MI6

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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STUDY GUIDE

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CHAIRPERSON'S ADDRESS

Delegates it gives me great pleasure to present to you the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS-MI6), one of the 4 committees to be simulated as a part of the St. Xavier's Collegiate School Model United Nations Conference 2015. With the agenda of this committee being countering the axis threat faced during World War 2, the SIS will work against the German secret service agency, Abwehr. As a Joint Crisis Committee, the SIS will involve several unexpected updates and any decision or action taken by either of the JCC committee's will have severe repercussions in the other. It goes without saying that this committee requires the very basic knowledge of World War 2 along with a minimum amount of research. Unlike other committees, the SIS will require very little research since it is a joint and constant crisis. Communiqués on the other hand are very important. Hence it will not be a research based but a communiqué based committee. However a minimum amount of research is necessary with special emphasis on the espionage missions conducted by both secret organisations during the World War, this will also help you with handling the updates. '. It is extremely important for you to know that the dynamics of the committee are slightly different than what you would have originally imagined, hence pay attention to the procedure section of this guide. Apart from this it is essential to study the 'TIMELINE OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE 2nd WORLD WAR', given in this guide itself.

Let me reaffirm that it is imperative for you to go through the study guide in complete detail in addition to external research. You should have an active knowledge about the various events of the World War along with their causes and consequences. I look forward to seeing you on the 11th of July. For any queries, please feel free to contact me at 9903423442.

Samar Singh (Chief of the SIS),
Major-General Sir Stewart Menzies

PS: ANYONE WHO CALLS THIS JAMES BOND COMMITTEE WILL BE DEBARRED PERMANENTLY.

ABOUT THE SIS-MI6

The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly known as MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), is the British intelligence agency which supplies the British Government with foreign intelligence. It operates under the formal direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) alongside the internal Security Service (MI5), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Defence Intelligence (DI). It is frequently referred to by the name MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), a name used as a flag of convenience during the First World War when it was known by many names. The existence of the SIS was not officially acknowledged until 1994. In late 2010, the head of the SIS delivered what he said was the first public address by a serving chief of the agency in its then 101-year history. The remarks of Sir John Sawers primarily focused on the relationship between the need for secrecy and the goal of maintaining security within Britain. His remarks acknowledged the tensions caused by secrecy in an era of leaks and pressure for ever-greater disclosure. Since 1995, the SIS headquarters have been at Vauxhall Cross on the South Bank of the River Thames. The Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service serves as the head of the Secret Intelligence Service. The Chief is appointed by the Foreign Secretary, to whom he directly reports. Annual reports are also made to the Prime Minister

The service derived from the Secret Service Bureau, which was founded in 1909. The Bureau was a joint initiative of the Admiralty and the War Office to control secret intelligence operations in the UK and overseas, particularly concentrating on the activities of the Imperial German Government. The bureau was split into naval and army sections which, over time, specialised in foreign espionage and internal counter-espionage activities respectively. This specialisation was because the Admiralty wanted to know the maritime strength of the Imperial German Navy. This specialisation was formalised before 1914. During the First World War in 1916, the two sections underwent administrative changes so that the foreign section became the Directorate of Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6), the name by which it is frequently known in popular culture today.

Its first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming, who often dropped the *Smith* in routine communication. He typically signed correspondence with his initial *C* in green ink. This usage evolved as a code name, and has been adhered to by all subsequent directors of SIS when signing documents to retain anonymity.

SIS ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The German occupation of most of Western Europe by 1941 seriously damaged existing SIS agent networks but it was not long before these setbacks began to be overcome. Opposition to Nazi rule inspired thousands of patriotic men and women into the gathering of intelligence for SIS and other Allied services.

