**73.2**The world faced a global wave of protest in 2019 that defied easy explanation. This wave—consisting of demonstrations in 40–50 different countries—spanned geographies, political divides, and regime types, with movements rising up against the likes of authoritarianism, corruption, inequality, poverty, and suppression of identity. Some commentators drew the analogy to the most famous protest wave in the Western imaginary, 1968, which included the U.S. civil rights movement, the Vietnam conflict, and anti U.S.S.R. rebellion. But this wave outstripped 1968 in volume and breadth, while appearing to feature lower overall conflict intensity. While a number of protests subsided after achieving concrete objectives, others simmered, with echoes throughout 2020. Later movements arose against the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic shocks, authoritarian leaders, corruption, and inequality across race and class. In its 73-year history, the Journal has sought to examine defining issues of global concern. Recent treatments reflect this, including the action-oriented issue on climate change in this volume, as well as examinations of threats to democracy, ungoverned spaces, global feminism. In 2014, the Journal covered the outlook of protest in the 21st century in light of movements around the global financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Beginning in the early 2010s, many observed a shift in the nature of social movements, which incorporated developments in social media and communications technology—the networked world—as well as the advent of “leaderless” protest. Had the nature of power changed? Were social movements changing in mechanics, goals, and organizational structure? And had governments gotten that much worse? Experts on protests, social movements, revolutions, and civil conflict weighed in, noting that primary causes included social media, the persistence of a non-hierarchy norm in youth protest movements, the rise in authoritarianism, and the increasing visibility of corruption. At that time, the Journal called it a “breaking point.” What was galling to groups then is even more so now, by virtue of both the individual’s tolerance and the state’s brazenness. The old order may have given way, but we do not know what is in front of us. Since 2014, borders and political systems remain largely intact, but the world has seen a new phase of great power competition, the acceleration of climate change, and a pandemic. In the breach, the world witnesses the essentiality of the politics of protest. We aim to help the reader understand it.

THE INQUIRY

To make sense of the protest wave, one can begin broadly by asking: does it exist, what causes it, what does it do, how does it work, and how will it matter—what are the politics of protest today? Political science situates protest within the landscape of action leading to change in electoral outcomes or political institutions—protest is about the nature of political power and political order. Bearing in mind these high-level questions, this issue addresses that which has emerged from the particularity of this wave: How can we conceptualize and model protest dynamics? What are the advantages and disadvantages of leaderless protest? What has been the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on protest activity? Are there novel dimensions of social movement or protest activity emerging? Have the dynamics of “people power” fundamentally changed?

CONTRIBUTIONS

This issue is designed for the reader to develop powerful questions and emergent insights. We invite the reader to draw from and synthesize information across the different kinds of contributions represented. But it need not be the essays that form the backbone of the reader’s interpretation—the most telling remark may appear in the third page of a Feature. This issue features academic essays that touch on a cross-section of geography, subject matter, and history. Two essays examine the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the phenomenon of protest—Paolo Gerbaudo sees the pandemic as a novel scenario for protest action, while Jonathan Pinckney and Miranda Rivers use an original cross-national survey to show the effects of the pandemic on protest activity. Thanassis Cambanis and Sarah Mokh ambitiously suggest an effective idea of transformational reform based on the cases of Lebanon and Iraq, where protest appears endemic. Priyanka Sethy takes a look at history, studying ethnolinguistic nationalist incidences in historical South Asia to explore what causes ethnic protest to progress to violence. Moises Arce and Riley Moran study the mechanisms of social movements in the context of natural resource extraction in Peru and South Africa. Finally, Rowena He offers a scholarly narrative of the recent Water Movement in Hong Kong, with ominous and hopeful notes for the protesters as well as observers.

In addition to academic essays, the Journal includes Arguments, which are mid-length analytical pieces covering a narrow or contemporary topic. For these pieces, there is an emphasis on informed insight rather than original research. Each focuses on a single country, and asks: “How did we get here?” and “Why is this time different?” Roberta Rice studies Chile; Saeed Ghasseminejad, Behnam Ben Taleblu, and Eliora Katz analyze Iran; Pavin Chachavalpongpun writes on Thailand; Duncan Wheeler opines on Spain; Mohammed Soliman comments on Egypt; and Michael T. Heaney covers the United States.

In the Features section, the Journal showcases interviews with practitioners—that is, activist leaders—on the genesis and meaning of their protests. These leaders hail from Lebanon, Sudan, Xinjiang, Zimbabwe, and the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. This issue contains interviews with Rushan Abbas on the Uyghur plight, Mayada Hassanain on Sudan, Evan Mawarire on Zimbabwe, David Archambault II on Standing Rock and Indigenous rights, and Assaad Thebian on Lebanon.

An innovation for this issue is a space reserved for the showcase of the practice of protest and international affairs. The Journal features perspectives from Marco Rubio and Joshua Wong on a global contest between democracy and authoritarianism, and the role of an international coalition in the preservation of individual rights and freedom. Winners of student essay contests offer yet another distinct vantage point on the subject. Rhe-Anne Tan, a dual BA student from Columbia College and Sciences Po, argues that there is a hazard, despite protest, for the Papuans against the project of the unitary Indonesian state; and Jasmine Ong, from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, examines the details of the Hong Kong protesters’ communications to identify effective and ineffective approaches. Casey Buckley, from Columbia Business School and the School of International and Public Affairs, reveals in photographs the lament of a seemingly fruitless protest in the United States. We regret the perspectives left undiscussed in this issue. As this issue goes to print, Belarus is raging, and pro-feminist protests have emerged in Namibia and Bangladesh. Recent demonstrations in India and Russia, as well as perspectives on climate justice and labor rights movements, deserve the reader’s independent examination.

We are fortunate that this issue will be alive after publication, with the discussions reflected in these pages stimulating and catalyzing bodies of knowledge. The Journal’s online edition will complement this issue, in light of both the pandemic and the pace of developments in the realm of protests and social movements. Essays, Arguments, and correspondence on this topic are welcome and encouraged.

**73.1**

For a generation that came of age when Climate Change represented an established, undisputed fact, a sense of optimism pervaded thinking about the earth’s future. Textbooks taught us that the world had already woken up to what was happening. All that remained, we were led to believe, was finding a workable solution. This was a technocratic problem, and there was little doubt human ingenuity would prevail. In recent years that optimism has crumbled. Climate scepticism has surged across the globe. Armed with a new pseudo-science, a wave of resurgent demagogues paints climate change with the brush of hyperbole and partisanship. Even those political leaders sympathetic to climate change have made environmental goals secondary to economic output. The rise of a new generation of climate activists offers hope. But it also reflects how dire today’s state of affairs is. As political leaders across the globe dither, the world stumbles towards toward crisis, already seen in increasingly frequent and more intense storms, droughts, wildfires, and floods. This sense of urgency drove the Editorial Board of the Journal of International Affairs to dedicate its latest issue, Volume 73, No. 1, to climate change—with one caveat. We have shed the old name. Climate Change portrays the path we are on in neutral terms. This is false. It misleads, and it pacifies. Climate Disruption represents a threat to all of humanity, and some populations more than others. We can no longer afford complacency. Climate Disruption: Bridging the Gap Between Awareness and Solutions approaches this issue from the perspectives of both action and advocacy. A new generation of activists, journalist, political leaders, and citizens will have to fight not just to develop technical solutions, but also to drive a new consensus. Climate Disruption is not just a technical or scientific challenge. It is also a political challenge of the highest order. Does the Journal of International Affairs risk slipping from academia into activism? We do not recognize the distinction. The purpose of all academic work is to reveal knowledge and to inform better decision-making. Volume 73. No. 1 merely represents the latest step in the Journal of International Affairs’ long history of bringing together leading scholarship on the most pressing international political issues of the day.

.

**72.2**

The world if full of urgent global challenges. From climate change to trade disputes, to humanitarian crises and faltering alliances, the 21st century’s second decade has witnessed an assault on many of the long-held orthodoxies of international relations. Nevertheless, the Editorial Board of the Journal of International Affairs believes that the topic chosen for this issue is as important, and as timely, as any.

From the MeToo Movement and worldwide women’s marches, to #Balancetonporc and #tystnadtagning, feminism has surged into the public discourse like never before. These developments have catalyzed new, often bitter debates on important topics, including women’s rights, the gender pay gap, women’s involvement in politics and the workplace, and gender-based violence. On many of these issues progress remains uncertain: a resurgent activism emerges hand-in-hand with the forces of reaction. Whatever side one takes, there is no denying that feminism finds itself at the center of today’s most important public policy debates. At last, feminism has truly gone global.

Unfortunately, the international affairs and public policy fields have failed to dedicate sufficient attention to feminist politics and political movements. This failure is endemic, found everywhere from academia to think tanks and international organizations. Feminist IR theory, when taught, is often an afterthought, while feminist paradigms have not yet cracked the academic mainstream in universities across the world. With this issue on the Dynamics of Global Feminism, the Journal of International Affairs has chosen to dedicate its voice to filling that gap.

The Dynamics of Global Feminism asks its contributors a series of questions. Is there one “Global Feminism,” or several? Why have some feminist movements been successful while others have failed? How have globalization, the rise of populism, and the emergence of new technologies affected both the form and substance of feminism? What have past movements gotten wrong, or right, and how can feminism contribute to building a better world?

Nobel Peace Laureate Leymah Gbowee, our keynote, opens the issue. She shares her remarkable experience in the peace movement in Liberia. Ms. Gbowee demonstrates the immense potential of women’s activism but cautions that a local approach to female organizing is essential to its success.

Dynamics of Global Feminism then applies an international lens to feminism. Columbia’s Yasmine Ergas begins by highlighting the ways that the Beijing Settlement has affected feminist policy goals in the international arena. Nahla Valji and Pablo Castillo Diaz explore the troubling linkages between misogyny and violent extremism, while Victoria Scheyer and Marina Kumskova outline a proper feminist approach to foreign policy. Mona Lena Krook charts the emergence of the concept of violence against women in politics and explains how it can be used to develop new political frameworks.

The issue picks back up with Olga Jurasz and Kim Barker, who take readers into the digital realm. They argue that online misogyny has denied women equal participation in public and political life, and restricted their ability to express themselves openly. The section concludes with two interviews with the Editors. Professor Nimmi Gowrinathan outlines her work on women’s involvement in militant organizations, and Professor Cynthia Enloe interrogates the very title of this issue, highlighting the problems of terms such as “Global Feminism.”

At this point, the issue changes pace, nudging readers from argument towards art. Saumya Deva, the winner of the Journal’s inaugural Student Art Contest, draws readers’ attention to the struggle of female activists in Palestine with her powerful series “Repetition=Resistance.” Saumya supplements the series with a short written piece on its meaning and her inspiration.

The Journal then brings its readers the winning entry of the biannual Andrew Wellington Cordier Student Essay Contest. This year’s winner, Jasneet Hora, explains how the women vying for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in the United States are poised to change both the perception and practice of public service.

Next, the issue turns to a series of regional case studies. Former Afghan Minister for Women Sima Samar shares her story of how she and other women contributed to the peace movement in Afghanistan. Author and activist Farida Shaheed also draws on personal experience, exploring how the contemporary women’s rights movement in Pakistan compares with past women’s movements, and what the two can learn from each other. Finally, Nela Porobic Isakovic and Gorana Mlinarevic take a close look at the peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina to explain how feminist perspectives can support a more sustainable transition from war to peace.

The issue concludes with regional perspectives on governance and public policy. Professors Ipek Ilkkaracan and Naila Kabeer bring an important economic lens to the issue. Dr. Ilkkaracan examines the relationship between populist politics and economic gender disparity in Turkey, while Dr. Kabeer, in an interview with the Editors, shares her thoughts on global feminist movements, women’s empowerment, and women’s labor issues in Bangladesh and India. As these are only a few of many possible case studies, the issue concludes with a nod to other important works. Eugenia McGill’s review of Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouche, and Hila Shamir’s Governance Feminism: Notes from the Field brings our readers’ attention to another valuable compendium of research and analysis of feminist politics around the world.

An issue on feminism is long overdue. And still, much remains to be said. It is the mandate of the Journal to provide a forum for discussion and debate on the most pressing issues of the day. We hope that this issue will be the start of a new conversation, not its coda. Until the next issue on Global Feminism.

**72.1**

The mandate of the Journal of International Affairs is to provide a forum for exploring issues and offering innovative solutions to problems of global concern. This guiding principle has led the Journal to focus on a vast array of topics, and our archive is a compendium of the most urgent topics of the time, captured in our volumes dating back nearly three-quarters of a century.

Our latest issue focuses on the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is one the most pressing issues facing our generation because the next phase of global economic transformation is happening now. The integration of automated processes and digital innovation with physical systems of production promises to fundamentally change how humans all over the world live their lives. Indeed, its impacts are already being felt in industries as varied as agriculture, manufacturing, and the services sector.

But the relevance of 4IR to international affairs is not only in how it will change the nature of work. It is also in the social, political, and economic consequences 4IR engenders.

These changes and their consequences provide the touchstones for this issue’s contributors. Professor Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum (WEF) provides a foreword to the issue, outlining his vision of what the Fourth Industrial Revolution entails, three years after introducing the term itself into popular use. Professor Schwab’s foreword is accompanied by a primer on 4IR by WEF’s Thomas Philbeck and Nicholas Davis. Together, these high-level perspectives ground our understanding of the Fourth Industrial Revolution by laying out theoretical parameters our contributors explore.

From the International Labor Organization, Director-General Guy Ryder writes about the challenges of valuing work as the labor market changes, which is followed by an examination of the gig economy by Alex De Ruyter, director of the Center for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess. An interview with Stefano Scarpetta of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development focuses on how labor resilience might be improved in the face of the changing nature of work, and Federica Saliola and Simeon Djankov from the World Bank Group expand on the latest World Development Report and provide robust analysis of the effect of technology on work and consider how governments could respond.

Our contributors also focus not just on the broad social impacts of 4IR, but also its nuances. Elizabeth Pollitzer, co-founder of Portia, lays out four scenarios for the digital future, using territorial considerations (global versus local) and degrees of societal involvement (inclusive versus exclusive). Jill Rubery, of University of Manchester, provides a gender-based perspective on the future of work and how women’s status within the labor market is likely to change. Shuo-Yan Chou, director of the Center for Internet of Things Innovation at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, writes on how humans can and should remain an integral component of the Internet of Things.

Allan Dafoe at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University helps us make sense of how human governance regimes might intersect with the increased use of artificial intelligence brought on by 4IR. We also have an industry perspective, from Francesca Rossi of IBM Research, on

how trust and explainability will influence the extent to which users and companies buy in to the utility of artificial intelligence. Our SIPA Student Essay winner, Schoni Song, contributes a broad essay on the implications of AI to society, the economy, and public policy going forward.

Some elements of 4IR have particular relevance to distinct regions. Wim Naudé of Maastricht University critically examines the changing manufacturing industry on the African continent and emerging narratives about the industry and the continent, while Yovanna Pineda from the

University of Central Florida reviews the Argentine agricultural industry and its implications for decent work. In an interview, Swedish Minister for Employment and Integration Ylva Johansson, explores the ways in which wealthy countries such as Sweden are already grappling with the implications of 4IR and what lessons they may offer to developing states.

We conclude with reviews of Tim May and Beth Perry’s Cities and the Knowledge Economy: Promise, Politics and Possibilities, a study of how urban universities stand to contribute to the future knowledge economy, by Steven Cohen at SIPA, and of Professor Schwab’s latest book, Shaping the

Fourth Industrial Revolution, reviewed by Betty Sue Flowers of the University of Texas at Austin.

Since Professor Schwab wrote on the Fourth Industrial Revolution in 2016, the concept has inspired both critiques and attempts to elaborate on its meaning. Readers will find samples of both within this issue, and although the articles are diverse in their proposals and outlook, a unifying thread of timely urgency runs through them. One thing that all of our contributors agree on is that the 4IR cannot be ignored. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a topic of essential global concern, and with this issue, the Journal of International Affairs is proud once again to fulfill its mandate by providing a space to explore 4IR’s varied facets and to offer innovative solutions to its biggest challenges.

**71.2**

In our last issue of the Journal of International Affairs we looked at the state of democracy around the world. Part of the impetus for choosing that theme was our observation of the weakening global institutions and norms that support and uphold democratic governance. For this issue, we have decided to take that observation in a different direction, and examine not a specific form of governance, but the phenomenon of its absence. This issue looks at Ungoverned Spaces, both physical and theoretical. From monetary policy to migration, the world appears to be witnessing a shift from established institutional oversight to radical disruption and contested authority.

It is this trend that our issue explores. Within this issue we examine vacuums of governance across many fields, and explore the question of whether legal and policy interventions are needed to regulate newly emerging ungoverned spaces. This takes us first to a critique of the concept itself by Jennifer Murtazashvili, associate professor at the Graduate School of International Affairs at the University

of Pittsburgh, who cautions against ascribing significant analytical value to the idea of ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ when applied to conflict zones. She suggests that spaces apparently ridden by anarchy may give rise to forms of self-governance, which can be both productive and unproductive. We continue with the theme of anarchy and informal governance in our next piece, taking a closer look at informal institutions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan with a piece by Suzanne Levi-Sanchez from the Naval War

College. Informed by six years of research on both sides of the border, she analyzes the role of informal organizations and how they mediate between civil society, the state, and familial networks.

Moving to an exponentially expanding and increasingly ungoverned space, the Internet, we have a thought-provoking piece by Bharath Ganesh, from the Oxford Internet Institute, who explains the ungovernability of digital hate culture. Recent attempts to curtail hate speech on popular social media sites such as Reddit and Twitter have exhibited varying degrees of success in addressing challenging concepts such as swarm structure, inconsistent web governance regimes, and ‘coded’ language. Our section on technology continues with a contribution by participants of the Citizen Lab, who argue that the dual-use of technology might eventually be used to block digital speech that international human rights law protects. They look at examples from Bahrain, the UAE, and Yemen. To conclude our review of digital spaces, Andrea O’Sullivan, Program Manager of the Technology Policy Program for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, reflects on Bitcoin and its potential as a store of value and medium of exchange that could potentially undermine the dominance of Western institutions over global trade and commerce.

In our features section we interview internationally renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier on the risk that cybersecurity issues pose to governments around the world. We feature a conversation with Michael Doyle, director of the International Migration Project at Columbia University, on the challenges of global migration and failed states. Finally, as 2018 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the first UNISPACE conference of 78 Member States, we look out into that ultimate ungoverned field, space itself. An interview with Simonetta Di Pippo, Director for the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, features discussions on the unexplored potential of space science and technology.

The Journal of International Affairs is also proud to feature a student essay winner, from the University of Tokyo. Shu De Teo writes about the limitations of a two-dimensional look at ungoverned spaces, arguing that the overemphasis on state control does a disservice to the concept.

What does it mean for a space to be ‘ungoverned’? This is the question that many of our contributors are grappling with as the foundational institutions of post-war global governance suffer severe structural failures. It is an open question, uncertain and amenable to interpretation. This issue represents the Journal’s view on how we might shape the conversation on a concept that is inherently shapeless, fluid, and ungoverned.

**71.1.5**

Online disinformation campaigns in the past several years have changed the world. The evidence for this is apparent in the United States and across the globe, and as our societies become more connected and technology continues to advance, such evidence is only likely to increase. For more than 70 years, Columbia University’s Journal of International Affairs has addressed the most pressing developments in global affairs in its pages. Our mission is to be topical and relevant, and each of our issues focuses on a single theme and includes articles that present as many perspectives and ideas on that theme as possible. Today, through this special issue, we are following in that tradition by collaborating with premier international institutions in an effort to shed light on one of the most important aspects of international affairs today: online disinformation and the threat it poses to liberal democratic norms.

The challenges that online disinformation campaigns present warrant urgency on the part of broader society, and we have designed this special issue to be read and disseminated widely. To that end, it is composed of relatively short pieces written in a style accessible to academics and non-academics alike. Articles include essays on disinformation’s underlying theories, case studies on how it has been used, and practical proposals on how smart policy might mitigate the most damaging effects of online disinformation campaigns.

Although the digital age is no longer new, only in the last decade has the impact that new technologies can have on our politics and institutions become so clear. Just eight years ago, in the early days of the Arab Spring, commentators marveled at the connective potential of Facebook and Twitter to harness the efforts of organizers and allow them to affect dramatic change, even so far as to bring down repressive governments. These discussions were overwhelmingly positive. Today the view is quite different. Authoritarian governments have deployed armies of bots and trolls, guided by social network data mining, that have demonstrated capabilities that are disruptive at best—at worst, destructive—to liberal democracy and the social norms that sustain it.

This special issue, titled “Contentious Narratives: Digital Technology and the Attack on Liberal Democratic Norms,” is an outgrowth of a similarly titled April 2018 conference hosted by George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs and the Elliott School of International

Affairs, Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the World Bank Group. The Journal of International Affairs subsequently assembled leading minds in online disinformation to examine the impact it has had, and might have in the future, on liberal democratic norms and societies.

Some of the pieces included in this issue raise serious concerns, while others lean towards optimism. We endorse neither position. Instead, we hope that this special issue will continue the conversation about disinformation and its digital conduits and help spread knowledge about it among practitioners, academics, and concerned citizens. The better informed we are, the less likely our society is to fall prey to weaponized digital technologies and the better equipped we will be to see online information networks as the reservoirs of positive potential that we once believed them to be.

**71.1**

The current Journal of International Affairs editorial board is diverse, comprising of students from countries across six continents, ranging from the oldest constitutional democracy in the world to four ex-Commonwealth states, one of which gained independence less than 60 years ago. Regardless of our backgrounds, we, like the majority of the diverse student body at SIPA, had our worldviews shaken by the historical events of 2016 and 2017: multiple impeachments, social-media driven uprisings, unpredictable political campaigns that redefined expectations and bewildered analysts, covert interference in national elections, and referendums that wreaked political havoc. In the United Kingdom, a win by the “Leave” camp made it clear that predictive polls have to be taken with a grain of salt. Catalonia attempted to declare independence from Spain through popular referendum. Turkey continues to crack down on society following a failed coup attempt, while the Zimbabwean military overthrew long-time ruler Robert Mugabe.

At the same time, democracies around the world experienced triumphant firsts. Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) struck a landmark peace agreement 50-years in the making. Political scandals surrounding South Korean President Park Geun-hye led to a grassroots-driven impeachment in South Korea—the first for the country since 1948. While debates continue on the extent and role of foreign interference in the 2016 United States presidential elections, over 5 million women across 84 countries took to the streets in a historic march for “Women’s Rights as Human Rights” following the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States.

At this uncertain moment in time, the editors of The Democracy Issue brought together prominent experts, thought leaders, and political figures from across the world to debate and discuss the current state of democracy and democracies in the world. Professor Lisa Anderson at Columbia SIPA

evaluates the ability of political science to explain recent political phenomena. Álvaro Gómez del Valle Ruiz, graduate student at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, Spain, considers troubling non-democratic practices in the world’s democracies that harm the political system itself.

In addition to gauging the general state of democracy and political analysis, our authors have addressed specific aspects of this issue. Anya Schiffrin, professor and director of the Technology, Media, and Communications specialization at Columbia SIPA, examines forms of disinformation

and their impact on democracy. H. Akin Unver, assistant professor at Kadir Has University and fellow at Oxford University and Alan Turing Institute, analyzes the transformation of digital media platforms into political governance systems. Looking at the digital problem practically, Venkat Motupalli, Chief Information Officer of the New York City Department of Veterans’ Services and professor at Columbia SIPA, offers recommendations to various actors on their use of big data.

On the role of civil society, Jenik Radon, adjunct professor at Columbia SIPA, and Lidia Cano Pecharroman, graduate research fellow at Columbia University Earth Institute’s Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity, argue that governments can benefit from its

ability to ease social tensions. Writing on their organization’s work, Laleh Ispahani and Sarah R. Knight of Open Society Foundations consider the ways in which philanthropy must adapt to a changing political landscape in the US and around the world. Steven Cohen, Executive Director of

Columbia University’s Earth Institute and professor at SIPA, assesses the role of grassroots initiatives for environmental protection at the local level in the transition to renewable resources.

We learn more about democracy from the specific experiences of countries. We have the honor of including a piece by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, 2016 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, offering his own perspective on the peace process with FARC. Benjamin Goldfrank, associate professor at Seton Hall University, writes on the opportunities for participatory democracy missed by the Left in Latin America. Journalist and writer Nicole Pope presents an in-depth look at the recent coup attempt in Turkey and the country’s drift into authoritarianism.

In addition, we interview Rana Foroohar, a global economic analyst at CNN and The Financial Times, about the impacts of globalization on modern democracy. Sheri Berman, professor of political science at Barnard College and an expert in European politics, speaks on the state of democracy in Europe given recent events. Lilia Shevtsova, associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, offers her opinion on prospects for democracy in Russia considering the country’s upcoming presidential elections.

Our winning student essay by David Korenke, Columbia SIPA, revisits the issue of US democracy promotion, specifically in the context of Ukraine and the Maidan protest movement. We also review Human Rights Futures, edited by Stephen Hopgood, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri; We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy by Ta-Nehisi Coates; and The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History by Cemil Aydin. We intend for this issue on democracy to be both reflective and informative: understanding the challenges ahead based on these perspectives and experiences will be key in addressing them moving forward.

**70.2**

Walls are going up. Trade deals are going down. And regional unions are crumbling apart.

Does the rise of nationalism threaten the future of transnational cooperation? Will narrow national interests trump shared international concerns? And will diminished prospects for cooperation damage global stability and increase the risk of war?

The End of International Cooperation? brings together leading experts who research, analyze, and debate the prospects for cooperation and possibilities of conflict in a changing world. Academics and policymakers assess the effects of rising populism and the shifting balance of power on global governance. Is the future really as bleak as it seems?

**David Bosco**, an associate professor at Indiana University, questions whether we’ve been here before. Comparing Donald Trump’s hostility to international institutions to Charles de Gaulle’s in the 1950s and 1960s, he shows the durability of multilateralism. Columbia SIPA’s **Richard Gowan** looks at the wild recent months of diplomacy at the United Nations. Despite conventional wisdom, there are surprising continuities, rather than discontinuities, between the approaches of the Obama and Trump administrations to the UN. And **Thomas G. Weiss**, a presidential professor at the City University of New York, asks whether the world would be better without the UN. His short answer is no—the UN remains a crucial, although sometimes unacknowledged, component of the international system.

In our peer-reviewed articles, Columbia SIPA’s **Dirk Salomons** analyzes the current tragedy of humanitarianism, arguing that fully funding humanitarian responses is essential for stability and national security. **Irina Bokova**, director general of UNESCO, writes that education and respect for heritage should be top priorities during conflicts and disasters.

**Michael Eckhart**, a managing director at Citigroup, considers whether the world will continue to fund solutions to climate change. The world already has the technology and resources to do the job and anti-globalization and nationalism won’t be enough to slow momentum in financing climate solutions. **Jenik Radon**, an adjunct professor at Columbia SIPA, and **Mahima Achuthan** outline the cure to the ills exposed by the Panama Papers, arguing that disclosing beneficial ownership can prevent the loss of natural resource revenues and mitigate the resource curse.

Global trade analyst **Leonardo Scuira** evaluates whether the European Union will slowly disintegrate after Brexit and as concerns about immigration continue to mount. **Lisa Davis**, a professor at the City University of New York’s School of Law and the human rights advocacy director for MADRE, examines how to help the survivors of gender-based violence in Iraq find shelter. And Middle East historian **James Bowden** analyzes regional security cooperation in the Middle East, considering the Peninsula Shield Force and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

We also interview **C. Fred Bergsten**, director emeritus of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, about the war on globalization. The Eurasia Group’s **Ian Bremmer** discusses geopolitics and the current and future threats to international stability. And **Guy Verhofstadt**, the European Parliament’s lead Brexit negotiator and a former prime minister of Belgium, offers his take on Britain’s departure from the EU and the future of Europe.

The winner of our student essay contest, **Yoonhye Kim**, looks at the timely issue of media bias and so-called fake news, arguing that it is often impossible to separate facts from norms because journalists’ factual descriptions are inextricably linked with audiences’ normative interpretations. Lastly, we review Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra, The Populist Explosion by John B. Judis, The Only Game in Town by Mohamed A. El-Erian, States in Disguise by Belgin San-Akca, and A World in Disarray by Richard Haass.

There’s no shortage of hyperbole about events in recent years. We are proud to feature such an impressive group of scholars who offer sober analysis and new research on cooperation and conflict in the world ahead.

**70.S**

The world order is falling apart. The rise of nationalism and spread of populism is upending local power structures and changing foreign policies. With the United States turning inward, the global balance of power is shifting toward rising powers looking to dominate their own spheres of influence. And any hope for a liberal, democratic peace is giving way to fears that new or unending conflicts are uncontainable. The world as we knew it is gone.

Or is it?

For 70 years, the Journal of International Affairs has analyzed problems of global concern. Established in the wake of World War II, the journal traced the formation of new international institutions, norms, and power structures - in short, a new world order. From nuclear strategy during the Cold War, to America's misadventure in Vietnam, to the fall of the Berlin Wall, leading academics and policymakers wrestled with the day's most-pressing issues. Pages of the journal have been dedicated to understanding development and democratization and offering innovative policy solutions to conflicts and crises.

In this special anniversary issue, we bring together some of the world's leading thinkers to assess the most-critical global issues. The authors look forward to the world ahead. Are we living through an inflection point in global history? Is this the beginning of the next world order?

New America's Anne-Marie Slaughter looks at the dangers shaking, and perhaps toppling, the current world order, questioning whether there will be a return to anarchy. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the president of the International Crisis Group, argues that war must not become the new normal. But despite a penchant for unilateral action today, the former foreign minister of Israel, Shlomo Ben- Ami, says it may be premature to declare the death of multilateralism.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, the chief economic advisor of Allianz, analyzes the the future of economic and financial globalization, recommending solutions to the West's ill-fated romance with finance. NYU's William Easterly offers a much-needed take on development in a time of xenophobia, breaking the

unofficial taboo on discussing racism in development. And the administrator of the United Nations Development Program and former prime minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark, details what it will take to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

The dean of Maryland's School of Public Policy and UN undersecretary general, Robert C. Orr, argues that self-interest dictates that the United States must take the threat of climate change seriously. Laurie Garrett, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and award-winning journalist, assesses global health in a populist and nationalist age. But of all the macro trends likely to transform the world as we know it, the president of IREX, Kristin M. Lord, says the global youth boom is the one that merits special attention from policy-makers.

Human Rights Watch's Kenneth Roth looks at the dangerous rise of populism, arguing that the best way to counter populist trends is by vigorous reaffirmation of human rights. Moisés Nairn of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains why democracies are at a disadvantage in cyber wars. And Richard Fontaine, the president of the Center for a New American Security, offers a

roadmap for how the world's leading power, the United States, can respond to today's disorder and tomorrow's global threats.

While this special anniversary issue of the journal is not filled with optimism, this great collection of thinkers offers sober analysis and essential policy corrections. The world's leaders would be wise to follow their advice.

**70.1**  
Cyber is a hot issue right now. But it is no passing fad. Cyber is pervasive in the news, policy discussions, and education, and there will be implications for almost everything—from security to governance to communications. While there has been a great deal written about cyber issues in recent years, experts are only beginning to wrestle with the essential questions and understand their ramifications.

Cyber realities are changing faster than many policymakers and academics can keep up with. New technologies are constantly being introduced and new norms are regularly being developed that affect how states and organizations operate. This new normal is defying conventional wisdom and challenging the basic assumptions of prominent international relations theories. The Cyber Issue is an

attempt to cut through the noise and offer sober analysis on the most critical problems.

The research and opinions found in these pages were developed against a contentious backdrop of high-profile news stories. Fears were high that outside powers and individuals could influence the U.S. presidential election, heated debates continued over the right balance between security and privacy, and hackers targeted global businesses and media outlets and disrupted Internet service in countries around the world, from the United States to Liberia.

The Cyber Issue features leaders in the field who have written articles that both break new ground and will serve as foundational studies for the examination of cyber issues moving forward. In our peer-reviewed articles, Heather Brooke, the professor and award-winning journalist, goes inside the digital revolution. She argues that while technology can make governments more transparent and strengthen democracy, it can also increase surveillance and threaten democracy. Oxford’s Philip N. Howard and his coauthors investigate whether social media use helps or harms civic engagement. It is commonly believed that social media conversations about politics are brief and lack substance, but they find evidence in Mexico that social media discussions can build greater political involvement.

Stanford’s Herbert Lin writes the definitive account of the attribution problem. The difficulty of quickly and correctly identifying the perpetrators of cyber attacks has been one of the biggest concerns about cyber threats, and this article puts together the best expertise on all aspects of attribution. Benjamin Dean, a former cyber fellow at Columbia SIPA, writes an overdue evaluation of national cybersecurity strategies. And the manager of the strategic intelligence and forecasting arm of FireEye, Christopher Porter, analyzes strategic deception. Formerly with the CIA, he describes how states can better detect and expose strategic deception campaigns in cyberspace.

This research is given more context in our arguments and interviews. Columbia’s Jason Healey provides a non-state strategy for saving cyberspace. He warns that even though the Internet has been a truly transformative technology, it is unsustainable unless major changes are made. Rob Knake and Adam Segal, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, detail how the United States can contain

China in cyberspace, arguing that following President Obama’s playbook is a good place to start.

We interview Toomas Hendrik Ilves, until recently the president of Estonia, about the consequences of cyber attacks. Richard A. Clarke, who served three U.S. presidents, discusses the risks of cyber war and cyber terrorism, and Sorin Ducaru, an assistant secretary general of NATO, looks at whether real cyber defense is possible or not. Kim Zetter, the award-winning cyber journalist who recently reported for Wired, gives an insider’s look into the cyber community. And we talk with one of the journalists who broke the Edward Snowden story, Glenn Greenwald, about secrecy and transparency.

The winners of our student essay contest offer fresh insight into these issues. Nicole Softness looks at terrorists’ use of social media and the relevant legal precedents, offering a unique take on whether Facebook, Twitter, and Google should be held responsible for dangerous content. Justin Key Canfil outlines an original theory that assesses the propensity of states to delegate cyber attacks to non-state actors. We also review several of the most important new cyber-related books, including Lords of Secrecy by Scott Horton, The New Tsar by Steven Lee Myers, and Dark Territory by Fred Kaplan.

There is no shortage of topics raised in these pages that deserve further study, but we think our issue is a good start and makes an important contribution to the field. We are proud of putting together such an impressive group of scholars and ideas. Thank you for reading.

**69.2**

Events in the Middle East reverberate beyond its precarious borders. Ongoing turbulence in the region, notably in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran, continue to challenge states’ ability to engage their citizens and the global community. The Arab Spring, with origins in marginalized youth, poor governance, and the rise of social media, unleashed a tide of civilian discontent. In many cases, the transnational forces of terrorism and violent extremism have capitalized upon existing dissatisfaction, posing increasing threats to peace and stability.

Our authors in this issue - human rights advocates, policy analysts, UN officials, civil society leaders, professors, and students—shed much-needed light on these challenges. Threads are woven between the forces behind regional spillovers of conflict, the illegal drug trade in Syria, and the role of youth in peacebuilding, among other topics. Ambassador William J. Burns, credited by NPR’s Renee Montagne in 2015 as “quietly creating the foundation for the greatest diplomatic breakthrough with Iran in 35 years,” shares his insights on what the Iran nuclear deal means for the region, and how the new U.S. president should react. Far removed from the geopolitical impacts of modern diplomacy, Ahmed Danny Ramadan shares a brave personal essay on coming out - first as a gay Syrian, then as a refugee of war.

While there is much to lament in the Middle East, there is also much potential. Economies are growing, education and technology are empowering citizens to connect with each other and with their governments, and rich cultures are transcending borders. Through this issue, the editors invite a robust discussion of the drivers of change in the Middle East. It is our hope that this conversation leads not only to a clear understanding of pressing issues facing the region, but also to feasible solutions that promote peace, stability, and progress.

**69.1**

Today’s globalized world calls for a nuanced approach to energy production and consumption. In the context of the increasingly dangerous threat of climate change, energy is at the forefront of our collective fight to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

On its own, this challenge is daunting. Introduce politics, and it becomes seemingly impossible to surpass. The authors published in this issue are among the brave voices reflecting on the issues. From Helsinki to Shanghai to Mexico City, our authors take on Russia-EU relations, American adventurism in the Middle East, energy security in China and Kazakhstan, and the effects of the shale gas boom in rural South Dakota and Pennsylvania on the far-flung countries of Nigeria, Angola, and their sub-Saharan neighbors.

As we look to the future of renewable energies, one hopes that oil and gas will soon become relics of the past. But today, their importance cannot be ignored. These authors present not only important, thought-provoking analysis, but also ways forward that seek to traverse borders and break down barriers in the interest of the greater good. It is with these solutions in mind that we approach the topic of geopolitics of energy – with clarity, realism and an assurance that peace and prosperity are within our grasp.

**68.2**

Factoring Migration into the ‘Development Data Revolution' - Frank Laczko

A Manifesto for the Fragile City - Robert Muggah

Never Mind the Metrics: Disrupting Human Trafficking by Other Means - Vanessa Neumann

Exploration in Migration: Unacceptable but Inevitable - Anne Gallagher

Lessons from Contemporary Resettlement in the South Pacific - Maxine Burkett

The Child and Family Migration Surge of Summer 2014: A Short-Lived Crisis with a Lasting Impact Muzaffar Chishti and Faye Hipsman

Unaccompanied Children and the U.S. Immigration System: Challenges and Reforms - Annie Chen and Jennifer Gill

Preventing Mass Atrocities Against the Stateless Rohingya in Myanmar: A Call for Solutions - Katherine Southwick

Are Syria’s Do-It—Yourself Refugees Outliers or Examples of a New Norm? - Lionel Beehner

Global Competition for Brains and Talent - Manolo Abella

Reversing the Elite Brain Drain: A First Step to Address Europe’s Skills Shortage - Edoardo Campanella

Towards a South American Citizenship? The Development of a New Post-National Form of Membership in the Region - Diego Acosta Arcarazo

Global ‘Undocumentedness' - Kavitha Rajagopalan

Actors in Forced Migration - Kelly Greenhill

Eighty-Thousand Entry Points - Antje Missbach

Rising Tides - Aunese and Sunema Simati

Define American - lose Antonio Vargas

Visualizing Global Migration - Nikolas Sander, Guy Abel, and Ramon Bauer

Images of Statelessness - Saiful Huq Omi

Rethinking Local Governance in Modern China in Light of Migratory Patterns - Tristan G. Brown

Children as Individuals: Assessing Their Rights in the Context of Global Migrations - Andrew Burns

Freedom of Migration: Oxymoron or Paradox? - Joanna Caytas

A Narrative of Low-Wage Migrants in Singapore - Xin Yi Cheow

Setting up Shop: the Far—Reaching Implications of China’s Burgeoning Presence in Africa - Michael R. Corcoran

Unauthorized Immigrants as "Americans in Waiting:” A Call for Re-Articulating the Scope of Legality and Documentedness - Andre Gallo

Beyond Geographic Borders - Chuck Stanley

A Quest of Self, Opportunities, and Belonging - Sonia Syafitri

Remittances in a Continuum of Space and Place - Michelle Truong

An Argument for Using Frozen Assets for Humanitarian Assistance in Refugee Situations - Selim Sazak

Role of Diasporas in Conflict - Amanda Roth

**68.1**

In the last five years, the world has watched citizens, activists, and students come together to make their voices heard. On the worn bricks of city streets and in the muddied grass of public parks, demands for participatory government, respect for human rights, and the abdication of authoritative regimes have manifested into citizen-led action. On the Maidan, or Independence Square, in Kyiv, Ukrainian citizen demonstrations brought about the flight of a president, a new government, and the beginning of significant reforms. Cairo's Tahrir Square was the home of two massive uprisings, wherein Egyptian citizens rejected governments and had a part in ousting presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi. The Jasmine Revolution, in Tunisia, eventually led to a democratization of the country and free elections. Bahrainis, since 2011, have been embroiled in conflict with the island nation's government on behalf of greater political freedom. And the world's youngest nation, South Sudan, is experiencing civil insurgency aimed at making its new system of government more adaptable and responsive to its people.

