

The UN and the nuclear age were born almost simultaneously.  The horror of the Second World War, culminating in the nuclear blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, brought home the need to address the nuclear issue.  By its first resolution, the General Assembly established the UN Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.  And a landmark address by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, “Atoms for Peace”, led to the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency ([IAEA](http://www.iaea.org/)).



Today, 439 nuclear power reactors produce approximately 16 per cent of the world’s electricity. In nine countries, over 40 per cent of energy production comes from nuclear power. The IAEA, an international organization in the UN family, fosters the safe, secure and peaceful uses of atomic energy and helps ensure the use of nuclear technology for sustainable development.

Under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ([NPT](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html)), the IAEA conducts on-site inspections to ensure that nuclear materials are used only used for peaceful purposes.  Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, its inspectors played a key role in uncovering and eliminating Iraq’s banned weapons programmes and capabilities.  In 2005, the Agency and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei were awarded the [Nobel Peace Prize](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2005/) “for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way.”

The UN Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, produced the [*Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*](http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/), which was adopted in 1996.  The Office for Disarmament Affairs promotes nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space produced the 1992 Principles on the use of nuclear power sources in outer space.  The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation reports on the levels and effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, providing the scientific basis for protection and safety standards worldwide.

Addressing the danger of nuclear terrorism, the UN has also produced the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 1980), and the International [Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism](http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/English_18_15.pdf) (2005).

*Commission on conventional armaments*

This commission was set up by the Security Council in February 1947, in pursuance of 12 Aug 1948. In this resolution of December 1946.

The commission after due deliberations adopted a resolution on 12 Aug 1948.In this resolution the commission recommended:

1. Setting up of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments which shall include all states having substantial military sources.
2. Creation of an atmosphere of international confidence and security because the measures for reduction and regulation armaments could succeed only after necessary confidence had been created.
3. Establishment of an adequate system of agreements under Act.43 of the charter; establishment of international control of atomic energy and conclusion of peace settlement with Japan and Germany.
4. The reduction of armaments and armed forces to the extent they were indispensable for the maintenance of international peace and security.
5. Provision of adequate safeguards and
6. Effective enforcement action in case of violation.

*Disarmament Commission*

In October, 1950 and again in November 1951, President Truman of USA made a suggestion to the U.N General Assembly to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission.

Consequently on January 11,1952, General Assembly asked for the merger of the two commissions into a single Commission known as Disarmament Commission. The Commission consisted of 11 members of the Security Council as well as Canada.

This Commission worked under the Security Council and laid before it a number of proposals like (i) Inventory and verification , (ii) calculation of limits and reductions for all armed forces and all armaments, (iii) determination of armament programme through negotiations among states, (iv) agreement projects for armament limitations such as nuclear weapons ,conventional weapons , budgetary expenditure for armament , inspections and controls etc: But the efforts of this commission also failed to produce any fruitful results.

*Atoms for Peace (1953*)

In December, 1953 President Eisenhower of USA proposed ‘Atoms for peace Plan’. The plan aimed at peaceful uses of atomic energy.

*Anglo- French Plan (1954)*

In June, 1954, England and France submitted a fresh plan for disarmament in the General Assembly which made a plea for disarmament in three phases. During the first phase military expenditure and manpower were to be frozen at a specific level and a control organ established.

During the second phase the control organ was to become fully operative and expenditure on conventional weapons and maintenance of military was to be reduce by one half. During this phase the manufacturer of nuclear weapons was also to be prohibited. During third and final phase the military expenditure was to be further reduced and nuclear weapons to be eliminated but the plan had to be shelved on account of Soviet opposition.

*Geneva Summit, (1955)*

The meeting in [Geneva](http://www.britannica.com/place/Geneva-Switzerland) of the leaders of the U.S., [France](http://www.britannica.com/place/France), Britain, and the Soviet Union that sought to end the [Cold War](http://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War). Such issues as [disarmament](http://www.britannica.com/topic/disarmament), unification of Germany, and increased economic ties were discussed. Though no agreements were reached, the conference was considered an important first step toward easing [Cold War](http://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War) tension.

*Eighteen Nations disarmament conference*

The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations GeneralAssemblyheldin1978.  
  
It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating for a, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78).  The current Director-General of UNOG is the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament as well as the Personal Representative of the UNSecretary-GeneraltotheCD.   
  
The terms of reference of the CD include practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems. Currently the CD primarily focuses its attention on the following issues: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons including radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in armaments.   
  
The CD meets in an annual session, which is divided in three parts of 10, 7 and 7 weeks, respectively. The first week shall begin in the penultimate week of the month of January. The CD is presided by its members on a rotating basis. Each President shall preside for a period of four weeks. 

In order to ensure a coherent approach among the six Presidents of the session to the work of the Conference, as of 2006, an informal coordination mechanism - the P6 - was established that provides for the six presidents of the session to informally meet, usually on a weekly basis. Also on a weekly basis, the President meets informally with the Regional Group Coordinators and China together with the P6 (Presidential Consultations).   
  
As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. Subsequently its membership was gradually expanded (and reduced) to 65 countries. The CD has invited other UN Member States that have expressed a desire to participate in the CD's substantive discussions, to take part in its work as [non-member States.](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/2D1BBD8081A028DBC1257F77005B41D7/$file/Non-member+States.pdf)  
  
The CD adopts its own[Rules of Procedure](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1F072EF4792B5587C12575DF003C845B/$file/RoP.pdf) and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals of its Members.   
  