Human intelligence was by no means SIS' only asset during the war. The Service also oversaw the work of the code breakers of the Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park. Here enemy signals that had been enciphered using the 'Enigma' machine were broken. Codenamed ULTRA intelligence, this crucial information was distributed by SIS to Allied commanders throughout the war

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE AGENCIES

By repute, the British Secret Intelligence Service is the oldest, most experienced, and most secret in the Western world. Today, according to former Chief of Secret Service (CSS), Sir Colin McColl, this not unhelpful “myth…of excellence and secrecy” surrounds the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Intelligence historians have addressed the question of British myth versus reality with considerable vigor. Building on the ground breaking work of Mildred Gladys Richings in her 1935 book, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown*, Christopher Andrew, in his 1986 book *Her Majesty’s Secret Service*, examined the British intelligence record from the Victorian era to the late 20th century. He recognized that historical coverage of the subject was uneven. One reason, to Andrew’s dismay, was that even though records from WW II had been released, many documents from earlier years remained classified “on the dotty grounds that intelligence gathering before the war must remain more secret than during the war.” The availability of primary sources has improved since Andrew made that complaint, and former British army intelligence

officer Michael Smith has used them well in his history of the SIS from its 1909 origin to 1939.

Smith begins his story in the early 20th century when books like *The Invasion of 1910*, and *Spies of the Kaiser*, both by journalist William Le Queux, grossly exaggerated the threat of German espionage in Britain. Nevertheless, the result was a greatly aroused public at a time when Britain had no civilian organization to deal with the espionage threat whatever its magnitude. Why was a civilian organization needed? The War Office had only one overtaxed civilian intelligence officer who ran agents in Europe, but couldn't diplomats supplement his efforts? Smith explains that although the War Office and the Admiralty both had small intelligence staffs that relied on diplomats and attachés, they were models of open source intelligence acquisition and did not want to change. When it came to espionage or any secret intelligence collection, they preferred to decline the honor. The military attaché in Brussels wrote, "I would never do any secret service work." When his counterpart in Berlin was tasked with collecting against his German hosts, he responded that "contact with the class of man…employed in this sort of work…and the measures to which we are obliged to resort are repulsive to me."

Accepting this reality and recognizing the increasing public "spy fever," the Committee of Imperial Defence established a subcommittee to create an organization "that could handle such delicate matters and ensure government officials did not have to dirty their hands by dealing with spies." Hence, in 1909, the independent Secret Service Bureau (SSB) was established with two branches, briefly housed together. The Domestic Branch, initially subordinated to the War Office, and later to the Home Office, eventually became MI5 and was publicly avowed though not publicized. The Foreign Branch was placed under the Admiralty but for cover purposes was designated MI1c, later MI6, and the designation from which the book's title is taken. Officially called the SIS, its existence was neither avowed nor officially publicized. To preserve its anonymity, SIS imposed "a comprehensive ban on publication of exploits" by serving and retired officers. In practice the ban was selectively applied. More than 100 SIS officers and government officials have published memoirs in which they mentioned their secret service work, but only a few were prosecuted. Others resorted to thinly disguised fiction. The nonfiction accounts are as a rule narrowly focused and not well documented, but they leave no doubt that a secret intelligence service existed. Fiction is at best an imperfect mirror and readers are often left guessing. In *SIX*, Michael Smith takes a broad view, adding new stories, filling in details, using true names and dates, and perhaps most interesting, describing the reactions of government entities to the intelligence they received.

The book is roughly divided between the tenures of first two SIS chiefs of service, Captain Mansfield Smith-Cumming and Admiral Hugh Sinclair. Smith addresses

several recurrent issues that neither chief resolved completely. The most annoying and persistent were turf battles among elements of the Foreign Office and the War Office that clashed with "C," as the chief was called, over the SIS mission. Equally serious and frequent was an inadequate budget often, coupled with increased demands for collection. But the majority of the book deals with operations, their management and execution and their failures and successes.

The sophistication, geographical scope and audacity of the operations are remarkable, especially since Cumming, the first "C," had no prior management or intelligence experience. Applying his intuition, writes Smith, Cumming selected officers, sent them behind enemy lines to "determine the situation" and they were often successful. Even more remarkable, the officers Cumming selected didn't have experience in espionage either! The Paul Dukes operation in revolutionary Russia is a good example. Dukes was a concert pianist. Finally, while SIS didn't provide any training for most of WW I—one learned on the job—written instructions were developed in the field and provided to agents during as the war progressed.

While personally recruiting and handling officers and agents, C was also expanding operations world-wide. *SIX* documents a greater concentration of agents operating in Germany, other European nations, and the Middle East during WW I than previously revealed. In discussing these operations Smith shows that despite a genuine demand for intelligence, turf battles among military and civilian elements commanded at least as much attention as running operations.