Protests, revolutions, and uprisings are not new methods of political and social action. But in the modern era, demonstrators find themselves equipped with new tools to better organize, communicate, and be heard. Twitter, Facebook, and other social media outlets have allowed people to circumnavigate government crackdowns on digital communications. Databases are being constructed to store and analyze movements to better predict—and assist—participatory efforts. New technologies, such as drones, may afford authorities better measures of crowd control, but they have also been adapted by everyday citizens to benefit grassroots efforts.

The editorial board is pleased to bring you this issue of the Journal of International Affairs on the topic of protests and revolutions in the 21st century. This issue examines the methodologies of citizen participation in civil movements and seeks to understand the characteristics of a movement that results in political or social change. The new implications of advanced technology, social media, and

an interconnected world are approached through both qualitative and quantitative assessments. Some of the broad underpinnings of revolutionary environments, such as energy systems and political economy, are also discussed. Finally, specific regional case studies are presented on the movements in South Sudan, Thailand, and Bahrain.

The Journal is pleased to announce the addition of a new section. In this inaugural edition of Perspectives, we feature a piece by Bahraini activist leader Maryam Al-Khawaja. Her piece is unique in its incorporation of her first-hand experiences participating in citizen efforts on the ground in Bahrain. Shortly after her submission to the Journal, Al-Khawaja was detained and jailed while trying to visit her father in prison in Bahrain. She was held for nineteen days before being released, at which point she immediately continued to work with us to edit and refine her article about the relevance of nonviolent protest and the shortcomings of international law.

With this edition of the Journal also comes an array of features that give voice to those involved in various uprisings and citizen efforts. Our features section includes activist interviews, a special edition photo essay from award-winning photographers on the ground in Bahrain, and an interview from Kalev Leetaru, an innovator named as one of Foreign Policy Magazine's Top 100 Global Thinkers

of 2013. At the Journal, we believe a fundamental tenet of our work is to expand dialogue on an issue through our unique single-topic format. While we strive for balance, we are not always met with success in achieving representation from all sides of an issue. This issue includes an interview with a member of the Colombian FARC group, known as Alexandra Narino. At the time she was interviewed, she was involved in a peace negotiation process with the Colombian government that later, unfortunately, broke down. Despite our efforts to include a similar interview from a representative of the Colombian government, it was not possible to have a participant during the time of these negotiations. This experience was not unique. This issue also includes interviews with individuals who were part of resistance movements against established governments that resulted in their official detention, imprisonment, or flight from their respective countries.

We begin this issue with three articles examining different aspects of media and technology and their effects and contributions to protests and revolutions over the past five years. Zeynep Tufekci, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, examines how social movements and governments are utilizing digital media with particular attention to how social media can both empower and weaken social movements. Tufekci examines the case of Turkey and highlights the 140journos project that we also exhibit in this issue's Features section. Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, an assistant professor of political sociology at Central European University, takes an in-depth look at the various uses for drones and how civil society actors can make use of them. He explores how drones can be used for the public good as well as the complex legal environment this technology occupies. Muzammil M. Hussain, an assistant professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, examines Internet freedom stakeholder groups and digital infrastructure politics after the Arab Spring.

Next, the issue shifts its focus to participation in movements. Valentine M. Moghadam, a professor of sociology at Northeastern University, examines women's leadership in North Africa, specifically Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. She argues that countries likely to successfully transition to democracy saw advances in women's participation and rights prior to the Arab Spring. Francesca Polletta, a professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine, takes an in-depth look at consensus-based decision making and leaderless organizations. Polletta examines why such organization, which was popular in the 1960s, has regained a foothold around the world. Having examined tools and participation, we then pull back our focus to some of the broader economic and geopolitical underpinnings of protest and revolution. Adeel Malik, an associate professor of development economics at the University of Oxford, contextualizes the political economic landscape of the Arab Spring uprisings, arguing that a failed economic model was responsible for much of the unrest.

Malik argues further that the flaws in this model have not truly been addressed since the protests began in 2011. Another factor that cannot be ignored is the role of energy resources in the political machinations of these uprisings. Paul Sullivan, a professor of economics at the National Defense University and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, provides a broad overview of the intersection between energy systems and revolutions. Sullivan addresses the duality of energy systems as both a source of immense strength, as well as a potential Achilles heel for any government or regime that finds itself on uncertain ground, and provides policy recommendations for maintaining stability.

The issue then delves into three regional case studies. First, coauthors Jenik Radon and Sarah Logan grapple with the fraught and violent situation in the world's youngest country, South Sudan. They draw lessons about the importance of institutional structure and process. Next, Pavin Chachavalpongpun explores the impact of international sanctions on the Thai government after the recent 2014 military coup, arguing that more forceful sanctions could influence the military government. Chachavalpongpun himself, currently a professor at Kyoto University, spoke out against the coup and fled to Japan after having his passport revoked by the new government. Finally, Maryam Al-Khwaja's Perspectives piece examines the international response to nonviolent protests in Bahrain. As mentioned, our features take us all over the world to the heart of protests and revolutions through the eyes and voices of the people who lived through them. Burcu Baykurt, a doctoral candidate at Columbia University, describes her work on the 140journos project in Turkey. The group has been fact-checking and sourcing news throughout Turkey. In an interview, Professor Michael Davis from the University of Hong Kong offers his take on the recent protests in Hong Kong and the atmosphere on the ground. In an interview, Kalev Leetaru, the founder of the GDELT Project, explains his global dataset project and how applications of large datasets can change our understanding of the world. Tanja Nijmeijer, nom de guerre Alexandra Narino, gives her perspective on the conflict in Colombia. Photographer Mohammed Al-Oraibi discusses the challenges of working in Bahrain as well as his detention. At the center of this edition, the photos of Ahmed Humaidan, Hussain Hubail, and Sayed Ahmed al-Mousawi capture civil unrest in Bahrain. Humaidan and Hubail have both been sentenced to prison terms while al-Mousawi was detained by Bahraini authorities. Finally, our features section ends with interviews with three students who have participated in the recent protests. Alfredo Graffe discusses his experiences in the Movimiento Estudiantil (Student Movement) in Venezuela and what he sees for the movement's future. Efe Koç talks about her participation in the spontaneously organized Gezi Park protests in Turkey and her belief that the protests have not changed the political situation in Turkey. Mila Moroz discusses her time on the Maidan in Kyiv, Ukraine and how students have now turned their activism towards the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Finally, this issue's student essays tackle some of the theory behind revolutionary action. The Cordier Esssay, by Niklas Plaetzer, asks whether or not there truly was an Arab Spring, examining the interplay of language, phraseology, and expectations in revolutions. Gustavo A. Vargas Victoria, author of the Global Public Policy Network Essay, uses rational choice theory to understand the individual's choice to protest or not in a given political situation. He uses the recent student led protests in Venezuela as a backdrop, but the conclusions he draws are broadly applicable.

The purpose of this issue of the Journal is twofold. In keeping with our signature single issue topic format, we provide one of the most detailed and extensive academic collections on protests and revolutions in the 21st century. This issue also provides a forum for debate and discussion of these controversial issues. If peace is to be achieved, and pursuits of justice and dignity met with success, this dialogue must be allowed to take place. The editors of this issue of the Journal see our purpose, and our product, as a manifestation of this mission.

**67.2**

Chronic and widespread food insecurity remains a critical issue in the twenty first century, as it has throughout human civilization. With approximately one in eight people worldwide undernourished, meeting global food demand is a fundamental challenge faced by governments, aid organizations, communities, and individuals. Global population is growing, but arable land is not increasing.

Agricultural productivity has improved, but sufficient and equitable food dissemination methods have not kept pace. Warmer temperatures, rising fuel costs, harmful trade practices, and social unrest have all conspired to push the price of food higher, and push more people into food-insecure situations. In the developing world, systematic and environmental pressures limit the availability, access, and use of food and increase the potential for cyclical food crises that often lead to mortality and morbidity, economic losses, stunted growth in children, mass migration, and conflict. In developed nations, powerful food lobbies and regulatory hurdles render policymakers powerless against the aggressive marketing and availability of unhealthy food that contributes to the primary food security-related problems of industrialized countries: undernutrition and obesity. Enough food is produced to feed every person on Earth, but millions go to sleep hungry every night, while millions more die from obesity-related diseases. Clearly, the current food system is broken.

The editors are students of international affairs: of economics, energy, and policy; of development, human rights, and security. We understand the cross-disciplinary nature of this topic, and that to find solutions, academics, practitioners, scientists, and activists must cooperate across their disciplines and methodologies. To that end, the content of this journal comes from a wide range of contributors, and seeks to present a holistic picture of food security while offering policy recommendations—be it a regulatory overhaul of financial systems, a reexamination of food choice, suggested new development considerations, or the application of technologies—that transcend the current dialogue.

We begin this issue with two articles discussing economics and food choice. In the first, Jennifer Clapp, a professor of environment and resource studies at Waterloo University in Canada, examines some of the global economic forces since 2008 that have contributed to food insecurity. She suggests that policies addressing hunger incorporate elements beyond food production, including comprehensive economic policy reforms, in order to reduce both food price volatility and deep inequities in the global food economy. Carolyn Dimitri, an applied economist in the Department of Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health at New York University, and Stephanie Rogus, also of New York University, explore

food choice in the context of economic factors such as prices, income, access, and availability. The authors argue that monetary transfers and enhanced food availability are critical components of a successful policy, but alone cannot sufficiently reduce food insecurity; rather, additional policies should be designed to address the behavioral factors that influence our food choices.

Next, the issue shifts its focus to development, addressing food security within that paradigm. The Journal explores development first through an article by Thomas Jayne, a professor in the Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics at Michigan State University (MSU), and a number of his colleagues at MSU and researchers on the ground in Ghana and Zambia. Using statistical analysis, Jayne and his team analyzed medium-scale land acquisitions across three countries—Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia—and outlined three strategies to counter localized land scarcity: undertake assessments of land supply and demand to better inform decision making; allocate a higher share of public expenditures towards raising productivity in existing farmlands; and identify methods to improve access to land through improvements in infrastructure and service provisions.

Another paper from a team of MSU professors and researchers led by Steven Haggblade and Duncan Boughton, both of whom are economists and professors of international development, examines the underlying causes of poor agricultural performance in Myanmar. Their study suggests key institutional and policy reforms to help boost the agricultural sector in Myanmar and rescue the many in the population who are food-insecure. Suggestions range from long game reforms, such as restructuring government ministries and departments and allocating more resources to the agricultural sector, to short game boosters, such as raising productivity levels, promoting crop diversification, enhancing education, and improving safety nets.

We then have three articles that propose solutions to some of the problems discussed in previous articles. Jessica Wurwarg works both locally and internationally in urban development, public policy, planning, and food. Through urban area case-study analysis, she assesses food policies' effectiveness in the context of rising food prices, transportation limitations, food deserts, and urban food production, and discusses the challenges of rising obesity rates. A team led by David Zilberman, professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, Berkeley, argues for genetically engineered (GE) foods. The paper suggests that GE foods can increase food supply, which would lower food prices, but that regulatory mechanisms in many major food-producing countries need to be reconsidered for GE technologies to have a greater impact on global food insecurity. Lastly, Rebecca Nelson and Richard Coe, professors at Cornell University and the University of Reading, UK, respectively, suggest policy and research redesign, as well as better coordination between scientists, researchers, farmers, and local institutions, to enhance agroecological intensification as a means to address food insecurity.

Our features include a debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), as well as a number of interviews with practitioners, activists, scientists, and academics. Mark Lynas, an environmentalist and author (for), and Colin Tudge, a biologist and writer (against), both give compelling reasons for their respective positions in the GMO debate. We invite our readers to weigh both sides of the discussion. Cary Fowler, chair of the International Advisory Council of Norway's Svalbard Global Seed Vault, tells the Journal why protecting and maintaining agricultural diversity is critical to the world's food supply. Our next interview is with the farmer-turned-philanthropist Howard G. Buffet. Mr. Buffet's foundation targets food security by funding farmers, and he discusses hurdles faced and lessons learned from his experiences. Fahad Bin Mohammed Al-Attiya, chairman of the Qatar National Food Security Programme, discusses obstacles encountered by dry regions and Qatar's plans for agricultural self-sufficiency. The United Nation's World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest humanitarian organization in the world. WFP executive director Ertharin Cousin believes the biggest impediment to addressing hunger is improving access, and speaks to some of the recent successes of the WFP. Our final interview is with Jessica Fanzo, professor of nutrition at Columbia University, concerning nutrition-sensitive agriculture and progress made in addressing stunting in Timor-Leste.

Milica Koscica, a Master of Public Administration candidate at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, is the winner of the Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay Contest. Koscica argues for innovative urban agriculture growing techniques that optimize the access, quantity, and quality of food for food-insecure urbanités.

This is the sixty-seventh year of publication of the Journal of International Affairs. We strive to be as comprehensive as possible when exploring pressing policy in our unique single-topic format, not only through the content within the pages, but also by soliciting experts with different points of view across a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds. The crisis of food security is real, but it has not gone unnoticed. The challenges highlighted in this journal demonstrate the range and complexity of the food security crisis. To achieve global food security, all levels of government, all organizations fighting for a common cause, and all other people of interest—everyone—must innovate, strategize, and act in concert to end the scourges of undernutrition, obesity, and food insecurity.

**67.1**

Historically, women have been absent and often prevented from participating in most debates on international relations, power, statecraft, economics, and education. Using gender as a lens through which to frame and consider policy is a relatively new consideration, even though women account for almost half of the world's population. In the twenty years since "women's rights" were declared "human rights," thereby placing gender equality on the international agenda, women are still being characterized as a vulnerable group. Without deeper reflection, the public debate about gender inequality revolved largely around disparities and gaps—the lack of women in high-level government decision-making and executive positions, for instance—which perhaps explains why policies do not take their specific needs into account. The current discussion has overlooked potential opportunities to include both men and women when discussing paths forward.

As scholars of public policy, we are aware of the interconnectedness of these issues, since they affect both developed and developing countries—from war zones to the boardroom and from the negotiating table to policymaking. The editors have solicited articles from academics, experts, advocates, and activists to analyze and assess public policy as it relates to gender. This collection of articles, interviews, and commentaries explores the potential implications of new thinking and innovation on economic empowerment, development capabilities, poverty reduction, political parity, and security sector representation through the gendered lens of international affairs. This issue also explores the opportunity for revaluation post-conflict—whether after the global financial crisis of 2008 or the Arab Spring revolutions—and how disorder can level the playing field.

Yasmine Ergas, a professor of international affairs and Director of the Specialization on Gender and Public Policy at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, opens the issue with an analysis of gender in international affairs, exploring how changing institutions and frameworks have

led to increased discussion of gender issues. Ergas argues that promoting gender equality policies requires coordination, not conflict, between institutions and academics—a symbiotic relationship in which the strengths of each mutually reinforce the other, advancing the concept of gender mainstreaming.

The next section examines domestic policy challenges. Joya Misra and Eiko Strader analyze the gender wage gap across a number of advanced countries and find that entrenched employer assumptions and perceptions of caregiver responsibilities are central to explaining this issue. Inès Sanchez de Madariaga, considering Spain, uses gender as an analytical category to propose a new concept called

the "mobility of care," arguing that transportation policy needs to move away from its current focus on employment-related mobility toward an equivalent that considers and values the travel requirements of care work, which primarily affects women. Beth English presents a historical perspective of the textile and garment industries, exploring the development of gender norms and workplace standards and offering suggestions for strategies to address the plight of women workers in the Global South.

The issue then delves into policies that champion the advancement of women and gendered issues beyond practices of exclusion. Susan E. Perkins, Katherine W. Phillips, and Nicolas A. Pearce, professors at MIT Sloan School of Management, Columbia Business School, and Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, respectively, quantitatively analyze the intersection of ethnic diversity, gender, and leadership to examine the effectiveness of male versus female leadership in highly diverse societies. John Hendra, Ingrid FitzGerald, and Dan Seymour argue that the post-2015 UN development agenda must fully mobilize men and boys as drivers of a transformation of the structural constraints and power relations that undermine development and that underpin the failure to realize human rights. Jeni Klugman and Matthew Morton of the World Bank discuss development financing, presenting specific case studies of success and arguing that, in order to realize better outcomes for gender equality, policies must simultaneously address multiple key constraints through all stages of development operations. Roy Prosterman offers a study of situations in which women's land property rights have been enhanced and discusses the legal, political, and societal impact of these advances.

Our last section presents an analysis of gender as it pertains to security issues in the twenty-first century. Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor of the London School of Economics and Political Science revisit their past work on war and international law, positing that specific differences in the way gender is constructed in different types of wars are a mechanism for rolling back gains women may have made in recent decades.

Gender is further explored through our features, which present a variety of interviews and an opinion piece. Swanee Hunt explains the unique contributions of women to the peace process and how women can play a role in diplomatic discussions, offering thoughts on encouraging political participation; Jamal Benomar, adviser to the UN Secretary-General, speaks on the role of women in the reconstruction of fragile states, specifically in post-revolution Yemen. Denis Mukwege, a physician and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, talks to us on the culture of impunity that exists with respect to perpetrators of sexual violence in the Congo; filmmaker Amy Ziering, in her discussion about sexual assault and rape in the U.S. military, stresses that this impunity is not a cultural problem but rather an institutional one. Ted Bunch continues the discussion on gender-based violence and posits a third explanation for its pervasiveness: that discrimination against women is rooted in a history of male domination and a definition of manhood that devalues, disrespects, and dishonors women. Shaharzad Akbar and Zainab Salbi speak about the role of women in Afghanistan and in the post-Arab Spring

context, offering insight on women's futures in participatory politics, their impact on economic development, and the structuring of new laws as states undergo transition and reintegration.

The winner of this issue's Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay Contest is Sonya Kuki, a student at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. Kuki argues that the Japanese government has inadequately addressed the legacy of "comfort women," and that its inaction has hampered regional cooperation. We stay in the region for the Global Public Policy Network Essay, where Martin Taarn Pedersen quantifies the macroeconomic import of women's participation in Japanese boardrooms, an interesting case study given the government's recent proposals to increase the participation of women in the workforce.

The Journal of International Affairs has been publishing original content in its unique single-topic format since 1947, and has not published an issue on women and gender in over forty-five years. This collection not only provides insightful commentary on issues and opportunities of public policy from a gendered perspective, but also introduces readers to leading scholars, experts, and practitioners and their policy recommendations. The problems described are problems of inequality, of disenfranchisement, and of inaction. The recommendations described in this journal are practical and thought-provoking, and will necessitate the implementation of both institutional and societal change.

**66.2**

Latin American countries share a common colonial history—one that has shaped the region and contributed to many modern tendencies that exist today. However, looking through any other lens will unveil a region that can only be defined by its colorful diversity. Indeed, each country is distinct in its triumphs and failures and its unique combination of traditions. Nevertheless, technology, social reform, and a propitious international environment have provided opportunities that, overall, suggest a region on the rise. Many have defined this rise in economic terms. But these opportunities have contributed to other emergent features of the region including energy, social justice, technology, and security.

This issue of the Journal captures Latin America at an important moment when regional self-confidence and self-determination are at an all-time high, and when many inside and outside the region are seeking its redefinition. This collection of essays and interviews provides a snapshot of how a transitioning Latin America is responding to historical legacies and exploiting new opportunities.

Christopher Sabatini, editor in chief of Americas Quarterly, opens the issue with an exploration of U.S.-Latin American relations. For much of its modern history, Latin America has been heavily influenced by "the colossus of the north." Sabatini takes a close look at this relationship and the implications for Latin America in what many perceive to be the declining role of the United States in Latin America and the world.

The next three essays discuss topics that have a profound influence on the future wellbeing of the region as a whole, namely development, trade, and inequality. Albert Fishlow begins the discussion by looking at high rates of growth across Latin America and proposes that the continuation of such growth depends on whether policies will be implemented to sustain investment and promote regulatory stability and openness to technological advancement. Osvaldo Rosales and Sebastian Herreros then compare internal and external sources of development in the past decade by focusing on foreign and intra-regional trade. The next essay by Leonardo Gasparini and Guillermo Cruces provides a regional overview of the degree to which countries have reduced poverty and income inequality over the last decade. The authors argue that, in addition to changes in the international economy, internal changes in social policy have played an important role. The issue then turns to security in Latin America. Gabriel Marcella details the specific types of threats facing the region, developing an understanding of security that is moving toward the concepts of multidimensional security and security of the individual and society, and away from the classical understanding of

the security dilemma posed by an external threat to the state. Harold Trinkunas goes into further detail and discusses the constraints to building a hemispheric security agenda in the post-Cold War era, citing heterogeneous threat perceptions, differences over democratization, and tensions over liberalization as its main obstacles. Cynthia Watson looks at China's increasing international involvement, drawing distinctions between Chinese and Soviet military approaches toward Latin American engagement.

The following section focuses in on a few key regions, opening with an essay by Andrew Selee, founding director of the Wilson Center's Mexico Institute. Selee looks at recent economic and political developments in Mexico and discusses their short-term dislocating effects as well as their potential to lead to major improvements. Thomas Trebat examines whether increasing global confidence in Brazil and its prospects are well founded and, if so, what the implications might be for the global community of nations.

The issue also explores Latin America through a variety of interviews, beginning with Michelle Bachelet, first under-secretary-general of UN Women and former president of Chile, who discusses gender representation in Latin America. The second interview, on public management and leadership, features former mayor of Medellin, Sergio Fajardo, whose tenure in Medellin was granted international recognition by the Inter-American Development Bank as an exemplary case of good public administration. The following two discussions take a historical and anthropological approach to understanding nation building and development in Latin America. Columbia University Provost John Coatsworth offers a broad analysis of current trends in the region based on its modern and colonial history.

Then, anthropologist, Claudio Lomnitz, and historian, Pablo Piccato, use their particular analytical lens in a discussion on the process of nation building in Mexico to draw lessons on the postcolonial making of modern states. The last interview with Santiago Levy takes a critical look at common Latin American

policies intended to promote economic growth and details some of their unintended consequences.

This issue's Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay is written by Nathaniel Flannery, a student at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, who takes a critical look at former President of Mexico Felipe Calderôn's anti-cartel operations. Our Global Public Policy Network Essay, written by Sophie von Hatzfeldt of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, discusses Chile's vast potential to expand renewable energy production.

The Journal of International Affairs has sixty-six years of tradition publishing issues in a single-topic format. The Journal has not produced an issue solely on Latin America in over forty-five years. At this issue's printing, accelerated political and economic progress in Mexico, the death of former president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, and the newly ordained Pope Francis of Argentina have dominated the news across the globe. The steady growth of many Latin American countries over the last two decades has propelled the region to undeniable global prominence, worthy of its recent global attention. The editors of the Journal have aptly seized this moment to provide our readers with a rich collection of scholarship from the region's leading thinkers and implementers with the objective of rediscovering a region in transition.

**66.1**

The end of the twentieth century ushered in an era of transformative technology that has revolutionized the global marketplace. At the same time, transnational criminal networks have benefited from this revolution and have used it to penetrate economies and political entities across the globe. Their tremendous growth has had staggering consequences for the stability and development of states, and has posed a serious threat to the lives and wellbeing of populations everywhere. In addition to globalization, a shift in government resources toward combating international terrorism has also provided this opportunity, and the collective response in combating this scourge so far has been either timid or misguided.

Traditionally organized crime was viewed as a domestic concern. Today however, organized crime often weaves seamlessly across national borders. This issue of the Journal aptly broadens the traditional domestic scope by focusing on organized crime's transnational nature. The editors have solicited a wide range of experts to discuss its impact in an effort to expose and confront this little understood threat to global security and development. Rather than catalogue all forms of crime in every region, this issue seeks to provide a better understanding of transnational organized crime (TOC) as a phenomenon by exploring its stimuli, consequences, and possible solutions.

Each essay focuses on a particular characteristic of TOC, using regional or topical cases to illustrate the author's arguments. Jay Albanese opens the issue by showing how crime has evolved under twenty-first-century conditions, arguing that TOC is in fact a modern manifestation of age-old crimes.

The next two authors, Louise Shelley and Michael Levi, focus on global commerce. Shelley undertakes an in-depth analysis of the multibillion-dollar counterfeit market, which she depicts as a hotbed for terrorism and corruption. Levi, in his discussion on the shifting complexities of who and what are threatened by TOC seeks to redefine commercial fraud as a manifestation of organized crime.

The issue then pivots to the effects of the drug trade on the stability and development of fragile states. Douglas Farah reports on the changing nature of Central American gangs, in particular their strengthening of ties with transnational criminal organizations, which he argues will wreak havoc on the region and its fragile institutions. Ashley N. Bybee examines how new trends in the drug trade in Africa—from the arrival of new drugs to the proliferation of new manufacturing facilities—are contributing to the expansion of drug trafficking in the region.

The final three essays look at criminal regulation. Lorraine Elliott looks at the relationship between crime and the environment, and examines the developments in international regulation and policing of transnational crime within this context. Mohamed Mattar, law professor and international expert on antitrafficking legislation, addresses corporate criminal liability for illicit business practices under

both international conventional law and U.S. domestic law. Frank Madsen, former head of criminal intelligence at INTERPOL, traces the evolution and costs of the international prohibition regime, and argues that supply-reduction enforcement efforts have been ineffective.

The issue also explores TOC through a variety of features including interviews, graphics, and discussion. The first two features address the role of technology. Misha Glenny, author of McMafia and recent visiting professor at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), delves into the growing concern over cybercrimes and the strategies necessary to combat cyber threats. From the

labs of MIT comes a series of global supply-chain maps provided by Matthew Hockenberry, co-founder and director of Sourcemap Foundation. Hockenberry shows how crowdsourced mapping of supply chains can reveal flows of illicit trafficking.

The next five features tackle a diversity of topics. Reporter Jake Adelstein discusses the expanding reach of the Japanese mafia, whom he calls "Goldman Sachs with guns"; Architect Eyal Weizman explains how the built environment can be culpable of abetting crime; Vanda Felbab-Brown brings her expertise in illicit economies to bear in a discussion on the role of the state in both sustaining and combatting illicit economies in areas such as drug trafficking and insurgency;

Col. Robson Rodrigues da Silva, former commanding officer of the Pacifying Policy Unit in Rio de Janeiro, discusses how a non-violent strategy of social engagement became a more effective and less destructive alternative to armed combat in regaining territory from organized criminals in Rio's favelas; and American historian, Rachel St. John and Mexican anthropologist, Natalia Mendoza, have

a conversation about cross-border crime in Latin America.

This issue's Cordier Essay is written by Nemanja Mladenovic, a student at SIPA, who analyzes the investigation of the assassination of Serbia's first democratically elected prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, in 2003. His essay illustrates the linkages between politics and organized criminal networks within the Serbian diaspora. The Global Public Policy Network Essay discusses the effect of TOC on stability in Honduras. Ana-Constantina Kolb, a German-Honduran graduate student in Public Policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, argues for greater security cooperation and financial assistance between the central government in Tegucigalpa and the international community.

Since 1947, the Journal of International Affairs has produced high-quality analysis that has allowed each issue to endure as a topical authority years after publication. That has certainly been our aim for this issue—to draw in curious readers as well as to serve as a foundational resource for policy debate and further scholarly inquiry on transnational organized crime. As with all our issues, we hope that an in-depth, single-topic format will provide the necessary depth and breadth to effectively confront this emergent international challenge.

**65.2**

In its sixty-five-year history, the Journal of International Affairs has explored some of the most important transformations of the postwar world: from the U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan to the collapse of the Soviet Union, from democratization and development to the explosion of global trade. The unprecedented—and accelerating—growth of cities today will prove to be no less important. Mass urbanization will have a transformative effect on the political, economic and social fabrics of societies around the world. The demographic shift from rural to urban areas promises to release untapped human potential—creative and productive energies that will emerge from the increased exchange of ideas and capital.

However, managing this transition will be difficult. The diverse backgrounds of our authors and contributors—who hail from academia, think tanks and the public and private sectors—highlight the range of issues that arise during periods of rapid change. Urban planners and city governments will face complex new challenges requiring just the right mix of solutions. Urban problems will become, almost by definition, national and international problems. In broad terms, our authors and contributors examine "The Future of the City" through political, economic, social-equity and environmental lenses, and propose solutions that make it more likely that this new urban project will be a success.

The issue opens with an article from Andrés Cadena, Richard Dobbs and Jaana Remes, experts from McKinsey & Company and the McKinsey Global Institute. They explore how cities in emerging markets will gain significant economic power over the next decade and a half, and how midsized cities—not just megacities—will soon play an outsized role in the global economy.

The next four articles discuss the sustainability of urban policies and address, respectively, the environment, religion and civic rights, political consent and housing. Xuefei Ren examines urban environmental policy in the world's most populous nation—China—and finds that green initiatives are often self-conscious ventures introduced to aggrandize cities and the officials who lead them. In light of the Arab Spring, Nezar AlSayyad and Mejgan Massoumi discuss the conflict between urbanization in the Arab world and the increasing influence of religion in the cities of democratizing nations.

Ester R. Fuchs uses her experience working in New York City government to argue that the political organization of cities plays a defining role in their ability to cope with economic challenges and earn legitimacy in the eyes of the public. She asserts that New York's governance model can be replicated in rapidly expanding cities around the world. Marc Angélil and Cary Siress argue that banlieues, the peripheral suburbs of Paris, are a persistent symbol of urban poverty and social exclusion. They highlight how inequitable development sparks social unrest, as it has in Paris, and that this will soon be a problem for other cities.

Joan C. Henderson writes about Singapore, one of the East Asian tigers that has captivated the attention of city planners since it achieved independence nearly fifty years ago. She discusses the city-state's efforts to implement sustainable growth and governance strategies with particular emphasis on the tourism industry.

The next two articles explore the increasingly popular "global city" concept and illustrate how cities are both sources of and solutions to major international problems. Saskia Sassen focuses on open cities and urban conflict and finds that the modern city is, on the one hand, uniquely capable of mitigating conflict, and on the other, increasingly prone to hosting it. Richard C. Longworth presents an engaging critique of the shortcomings and strengths of American cities in a globalized world. He argues that the place-based origins of most U.S. cities have become problematic in the new global economy, which rewards a set of urban features entirely different from those that were profitable in the industrial era.

The issue also explores the global challenges of the future through an array of feature interviews. Rem Koolhaas, an urban theorist and prolific architect, discusses his experience witnessing and participating in the often-intense transformation of cities in the developing world. As chief of staff to the president of Honduras, Octavio Sanchez Barrientos discusses his country's attempt to build a new, independently governed city from scratch to spur growth in Central America.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs explains the Earth Institute's Millennium Cities Initiative, and architect Rahul Mehrotra describes impediments to equitable development in India; both shed light on the state of urban planning in the Global South. Architect and urban planner Ricky Burdett also describes the challenges of equitable development, focusing instead on London as it plans for the 2012 Olympic Games and attempts to revive neglected parts of the city.

In a feature essay for the Journal, Antanas Mockus, the former mayor of Bogota, Colombia, discusses his creative approach to urban governance. The section concludes with an interview with Guruduth Banavar of IBM, who considers how smart-city technology will make the cities of the future more livable, sustainable and efficient. This issue's Cordier Essay is written by Zachary Craun, a student at

Columbia's Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation and Planning, and endorses the approaches of Madrid and Barcelona for repurposing buildings and space. Our Global Public Policy Network Essay takes the opposite approach and condemns the top-down planning efforts of officials in Cairo. The author is Nada Tarbush, a student at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs and Sciences Po Paris.

Our goal for the sixty-fifth anniversary issue of the Journal is to look forward and explore an emerging topic in international affairs; the issue should also be able to stand up to scrutiny when the Journal reaches its seventy-fifth and hundredth anniversaries. We hope that the combined efforts of our authors and contributors provide a glimpse of our collective urban future, and that their arguments, debates and recommendations make a bright future more likely.

**65.1**

The topic of this issue of the Journal of International Affairs requires little intro duction, particularly at the end of a long year for autocratic rulers around the world. However, while many scholars have focused their attention on the causes of the Arab Spring revolutions—asking "Why there?" and "Why now?"—our aim is deeper. We asked our contributors, many of whom have first-hand knowledge of authoritarian regimes around the world, to examine the factors that underpin regime durability, not democratization. Our questions are, "Why not there?" and "Why not now?"

In 1951, one-time Journal contributor Hannah Arendt examined the ideologies of National Socialism and Stalinism in The Origins of Totalitarianism and concluded, quite rightly, that "totalitarianism, like tyranny, bears the germs of its own destruction." The same is true of modern-day authoritarian regimes, except that for many, it is unclear whether destruction is indeed inevitable. Today's regimes eschew Stalinist-style ideological purity; they are pragmatic and will do what works. This means that most regimes are finding ways to take part in the booming global marketplace of products and ideas, even though it is difficult for authoritarian leaders to do so while continuing to stifle political dissent.

Our contributors explore these issues with great expertise, and some with inside knowledge that is not typically available to readers in the United States. As editors we struggled to finalize the order of the articles because as we read and re-read them, similar themes emerged and our authors appeared to be engaging in an impromptu dialogue. Resisting the urge to order and re-order them, we leave it to you to discover the many felicitous conversations that arise.

The issue begins with a lively debate about the mechanisms of regime durability. Natasha M. Ezrow and Erica Frantz contend that political parties and legislatures are important institutional mechanisms that allow authoritarian states to prolong their rule. They offer citizens a measure of political participation, even if their voices are co-opted and ignored, and enable regimes to channel and deflect

leadership challenges. Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner take a different approach.

They argue that while institutions are important, the most important feature of long-lasting regimes is their ability to mobilize state power to suppress dissent and eliminate political rivals. Teresa Wright examines recent threats to the stability of the Communist Party in China in light of the Arab Spring revolutions and Eldred V. Masunungure argues that the durability of autocracy in Zimbabwe is a function of the diminished political voice of the middle class, Robert Mugabe's personality and, most importantly, the powerful state-security apparatus.

Sven Behrendt describes a relatively new development in the authoritarian tool kit: the use of sovereign wealth funds to invest state funds and achieve big returns from the global economy. Sean Turnell also discusses the state-resource question vis-à-vis Myanmar, where resource wealth and a close partnership with China have given the ruling military junta the confidence to extend its grip on

power through a more open, but still highly controlled, political process.

Oleg Manaev and co-authors Natalie Manayeva and Dzmitry Yuran use their extensive knowledge of Belarus to argue that Alexander Lukashenko has exploited the people's uncertainty about their national identity—are they European or Russian?—and empowered a small elite to become Europe's last dictator. In contrast to the Belarusians, B. R. Myers contends that North Koreans have an excess of national identity. The Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II regimes have gained strength by stoking a racial and nationalistic fervor among the people, while South Korean leaders have been unable to generate as much goodwill for the state among South Koreans.

In the next three articles, scholars use their regional expertise to describe how regimes are empowering or co-opting certain classes of elites: Mehdi Khalaji describes the state appropriation of Shiite clergy and religious institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Eusebio Mujal-Leön describes the transition of power from Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba and the younger brother's efforts to replace the

aging revolutionary generation with a new crop of leaders; and Johan Lagerkvist describes how China's Communist Party is actively managing, and sometimes reining in, its "red capitalist" Internet entrepreneurs.

The issue features an exciting range of interviews with Nobel Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei on Egyptian politics, former political prisoner Wei Jingsheng on China's leaders, Soviet-bloc expert Ivan Krastev on modern authoritarianism and political scientist Alastair Smith on his new book, The Dictator's Handbook, co-authored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.

Finally, this issue's student essays take a right-brain-left-brain approach to topic: the Cordier Essay, written by Samantha Libby, uses modern art to discuss the futility of censorship in Vietnam, and Utz J. Pape, author of the Global Public Policy Network Essay, uses game theory to analyze international interventions in authoritarian regimes, which is particularly relevant to the case of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. His model yields insights into the sometimes inscrutable decision-making process that informs whether dictators step down and whether the international community intervenes.

Since 1947, the Journal of International Affairs has served as a forum for exploring the critical issues of the day, principally by exploring the past in service of the future. We are proud to present this collection of scholarship on the authoritarian state and hope that it will do just that, animating discussion and informing debate in the years to come.

**64.2**

The emergence of China and India on the geopolitical landscape will define international affairs in the 21st century. Together, the two countries represent more than a third of the world's population, use over a quarter of the world's energy and constitute almost a fifth of the world economy. Indeed, much has been written about the shifting global balance of power and the impending decline of U.S. hegemony in the face of emergent and increasingly influential states like China and India. Less explored, however, are the relations between the two countries. Are China and India destined for confrontation, as is often assumed, or cooperation?

Given their acrimonious history, which came to a head in a bitter border war in 1962, it is reasonable to conclude that competition between China and India is inevitable. But while the border war looms large in the two countries' shared history, cooperation between them is not without precedent. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned a China and India unified by a common history of exploitation by the West—a vision that he called "Asianism." In 1954, the two countries established a set of norms aimed at preserving amicable relations between them known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. More recently, China and India have sought to engage more strategically on a range of issues, including trade, climate change and poverty alleviation. For this issue of the Journal, we asked contributors to reflect on whether Sino-Indian relations are inherently cooperative or competitive, and to explore the broader implications of this relationship for the international community.

Francine R. Frankel begins by examining the geopolitical and security dynamics at play between China and India. Skeptical of official proclamations of friendship made by politicians in both countries, Frankel predicts a dangerous and growing rivalry between the two neighbors. Moving from the Indian Ocean to the Himalayan rivers, Jonathan Holslag investigates the possibility of water war between China and India, arguing that Indian fears about Chinese water diversion projects are premature. Cooperation on this important issue will be difficult, according to Holslag, given mutual distrust on both sides.

Our next two authors take a closer look at the complex interplay of geopolitics that affect—and to some extent define—Sino-Indian relations. Jingdong Yuan examines the "Pakistan factor" and discusses how China's close relationship with Pakistan, rooted in concerns over ethnic unrest, energy security and the need to hedge against a potential rival in India, poses a major barrier for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations. Rajiv Sikri considers how Chinese military and infrastructure development on the Tibetan border and continued Indian support for the Dalai Lama are increasing the temperature between the two countries, challenging prospects for cooperation.