It reports to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently, as appropriate. Its budget is included in that of the United Nations. Staff members of the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs service the meetings of the CD, which are held at the Palais des Nations.  
The Conference conducts its work by consensus.  
  
The CD and its predecessors have negotiated such major multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the seabed treaties, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

*Limited test ban treaty 1963*

In the early 1960s, U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev each expressed deep concern about the strength of their respective nations’ nuclear arms forces. This concern led them to complete the first arms control agreement of the Cold War, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.



*President signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty. (John F. Kennedy Library)*

This treaty did not have much practical effect on the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it established an important precedent for future arms control. Both superpowers entered the 1960s determined to build or maintain nuclear superiority. The Soviet Union had led the way in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles after its launch of the first man-made satellite, [*Sputnik*](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/sputnik), in 1957. In just a few years, it had developed an arsenal of long and medium range missiles that had raised alarm in Washington. President Kennedy had even campaigned for office on a claim that President Dwight Eisenhower had allowed the Soviet Union to far out-produce the United States in nuclear technology, creating a “missile gap.” However, soon after he took office, the Kennedy Administration determined that the balance of nuclear power remained in favor of the United States.

With both sides working to develop new and better nuclear technology over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, each engaged in a series of test explosions. These nuclear tests received worldwide scrutiny, not only for what they meant for the arms race but also for what they meant for human life. As the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom tested new nuclear technologies in the earth’s atmosphere, concerns emerged worldwide about the potential effects of radioactive fallout on the people exposed to it. This led to the formation of activist groups and public discussion of the issue.

The three countries entered into negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty in 1958. Having recently completed rounds of tests, at that time all three entered into a voluntary moratorium on all forms of testing, initiated first by the Soviet Union but later adhered to by the United States and Great Britain. In spite of this willingness to self-restrict testing, one of the most difficult issues preventing the conclusion of a formal treaty was the question of verification.

The United States and Great Britain, in particular, pushed for on-site inspections of Soviet facilities as without them, it was impossible to determine whether the Soviets were continuing underground nuclear tests or just experiencing the frequent seismic activity to which its geographic area was prone. However, the Soviets were hesitant to permit such onsite inspections of its nuclear facilities, interpreting U.S. insistence on these inspections as a ruse to facilitate U.S. efforts to spy on Soviet advancements.

After the Soviet military shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960, the prospects for reaching an agreement on the inspections issue all but disappeared. Khrushchev also rejected the idea of having the United Nations conduct inspections after observing what he believed was the organization’s mishandling of the Congo crisis. Instead, in the wake of these incidents both the United States and the Soviet Union resumed testing.

In 1961, Kennedy established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency within the U.S. Department of State, and the new organization reopened talks with the Soviet Union. That year, however, neither side was ready to make major concessions. As long as it remained difficult to verify that the other side was not engaging in clandestine testing, there was little incentive to form an agreement.

Over the course of the next year, however, the situation changed dramatically for a number of reasons. Concerns about nuclear proliferation increased interest in the testing ban, as France exploded its first weapon in 1960 and the People’s Republic of China appeared close to successfully building its own atom bomb.

However, it was the rapid escalation of the [Cuban Missile Crisis](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis) in October of 1962 that compelled leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue more aggressively an agreement that could help them avoid the devastating destruction that nuclear warfare would bring.

Although the crisis provided the impetus for an agreement, its final negotiation was made possible by the decision to step back from the original idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty and work instead on a more limited arrangement. Atmospheric and underground tests proved equally effective for scientific purposes, so there was no reason to insist that access to both types of testing remain available.

In past negotiations, the inability to detect underground explosions and agree on provisions for inspections to ensure such explosions were not taking place became a problem that prevented an agreement. Once the Soviet Union and the United States decided that underground testing would not be included in this first treaty, the two sides very quickly reached terms they could agree upon.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in 1963, and it banned all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, or underwater. Because it stopped the spread of radioactive nuclear material through atmospheric testing and set the precedent for a new wave of arms control agreements, the Treaty was hailed as a success.

The Treaty was the first of several Cold War agreements on nuclear arms, including the [Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/npt) that was signed in 1968 and the [SALT I agreements of 1972](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt). In 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty returned to the question of nuclear testing by limiting underground testing of bombs with a yield greater than 150 kilotons.

[*Outer Space Treaty*](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html) *1966 and 1967*

The [Outer Space Treaty](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html) was considered by the Legal Subcommittee in 1966 and agreement was reached in the General Assembly in the same year ( [resolution 2222 (XXI)](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html)). The Treaty was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted by the General Assembly in its [resolution 1962 (XVIII)](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/legal-principles.html) in 1963, but added a few new provisions. The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository Governments (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it entered into force in October 1967. The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following principles:

* the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind;
* outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States;
* outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means;
* States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner;
* the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
* astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind;
* States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities;
* States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and
* States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

*The Non-Proliferation Treaty*

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 created a framework for controlling the spread of nuclear materials and expertise. 30 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN agency based in Vienna, is charged with inspecting the nuclear power industry in member states to prevent secret military diversions of nuclear materials. However, number of potential nuclear states (such as Israel) has not signed the NPT, and even states that have signed may sneak around its provisions by keeping some facilities secret (as Iraq and Iran did). Under the terms of the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire, Iraq’s nuclear program was uncovered and dismantled by the IAEA.

In 2006, a deal between the United States and India to share nuclear technology led many states to question the NPT, because those benefits were supposedly reserved for only signatories. Nonetheless the deal received final U.S. and Indian approval in 2008.