Several agents and officers addressed in *SIX* have not been previously mentioned or were only briefly acknowledged in earlier intelligence literature. These include journalist Hector Bywater; a naval order of battle expert codenamed Walter Christmas; and author Arthur Ransome, who received minutes of meetings of the Bolshevik leadership from Trotsky's secretary Yevginya Shelepina—Ransome's lover and later his wife. John Leather—cousin to Desmond Morton—a senior SIS officer and later an assistant to Churchill—was arrested, tried, and jailed by the French for espionage. Border control officer Harry Gruner gets less attention but is worth a place in history as the SIS officer who strip-searched Lenin at the Finnish-Russian border—looking for evidence of German support of the Bolsheviks. Gruner was later arrested and sentenced by the Cheka to be shot, a sentence not in fact carried out.

During Cumming's tenure, SIS was not only involved in intelligence collection. Smith recounts operations that would today be called covert action—the SIS role in the murder of the Russian monk, Rasputin, for example. During the discussion, he raises the question of whether SIS officers have a "license to kill"; he quotes wartime officer Jack Lawson who said circumstances must decide. More traditional assignments discussed include sabotage missions conducted by the *Nemesis* network out of

Denmark and the opening of German diplomatic bags on the Siberian Railway.

When it comes to technical tradecraft, Smith shows how it was often developed on the job. Here too Cumming was involved—for example, in the search for an effective secret writing ink. Smith reveals some curious details concerning SIS's response to a claim that semen is the best secret "ink," though "it cannot be stored." *SIX* also looks at problems of agent communication, surveillance, recruitment techniques, and management of overseas stations. Cumming generally let the head of station (HOS) use his initiative without having to check with headquarters first. Author Compton Mackenzie, who was HOS in Greece and—viewed by Smith as something of a loose cannon—initiated what became the SIS routine cover at embassies years later—the Passport Control Office (PCO).

As WW I drew to a close and the Bolsheviks struggled for dominance, the attention of SIS shifted from Western Europe to Russia, and Smith describes the effect on SIS. Here we learn why Cumming recruited Sidney Reilly—"Ace of Spies"—despite reservations about his character: agents who could pass as Russian were in short supply. In the end, Reilly gets much better marks from Smith than from other writers. He quotes an anonymous former SIS officer who had worked with Riley who said that although Reilly was "written off by historians… [he] has been greatly underrated. He was a very, very good—a valuable agent… [a] more serious operator than the impression given by his myth." Smith also corrects the record concerning Reilly's attempt to visit Lenin at the Kremlin: it never happened.

SIX concludes with several chapters on SIS during the interwar period. It was a time of fiscal parsimony, staff reduction, mission review and a struggle to survive. The Admiralty and the War Office both pushed for a single intelligence service. Cumming rejected the idea as "utterly unworkable." In the end he won and agreed to administrative subordination to the Foreign Office. Despite the relative austerity, he went on to establish additional SIS offices throughout the world, offices that became key to the interwar operations Smith describes in considerable detail. At home Cumming reorganized geographically to fit the peacetime mission. He also continued the centuries-old practice of opening diplomatic mailbags, assigning the task to David Boyle in a new section.

Then, in 1923, even as he was planning to retire, Mansfield Cumming died. The new C, Sinclair—the former director of naval intelligence—had been recommended by Cumming and continued—what became the tradition of using green ink and signing his name as "C." *SIX* devotes significant attention to Sinclair's initiatives, which began by his vigorously advocating a variation on the single intelligence service idea: he wanted MI5 and SIS consolidated, all under his control. He failed. He was more successful in his push to strengthen station operations. He insisted on improved

reporting to meet the increasing demands for intelligence on Germany, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Smith tells of major successful efforts in collecting on the Soviet germ warfare program and the German-Soviet relationship and in recruiting agents to report on the new Soviet government.