Toufiq Siddiqi points out that in securing access to energy resources, China and India compete not only with each other, but also with major industrialized countries. This, Siddiqi suggests, presents an opportunity for Sino-Indian cooperation in the realm of energy security and climate change.

Competition between China and India extends beyond Asia, argue Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi in their exploration of the two countries' courtship of the African continent. In this thought-provoking article, Cheru and Obi suggest that, despite China's early overtures in Africa, India may ultimately develop an edge over China in its engagement in the continent.

Shifting from the realm of geopolitics to economics, Yasheng Huang finds that popular proclamations of "Chindia rising" suggest an economic complementarity that does not exist, and that similar economic and social endowments make the two countries fundamentally competitive. Varaprasad S. Dolla similarly emphasizes the need for careful management of economic relations between China and India, specifically in the area of technology trade. Dolla outlines three dynamics at play in Indian and Chinese technology trade: perceived competition between the two countries; actual, subtle competition in space technology and other sectors; and a cooperative dynamic that holds some potential.

Pengfei Ni takes a unique look at how international cooperation can occur at the level of cities, where many of these countries' most important economic activities are centered. Ni argues that the conditions are ripe for cooperation between cities, and that collaboration between Chinese and Indian cities can form the basis for enhanced cooperation at the country level. Swaran Singh also takes a fresh perspective, arguing that the relationship between the two countries is too often discussed in terms of simplistic dichotomies—competition or cooperation, friends or foes, rivals or partners. Singh posits that increased engagement in multilateral forums has positive spillover effects for bilateral relations, setting the stage for greater cooperation in the future.

Lora Saalman presents firsthand research on the threat perceptions of Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific and academic experts. She finds that the Sino-Indian security dynamic is much more complex than is commonly depicted. The winner of this year's Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay, Paul Fraioli, also tackles perception, finding that different political ideologies affect the way that current affairs are covered in the popular media. Focusing on media portrayals of recent events in Myanmar, including the release from house arrest of political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi, he finds that the media in both countries report events in line with perceptions of national interest.

This issue of the Journal launches our Global Public Policy Network (GPPN) Essay. The winners of this inaugural essay, Shirish Jain and Yan Shufen from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, challenge the inevitability of confrontation between China and India. Cooperation, they say, is possible provided that a more concerted effort is made to promote sociocultural understanding between the two countries. Flashing back nearly twenty years, Arvind Panagariya revisits his article, "India: A New Tiger on the Block?," originally published in the Journal's Spring/Summer 1994 issue on Contemporary Issues in World Trade. Interviews with Cheng Ruisheng, Kishore Mahbubani, Surin Pitsuwan and Strobe Talbott provide unique insights into the prospects for Sino-Indian relations, including the contentious role of the United States.

With a growing presence on the geopolitical landscape, India and China are at a crossroads. The trajectory that Sino-Indian relations take will have far-reaching implications, both regionally and globally. As such, relations between these two titans of Asia merit greater attention than they typically receive

**64.1**

Innovation has been the catalyst for some of the most significant advances in human development. The advent of the wheel revolutionized transportation systems and laid the foundation for modern trade; the development of heat resilient, high yield agricultural crops spurred the Green Revolution and increased food security and incomes in many developing countries; and the discovery of vaccines has virtually eliminated some diseases, contributing to vital improvements in global public health. Today, innovation continues to play a central role in the achievement of development goals. From the creation of a $100 laptop to the use of nuclear power to meet sustainable energy needs, fast-paced technological innovation has created new promise and posed complex challenges for the developing world. Innovation and technology transfer have the potential to bridge development gaps in areas as diverse as education, gender, health and the environment.

At the same time, technology can be a double-edged sword. The expansion of fossil fuel-based transportation, for instance, has increased the mobility of people and goods while threatening the durability of resources and exacerbating climate change. Nuclear power offers sustainable energy but poses new threats to global security. Moreover, access to modern technologies is unevenly distributed, as technology transfer is constrained by rigid intellectual property regimes, limited resources and weak absorptive capacity in developing countries. The Fall/Winter 2010 issue of the Journal of International Affairs explores the myriad ways in which technology is changing the development agenda.

David M. Driesen and David Popp start by discussing the role of technology transfer in addressing climate change. They compare the effectiveness of market measures such as the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol with direct aid programs as a means of reducing global carbon emissions, arguing for meaningful technology transfer that enhances the capacity of developing countries to address climate change in the long term without hindering economic growth. Bertrand Tessa and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya similarly emphasize the importance of technology transfer, but shift the focus from mitigation efforts to technologies that help developing countries adapt to the harmful impacts of climate change. They also discuss the effect of the WTO's agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on adaptive technology transfer.

The authors describe how the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is attempting to address deficiencies in the transfer of climate-smart technologies needed for adaptation in developing countries. Mark Warschauer and Morgan Ames touch on recent debates about whether technology alone can catapult low-income countries into later stages of development and question the wisdom of investing narrowly in technological interventions without a holistic understanding of the local social and economic context. The authors critique the premise of the One Laptop per Child program, arguing

that support for basic educational reforms, such as construction of schools, teacher training and curriculum development, is more pressing in resource-limited settings than the distribution of laptops to individual children.

Walter G. Park explores the interdependence of innovation, copyright regimes and economic development. Just as patent laws are a driver of technological innovation, creative industries such as art, music, film, literature and media are more likely to flourish when protected by copyrights. Park argues that copyright protections can spur economic growth in developing countries through human capital accumulation and the creation of creative industries. At the same time, growth and development may be impaired if developing countries lack adequate mechanisms to enforce copyrights. Bhaven N. Sampat looks at intellectual property laws from the perspective of patents. Specifically, he investigates the role of American universities in safeguarding access to affordable medicines. Recommending changes to existing patenting and licensing policies to ensure that university-developed drugs are licensed at low cost to the developing world, Sampat highlights the potential for academic institutions to play an important role in promoting global public health. William E. Bertrand delves further into the role of universities in promoting development, but finds that universities have lagged in their understanding and adoption of new technologies—a phenomenon he calls "techno-sclerosis." Bertrand proposes a unique solution to this problem, advocating for the creation of a worldwide educational network modeled after land grant colleges in the United States and devoted to evaluating and rapidly disseminating information about the impacts of new technologies.

Henry Etzkowitz, Namrata Gupta and Carol Kemelgor explore the gender divide in science and technology, and discuss how the gender and information technology revolutions are creating new opportunities for women scientists. With a focus on India, where technology has brought large macroeconomic gains, the authors describe how information and communication technologies can empower women by upgrading their skills, generating income and creating jobs.

The use of green chemistry to mitigate environmental degradation has gained traction in recent years as policymakers, industry and civil society seek to reduce the negative effects of commercial manufacturing. Kira J. M. Matus articulates the challenges that policymakers face in implementing innovations for sustainable development, and recommends several strategies to help bring these innovations into mainstream use. H.-Holger Rogner of the International Atomic Energy Agency tackles in depth the debate about the sustainable use of nuclear power in the face of enduring concerns about the longevity of radioactive wastes, operating safety and weapons proliferation. He makes the case for an expansion of nuclear power as a means of broadening the natural resource base to meet global

energy demand, and maintains that nuclear power, in the right hands, poses no more danger to human health and natural ecosystems than alternative sources of energy.

For an official perspective on the evolving development landscape, we speak with Rajiv Shah, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who elucidates how technology is creating novel possibilities, but distinct challenges, for development and diplomacy. Randi Zuckerberg of Facebook, Michael T. Jones of Google and David Kobia of Ushahidi shed light on the dynamic ways in which private entities are innovating for development.

This year's Andrew Wellington Cordier essayist, Nima Veiseh, attempts to reconcile two well-known theories of economic growth: that associated with Jeffrey Sachs, which stresses the importance of geography as a determinant of growth, and that of Daron Acemoglu, which emphasizes the dominant role of institutions. Veiseh proposes that the geographic landscape of a country determines the ease with which it can assimilate foreign technologies and establish institutions favorable to development. He concludes that, after a certain technological threshold, growth shifts from being geographically to institutionally driven.

This issue of the Journal of International Affairs focuses not only on how innovation is being deployed for development, but also on the underlying policies, structures and incentives that facilitate the acquisition, transfer and diffusion of technology to the developing world.

The world has at its disposal an ever-increasing arsenal of tools for the attainment of a wide range of development goals. These tools are changing the possibilities for development in far-reaching ways. The challenge is ensuring that innovation is used to solve pressing development problems, while at the same time enhancing the capacity of developing countries to address these problems more effectively in the future.

**63.2**

Nearing the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union, this issue of the Journal of International Affairs draws upon a diverse group of scholars to provide a comprehensive outlook on Russia's post-Cold War position in the world. While it is clear that Russia will be an important actor in 21st century international affairs, many questions still merit consideration. Is the world seeing the re-emergence of Russia as a global heavyweight? How has the current financial crisis affected Russia's geopolitical aspirations? Can the United States effectively reset its relations with Russia, given the lingering tensions concerning NATO enlargement in post-Soviet territories? As access to diverse energy sources increasingly becomes a security concern across Eurasia, how do Russia's natural resources affect its relations with neighboring in Europe and Central Asia? Looking beyond geostrategic concerns, what role does the current state of civil society and freedom of the press play within the context of Russian democracy? The Journal is proud to present a series of articles that will stimulate discussion about the current nature of the Russian state and its designs for the future.

Our first author, Jeffrey Mankoff, looks at the impact that the first post-Soviet generation will have on Russia's view of itself and its place in the world. He argues that resurgent nationalism and continued support for a semi-authoritarian system among Russian youth may portend a turbulent future for Russia and its relations with the rest of the world. The relationship between Russia and the United States, in particular, may be problematic as experienced veterans of the Cold War are replaced in both countries by young leaders with very different understandings of the roles played by both states in world affairs.

Fyodor Lukyanov presents a different view of the former Cold War rivals, suggesting that realist balance-of-power principles will be the essential factors in defining the shape of future relations between the two. Lukyanov describes how the United States has disrupted the global system in recent years with its pursuit of unilateralist foreign policies. He suggests that the goal of international stability

would best be served by having Russia regain a prominent position as a central pole in a multipolar world system.

Moving from analysis of Russia's global position, our next three authors analyze Russia's relationship with its neighbors in Europe and Central Asia. F. Stephen Larrabee looks closely at the changing security dynamics surrounding Russia, with a special focus on Ukraine and on NATO's plans for enlargement into post-Soviet space. Larrabee argues that Russia has in recent years become both more assertive and more creative in its approach to Europe, using both intimidation tactics and clever manipulation of the various policies espoused by the United States, Germany, and other European actors. He concludes that the United States must find a balance that includes active engagement with the states along Russia's border and a clear understanding of Russia's own foreign policy aspirations.

Gary Espinas delves further into the trilateral relationship between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, arguing that Ukraine's future must be found in deeper connections with the West. Worried about the interfering role that Russia plays in former Soviet satellite states, Espinas presents close political and military ties with the United States, including eventual NATO membership, as the only

clear option for Ukrainian leaders.

Christophe-Alexandre Paillard expands on the idea of a continuing East West struggle on the European continent but one defined in economic and energy terms. As western European states have become more dependent on Russian gas in recent years, they have developed poorly coordinated strategies to deal with their uncomfortable dependence. Paillard advocates a more mature approach that recognizes Russia's own dependence on gas sales to the West and that pursues rational energy supply strategies separate from worries about geopolitical pressures.

Daniel Treisman focuses his article on the impact that profits from energy sales have had on Russian democratic development. Treisman uses a detailed analysis of political and economic indicators to show that while Russia's democratic development is hindered by its resources, it is not doomed to an autocratic form of governance. He recognizes that excessive dependence on natural resource exports

can render Russia susceptible to periodic crises and instability, but this need not determine the evolution of its political institutions.

The close relationship between the international expansion of Russian energy companies and the Russian government is the focus of Nina Poussenkova's article. Poussenkova traces the ups and downs of Russia's largest energy companies over the past two decades and highlights a mixed record of success in their expansion plans outside of their home country. Their position as strategic partners of the Kremlin has meant that their economic success has often been contingent upon the correlation of economic and geopolitical objectives in their investment projects.

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya and Sergei Guriev look beyond the oil industry to analyze the future prospects for the development of the entire Russian economy. They point out that though Russia exhibits similar economic credentials to those of South Korea from a decade earlier, Russia is unlikely to follow its path toward economic success. Zhuravskaya and Guriev believe that while this difference is heavily influenced by Russia's reliance on resource exports, it is just as much a result of the inertia of its political leadership and their unwillingness to tackle meaningful economic reforms.

The strength of Russia's economic institutions was tested, but not severely damaged, by the recent global economic crisis, as noted by Padma Desai. Desai describes how the Central Bank of Russia was able to limit the worst of the recessionary effects and how the rebound in oil prices in 2009 prevented the government from being pushed toward bankruptcy. In the long term, however, the dependence of Russia's economy on natural resource extraction will prove to be a serious obstacle for sustainable economic growth and the transparency of the government.

Maria Lipman stresses a very different reason for the slow development of a government free from corruption in her article on press freedom in Russia. Lipman draws attention to the assassination of crusading journalist Anna Politkovskaya and how the press and the government responded to that tragedy. She argues that the current political climate in Russia makes it very difficult for the media to

operate without being subject to significant self-censorship. This situation will not be easily altered as long as Russian elites continue to perform well economically and the Russian population remains uninspired by calls for more political and civil liberties.

Debra Javeline and Sarah Lindermann-Komarova look closely at how the development of Russian civil society has been assessed by outsiders in an almost universally negative matter, often based on limited and unsystematic evidence.

In calling for new research to investigate legal and civic development, the authors discuss the introduction of competitive government funding for NGOs as evidence of progress in Russia's civil society. The nature of the relationship between Russia and the West is the focus of candid interviews from each side of the Atlantic. Stephen F. Cohen laments the lack of debate in the United States in regard to U.S. policy toward Russia. He touches on the need for the Obama administration to recognize Russia's sphere of influence and to approach the Kremlin as a partner, rather than an opponent.

Cohen regards U.S. Cold War triumphalism as a crucial element in the inability to reach a new agreement to control and reduce nuclear arms, a problem which puts Americans in more danger than ever. Presenting an official view on relations between the United States and Russia, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Russian Federation, Sergey Ryabkov, addresses issues from the expiration of the START agreement to Russia's interest in halting Iran's nuclear progress to the expansion of NATO and what it means for Russian security. Ryabkov looks to the Obama administration with hope that, under his leadership, relations between the former rivals will improve.

This issue's Andrew Wellington Cordier writer, Iva Savic, addresses the plight of young conscripts in the Russian Armed Forces. Drawing on dozens of interviews with conscripts, army officers, and human rights activists, Savic argues that widespread hazing and human rights abuses within the army are doing damage both to the individuals subject to the mistreatment and to the quality of the Russia military as a fighting force.

By including a diversity of topics that are capturing the attention of top scholars pursuing work on Russia, this issue of the Journal of International Affairs highlights the complexity of Russia's relationships with the rest of the world. No longer cut off behind the Iron Curtain, Russia has moved from being primarily a security threat to becoming a partner in a widening range of economic, political, and energy relationships. While the possibility of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West still exists, it is important to question the preset notions of Cold War thinking and candidly assess Russia's evolving role in an increasingly complex international system.

**63.1**

Eight years after the attacks of 9/11 and the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Western leaders recognize that achieving success in Afghanistan—however that is defined—will require the support of its powerful neighbor Pakistan. This issue of the Journal of International Affairs brings together work from American and South Asian scholars and policy leaders to address the issues critical to stability and development in the region. For years, American leaders prioritized regional stability over democratic development, with limited success in achieving either. With thousands of NATO troops tied down in Afghanistan and thousands more Pakistani troops engaged in a civil war on their western border, both countries remain at the center of international debates over terrorism, democratization, state-building and counterinsurgency.

While Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to grapple with violent insurgencies, their civilian governments are working to consolidate the domestic support necessary for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures to succeed. Winning this domestic support, however, requires that governments achieve some success in improving the daily lives of their citizens. We therefore precede our considerable analysis of political and security issues with two articles that concern economics and the provision of government services in Pakistan.

Ishrat Husain opens this issue with an in-depth study of Pakistan's economic development through decades of instability under both military and civilian rule. He pays particular attention to Pakistan's evolving relationship with the United States and its effect on the major economic and political developments of recent years. Husain argues that despite a longstanding consensus on the pursuit of liberal economic policies, political volatility, particularly following transitions to military rule, has wreaked havoc on social and economic development in Pakistan.

Our second scholar, Andrew Wilder, posits that a wealthier Pakistani state may be of limited benefit unless the government and its international donors prioritize a politically astute public administration reform program. Wilder describes how the fundamental obstacles to reform in Pakistan are political in nature rather than gaps in understanding or technical expertise. The main challenge, he contends, is that those with the power to push for reform—namely the military, politicians and civil servants themselves—have historically had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

The way that the government responds to pressures from its citizens is the subject of C. Christine Fair's article, in which she examines Pakistani public attitudes toward domestic militants operating in Pakistan. Fair first describes the militant landscape in Pakistan before turning to polling data that illuminates Pakistani beliefs about domestic militant groups and how they are treated by the state. She concludes by discussing the implications of popular opinion on the success of Pakistan's efforts to combat militancy.

Ayesha Siddiqa provides a valuable analysis of the origins and goals of various jihadist groups and describes how the changing landscape of jihadism across Pakistan's provinces is forcing a new evaluation of how Pakistanis and their government think about extremism. Siddiqa argues that this reassessment is constrained both by internal political dynamics and by Pakistan's reaction to

American pressures.

Marvin Weinbaum delves into militancy issues with a study identifying the factors feeding insurgency in the Pakistani tribal borderlands and neighboring regions. Weinbaum describes how the expansion of the recent crisis from the tribal areas into Swat and Buner may have instigated a major shift in Pakistan's willingness to confront threats to state authority. The study also examines the role U.S. policy may play and how progress against terrorism and the Afghan insurgency strongly hinges on Pakistan's success with both political reform and security efforts along its northwest border areas.

Saeed Shafqat discusses how the United States and Pakistan are struggling to build a partnership that addresses the geostrategic and security goals of both states. Shafqat suggests that the relationship should have a solid footing based on genuinely shared interests that include the stabilization of civilian rule, the elimination of terrorism and the containment of nuclear proliferation. He argues that despite Pakistan's struggles with alternating military hegemonic and single party dominant governance, renewed American support can help Pakistan in its consolidation of genuine multi-party democracy.

Bruce Riedel addresses a major potential roadblock in American-Pakistani relations in discussing the terrorist attack of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) organization in Mumbai, India in November 2008 and its implications for the entire region. He suggests that American interests in South Asia, including NATO war efforts in Afghanistan, would be set back considerably by another similar attack, especially if it led to a major Indian military response. He argues that, in addition to quietly expanding its involvement in South Asian security issues, the United States should undertake a major diplomatic effort to pressure Pakistan into shutting down LeT's operational capability.

The Indo-Pakistani rivalry is further developed by Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein. Their article traces the origins of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan, assesses India's current role in Afghanistan in this context and discusses the implications for American policy. They argue that American and Indian interests in Afghanistan are increasingly aligned and that long-term stability in the country will require a similar move toward concurrence of aims between India and Pakistan.

Syed Hasnat focuses on Afghan-Pakistan relations, highlighting the historical tensions between the two states and outlining how their strategic policy concerns have overlapped and diverged at various times. Hasnat suggests that it is the historical differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan—not their similarities—that should guide U.S. policy in the region. He argues for both a réévaluation of America's AfPak strategy and for a reorientation of Pakistan's approach to dealing with its western neighbor.

The difficulty of drawing analogies between the historical experiences of Pakistan and Afghanistan is highlighted by Kimberly Marten in her analysis of how outside powers have attempted to deal with tribal militias in the two states. In Afghanistan's Pashtun areas, where neo-Taliban insurgents have their ethnic base, U.S. commanders are hoping to repeat the apparent success achieved in Iraq where local militias were paid to guard their communities and support the government. Marten warns that this approach is a strategic mistake. She discusses the lessons that can be learned from a similar plan pursued by British colonial troops in what now forms the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and argues that by funding and supporting new local warlords, the United States and its allies will unwittingly plant the seeds for a future round of radical Islamist backlash against warlord rule.

Justin Mankin, the author of this issue's Andrew Wellington Cordier essay, addresses the impact of the drug trade on localized Afghan power structures. Mankin describes how the consolidation of state power in Kabul is impeded by the strength that involvement in the drug trade provides to local power centers, including both allies and opponents of the central government in Kabul.

As Pakistan and Afghanistan struggle with the fundamental problems of achieving domestic security and consolidating democratic governance, it is important to question the role that external actors can and should play. This collection of essays provides a valuable examination of the complex relationships among the countries of this region and their ongoing political and security developments. Our contributors offer clear analysis to inform American engagement by highlighting the region's brimming tensions and, more importantly, by outlining future prospects for sustainable peace and security.

**62.2**

At any other time since the Cold War, Africa commands the attention of scholars, decisionmakers and the global public alike. The turn of the century has brought with it new strides in economic growth, political development and regional integration, even as the urgency of the continent's problems remains undiminished. It is this confluence of grave challenges and extraordinary opportunities that makes this issue of the Journal of International Affairs so timely.

To explore this fascinating moment, we offer a range of views from some of the leading scholars and practitioners working on and in Africa. From international security to regional cooperation; from the development of domestic civil society to new measurements of political progress; from American engagement to the role of other global actors, our contributors explore the myriad ways in which the continent is changing.

We begin with three perspectives on American engagement with Africa. In their piece, Princeton Lyman and Kathryn Robinette weigh the challenges facing the new administration in Washington and argue that the president should encourage democratic accountability and the development of trade capacity on the continent. Katherine Almquist looks back to offer an assessment of aid policy under the Bush administration and then asks how future development assistance can be made more effective. Only by marshaling sub-Saharan Africa's natural and human resources, she argues, can the region overcome the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment. The contrast between American and Chinese policies in Africa is the focus of David Shinn's contribution. While the United States still wields more influence in most of the continent, China is rapidly catching up. With similar interests, despite their very different approaches, Shinn posits that the two powers may find opportunities for cooperation.

Questions of regional and international security are the focus of our next four articles. With hijackings off the Somali coast grabbing headlines, James Kraska and Brian Wilson review the international legal framework for combating piracy and examine how African states and partners from beyond the region can join together to stem the tide of these attacks. With the international shipping industry already suffering from the global financial crisis, the mounting scale of the problem demands a comprehensive solution. Carrying on the theme of regional security cooperation, Guy Lamb and Dominique Dye examine intergovernmental arms control and disarmament agreements in sub-Saharan Africa. Although a range of instruments is in force in the region, their implementation suffers from a deficit of financial and political resources. With the continued availability of small arms and light weapons fueling conflict in numerous "hot spots," building capacity to enforce these agreements should be a priority. The International Criminal Court's (ICC) intervention in Sudan draws a critical response from Mahmood Mamdani.

Situating the ICC indictment against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in its political and historical context, he argues that the document ignores the legacy of colonialism and the complex roots of conflict in Darfur. Mamdani's critique is a provocative reminder of the distortions that can result from oversimplification. Next, we turn to the core questions of civil society, governance and development on the continent. With regional cooperation gaining a higher profile in the 21st century, Wafula Okumu, offers a critical assessment of the African Union's effort to find "African solutions to African problems." Despite the high ideals expressed at the African Union's founding in 2002, Okumu argues that it has yet to develop the capacity or political will to realize its purpose. Overcoming the technical problems facing the organization is just a first step; only by recapturing the spirit of Pan-Africanism can the Union succeed in forging a true bond with the African people. In his contribution, Robert Rotberg lays out the analytical model he helped develop to measure the quality of the delivery of public and political goods. In the years since its creation, the Index of African Governance has become a tool for regional actors, donors and others looking for a more objective gauge of government performance. By bringing governance to the fore, Rotberg argues that the Index gets to the heart of the challenges facing development efforts. Turning to the role of civil society, Anya Schiffrin explores the challenges facing African journalists. Arguing that a well-functioning media is essential to a democratic society, she lays out the constraints reporters face, especially in reporting on economics and development. Before the press can play its vital part in informing and empowering the African public, steps must be taken to comprehensively address the conditions under which it operates.

The role of civil society in the political crises in Kenya and Zimbabwe is the focus of our next two pieces. Examining the aftermath of Kenya's contested 2007 election, Jacqueline Klopp sees the country at a crossroads. One path leads back to the cycle of violence that has plagued Kenyan politics for decades, the other leads to change by harnessing ethnically and political diverse civil society networks to demand accountability and good governance. The situation is urgent, as elections scheduled for 2012 threaten the momentary stability provided by a power-sharing agreement. For Clapperton Mavhunga, Zimbabwe offers an example of how civil society can break new political ground on the airwaves and the Internet. From online newspapers to expatriate radio stations, Zimbabweans have fought back

against physical repression and exile by freeing their words and challenging the party line in the new forums offered by technology.

We close with a policy analysis by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who discusses the impact of three shocks that threatened African development gains in 2008. A rise in food prices, a sudden drop in oil prices and the worldwide financial crisis each have the potential to derail the significant gains of the region's economies in recent years. So far, Okonjo-Iweala argues, African governments have managed to weather the storm with a combination of wise macroeconomic management and timely infusions of aid. Whether they can continue to do so in the face of a prolonged global downturn will determine the continent's prospects in the next decade of the 21st century.

No single collection of articles can capture the full range of issues affecting the rich diversity of African societies, but each of these pieces speaks to the extraordinary opportunity of this historical moment. In this period of greater regional and global integration, the political, economic and technological advances of past decades offer a foundation for new possibilities. While parts of the continent face grave challenges, African governments, civic groups and their partners in the region and further afield are finding new ways to meet them. There are new openings for positive American engagement and new priorities for African leaders. As the first decade of the 21st century nears its close, this issue offers a taste of what the future may bring.

**62.1**

The choice of global finance as the unifying theme for this issue of the Journal of International Affairs should require no explanation. The successive crises afflicting international markets have fixated scholars, pundits and the public at large for over a year. It is in light of these extraordinary events that, following the Journal's tradition of providing a forum for in-depth exploration of the most critical issues of the day, we are proud to offer this collection of thought-provoking essays by some of the field's leading scholars.

As this volume goes to press, the modern global financial system appears to be facing its greatest hour of peril. Given the pace of events in the six months since the topic of this issue was first conceived, it would be presumptuous to speak of the situation at press time as current. Yet the salience of the themes discussed in these pages has so far endured. As private firms succumb to the reverberations of the subprime crisis, the articles in this volume focus on states and their roles as market participants and regulators, as well as broad trends in geopolitics. We have divided the issue into four broad themes, which highlight the trends explored by the contributors.

The first section examines the importance of global finance to the state as a tool to achieve policy objectives. Nicholas Bayne explores financial diplomacy—the method by which states conduct their external economic relations. Reviewing the history of this field through the credit crunch, he offers insight into its evolution since the end of the Cold War and its future in a time of uncertainty. An expanding role for the state is the theme of Brad Setser's contribution, which remarks that the last round of financial crises in the 1990s prompted emerging economies to become the biggest players in a host of key markets. With the new crisis and the rise of sovereign wealth funds, the global markets depend once more on the actions of powerful states. Giselle Datz carries this theme of governments as market players further, exploring the way that states have evolved from risk-averse actors to higher yield-seeking investors.

The implications of global finance for international security are the focus of the next section. Quan Li presents a study of the relationship between foreign direct investment and interstate war, using detailed analyses of two-country conflicts to test a range of hypotheses. In a preview of their forthcoming monograph, Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt offer a study of U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing. The evolution of the global terrorist threat from a centralized model (centered on al Qaeda) to a more dispersed profile has changed the nature of terror financing.

Increased government engagement with the private sector is the key to continued progress in this new environment. Soaring deficits in the United States since September 11 have drawn attention to the phenomenon explored by Gregory Chin and Eric Helleiner: the rise of China as a creditor. While its newfound economic power has translated to enhanced global influence, the authors argue that U.S. structural power in the international financial and monetary systems continues to constrain this potential challenger. The use of financial leverage in pursuit of security objectives by the United States is the focus of Sue E. Eckert's contribution.

While the increasing cost of military action has made financial measures more attractive, the potential for their abuse and overuse risks undermining their credibility and future effectiveness. The increasingly important phenomenon of sovereign wealth funds is the focus of the two pieces in the third section. Daniel Drezner explores the impact of sovereign wealth funds on Western foreign policy, arguing that the growth of assets held by states is not as dangerous as some have claimed. Despite their generally benign effects, however, such funds are not without the potential to complicate efforts at democratization. Sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises may pose a more fundamental challenge, however: the potential for nationalist motivations to disrupt the liberal financial order. This is the issue addressed by Kathiyn Lavelle, who concludes that a divide between states and state-owned financial organizations is both growing and becoming more complex, with some nationalist design elements focused on maintaining control and others freeing firms to maximize profits.

Finally, the Journal offers several views on the broader geopolitical implications of global finance. Benjamin Cohen and Paola Subacchi take a critical view of the rise of the euro as a truly global currency. While its influence has grown, the euro's ascendancy to parity with the dollar has been hampered by the limitations of the European Monetary Union's governance structures. Reform will be necessary before the euro is ready for "prime time." Meanwhile, the credit crunch may be undermining the very basis of the Anglo-Saxon model, according to Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan. They focus on three tendencies that have the potential to undermine the existing balance of power in the global political economy: the waning position of the dollar, the apparent shift towards a re-intermediation in the Anglo Saxon financial system and crisis within the U.S.-led paradigm of global financial governance. At the root of the credit crunch lies the explosion of mortgage-backed securities—the focus of Saskia Sassen's essay. The use of subprime and low- and moderate-income residential mortgages to develop new types of securities represents a new frontier for wholesale finance, she argues; one that poses great risks for developed and developing economies alike.

There is no doubt that global finance is in a transformational moment. Some of the conclusions of these essays may already seem frozen in time. Yet, the questions they address speak to some of the fundamental issues of financial globalization. It is our hope that the insights offered by our contributors will shed light on the myriad challenges faced by the international community in this uncertain time.

**61.2**

Water has been a considerable source of power throughout human civilization. Water courses have served as natural boundaries between states, routes for trade and commerce, and as a necessary component in health, cultural and religious practices of peoples around the world. Over time, human population growth and economic expansion have placed enormous demands on the planet's freshwater resources. As a result, water has long been a source of hostility and conflict between neighboring communities and across borders. From the Tigris-Euphrates River basin to the American Southwest to the deserts of Sudan, water has been a driver of tension between its users. The insertion of global climate change into this equation threatens to make water resources less secure and the potential for conflict even greater.

At present, an estimated 1.1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water. Each year, over 3 billion people suffer from water-related diseases. Understanding the compounding global challenges of climate change, population growth and the increasing demand for water has never been more urgent. This is reflected in the language of politicians and businesspeople, the media and international institutions.

For instance, in 2002, the United Nations amended the Millennium Development Goals to include drinking water and sanitation targets. The United Nations has also branded the years 2005-2015 as the "International Decade for Water Action" and 2008 as the "International Year of Sanitation." At the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, water was featured prominently in the discussions between corporate and government leaders, with particular corporations pledging to become net-zero water

users in the near future.

The Journal of International Affairs uses its single-topic format to analyze water from a variety of angles. "Water: A Global Challenge" examines water in remote indigenous communities and cosmopolitan megacities, as a right and as a commodity, in sustaining ecosystems and our modern lifestyles, as a source of disease and life, and in promoting conflict and cooperation. Such an endeavor accomplished through the works of a diverse set of scholars and practitioners experienced in water's global implications.

In this issue's capstone essay, Upmanu Lall, Tanya Heikkila, Casey Brown and Tobias Siegfried identify three distinct water crises that have yet to be systematically connected by scholars: access, pollution and scarcity. By looking at how these three challenges are interrelated, the authors argue that scholars can better articulate the global characteristics of water resource dilemmas, and ultimately identify the factors that can lead to solutions.

Sandra Postel and Kathleen A. Miller remind readers that water, in addition to being an essential human need, is an integral part of the environmental system. Postel examines how ecological infrastructures are deteriorating, and how a number of nations are pioneering policies that establish boundaries on human degradation of fresh waters, with the aim of safeguarding ecosystem health. Miller addresses one of the most preoccupying topics of our generation—climate change—and its

implications for water resource planning and policy negotiations.

We present two essays that challenge the notion that shrinking freshwater supplies will inevitably lead to future wars. Karin R. Bencala and Geoffrey D. Dabelko contend that the challenge for scholars and practitioners is to differentiate between the various dynamics that can lead to conflict over water and find ways to capitalize on a range of cooperative opportunities, which are often overlooked by the water wars rhetoric. Aaron T. Wolf explores how a more holistic approach to water use could unite nations through a comparison between the North/West's more practical approach to water use and the South/East's holistic approach to this vital resource.

Collins A. Ayoo and Theodore M. Horbulyk explore the potential and promise of water pricing and its ability to promote appropriate and efficient usage levels, while simultaneously encouraging conservation and reuse through investment and innovation in new technologies and practices. Cecilia Tortajada analyzes the nature of water management in megacities with a detailed examination of the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Her comparative analysis highlights the similarities and differences of water access and allocation among urban conglomerates across the globe, such as Dhaka, Sâo Paulo, Bangkok and London.

The control of water sources is historically a story of power relationships. Rutgerd Boelens explores how water creates complex power dynamics between indigenous communities in the Andes and water experts who impose universal strategies for water management, which often do not fit local structures and needs.

Vivienne Bennett, Sonia Dâvila-Poblete and Maria Nieves Rico investigate women's role in water management in Latin America, showing that even though women are often the primary water users, they are left out of the decisionmaking process of water allocation and management.

Four authors look at historical regional disputes over water and how strategies for cooperation have succeeded in some cases and failed in others. Saleem H. Ali explores the possibility of instrumental cooperation in the case of South Asia where regional conflict between two nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan, is predicated in a history of religious rivalries and post-colonial demarcation, and how despite antagonism the two countries have managed to cooperate over the water resources of the Indus River. Aysegul Kibaroglu considers the role of epistemic communities in creating frameworks of cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, with special attention to war's impact on water resources in Iraq. In Ashok Swain's essay, he suggests policy measures that riparian countries might adopt with the aim of reducing tension over scarce resources and facilitating effective and lasting cooperation in the Nile River basin. Marwa Daoudy looks at the failed peace negotiations between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights, highlighting water's role as a catalyst for both conflict and

cooperation throughout the negotiating history of the two countries.

Roberto Lenton, Kristen Lewis and Albert M. Wright offer a policy update on the role of water and sanitation in the Millennium Development Goals, outlining recommendations to meet the target year of 2015. The issue also presents an exclusive interview with leading global water rights advocate and author Maude Barlow. Barlow discusses her experiences fighting for indigenous rights and gender equity as they relate to water access, as well as her views on what roles the public and private sectors should play in ensuring water rights.

This collection of essays not only updates the international affairs audience on global water scarcity, but introduces readers to the world's foremost scholars on the matter and their forward-looking analyses and policy recommendations. This issue moves the discussion of water beyond simply identifying it as the next oil. Water is the very essence of our existence, making up the largest portions of our planet, as well as the human body. With the world's freshwater supply shrinking, this distinction has been recognized by policymakers and a greater sense of urgency to better manage our shared resources has emerged. It remains to be seen whether calls for action will be met before global health and quality of life are placed at greater risk. This is our challenge.

**61.1**

It was ten years ago that the Journal of International Affairs examined religion's role in the post-Cold War period. At the time, new theories—such as the "end of history" and a "clash of civilizations"—influenced and divided much of the thinking as scholars struggled to define this new moment in the international relations system. In that Summer 1996 issue, many of our contributors argued that the Cold War had obscured the deeper, cultural roots of numerous global conflicts and found religion to play a central role in many of them.

Why revisit the subject of religion one decade later? First, the attacks of September 11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have warranted renewed scrutiny of religion's relevance in international affairs. We have also witnessed a rise in political participation from religious groups throughout the world and, consequently, the challenge to encourage toleration and cooperation between secular entities (whether it be states or political parties) and those that represent religious constituencies. The increasing geopolitical influence of religious states also demands international affairs scholars to revisit this ever-evolving subject.

According to Scott M. Thomas, a contributor to this new issue, "We live in a world that is not supposed to exist." The rise of the modern state system saw the role of rationality take center stage in political and economic organization. Accordingly, explanations referring to forces outside the earthly realm were increasingly rejected. Science was to displace the historical primacy of religion. Secularization theory—described in the early 20th century by theorists such as Max Weber—predicted the decline in the importance of religion as societies modernized. Yet, religion's importance continues unabated in our world.

Religion's emphasis on faith distinguishes it from the practicality that characterizes traditional instruments of statecraft. The indelibility of religious identity has fuelled many conflicts, which threaten the stability prescribed by the modern nation-state. Thus, with a world view firmly planted in Western rationalism, scholars of international affairs have traditionally regarded religion with suspicion, viewing it primarily through the prism of security. This perspective, however, limits our understanding of religion's complex interactions with states and non-state actors; it ignores the ubiquity of religion in shaping everyday realities for a significant portion of the world's population.

Drawing upon the work of a diverse set of scholars, "Religion & Statecraft" endeavors to widen the scope of examination beyond the issue of security, exploring salient themes such as religion's role in democratization, reconciliation, and development.

Broadening the analysis of religion's role in international affairs requires a philosophical examination of toleration—an examination conducted by Michael Blake in the capstone essay. In this piece, the author provides a philosophical framework for the toleration of theocracies by liberal states. He offers a conception of tolerance that seeks to combine a belief in the moral importance of equality with a willingness to speak, listen and understand.

Scott Thomas addresses general trends in the role of religion in international affairs over the past century. He refutes the argument that secularization causes a decline in religion and argues instead that there has been a resurgence and restructuring of religion. Thomas explains that religion is taking on new forms, roles and functions in domestic and world politics as a result of modernization and globalization.

Jonathan Fox's survey of 175 states between 2000 and 2002 finds that religious discrimination was present in the majority of states and that mean levels of such discrimination rose during this timeframe. His extensive quantitative analysis adds new dimensions to the exploration of the role of religion in international affairs. In situations of conflict, religion plays a significant role in establishing peace in the present and dealing with the past. Sheherazade Jafari highlights the importance of local religious leaders' participation in the peace-building process. She argues that these religious peacemakers are an underutilized resource in U.S. foreign policy.

Daniel Philpott, in his essay, focuses on the role of religion and reconciliation in the process of transitional justice. He explores the meaning of reconciliation from a religious perspective and how it differs from the approach of a liberal human rights tradition, concluding that religious voices often impact the institutions and policies through which political orders deal with the past.

Church-state relations in developing countries are surveyed through two pieces on Russia and Brazil, respectively. John Anderson examines the intersection of the spiritual with the political in the context of the Putin presidency. The article assesses the relationship shared by Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church in four critical areas: liberalization and Westernization, pluralism, security, and religious education. Rudolf von Sinner examines the role of religion in promoting democratization in Brazil, looking at the specific contributions of three churches—the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, and the Assemblies of God.