North Korea withdrew from the IAFA in 1993, then bargained with Western leaders to get economic assistance, including safer reactors, in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. North Korea’s leader died months later, but the compromise held up. In 1999, North Korea allowed inspection of a disputed underground complex and agreed to suspend missile tests in exchange for aid and partial lifting of U.S. trade sanctions.

Then in 2002, the United States confronted North Korea with evidence of a secret uranium enrichment program, which the North Koreans then admitted to having. North Korea then pulled out of the agreement and out of the IAEA, restarted its nuclear reactor, and apparently turned its existing plutonium into a half-dozen bombs within months, one of which it tested in 2006.

North Korea again agreed to give up its program in 2008, yet after another nuclear test in 2009, it began processing nuclear material again. Iran denies, but appears to be, working to develop nuclear weapons. Since 2003, Iran first agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program and allow surprise IAFA inspections, then restarted enrichment, suspended it again, and restarted it again.

In 200, U.S. backed efforts by Europe to offer Iran economic incentives to dismantle its program, and by Russia to enrich Iran’s uranium on Russian soil with safeguards, both faltered. In 2006, the UN Security Council condemned Iran’s actions and imposed mild sanctions. Iran insisted on its right to enrich uranium for what it called peaceful purposes. In 2008, Iran’s behavior led to further UN Security Council sanctions, and in 2009, after a secret underground processing facility was discovered, Iran was engaged in talks over the program with Western powers.

An number of middle powers and two great powers (Japan and Germany) have the potential to make nuclear weapons but have chosen not to do so. Te reasons for deciding against “going nuclear” include norms against using nuclear weapons, fears of retaliation, and practical constraints including cost. Brazil and Argentina seemed to be headed for a nuclear arms race in the 1980s but then called it off as civilians replaced military governments in both countries. 32In 2004, after years of resistance, Brazil gave IAEA inspectors access to a controversial uranium enrichment plant (not part of a nuclear weapons program, evidently).

# *Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II*

SALT I

During the late 1960s, the United States learned that the Soviet Union had embarked upon a massive Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) buildup designed to reach parity with the United States. In January 1967, PresidentLyndon Johnson announced that the Soviet Union had begun to construct a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system around Moscow. The development of an ABM system could allow one side to launch a first strike and then prevent the other from retaliating by shooting down incoming missiles.

Johnson therefore called for strategic arms limitations talks (SALT), and in 1967, he and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met at Glassboro State College in New Jersey. Johnson said they must gain “control of the ABM race,” and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that the more each reacted to the other’s escalation, the more they had chosen “an insane road to follow.” While abolition of nuclear weapons would be impossible, limiting the development of both offensive and defensive strategic systems would stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations.



*Nixon and Brezhnev during the latter’s visit to the U.S. in 1973. (Nixon Presidential Library)*

Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, also believed in SALT, and on November 17, 1969, the formal SALT talks began in Helsinki, Finland. Over the next two and a half years, the two sides haggled over whether or not each nation should complete their plans for ABMs; verification of a treaty; and U.S. concern that the Soviets continued to build more Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement on May 26, 1972, in Moscow.

For the first time during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. SALT I is considered the crowning achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente. The ABM Treaty limited strategic missile defenses to 200 interceptors each and allowed each side to construct two missile defense sites, one to protect the national capital, the other to protect one ICBM field. (For financial and strategic reasons, the United States stopped construction of each by the end of the decade.)

SALT II

Negotiations for a second round of SALT began in late 1972. Since SALT I did not prevent each side from enlarging their forces through the deployment of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs, SALT II initially focused on limiting, and then ultimately reducing, the number of MIRVs. Negotiations also sought to prevent both sides from making qualitative breakthroughs that would again destabilize the strategic relationship. The negotiations spanned the Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter administrations.

At the November 1974 Vladivostok Summit, Ford and Brezhnev agreed on the basic framework of a SALT II agreement. This included a 2,400 limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) for each side; a 1,320 limit on MIRV systems; a ban on new land-based ICBM launchers; and limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms.

Even after the Vladivostok agreements, the two nations could not resolve the two other outstanding issues from SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation’s arsenal. The first was complicated by the Soviet Backfire bomber, which U.S. negotiators believed could reach the United States but which the Soviets refused to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to limit American deployment of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs).

Verification also divided the two nations, but eventually they agreed on using National Technical Means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites. On June 17, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited the total of both nations’ nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including MIRVs.

However, a broad coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats grew increasingly skeptical of the Soviet Union’s crackdown on internal dissent, its increasingly interventionist foreign policies, and the verification process delineated in the Treaty. On December 17, 1979, 19 Senators wrote Carter that “Ratification of a SALT II Treaty will not reverse trends in the military balance adverse to the United States.”

On December 25, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and on January 3, 1980, Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent, and it was never ratified. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. Carter’s successor Ronald Reagan, a vehement critic of SALT II during the 1980 presidential campaign, agreed to abide by SALT II until its expiration on December 31, 1985, while he pursued the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and argued that research into the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) adhered to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

*Sea-Bed Treaty (1971)*

**Opened for Signature:** 11 February 1971; **Entered into Force:** 18 May 1972.; **Number of Parties:** 95 States.; **Number of Signatories:** 21 States.

**Depositories:** Russia (originally the Soviet Union), United Kingdom, and United States.

[*Treaty Text*](http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptseabd.pdf?_=1316630217&_=1316630217)

In the 1960s, there were concerns that due to recent advances in oceanographic technologies, nations might use the seabed as a new environment for nuclear-related military installations. The Soviet Union and the United States submitted two separate drafts that differed on what was to be prohibited and verification measures. On 7 October 1969, the two States submitted a joint draft to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

During the deliberations in the CCD, coastal States raised concerns about the protection of their rights and smaller States had doubts whether they could check on violations.