All did not go smoothly, however, as the famous Zinoviev Letter incident illustrates. As Smith explains, SIS initially concluded that the letter advocated "armed revolution" and contained "strong incitement to contaminate the armed forces." It was then forwarded to the Foreign Office with an endorsement stating that "the authenticity of the document is undoubted." (306) Further investigation, however, revealed it was a fake and the Foreign Office was informed that SIS was "firmly convinced the actual thing was a forgery" as Moscow had maintained. When the Foreign Office refused to believe that it was a fake, SIS reconsidered and reversed its position again. The episode did not enhance the reputation of SIS, but the organization persevered.

Smith describes several other equally embarrassing incidents, one of which resulted in a major change in the relationship of MI5 and SIS. In the 1920s, SIS was tracking Bolshevik agents in Britain. Some were connected with the All-Russian Cooperative Society (ARCOS), which was conducting espionage in Britain. SIS's own agents penetrated ARCOS and learned it possessed secret British documents. With confirming evidence collected "by the work of the GC&CS [Government Code and Cipher School] code breakers," SIS decided to raid ARCOS headquarters and get the evidence. Smith concludes the "raid itself was even more inept than the decision making process that proceeded it" and produced nothing. The worst was yet to come. The politicians, intent on revealing Moscow's perfidy, made public the fact they had evidence obtained by decoding Moscow's cables. The Soviets switched to one-time-pads, a major setback for SIS. Finally, an infuriated SIS was forced to give up running agents in Britain to spy on foreign enterprises. The domestic security mission was moved to MI5, where it remains today.

These failures had additional consequences. For example, when genuine German war mobilization plans were acquired in 1929 by an agent in Berlin, the prime minister suppressed distribution of the information to avoid aggravating the political situation —appeasement was preferred. Similarly, during the 1930s when the illegal clandestine military relationship between the Russians and the Germans was detected, the Foreign Office refused to act. Even worse, reports of German submarine and aircraft construction were ignored by the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force because the information contravened existing thinking.

Despite these and other setbacks, SIS carried on. The PCO system was expanded and a network of nonofficial cover agents was created to supply intelligence. When

Sinclair could not get funds for an expansion of the GC&CS, he bought its new headquarters at Bletchley Park with his own finds and approved contacts with France and Poland to improve code breaking capability. In the late 1930s, recognizing that war was likely, Sinclair created an organization charged with planning sabotage operations. Guy Burgess was recruited in December 1938, as was Kim Philby in June the following year. According to Smith's account, it was Burgess who "brought [Philby] in," but Philby himself refuted that claim in a report submitted to the KGB.

Part 1 ends just before WW II begin. Smith has documented an SIS better prepared to meet the demands of war than "is commonly believed to [have been] the case." What he has also demonstrated is that SIS had acquired extensive experience, some of which it would begin passing on to its American cousins as they prepared for WW II. But that story is left to be told in the forthcoming *Part 2*.

PROCEDURE IN COMMITTEE

1. Procedure in committee will be relatively flexible, however let me remind all the delegates that this committee is not a war cabinet, house of parliament or any other executive/legislative organ of the state. Therefore there will be certain restrictions as far as decision making powers are concerned. This committee cannot actively mobilise troops or take any military decisions, it can merely suggest the same. Delegates are advised to know the powers and limitations of their allotments and keep the same in mind while acting in committee Hence all decisions taken by committee have to be ratified or sanctioned by the PM's War Cabinet, which in this case is the Executive Board.
2. As with other historic committees, a freeze date for information has been set at 3rd September, 1939. Any and all information after that date will not be accepted in committee. However, delegates are free to base their actions along the lines of such information.
3. Committee starts on the 3rd of September, 1939. However, committee may follow an accelerated timeline and updates may alter the flow of time. Note that upon accelerating the time, the Executive Board will inform the delegates about events that have transpired between the previous and current dates.
4. Delegates must be prepared with proof or sources for their facts, as a report for the same can be asked for by the Executive Board at any time.
5. Both Private and public Communiqués are accepted in committee, however all communiqué given by delegates must be ratified by the Executive Board.
6. No Resolutions will be entertained in committee, the only formal piece of paperwork will the Directives.

7. Action orders will also apply in committee and will be similar to a public communiqué, the only difference will be that each action order will be voted upon and passed by a simple majority (51%).
8. If any further information or detailed study guide is required by the first timers, please feel free to contact me.