J. Paul Martin, Jason Chau, and Shruti Patel consider the issue of religion and development. The piece discusses the nature of social capital provided by religion and its implications for poverty alleviation. The authors analyze the benefits and pitfalls of religious agencies' increasing involvement in the field of development. The war in Iraq has underscored the inextricable association of religion with issues of peace and security in international affairs scholarship. Ron E. Hassner's essay grapples with the difficulties of combat in sacred spaces in Iraq. His research demonstrates the benefits of understanding and applying principles of Islamic just war theory in order to prevent a popular backlash amongst local Muslim populations during combat in mosques or other sacred spaces. While Hassner's analysis is limited to the war in Iraq, particularly during counter-insurgency operations, the lessons it draws can be applied to the more universal context of combat within sacred space.

Elizabeth Ann Mayer's article deconstructs the Iraqi constitutional project as conceived by the United States. Mayer contrasts U.S. constitutional recommendations against a backdrop of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. In doing so, she argues that constitutional prescriptions are incapable of diminishing cleavages engendered by deep-seated religious rivalry—constitutional architecture alone cannot secure a liberal democratic order and control the pressures that religion exerts upon the state.

Alfred C. Stepan and Mirjam Künkler interview Amien Rais, who led and inspired the reform movement that forced the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 and ushered in an era of constitutional reform and democratization in the word's most populous Muslim-majority country, Indonesia. Through sharing his personal experience as chairman of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly during four rounds of constitutional revisions between 1999 and 2004, Rais demonstrates the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

The Journal also provides a photo essay of Buddhist monks in Myanmar. Their spiritual and institutional legitimacy among the Burmese people earned them popular and international support in their recent protests against the military regime. These photographs demonstrate the spiritual and political power of the Saffron Revolution.

In contrast to certain expectations, religion remains a dominant force in international affairs and its influence encompasses issues of peace and security, reconciliation and justice, and democratization. Scott Thomas concludes that, "Religion can and does console people in poor communities but it can also empower them. It can help them transform their lives and their communities, which in turn transforms international relations." As the editors, we hope that this issue of the Journal—by bringing together a range of authors with a breadth of perspectives and expertise—helps enliven and enrich the debate about religion's role in statecraft.

**60.2**

Few countries at the center of the contemporary international debate have proven as willing, openly and actively, to challenge the status quo as Iran. With the resumption of its nuclear program, having been labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism, it is clear that Iran presents a potential threat to many nations. But as power broker of the Middle East, Iran also presents significant opportunities for cooperation and reconciliation. Understanding the duality of modern Iran, as both friend and foe, as human rights violator and facilitator of democratic reform and as keeper of tradition and agent of modernization, is central to understanding Iran's emerging identity and its trajectory today.

With this sixtieth anniversary edition of the Journal of International Affairs, we take a closer look at an Iran in transition—a nation that has seemingly moved into the spotlight in recent years, yet has acted on the international stage for thousands of years. Drawing on the insights of some of the foremost scholars and practitioners, this issue offers a nuanced portrait of this rising power and endeavors to fully unpack and transcend the rote issues that have dominated the mainstream discourse.

Past issues of the Journal of International Affairs have reflected a commitment to exploring the era's most salient global debates. In covering the Middle East over the past sixty years, the Journal has charted the evolution of both the region and the strategic and scholarly thinking that describes it. The first of these issues, published in 1959, examined the origins, policies and problems of the region. In a 1995 issue, "Continuity and Transformation: The Modern Middle East," the Journal examined the dynamics of conflict, privatization and other forces for change. Most recently, our 2001 issue on rogue states featured an article by Stephen Fairbanks entitled "Iran: No Easy Answers." Today, as the Journal revisits the question of Iran, the search for answers has become ever more complicated. Yet that complication has yielded a common theme that runs through this volume: the duality of modern Iran.

Afshin Molavi expresses this duality aptly in his description of the tension between "spectacle" and "substance" in Iranian foreign and domestic policy. Ideological dogmatism and brinksmanship with the United States, he argues, has led to squandered opportunities in diplomacy. He writes, "The untold story of the Iranian revolution is the slow decline of the economy." He questions how far Iran is willing to go—how much substance it is willing (or can afford) to sacrifice—to continue the show.

Recent clashes between Iran and the United States may augur disaster. According to our capstone author, Richard Bulliet, however, Iran's western orientation is most likely only temporary. His vivid article draws upon an encyclopedic knowledge of Persian history from ancient times up to the present and provides compelling evidence that Iran's destiny ultimately lies to the east. He argues that the tendency to "fantasize Iran as a threatening force of cosmic dimension" is one common to westerners dating back as far as Aeschylus and Herodotus. Nowhere does the threatening aspect of the spectacle/substance dichotomy play out more dramatically than in the prospect of a nuclear Iran.

From Iran's future energy needs to the strategic interplay over Iran's nuclear intentions, the future course of the Iranian nuclear debate is held hostage by the progressively dangerous pull of these unbalanced dynamics. In addition to identifying the "nuclear players"— Russia, China, Iran, the United States, the Gulf Arab States, Israel and the European bloc—Karim Sadjadpour explores the preferred approaches of each of these parties, and asserts that that collective decisions of outside actors may determine whether the situation ends in "confrontation or conversation."

Updating their now classic nuclear proliferation debate, Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz further demystify the spectacle and substantive concerns of proliferation. They provide their own predictions as to whether a nuclear-armed Iran will provide a force for stability or an invitation to disaster. In addressing the pitfalls of what he calls "proliferation fatalism" and "deterrence optimism," Sagan highlights the often unexplored territory of internal government dynamics as well as the danger presented by Iran's enduring relationships with various non-state actors. Waltz, on the other hand, uses history as his guide and argues, based on numerous empirical examples, that nuclear deterrence will actually help to moderate the Islamic Republic, as well as its potential attackers.

David Menashri explores the historical interplay between the influences at work between Iran and its neighbors. He concludes that the Islamic Republic's interests have ultimately superseded its revolutionary dogma both at home and abroad.

While Iran's state interests have usually served as a moderating influence, Iran's denunciation of Israel, its relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah and its influence in Iraq also illustrate the countering strength of Iran's revolutionary creed. The balance between moderate and radical influences is crucial to defining Iran's trajectory. However, as Ian Bremmer points out in our featured interview, escalation

between Iran and the United States is a very real possibility—and one which is far more likely than we might think. The repercussions of escalation are dire on both sides of the strategic fence, especially in the financial sector. Indeed, Bremmer argues that the potential of the Ahmadinejad regime to acquire nuclear weapons "is the single highest risk factor in the world impacting the global economy for the foreseeable future."

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad served as a central point of departure for several of our contributors as they sought to address the finer points of the domestic debate and the distinction between spectacle and substance. Jahangir Amuzegar refuses to mince words as Ahmadinejad "prepares for the apocalypse," targeting the role and influence of the current president by comparing his campaign promises with his policymaking track record. Ultimately, Amuzegar, a pre-revolution government official in Iran, concludes that Ahmadinejad has proved more effective at promoting himself than he has at strengthening Iran.

Indeed, many contributors have noted that the dire domestic situation in Iran, in contrast to the image it projects on the international stage, is where the real story lies. The domestic domain remains opaque for most of us outside the country. However, when it enters the international debate, it is no less susceptible to manipulation.

Human rights represent one arena in which myth and reality are often confounded. In her article, "Iranian Women's Status and Struggles since 1979," Nikki Keddie asserts that the plight of women in Iran is often overstated and under-researched by those who deploy it to call for foreign intervention or even war. Keddie's article takes a nuanced look at the history of women's rights and in so doing, both confirms some commonly held beliefs about the treatment of women in the Islamic Republic and debunks the notion that there is something categorically "Islamic" about this treatment.

Unlike the publicity often afforded to the rights (or lack thereof) of Iranian women, the issue of religious minorities has remained more or less below the radar. In their illuminating analysis of Jews, Bahais and Christians in Iran, Eliz Sanasarian and Avi Davidi examine the treatment of non-Muslims in Iran since 2000. Providing a window into the domestic scene, they show that spectacle and substance are not always mutually exclusive. Citing the example of diyeh (blood money), they show how political theatrics have been deployed to enact real changes in the lives of some Iranian minorities.

How do we extricate reality from the veneer of the spectacle? How do we gain a truer understanding of the Islamic Republic and its future orientation? Isaiah Wilson III prescribes that the United States should rediscover containment. Adapting George Kennan's long cable, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," to the present quagmire of U.S.-Iranian relations, Wilson argues that we need a new strategy— a new long telegram—to deal with the question of Iran, one that includes an understanding of its actions toward and reactions to U.S. policy. He also emphasizes the necessity for the two powers to look inward for a solution to this conflict. Permanent Representative to the United Nations M. Javad Zarif also calls for a paradigm shift in U.S.-Iranian relations, arguing that the "enemy paradigm" of Iran

is "outdated" and not constructive for either side. He notes that sanctions and other forms of pressure are contributing to an environment of escalation and insecurity and warns that the "imaginary threat" might become a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

Looking forward to Iran's future relations with the United States and other nations, Zarif proposes that they focus on mutual interests, such as regional stability, rather than resorting to ad-hominem attacks.

This sixtieth anniversary issue of the Journal reveals the multiple overlapping identities of modern Iran. Having assembled a range of authors with differing views and areas of expertise, we hope this issue serves as a platform for future discussions on Iran, discussions that work to distinguish fact from fiction, substance from spectacle, as we have tried to do here.

**60.1**

As former warriors embrace magnanimity over conquest and victims opt for redress over vengeance, we marvel at how enlightened visions of the future could triumph over hatreds of the past. Still, the notion that a society will never reach lasting peace unless it seeks an expansive dialogue with its external enemies or confronts its internal demons holds powerful appeal. Such processes are being actively engaged throughout the world. As one author notes in this issue, twenty-seven countries today have launched reconciliation commissions. Rare is a peacebuilding strategy that does not advocate for some mechanism of inter-group reconciliation. Yet reconciliation remains a work-in-progress in many conflicts and a feat still to be imagined in others. Divergent interpretations of events from decades and centuries past continue to shape contemporary international relations in Japan, Turkey, Eastern Europe and Timor-Leste, to name but a few. Peace negotiations from Northern Ireland to Israel/Palestine have hinged upon questions of recognition and redress as much, if not more, than the delineation of power-sharing rules and borders. Societies emerging from civil war or ethnic conflict wrestle over how, and to what degree, peace and justice must be traded off against one another or combined.

This issue of the Journal of International Affairs takes a closer look at the concept of historical reconciliation. The scholars, practitioners and participants featured in the following pages offer insights into how reconciliation has unfolded, why it has occasionally failed and where efforts at reconciliation have left some behind. Taken together, these articles, book reviews and interviews leave one with the sense that historical reconciliation is never simple—nor is it a chimera. As humans, we are custodians of our past, not its prisoners; shadows of massacres, persecution and resentment need not shape a world of permanent antagonisms.

We asked Elazar Barkan to provide an overview of the field. Drawing on his many years of scholarship and experience in peacebuilding, reconciliation and human rights, he asks, "How do local conditions and the agency of the individuals (or groups) involved, influence the dynamics of rights?" Through this and other questions, he maps key examples of historical reconciliation and identifies a novel conception of redress that is at once expansive and concrete.

Alexander L. Boraine examines what it means to be a country in transition. He notes that while criminal justice is important, it does not obviate the need for other models. Retributive justice must be balanced with restorative justice in order to achieve a peaceful and just society. He articulates five pillars that support a holistic vision of transitional justice: accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, institutional reform and reparations. While every conflict is unique, Boraine offers a model that can be widely applied.

A culture of reconciliation is at the center of Roland Bleiker's book, Divided Korea, reviewed by Aleksandr Ilitchev. Ilitchev discusses Bleiker's proposal to pursue the active engagement of cultural identity on the Korean peninsula, as opposed to more traditional political approaches, in order to promote mutual acceptance.

Another approach, one based on the rule of international law, is taken up by Jeremy Goldberg in his review of Tim Allen's Trial Justice, which considers the challenges faced by the International Criminal Court and the potential trade-offs between justice and peace within the context of northern Uganda. The Second World War is a central point of departure for several of our contributors as they investigate the role of cultural and historical memory in developing mechanisms for peace. Alexander M. Karn provides a case-by-case analysis of Polish-Jewish and Czech-German experiences following the war and applies the lessons of these examples to contemporary efforts at Catholic-Jewish reconciliation. In an interview, Benjamin Ferencz, a former prosecutor at Nuremberg, reflects on his own professional and personal confrontations with Nazism and reconciliation.

Elsewhere, Ian S. Lustick details how Germany and the nascent state of Israel worked together to reconcile the irreconcilable. While acknowledging the vast differences in scale of the two conflicts, Lustick offers an eye-opening account of how strategies employed by Germany and Israel following the Second World War can be effectively applied to negotiations in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Zachary Wales takes a new look at a controversial proposal for achieving the peaceful coexistence of these two deeply divided communities in his review of Ali Abumiah's One Country. Alfred L. Brophy returns the point of examination to the United States as he demonstrates how reconciliation efforts have been framed by particular representations of the past that have gained popular acceptance. He discusses how prominent legal cases such as Plessey v. Ferguson and the legacy of American universities connected to slavery have set the tone for discussions of race and equality in the United States. Raymond A. Winbush remains on domestic soil with his review of Mary Poole's The Segregated Origins of Social Security, which explores some of the hard truths about the role played by racism in the development of American social policy.

Patrick Bond reminds us that fundamental to such reconciliation is change. He trains a critical eye on South Africa, questioning the efficacy of reconciliation in light of enduring economic inequality. Unrelenting at times, Bond spells out how the reconciliation process has been undermined by the country's leadership and upper classes in favor of economic progress for a select few. In an interview, one of the central architects of that reconciliation, former South African President F.W. de Klerk comments on his own efforts in the process. While sharing some of Bond's criticisms, de Klerk identifies those elements of the South African experience that were indeed successful and that might be appropriate for emulation throughout Africa.

Kenneth Lizzio critiques theoretical and methodological approaches to studying root causes of conflict in his review of Researching Conflict in Africa, edited by Elizabeth Porter and colleagues. Marie Beatrice Umutesi's article, translated from the French, points out that reconciliation cannot be a one-way street. A survivor of refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo following the genocide and civil war in Rwanda, Umutesi writes with a powerful first-person perspective about the neglect of Hutu victims in Rwanda's reconciliation process. Responding to questions about her work, which has covered both South Africa and Rwanda, Pricilla Hayner offers insights into another post-conflict setting in Africa—Liberia—and warns readers of the danger of a country moving on without truly coming to terms with the past.

Hayner's advice is echoed by Ross B. MacDonald and Monica C. Bernardo who discuss the implications of Spain's effort to forget a history of violence during a transition from the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Using the context of the Spanish-Basque conflict, MacDonald and Bernardo describe the obstacles to achieving reconciliation in societies where communities of victims are mutually exclusive and each is politically mobilized to marginalize the claims of the other.

That this issue of the Journal of International Affairs addresses but a handful cases suggests that the conflicts of the 21 st century may be no more immune from the reach of the past than those of previous times. If, however, the discussion of reconciliation continues to be advanced as thoughtfully as our authors do here, perhaps this century can be one in which the legacies of past wrongs do not impel new tragedies, but instead catalyze new triumphs, in which visions of common futures transcend bitter memories of the past.

**59.2**

When disasters strike, ecological damage reverberates across regions, local out breaks become transnational pandemics, environmental changes stress societies, and famines and drought feed into the complex and devastating logic of conflict. As a result, the distinction between natural and manmade disasters blurs. The interdependence of governments, civil society and international institutions becomes undeniable in the face of emergencies that are as devastating as any human born conflict. In short, disaster is a fundamental element of globalization.

The Spring/Summer 2006 issue of the Journal of International Affairs takes inventory of the inadequacies of traditional approaches to disaster response and preparedness. Since 11 September 2001, many governments, especially in developed countries, have been preoccupied with combating terrorism or bracing for attacks on their own soil. At the same time, the international community has acknowledged the plight of the world's poorest and most vulnerable by making commitments to eliminate poverty, promote sustainable development and enhance social welfare in the Global South, as articulated by the UN Millennium Development Goals. However, a recent spate of catastrophes that are unusual if not unprecedented in scale—the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the South Asia earthquake—have garnered extensive media coverage and stretched thin the response capacities of governments and humanitarian aid organizations. The attendant consequences underscore the need to redefine conceptions of national security, environmental protection and public health, and to link disaster management to development strategies.

International forums such as the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan and the resulting Hyogo Protocol have attempted to bring policy attention to disaster risk reduction. Yet several barriers remain. For one, economic liberalization and deficiencies in political accountability tend to inhibit the incorporation of disaster risk management into mainstream policy and practice.

However, as practitioners and administrators recognize a disaster's complicating factors, technological and strategic advances provide hope for responding to future calamities, so long as the political will to do so exists.

More than offering a critique, then, our contributing scholars and practitioners explore efforts to create frameworks that locate natural catastrophes within the context of security and development. In the process, they chart the challenges faced by state and non-state actors in addressing the causes of these threats, and in building the capacity to tackle them when they materialize, with a view to restoring people's lives in their aftermath. To frame the issue, David Alexander provides a snapshot of the prevailing international modes of responding to calamity and assesses the prospects for major changes to these approaches. He posits that while the increasing reach of mass media and other technologies have raised international awareness of natural catastrophes and enabled mobilization of relief mechanisms, growing imbalances in global economic and political structures have exacerbated the impact of disaster. Although local self-sufficiency may form the basis for resilience before a disaster strikes, it is typically not until the aftermath of disaster that the international community provides the necessary resources.

The articles that follow address specific aspects of the so-called disaster management cycle: prevention, mitigation and preparedness; relief and response; and recovery and reconstruction. Nathan Hultman and Alexander Bozmoski begin by situating what are perceived as singular and infrequent events, but are actually "normal" disasters, within the context of global climate change. Using Bangladesh and the Netherlands as case studies along with a number of other geographic examples, the authors determine that distinct mitigation and preparedness efforts to alleviate the effects of normal disaster and climate change are each designed to augment resilience, and are therefore mutually reinforcing. To exploit this fortuitous alignment—that is, both to curb the advance of climate change and to adapt to the disruptions to which it gives rise—the authors recommend devolving decision making authority to the local level, bolstering environmental protection and distributing risk among a variety of actors.

The employment of scientific knowledge and diagnostic tools for environmental risk assessment cannot alone build resilience against the occurrence of sudden onset events. Jesus M. Macias and Benigno E. Aguirre address the challenges that attend mitigation and preparedness for one type of such events, volcano eruptions, in Latin America. Their article revolves around case studies of five volcanic hazard scenarios in three countries in the region. The authors analyze the approaches of provincial and national emergency management actors with respect to evacuation procedures, the resettlement of indigenous populations and militaries' and governments' roles in implementing early warning systems. The authors argue that the wholesale application of the UN Disaster Relief Organization's volcanic emergency model, without regard to the customs and social networks of the affected population and without enlisting their participation sufficiently, has bred seemingly intractable problems of environmental refugees, weakened political institutions and undermined the viability of communities.

In a similar vein, Geoff O'Brien then draws our attention to flaws in the United Kingdom's efforts at constructing a national emergency preparedness edifice for a wide range of events—a process that began as a response to a succession of floods, epidemics and economic and technological emergencies, such as the Y2IC Bug, but was transformed by the September 11th and July 7th terrorist attacks in the United States and United Kingdom respectively. The government's exclusive focus on the threat of terrorism has shifted attention from more comprehensive civilian protection schemes.

Resilience, argues O'Brien, should be an inclusive process of societal adaptation, rather than just aimed at returning to the status quo. Just as the perception that acts of violence constitute the primary threats to homeland security has directly affected planning for natural disasters, it is worth considering whether the reverse might also be true, or whether both aspects of civil protection exhibit shared or parallel patterns. To that end, Irwin Redlener and David A. Berman of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness examine trends in individual and family preparedness in the United States from the Second World War to the present using historical and post-September 11th survey data. The authors maintain that ever since Pearl Harbor, the federal government has led a national public readiness campaign that prioritizes manmade international threats.

Nevertheless, they find that over the decades the public has remained unconvinced of the need to take measures to protect themselves. And despite fine-tuning, the message and an attempt to convey a more inclusive conception of disaster at various points in time, the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 have done little to overcome this disconnect.

While Redlener and Berman warn of the obstacles and limits to enlisting public participation, regardless of the particular threat, in a domestic context, Mely Caballero-Anthony of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore urges the development of institutional devices for increased involvement and coordination by a broad mix of state and non-state actors in tackling the transnational threat of infectious diseases in East Asia. Drawing on the lessons that the recent SARS epidemic holds for stemming the potential outbreak of a deadly avian influenza pandemic, Caballero-Anthony supports ongoing efforts to treat what were formerly considered medical and scientific matters as imminent and ominous security threats. However, because the spread of infectious disease in the region is interwoven with a variety of socioeconomic and demographic issues and precipitated by a lack of state capacity, surveillance mechanisms and other immediate measures are not sufficient.

Thus, Caballero-Anthony recommends introducing an integrated "global public goods" approach to combating epidemics through sharing and diversifying responsibility in a manner somewhat analogous to Hultman's and Bozmoski's policy prescriptions.

Next, Alex de Waal reminds us that disaster prevention is the ultimate public good, but we have yet to systematize our knowledge of what factors explain specific instances of failure or success. Outlining a framework for the comparative political ethnography of disaster prevention, de Waal identifies four aspects of political incentives: visibility, political salience, constituency and the availability of technology for effective response. De Waal builds on his earlier studies of famine prevention and political contract to consider the HIV/AIDS epidemic. He provides an intriguing explanation as to "why national and international responses to HIV/AIDS have been surprisingly successful in mitigating the worst social and political impacts of the epidemic but have mostly failed in preventing HIV infection." Yet even if the political incentives for disaster prevention and mitigation are in place, the need to provide effective relief for sudden onset disasters is still critical. Arjun Katoch, Chief of the Field Coordination Support Section of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), overviews the system of international disaster response, the unique features of an emergency response environment and the challenges a whole new range of actors and stakeholders pose to on

scene coordination. Maintaining an effective international emergency relief capacity, Katoch argues, requires ensuring verifiable operational standards, restoring the consensus on international coordination mechanisms, creating guidelines for corporate involvement in disaster response, maintaining specialized knowledge in disaster preparedness and relief at the decision making level and establishing a common fund for deploying resources as soon as disasters occur.

As acknowledged by many of our contributors, the question of "who evaluates the world's disasters significantly influences how much attention those disasters receive." And to command the world's attention and hence donors' attention requires capturing the media's attention. In addressing the question of why the media cover some disasters and neglect others, Susan Moeller goes beyond simple explanations of staggering death tolls and the appeal of telegenic images. Simple emergencies lend themselves to self-evident, apolitical solutions. According to Moeller, it is "not consciousness of another's pain that compels media attention; rather, it is the media's conviction that certain kinds of pain are fascinating for their public." In order to command attention, pain must not overwhelm an audience to the point of helplessness.

Given the distorted consequences of this intimate relationship between the visibility of disasters and donor funding, new strategies are needed to sustainably address populations ongoing vulnerability to disaster: Strategies that promote an effective and equitable system of international emergency aid.

Joanna Syroka and Richard Wilcox argue that achieving this dual goal requires shifting from the current

"reactive emergency aid business model" to a "proactive risk-management model." In doing so, already impoverished and vulnerable populations are empowered to manage their ongoing risk through sophisticated investment and financial strategies rather than by relying on charity during an emergency. The authors explain current drought monitoring and weather derivative initiatives at the World Food Programme to illustrate this innovative model of disaster financing. If, as many of our contributors argue, disaster response requires cooperation among a variety of actors at the local, national and international level, could the inverse be true—could disaster represent an opportunity for fostering international cooperation among traditional "enemies"? This question frames the field of disaster diplomacy. In two disaster diplomacy case studies—India-Pakistan and Ethiopia Eritrea—Ilan Kelman elucidates seven pathways that promote and nine pathways that inhibit disaster diplomacy. Kelman concludes that disaster diplomacy does have a significant impact on interstate relations. Disaster "frequently catalyzes, but rarely creates, diplomacy."

While disaster diplomacy focuses on bilateral relationships among enemy states, Frederick M. Burkle Jr. advocates reviving multilateralism and investing globally in disaster response. According to Burkle, "socially sustainable forms of disaster management" must meet the expectations of an increasingly global society. To understand the limitations and opportunities at this critical moment, Burkle explores the complex relationships among globalization, state capacity and public health.

From the call for a global investment in disaster response, we move to two commentaries on post-disaster reconstruction. With an extensive background in risk management at the World Bank, Margaret Arnold begins the discussion by addressing the challenges that face the current policy framework of reaction and recovery.

In Arnold's view, more could be done, particularly through the World Bank, to mainstream risk mitigation into development. Supporting her argument is the evident toll disasters take on the poor, who are by all measures the most vulnerable. Arnold's prescriptions are preventative: The development paradigm should shift from one of temporary relief to permanent coping strategies. A key aspect of this strategy involves better livelihoods and housing conditions in impoverished communities.

Waiden Bello brings an alternative perspective to the globalization of disaster with the "relief-and-reconstruction complex." Bello argues that post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction have become increasingly intertwined, to the point that the same actors with strikingly similar agendas arrive on the scenes in Baghdad and New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. This blurring of lines suggests an infiltration of U.S. foreign policy in the realm of humanitarian aid, or "militant humanitarianism," where neoliberal economics takes precedence. A complicit player in these relief quagmires, Bello argues, is the World Bank, which adds an interesting twist in light of Arnold's postulations.

In the Andrew Wellington Cordier essay, Cary McClelland steps outside the disaster management cycle, demonstrating that the "natural" aspects of certain calamities are largely illusory. He charts the decline of post-colonial Zimbabwe's formerly vibrant agricultural sector to highlight the role of human forces in precipitating the famine that began in 1999. While famine is often described as a natural disaster brought on by drought and climate change, McClelland first levels criticisms on the failures of President Mugabe and the Zimbabwean government and second on the international aid community for the tragedy in Zimbabwe.

The issue concludes with a series of book review essays. In a review of Jared Diamond's most recent work, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Jack Goldstone explores the inverse relationship between societies' initial resource endowments and later wealth. According to Goldstone, in the face of coming environmental disaster, societies must change their own long-established behaviors in order to conserve and replenish the resources necessary for their survival. Other reviews examine the challenge of establishing insurance markets to mitigate risk; the U.S. public health system's preparedness for an infectious disease outbreak; the potential role of human-centered technologies in mitigating the risks of both manmade and natural disasters; and disaster response management approaches and recovery strategies in the United States.

There may not yet be a practical consensus on reducing vulnerability and facilitating recovery and response in ways that attend to both security and development imperatives around the world. While there exists considerable overlap in the conceptual frameworks and prescriptions put forth by a number of the authors, there continues to be a lively debate about new directions for the field. Empowering and mobilizing local communities, shifting resources from the post-disaster to pre-disaster phase, spreading risk and enhancing coordination, and insisting on a democratic and equitable spirit in allocating responsibility for the causes and consequences of disasters, are key themes running throughout this issue of the Journal. The globalization of disaster resonates with the most pressing international issues of our time;

It encapsulates the expanding scale of natural catastrophes; the necessarily interdependent nature of risk-reduction strategies; and the ascendance of liberal market economics, with all the dislocations, vicissitudes and transformative prospects that it implies.

**59.1**

Almost three-quarters of the earth's surface is covered by water. The oceans are home to the longest mountain ranges, deepest valleys and widest array of living organisms on the planet. Civilization evolves around and depends on the sea as an essential source of food and natural resources. Ships carry the bulk of international trade, and natural phenomena from tsunamis to hurricanes can topple economies and devastate lives.

Despite our reliance on it, the sea remains in many ways a stateless space, where boundaries are often not delineated and international rules of conduct are nebulous or non-existent. The Fall/Winter 2005 issue of the Journal of International Affairs grapples with these problems, examining political interaction in a realm where pirates raid cargo, multinational companies seek oil, navies fight territorial battles and marine life and island inhabitants alike are displaced by rising sea levels.

A substantial body of international law developed out of early maritime disputes. The most comprehensive treaty in force today that addresses questions of trade, transport, security, energy and environment in the ocean is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), one of the most widely ratified international treaties. By exploring the debates surrounding the convention and the ways in which sovereign nations seek to protect their interests in stateless space, this issue of the Journal promotes further investigation into questions of governance and interstate relations on the high seas.

The United States is among the few nations that have not ratified UNCLOS, and this decision has generated considerable criticism. To frame this debate, the Journal opens with two position papers that assess whether ratification would advance or constrain U.S. interests. The debate begins with an argument in favor of adherence, presented jointly by John Norton Moore from the University of Virginia School of Law and Rear Admiral William L. Schachte Jr., a former U.S. delegate to UNCLOS and Vietnam Swift Boat volunteer. Moore and Schachte assert that the United States' continued failure to ratify the treaty actually constrains U.S. interests and weakens the country's role in protecting world navigational freedom. They seek to debunk a list of "myths" put forward by UNCLOS critics, who, they argue, lack an adequate understanding of international law. The opposing argument comes from the Cato Institute's Doug Bandow, who stands opposed to ratification. Bandow asserts that even a revised "LOST," as he dubs it, would impinge on U.S. commercial and security interests, as it would mandate global redistribution of resources, restrict competition, require the transfer of technology and create a monopolistic public mining entity.

To situate these views in a broader historical and institutional context, Journal editors interviewed Gudmundur Eiriksson, Iceland's ambassador to Canada and a former judge on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. In the interview, Eiriksson traces the development of UNCLOS and examines how this history is reflected in present day oceans policy. In a discussion that ranges from the Cod Wars of the 1970s to the formative contributions of the Reagan administration to UNCLOS, Eiriksson weighs the validity of arguments both for and against the treaty's implementation.

The articles that follow address more specific areas of oceans policy. We first move into the area of deep-sea resource development with an article by Caitlyn Antrim that examines the treaty's corresponding mining entity, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), in depth and traces its evolution alongside the three-decade negotiation process that culminated in the creation of UNCLOS in 1982. She sets forth the ISA as a model of international global development that could inform other cooperative international resource regimes. Meanwhile, Hurst Groves focuses on another aspect of deep-sea resource development—offshore oil exploration—and uses the cases of Sâo Tomé e Principe and Nigeria to examine the issues that arise when states with vastly different resource development experience embark on a joint venture to exploit shared offshore oil deposits.

The Journal then moves into a series of articles examining maritime security issues. Captain J. Ashley Roach, the United States' chief negotiator for bilateral and multilateral maritime law enforcement agreements, discusses current security measures in the Malacca Straits, a potential chokepoint in the primary shipping route for Asia-bound cargoes of Persian Gulf oil. Vessels transiting the straits face the constant threat of piracy and other forms of violence and theft, and Roach proposes mechanisms for international cooperation that can better secure this strategic transit route.

Zou Keyuan from the Singapore-based East Asian Institute then examines the measures taken to combat piracy in South Asian seas and finds that effective anti-piracy efforts require greater regional cooperation supported by more robust legal regimes in affected states. Keyuan leaves us with the impression that piracy has not been relegated to the domain of lore but remains a real and pressing threat to maritime trade.

Yet regulating stateless space can be far more complicated than interdicting roaming troublemakers. When questions of national sovereignty and resource economics surface, even an uninhabited rocky outcrop can become the center of an international dispute. Alison Williams and Jonathan Donaldson explore some of the 61 ongoing embroilments that involve overlapping claims to territorial waters. Their critical analysis of the physical and theoretical parameters that influence these disputes is complemented by a case study of the East China Sea.

John Harrald then brings the debate on maritime security back to the docks with an argument that post-9/11 investment in port security has been sorely inadequate. As the director of the George veteran, Harrald examines recent U.S. and international port security initiatives and argues for a holistic approach that incorporates technology, governmental agencies, legislation, partnerships and a greater political commitment.

The dimensions of ocean security reach far beyond the prow of a military patrol boat. Global environmental conditions ultimately affect the safety of all nations, but immediate security interests often take precedence when they come into conflict with seemingly less tangible environmental impacts. In the words of Alfred M. Duda, our first contributor to this section, "we all need to get on the path of [environmental] sustainability." Duda questions the ecological effects of the sector-by-sector development strategies of coastal states, particularly in the Global South. By applying practical lessons from the World Bank's Global Environmental Facility, he suggests a broader reframing of the land-sea interface that would incorporate sea-related issues into the overall development framework.

Environmental effects are not distributed equally, and the causes of borderless problems such as global warming typically have little, if any, connection to the most affected states. Jon Barnett addresses the impact of climate change on the politics of Pacific island states and suggests adaptation and mitigation strategies to confront rising sea levels. Meanwhile, this issue's Andrew Wellington Cordier essay addresses the appalling magnitude of marine debris and other ocean waste. We conclude with a contribution by Meryl J. Williams, the former director of the WorldFish Center, who asserts that fisheries management and marine wildlife conservation present "the ultimate sustainability challenge."

When resource development and environmental welfare come into conflict in a stateless space, or national security and sovereignty are challenged beyond national borders, the ideal international framework is one that would guide the parties toward a peaceful and sustainable outcome. UNCLOS, the current framework for oceans policy development, falls short of this ideal, as illustrated in the debates that open the Journal. Yet its significance is highlighted by the fact that all of the authors reference UNCLOS as they explore their various topics. These articles depart from received wisdom on stateless space, embracing the boundlessness of the sea while seeking to ensure the health of its inhabitants, the equitable use of its resources and the safe passage of ships and their cargoes.

**58.2**

Ending global poverty, decreasing human misery and promoting economic growth have long been lofty goals of humanity. Yet, it was not until the United Nations distilled these aspirations into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 that the international community agreed, at least in principle, to coordinate their development efforts around eight specific objectives. The ambition of the Goals is monumental—some might say beyond the reach of current economic development methods given a world of vast inequality. One innovation, however, of the MDGs is to make progress quantifiable, with measurable ways of charting and evaluating results.

In September 2005, world leaders will meet at the Millennium 4-5 Summit to take stock of how member states have done so far in making the Goals a reality by 2015. Chief among the questions that will be addressed is whether the Goals are being adequately funded and if not, what more needs to be done. It seems fitting then for this issue of the Journal of International Affairs to serve as a stimulus for the debate, evaluating the current interactions between institutions, processes and mechanisms for financing development. The challenge is to look past theory and high ideals and examine what works and what fails. To this effect, Financing Development: Challenges for the Millennium Development Goals features scholars and practitioners who examine these interactions and offer critiques and alternatives to existing methodologies.

Jeffrey D. Sachs, an influential development economist and Director of the UN Millennium Project, helps to frame the issue by providing an overview of the key challenges still facing the MDGs in his interview with the Journal. In view, former President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, provides unique insight as both an academic and national leader into the process of transforming development theory into strategies for implementation.

Though many billions of dollars have been directed to development, there remains an ongoing debate about its effectiveness. Tony Addison, George Mavrotas and Mark McGillivray explore trends in global aid, highlighting a decline in assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, where the MDGs will be the hardest to achieve. Taking a closer look into the effects of foreign aid on economic growth and human welfare, Stephen Turnovsky offers a dynamic economic model that takes into account financial, investment, production and labor flexibilities of different economies. William Masters evaluates the need for increased agricultural research in Africa and proposes an incentive-based funding mechanism to encourage innovation.

Building on these analyses of aid effectiveness, three articles explore the sources and allocation of the funds that support development. In his commentary, Akbar Noman evaluates the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in providing development assistance and suggests a more country-specific approach to aid. Saskia Sassen explains the power of markets in determining capital flows, and argues for changes to the investment criteria used by key actors in order to better support economic development and environmental sustainability. Rathin Roy and Antoine Heuty assert that current poverty reduction strategies should be more tailored to recipient countries and that development financing should foster sustainable national capital accumulation.

Olivier and Shahin Vallée counter that the current conception of debt sustainability undermines the very process of development that it is meant to advance, prioritizing debt over fiscal sustainability and weakening states in Africa. Ravi Kanbur poses some "hard" questions about the complicated relationship between growth and inequality and, more importantly, what exactly it is that we are buying into when we commit to eradicating world poverty.

An essential foundation for equitable growth, as described by Kathryn Imboden, is the cultivation of inclusive financial sectors that provide low-income populations with access to basic financial services. David Satterthwaite demonstrates the vital role local governmental and community organizations, as compared to traditional funding agencies, play in providing more inclusive and immediate access to aid for the urban poor.

Two commentaries on specific MDGs—gender and education—convey how individual objectives are interdependent, requiring coordination among all stakeholders for genuine improvement in human welfare. Stephan Klasen posits that gender equity underpins the advancement of most other development goals. Nancy Birdsall and Milan Vaishnav discuss how the monitoring of both donors and recipients is necessary to encourage consistent donor support for education initiatives. While energy

is not formally a focus of the MDGs, a graphic essay on an innovative energy platform in Mali shows how energy is a critical element of any discussion about development.

This diverse selection of articles shows that the dialogue on economic development is constantly changing. The measurable outcomes of the MDGs provide a practical way to tackle the problems that often seem overwhelming in the face of complex political, social and economic realities. As the Editors, we hope that the content of this Journal will provide our readers with a deeper understanding of the current efforts to mitigate some of the most challenging problems in our world today.

**58.1**

States have long been a central unit of analysis for political scientists and a focal point for policy making. But recent trends in world politics have affected our appreciation of the role of the state. What purposes do states serve for us today and what does this imply for "state building"? This issue of the Journal approaches state building as a multidimensional problem. One dimension is international, in which transitional or nascent governments work to assert their sovereignty within international society. Another is domestic, and concerns the development and extension of capable institutions that can govern within a given territory. There is no set sequence to these processes, as each state building project faces a unique array of international and domestic challenges.

This collection of articles attempts to inform and, at times, challenge the current thinking on the topic. We present a broad array of cases from different regions, different time periods, and with differing results. Cases include Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Israel and Palestine among others.

Lisa Anderson's essay frames the issue by asking why states have emerged as a dominant form of human organization. She reveals how ethnic and religious communities often provide alternative forms of civic identity, but also how the transition from a state-based system to one more accommodating to such alternatives could prove costly and complicated. Joel Migdal also discusses the challenge to convincing citizens of the primacy of national identity over other forms of political or social organization. But in reviewing the history of older states, namely the US and Israel, he discovers that these problems are nothing new. While Anderson and Migdal explain why states have outpaced competing forms of organization, Rosemary Shinko uses the example of Palestine to examine how international society may actively deny aspirations toward statehood.

Societal cleavages pose major challenges to the state building process. Samuel Issacharoff shows how constitutional reform may be used to protect group rights in deeply divided societies and argues that these strategies have important implications for a government's ability to withstand political shocks. He is skeptical about the resilience of the ethnic power-sharing model in Bosnia, but is more hopeful about the South African constitutional system because of its restrictions on majority rule.