The final draft was approved by the [United Nations](http://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/united-nations-general-assembly/) General Assembly's Resolution 2660 (XXV) on 7 December 1970 by a vote of 104 to 2 (El Salvador, Peru), with two abstentions (Ecuador, France). The Seabed Treaty was opened for signature on 11 February 1971 and entered into force on 18 May 1972, when the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as more that 22 nations had deposited instruments of ratification.

**Treaty Obligations:** The Treaty forbids States Parties from implanting or placing on the seabed or ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, beyond a 12-mile territorial zone, any [nuclear weapons](http://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/nuclear-weapon/) or any other types of [weapons of mass destruction](http://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/wmd-weapons-mass-destruction/) or structures, launching installations, or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons.

Verification: The Treaty allows for verification through observation by the States Parties of the activities of other States Parties, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain, further procedures for verification may be agreed upon, including inspections. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.

Compliance: If consultation and cooperation have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

*The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)*

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a legally binding treaty that outlaws biological arms. After being discussed and negotiated in the United Nations' disarmament forum[1](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc#note) starting in 1969, the BWC opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. It currently has 165 states-parties and 12 signatory states.

*Terms of the Treaty*

The BWC bans:

* The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of:
  1. Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;"
  2. Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."
* The transfer of or assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above.

The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes the "agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery" described above within nine months of the convention's entry into force. The BWC does not ban the use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use. It also does not ban biodefense programs.

*Verification*

The treaty regime mandates that states-parties consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve compliance concerns. It also allows states-parties to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if they believe other member states are violating the convention. The Security Council can investigate complaints, but this power has never been invoked. Security Council voting rules give China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States veto power over Security Council decisions, including those to conduct BWC investigations.

*Membership and Duration*

The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration that is open to any country. Notably absent from the list of member states is Syria, a treaty signatory that the United States believes is probably developing biological weapons.

# The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was an agreement signed in 1968 by several of the major nuclear and non-nuclear powers that pledged their cooperation in stemming the spread of nuclear technology. Although the NPT did not ultimately prevent nuclear proliferation, in the context of the Cold War arms race and mounting international concern about the consequences of nuclear war, the treaty was a major success for advocates of arms control because it set a precedent for international cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states to prevent proliferation.



*U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, signs nuclear non-proliferation treaty as Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko watches in Moscow, Russia, on July 1, 1968. (AP Photo)*

After the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, leaders of both nations hoped that other, more comprehensive agreements on arms control would be forthcoming. Given the excessive costs involved in the development and deployment of new and more technologically advanced nuclear weapons, both powers had an interest in negotiating agreements that would help to slow the pace of the arms race and limit competition in strategic weapons development.

Four years after the first treaty, the two sides agreed to an Outer Space Treaty that prevented the deployment of nuclear weapons systems as satellites in space. Of far greater import, Soviet and U.S. negotiators also reached a settlement on concluding an international non-proliferation treaty.

By the beginning of the 1960s, nuclear weapons technology had the potential to become widespread. The science of exploding and fusing atoms had entered into public literature via academic journals, and nuclear technology was no longer pursued only by governments, but by private companies as well. Plutonium, the core of nuclear weapons, was becoming easier to obtain and cheaper to process.

As a result of these changes, by 1964 there were five nuclear powers in the world: in addition to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, all of which obtained nuclear capability during or shortly after the Second World War, France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, and the People’s Republic of China was not far behind in 1964. There were many other countries that had not yet tested weapons, but which were technologically advanced enough that should they decide to build them, it was likely that they could do so before long.

The spread of nuclear weapons technology meant several things for international lawmakers. While the only countries that were capable of nuclear strike were the United States, its close ally Britain, and the Soviet Union, the doctrine of deterrence could be reasonably maintained.

Because both sides of the Cold War had vast stocks of weapons and the capability of striking back after being attacked, any strike would likely have led to mutually assured destruction, and thus there remained a strong incentive for any power to avoid starting a nuclear war. However, if more nations, particularly developing nations that lay on the periphery of the balance of power between the two Cold War superpowers, achieved nuclear capability, this balance risked being disrupted and the system of deterrence would be threatened.

Moreover, if countries with volatile border disputes became capable of attacking with nuclear weapons, then the odds of a nuclear war with truly global repercussions increased. This also caused the nuclear states to hesitate in sharing nuclear technology with developing nations, even technology that could be used for peaceful applications. All of these concerns led to international interest in a nuclear non-proliferation treaty that would help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Although the benefits to be derived from such a treaty were clear, its development was not without controversy. A ban on the distribution of nuclear technology was first proposed by Ireland in a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961. Although the members approved the resolution, it took until 1965 for negotiations to begin in earnest at the Geneva disarmament conference.

At that time, U.S. negotiators worked to strike a delicate balance between the interest in preventing further transfer of the technology that it shared with the Soviet Union and the desire to strengthen its NATO allies by giving several Western European nations some measure of control over nuclear weapons. The plan for a nuclear NATO threatened to scuttle the talks altogether, and the United States eventually abandoned it in favor of reaching a workable treaty.

A more difficult problem involved the question of bringing non-nuclear nations into line with the planned treaty. Nations that had not yet developed nuclear weapons technology were essentially being asked to give up all intentions to ever develop the weapons. Without this agreement on the part of the non-nuclear powers, having the nuclear powers vow never to transfer the technology would likely not result in any real limitation on the number of worldwide nuclear powers. After two years of negotiations, the nuclear powers managed to make enough concessions to induce many non-nuclear powers to sign.