TIMELINE – THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO WW2:

- 18th September 1931 – Japan invades Manchuria
- 30th January, 1933 – Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany
- 23rd March 1933- The Reichstag passes the Enabling Act, making Adolf Hitler dictator of Germany
- 27th March 1933- Japan leaves the League of Nations followed by Germany in October 1933.
- 26th January 1934- The German-Polish Non Aggression Pact is signed
- 30th June 1934- The Night of Long Knives, several opponents of Hitler are murdered
- 25th July 1934- In spite of the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss, Hitler's first attempt towards Anschluss fails with the failure of the July Putsch
- 2nd August 1934- After the death of Hindenburg, Hitler makes himself the Fuhrer
- 7th January 1935- The Saar Basin was returned to Germany after a plebiscite
- 15th March 1935-Hitler reintroduces conscription in Germany
- 14th April 1935- Italy, Britain and France form the Stresa Front

- 2nd May 1935- France and USSR sign a pact of mutual assistance
- 18th June 1935- Anglo-German naval agreement led to fall of the Stresa Front
- 31st August1935- The Neutrality Act of 1935 is passed in USA
- 15th September 1935- Nuremberg laws are passed by the Reichstag
- 3rd October 1935 – Italy invades Abyssinia (Ethiopia)
- 29th February 1936- conservative military factions gain power in Japan
- 7th March 1936 – Germany flouts the Treaty of Versailles and remilitarises Rhineland
- 17th July 1936 – Spanish Civil War breaks out, Germany and Italy send aid to general Franco
- 25th October 1936- Rome-Berlin Axis Pact is signed
- 25th November 1936- Japan signs an Anti Comintern Pact with Germany
- 19th January 1937 – Japan terminates the Washington Conference Treaty
- 7th July 1937- the second Sino-Japanese war begins
- 6th November 1937- Italy joins the Anti Comintern Pact
- 11th December 1937- Italy leaves the League of Nations
- 12th December 1937- The USS Panay incident leads to a further straining relations between USA and Japan
- 12th March 1938- Germany invades Austria and chancellor Schuschnigg's government resigns, Anschluss is finally complete, Austria is a part of The Third Reich
- 29th September 1939- Hitler invites Chamberlain and Daladier to a four power
- 30th September 1938- The Munich Pact is signed, Germany annexes

Sudetenland

- 9th November 1938- The Kristallnacht Pogrom begins in Germany
- 25th January 1939 – A uranium atom is split for the first time in the USA
- 14th March 1939 - The pro-German Slovak Republic is created with Josef Tiso as its prime minister, provoking the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
- 15th March 1939 - Germany occupies the Czech part in violation of the Munich Agreement, President Hacha's government has been deposed and the Czechs do not attempt to put up any organized resistance having lost their main defensive line with the annexation of the Sudetenland. Germany establishes the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, The protectorate includes those portions of Czechoslovakia not incorporated into Germany.
- 20th March 1939- German Foreign Minister delivers an oral ultimatum to Lithuania, demanding that it cede Memel to Germany.
- 21st March 1939 - Hitler demands the return of the Polish Corridor and the Free City of Danzig to Germany
- 23rd March 1939- The German–Romanian Treaty for the Development of Economic Relations between the Two Countries is signed
- 21st March 1939 - The United Kingdom and France offer a guarantee of Polish independence
- 28th March 1939- Madrid falls to Franco's forces
- 1st April 1939- Spain becomes a dictatorship with Francisco Franco as the head of the new government
- 12th April 1939- Italy occupies Albania, meeting very military resistance
- 18th April 1939- The Soviet Union proposes a tripartite alliance with the United Kingdom and France. It is rejected
- 28th April 1939-In a speech before the *Reichstag*, Adolf Hitler renounces the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact

22nd May 1939- Italy and Germany sign the Pact of Steel

- 23rd August 1939- USSR signs a non-aggression pact with Germany
- 30th August 1939- Germany gives an ultimatum to Poland regarding the Polish Corridor and the Free City of Danzig
- 1st September1939- without any response to the ultimatum, Germany invades Poland, Blitzkrieg on a large scale
- 2nd September 1939- Germany officially annexes the Free City of Danzig

THIS IS WHERE COMMITTEE BEGINS – 3rd September 1939, 11:00AM