Similarly, Sumantra Bose claims that critical issues of representation and integration of disparate groups should be resolved in the earliest phases of the state building process. By examining the varied experiences of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, Bose shows that incompetence in dealing with these problems early on will likely put the state on a path toward destabilizing conflict. Yet despite societal divisions, citizens may continue to identify strongly with their state. Herbert Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis use original research and survey data to show that citizens in the Democratic Republic of the Congo still consider themselves Congolese despite the complete collapse of state institutions and social services. The authors come to the counterintuitive conclusion that inter-communal violence does not necessarily signal the destruction of national cohesion.

Civil war presents another set of constraints. Two articles propose different strate gies for constructing viable institutions in war-torn societies. On the one hand, Michael Shifter and Vinay Jawahar use the example of Alvaro Uribe's Colombia to suggest that securing the country is a prerequisite for a broader agenda of social and economic development goals. The authors acknowledge, however, that security gains have to be reinforced by progress in education, health, housing and employment to prevent backsliding. In contrast, using the example of Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand argues that security problems cannot be solved unless underlying market and political incentives for war are changed. In addition, only with international support can a "war economy" be transformed into one that supports peace.

States may have to be adapted to changing international circumstances. Julio Carranza Valdés and Juan Valdés Paz show how after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba's leadership skillfully adapted economic institutions to interact more effectively with the world economy. They argue that international pressures and economic downturns have not destroyed Cuba's commitment to its social policy agenda.

These varied investigations clearly demonstrate that there is no single model for state building. Francis Fukuyama provides an innovative explanation of why public administration cannot be treated scientifically. Our interview with Lakhdar Brahimi reaffirms this point. Brahimi poignantly reminds us that most state building projects are faced with a common hazard: the most important decisions have to be made early on when little is known.

This issue finishes with a series of book review essays that explore a number of important themes, including democratization, state failure, multiculturalism, and rule of law. In addition, we provide an annotated list of "required reading" for those interested in deepening their knowledge.

Current US foreign policy is captivated by major state building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. European states and other regional powers are pursuing similar tasks in the Balkans, Africa, and the South Pacific. Theory on how to strengthen institutions and governance around the world has become more dynamic with each new crisis and as a result the United Nations and other international organizations are reconceptualizing their practices. As the editors, we hope that this collection will help sharpen perceptions in what will likely remain a key area of inquiry and policy making.

**57.2**

Land and migration might seem peripheral topics in the current international climate, where war, security, terrorism, and U.S. military and political power drive debate in every corner of the world. Yet as the articles in this volume of the Journal of International Affairs attest, land is fundamental to issues of ownership, identity, and rights—the very core of events unfolding today. And while borders—territorial, economic, and cultural—fall away, the age-old phenomenon of migration becomes increasingly influential in relations within and among nation-states, so much so that it is changing our understanding of the nation-state itself. Politics, economics, culture, and human beings themselves are less bound to territory today than perhaps at any time in history, yet territory is still essential.

Examining these shifts and the history that informs them can make for more effective and more humane policy. These topics are inherently multidisciplinary, and benefit from treatment from multiple angles. Thus we are fortunate that the writers within our pages come from the fields of law, demography, history, literature, and journalism, and have made policy on national and international levels.

A short essay by Michael Doyle lays the groundwork for the discussion of movement across borders with a global overview of migration today. Jonathan Greenberg argues that border drawing is a major cause of conflict in his historical look at postwar partitions.

Manuel Orozco addresses the increasingly significant border crossings of Mexicans to the United States with a policy perspective, in his article on the role of migrants' hometown associations in development in Mexico. Journalist Michael Kamber provides human faces for these crossings in a photo-essay.

Three region-specific articles find identity's roots in land and home. Stephen Chan and Ranka Primorac consider land in Zimbabwe through the complementary lenses of literature and politics. Patricia Schiaffini also uses literature to explore the relationship between identity and language in Tibet. Timothy Heleniak uses Russian migration patterns after the breakup of the Soviet Union to examine the shifting identities resulting from migration. An interview with Manthia Diawara brings a personal perspective to the topic.

Finally, Maivän Läm and Roger Heacock look at stateless peoples' rights to territory with a legal framework. Lam writes on the international-law regime surrounding indigenous peoples and self-determination. Heacock examines the relationship in recent decades between Palestinians' access to land and their political and legal status in the occupied territories.

The Journal joins a growing number of scholars and practitioners critically engaging these issues and their interconnectedness. We hope that these pieces contribute to an intelligent and open-minded discourse on land and migration—a discourse that looks through a global lens without forgetting its impact on the lives of human beings, every day, all over the world.

**57.1**

What is the relationship between economic and political development—or to use the dominant ideology of our times, between economic liberalization and democracy? These tenets are a large part of the current conception of good governance, and it is a common assumption that the two are related. For some, the connection is causal, though the debate continues over which one should come first. For others, the two must go hand in hand, suggesting that they may be complements: democracy makes it easier to have a market economy, say some; others argue the converse. The theoretical connection between them takes multiple forms, perhaps as many as there are people who think about the problem, but the idea that these two facets of governance are linked drives much of the policy of donors, international agencies, community groups, non-governmental organizations, and most important, governments. Democracy, or at least the trappings of it, is often considered a precondition for trade and aid, though there are glaring exceptions. In Iraq, the United States is gambling that the establishment of a democracy will lead to improvements in other arenas.

International human rights norms, on which many NGOs base their efforts, are grounded in notions of political and legal representation alongside equitable prosperity. But how have these ideas played out? What has happened when states implement reforms?

The experience of some states suggests that the link between democracy and economic development may not be one of cause or condition so much as one of balance. Faced with financial hardship and populations grumbling about their lack of representation, East Asian governments have ceded some political power to their people to ease the pain of economic reforms. The experience of other states, however, suggests that there may not be a link at all. Iran's relative political loosening has not been accompanied by redistribution of wealth; Mozambique has seen economic growth without equity or meaningful political participation. For Turkey, political and economic conditions acted more as barriers to reform, a situation exacerbated by the demands of international actors. Hemmed in on every side, the government could do little to prevent crisis, and has had trouble recovering from it.

Many governments share the experience of political and economic factors acting as insurmountable constraints to progress. Those constraints can set the stage for instability, causing the slow disintegration or even the wholesale collapse of regimes, as has happened in Colombia and Indonesia respectively. Other regimes, such as those in Central America, are simply inert, with governments and their people harboring mutual animosity toward each other. In the most afflicted states, political and economic conditions are so dire that governments are powerless to improve them; in the worst cases, governments make an ominous situation even worse. A year after independence, the threats and challenges facing East Timor are as great as ever, and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a place where, according to reports from Goma, people prefer to brave flowing lava rather than resettle in refugee camps.

Where does this wide variety of sobering experience leave us? While it weakens the theoretical links between political and economic conditions—and perhaps sunders them altogether—it highlights the strong connections between the various actors that play a part in determining those conditions. Governments are capable of both preventing and creating crises; international organizations and businesses are both the catalysts for catastrophes and part of the solution to them. And ordinary people, who are so often underestimated, can be the abject victims of calamitous political and economic circumstances and the sole force that staves off chaos. In Somalia, a place that has been without a functioning government for a decade, some people have found ways to flourish. With such dynamic relationships between governments, businesses, international organizations and civil societies, the cases in this volume suggest that, despite the rather strict rules of governance that all are supposed to follow these days, the actions of one have a way of reverberating throughout the others in ways that the rules are not ready to address. Policies are hard to control: small efforts may have large, unbidden effects, and even with the most able lines of communication between them, it is very difficult to predict how everyone will react, and what the consequences will be. But it

is not impossible to prepare.

In putting this issue of the Journal together, our aim was not to provide answers; to do so would be suspicious, even irresponsible. By highlighting the complications of governance— the constraints that policies work under, the ways that policies can create as many (or more) problems than they solve, and the ways those problems can be addressed—we hoped we might question the assumptions, or help reframe the debate about what good governance is.

The conception of governance today is motivated a great deal by theory and ideology; meanwhile, the world is a much more vibrant and volatile place than many policy makers give it credit for. We indulge the naïve hope that by showing this, the pieces in this issue might play a small part in the formation of better public policy.

**56.2**

The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan saw their fair share of winners and losers in the international arena. The Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, at the very least, got noticed. As the United States scrambled for tactical support from willing allies, several of the aforementioned states immediately complied. In exchange for military bases and overflight rights—essential for U.S. success in Afghanistan—the Central Asian republics received aid and orders to maintain sluggish democratic reforms. Optimism bloomed inside and outside the region. Eager for their slice of the fortune, these states, rich in oil, could generate great wealth with sufficient investment from abroad. This excessive optimism, however, overlooked a few facts. The Central Asian republics are, for the most part, tyrannical regimes. Militant Islam is on the rise, as is the suppression of democratic opposition groups. The region is home to the world's worst environmental disaster and is a key thoroughfare in the global drug trade.

September 11th also cast the Central Asian republics in a new strategic light. They suddenly became important to many nations, particularly the United States. This importance gave the region's leaders unforeseen leverage. But have changes been felt in the countries themselves?

With this regionally focused issue on Central Asia, the Journal of International Affairs sets out to address this question. Martha Brill Olcott's capstone article introduces key issues that other articles illustrate in depth. Part one contains analyses on Islam, drug-trafficking, economics and energy development, environmental degradation and census politics. Part two looks at Russian, Iranian and U.S. foreign policies toward the region, while the Cordier Essay offers a take on the domestic sources of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. The importance of the war in Afghanistan should not be understated in this assessment of the region. Operation Enduring Freedom brought Central Asia to the forefront of many states' policies. Thus, part three looks at Afghanistan and its prospects for stability from two unique perspectives: an analysis of warlord politics and the link between governance and ethnicity. This collection captures neither all relevant perspectives nor all relevant topics. It does, however, offer a nuanced view of the most pressing issues, from some of the world's foremost scholars on the region. Although each author offers a distinct voice, there is one clear commonality: The problems facing Central Asia are not new; they are merely new to those of us who, prior to September 11th, did not appreciate their importance

**56.1**

Global population growth is slowing. Yet, as the UN Secretary-General noted in his 2002 World Population Day message, "[There will still be a billion more people in the developing world by 2015. And the most rapid growth is occurring in the world's least developed countries, where the population is expected to triple over the next 50 years from 658 million to 1.8 billion. Already, these countries are least able to provide basic services and among the most severely challenged by hunger, HIV/AIDS, water scarcity and environmental degradation."

What hope is there for states playing a seemingly impossible numbers game? This issue of the Journal of International Affairs explores the connections, issues and assumptions within this question. Demographic factors haunt history, suggesting irreducible links with instability: Iran was experiencing a youth bulge before its 1979 revolution, which brought young people to the streets to end the monarchy; the French population before revolution in 1789 was likewise weighed toward youth; and today the mass of unemployed males throughout the Muslim world is held by some as a direct factor in extremism's rise. Moreover, scarce resources, increasing populations and the imperative for economic growth conspire to degrade the environment, bringing deforestation, water depletion, air pollution and disease. These developments may spur further social and political instability.

Fortunately, demography is far from destiny. In fact, destiny depends very much on how a given state deals with demographic challenges. From immigration, population and labor policy to family planning, as well as political systems sufficiently flexible—or inflexible—to manage people and their demands, states maintain stability with a host of tools. In his message the Secretary-General notes that implementing real family-planning policies, resulting in fewer dependents, provides potential economic growth within a generation—a phenomenon observed throughout East Asia in the 1980s. Regarding the environment, institutions mediate resources with production technologies and economic structures. Beyond demographic determinism, an array of actors and factors play a role in the population numbers game. The capstone essay by Jack A. Goldstone lays the ground work for exploring issues in population change and security, parsing the interrelation of influences. Milica Z. Bookman explores the implications of relative population size in multi-ethnic states; Neil DeVotta and Monica Duffy Toft turn to India and Israel, respectively. Nazli Choucri, providing a framework for weighing migration and security, addresses the subjectivity of both terms. Ellen Brennan-Galvin investigates the main site of the world's future population growth, urban areas. Jonathan Crush examines the exodus of skilled workers from South Africa.

Ellen Laipson and Peter G. Peterson consider broad demographic transitions and their intersection with state policies. Richard A. Matthew explores the role of the environment in population and stability questions, while Ariaster B. Chimeli, Carolyn Z. Mutter and Chet Ropelewski present a case study.

Colin Kahl, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Henrik Urdal examine current debates. In sum, the authors deliver analyses both broad and deep on how politics, populations and the challenge of stability shape the face of the state.

**55.2**

"But then peace, peace! I am so mistrustful of it: so much afraid that it means a sort of weakness and giving in." —D. H. Lawrence

We're a bit more optimistic about the prospects for peace than Lawrence was, but his comment implies issues inherent in peace operations: consent, neutrality, use of force and legitimacy.

Over the past decade, the number of peace operations undertaken by the international community has expanded exponentially, but we have been slow to examine the effectiveness of those operations. Although the Brahimi Report (a UN self-assessment, co-authored in 2000 by J. Brian Atwood, one of our contributors) suggested possible reforms, the process of analysis is far from over. The international community needs to learn from its mistakes while adapting to the ever-changing global environment.

When we chose the topic of peacekeeping in June 2001, our goal was to evaluate the political, economic and social impacts of peace operations, taking into account the often under-examined perspectives of third world nations and the people affected by such operations. After the September 11 attacks, we considered refocusing our energies on examining terror and low-intensity conflict. But,

we decided that the debates surrounding peace operations were still—if not more—relevant in the context of the new war on terrorism. The attacks emphasized the increased role of non-state actors, technological change and the decentralization of the international system, all of which have significant implications for future peace operations.

Our articles deal specifically with these issues. The capstone essay, by Giandomenico Picco, notes the positive changes occur ring within the UN structure. Naomi Weinberger applies lessons from other civil-military coordination experiences to the situation in Afghanistan. John Sanderson comments on the relationship between the military and humanitarian emergencies based on his experience as commander of the peace operation in Cambodia (UNTAC). And Michael E. O'Hanlon argues for an increase in déployable force size, suggesting that regional training initiatives could be part of the solution.

Other authors investigate the intersections between peace operations and development, economics, the media, corporations and mercenaries. Regional case studies focus on future peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges for Africa, Europe and Asia. In an interview, UN under secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, ponders responsibilities and obstacles facing the organization.

Together, the analyses and experiences of these journalists, academics, practitioners and government officials provide a rich variety of perspectives on how the blue line is and can be toed.

Defining Key Concepts

Just as the number of peace operations has expanded, so has the terminology associated with it. The debate often centers around which type of peace operation has been or should be mandated by the international community. Peace operations are international interventions for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace. They include peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement.

Peacemaking is the use of diplomatic tools to halt ongoing conflicts. Peacekeeping is the traditional UN mission of monitoring ceasefires and separating hostile forces. Peacebuilding involves an array of social, political, administrative and economic measures designed to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peace enforcement refers to the threat or actual use of force by peacekeeping troops.

**55.1**

Eleven years ago, the international community ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a watershed event for international human rights and for children. It is the most ratified human rights treaty in history. It signaled a need to provide for children's basic rights and brought these issues to the attention of the international community. However, despite medical, technological and communications advances, as well as an increasing cooperation among nations, children still face myriad tragedies ranging from displacement, discrimination and violence to lack of access to food, education and healthcare. The HIV/AIDS crisis, for example, is a complex emergency that is destroying more lives than all of the armed conflicts today. As we begin the first years of the millennium the Journal identifies the challenges and obstacles that affect children around the world and examines strategic alternatives to address these problems.

Our objectives for this issue are threefold. First, with the insights of our distinguished authors, we drive at thorough, fact-based analyses of the more critical and complex issues facing children around the globe. Second, we want to continue to generate alternatives and propel the debate forward toward the most effective solutions. Third, we hope to emphasize that the solutions to these challenges are within our reach; that children must become and remain a priority; that we must seek to include their voices and experiences to attain a more inclusive, equitable and just approach to development.

In our first article, international human rights lawyer Ilene Cohn tackles the tough question of whether child soldiers in Sierra Leone should face criminal proceedings in an international court. An article by Beverlee Bruce also deals with the impact of warfare, violence and forced migration on children. On the labor front, author and economics professor Luis F. Lopez-Calva attempts to dispel myths surrounding child labor, while expounding on his own insights and theories. The Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay also deals with questions surrounding child labor legislation. Dr. Judith Evans writes on the importance of early childhood education, while Fabian Koss examines the digital divide and the impact it is having on education, and hence, the economies of the developing world. We also included articles on child abuse, pedophilia and international adoption. Two compelling interviews round out the issue. The first is with Dr. Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS; and the second is with Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF.

Focusing primarily on the problems of children may seem pessimistic, and the multiple and concurrent challenges of HIV/AIDS, child soldiers, development, education, child labor and legal rights may seem daunting, but we are confident that these problems can be addressed and tackled over the next few decades. As a society, we possess the technologies and the treatments. Now we just need the political will, prioritization and resource allocation. In addition, we must realize that these complex crises outstrip the capacity of any one agency or nation. Thus, we must look at these issues not only with a relentless bias toward improving the lives of children, but as an opportunity for interagency and international cooperation and coordination.

As we go to press with this issue, a record number of world leaders are preparing to attend a landmark Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Children. This Special Session in New York will review progress made since the 1990 World Summit for Children, where governments committed to specific goals within agreed upon timeframes on child-survival, protection and development. The Special Session will also examine the long standing obstacles to children's wellbeing, and emerging threats to child health and universal access to quality basic education. It is imperative that we continue to put the interests of children at the forefront of national development policies, as investing in children results in real dividends. We hope that the international community in all its ranks, organizations, and agencies, in concerted effort, strives to identify strategic solutions to children's issues and commits the critical human and material resources needed to turn those solutions into reality. That would be a fitting legacy for our millennium.

**54.2**

The global landscape has shifted considerably since the end of the Cold War, but one fact stands out: a relative handful of small to mid-sized states have carved out a potent role for themselves by confounding the American inspired international order. By virtually any measure, this group of "rogue states" has commanded a disproportionate amount of attention from the United States and its allies.

Managing the post-Cold War order has proven to be a tricky and treacherous business. Each "rogue" has its own unique history and presents an equally unique set of contemporary challenges. Accordingly, each requires a coherent and exact policy response. For the last decade, Washington has sought to ensure American security and global stability by veering between policies of isolation and engagement. Deciding which states deserve inclusion in the rogue category is highly subjective. The United States has been the driving force in determining the vocabulary that defines such states. Yet Washington's domination in defining "rogues" has resulted in neither a rigorous definition nor an effective policy to change those states' behaviors.

The very notion that the US State Department can declare its foreign policy lexicon cleansed of the term "rogue states" and substitute the more benign "states of concern" is an indication of the policymaking conundrum that goes far beyond semantic niceties.

This issue of the Journal of International Affairs offers a framework for examining and hopefully better understanding rogue states. The first essay, by Thomas Henriksen, traces the historical evolution of rogue states. The second, written by Robert Litwak, looks at changes in US foreign policy terminology regarding these polities. Leader profiles examine the characters of four unusual men who have imposed their will upon their respective populations, exerted their influence on neighboring countries and made themselves players on the world stage.

Country case studies cover several states associated with the rogue label. Even though the United States has at various times shunned three countries—Iran, North Korea and Serbia—now it seems to be engaging each of them. Afghanistan, Burma and China are explored within the context of US policy approaches. China is a special case. While it typically escapes the "rogue state" designation due to its sheer size and growing economic and political clout, it nonetheless aspires to a unique role in the post-Cold War era, namely that of pariah state patron. China has intensified its collaboration with and support for a group of states—including North Korea, Iran and Iraq and, until recently, Serbia—that are opposed to the preeminent role the US plays in world affairs.

Currently, a debate rages over the impact of sanctions on Iraq. Nobel Peace Prize nominee Kathy Kelly takes issue with the US-UN sanctions policy against Iraq in an exclusive interview with the Journal. The included essays leave at least one distinct impression: that precisely what constitutes a "rogue" is in the eye of the beholder. As there is no firm agreement on definitions, some readers will take issue with the selection of the case studies that appear in this issue. We welcome and encourage the debate.

**54.1**

Choosing the two topics that are covered in each year's Journal is always a process debated at length. It is rare that a single country is chosen as the focus for an entire issue; until this year, only China and Mexico had been awarded this distinction. Yet, as we considered the most current topics in international affairs—from the strains that accompany development in a globalized economy to the rising influence of religion-based politics to the dramatic institutional accomplishments of the European Union—one country kept coming up: Turkey.

Since the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey has played a significant role on the world stage, a much larger role, indeed, than its size, population or economic strength would indicate.

Turkey's geographic position—at the crossroad of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East—makes it a pivotal state, one whose development and stability affect countries in several regions. This heightened importance is a mixed blessing; with it come the responsibility and the challenge of interacting with countries of with vastly different political, economic and cultural landscapes.

This ideological and cultural melange, combined with the historical legacy of the Ottoman era, make Turkey a compelling and intriguing subject. Little did we know when we chose Turkey as our topic in May 1999 that Turkey was on the verge of an extraordinarily tumultuous year. In August 1999, horrific earthquakes struck Turkey, taking innumerable lives and causing immense economic losses. Ironically,

this devastation helped to bring about a nascent reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, as the two countries generously provided aid to one another after their respective natural disasters.

Despite the damage to Turkey's economy in the wake of the earthquake, the EU finally accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. However, this good fortune did not carry through into the new year: in the spring of 2000, the gruesome Hizbullah murders were uncovered, as were that organization's links to state-sanctioned terrorism. But, on a more positive note, elections in May 2000 replaced long time politico President Suleyman Demirel with Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former president of the Constitutional Court, known for his liberal stance on ethnic and religious freedoms. Turkey changed even as we were soliciting and editing articles for the

issue. A year ago it would have been premature and naïve to state that Turkey was headed toward increased democratization and social liberalization. Today, Turkey is moving in precisely that direction.

We have purposely avoided dedicating entire articles to the topics that the general and academic press typically focus on: Turkey and its relationship with the EU, the conflict between Turkey and Greece and the Kurdish issue. Instead, we have attempted to look at the larger domestic and international context to analyze the roots of these issues. For example, instead of having an article solely on the relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish population, several articles in this issue of the Journal examine the roots of Turkish national identity and how this relates to current day ethnic tensions in Turkey. Another article looks at the multi-ethnic character of the Ottoman Empire and how it influenced Atatiirk's restrictive ethnic policies. Yet another explores the differences between Turkish and Kurdish feminism, while another discusses the international dynamic created by a Kurdish population spread across the Middle East.

The theme of this issue, A Struggle between Nation and State, conveys the underlying imperatives driving Turkey. Heavily influenced by the French corporatist model, Ataturk created Republican Turkey and erected a state structure that would drive the country into the modern era. However, this state has become unwieldy and unrealistically restrictive, leading to inefficiency, corruption and vocalized rebellion from groups that have been ignored or mistreated by the state. The struggle between nation

and state has existed since the very inception of the state, starting with the first Kurdish rebellion in 1925. The struggle continued as the military replaced democratically elected governments with leaders of their choosing in I960 and 1971, dictated foreign and economic policies and brutally repressed civil society. The combined effect of corruption and the import-substitution model wreaked

havoc on Turkey's economy, culminating in a military intervention in 1980 and official support for a free market economy. The economic liberalization of the 1980s gave a voice to previously disenfranchised groups, enabling minority groups to be heard for the first time. The end of the Cold War changed Turkey's geostrategic position significantly and forced it to begin reforming its polity. Turkey's desire to join the EU has spurred it to pay increasing attention to Western standards of democracy and civil rights.

The struggle between nation and state permeates all facets of Turkish life, and is reflected throughout the pages of this issue. Its roots can be found in the conflict over Turkey's national identity, which has stagnated in the elites' faithful obeisance to Atatiirk's doctrine. This tension manifests itself in a blossoming civil society, which has emerged independently for the first time since the founding of the Republic. It is present in the corruption that runs rampant in the state bureaucracy and in business conglomerates.

Likewise, the press—tied to business and state interests alike—is robbed of its freedom of speech and objectivity. Above all, the tension between nation and state is evident in the conflict between devout religious forces and the secular nature of the Republic. The struggle also affects Turkey's external policies. Domestic political imperatives, such as quelling the uprisings in southeast Turkey or securing a popular mandate, drive economic and foreign policy decisions. And yet, the fact that this struggle is being vocalized confirms Turkey's passage from an adolescent government to a mature, legitimate democracy. This struggle will not end in the near future, but it can be used as a barometer to measure how Turkey will confront its major domestic and international challenges. We hope that this issue will help to elucidate many of these issues and to move beyond the mere headlines about Turkey's political, economic and social development.

In formulating this issue, the editors of the Journal are indebted to many individuals for their generous assistance. We would especially like to thank two SIPA students—Yeliz Arat and Arda Karakaya—who helped us better understand developments in Turkey in their historical context and advised us on countless issue specific questions. We are indebted to Harpreet Mahajan and Leardo Getty for their help with our numerous technical hitches.

Lastly, we are always grateful for the support and trust that SIPA's administration and faculty place in the Journal's Editorial Board. Finally, a note on the appendices to this issue: We have provided several additions to the articles that we hope will prove useful to our readers. On pages 335-339, a glossary explains terms and names that appear in articles and bear further explanation. On pages 341-346, a chronology details the major events in Ottoman and Republican Turkish history. And, on pages 347-348, there are maps of Turkey and the surrounding region and of the historical Ottoman Empire, as well as a map of the Caspian pipeline region.

**53.2**

Throughout history, the struggle for financial security and economic well-being has been a shared endeavor for all. Presently, we live in a world that functions under what appears to be a rule-based system of economic order that is expanding across the globe—what we call globalization. This formal economic system, however, has been constructed over an extremely short period of human economic history and despite its "global" scope, does not involve direct participation by a majority of the world's

population. Perhaps, then, what we understand to be the formal economy—measurements of GDP, GNP and official transactions— is an anomaly; and, the mass of activities outside of this realm, which includes the majority of the global population, are the norm.

In 1972, the International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced the concept of the informal sector in an employment mission report on Kenya, which found that migration to the cities from the countryside resulted in more than simply urban unemployment. It concluded that when the formal sector does not provide enough job opportunities, the urban work-force and rural migrants develop employment in small- and micro-level production and distribution of goods and services. The informal

sector was defined as these largely unrecorded, unrecognized and unregulated economic activities.

Nine years later, the Journal of International Affairs published an issue entitled "International Underground Systems." It covered topics such as illicit arms transfers to South Africa, international

covert nuclear trade, drug trafficking in Mexico and Colombia, pimping, offshore money flows and the "second economy" in Poland. While these issues continue to be significant to shadow economies today, political and technological change present new realities for economic development. As globalization sweeps across the continents, communities in the developed world are increasingly exposed to the realities of the developing world, including widespread poverty and often conflicting religious and cultural worldviews. At the same time, through television and other media, the developed world's lifestyle of post-war prosperity has become the aspiration of masses living under pressing poverty.

Indeed, economic development and the achievement of a new model of prosperity have become a priority not only for individuals but also for many states in terms of their national policies. Both seek affluence, but not always in the same manner or over the same period of time. The effectiveness of the state can be undermined by poorly-designed policy programs, corruption or influence from outside forces. This frequently creates contradictory methodologies, whereby the formal, rule-based economic model of states clashes with the individual struggle to obtain prosperity, often through "whatever means necessary."

A journey through the townships of South Africa clearly illustrates these opposing methodologies. There, one witnesses the abject poverty that has resulted from decades of exclusion from the formal economy during Apartheid. Incongruously, millionaire mansions are scattered throughout these same communities. Would these people have succeeded in the same way if they had been operating in the formal economy? Probably not, for the goal of the Apartheid-era South African state was to bring prosperity to only a select few while leaving behind the majority. Thus, the only way for the masses to gain a level of prosperity was to develop and participate in an informal sector, one that was composed not only of sidewalk street-traders selling flowers or offering haircuts, but others, who undertook illicit activity, such as selling arms, drugs or diamonds.

The shadow economy, however, extends far beyond developing countries. Developed nations have not escaped the existence of the informal sector within their borders. Taxation influences economic behavior to the extent that people may be driven to engage in transactions outside of the formal sector: above ground, but not under state control. In this instance, the efficient implementation of state policy leads to diminished revenue for the state, and, consequently, loss of social benefits in terms of public spending. Migration generally fills the low-wage and lower skilled labor needs of the more prosperous economies, contributing, at times, to the strong performance of those sectors (for example, migrant farm labor in California supports one of the most prominent and prosperous agro-economies in the world). The high level of consumption in many of these nations also creates markets

for illegal goods—the most well-known being drugs—that support large organized crime circuits. There are myriad methods for these crime circuits, corporations or even individuals to move between

licit and illicit, formal and informal sectors. Money laundering, tax havens and other activities help to construct strong commercial links between the two sectors that are often mutually supportive, and help to perpetuate the existence of the shadow economy.

The Journal's objective in presenting current issues and trends in the shadow economy is to reveal the nexus of activities between states, individuals and business and to explore the effects on society, economies, governments and cultures. With this volume, we hope to shed new light on the shadow economy by reconsidering the way in which it is conceptualized. The articles selected for this issue offer new perspectives on the subject of the shadow economy and offer a cross-disciplinary approach, while raising many provocative and contentious questions along the way. The overarching question of this issue—do shadow economies promote prosperity or undermine stability?—asks who wins and who loses in the shadow economy. The answers, as you will see from these articles, are not always simple or readily visible.

**53.1**

The evolution of human societies is dependent upon the conversion of ever more concentrated and more versatile forms of energy.... Neither the growth of technical capabilities and a deeper understanding of the surrounding world nor the effort to secure a better quality of life would have been successful without innovations in energy use.

Are the basic prerequisites of modern society. Yet this is all too often taken for granted. Certainly economic development depends on political stability, the rule of law, competitive markets and wise macroeconomic policy, but without the fuel to power this transformation even the most vigorous economy grinds to a halt. In its more than 50 years of publishing, the Journal of International Affairs has never devoted a single issue to the topic of energy, though we've come close, with explorations of "Technology and International Policy" (Spring 1998) and "The Global Environment" (Winter 1991). Despite this fact, each of the articles in the present volume might have fit seamlessly into any one of our previous issues in the last ten years—testament to the myriad ways in which energy issues inform all aspects of international affairs.

The oil shocks of the 1970s put energy high atop the list of policy priorities, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter declaring energy conservation efforts "the moral equivalent of war." The bold price increases engineered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Arab oil embargo against the United States sparked fears of an imminent energy shortage, while the rampant nationalization of energy industries throughout the developing world demonstrated once and for all that power from energy remained subject to the power of politics. Today—with oil again relatively inexpensive and abundant in the industrialized countries, OPEC in seeming disarray and most overt forms of resource nationalism nearing dissolution—the word "crisis" is no longer commonly associated with energy.

Appearances, however, can be deceptive. In the several months since the editorial board of the Journal decided on this theme, energy issues have recaptured the headlines on numerous occasions: "merger mania" in the oil industry as Exxon and Mobil, as well as British Petroleum and Amoco, joined forces; DaimlerChrysler's unveiling of the first driveable, zero-emission automobile run on the hydrogen fuel cell; OPEC's first agreement in more than a decade committing its members to production cutbacks; and the continuing debate on how the industrialized countries will achieve the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions promised at the Kyoto Conference on Climate Change in 1997.

The Journal prides itself on its unique single-topic format. It is our aim in choosing the theme for each issue that we hit upon a consequential and timely subject in international affairs. We believe that, though it has often been neglected, energy is such a topic, and that its importance will in time—and with the earnest efforts of the esteemed academics and practitioners we publish— be made manifest. Today energy is too often recognized only by its absence or its excess. In other words, energy is like national security: when one has it, it is easy to ignore, but the moment one loses it, its importance is quickly revealed. As we approach the 21st century and attempt to divine the major currents in international affairs for the foreseeable future and beyond, we at the Journal are convinced that energy problems will once again be recognized as a major concern.

Accordingly, the Fall 1999 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, "Fueling the 21st Century: The New Political Economy of Energy," explores many of the important energy challenges facing the world today. By examining this topic in such diverse contexts as economics, politics, human rights and the environment, our authors demonstrate that a new political economy of energy is emerging. This new political economy is characterized by several features: the growing importance of alternative and renewable energy sources; the ascendancy of market forces as expressed in widespread privatization, deregulation and openness toward foreign investment; an environmental consciousness that reflects

the threat posed by cumulative energy use to the ecosystem; startling advances in technology that offer new possibilities for improving the efficiency with which we consume energy; and the general sense that both the political and economic forces affecting the energy world have become more dispersed while the relationship between the two has become more complex. Reflecting these aspects of the new era, the articles in this volume examine energy's wide-ranging points of tension, from Venezuela to Nigeria, from the politics of biomass fuels to the cultures of electricity consumption.

Edward L. Morse contributes our introductory essay, questioning whether a new political economy exists for oil today. He provides a short conventional history of hydrocarbons in the 20th century, and then demonstrates what this standard version leaves out—namely, the role of short-sighted U.S. policy in encouraging the establishment of OPEC and its radical use of the oil weapon. Mr. Morse concludes that, despite the ascendancy of market forces and the demise of resource nationalism, the new political economy retains several important characteristics of the old era.

In our second overview essay, Terry Lynn Karl explores what she has famously termed "the paradox of plenty"—the irony that developing countries rich in natural resources often find themselves stuck in a quagmire of corruption and gridlock. Dr. Karl argues that abundant energy resources have had the perverse consequence of encouraging the development of "rentier states" that need not engage in the quid pro quo negotiations between ruler and ruled necessary for successful state-building.

In the section "Energy Dilemmas Around the World," Dai Qing and Lawrence R. Sullivan examine the Three Gorges Dam in southeastern China, the largest construction project in human history, which when completed will join the Great Wall as the only two man-made structures that can be seen from outer space. Ms. Dai and Dr. Sullivan investigate whether the dam is the proper means through which to provide hydropower for China's rapidly growing economy, or whether the forced displacement of

1.9 million residents of the flooded areas will prove a political and humanitarian disaster. The authors' bleak assessment reveals that the urge to satisfy energy demand can sometimes lead to widespread dissatisfaction, especially in closed political systems where channels for expressing opposition remain cut off.

Marshall I. Goldman argues that Russia's abundant energy resources may be more of a curse than a blessing. His analysis of shady corporate practices in the natural gas and petroleum industries since the demise of the Soviet Union provides a good demonstration of how foreign investors have become alienated by the domestic economy, and how the Russian people have been largely denied the promise of their country's ample natural wealth. Fereidun Fesharaki advocates a new concept of energy security for Asia, one recognizing that market forces can secure the access to and transport of oil much more effectively than the misguided state interventionism of the past. He foresees the continuing importance of petroleum in the region's energy mix, and the growing importance of the Middle East as a source of that oil.

R. K. Pachauri boldly challenges the conventional wisdom that coal use in developing countries needs to be significantly reduced. Using India as a case study, Dr. Pachauri explains why the economic well-being of his country's population will require significant increases in energy consumption—increases that can only be achieved by making the most of India's coal resources, albeit in a more environmentally friendly manner. Luis E. Giusti, the former chief executive officer of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), offers a unique perspective on the transformation of PDVSA from a state-run oil enterprise to a partially privatized, competitive global company. Examining both the current political situation in Venezuela and the country's rapidly changing oil industry, Mr. Giusti's personal account of

PDVSA's turbulent years sheds light on the challenges that many oil-rich developing countries currently face in this market-driven era.

David E. Nye compares the widely differing cultures of energy consumption in the United States and Europe. Exploring energy as a social phenomenon rather than a merely technical issue, Dr. Nye examines the historical and cultural roots of Americans' excessive energy consumption, and explores why Europeans tend to express less faith in the ability of technological innovation to prevent future energy shortages.

Examining extensive public opinion data from Western Europe, Debra Johnson reveals that the ascendancy of green and leftist parties in several governments throughout the region has not been

accompanied by a concomitant rise in anti-nuclear sentiment. The accelerated phase-out of nuclear power advocated by European environmentalists, Dr. Johnson argues, is not feasible— and the public at large seems to understand this.

Of course, ensuring energy supply is not the only goal or value of modern society. Which source of energy is most compatible with our many ambitions—not only to power the economy, but also to preserve the environment, to protect citizens from the noxious by-products of energy exploitation and production, to minimize the costs of industrial inputs, or to prevent excess dependence on other regions whose political interests may conflict with our own? The 20th century has been, as Daniel Yergin has remarked, "the age of oil," but as we approach a new millennium some are proclaiming the end of the hydrocarbon era. Debate continues to flourish about how long it will be until the world's stock of oil is depleted, if ever. But already policymakers, as well as major players in the energy industry, are working toward a post-petroleum future—one in which nuclear power, renewable energy such as wind and solar, and even biomass fuel from wood, dung and crop residues—may play an increasingly significant role.

Global warming, though not yet accepted by all climatologists, may hasten this transformation, especially since the countries of the world have agreed to decrease their use of fossil fuels. The section on "Envisioning the Future of Energy and the Environment" was inspired by these developments. Defying traditional constructs of a political economy of energy based on hydrocarbons, Christopher Flavin and Seth Dunn unveil an emerging energy economy based on a decentralized, demand-based system of renewable energy sources. Parsing the socioeconomic forces that have fueled past energy transitions, Mr. Flavin and Mr. Dunn advance a scenario in which a new geopolitical energy balance emerges, giving environmental and efficiency concerns much greater weight. Amory Lovins and Chris Lotspeich continue in this vein, proposing a new paradigm for the energy industry based on properly valuing the "natural capital" of the ecosystem. They offer a vision of—and practical suggestions for—an energy economy using not fossil fuels but the most abundant element in the universe, hydrogen.

Jerry Taylor and Peter VanDoren adamantly refute the argument that renewables will gain increasing importance in the coming century. With renewable energy comprising only 1.5 percent of the world energy market, they declare that "...victory over fossil fuels is nowhere in sight." Mr. Taylor and Mr. VanDoren rebut the charge that energy markets are inefficient, skeptically asking whether governments are any more capable than private actors of allocating energy resources wisely.

Douglas Barnes and Willem Floor make the case in favor of biomass-based energy in developing countries, arguing its merits over "big oil" and "big power" in the transition to a low-carbon energy economy. They assert that increasing the efficiency and cleanliness of biomass use—not abandoning it in favor of more "modern" energy sources—is especially necessary to enhance energy access and improve the quality of life for poor and rural people in low- and middle-income countries such as China and India.

One of the most contentious issues in the political economy of energy is the role of large multinational energy companies in promoting, or hindering, the democratic development of the countries in which they do business. Throughout the Third World, popular resentment of Western oil companies was a major impetus behind the widespread nationalizations of the 1970s. Today human rights advocates are quick to criticize the multinationals for their alleged complicity with autocratic regimes, while their

defenders argue equally vigorously that such companies hold the key to the development of some of the world's most desperately poor nations. Leading off the section, "Human Rights and Oil Companies: A Debate," John F. Imle, Jr., the vice chairman of Unocal Corporation, a major oil multinational headquartered in California, argues in favor of "constructive engagement." By this he means using continued business investment as a lever to promote economic development and, ultimately, democratization.

Given the extremely long-term commitment necessary for petroleum activities to become profitable, it is especially important for energy multinationals to forge ties with a country as a whole— and not to involve themselves with the vicissitudes of its everyday politics.