The final treaty involved a number of provisions all aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons technology. First, the nuclear signatories agreed not to transfer either nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to any other state. Second, the non-nuclear states agreed that they would not receive, develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

All of the signatories agreed to submit to the safeguards against proliferation established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Parties to the treaty also agreed to cooperate in the development of peaceful nuclear technology and to continue negotiations to help end the nuclear arms race and limit the spread of the technology. The treaty was given a 25-year time limit, with the agreement that it would be reviewed every 5 years.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was, and continues to be, heralded as an important step in the ongoing efforts to reduce or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Still, it had one major drawback in that two nuclear powers, France and the People’s Republic of China, did not sign the agreement, nor did a number of non-nuclear states. Of the non-nuclear states refusing to adhere, and thereby limit their own future nuclear programs, of particular importance were Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, because these powers were close to being capable of the technology. In fact, in 1974, India joined the “nuclear club” by exploding its first weapon. Pakistan tested its first atomic bomb in 1983.

*Current Problem*

Even as the legal regime was expanded by these agreements, the NPT came under strain elsewhere. One of the most significant blows was Iraq’s demonstrated ability to hide its nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the Gulf War. With inspection authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that war—authority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification standards had given the IAEA—inspectors found previously hidden Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons and even an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched research-reactor uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet Union.   
  
These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEA’s NPT inspection authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA parties who negotiated the 1997 model for this protocol did not agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept the model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards. It is now up to each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards agreement pursuant to the model.

 As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards agreements; only 37, or about 20 percent, had given final approval to them through parliamentary or other ratification.

 Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States rejects an important one—the CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing—and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself.   
  
After the experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques to deal with other problem states such as North Korea. Some evidence was produced by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s using a new technique called “environmental monitoring”—testing for small traces of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or vegetation in areas within or surrounding a nuclear site, or in streams or rivers nearby.

This is explicitly authorized in the 1997 Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors that a country has declared open for inspection. Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites encouraged the IAEA to press North Korea for broader inspections in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused.

A stalemate between North Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle a reactor who’s spent fuel rods had apparently been used by North Korea to produce plutonium.

Pyongyang was also asked to provide information about its past activities. These steps were to be in exchange for the construction of new, more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors from South Korea and Japan, as well as interim supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States. However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities at other sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003, North Korea and the United States each concluded that the 1994 agreement was not to their liking, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT.  
  
Discovery of Iran’s failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered concern since last year. Using environmental monitoring and other techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that Iran permitted them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items, including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used for enriching uranium in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uranium—none of which Iran had reported to the IAEA.

In negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to sign an additional protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside its uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though the IAEA director-general’s report shows that Iran had not disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-enrichment efforts or an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making weapons—to the consternation of officials in the United States. The IAEA Board of Governors then adopted, with U.S. support, a decision to order continued inspections in Iran for clandestine activities.   
  
The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not to permit such efforts even if subject to IAEA inspection. The concern is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it might then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium to make weapons.

The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants of non-nuclear-weapon states be placed under multilateral ownership and control so that the co-owners from the different countries could check on each other. However, Japan; some western European non-nuclear-weapon countries; and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and a few others, as well as all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Should these all now be subject to a rule requiring multilateral ownership and oversight? Would limiting the requirement to non-nuclear-weapon countries be regarded as adding further insult to the NPT’s existing discrimination in favor of nuclear-weapon states? IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled in the future, with each country involved being urged to check on what its partner countries are doing to make sure that the enriched uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons purposes.   
  
The Bush administration has pressed hard on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to restrain them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it has done so sometimes in unilateral or domineering ways that seem inconsistent with a multilateral regime like that of the NPT.

The American-led, counter-proliferation-justified, preventive-war invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the United States waged without UN Security Council authorization is a recent example. At the time, the invasion was said to be necessary to prevent Iraq from again acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or long-range missiles. It took place even though Security Council-authorized inspections, consistent with the NPT, were going on in Iraq to look for these weapons.

It resulted in UN inspectors being withdrawn from Iraq for their own safety. U.S inspectors have subsequently found little evidence of ongoing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons programs but the decision reflected Bush’s tendency to downgrade treaties and international efforts in favor of more proactive proliferation efforts.”   
  
Likewise, the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT in 1999. The Bush administration has not asked the Senate to reconsider that vote and instead has said that the United States “will not become a party” to that treaty.

 At the same time, the administration seeks money from Congress for new types of nuclear weapons—ones that may well need testing before the United States would rely on them. However, in 1995, when the United States negotiated an agreement with all the non-nuclear-weapon states to extend the NPT beyond 1995, it agreed to negotiate a CTBT by 1996 as part of the price it had to pay to gain agreement to renew the NPT.

 The CTBT was negotiated by 1996. Then, in the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration agreed on “the importance and urgency” of ratification of the CTBT “without delay” to “achieve the early entry into force” of the treaty even though the Senate then had no plans to vote again on the CTBT.[[23]](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn#notes23) Is the CTBT such an essential element of the nonproliferation regime that U.S. failure to join it could provide persuasive justification for withdrawal from the NPT for those who choose to do so?   
  
