

BigData Experience Lab
Bangalore

RSA: Public Key Encryption

Pranav Maneriker

September 2, 2016



Introduction

- What is Cryptography
- Cryptanalysis

Encryption

- Types of Encryption

Public Key Encryption

- Introduction to Fields
- Diffie-Hellman

RSA

- Introduction
- Algorithm
- Attacks

References



Introduction




Figure: Typical Crypto Algorithm pipeline

Cryptanalysis

Types of attacks (Kootlipi-vinash)



- ▶ Chosen Plaintext
- ▶ Chosen Ciphertext
- ▶ Known Plaintext
- ▶ Known Ciphertext



Encryption

Types of Encryption

Public and Private key



- ▶ Private key encryption

Shared Secret. Parties must meet and exchange key before establishing a secure communication channel.

Examples: DES, Rijndael AES

Fast, but tedious on their own

Substitution Cipher demo

Types of Encryption

Public and Private key



- ▶ Private key encryption

Shared Secret. Parties must meet and exchange key before establishing a secure communication channel.

Examples: DES, Rijndael AES

Fast, but tedious on their own

Substitution Cipher demo

- ▶ Public key encryption



Public Key Encryption



We hold these truths to be self evident

- ▶ F_p^*
- ▶ Generation of a prime : **Miller Rabin Demo**
- ▶ Fermat's little theorem
- ▶ Euler Totient Theorem
- ▶ GCD algorithm, Bezout identity
- ▶ Chinese Remaindering?

Diffie-Hellman [3]

Optional



- ▶ Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman - Turing Award 2016
- ▶ Public key exchange protocol
- ▶ Discrete Log Problem



Sophie Germain Primes ($p = 2q + 1$)

Algorithm

- ▶ Generate a large prime p
- ▶ Fix a generator g of F_p^*
- ▶ (g, p) generated by sender/receiver and sent to other
- ▶ Sender picks random r , $0 < r < p - 1$, sends g^r to receiver
- ▶ Receiver picks a random s , $0 < s < p - 1$, sends g^s to sender
- ▶ Sender computes $(g^s)^r = g^{sr}$, Receiver computes $(g^r)^s = g^{sr}$
Shared secret key g^{sr}



RSA



- ▶ Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, public description 1977
- ▶ Clifford Cocks, English mathematician, UK intelligence agency (1973), declassified 1997
- ▶ Still the most popular public key encryption



Algorithm

- ▶ Pick two large primes p and q
- ▶ Let $n = pq$
- ▶ Pick a number $e \mid 1 < e < (p-1)(q-1), \gcd(e, n) = 1$
- ▶ Compute $d \mid d < (p-1)(q-1), ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Sender (Public Key) : (n, e)

Receiver (Private Key) : d

Sender sends m as $c = m^e \pmod n$

Receiver gets c , retrieves $m = c^d \pmod n$

Attacks on RSA

Simple (optional)



- ▶ Brute Force
- ▶ l-smooth prime p (choose Sophie Germain)
- ▶ Quadratic Sieve



All truths are equal, some truths are more equal than others

- ▶ Integer Lattices

- ▶ Minkowski's theorem

For lattice $\mathbb{L} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, $\lambda(\mathbb{L}) = \sqrt{m} v(\mathbb{L})^{\frac{1}{m}}$

- ▶ Ajtai-Micciancio theorem [5]

Given \mathbb{L} , finding a vector of length $\sqrt{2}\lambda(\mathbb{L})$ is NP hard

- ▶ Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász theorem [4] (Gram-Schmidt for integer lattices)

Can compute a vector of length $\leq 2^{\frac{n-1}{2}} \lambda(\mathbb{L})$ in polynomial time

Attacks on RSA

Coppersmith method [2, 1]



Attacks on RSA

Coppersmith method [2, 1]



Demo!



References



- [1] D. Boneh et al.
Twenty years of attacks on the rsa cryptosystem.
Notices of the AMS, 46(2):203–213, 1999.
- [2] D. Coppersmith.
Finding a small root of a univariate modular equation.
In *International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques*, pages 155–165. Springer, 1996.
- [3] W. Diffie and M. Hellman.
New directions in cryptography.
IEEE transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
- [4] A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, and L. Lovász.
Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients.
Mathematische Annalen, 261(4):515–534, 1982.



[5] D. Micciancio.


The shortest vector in a lattice is hard to approximate to within some constant.

SIAM journal on Computing, 30(6):2008–2035, 2001.

[6] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman.

A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.

Communications of the ACM, 21(2):120–126, 1978.



Thank you!