Bronwen Manby asks, on the other hand, why companies claim that they cannot intervene in local politics when it comes to human rights allegations, while they lobby those very governments to lower their tax burdens or make more congenial political decisions regarding foreign investment. She focuses her analysis on the role of multinationals in Nigeria, while Mr. Imle examines his own company's projects in Myanmar (Burma).

Our "Spotlight: Energy in the Caspian Basin" section looks at a region that, given its potential for vast reserves of petroleum, has greatly gained in strategic importance since the collapse of the Soviet empire. Martha Brill Olcott attempts to dampen enthusiasm toward the region's energy prospects by arguing that despite the promise of windfall profits from oil, energy abundance in the Caspian states may prove—as in so many resource-rich countries—as much a curse as a blessing. In the Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay, Carolyn Miles argues that the United States must put aside its political differences with Iran and allow oil from the Caspian region to be transported via a pipeline through the Muslim theocracy it has long derided as a "rogue state." Finally, Lisa Anderson reviews two recent academic studies of oil and state-building in the Middle East and North Africa. She explores the riddle of why the quadrupling of oil prices after 1973, while flooding producer governments with huge revenues, did not lead to a change in any political regime in the Arab world. She finds the answer in the peculiar political economy of oil, which has encouraged the creation of distributive states that "need not concern themselves systematically with their own populations at all."

Collectively, the essays in this volume examine the many intersections between energy and the world of international affairs. They seek to demonstrate, above all, that energy is not merely a technical subject to be understood by specialists, but also a rich area of interest for policymakers and concerned citizens alike.

For all of the new characteristics that mark today's political economy of energy—and although the zero-sum use of energy as a blunt political weapon is now yesterday's headlines—the energy game still creates winners and losers, albeit in different ways than in the past. Beneath the relatively calm surface of energy politics today lie currents that may prove to be every bit as exciting and contentious as those of the days when oil went unchallenged and prices were set by government and corporate fiat.

The Journal of International Affairs relies on the dedication and enthusiasm of many people. We would like to extend our gratitude for the support of Lisa Anderson, dean of Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, Joan Turner, associate dean, and Penny Zaleta, business manager. We are also indebted to Harpreet Mahajan, executive director of information technology, and her staff for their technical assistance. Finally, we thank our dedicated team of editorial assistants for their invaluable contributions.

**52.2**

For Justice is one; it binds all human society and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. Whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice.

Justice is a word fraught with tension and conflict. From its theoretical foundations to its practical implications, it is a concept with which societies have struggled for centuries. The 1948 signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represented a nascent attempt by the international community

to address this struggle by creating a system dedicated to working toward justice for all. The recent commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the declaration has served as an opportunity to reassess the world's commitment to its principles. Today, with the international community still searching for an effective global legal framework, numerous cases continue to emerge to challenge the pledge of the 1948 declaration. Does the sluggish response to the atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia serve as a testimony to a universal indifference, or should we be encouraged by attempts to institutionalize the pursuit of justice as seen in the 1998 Rome conference to establish the International Criminal Court?

When the Journal of International Affairs published "The Politics of International Law," in the winter of 1984, the Cold War was in its waning years. Though less than two decades ago, the practice of international law at the time was, in many ways, still in its infancy. Our authors addressed dilemmas of arms control and humanitarian intervention and questioned the relevancy of pursuing international solutions to global injustice. Writing an article on the International Court of Justice in that issue, Richard Falk acknowledged its apparent failure, lamenting: .. .even jurists seem disenchanted with international legal institutions. Many now suggest that the true function of the Court should be assessed less in terms of its effectiveness in settling international disputes than in terms of its contribution to the development of international law. A prudent evaluation of the future of the Court seems to suggest a 'wait-and-see' attitude, dedicated to preserving this institution in the hope that sometime in the future, its existence will facilitate the effective application of international law.

There are those who think that Dr. Falk's "sometime" might be now. In light of that, we must evaluate whether we have truly remained committed to efforts of seeking justice and defending peace. Truth and reconciliation commissions and ad hoc tribunals seem to represent a renewed faith in institutions and progress toward a place where normative international law must depend on more than the moral suasion of a select few. Even those skeptical of the inclusive concept of world governance must recognize the increased cooperation between states and among peoples brought about by formal and informal institutions. The increased influence of nonstate actors such as corporations and nongovernmental organizations requires a consideration of their role in the process of building such institutions. What remains to be seen is whether the creation of these new institutions works to unite the world or further divide it along political lines.

The Spring 1999 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, "Seeking International Justice: The Role of Institutions," explores justice in the context of some of today's current struggles, some of which have roots reaching back centuries. There are two threads that link the articles of this issue: justice in its varying forms and the institutions that have been created to address this complex concept.

Richard Falk is a Journal contributor again, writing the introductory essay that looks at the origins of the normative, moral, historical and legal sources of international justice. He identifies the pervasive dilemmas that are currently impeding the pursuit of justice on a global scale and provides a vision of a transformed world order in which the realization of justice is more tenable. An interview with Jimmy Carter illuminates some of the most significant and relevant events of his tenure as president of the United States as well as his work at the Carter Center.

President Carter provides the reader the opportunity to examine the pursuit of international justice through both individual and institutional mechanisms, and he encourages the increased activity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in that pursuit. Benjamin Ferencz gives a personal account of his lifelong struggle for justice. Beginning with his work as a prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trials in 1945 and continuing with his involvement in the efforts to create the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the summer of 1998, Mr. Ferencz argues that we must develop new ways of thinking and new institutions to create an international society that is more lawful and humane for all people.

The "Establishing a Framework" section of this issue is intended to provide an analysis of some of the broad concepts that are critical to understanding international norms of justice. Naomi Roht-Ariazza begins this section by providing some of the key concepts of justice in the context of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. She traces the difficulty of establishing definitions and jurisdictions for these crimes and examines the potential of the ICC to grapple successfully with such criminal acts. She concludes, among other things, that the creation of global institutions of justice will likely improve national justice systems around the world.

Peter van Tuijl describes the role that NGOs have assumed in advocating human rights and justice on an international scale. If NGOs learn to improve their networks and collaborate in more systematic ways, he argues, they will continue to be an important element of civil society and a source of democracy. Marsha A. Freeman analyzes the concept of gender justice and the institutions that have been created to enforce it. She argues that institutions, regardless of their mission, should incorporate a gender perspective in all their work rather than consider the issue separately.

Shifting to an economic perspective, Ethan B. Kapstein explores the international trade regime and the extent to which it provides—or fails to provide—a just arena for its participants, whether they be developing countries or workers in industrial countries displaced by liberalization. He argues that compensation mechanisms both between and among nations are necessary if international trade is to adequately serve the interests of justice. Debora Spar and David Yoffie examine the growing influence multinational corporations and the concept of "racing to the bottom." Though it might be unrealistic to expect corporations to lead the struggle for international justice, they contend, there

are ways to encourage them to stive for higher standards and be concerned about social issues. In the section's last essay, Yozo Yokota examines attempts to seek justice in the context of international environmental concerns. He argues that traditional international law is incapable of addressing emerging global environmental threats, asserting that a fundamental change is necessary from laws among sovereign states to those encompassing the entire global community.

The "Justice in Practice" section looks at recent efforts toward justice in several regions of the world. Ed Vulliamy begins the section by recounting his experiences as a reporter covering the war in the former Yugoslavia and his decision to testify for the prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Considering neutrality complicity, he looks closely at the atrocities of ethnic cleansing and challenges the reluctance of the international community to provide an adequate response. Michael P. Scharf examines the options available to the international community in responding to mass violations of international humanitarian law and evaluates the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in holding accountable the perpetrators of injustice during the Rwandan genocide. Brenda Sue Thornton, a legal adviser for the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, offers a report from the field reviewing the first five cases heard by the tribunal.

Paul van Zyl examines the establishment of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the mechanism chosen to come to terms with the legacy of apartheid and prepare for his country's tenuous future. When injustice is the rule in society instead of the exception, he argues, transition governments must find a creative approach to deal with such atrocities. In considering Argentina's legacy of disappearances and tortures, Louis Moreno Ocampo contemplates the search for justice in

the wake of prosecutions undermined by amnesties, determining that only truth telling, disclosure of information and an active civil society will provide a modicum of societal closure. Stephen P. Marks discusses the lasting impact of the Khmer Rouge regime on Cambodian society, describing how political turmoil and lack of political will, both domestically and internationally, have delayed justice for the victims of two decades of atrocities. Turning to Northern Ireland, Seamus Dunn analyzes the

origins of the peace process leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. His essay discusses the need for justice for all those involved in the negotiations, as well as the dilemmas posed by decommissioning arms and the symbolism of street parades.

David Cortright and George A. Lopez examine the role of sanctions as a policy weapon, specifically the imposition of sanctions on Iraq. They argue that such actions serve the interests of the mighty and represent an injustice for the members of Iraqi society The Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay concludes this section, with Michelle Sieff and Leslie Vinjamuri Wright considering the different institutions chosen to seek justice in Argentina, South Africa, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The authors argue that the ways countries deal with transitional justice depends on the balance of power, the role of transnational advocacy networks and the goals of political leaders. This edition of the Journal concludes with a section debating the viability of the newly-created International Criminal Court. Alfred P. Rubin argues that the danger of the court's surrendering to political pressures would be too great to overcome, and that the technical flaws of the ICC make it impractical and impossible

to implement. Cherif M. Bassiouni, on the other hand, supports the decision to establish the ICC, claiming that only through such a body will the international community be able to address the crimes and atrocities of today's world in a manner considered fair and just.

Collectively, the essays of this issue provide an in-depth examination of the existing and evolving international legal system and illuminate, in their foresight and analysis, the challenges inherent in the pursuit of justice. These challenges should not be seen as insurmountable, but should serve as a reminder of the importance of being ardent in that pursuit. In the end we find that justice is not only a concept that embodies tension and conflict, but one that is emblematic of the ideals for which we strive.

**52.1**

Poverty is lack of opportunity, lack of freedom. It is hunger and malnutrition, disease and lack of basic sodal services. It is a policy failure that degrades people—those who suffer it, and those who tolerate it. It is an equity gap between countries and within countries. Poverty is still the gravest insult to human dignity. Poverty is the scar on humanity's face. Gro Harlem Brundtland (Director General, World Health Organization and former Prime Minister of Norway) discussed in a number of past issues of the Journal of International Affairs, the present issue, "The Multiple Faces of World Poverty: Conceptions, Manifestations and Responses," is the first to focus exclusively on the international dimensions of poverty.

In this era of unprecedented affluence, enormous enthusiasm has been generated around the potential of globalized markets and technological innovations to transform the world for the better.

Yet, in the midst of such optimistic prospects, many groups remain excluded from the general prosperity. As social concerns have lost their prominence in discussions centering on commerce and trade, economic disparities within and between countries have continued to widen. Today, one quarter of the world's population still lives in abject poverty. This issue of the Journal is an attempt to give voice to the multiple realities of world poverty, bringing together a carefully selected group of academics and practitioners who are at the forefront of the debate on poverty and poverty alleviation.

It is a timely issue, given that the United Nations has dedicated the decade 1997 to 2006 to the eradication of poverty. The focus of this issue is poverty in the developing world. This is not to deny, however, that the problems that developed nations face in addressing poverty are as pressing as they are in less developed countries. This reality was brought home to us by a letter we received as we were conceptualizing this issue from an American woman who expressed her hope that this issue, which she saw advertised in another publication, would address poverty in developed countries. "How we look at the rest of the world is not how we see ourselves," she wrote. She went on to describe her

struggle with serious health problems, and how inconsistent insurance and welfare coverage had forced her and her child out of their home and onto the streets.

According to the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, which measures national average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development (longevity, level of basic education and adequate standard of living), the United States ranks fourth, and most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are ranked in the top 20.1 However, while the average person living in these countries enjoys a high standard of living, there are still many who fall between the cracks. Official statistics show that poverty in the United States has continued to rise even as public spending on anti-poverty programs has increased.2 For those interested, we have included a list of books at the end of this issue—many of which specifically cover issues of First World poverty.

In an attempt to address the topic of poverty in an organized and comprehensive manner, this issue of the Journal is organized into three sections—Conceptions, Manifestations and Responses. The Conceptions section seeks to provide a theoretical framework to understand poverty by addressing some of the most important debates on the subject. A recent article in the Economist points out that "measuring] the extent of poverty...is almost as tricky for economists as tackling poverty is for politicians."3 Thus, one of the purposes of the Conceptions section is to lay out a framework for conceptualizing and measuring poverty. Analyzing several important aspects of measuring poverty, Paul Streeten argues that there are three sets of indicators that hold the most promise for identifying and assisting the world's poor. These include real income, expenditure or consumption per adult-equivalent; calories per adult-equivalent; and the proportion of expenditure or income spent on food.

In his essay, Jagdish Bhagwati addresses an intense debate among academics and policymakers as to whether the market oriented economic reforms that have been implemented in a large number of developing countries have exacerbated or abated poverty. Bhagwati concludes that growth—stimulated by such reforms—is a successful anti-poverty strategy that helps improve living standards among the poor, both directly and indirectly.

Muhammad Yunus, for his part, contends that it is the very economic institutions currently in place that perpetuate poverty. Stating that "[a]bject poverty is a creation of mankind, not of nature," he sets out to challenge three assumptions that, he argues, have generally been accepted by economists: that credit is a neutral tool; that entrepreneurs are a special, select group of people; and that capitalism is reliant only on profit-maximization.

The collection of conceptual essays concludes with Cecile Jackson's contribution to the current debate on women and poverty. Critiquing analyses that characterize women as "the poorest of the poor" and attempts to mainstream gender into poverty, Jackson provides a framework that incorporates gender

based insights into the character of poverty and dispossession and "reformulate[s] understandings of poverty to reflect the distinctively gendered nature of disadvantage for both women and men."

The Manifestations section, which includes an interview as well as articles by academics and practitioners in the field, focuses on the different forms that poverty takes around the world, especially in developing countries, and explains analytically how and why certain types of poverty subsist where they do. An interview with Bishop Samuel Ruiz analyzes the inextricable link between poverty, democratization and the rights of indigenous people in Mexico. In his article, Francis M. Deng argues that, in the Sudan, the Dinka have been able to integrate institutional development models and make them their own as a result of their strong cultural identity. Addressing the particularly relevant topic of transition to a market economy, Jude Howell contends that transition in Kyrgystan has had a particularly detrimental impact on children and families in rural areas. Raghav Gaiha and Vani Kulkarni, for their part, challenge Jagdish Bhagwati's argument that growth is an effective poverty alleviation strategy. Disaggregating the poor in India into several subcategories, they find that it is less

insufficient growth than the exclusion of some sections of the poor that perpetuates poverty.

In her article, Coralie Bryant draws attention to an often neglected theme in development studies: rural poverty. Arguing that poverty cannot be properly addressed without resolving the problem of landlessness, she stresses the need for property rights reform in developing countries. For his part, Reginald Herbold Green contends that structural adjustment as originally conceived is no longer a viable development strategy for sub-Saharan Africa.

In their contribution, Margaret Catley-Carlson and Judith A. M. Outlaw set out to clarify certain misconceptions surrounding the linkage between poverty and population growth. Finally, Alan Piazza and Echo H. Liang contend that, while economic reforms in China have had a favorable impact for most of China's poor, this progress has largely bypassed the core of absolute poor concentrated in remote upland areas.

The Responses section is devoted to analyzing some of the most innovative approaches developed by actors on various levels to address the problem of world poverty. This section opens with an article by James Gustave Speth, in which he discusses the new approach of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to poverty alleviation, defining poverty eradication as a human right. Michel Chossudovsky, on the other hand, offers a critique of what he refers to as "global falsehoods" and analyses the serious limitations of international organizations like the UNDP in alleviating poverty. Analyzing the causes of poverty in Uganda, E. A. Brett argues that the Ugandan regime has made significant progress in undertaking policy and institutional reform and has recognized the need to move from a program focused on growth to one emphasizing redistribution and poverty alleviation.

Joanne Fairley, in the last article of this section, analyzes successful poverty alleviation programs at the local level and finds that microenterprise development offers an innovative approach to empower the poor that transcends many of the limitations inherent in microcredit.

Finally, Wendy Rhein's Andrew Wellington Cordier essay argues that the political and economic transformation currently taking place in Russia has hit women particularly hard, leading to a "feminization" of poverty in that country due in part to high levels of female unemployment.

Three broad themes emerge from this collection of essays which point to potential future successful poverty eradication efforts. Several authors, including Brett, Chossudovsky and Yunus, stress the importance of stimulating small- and medium-sized entrepreneurship to overcome poverty. The continued provision of a social safety net to assist the poor in meeting the basic needs of education, health and nutrition is another theme that several contributors, such as Green and Howell, emphasize. Finally, many authors, including Catley-Carlson and Outlaw, Piazza and Liang and Gaiha and Kulkarni, suggest that if the battle against poverty is to be won, groups that have traditionally been marginalized

and/or excluded must be fully incorporated into any efforts aimed at poverty eradication.

The Journal of International Affairs relies on the energy and enthusiasm of many people. We would like to extend our gratitude for the support of Lisa Anderson, dean of Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, Joan Turner, associate dean, and Penny Zaleta, business manager. We are also indebted to Harpreet Mahajan, executive director of information technology, for her technical assistance. Finally, we thank our dedicated team of editorial assistants for their invaluable contributions. In an effort to go beyond merely providing a forum for discussion on the topic of poverty, the Journal of International Affairs will contribute U.S.$1 to Oxfam International for each copy of this issue sold. Oxfam International is a non-profit organization working in response to humanitarian need in over 120 countries. Through this action, we hope to communicate to our readers that while words are important in the war on poverty, they must be followed by action.

**51.2**

Science is giving man the physical prowess of Superman in a Buck Rogers' suit. Man is attaining an awesome ability to control, exploit, transform and destroy his earthly environment. The time is fast approaching when he will be able to move mountains, wipe out most diseases, circle the earth in a flash and build machines to do a large part of his mental as well as his physical labor.

While man has yet to move mountains, Albert Stillson's contribution to the 1959 issue of the Journal of International Affairs on "Science and World Politics" reflects the ever-evolving nature of the events and issues that define eras. It also evokes the unique privilege that editors of the Journal have enjoyed for over 50 years: the opportunity to participate in the creation of an informed body of research that attempts to clear the haze surrounding emerging policy issues of international consequence.

The influence of technology, both its promises and perils, is one such issue. In 1959, 1979 and 1985, the Journal provided readers with timely analyses of the economic, political and social impact of technology, from military control of outer space to North-South technology transfer to Star Wars.

Two years after the 4 October 1957 launching of Sputnick I, with the world caught between the Atomic Age and the Space Age, "Science and World Politics" covered debates within the United Nations on the "peaceful uses" of outer space and the first discussions on nuclear disarmament. Warner R. Schilling, then an assistant professor in the Department of Public Law and Government at Columbia University, noted that the relationship between technology and foreign policy was "nowhere more evident than in the innovations made in the instruments for coercion."

The issue had clearly evolved by 1979, when the Journal published "Technology and the New International Order." Debates on technology's role in the North-South divide raged within UNCTAD. With little evidence of the impending debt crisis, calls for a New International Economic Order also dominated the international agenda. Erskine Childers, then the director of Information for UNDP, noted that "Of the various new dimensions of international development that have come to the surface in this decade, perhaps none has seemed so elusive to many in the North and also in the South, as Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries."

During the Cold War, space technology surfaced as a critical defense issue, capturing the attention of Journal editors in 1985—two years after President Reagan's famed "Star Wars" speech. Still four years away from the end of the Cold War, the Journal surveyed issues such as NATO's capacity to survive the onset of ballistic missile defense systems and the prospects for war and peace in space.

The Spring 1998 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, "Technology and International Policy: Essays on the Information Age," attests to both how much and how little the nature of technology issues have changed in the post-War period. We may not have attained the "physical prowess of Superman in a Buck Rogers' suit," but we have certainly furthered the noble goal of "wiping] out most diseases"; a select few of us have even "circled the world in a flash."

As we approach the next millennia, it is clear that computer, communications and information technologies have ushered in a new era. Many of the authors in this edition of the Journal have broken new ground in several arenas. David J. Rothkopf offers a fresh approach to the changing nature of power in the Information Age, which he documents as a transformation from the realpolitik of Metternich to the cyberpolitik of "an ever-growing cast of actors who have the power to damage or otherwise impact each other's interests." He argues that, thanks to information technologies, "power itself is being... endlessly redistributed and redefined," and that its changing nature "is one of the principle destabilizing forces in the world today." Stephen J. Kobrin, in surveying the new digital world economy, observes an ascendant "neomedievalism" and argues that a number of aspects of modern

political and economic organization "may be exceptional and ephemeral." In contrast, Eric Helleiner surveys the impact of electronic cash to refute the argument that new information technologies undermine state sovereignty.

In the fields of trade and economics, Ellen L. Frost outlines the new challenges confronting trade policymakers in the Information Age. Gavin Cameron surveys economic growth theories, outlines the dynamics of the new "weightless economy" and offers economic prescriptions for both developing and industrialized countries alike.

Martin Libicki and Ahmed S. Hashim tackle the military aspects of technology: the former outlines current and future possibilities of information warfare and their implications for U.S. leadership in the international system; the latter examines the revolution in military affairs outside the West, particularly in China and Russia.

The collection of essays concludes with Michael Vlahos' intricate description of the "revolution" and "migration" that will form part of society's passage to the Infosphere. An interview with Ira C. Magaziner adds an important practitioner's perspective to the development of the Clinton Administration's Framework for Global Electronic Commerce—a key policy document and one of the first to govern financial transactions in cyberspace.

The Journal's technology case studies include a wide range of perspectives on the nexus between technology and international policymaking. Joseph Yam offers a perspective on the impact of technology on financial development in East Asia. Jorge Rosenblut and Derrick L. Cogburn analyze developments in the Chilean and South African telecommunications sectors, respectively. Louise I. Shelly examines the challenges of the new crime and corruption paradigm. Minoru Makihara critiques

Japan's role in the information economy. Harry M. Cleaver, Jr., traces the role of the Internet in an emerging "Zapatista Effect” that is linking an alternative political fabric in new ways. Alistair Millar and Daniel T. Plesch outline the impact of technology on prospects for NATO enlargement. Finally, Thelma Krug outlines the use of space technology for environmental monitoring in Brazil.

Candice S. Levine's Andrew Wellington Cordier essay argues for an integrated U.S. national science and technology policy in support of sustainable development. The Journal of International Affairs survives on the energy of many people. The editors are grateful for the support of Lisa Anderson, dean of the School of International and Public Affairs, as well as Joan Turner and Penny Zaleta for their patient guidance. We are also indebted to Harpreet Mahajan for her technical assistance. Finally, we thank our enthusiastic editorial assistants for their crucial contributions.

This issue is, of course, constrained by its own historical moment. We have no ability to see beyond the curve of the year 2000 and are destined to make our own anachronistic statements. Our authors, however, have examined the present and peered into the future in order to risk taking a stand on the impact of technology on policy challenges in a constantly evolving international environment. The 1997-1998 Editorial Board of the Journal is proud to offer this issue, volume 51, no. 2, to the scrutiny of the generations to come. One can only imagine how readers will refer to this Journal issue 40 years from now. Such notions mark the boundlessness of our expectations and achievements.

**51.1**

India and Pakistan achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1947. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan became autonomous states roughly 25 years later. Each has faced many challenges to statehood, including impediments to economic development, effective governmental institutions, political legitimacy and national security. Rapid population growth in India, poverty in Bangladesh and religious and ethnic insurgencies such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have strained the natural resources and governing abilities of the state. Additionally, external pressures such as the three wars between India and Pakistan, superpower meddling in Afghanistan, refugee flows and crippling floods have tested South Asian states. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985, recognized that many of these obstacles are best solved collectively. At its May 1997 meeting in the Maldive Islands, the Association acknowledged the need to curb hostile ties, which have strained regional economic and political relations, contributing heavily to poverty. Although almost 20 percent of the world's population resides in the region, trade among South Asian states accounts for barely 1 percent of international trade.

Government leaders understand that the promise of peace and prosperity in their countries depends largely upon regional cooperation on matters such as free trade, natural resources, refugees and security. While each country embarked on an independent course either 25 or 50 years ago, today their futures are interdependent.

On the eve of their independence anniversaries, this issue of the Journal examines each country in the region as part of a collective. Our endeavor is not to single out the importance of any one country, but rather to emphasize their complex linkages and search for areas of cooperation.

Moreover, this issue presents a region that has often been overlooked by analysts who tend to focus on political and economic union in Europe and Asia, changes in Russia and the growth of China. Politicians demonstrate a similar indifference: The last U.S. president to visit South Asia was Jimmy Carter in 1978.

In an effort to improve our understanding of this dynamic region, the Editorial Board has dedicated this issue to a review of the challenges of statehood in South Asia. The authors in this issue apply their academic expertise and field experience to present a comprehensive look at the various obstacles these countries face as independent states.

Beginning with political legitimacy and government efficacy, Ainslie Embree reviews the historical context of statehood in South Asia and examines the obstacles that India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have faced since independence. Christopher Candland considers the evolution of politics in India, the world's largest democracy. Candland asserts that the decline of India's historically dominant Congress party was inevitable for a growing democracy in a diverse country. Zalmay Khalilzad analyzes the causes of persistent anarchy in Afghanistan and the recent emergence of the Taliban. Predicting several possible outcomes of the current political instability, Khalilzad suggests a solution for Afghanistan's crisis of governance.

While the subcontinent contains some of the largest democracies in the world, it also includes some of its poorest countries. This issue of the Journal closely examines economic development to assess the state's ability to provide for its people. Amitiva Dutt analyzes the Indian effort to shift its socialist economy to one that employs market principles. Dutt analyzes the 1991 economic liberalization package from a political economy perspective and challenges the extent of its success.

Additionally, Smitu Kothari sheds light upon the many unseen effects of liberalization on India. By documenting the social impact of economic reform, Kothari asserts that disparities between the poor and the wealthy have actually increased since 1991. Greg Ailing further examines the societal impact of economic reform in other areas of South Asia. Ailing compares economic liberalization in Tibet and Sri Lanka and suggests that there is a correlation between economic disparity and ethnic separatism. At times, argues Ailing, economic reform exacerbates societal tensions and lends strong appeal to resistance movements.

South Asia: The Challenges of Statehood examines efforts by international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to spur economic growth and reduce poverty in subcontinent. Addressing development from the United Nations' perspective, Nafis Sadik analyzes the tensions between rapid population growth and sustainable development. In particular, Sadik emphasizes the unique role of women as catalysts of economic growth. In an interview with the editors, Nancy Barry explains how one NGO, Women's World Banking, facilitates micro-credit loans to poor women in South Asia, and how such financing fits into a broader development agenda. Barry also considers the cultural implications of empowering women in traditional societies.

Other experts assess the ability of South Asian governments to manage national crises. Ravi Nair challenges the ability of the Indian government and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to accommodate large refugee flows from neighboring countries. Nair suggests that NGOs are better able than the United Nations to document the mistreatment of refugees. In a case study, Murray Leaf analyzes the ability of local government in Bangladesh to minimize the destruction caused by annual flooding.

Leaf explores flood prevention planning in Bangladesh and its implications for local organization. National survival is also an important challenge of statehood. Sumit Ganguly examines current threats to India and concludes that India's defense policy toward its neighbors and the world lacks direction as the new millenium approaches.

Arundhati Ghose and John Holum respectively present the Indian and American views of the recently concluded Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. They explain India's unwillingness to sign the Treaty and their governments' approaches to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons.

This comprehensive issue is the product of many individuals. The editors of the Journal are indebted to them for their generous support. We especially thank Philip Oldenburg, director of the Southern Asian Institute at Columbia University, for his advice and assistance.

We also thank Lisa Anderson, dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and her predecessor Douglas Chalmers, for their encouragement. Harpreet Mahajan, executive director of information technology, played a critical role in all aspects of production. Jeremy Blumenfeld and Rachel Smith deserve recognition for their technical expertise and troubleshooting, as well as Joan Turner and Penny Zaleta for their patience and wisdom. Our editorial assistants also contributed their time, skill and enthusiasm to make this a better issue. This publication would not have been possible without their dedication and energy.

**50.2**

Although privatization has been analyzed extensively in business, finance and economic journals, its political and social consequences have been explored only rarely. Privatization, defined as any transfer of control in the economy from the public to the private sector, is one of the most important trends in the economy today. In almost every country, governments are privatizing services previously provided by the state. In the developing world, international institutions encourage governments to

create an "investor-friendly" environment by eliminating public control of key resources and denationalizing infrastructure and industry. In the industrialized world, governments abide by the credo that the private sector is able to operate more efficiently than the public sector. In the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the transition to capitalism has been led by massive privatizations of state-owned entities.

Around the globe, privatization is behind many structural reforms that have deep social and political consequences. Many of the effects of privatization can be positive, leading to growth, improved efficiency and the transition to a stable market economy.

Some contend that formerly totalitarian societies will be forced to liberalize their political systems once their citizens have tasted economic freedom. In other cases, privatization can seem to harm the economy it is purportedly designed to help, when the strain of restructuring interrupts growth or increases unemployment, or when undeveloped legal systems allow corruption to become endemic.

These negative consequences can in turn reduce public support for privatization, causing political difficulties for the governments that ushered in reform. This 50th Anniversary Issue of the Journal of International Affairs seeks to unearth some of the consequences and challenges brought on by privatization.

Privatization always involves movement from public to private control. This transition has rarely been smooth and has frequently been accompanied by decreases in employment and declines in consumption, particularly in the developing world. In transition economies, the shock of reorganization has paralyzed some sectors of the economy, while it has motivated others to new heights of entrepreneurship. Policymakers and economists who advocate privatization argue that such disruption and losses in overall welfare are temporary, and that eventually the restructuring will lead to economic growth and greater efficiency of markets.

However, while many of the economies and industries that have been privatized have achieved impressive results in growth and efficiency, the benefits have not accrued to everyone. Increasingly, it seems that a new economic elite is emerging in the new market economies, one that is reaping profits at the expense of downsized workers. Still other industries have failed to achieve the promised efficiency gains, despite privatization. The result is increasing political sentiment against privatization and calls for a more equitable distribution of its benefits, leading to a tension between the architects of privatization and political leaders in many countries.

Of course, not all privatizations are created equal, and that is another theme explored in this Journal. Voucher privatizations differ from investor buyouts, and the range of options available to policymakers is wide. The type of privatization pursued typically reflects a country's goals: a more equitable distribution of capital may be achieved, at least initially, through the voucher system, while more revenue will be raised by the government when state assets are sold to the highest bidder. A country that is using privatization to engineer its transformation to a market economy will choose a method that strengthens or builds market institutions.

Finally, contrary to the advocates of standard formulas such as the popular "shock therapy" approach, privatization is not a science. No plan can be right for every economy. Given the transformative nature of the process, the privatization program itself may have to evolve to reflect the changes in the economy that it has wrought. Since there is no proven "best way" to implement the transition from the public to the private sector, adjustment and flexibility are critical. Still, mistakes will be made, and often these mistakes are costly. Privatization is likely to lead to greater economic growth and efficiency. But without caution, the wrong policies may be implemented, leading to setbacks in growth, equity and democracy. Further, societies must be prepared for privatization: legal structures must keep it honest, while social programs must alleviate its harsher repercussions.

Privatization will be a crucial feature in the global economy of the future; our task is to understand it. The editors hope that the contributions from the authors in this issue will significantly enhance our comprehension of the privatization process. This issue of the Journal begins with several articles that lay out a framework for analyzing privatization. Harvey Feigenbaum and Jeffrey Henig offer a theoretical underpinning drawn from the political sciences. They examine how existing theories of state behavior explain the international trend toward privatization and find that the traditional paradigms of Marxism, liberalism and neo institutionalism all come up short.

Elliot Berg and Andrew Berg discuss five methods of privatization, arguing that governments should carefully consider their objectives when choosing a privatization technique. They conclude that no privatization method is perfectly suited to all circumstances, and that policymakers should seek to incorporate the most useful components of each method.

Taking a look at why countries choose to privatize, Alan Miller examines the varying ideological motivations behind privatization. He finds that governments in the developing world have been driven to privatize for pragmatic reasons, such as the need to ease skyrocketing budget deficits, while developed countries have typically been motivated by free-market ideology, making privatization a key component of their transition to a market economy

Rubens Ricupero looks at the ramifications of privatization for the international economic system. He writes about the changing role of international institutions in a global economy that is increasingly dominated by the private sector. Drawing on the initiatives he is leading at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, where he is Secretary General, Ricupero argues that multilateral development institutions must act as a liaison between governments and owners of private capital, promoting investments that will lead to long-term growth and stability.

This issue of the Journal then turns to an analysis of the effects of privatization on specific countries, industries and sectors of society. Daniel Kaufmann and Paul Siegelbaum tackle the relationship between corruption and privatization in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. They demonstrate that, contrary to popular belief, privatization actually reduces the opportunities for corruption in transition economies. The authors argue that, without privatization, the problem of corruption, while admittedly rampant in these societies, would be magnified.

Domingo Cavallo discusses the implementation of privatization programs in the context of the policies that he instituted in Argentina as Finance Minister. Noting that economic and political goals are often at odds in the privatization process, Cavallo outlines an approach that can produce privatization solutions that are both economically desirable and politically palatable. He concludes that privatization, despite its difficulties, produces a net increase in social welfare, by increasing economic efficiency and allowing governments to direct scarce resources toward social services.

To take an even closer look at the practical problems of privatization, we have included a "Privatization in Practice" section, a collection of case studies intended to illuminate the challenges encountered in the process. Tomâs Jezek discusses the development of the voucher system in the former Czechoslovakia, which sought to achieve an equitable distribution of state assets as a first step toward the establishment of a market economy.

Michael Millea focuses on the privatization of a film studio in the former Czechoslovakia, detailing the challenges of valuing a previously state-owned company. Scott Thomas compares privatization efforts in Russia and the former East Germany by analyzing the experiences of several firms and offers some lessons to be learned from the East German process. Dominique Borde and Marie-Chrystel Dang-Tran discuss their involvement in the legal aspects of the privatization of a French aluminum and packaging materials company. Michelle Celarier concludes the Privatization in Practice section by taking a journalist's look at the corruption that has arisen during privatization efforts, primarily drawing on her experiences in Russia.

Rosa Geldstein takes a broad view, analyzing the sociological impact of privatization in Argentina. She argues that structural adjustment has increased the number of women entering the workforce as primary breadwinners, resulting in a disintegration of the nuclear family. She asserts that, in privatized Argentina, women earn less than the men whose jobs they assumed, and overall social welfare for the majority of the population has declined.

In a conversation with Jariusz Lewandowski, the former privatization minister of Poland, the Journal learned that, like Argentina, in Poland the privatization process ran into difficulties due to the conflict between political and economic forces. Mr. Lewandowski noted that political pressures often obscure economic goals of growth and efficiency.

A.J. Goulding, the winner of this year's Andrew Wellington Cordier essay contest, describes the privatization route that India has taken, arguing that it has been a middle path between total liberalization and state control. "Parallelization," as Goulding calls it, has allowed India to balance economic and political goals. Jonas Prager explores the trend toward contracting out traditional government services to the private sector, considering the viability of outsourcing as a method of privatization. He concludes that, while contracting out can be an important component of a privatization program, it must be implemented judiciously, as there are often hidden costs.

A specific analysis of the importance of privatization in the transportation sector is provided by Peter N. Marber. He argues that the privatization of airports and other key transport infrastructure, as an important element of a country's economic base, will have a profound effect on development in emerging market economies.

Finally, Zhiyuan Cui concludes this volume on privatization with a discussion of the frequent tension between privatization and democracy. Privatization, argues Cui, assists the transition to democracy but hinders the consolidation of a democratic regime. He concludes with a framework for simultaneously enhancing democracy and free markets.

The editors are grateful to the many individuals who have helped us to shape this issue of the Journal. We thank Douglas Chalmers, dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, for his support, as well as Joan Turner and Penny Zaleta for their assistance and encouragement. We are also deeply indebted to Harpreet Mahajan and Jeremy Blumenfeld for their technical assistance and troubleshooting. Finally, we thank the editorial assistants for their energy and crucial input. We have been very fortunate to work in such good company.

**50.1**

Nothing but good can come from seeing a society whole, from understanding its most salient cultural characteristics....[T]his intelligence and this understanding are the essential precursors to enlightened action.

- Stanton Burnett in Religion, the Missing Dimension in Statecraft

Religion may seem an unusual topic for an international affairs XVjournal. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the study of international affairs has been based on the assumption that the important actors are states and that the policies of states are based on rational self-interest. Religion runs directly counter to this view in a number of ways. It is a tie between people and communities that is generally older than that of the nation. It elicits intense loyalty that cannot be argued or bargained away in the same way as ideas which can be considered, in western secular terms, rational.

To the faithful, the existence of God cannot be proved or disproved, nor should it be. Given the focus on rationality in international relations and the inherently nonlogical nature of religious belief, it is hardly surprising that scholars in international affairs have, for the most part, ignored religion in their analyses. Nevertheless, within communities, and perhaps between them, there are forces at work which could not be described in terms of "rational self-interest." History, emotions and beliefs may all influence different actors at different times. For those interested in maintaining peaceful relations or effectively managing conflict, it is necessary to understand how each of these factors affects the situation. Unless we can comprehend the impact of social forces on relations between communities, we will have only a limited, fragmentary view of the world.

Few of the current conflicts in the world or addressed in this journal are specifically religious conflicts. Religion is rarely the sole reason why people fight, but it is certainly one of the complicating factors in many of these conflicts and deserves special attention in the attempt to understand, prevent or resolve conflict. Frequently, one or more of the parties involved defines itself, or is defined by the rest of the world, by its religious identity. Over the course of a conflict, religious identification may grow stronger, convincing some that this is the cause of the problem. As this occurs, it becomes increasingly difficult to find the line between political issues, which frequently are negotiable, and religious ones, which often are not.

There has been an increase in conflicts based on identity rather than ideology over the last few years. This may be due to the end of the Cold War, and with it the shrinking salience of ideological arguments; conflict is no longer immediately viewed as a choice between two ideological blocs. Whether this has changed the nature of conflicts, allowed the eruption of conflicts that where held in check by the bipolar system, or simply enabled us to view problems in terms of their own individual causes rather than in terms of the balance of power, is difficult to say. Whatever the reason for the rise in identity-based conflict, it is clear that the causes (and thus potential solutions) lay elsewhere than in the East-West struggle to which we had grown so accustomed.

There is a tendency to dismiss these conflicts as incomprehensible, thereby removing any need to try to understand them. Many of the conflicts and problems described in the following pages are discussed in the media as intractable and based on historical enmities, suggesting that the participants are irrational and perhaps out of step with the times. However, in each, the people involved are dealing with the concrete situations in which they live. They are struggling to improve their lives, whether by trying to transfer political power to new leaders, as in Ireland, or to radically alter the nature of that power, as in Iran. Religion is used to define both the community and, in some cases, the demands of that community. There is little indication that religion will cease to be used as a tool, both for sustaining relations between communities and for effecting change. This issue of the Journal is roughly divided into two parts.