Other problems of this sort occurred with Article VI of the NPT, agreed to in the original treaty negotiations in order to gain the support for the treaty of non-nuclear-weapon states. In that provision, the United States and the other recognized nuclear-weapon states promised to negotiate nuclear-weapon reductions with the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Then, to gain the votes of these parties for extension of the NPT in 1995, the United States agreed to pursue “progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.”

 At the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration made similar commitments. It also promised to implement START II (negotiated in the prior Bush administration) and to conclude “START III [more reductions] as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)] Treaty](https://www.armscontrol.org/documents/abmtreaty.asp) as the cornerstone of strategic stability.”   
  
These promises were shredded when the present Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The withdrawal nullified START II because the Russian Duma had conditioned its approval vote for START II on a continuation of the ABM Treaty. The substitute for START II negotiated with Russia by President George W. Bush, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, required withdrawal of warheads from many long-range missiles on each side to the end that, by 2012, no more than 2,200 warheads would be deployed on either side.

The treaty, however, does not require the warheads to be destroyed, calls for no inspections, has a more permissive withdrawal clause than in START II, and contains no stated plan for a subsequent treaty such as START III that would require further reductions. Does this satisfy the NPT commitment to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament?

ElBaradei has suggested that the United States may be employing a double standard by not actually cutting its own arsenal of nuclear weapons (as distinct from its missiles) while attempting to restrain other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.   
  
To gain the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties to the treaty’s extension in 1995, the United States also made promises in connection with a UN Security Council resolution calling for what are called negative security assurances, which for the United States was a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties unless they attack the United States while in alliance with another nuclear-weapon state.

Yet, in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 and its National Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002, the Bush administration made clear that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT party that threatened the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies whether or not this NPT party was allied with a nuclear-weapon state.

 Thus, the United States watered down another promise that was important to gaining the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties for renewal of the NPT in 1995. Whether all these problems will produce further withdrawals from the NPT is, of course, unknown, but they might be used as excuses for withdrawal by any who want to do so.

[**Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty**](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/c42328.htm) (CTBT)

The first nuclear explosive test was conducted by the United States on July 16, 1945. The Soviet Union followed with its first nuclear test on August 29, 1949. By the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union were both conducting high-yield thermonuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. The radioactive fallout from those tests drew criticism from around the globe.

The international community’s concern about the effects on health and the environment continued to grow. In 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru [**proposed**](http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-2009/page-4-nuclear-testing-1945-2009/) a ban on all nuclear testing. The increasing public concern over explosive tests led to the negotiation and entry into force of the 1963 [**Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty**](http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm)(LTBT).

This Treaty banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but underground tests were still permitted.

When the [**Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**](http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm) was being negotiated in 1968, a comprehensive test ban was discussed, but the international community failed to reach agreement on the issue. Advocates for a ban on explosive testing persisted.

In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the [**Threshold Test Ban Treaty**](http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm) (TTBT). It established a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting the United States and the Soviet Union from conducting tests that would produce a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The mutual restraint imposed by the Treaty reduced the explosive force of new nuclear warheads and bombs, which could otherwise be tested for weapons systems. The TTBT was not intended as a substitute for a comprehensive test ban. Article I of the Treaty states that, “the Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests.”

In 1976, scientists from different countries formed the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) and began conducting joint research into monitoring technologies and data analysis methods for the verification of a comprehensive test ban.

Almost two decades later, the Cold War ended, bringing with it increased possibilities for progress on disarmament and self-imposed testing moratoriums from the United States and the former Soviet Union. Capitalizing on this momentum, the United Nations’ disarmament body, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, began formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1994. Capitalizing on the GSE’s research, the CD was able to reach consensus on the verification regime. Other parts of the negotiations proved more difficult, but members of the CD were able to find common ground and move forward. Australia submitted the Treaty to the U.N. General Assembly, where it was adopted on September 10, 1996 and opened for signature on September 24, 1996.

Since then, 182 nations have signed the Treaty, and 156 have ratified it. Of the 44 nations whose ratifications are specifically required by the Treaty for it to enter into force, 41 have signed and 36 have ratified.

**India and CTBT**

## *India’s future with the CTBT is still unwritten. Leadership until now may have been delayed, but there are opportunities for it to be reengaged and renewed*

India’s past with the treaty to ban all nuclear tests in all places for all time is well known. Some might characterise it as leadership defaulted or, more optimistically, merely delayed. A lot has changed for India since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in 1996, and the same is true for the treaty itself — enough to prompt fresh thinking about some renewed engagement.

India did not support the treaty in 1996 — and still does not — but it had been very supportive during negotiations. The roots of that exuberance can be traced to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous initiative in 1954 for a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing. His intervention came at a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were detonating powerful nuclear weapons with increasing frequency. Nehru played an important role in building international momentum for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which India joined. This treaty significantly reduced global levels of fallout, but did little to constrain the nuclear arms race. The CTBT was created as a result.

It has been hard in recent years to discern a public debate on the CTBT in India. This is tragic in the very country that made the path-breaking call for the “standstill agreement”; has been observing a unilateral moratorium since 1998; is a champion of nuclear disarmament; and, in the words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “will continue to contribute to the strengthening of the global non-proliferation efforts.” For all of its efforts in galvanising the creation of an effective international verification system, India is currently unable to derive either the political or the technical benefits from it. But 183 other countries do.

The CTBT with its 183 signatories and 163 ratifications is one of the most widely supported arms-control treaties. This near universal support is due to the treaty’s non-discriminatory nature, where everyone has the same obligation never to conduct a nuclear explosion. As another mark of progress, the prohibition against testing has emerged as an established global political and behavioural norm. The international condemnation of North Korea as the only country that has conducted nuclear tests in this millennium is a vivid illustration.

After each of the North Korean nuclear tests, all CTBT State Signatories received the same high-quality information about the location, magnitude, depth and time of the event within hours of detection by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation’s (CTBTO) system of monitoring stations.

CTBTO has evolved from a mere blueprint to the custodian of the world’s largest and most sophisticated multilateral verification system. Over 300 stations in 89 countries have been built to monitor for signs of nuclear explosions around the globe and round the clock. The International Monitoring System (IMS) monitors the Earth’s crust, listens in the atmosphere and in the oceans and sniffs the air for traces of radioactivity. While scanning the globe for signs of a nuclear test, this monitoring system produces data that have many spin-off applications, from disaster early warning to scientific research on the Earth’s inner structures, climate change or meteors, to name just a few of the potential uses.

**Nuclear Safety**

CTBTO is also making contributions to the nuclear safety field. After the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, CTBTO data provided timely information on the radioactive emissions from the crippled plant and their global dispersion.

In spite of all these achievements, the CTBT has yet to become global law due to its demanding entry into force clause, which requires the signature and ratification of all 44 countries listed as nuclear technology capable. At present, eight of those countries are yet to join: India, Pakistan and North Korea are the only non-signatories from this list.

Before India even signs the CTBT, it can reacquaint itself with today’s global nuclear test ban, while making an important contribution to the multilateral verification system. Radionuclide stations, which “sniff out” radioactive particles and noble gases, are the only means to confirm a nuclear explosion. In particular, the radionuclide station still sought for India to host is vital to finishing the now 90 per cent complete IMS, which is already highly effective in detecting nuclear explosions.

The IMS has also facilitated a rich international exchange of data and expertise and boosted technological advancements pertaining to infrasound and noble gas monitoring. Additionally, the CTBTO has an active programme of engagement with the international scientific community who can tap into a wealth of data generated by the IMS, and civil and scientific applications are booming. India should be part of this.

Science should support diplomacy. Today, a first step toward reengagement would be for relevant scientific and other government institutions to initiate contact with the CTBTO for the purpose of beginning scientific cooperation. This could eventually lead to India participating in the international exchange of data from the monitoring stations and would be an important first step to establishing familiarity and trust.

Taking these initial steps within the scientific context is wholly consistent with India’s standing in the 21st century as it looks to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Scientific cooperation is crucial for sustainable dialogue. Interactions between scientists serve to promote cross-border exchanges and can become a precursor for greater engagement. One avenue for engagement takes place this June in Vienna at the CTBT: the Science and Technology Conference 2015, which is the world’s largest scientific forum on nuclear-test-ban verification and its other benefits. Encouragingly, Indian scientists attended the last conference and I look forward to welcoming more this year.

India’s future with the CTBT is still unwritten. Leadership until now may have been delayed, but there are opportunities for it to be reengaged and renewed.

**International Banks**

Since inception in 1944, the World Bank has expanded from a single institution to a closely associated group of five development institutions. Our mission evolved from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as facilitator of post-war reconstruction and development to the present-day mandate of worldwide poverty alleviation in close coordination with our affiliate, the [International Development Association](http://www.worldbank.org/ida/), and other members of the World Bank Group, the [International Finance Corporation (IFC)](http://www.ifc.org/), the [Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA)](http://www.miga.org/), and the [International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)](http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp).

Once, we had a homogeneous staff of engineers and financial analysts, based solely in Washington, D.C. Today, we have multidisciplinary and diverse staffs that includes economists, public policy experts, sector experts and social scientists—and now more than a third of our staff is based in country offices.

Reconstruction remains an important part of our work. However, at today's World Bank, poverty reduction through an inclusive and sustainable globalization remains the overarching goal of our work.

The World Bank is like a cooperative, made up of 189 [member countries](http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members). These member countries, or shareholders, are represented by a [Board of Governors](http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/governors), who are the ultimate policymakers at the World Bank. Generally, the governors are member countries' ministers of finance or ministers of development. They meet once a year at the [Annual Meetings](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20042540~menuPK:8336881~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html) of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the [International Monetary Fund](http://www.imf.org/).

The governors delegate specific duties to 25 [Executive Directors](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:22421219~menuPK:64020004~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html), who work on-site at the Bank. The five largest shareholders appoint an executive director, while other member countries are represented by elected executive directors.

World Bank Group President [Jim Yong Kim](http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/president) chairs meetings of the Boards of Directors and is responsible for overall management of the Bank. The President is selected by the Board of Executive Directors for a five-year, renewable term.

The Executive Directors make up the [Boards of Directors](http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/directors) of the World Bank. They normally meet at least twice a week to oversee the Bank's business, including approval of loans and guarantees, new policies, the administrative budget, country assistance strategies and borrowing and financial decisions.

The World Bank operates day-to-day under the leadership and direction of the president, management and senior staff, and the vice presidents in charge of Global Practices, Cross-Cutting Solutions Areas, regions, and functions.

**Objectives:**

**The following objectives are assigned by the World Bank:**

1. To provide long-run capital to member countries for economic reconstruction and development.

2. To induce long-run capital investment for assuring Balance of Payments (BoP) equilibrium and balanced development of international trade.

3. To provide guarantee for loans granted to small and large units and other projects of member countries.

4. To ensure the implementation of development projects so as to bring about a smooth transference from a war-time to peace economy.

5. To promote capital investment in member countries by the following ways;

(a) To provide guarantee on private loans or capital investment.

(b) If private capital is not available even after providing guarantee, then IBRD provides loans for productive activities on considerate conditions.