The first looks at broad issues involving religion and politics in the world. The article by Mark Juergensmeyer sets up a model for looking at religious nationalism. He argues that there are different types of religious nationalism that do not spring from the same impulses some nationalisms arising out of a desire to change the people who are in positions of power, others arising from the wish to change the nature of the power itself. He then goes on to explain how this second, more radical form, arises.

Johan van der Vyver, in his article on religious fundamentalism and human rights, examines the question of whether these two systems of belief can ever be compatible. In doing so, he clarifies the distinctions between different fundamentalisms, differences not between religions, but between the kinds of thought that lead to fundamentalism or to being defined by outsiders as a fundamentalist community.

The last article in the first section of this issue, written by Magnus Ranstorp, addresses the question of why religious terrorism appears to be on the rise, whether it is indeed a new phenomenon and who is likely to take part in this destructive trend. His article recognizes the importance of clerical leaders in the terrorist organizations, but also emphasizes the defensive nature of these organizations.

The second portion of the Journal looks at a variety of regional conflicts and questions in terms of how religion has played a part in creating a situation and how religious bodies might be able to assist in the resolution certain problems. Fionnuala Ni Aolain discusses the situation in Northern Ireland, and the way in which deeply felt insecurity on the part of Protestants has led to discriminatory practices and the cycle of violence which commenced again this spring, after a cease-fire of almost a year-and-a

half.

Marshall Breger looks at another complicated and tense question: the status of Jerusalem in Israeli-Arab peace negotiations. He explains the importance of the city to the three western religions and lays out several of the proposed solutions. One of the points he highlights in this article is the difficulty in separating religious needs for access to sacred places and the political necessity that the city be administered.

Similarly, Peter van der Veer notes the importance of sacred places in India, as he describes the conflicts between Sikhs and Hindus and between Hindus and Muslims. Besides politics of space, he stresses the sense of insecurity in some of these groups and the resulting needs to assert their identity and connect their past to their present.

In discussing the uprising in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994, J. Charlene Floyd, describes the changing and often problematic relations between the church and the state in that country, even prior to independence. Her history of the Catholic Church in Mexico is a clear example of the way the church functions either as a social force to assist the state in maintaining stability, or as a catalyst for change, supporting the people as they struggle for social justice.

The article by Jesse N. K. Mugambi describes the history of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Africa. He shows the immense power of the church in that continent under colonialism, both as a supporter of colonial powers and as a liaison which helped the colonized peoples adapt to their changing world. He examines the motives of the churches in recent years in pushing for democratization and sets out several issues that must be resolved if the church is to become an effective and benevolent actor in political development, while raising questions as to whether that is an appropriate role for the church.

In his article on politics in Iran, and by extension the Middle East, Mohammad Mahallati presents the idea that in a region of the world with a strong religious belief, the political system can never be successfully severed from religion. He argues that Iran is a model for Middle Eastern countries, as it has incorporated religion into governance, has embarked on a program of liberalization in other fields and is beginning to work towards the economic development which is necessary for the survival of any state.

Peter Moody writes of a set of "Asian values," which have been much touted in recent years as explaining the differences in the idea of rights in the West and in Asia, particularly in China.

He explores the connection between current value systems and Confucianism, as well as looking at the ways in which Confucianism has been manipulated by leaders in China. He is especially concerned with the effects of the two value systems on their respective societies and calls for a tempering of the extremes in both.

In his examination of the forces at work in the former Yugoslavia, Gerard Powers shows that religion has frequently been manipulated by the leaders of the different populations. However, he argues that the churches have at times fueled the antagonisms, beyond a merely defensive stance.

The editors of the Journal would like to express our gratitude to Harpreet Mahajan and Jeremy Blumenfeld for their assistance and hard work during a particularly difficult year. We would also like to thank Dean John Ruggie for his guidance and encouragement, and Dean Joan Turner and Penny Zaleta for their support over the course of this year. Lastly, many thanks to our editorial assistants for their invaluable research, editing and input.

**49.2**

"...more people are concerned about the present than about recollections of the past. Astrophysicist and dissident Fang Lizhi in a letter to Deng Xiaoping

Judging from the reports by many Western observers (and some Chinese), the central government in Beijing is continually setting new precedents in authoritarian rule. From tighter censorship of foreign information and business-news services, to the re-internment of dissident Wei Jinsheng and the renewed military and rhetorical posturing over Taiwan, China is habitually seen as redrawing the basic conditions of Deng Xiaoping's greater openness with the outside world.

At the time of writing, the common view in Western reports from China is that the pendulum of political tolerance may be swinging back toward heightened repression, with top-tier Party officials increasingly pandering to a more vocal Chinese nationalism. For instance, the current revival of anti-corruption campaigns are justified less in terms of upholding Party authority and more in terms of improving national stability.

Western states, on the other hand, are portrayed by China watchers as being forced to react to Beijing's policy decisions or, at worst, as being caught unawares. The West's position often seems to be one of fending off an imagined, impending disaster, namely the power struggle which may occur after Deng's death is announced. In the meantime, few other states are less conducive to conjecture by outside observers. Few other countries also have China's potential to alter international stability, whether politically or economically, which is one of the few predictions that most China observers agree is possible. Yet, few other countries also have so many opportunities to expand further within world markets and play a new, decisive role in multilateral institutions.

The Journal's China issue in Winter 1986 focused on the optimism of the central planners' sweeping economic reforms, at a time when Party dogma was being replaced by talk of entrepreneurialism and profit incentives. Our aim ten years later is to reevaluate the forces behind China's continual changes, in an era when Western optimism for China is increasingly dissipating.

Much of the West's weakening enthusiasm stems from the apparent randomness of the Politburo's decisions. This, however, is often exaggerated by Western commentators. The Party's seemingly arbitrary rule may be just as easily characterized as calculated domestic consensus building. For instance, the ability of President Jiang Zemin to maintain power, apparently at the expense of Prime Minister Li Peng, has also meant having to keep any political ambitions of the People's Liberation Army under control. Even the death last year of Communist party octogenarian Chen Yun, a potential rival to Deng Xiaoping, helped affirm the continuation of Deng's program of economic reforms and discourage any lingering opposition by some conservative ideologues within the Party. Larger societal factors, including widening regional and economic disparities, also have an increasingly strong bearing on the central government's policies. Among these factors is the issue of China's political dissidents, who are viewed as either the tip of the iceberg of the country's antagonism to the government or perhaps an elitist group set apart from average Chinese, the latter being closer to the Communist party's view.

Much has occurred in China within the past ten years. Yet, the present state of Chinese foreign and domestic policy is not merely an aftereffect of the post-Tiananmen crackdown on political dissent, just as Deng's economic reforms in the 1980s were not simply a remedy for the ills following the Cultural Revolution.

Many of the basic societal and political changes in China have transcended these eras. It is these fundamental groundswell changes that the Journal has attempted to incorporate in its look at China today.

In putting together this issue, the editors of the Journal are indebted to many individuals for their generous assistance. We would especially like to thank the following people for their guidance: Andrew Nathan at Columbia University; David Shambaugh, editor of The China Quarterly and senior lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Agnès Gaudu at Amnesty International; Sophia Woodman at Human Rights in China and Michael Yahuda at the London School of Economics.

We would also like to thank John Ruggie, dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, for his support, as well as Joan Turner and Penny Zaleta for their help. Our editorial assistants deserve a warm thanks for their vital input and expertise, and many thanks to Yuan Xue and Judy Chen, along with Min San Co, for their excellent translation work. But mostly, we are forever indebted to Harpreet Mahajan and Jeremy Blumenfeld for their technical assistance with production.

Finally, a note on the use of the pinyin system for romanizing Chinese words: Throughout most of the issue, the Journal is following pinyin, the system officially used by the mainland Chinese government and increasingly becoming the most common system for romanizing Chinese words in Western literature. However, we have made exceptions with some names far more familiar to Western readers in Wade-Giles form, such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai shek and the Kuomintang. We are also following the pinyin rule of surname-first, given name-last, except when authors have requested to have their names appear in the Western word.

**49.1**

"There is no other region of the world in which non-regional powers are so actively and so permanently involved. Bülent Ecevit, former Turkish prime minister The history of the Middle East throughout the 20th century supports this assertion. Before the Second World War, Great Britain and France extended their colonial empires across the region, while the United States and the Soviet Union made it a focus of Cold War competition thereafter.

Today, with their vast oil reserves and strategic position straddling three continents, the countries which loosely constitute "the Middle East" continue to be central to the world's interests. The challenges currently facing the Middle East make this an auspicious time to examine the region. The end of superpower competition has resulted in large cutbacks in bilateral assistance and has exposed the precarious nature of dependent regimes. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 has caused a major realignment among the states in the region and has apparently confirmed the U.S. in its role as the sole non-regional hegemon. More recently, progress in the peace negotiations between Israel and its

former Arab enemies offers the prospect of a new era of peace and prosperity. Meanwhile, unpredictable oil revenues and the fiscal demands of government subsidies, continued high levels of defense spending and the rise of radical political groups, partly in response to the dislocations of modernization, are putting increasing pressure on a region that has thus far failed to successfully address such challenges.

It is with the failure to address such issues that this volume begins. Nubar Hovsepian provides an historical survey of the ideological roots of Arab political movements. He argues that, despite their apparent differences and, often, their animosities, these groups have faced essentially the same challenges throughout the last two centuries, including imperialism, authoritarianism and, today, poverty and social injustice. The articles by Lisa Anderson, Bradley Glasser and Peter Marber form a triptych of sorts that examines how foreign influence, in the form of "exogenous rents," has interfered with the natural political, economic and financial development of the Middle East. Anderson's piece addresses one of the most pressing political questions facing the region, namely, why the Middle East has been so resistant to democratic change while the rest of the world seems to be presently "convulsed" with liberal revolutions. She suggests that exogenous rents in the form of oil revenues and foreign aid, which have accrued directly to the states, create a "soft budget constraint."

This has allowed Middle Eastern regimes to appease, or simply ignore, domestic political dissatisfaction. The article by Glasser reinforces Anderson's thesis. By examining recent developments primarily in Morocco, Turkey, Egypt and Kuwait, Glasser uses a logic similar to Anderson's to argue that those states that have successfully attracted external resources have been able to avoid meaningful economic reform. Similarly, by examining eight Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Morocco and Turkey), Marber demonstrates that a country's access to oil rents or foreign aid has a profound impact on its ability or need to develop a capital market.

Andrew Hess looks at the political role of the private sector in the Middle East, and argues that, contrary to Western models, regional economic elites have not had a democratizing effect on their respective regimes. Nonetheless, Hess argues that the imperatives of economic modernization will force the state to increase the private sector's political space if it is to remain intact.

Miriam Lowi examines the political and technical issues involved in reaching regional agreement on the distribution of, and access to, scarce water resources. She concludes that political cooperation is a prerequisite for cooperation on technical matters.

Turning to the realm of security issues, Gary Sick presents a case study of Iran 16 years after the Islamic Revolution and examines the almost schizophrenic legacy left by the revolution. He highlights the ambiguities of Iran's revolutionary experience with regard to its military and nuclear strategies and its relationship to neighboring states and to the world community.

In our interview with Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, he discusses the multilateral effort to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and to monitor its future activities within the framework created by the United Nations Security Council in the wake of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Ambassador Ekéus passionately argues that weapons, in and of themselves, can be catalysts of conflict. Consequently, he sees international monitoring efforts as a potentially valuable tool in the pursuit of both peace and prosperity in the region. In contrast to Ekéus, Robert Neumann argues that conventional arms-control agreements between states will not reduce instability in the region, as the sources of instability lie not in the presence of weaponry but in the existence of marginal radical groups, whose access to necessary weapons is not regulated and cannot be controlled by such agreements.

Shai Feldman outlines the current state of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the relevance of the academic debate to the realities on the ground. He underscores the security problems that motivate individual states, quite rationally, to pursue nuclear capability, and undercuts Western fears of proliferation. At the same time, his analysis is tempered with caution as to the ultimate unpredictability of the impacts of nuclear proliferation, and the concomitant need for the West to tread carefully. The volume concludes with a case study of the ongoing civil war in Lebanon. Aziz Abu-Hamad presents a thorough analysis of the events leading up to the war and examines the history of communal violence in Lebanon. He looks at the role that Lebanon's various governments have played in inciting such violence and in perpetuating certain human-rights abuses which continue to threaten countries throughout the region.

At this historical juncture, the Middle East is confronted by new challenges: A region disrupted by foreign intervention in the past is now attempting to chart a more independent future. The editors of the Journal have assembled these articles in the hope of illuminating the complexity of the challenges facing the modern Middle East.

**48.2**

The state may not be quite ready to wither away, but it's not what it used to be. The state, once thought to be a fortress of sovereignty, now increasingly faces challenges to its traditional domain. There is an ongoing debate over whether or not these challenges signal its twilight. Although few doubt the continued primacy of the state, there is an emerging cadre of non-state actors with growing influence over the direction of global developments. As a result, the state's grip on its own destiny is increasingly compromised by the conflicting commitments that result from its relationships to these actors. The pooling of jurisdictions in the European Union, for example, is a case where the state must redefine its sovereignty while preserving its statehood, the unit upon which the Union is based.

Similarly, the growing influence of non-governmental organizations points to the potential for a "global citizenry," with loyalties to causes that may transcend patriotism and possibly undermine the state's basis of legitimacy. Whereas the issues addressed below have been treated at length within their own disciplines, rarely have their effects on state sovereignty been addressed in a single volume. By bringing together authors from a broad ideological spectrum, this volume of the Journal of International Affairs seeks not to take sides in the debate, but to add fuel to the fire. Daniel Philpott introduces this volume with a brief overview of revolutions in the norms of sovereignty, laying the historical foundation for a debate over whether such a revolution is, in fact, taking place today. The debate then begins with an exposition of the transnational forces behind such a revolution. Louis W. Pauly examines the new international norm implied by capital mobility and points to domestic legitimation as a prerequisite for its sustainability. Ole Waever's investigation of the European Union

describes the three sides of supranational organization in Europe — security, identity and integration — and argues for the preservation of state sovereignty as necessary for a successful integration project. Turning to new forms of organization among states, Amos A. Jordan and Jane Khanna look at the emergence of sub-regional economic zones in the Asia-Pacific — politico-economic entities which are developing an independent and unique dynamic.

Along with this increase in political and economic integration, there are emerging, non-traditional threats to state security, whose impact grows with global integration. Louise Shelley identifies one such threat in her discussion of the development of international organized crime networks.

She looks at the linkages such groups have developed with domestic and international institutions and examines the security consequences of such activities in the post-Cold War era. In a special Journal interview with Ambassador Jan Eliasson, the former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs assesses the state of U.N. humanitarian assistance in a world (and sometimes even a U.N.) seemingly wedded to the vicissitudes of force.

Global integration is not only precipitated by security and economic issues, however. There is evidence that certain local, as well as transnational, ideologies and social movements are beginning to affect

attitudes within states and their behavior internationally. In looking at the intergovernmental channels of influence being forged by non-governmental actors, Ann Marie Clark considers the growing importance of civic activity in international politics and asks whether this signals the potential

for the development of a global civil society. Lee C. Buchheit looks at another set of non-state actors — private consultants — who are contracted to handle matters vital to the prosperity of states in today's globalize economy. Examining the exportability of an ideology formulated in the West, Jean Bethke Elshtain argues for the potential incompatibility of a feminist agenda with activist mothers' groups in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, that perceive "women's rights" as limiting their broader interests in defending human rights.

Bruce P. Chadwick examines the debate over sovereign rights and international environmental cooperation. He proposes that sovereignty "from within" is a form of domestic legitimacy that will prevent any binding international environmental agreement from challenging a state's sovereign rights "from without." William Alonso looks at the notion of citizenship and its basis in the modern world, touching upon politics and the unlikely area of international sports competition. The Andrew

Wellington Cordier Essay, written by Catherine C. Orenstein, presents a first-hand account of the predicament of illegal migrant workers in California and the Dominican Republic, where transnational systems of labor and production capitalize on the illegality of migrant labor.

Of course, no discussion of transnational issues would be complete without an analysis of the world's foremost multinational forum. Thus, in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Richard Falk addresses the difficult role of today's U.N., trapped between the globalized economic values of its leading members and the turmoil engulfing many of their less-fortunate brethren.

This issue of the Journal hopes to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the nation-state in international politics. Although the articles herein represent a variety of disciplines and perspectives, all tackle issues which may pose considerable challenges to the status quo ante. While the state is unlikely to disappear, it will certainly have to confront these issues if it is to remain the prime catalyst of international life in the decades ahead.

**48.1**

When President Bill Clinton decided last summer that he had to get NAFTA passed by Congress, his determination seemed to have no bounds. He was willing to expend a surprising amount of political capital very early in his term — trading favors for votes, some said — to secure congressional support for the free trade agreement. In the past, such heated bargaining had generally been reserved for issues of "high politics"; what was Clinton doing, some observers wondered, betting the farm on so minor an issue as tariff barriers with Mexico? For their part, pundits were painting this issue as one that could make or break Clinton's presidency, and while politicking obviously had something to do with it, so did the matter at hand: free trade.

To be sure, Americans have always debated economics. But even ten years ago, such a fierce contest in the arena of international trade relations probably would have been unheard of. Now we had the vice president and a former presidential candidate going at each other live on cable television, in front of millions of eager viewers — debating free trade. The attention that the media, politicians and private citizens have been paying to trade relations in the last few years is surely unprecedented. As the GATT negotiations are heralded in banner headlines on the front pages of newspapers, as members of Congress debate linking trade to human rights in China and as Washington uses embargoes as strategically as it has used guns, we can see that world trade has leaped to the forefront of public debate and looks to remain there.

What has happened recently to the world trading system? In several ways, countries are working together to exploit changes in the international political system. For one, many formerly closed or planned economies — including those of China, India and Eastern Europe, for example — are liberalizing. Industries never before responsible for organizing their own exporting and importing affairs now need to institutionalize procedures to do so. More and more countries, most notably the new "Asian tigers," are counting on exports to fuel economic growth, and many are succeeding.

Another recent trend is the increasing regionalization of trade. On 1 January 1993, the European Union formally realized its single market, though glitches remain. One year later, the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect. Now, Asian nations, with the Asian-Pacific Economic Council, are considering similar arrangements, and some Latin American and Caribbean nations have expressed their desire to join NAFTA. Trade has long been used as a tool to advance political goals, and this is a strategy that shows no signs of changing. As this Journal issue goes to press, Congress is about to decide whether to revoke China's most-favored-nation status because of its human rights abuses. In addition, the Clinton administration has authorized a full embargo on trade with Haiti to topple the regime there. To be sure, this is not a new tactic. But some policy makers attribute the end of apartheid in South Africa in part to the power of sanctions, and they will always find economic warfare more palatable than bloody military action.

The changes in world trade have implications for states themselves. For example, some argue free-trade laws affect labor for the worse. And industries, citizen organizations, government agencies and other groups are confronting the need to adapt their mandates and approaches to meet the recent changes in trade policy. With the advent of trading blocs come issues of harmonization of standards and perceived discrimination. National economies must adapt to new exporting regimes and the resulting rapid economic growth. By necessity, government, media and business seem to be giving trade more consideration and priority than ever before.

Issue 48.1 of the Journal of International Affairs attempts to identify some changing conditions and concerns, both domestic and systemic, that have arisen as the world trading system takes new turns. As countries deal with each other in new ways politically, so must they economically. But they cannot do so without considering what happens at home.

John Gerard Ruggie opens this volume by re-evaluating his paradigm of embedded liberalism in the context of the post-Cold War order. He presents a form of denationalization in the face of strengthened independent linkages within the international trading order. Next, Carlos Heredia discusses the link between the passage of NAFTA and democratization in Mexico. He argues that NAFTA has led to increased scrutiny of the country and the emergence of a supranational grassroots movement, both developments that have furthered the democratization process in Mexico. As the U.S. government looks for ways to improve the competitiveness of industry, Senator Dennis DeConcini, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, puts forth his views on what the intelligence community's role should be in promoting U.S. economic interests. Many observers now recommend that the CIA engage in industrial espionage on behalf of private companies; Sen. DeConcini cautions against such a policy. Ray Marshall explores the effects of internationalization and

technological change on labor. The benefits of pacts such as NAFTA are overrated, he argues, and low-income workers bear a disproportionate share of the costs of change. Only by implementing high-wage, high-productivity strategies can the United States derive equitable benefits from internationalization.

On a more theoretical level, Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough compare regional and global trade agreements and institutions. They contend that the two should not necessarily be seen as antithetical; instead, regional institutions may supplement multilateral ones. Edward Mansfield analyzes the link between economic blocs and political alliances. He examines the ways in which alliances guide the formation of preferential trading arrangements, and discusses the influence of trade blocs on the conduct of economic statecraft, such as sanctioning. To add to the discussion of regional trading arrangements, Patrick Clawson looks at opportunities for economic cooperation in the Middle East after the recent peace accord. He suggests that cooperation might be possible in trade, investment and tourism while pointing out obstacles that first must be overcome in order to realize the potential gains. Jozef van Brabant discusses Eastern European states' efforts to liberalize their economies and integrate themselves into the world trading system. He examines and comments on various policy issues and concludes that the countries of the region should maintain advantageous ties among themselves even as they seek new trading partners. Arvind Panagariya offers an analysis of India's recent trade reforms and makes suggestions for future policy changes. He evaluates how P.V. Narasimha Rao and his government have managed the transition. Carol Cosgrove evaluates the impact of the Lomé accords in promoting trade with the European Community for the Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Given the impending midterm review of Lomé IV, Cosgrove recommends policy changes that would ensure Lomé's successful continuation. In the Andrew Wellington Cordier essay, Dallas DeLuca criticizes the U.S. campaign against trade-related investment measures (trims). He argues that Washington's claims that TRIMs hamper economic efficiency are disingenuous; instead, the United States is seeking to shape international law to serve American interests, and to protect the profits of U.S. multinational corporations at the expense of developing countries. Finally, the Journal is proud to present the proceedings of "The United States and the World Economy," a Columbia University symposium that brought together three influential economists: Jagdish Bhagwati, Richard Cooper and Burton Malkiel. Debates on international trade are ubiquitous in today's media institutions, halls of government and even homes. In planning this volume of the Journal, we intended to bring up, and answer, some questions about world trade not usually discussed in these fora. We hope we have succeeded.

**47.2**

Since the end of the Second World War, the global refugee situation has reached crisis proportions. In 1951, the United Nations based the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on conditions in Europe, assuming a category of politically persecuted persons as refugees and figures of no larger than

tens of thousands. Today, the number of refugees has skyrocketed, with scholars and practitioners estimating figures between 15 to 22 million people worldwide. In addition, approximately 25 million people displaced within their countries lack protection under the Convention definition.

Such exponential growth is astonishing and perplexing, given the inability of the international refugee regime to address adequately and resolve the problems. In the aftermath of the Cold War, national upheavals have multiplied the number of refugees fleeing persecution based on ethnic, political or class affiliation. The worldwide arms trade, a legacy of the regional ambitions of the Cold War superpowers, has done much to destabilize nations polities, economies and societies, especially in the Third World.

The critical issues now are fluctuating borders, the sovereign rights of nations versus the duty of the international community to intervene in humanitarian emergencies, internal displacement and refugees' increasing difficulties in gaining asylum. Whether victims of civil wars, communal violence, gross violations of human rights or forced relocation, those affected share a common fate: losing their homes, and in many cases, their countries.

Today's refugee crisis has pushed the international refugee regime toward unparalleled regional and global cooperation. While refugee flows are caused by local events such as civil trife or environmental degradation, the globalization of transportation, communication and news dissemination transform these flows into international events. Over the past few years, the international community, and publics at large, have come to recognize a few of the implications of such trends: The refugee crisis itself is no longer a national or regional problem, but a global one. Governments, NGOs and other relief organizations have taken steps towards resolving these situations through cooperation.

As part of these efforts, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) designated the 1990s the "Decade of Repatriation" — by which it meant, voluntary repatriation. But whether voluntary or not, repatriation may be the only option for relief organizations, especially given stringent immigration requirements and the increasing incidence of racist and random hate crimes in countries that once welcomed refugees such as Canada and Germany. Western countries have also begun to define the globalization of the refugee crisis in terms of compartmentalized regional concerns, requiring separate local responses.

Issue 47.2 of the Journal of International Affairs examines the international refugee crisis in the context of state disintegration, state sovereignty, ethnic conflict and humanitarian practice. We begin with an informal discussion with Aristide Zolberg, who provides a candid appraisal of both the refugee regime and the evolving efforts to deal with the current crisis. Among other topics, Zolberg comments on how technological advances have led to an escalation of violence and the spread of weaponry, and

the devolution of global humanitarian and peacekeeping functions to the regional level.

Our interview with Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, sheds light on progress made by the organization and the constraints it faces at a time when most donor nations are experiencing "aid fatigue" and domestic travails. She predicts that the current worldwide crisis will abate. Mrs. Ogata also calls for durable solutions to minimize the impact of domestic upheavals on populations. Gil Loescher surveys the history and contemporary status of the refugee regime. His article provides concrete suggestions for making the international refugee regime more efficient and,

therefore, better able to meet refugees' complex needs.

Acknowledging that growing numbers of refugees are diverting industrial countries' resources away from domestic populations, Charles Keely and Sharon Stanton Russell examine how these countries' governments, bureaucracies and people have responded. They describe how developed countries have restricted access to asylum and sought to harmonize their refugee policies.

Examining the crucial issue of international legal instruments, Arthur C. Helton considers how well such instruments provide refugees protection. Helton focuses on internal displacement and the rights of the displaced within their countries. Environmental problems also cause people to flee. Astri Suhrke discusses the causes and consequences of environmental degradation and how is it linked to the destruction of com munities and patterns of population flows. Dennis Gallagher and Peter Sollis reflect on past and current efforts to bridge the gap between providing emergency relief and long-term development assistance. Too often the emphasis on immediate crises and the need for quick results — as "proof" for funders, governments or NGOs — compels academicians and researchers to focus on the measurable and the material. Too often also, aspects of refugee life such as psychological health, the needs of refugee women and children and sanitary conditions in Camps are neglected. In the Andrew Wellington Cordier essay, Christina Schultz examines programs designed to help Afghan refugee women in Pakistan become self-sufficient. Sollis explores the need for cooperation between aid and development worker.

Gallagher describes the hierarchy of durable refugee solutions and how it has evolved since the end of the Cold War. Providing a more regional focus, Agnès Callamard and Judith Mayotte present detailed accounts of the political and economic constraints causing refugees to flee from Malawi and Mozambique and the Horn of Africa. With this compilation of articles, the editors of the Journal of International Affairs hope to make a significant impact on the important debate on finding lasting solutions to the global refugee crisis.

**47.1**

The computerization of the media is causing a communication revolution with profound implications for the international system. Laptop computers, cellular modems, satellite dishes and electronic mail allow the global proliferation of information at ever cheaper and faster rates. Fiber-optic networks,

transporting data at thousands of times the speed of their digital predecessors, already link personal computers to everything from libraries to news wires to video stores. As a result, anyone with a television, fax machine or PC has access to a staggering array of new information sources.

It is widely held that such technological advances can alter the outcome of international events and involve every individual in the making of history as never before. Instantaneous communication, myriad data-exchange possibilities and cheap news sources are also fostering global integration. Ironically, though, the availability and understanding of information can still be controlled.

Censorship and attacks against journalists still exist, and media owners and governments continue to manipulate the media, be it through financial control, threats of imprisonment or more subtle means, such as "press pools." With closer scrutiny, a host of questions arise about the effects of new communication technology on the role of the media: How do the media influence the world political climate? Just how valuable is trendy round-the-clock coverage of an event — when the opportunity cost is often an analysis of long-term implications or news on a variety of topics? Are the global media manipulated by "the powers that be" as much as they ever were? Is the profit motive destroying "quality" programming and cultural identities? Do the media now drive foreign policy, rather than respond to it? Can the new technology enable the media to play an expanded, more productive role in civil society? Are traditional news media even necessary anymore?

In an effort to address these questions, the editorial board of the Journal of International Affairs decided in Spring 1992 to publish an issue on the media in its now necessarily cross-border environment. "Power of the Media in the Global System" takes stock of the role of the media in society today, and assesses the potentially revolutionary impact of media technology throughout the world. It focuses particularly on the relationship between the news media and political change in the context of global economic integration and today's shifting world order.

Our contributors offer sometimes competing definitions of the media: whistle-blowers on corruption, interpreters of official policy, mouthpieces of government, defenders of civil rights or tentacles of multinational corporations. Authors address what the global media should be, as well as where they fall short of their ideals. Also examined are the ways in which media owners — governments, multinational corporations or independent individuals — can control editorial content.

As the media are changing on a global scale, we strove to find contributors representing a wide spectrum of geographical origins, and, in the interest of objectivity, we included authors from a variety of political stances and professions. The issue thus includes authors from Peru, China, the Sudan and Nigeria, and consists of contributors not only from the academic community but also the journalistic, government, business, human rights and consulting arenas.

This assortment of backgrounds and stances helps the Journal be "objective" about its topic — as if "objectivity" were attainable. Such an ideal in journalism is, of course, impossible to reach, since, even if writers and editors make an effort to write fairly, they still choose which facts to present, and they still hold opinions. By synthesizing a variety of views and well-documented research, however, we may approach objectivity. Thus, while each article successfully stands alone, the reader may gain a deeper, more balanced — more objective — sense of what the media are and should be, if he or she takes the issue as a whole.

James Carey sets the stage by providing an overview of the roots of democratic traditions in the U.S. media, their evolution in civil society and a sense for why the global media are at a threshold of change. He points out that new communication technology may be dangerous, potentially leading to the fragmentation of society — with each group plugged into its own specialized media. Carey also shows, however, that new technology can resurrect the people's role in politics. He argues that the new media might revive the kind of democratic society and freedom of the press that the Founding Fathers outlined in the Constitution. In highlighting the proliferation of call-in radio and television shows, for example, he reminds us of the positive role that the media can play as facilitators of democracy. Often the U.S. tradition of independent media is upheld as a model for the profession worldwide. At the same time, however, the U.S. media have their inadequecies, as argued by Edward Herman, who critiques the media's role in U.S. foreign policy. Contending that the mainstream U.S. media consistently support government policy for a variety of reasons, and that media elite exclude the public from participating in foreign-policy decision making, Herman shows how a kind of de facto censorship can exist, despite the presence of a democracy. On a grander scale, Herbert Schiller maintains that the emerging world order, including the media, is organized by transnational conglomerates. He argues that the transnational media corporations, unbridled in their pursuit of profit and dominated by U.S. corporate interests, have effectively quashed opposing international voices. In the same vein, Hamid Mowlana reviews whether Third World countries are able to benefit from today's technological advances and whether cultural imperialism still exists in the 1990s. Concluding that the new order is one of "many nations, one voice," Mowlana argues that industrial powers continue to block media in the Third World from asserting their cultural and political identities, and that there is a need to redefine the New World Information and Communication Order

(NWICO) for the next century.

In contrast, Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr. sheds light on the benefits of the U.S. government's involvement in international media, as he describes the role of U.S. broadcasting in spreading democracy. In his interview with the Journal, he also dismisses the potential for media domination by multinationals. Like Carey, he points to the fragmentation of the media and argues that the large number of news sources makes such domination impossible. Tunji Lardner also stresses the positive impact of today's media, in particular through the significant role of local media in the transition to democracies in Africa. Further describing the positions of both the international and indigenous media worldwide, Linda Jensen assesses the progress that the Russian media have made in achieving independence from government control since the fall of the Soviet Union. She shows how the media contribute to the development of civil society, but adds that much of the Russian media remain slaves to the Soviet system, often as they struggle for financial support. This issue also examines ethics in the media, as several authors discuss who is responsible for the quality and content of media programming. Implying that everyone — even the media consumer — must account for ethics in the media, Terry Anderson

stresses the importance of the individual journalist's decisions in sometimes life-or-death situations. Drawing on examples of Middle East terrorism, including his own captivity, Anderson makes the case that journalistic ethics cannot be codified but must be based on personal choices. James Grunig, citing several disturbingly effective examples of foreign governments mounting public relations campaigns to manipulate public opinion, analyzes ethics in the practice of international public relations. Providing a series of models, Grunig critically evaluates the potential for public relations campaigns to become propaganda, concluding that they can in fact provide a valuable service in informing the public under certain conditions.

Several non-U.S. authors extend the topic of ethics in media to a broader discussion of openness, freedom of the press and democratization. Abdelwahab El-Affendi squarely faces the linked issues of media and democracy in the Muslim world. Criticizing the stagnation of the media throughout the Umma (world Muslim community), he would likely be considered controversial both at home and abroad. El-Affendi defines the media restrictions in many Muslim societies as a crisis, and he argues in favor of the development of independent, well-balanced media. Furthermore, he asserts that the Umma cannot survive without open debate, and that the modern concept of the "public's right to know" need not conflict with traditional Muslim values. Zhang Xiaogang and Gustavo Gorriti, journalists from China and Peru respectively, also protest the suffocating climates for media in their countries. Zhang, strongly opposed to the suppression of a free press in China, discusses the state of the media in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He points out that the media in China have been aided by the introduction of the market economy, as the Chinese government can no longer afford to control information: An efficient market economy cannot exist without the flow of price information, and China cannot join the international financial community without market mechanisms.

Zhang illustrates that there is a clear link between information and financial reward — that the free flow of information is necessary from an economic perspective, not just from a moral one. He stresses, however, that China has a long way to go to rid itself of the state propaganda machine. Gorriti also protests the regime in his home country for curtailing democracy and censoring the media. At the same time, however, he criticizes much of the Peruvian media — perhaps even more so than the government — for their complacence under the current regime of President Alberto Fujimori. Gorriti further analyzes the reasons for their minimal protests against the Fujimori takeover in 1992. His examination of the Peruvian media echoes Herman's critique of their U.S. counterparts, as Gorriti also points out that a government's tolerance of a few dissenting voices does not guarantee democracy. Rather, he stresses that journalists and editors must be willing to fight for financial independence, depth in reporting and freedom of expression — themes repeated throughout this issue.

For all their diverse views, our contributors are joined in a common project of critical inquiry. In this spirit, we present our tenth annual spring Cordier Essay Competition winner, Carole J.L. Collins. Her paper, on our contest's namesake, former SIPA Dean Andrew W. Cordier, critiques his role in the overthrow of Congolese nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba during the 1961 U.N. intervention in the Belgian Congo crisis. In "Power of the Media," we wish to emphasize the importance of independent, pluralistic media, thorough reporting and freedom of the press. It is our hope that this issue will aid writers, editors and publishers in determining their responsibilities in the changing media environment. Most importantly, we hope these themes will aid readers in analyzing the news and evaluating for themselves the impact of today's communication technology. A well-informed, actively thinking public is an essential component of democracy.

**46.2**

We originally envisioned this issue of the Journal of International Affairs as a dialogue between the exponents of new approaches to conflict resolution — non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a reinvigorated United Nations and regional organizations — and those who still advocate the use of traditional state-centric diplomatic and military tools. Over the last 10 months, however, the very premises of our proposed conversation have been called into question. Given the ongoing crises in the Balkans, Somalia, Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan, one must go beyond seeking a replacement for the steadying hand of bilateral balance, and search instead for effective solutions to unprecedented conflicts as the international system evolves. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many believed that conflicts driven by superpower intervention could now be resolved, and that a more humane political order was finally possible. Yet where the East-West stand-off seemed to prohibit peace, we now know that the U.S.-Soviet rivalry played a unique stabilizing role, constraining — and sometimes even forestalling — intra- and interstate conflict. As the ultimate guarantors of the

international order, the superpowers pre-empted challenges from third parties — such as Saddam Hussein and the Serbs — who they could not otherwise co-opt for their own ends.

With the end of global confrontation, however, states that depended on ideological and material aid from Moscow and Washington are rapidly fragmenting along ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious lines. If the failed Kantangan and Biafran attempts at independence in the 1960s once served as warnings to would-be secessionists, the breakup of the former Soviet Union has had the opposite demonstrative effect. Especially because of its cross-border implications, this process of state fragmentation constitutes a challenge to the international system.

There is no international consensus on how to address the crises that characterize the post-Cold War era, or even on what level to define them as problems. The new world is chaotic in its complexity. International interdependence has developed to such an extent that many issues — from exchange rates to environmental security — can only be dealt with globally. The United States is increasingly focused inward, reflecting a domestic consensus that Washington needs to give long-term, domestic economic and social change priority over foreign affairs. Other potential superpowers, including the European Community, also seem wary of taking a worldwide leadership role until their own houses are in order. For its part, the United Nations — still bound by traditional notions of state sovereignty and prohibitions against interference in the internal affairs of member-states — appears conceptually unready to address the present transformation of the international system.

Not surprisingly, post-Cold War conflict resolution is now a hot topic for students of international relations — and therefore is in danger of becoming a cliché. Yet the immediacy and complexity of state disintegration, ethnic conflict and humanitarian crisis, and the absence of accepted explanatory paradigms, guarantees continuing opportunities for innovative research and policy making. This issue of the Journal is our effort to survey the current state of the debate, and provide studies of practical solutions.

Our interview with Boutros Boutros-Ghali provides an overview for the issue, as the U.N. Secretary-General defines his vision of the new world and grapples with the impact of peacemaking on such issues as state sovereignty, world order and human rights. He describes new challenges for international security as economic, social and environmental, and makes a forceful argument for an expanded U.N. role in these matters. In the interview, however, the Secretary-General took care not to move too far ahead of the international consensus, taking pains for example to note that the United Nations' intervention in Somalia was strictly humanitarian.

James Goodby, Kim Holmes and Peter Fromuth follow, each outlining alternative approaches to collective security. All contribute different perspectives to the discussion, presenting varied notions of multilateral organizational responsibility, state motivation and sovereignty. Recognizing the limitations inherent in a system compiled of diverse parts, they each suggest different

criteria to guide the international community in future conflict intervention.

Taking a more philosophical approach, Gabriel Negretto later contends that the contemporary concept of collective security can contradict the very ideal of international peace it seeks to uphold. Drawing on the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant, Negretto reminds us that without an international value consensus favoring peace over war, a security regime may do little to keep the peace — as violent defensive wars may be waged against aggressors. Addressing important new issues and new players in conflict resolution, Philippe Sands and Farouk Mawlawi discuss the increasing need for multistate environmental security and the ever-expanding role of NGOs, respectively. They broaden our inquiry with an examination of current challenges to peace in terms of humanitarian crises and the scarcity of renewable resources, and the best approaches to solving these dilemmas.

Three case studies then explore the concrete dilemmas and opportunities of post-Cold War peacemaking, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy. David Holiday and William Stanley analyze the United Nations' unprecedented role in brokering the settlement and monitoring the transition to peace in El Salvador, carefully examining whether U.N. efforts strengthen — or displace — local efforts to reform the state apparatus. As Muthiah Alagappa indicates in his discussion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Cambodia peace process, regional organizations have their uses but are not a simple panacea. In his case study, Barnett Rubin examines the failure of U.N. conflict resolution efforts to peacefully resolve the civil war in Afghanistan, and provides a sobering reminder of the limits of diplomacy and the intractability of many conflicts in less-developed regions today.