**Functions:**

World Bank is playing main role of providing loans for development works to member countries, especially to underdeveloped countries. The World Bank provides long-term loans for various development projects of 5 to 20 years duration.

**The main functions can be explained with the help of the following points:**

1. World Bank provides various technical services to the member countries. For this purpose, the Bank has established “The Economic Development Institute” and a Staff College in Washington.

2. Bank can grant loans to a member country up to 20% of its share in the paid-up capital.

3. The quantities of loans, interest rate and terms and conditions are determined by the Bank itself.

4. Generally, Bank grants loans for a particular project duly submitted to the Bank by the member country.

5. The debtor nation has to repay either in reserve currencies or in the currency in which the loan was sanctioned.

6. Bank also provides loan to private investors belonging to member countries on its own guarantee, but for this loan private investors have to seek prior permission from those counties where this amount will be collected.

Board of Governors

The Boards of Governors consist of one Governor and one Alternate Governor appointed by each member country. The office is usually held by the country's minister of finance, governor of its central bank, or a senior official of similar rank. The Governors and Alternates serve for terms of five years and can be reappointed.

If the country is a member of the Bank and is also a member of the [International Finance Corporation (IFC)](http://www.ifc.org/) or the [International Development Association (IDA](http://www.worldbank.org/ida/)), then the appointed Governor and his or her alternate serve ex-officio as the Governor and Alternate on the IFC and IDA Boards of Governors.

They also serve as representatives of their country on the Administrative Council of the [International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID](http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp)) unless otherwise noted. [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)](http://www.miga.org/) Governors and Alternates are appointed separately.

**Role of the Boards of Governors**

All the powers of the Bank are vested in the Boards of Governors, the Bank's senior decision-making body according to the [Articles of Agreement](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004943~noSURL:Y~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html). However, the Boards of Governors has delegated all powers to the Executive Directors except those mentioned in the Articles of Agreement. These powers include:

* Admit and suspend members;
* Increase or decrease the authorized capital stock;
* Determine the distribution of the net income of the Bank;
* Decide appeals from interpretations of the Articles of Agreement by the Executive Directors;
* Make formal comprehensive arrangements to cooperate with other international organizations;
* Suspend permanently the operations of the Bank;
* Increase the number of elected Executive Directors; and
* Approve amendments to the Articles of Agreement.

**The Boards of Directors**

The Boards of Directors consist of the [World Bank Group President](http://www.worldbank.org/president) and 25 Executive Directors. The President is the presiding officer, and ordinarily has no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division.  In line with the [Bank's Articles](http://go.worldbank.org/Q53G3UP520), the Executive Directors select the World Bank President, who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors.

The Executive Directors as individuals cannot exercise any power nor commit or represent the Bank unless specifically authorized by the Boards to do so. With the term beginning November 1, 2010, the number of Executive Directors increased by one, totalling 25.

Alternates to Executive Directors have full power to act in the absence of their respective Executive Directors. Furthermore, Senior Advisors and Advisors assist the Executive Directors in their work, who can, along with the Alternates to Executive Directors, attend most Board meetings in an advisory capacity, without voting rights.

**Previous Compositions**

The first Boards consisted of 12 Executive Directors, as provided under the [IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V Section 4(b)](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004943~noSURL:Y~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html). Increases in the number of elected Executive Directors require a decision of the Boards of Governors by an 80% majority of the total voting power. Before November 1, 1992, there were 22 Executive Directors, 17 of whom were elected. In 1992, in view of the large number of new members that had joined the Bank, the number of elected Executive Directors increased to 20.

The two new seats, Russia and a new group around Switzerland, brought the total number of Executive Directors to 24. With the term beginning November 1, 2010, the number of Executive Directors increased by one, totalling 25.

**Voting Powers**

The World Bank and the IMF have adopted a weighted system of voting. According to the [IBRD Articles of Agreement](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004943~noSURL:Y~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html), membership in the Bank is open to all members of the IMF. A country applying for membership in the Fund is required to supply data on its economy, which are compared with data from other member countries whose economies are similar in size.

A quota is then assigned, equivalent to the country's subscription to the Fund, and this determines its voting power in the Fund. Each new member country of the Bank is allotted 250 votes plus one additional vote for each share it holds in the Bank's capital stock. The quota assigned by the Fund is used to determine the number of shares allotted to each new member country of the Bank.

Member countries are allocated votes at the time of membership and subsequently for additional subscriptions to capital. Votes are allocated differently in each organization, and result in different [voting powers](http://workgroup.worldbank.org/units/boards/member/Pages/Voting-Powers.aspx).

The Corporate Secretariat is responsible for coordinating the process for members to complete their periodic capital increases in IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA. It provides advice on the procedures for subscribing to additional shares as authorized under resolutions approved by the [Boards of Governors](http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/governors), including required documentation and capital subscriptions payments.

**Ethics Matters**

The [Code of Conduct for Board Officials](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/Code0of0Conduct0for0EDs02007.pdf) that took effect in November 1, 2007, supersedes the Code of Conduct and Ethics Committee Procedures approved in August 2003.

The Code of Conduct for Board Officials sets forth principles and ethical standards for the Executive Directors, the Presidents of each of the organizations, Executive Director Designates, Executive Director Post-Designates, Alternate Executive Directors, Alternate Executive Director Designates, Alternate Executive Director Post-Designates, Temporary Alternate Executive Directors, Senior Advisors, and Advisors to Executive Directors (collectively, “Board Officials”) in connection with, or having a bearing upon, their status and responsibilities in the organizations of the World Bank Group.