An essay by United States Senator John Kerry concludes the issue, affirming that the so-called family of nations — coalescing and disintegrating at the same time — requires a new type of leadership. His idea of a U.S. role to meet the security demands of this paradoxical new world is the strengthening of American leadership in areas of the global economy, international law and the environment.

Last year at this time, the Journal focused on nationalism and sovereignty. With the current issue, we take the debate begun there one step forward, examining the impact of those issues on international peace and security now and into the next century. The topic of conflict resolution is a vast one, and the rapidity of world developments can render meaningless current analysis and conclusions. By any standard, the decade of the 1990s is the kind of historically seminal period in which the transitions and upheavals that we now only dimly grasp will long be of interest to historians and policy makers alike. While we cannot guarantee that these articles will not be overtaken by events, we believe that

their analytical arguments, and the broad issues to which they speak, will be of continuing relevance. In struggling with the critical issues of conflict resolution and world peace, we hope to have contributed some lasting insights into this complicated, but imperative, discussion.**46.1**

The term "dilemma" is uniquely suited to diagnosing sub- Saharan Africa's multifaceted economic and political development problems. Dilemmas have been used extensively in African folklore to interpret, illuminate or deride the difficult choices people confront in their relationships — whether with their peers or with those who exercise power over them. One old Nigerian dilemma, for example, describes a man who relies on the magical healing ability of a friend to cure his impotence. To this end he is given an armlet, which he must continue to wear for the cure to remain in effect. One day, when the man encounters his enslaved mother, he pleads with his friend to employ his gift and free her. But the magician will do so only on the condition that the armlet be returned. The dilemma is clear and unresolvable: The man must decide between himself and his mother. In this issue of the Journal, we focus on a new generation of African dilemmas — ones that speak to the continent's tenuous links to the international community and intermittent successes in reversing modes of governance and resource management that have, in many cases, been inimical to sustainable development. But like the dilemma of the Nigerian man, these seemingly broader dilemmas do not lose their distinctly personal dimension; they revolve around painful choices — choices that carry heavy opportunity costs and entail human suffering either way.

Our overarching goal in focusing on development dilemmas in sub-Saharan Africa is to vector scholarly attention from a variety of disciplines toward a continent that has — in the journalistic jargon of the day — been "marginalized." Yet the notion of Africa's marginalization, while stemming from the concrete reality of super power disengagement from the continent, is facile. Though famine and dislocation during the last two years have not mobilized limited Western government resources as expeditiously as the spectre of the hammer and sickle did during the Cold War era, a variety of emerging nongovernmental organizations (ngos) have directed international concern to sub-Saharan Africa.

Spurred partially by a global wave of revulsion toward South Africa's apartheid regime during the mid and late 1980s, as well as by incapacitating droughts first in the Horn and more recently in Southern Africa, a proliferation of ngos in the industrialized world has emerged to coordinate relief efforts, influence Africa policies and channel investment to the continent. Described as "the third sector" by Michael Clough, this assemblage of ngos, lobbying organizations and citizens' networks has been far more effective in placing African issues on the public agenda and implementing suitable development

policies than the most well-intentioned government efforts. Indeed, groups like Randall Robinson's TransAfrica — nourished by a nation-wide constituency of African Americans — have been in increasingly instrumental in shaping the terms and conditions of U.S. Africa policies vis-à-vis former U.S. clients like Kenya's Daniel arap Moi and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko.

The notion of Africa's marginalization is also problematic because it grows from residual paternalistic sentiment regarding Africa's "dependent" relationship with the industrialized world. Too often, sub-Saharan Africa's successes and failures have been ascribed by foreign observers to the vicissitudes of the continent's relationship with the industrialized world. Adhering to the notion of dependence has obfuscated Western understanding of many of the continents uniquely African solutions to complex development problems and has prolonged the condescension of the "white man's burden." But how can the West mobilize its abundant development resources without lapsing into such retrograde hauteur? A partial answer lies in a more thorough comprehension of sub-Saharan Africa's political and economic development dilemmas. Recognizing that these myriad dilemmas are tightly interlaced and that the limited length of our publication imposes strict parameters on our queries, we have chosen to steer our contributors toward the following themes: First, there is the dilemma of border stability versus self-determination. A succession of multilateral treaties and norms have rendered many of the world's state frontiers sacrosanct — whether or not they reflect coherent ethnic or national groupings.

This disparity is especially stark in sub-Saharan Africa, where most borders manifest the ambitions of Europe's colonial powers as articulated at the Congress of Berlin in 1885. The continent's borders have hardly changed in a century: Even during the rush to independence in the 1960s, the inviolability of these artificial borders was perceived by African heads of state as the sine qua non of peaceful coexistence. Ironically, sub-Saharan Africa's independence movements were energized by the notion of self-determination, which holds that any nation or ethnic group may forge its own political institutions and which leads inevitably to the right of secession. Since independence, however, the international community has rarely tolerated secessionist movements in Africa; the Biafran rebellion in Nigeria attracted little outside support, and more recently, the claims of Angola's ethnically homogeneous Cabinda enclave met with stony silence. Instead, states with very little internal cohesion and power of enforcement over their territory have been consistently propped up in the international system until very recently. This entrenchment of borders has had the beneficial effect of considerably reducing the prospects for the Balkanization of sub-Saharan Africa. As Robert Jackson points out in this issue's leading article, however, such colonial jurisdictions impede development by ignoring more rational geographic consolidations and preserving non-representative, self-serving regimes. The preservation of quasi-viable polities carries serious economic repercussions as well, and leads to a second dilemma: the dilemma of accountability versus adjustment. To offset low export-commodity prices as well as to speed industrialization and integration into the global economy, many sub-Saharan states have incurred crushing debt obligations that cannot be realistically serviced. Indeed, by 1989, the region's indebtedness equalled its cumulative gnp. This mounting debt is a double curse: If Africa is to be held accountable for this debt — one goal of the Bretton Woods lending institutions' "structural adjustment" programs — prospects for the continued peaceful democratization of the continent may be hampered. As states are forced to eliminate subsidized prices and channel agricultural goods to foreign markets for desperately needed foreign exchange, regimes will find themselves in the thorny position of squeezing already hard-pressed constituencies. Repressive measures may prove tempting to enforce such austerity — even for regimes operating on a popular mandate. On the other hand, ignoring the issue of financial accountability will only exacerbate the corruption and clientelism that block the transition to democratic governance and the effective distribution of painfully limited resources.

Just how far Western governments and lending institutions should press their "benign" intervention carries us to a third and closely related dilemma: that of regional cooperation versus bilateral relations with the donor/lender community. This dilemma was encapsulated in Southern Africa last year — during one of the most debilitating droughts in memory. Despite a network of cooperative regional arrangements built up under the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Zimbabwe found it difficult to provide its drought-stricken neighbor Mozambique with surplus grain. Notwithstanding one of the continent's most innovative regional cooperation arrangements, Zimbabwe was unable to respond to Mozambique's plight primarily because regionalism is incompatible with the individual states' relationships to Western lending institutions. Able to negotiate only with sovereign states, the World Bank, and especially the International Monetary Fund, have promoted contradictory goals. On the one hand, they have encouraged regional economic cooperation to facilitate cross-border market activities, improve the compatibility of the region's soft currencies and free hard currency for debt servicing. On the other hand, the pressure to export cash crops and other commodities in exchange for hard currency has obstructed efforts to strengthen local currencies and harmonize economic development across borders.

These development dilemmas are not easily disentangled; they necessarily entail the exclusion of attractive and seemingly necessary options, and worse, they often pit tempting short-term palliatives

against options that favor sustainability but provide returns only in the long run. The analyses we have assembled here, we hope, will help measure potential consequences as sub-Saharan Africa and the global community determine the continent's post-Cold War political and economic development trajectories.

**45.2**

When we began to put this issue of the Journal of International Affairs together nearly a year ago, events around the globe made it clear that nationalism was a resurgent force that would assume a dominant role in the post-Cold War international system. Over the course of the past year, a superpower wracked by nationalist tensions has disintegrated into its constituent pieces; the Yugoslav federation has been destroyed by an intensely nationalist civil war; we have witnessed the tragedy and the fury of nations without states in the plight of the Kurds wandering in the Iraqi desert and in the West Bank Palestinians' continued intifada against Israeli occupation. As this issue goes to press, the London police clear debris from a subway bombed by Northern Irish terrorist-nationalists, and civilian casualties are being counted in the latest clash between Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Until quite recently, conventional wisdom among political theorists held that nationalism was an obsolete force that would fade with the advance of history and the processes of modernization and economic development. Curiously, this belief may have been the only point of ideological conjunction between the democratic West and the communist East. The former touted a 45-year span of peaceful relations in Europe after centuries of warring as proof that democracy and the market were eradicating the atavistic blight of nationalism. The latter proclaimed that the "national question" had

been "solved" by the early 1970s, thanks to the material and spiritual superiority of developed socialism. As a result, both camps tended to softpedal signs that something might be seriously amiss in their interethnic relations.

Events in East Central Europe since 1989 and, more recently, in the former Soviet Union, have discredited the communist half of this conventional wisdom, as nationalist forces greatly facilitated the success of anti-communist movements throughout the region. Yet most Western observers still maintain that nationalism is inversely related to economic and political development. East Central Europe, the argument goes, will develop along the lines of Western Europe and eventually experience the same integrative forces that have led to the European Community Democracy and the market, however, may not be the panacea they are assumed to be: The experience of the Soviet successor states indicates that these forces may, in fact, contribute to interethnic conflict and further disintegration. Conversely, nationalism may not always be a scourge: It has contributed to the demise of authoritarian regimes and continues to advance the much-vaunted right of national self-determination. Now that self-determination has become more than an accusatory slogan between East and West, the inherent contradiction of the international state system — between the right to self-determination and the sanctity of state borders — can no longer be ignored. This contradiction has become especially conspicuous, as the former hegemons may no longer be willing or able to protect every international border that is challenged. Nationalist daims on territory are thus likely to increase, directly impinging on state sovereignty from within and without. There are literally hundreds of stateless nations, whose cries for territorial independence cannot feasibly be met. Nationalism therefore compels us to rethink the notion of sovereignty: We need to devise a new concept between servility and sovereignty, to envision various degrees of autonomy and self-rule and to consider anew the options of federation and confederation.

This issue of the Journal seeks to explore such questions attending the concepts of nationalism and sovereignty in their many manifestations. Much confusion surrounds discussions of these topics, in no

small measure because, like the allegory of the blind men and the elephant, each observer perceives something different. Alexander Motyl leads off the issue with a discussion of the importance of definitions and theory to ensure clarity of thought. He goes on to directly challenge the conventional wisdom regarding nationalism, arguing that modernity itself facilitates nationalist activity. Ruth Lapidoth, Allen Buchanan and Alexis Heraclides address the contradictions of the international state system from the perspectives of international law, philosophy and political science, respectively. They examine such questions as: How and when should a nation be permitted to pursue the right of self-determination? What moral conditions ought to guide the pursuit of self-determination and secession? Which structural arrangements can best address the challenges of nationalism? How can the concept of sovereignty accommodate the demands of nations for new states or greater sovereignty? Hedva Ben-Israel explores the essence of nationalism through historical analysis, arguing that it is a synthesis of ethnic heritage and national self-consciousness.

The second half of the issue uses case studies to explore these issues and themes. The former Soviet Union and formerly communist states of East Central Europe offer the most prominent examples

of nationalism in action and, given their plethora of nationalities, are case studies par excellence. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone examines the reasons behind the failure of the Soviet nationalities policy and offers a less-than-sanguine forecast for ethnic relations among the former republics. Gertrude Schroeder draws upon the experiences of states newly created from the Soviet bloc to evaluate the prospects for new states' economic survivability. Raymond Pearson surveys the geopolitics of people power in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, and Reneo Lukic looks at the failure of forced federations in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Case studies from other regions broaden our inquiry. Gregory Gause explores the nature of sovereignty and national identity in the

Middle East, where state borders were drawn by the European powers with little regard for ethnic or religious boundaries. Rodolfo Stavenhagen discusses ethnic identification and mobilization among the indigenous populations of Latin America. Finally, Maurice Pinard analyzes the forces behind the recent resurgence of separatist sentiment in Quebec, providing an example that seems to lend credence to the thesis of Professor Motyl's article.

It is always difficult to analyze a situation in flux: The rapidity of developments in the areas covered in this issue of the Journal poses a particularly challenging task. Though these authors' analyses are embedded in the time period in which they were written, the themes and theories that inform their work are, and will remain, relevant in helping to comprehend the nature of nationalism and sovereignty. Nearly two decades ago, the Journal devoted a full volume to the topics of nations without states and divided nations. In the ensuing years, the subjects of nationality and ethnicity have not received the attention that they warrant, either from academics or the general public. Now that the Cold War has come to an end, it is essential to rethink what may well prove to be one of the most powerful forces in international affairs. With this issue of the Journal we hope to contribute, in theory and in practice, to a vigorous debate on the topics of nationalism and sovereignty.

**45.1**

In 1972, the United Nations' Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment elevated environmental issues to the international agenda. By 1990, debate about the scope and severity of damage to the Earth's natural resources had retreated to the margins, while international efforts to craft sound environmental policy had become widespread. But increased international attention has not produced consensus on the more controversial political and economic issues that global environmental problems raise. The 1972 conference sought to address the conflicts between the goals of environmental protection and economic development. Since traditional development models often ignored environmental consequences, however, these goals remained essentially contradictory. Without an international authority to enforce trade-offs, sovereign states refused to sacrifice their interests for the greater social good. Since that time, though the need for links between environmental and development policies has been widely recognized, no overarching international consensus has materialized to take immediate and often painful action. At the same time, technological advances have revealed global damage to be more serious than was understood even a decade ago, and revolution in East Central Europe has exposed environmental damage of shocking proportions.

**44.2**

This issue of the Journal seeks not to catalog the world's environmental woes, but to explore the ability of existing political systems and institutions to cope with problems growing at exponential rates. Reflecting the expertise of both scholars and policy practitioners, the articles that follow examine the institutions and political forces that shape international environmental policy. Opening the issue, Maurice Strong argues that conflicts of interest between the developing and developed worlds remain the essential problems on the agenda for the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, as they were in its predecessor 20 years earlier. It is the job of the widening spectrum of non-governmental groups, he argues, to influence states in the direction of sustainable international environmental and economic policy.

Is the present international system up to the daunting tasks that Strong sets for it? How do the domestic politics of environmental issues influence international policy making? Two political scientists address these questions.

Dean Mann looks at the ways in which societies and governments adapt to fundamental shifts in the way they think about the world, arguing that the emergence of environmental consciousness is one such shift. Although the decentralized international system would seem to impede progress on critical global environmental and development issues, Mann argues that the often hap hazard and halting learning that the system has displayed in the past is likely to be a virtue in coping with the transition to an environmentally conscious world.

Within states, environmental issues have achieved political prominence only in a few cases, and in those few, environmental concerns have reached the national agenda by a wide variety of routes. Sheldon Kamieniecki analyzes the political processes by which environmental issues reach decision makers. He identifies three models of agenda building, each with very particular implications for the domestic success of environmental policy.

Specifically, Kamieniecki argues that the democracies of the advanced industrialized world are the most fertile grounds for sound environmental-policy making, followed by the emerging democracies of East Central Europe. In the Third World, he writes, monopolies on political power often prevent the grass-roots involvement that has led to shifts in policy in other countries. Though the worst of the environmental destruction is taking place in the developing world, the revolutions of 1989 in East Central Europe exposed the dire legacy of decades of communist mismanagement there. Helmut Schreiber outlines the devastation left in the wake of the centrally planned economies and explains its structural sources. He advocates massive Western aid programs, a need made even more compelling by the spillover of environmental problems from East to West.

In its effects on the entire world, the dire condition of the environment in developing countries is even more significant globally than that in East Central Europe. Gary Hartshorn identifies species extinction, global climate change, sustainable development and population growth as the four key environmental

issues facing the developing world. The effects of these issues will be felt worldwide, Hartshorn argues, and thus require action on a global scale to foster sustainable economic development.

If past Western aid to the developing world is any guide, however, there is little hope that economic and environmental priorities will be linked in a sustainable package. Richard Sandbrook demonstrates that economic and environmental policies toward the developing world have usually been made in isolation, with environmental goals inevitably losing out in the process. He calls for a more integrated approach in the developed world to solving the twin problems of underdevelopment and environmental degradation in the Third World.

Ernst von Weizsäcker sees the North's responsibility from a different angle. He argues that the greatest contribution that the industrialized world can make to global environmental policy is the radical transformation of advanced economies toward sustainability. Sustainable models of economic development in the North, he posits, would both serve as examples to the developing world and lead to quantum jumps in social welfare in the North. At the same time, multilateral efforts at environmental protection would be more successful, von Weizsäcker asserts, because the North would be able to point to its own model as a goal for the developing world.

Multilateral efforts at environmental policy are the focus of the closing two articles in this issue. Peter Thacher analyzes the checkered record of the U.N. organizations erected in the after math of the 1972 conference. Despite underfunding and often paralyzing political problems, Thacher argues that the United Nations remains at the center of the process of making international environmental policy and is in a unique position to confront the challenge of safeguarding the Earth's future. Outlining the gradual and uncoordinated evolution of international law on the environment, Oscar Schachter notes that law now covers nearly all aspects of international environmental issues. In a decentralized system, however, international law develops largely out of state practice and international treaties. Schachter argues that this handicap means that international law should not be looked to for solutions to the most difficult international environmental issues such as global warming, though it has a certain contribution to make.

This theme of decentralization and the obstacles standing in the way of a coordinated international policy on environment and development—to borrow from the title of the 1992 conference— resonates through all the articles of this issue. Though it makes policy making infinitely more complex, it may, as Dean Mann argues, make that policy more adaptable and appropriate. It is from this realization that we can draw hope in the face of daily reports of ever-worsening environmental destruction.

**44.1**

This issue is dedicated to the memory of William T.R. Fox, founder and long-time director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. All of the contributors shared a desire to offer testimony of respect, admiration and affection for a man and a scholar who inspired and encouraged a generation of students and colleagues. We hope that this collection of essays is an appropriate testimonial, one that Bill himself would have appreciated, and—one hopes—greatly valued.

Bill was fond of describing himself as a "pragmatic meliorist" and was, throughout his career, concerned with improving the conduct of world affairs and more carefully articulating the normative dimension of national and international policies. But Bill was also intensely concerned with the theoretical development of the discipline of international relations. And it is to this dimension of scholarly activity that this collection is addressed.

Bill was a remarkably undogmatic and open scholar. He did not demand from his students commitment to any particular theory, ideology, or vision of what ought to be. He asked only for a commitment to scholarship, a willingness to work, and an ability to make and defend an argument according to the best available standards and evidence. Indeed, when one looks at the contributors to this issue, there is ample, if indirect, testimony to Bill's openness; the group spans the ideological spectrum, theoretical commitments extend from efforts at "grand" theory to detailed (but theoretically informed) discussions of particular issues, and there is throughout, either explicitly or implicitly, a concern with normative issues.

This very diversity, however, creates a problem of its own. How can such a diverse group produce a collection of essays that is coherent, integrated, and of general interest to an equally diverse readership? Of course, one might fudge the issue by arguing that any collection by this particular group of scholars is bound to be intrinsically interesting, perhaps even valuable, but this is an inherently unsatisfactory response.

In any event, in my editorial capacity, I have attempted to diminish the problems created by diversity—without at the same time losing its benefits—by asking each author to take an evolutionary view of theoretical development in general, or a particular problem or issue that he or she has studied. My hope was that in some small way this approach might provide a rolling perspective on the way in which theory and theorizing have developed (or not developed) in our shared discipline over the past

three or four decades.

I shall leave it to the reader to determine what common themes emerge from this collection, in part because detailed explanation would require too much space and in part because any or all of us (authors and readers alike) might have very different judgements about the salience or importance of different themes. But I cannot resist noting, if only in passing, that the skepticism that is prevalent in at least part of our discipline about what theory has produced or can produce is not present in the pages that follow: All the contributors seem to share the belief that the abandonment of the quest for theory, or enhanced understanding as a preface to theory, would leave the discipline in a shambles. That the quest is difficult and unlikely to result in more than partial and contingent answers to the

questions that concern us does not mean that we can or should retreat into the seductive realm of policy advice, particularly if such advice reflects only personal opinions and judgments. At the same time, one might also note that most of the contributors to this issue, while committed to the theoretical enterprise, are much more aware of the limits of theorizing in international relations and much more modest about what can be achieved. Some of the more grandiose claims or promises of the past now seem very hollow, and in most cases there is more willingness to see many roads to increased understanding and more adequate theories.

No single substantive theme dominates this collection, which should not be surprising since we are not committed to a single theoretical vision or to the analysis of a single issue or problem. Still, I do think that one theme cuts across a number of essays in this collection—a concern with the problem of change (or the relationship between change and continuity) whether in concrete circumstances, as an extraordinarily complex analytical problem, or as a normative issue. Perhaps the emergence of this theme merely reflects the temper of the times or the difficulties in understanding how to direct or guide or even control changes that seem threatening to a system of world order from which we have benefited greatly. In any case, this issue will surely continue to dominate the debate about the adequacy of neorealism and perhaps generate some movement toward the achievement of a post-realist theoretical consensus—a movement which may require a greater concern with the normative dimension of international theory and with the complex linkages between different levels of analysis.

**43.2**

Wedged between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Rio Bravo and Guatemala, lies a country in search of a future—Mexico. Currently, Mexico faces several important decisions. Given a changing world order in which the polarization between the Soviet Union and the United States will play a diminished role, the solutions to Mexico ' s dilemmas of regime legitimacy, debt and foreign policy may serve to redefine the Mexican nation as well as the relations among the states of the Western hemisphere.

Because of Mexico's unique geographical location next to a world superpower and on the northern edge of Central and Latin America, Mexico's political and economic ties stretch the country in opposite

directions: north toward the United States and south to the rest of the Americas. Although Mexico has at times benefited from this position, more often than not the pull between north and south has been painful. As Mexico strives to resolve its current crises, it must also balance this tension between the interests of the north and those of the south. Encompassing the areas of domestic politics, economic development and foreign policy, Mexico's current crises, while unique in their origin, may serve as important lessons for other developing nations facing a changed international area.

In this volume, the Journal of International Affairs presents a series of articles that describe these dilemmas and explore their solutions. The focus is on the particular issues and choices Mexico faces and how their solution will affect Mexico's role in world affairs in the 1990s. Should Mexico tum its attention north or south, or pursue a course that does neither, choosing instead to balance between the two? Will Mexico be able to pursue a course of economic modernization, necessary in order to continue making payments on its current debt obligations, while at the same time preserving its traditional state-party regime? Or will the authoritarian state of Mexico's ruling party go die way of similar one party systems in Eastern Europe where market-oriented reforms have proven incompatible with political inflexibility? Or will Mexico tum inward, repudiating its foreign debt and relying on its past traditions and history of fierce independence to resist North America's cultural and

economic domination? Lorenzo Meyer sets up the issue with a history of Mexico's relations with its rich and often arrogant northern neighbor, the United States. Adolfo Gilly, John Bailey, Leopoldo Gömez and Diane Davis go on to describe the history and sources of the ruling party's crisis of legitimacy, which has been exacerbated by widespread allegations of electoral fraud during the 1988 presidential elections, and compounded by debt-imposed conditions of austerity that have led to increasingly vocal popular social and political opposition movements. Mexican essayist and intellectual Carlos Monsivâis and opposition leader Cuauhtémoc Cârdenas give voice to the dissatisfaction of the organized opposition.

In the economic sphere, Rudiger Dornbusch offers an analysis of Mexico's economy, including strategies for development and repayment of the debt and Jesus Silva Herzog, Mexican finance minister under former president Miguel de la Madrid, recounts the inception of Mexico's austerity program (resented at home, hailed abroad) as well as the behind-the-scenes issues and political struggles that eventually caused him to resign. In the realm of foreign policy, Jorge Castafleda directly addresses the content of Mexico's "independent" foreign policy, describing its past strengths and current failings, and suggests that Mexico's north-south balancing act has tipped dangerously to the north.

Saskia Sassen analyzes one of the most volatile foreign policy issues in the hemisphere, immigration, suggesting that the solution lies less in legislation than in the internationalization of the global economy. Finally, Susan Purcell, a former member of the State Department's policy planning staff, describes what she sees as the mutual benefits both Mexico and the United States can expect from greater cooperation.

What does the future hold for Mexico? The answer to this question lies in balancing tradition and modernity, stability and change. Mexico's decisions, as it contemplates the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, from poverty to development, are increasingly relevant to today's changing world order. Mexico has too often been misunderstood by its largest and closest neighbor and ignored by the rest of the world. We hope that this issue of the Journal will help focus new attention on Mexico and make a substantial contribution to the current debate both within Mexico and abroad.

**43.1**

In the aftermath of World War II, two former allies, the United States and the Soviet Union, squared off against each other in a competition for global hegemony. Although it is not unusual for allies in wartime to become adversaries in war's aftermath, certain aspects of this competition, and the postwar world that was forged by it, were unique. The new alliances that formed beneath the terror of nuclear destruction were remarkably stable, and behind the undisputed leadership of the two superpowers, a peculiar bipolar structure to international relations emerged. Today, 40 years after the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, dramatic changes appear to be affecting the basic conditions of the postwar world. The Soviet Union has become preoccupied with the problems of its economy and polity and has turned its attentions inward. Under the leader ship of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets have displayed a greater willingness to arrive at accommodations in the international arena so that the process of domestic rebuilding can proceed. This has made the Soviet Union a far less menacing adversary. It has become progressively clearer that the Soviets presently have neither the intentions nor the resources—neither the will nor the way—to challenge the West militarily. At the same time, postwar patterns within the Western alliance appear to be changing. American allies in Western Europe and Japan have become global economic players in their own right. Their emergence has been accompanied by a general decline in U.S. economic health, brought on in large measure by U.S. fiscal and trade policies of the 1980s. As its budget and trade deficits soar, the United States seems to be less and less capable of maintaining its far-flung commitments to friends and allies around the globe. The economic, political and military adjustments taking place today are reshaping the structure of the international system itself and the myriad of relationships that comprise it. How should the United States respond to these changes? How should it manage its relationships with its allies and friends as the perceived threat from the Soviet Union subsides and the economic inter dependence within the Western alliance—and the tension it produces—continues to increase? Should Washington begin a process of withdrawing from its numerous commitments around the world or should it continue to shoulder the responsibility of leadership in its alliance relationships? In this issue of the Journal, we have asked our contributors to reflect on these issues, and, not surprisingly, the responses have not been anything but uniform. Stephen Walt takes a theoretical look at the conditions that cause states to ally, pointing out that it is the existence of an external threat that drives nations together. As a durable U.S-Soviet détente sets in, U.S. alliance relationships are therefore certain to be affected. "If the present trends continue," writes Walt, "a significant decrease in alliance cohesion and a lessening of the Western military effort is likely." But he is quick to add that "such a development is less worrisome than it might appear." As the threat subsides, so too will the requirements of collective defense and hence the demands on alliance members. The United States' role in NATO as these changes occur is the subject of David Calleo's article. Calleo contends that the United States can no longer fulfill the role of hegemonic protector of the alliance. The problems of NATO— its high cost to the United States, the risky reliance on an extended U.S. nuclear guarantee in an era of strategic parity and the diplomatic challenge of Gorbachev's arms control initiatives—have reached crisis proportions. According to Calleo, a "devolution" of roles within the alliance must occur, in which the Europeans, particularly France and Germany, should take on the task of formulating the structure of an integrated European security system. The United States would remain a partner within this structure, but on more equal footing with the other members. Josef Joffe, a West German commentator, offers a perspective from the other side of the Atlantic. Joffe cautions that unless the Soviet Union were to "act in a lasting manner in ways great powers normally do not," there may be a lot more permanence to the postwar landscape than many of those so quick to predict its transformation now believe. Joffe acknowledges that the shadow cast over the alliance by nuclear weapons raises the level of anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic, but maintains that given the alternatives, the current structure offers the most security at the best terms to both the United States (as protector) and Europe (as the protected). Given the inescapability of the alliance, safety is enhanced by the strengthening of intra-alliance bonds, rather than by a withdrawal by the United States or a devolution of its role. To the contrary, warns Joffe, were West Germany to feel abandoned by the United States, it would be more likely to make accommodations independently with its neighbors to the East than to join an integrated West European security system. Using the debate over NATO as his backdrop, seasoned arms-control negotiator Paul Warnke offers his view on how the United States should respond to Soviet arms-control initiatives. In light of the tensions within the alliance, and the strong desire of European publics and leaders alike that Europe not become the site of a limited nuclear war, Warnke strongly cautions against further U.S. attempts to pressure it allies into accepting "usable" nuclear weapons on their soil—"with friends who push such proposals, who needs enemies?" Warnke advocates taking advantage of the need to modernize the NATO arsenal "as a means of furthering the cause of conventional arms reduction." He also suggests a policy of unilateral restraint from further weapons deployments—together with negotiated arms reduction agreements with the Soviets—as a way of continuing to improve superpower relations while easing the burdens of alliance. The alliance relationships of the United States are not confined to Europe. Just as vital, and just as problematic, is the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Nathaniel Thayer examines the security treaty between the United States and Japan in light of the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, the increasing tension over the U.S.-Japanese economic relationship and the growing tendency for Japan to assert an independent foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Thayer finds that the principal purposes of the treaty, which include providing the United States with basing rights, Japan with a security guarantee and other Asian states with the assurance that Japan will not again become a military threat, will continue to be met, even under the current changing circumstances. He warns, however, that the pursuit of short-term economic gains on the part of the United States could kill the treaty on a de facto basis, though in the long run, this would serve neither American nor Japanese interests. The changes occurring on the international scene have implications for U.S. foreign policy in other regions of the world. Two such regions where the United States has keen interests and special relationships with "quasi-allies" are Central America and South Asia. Robert Pastor sees Gorbachev's willingness to aid in the settlement of regional conflicts as presenting a new opportunity for hammering out a "hemispheric bargain" between the United States and the Central American nations. Pastor offers a plan for resolving the problems of debt, regional stability and democracy on a multilateral basis in terms favorable to enduring U.S. interests in that region. Paul Kreisberg reviews U.S. policy in South Asia, noting that in the past the region was of concern to the United States only insofar as it figured into U.S. global strategies vis-à-vis the Soviets. In recent years, however, recognition of the region's intrinsic importance has grown, and with it, an awareness of the centrality of India's role in the region. Kreisberg predicts that as the Soviet threat declines, the United States will become increasingly less concerned with global containment in South Asia and focus more upon the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Healthy U.S. Indian relations will become key in pursuit of this goal. Will the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations affect the means by which the United States has pursued its interests in these regions and elsewhere in the Third World, where the American public has been wary of making formal commitments? Michael Klare, using documents only recently made available during the trial of Colonel Oliver North, examines the United States' network of proxies—those states or groups that agree to act at the United States' behest in return for some type of consideration, i.e., a quid pro quo. As Klare points out, the network is sprawling and often unwieldy, involving secret commitments that frequently run counter to the stated goals and enduring concerns of the United States. Nevertheless, despite the relaxation in U.S.-Soviet relations, Klare predicts that the current administration is not predisposed to dismantling the network and thus will continue to seek out proxies as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the final section of the Journal, Friedrich Kratochwil and Stephen Krasner grapple with the question of whether, given the changes affecting the postwar structure of international politics, there are alternative means for structuring security arrangements. Kratochwil sees the current challenge for U.S. foreign policy, and to the international system itself, as one that demands solutions that go far beyond mere arms-control agreements. What is necessary is nothing less than the creation of a more encompassing, viable organization of political life. Although alliances have proven effective for maintaining the central strategic balance, today they must be augmented with greater coordination of international economic policy and the strengthening of existing international organizations. Stephen Krasner brings forth evidence to show how U.S. commitments, made in the aftermath of World War II, today outstrip U.S. capabilities and resources. Krasner prescribes a policy of neo-isolationism—a withdrawal from NATO—as the answer to the security problems of both the United States and Western Europe. According to Krasner, it is economic vitality that will ensure the continued extension of U.S. power, and this can only be gained if the resources currently dedicated to military commitments overseas are rechannelled, along with the attention of U.S. policy-makers, toward the fulfillment of domestic economic priorities. The issue is rounded out with the Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay by Jonathan Stromseth, which discusses the negotiations over U.S. basing rights in the Philippines, and scholarly book reviews by David Morey, Pamela Falk, Loren Thompson and Peter Juviler. The tensions affecting U.S. alliance relations appear to run deep and are likely to be on the agendas of policy-makers for years to come. For the United States, choices between the often competing priorities of security and economic health are growing more stark by the day, and these choices are increasingly intertwined with decisions of alliance management. A redefinition of the United States' global role that respects the changes that have occurred in the relative capabilities of both our allies and our erstwhile adversary, is now a necessity; and the decisions taken will affect the course of international politics well into the next century. The Journal wishes to extend its warm thanks to James Chace, Robert Jervis and Stephen Walt, whose helpful advice was instrumental in the planning stages of this issue.**42.2**

Hardly a week goes by without news of a bold shift in some aspect of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. The significance of Gorbachev's reforms and their potential impact on the lives of so many impel us to watch closely. The articles that follow address these reforms in depth. Specifically, they focus on the links between Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. By examining these links, we can hopefully gain insight into the origins of the Soviet leadership's decision to embark on such a bold program of reform. In turn, the examination provides us with a better understanding of the direction in which the Soviet Union is headed, and the obstacles that it may confront along the way. In short, we can begin to see what led the Soviets to undertake such a monumental task, and what kind of Soviet Union may emerge as a result. We in the West have never been merely neutral observers of events within the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior, viewed through the opaque lens of the cold war, has been of immense concern to U.S. policy-makers. Our reactions to Soviet behavior have reflected back to influence Soviet actions. Today, although the adversarial aspect of the relationship has begun to decline and our image of the Soviet Union has become clearer, U.S. concern with Soviet behavior has by no means evaporated. The U.S. response to the new challenges posed by Soviet reform will inevitably contribute to shaping the evolution of the reform process. We are, in this respect, engaged in the drama unfolding in the Soviet Union. A recognition by the leadership of both superpowers that their actions are interdependent will, it is hoped, help both sides learn from past mistakes so that our present and future relationship can be more productive. Each new development in the Soviet Union brings with it new risks and opportunities for the United States. Though the United States must continue to base its decisions on Soviet deeds rather than words, it is already becoming clear that Soviet foreign policy reforms are causing a reconsideration of U.S. policies in a number of vital areas. The Soviets have tabled proposals for asymmetrical cuts in conventional forces in Europe that would greatly reduce Soviet troops and materiel. While such cuts may indeed solve many of NATO's defense worries, they raise serious new questions about the necessity of a sizable U.S. military presence in Europe, and the utility of the Western alliance itself. Likewise, the Soviets have begun to show flexibility and ingenuity in resolving regional conflicts. Superpower cooperation in regional conflict resolution, however, compels the United States to re-examine its foreign policy priorities and commitments throughout the Third World. In addition, changes within the Soviet Union may cause the United States to look inward. Soviet willingness to finally engage in a dialogue over questions of human rights has, if nothing else, raised the issue to new prominence on foreign policy agendas. The resulting international attention on human rights may force the United States to scrutinize its own social problems and reconsider its support for states in Latin America and elsewhere where human rights abuses abound. It must be noted that there are many areas, notably on the domestic front, where the Soviets have only begun to make progress. Democratization and the revamping of the consumer market are crucial to the success of Gorbachev's reform program, and there is little the United States can do to influence their success. Although we are currently witnessing the emergence of thousands of informal groups, and the new phenomenon of openly contested elections, the Soviets have yet to develop a formula for alleviating shortages of basic consumer goods—and price reform has been shelved for another three to four years. The success of reforms on the domestic front will ultimately affect the Soviet Union's behavior in the realm of foreign policy, as well as affect its relations with the United States and the rest of the world. There are no easy answers to the questions raised by our changing relationship with the Soviet Union. We hope the following articles contribute to the process of re-evaluating previously held assumptions about the Soviet Union, of retooling, where necessary, our theories of Soviet political culture at home and intentions abroad, and ultimately, of reformulating our policy in this era of new thinking. We are certain that this process of re-evaluation is of paramount importance to the future prospect of global security, stability and peace. The Journal would like to extend warm thanks to former editors Justin Doebele and Edward Trickey, as well as to Columbia University's W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union and the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College for their kind assistance in the early stages of this issue. Finally, we wish to extend our heartfelt gratitude to Harpreet Mahajan, whose unflagging patience and technical expertise were essential in bringing this issue to fruition.**42.1**

On behalf of the present and past Journal staff and advisory board members, I begin this note with a tribute to Professor William T.R. Fox, who died earlier this fall. He was a member of the advisory board for thirty-seven of the Journal'1 s forty-two years, a tenure unequalled by any other member. The Journal was only one of Professor Fox's many commitments—a distinguished record in all respects. As an author, he coined the term "superpower" and produced many seminal texts; as a teacher, his classes on international relations theory shaped the views of many who later had their own significant careers; as an academic, he was instrumental in making international relations an established field of study; and above all, to those of us who knew and respected him, he was kind and gracious. The distilled wisdom of his experience and personal qualities he made readily available as an advisor. He will be missed: it is hard to imagine the Journal without him. Special recognition must also be extended to the next Board of Editors for its help in preparing this issue. In particular, Martin Malin and Colette Laurençot are thanked for their steadfast and generous support. The catalyst for this issue was described in the first line of the Wall Street Journal's lead story of October 20, 1987: "The stock market crashed yesterday." The crash's effects were immediately felt worldwide, as Tokyo's and London's markets also plunged. A global disaster was narrowly averted, and the event impelled widespread notice to the state of the world economy. The crash emphasized the importance of what Peter Drucker has called the "symbol economy." This economy, consisting primarily of world financial markets, surpasses the value and vitality of its commercial cousins many times over. For example, the total value of one month's global trade in the foreign exchange market now roughly equals that of one year's global trade in all goods and services; and foreign exchange is but one of many world financial markets. This situation, encouraged by the convergence of communications, more powerful computers and international deregulation, is what Karin Lissakers refers to as the "global bang." This global bang has also promoted the conditions under which national economies have become more interdependent, and monetary solvency becomes as consequential to national reputation as military might. These circumstances deepen the challenge faced by the United States in its quest to reduce the world's largest debt, correct a massive trade imbalance and address the danger posed by the possible default of roughly $100 billion in developing country loans. The irony that this nation, which so largely fashioned the existing economic order, is in such a plight has not escaped our authors. Indeed, it is fashionable to ask if the American century is waning, and a Pacific century, led by Japan, is dawning. Paul Kennedy, whose book is reviewed in this issue, is one of the leading advocates of the "decline school." Susan Strange provides a strongly opposing argument. Protectionist legislation provides one controversial answer for these economic woes. Writing in favor of such legislation is Senator John Heinz, who quotes Benjamin Disraeli's admonition that "free trade is not a principle. It is an expedient." Jagdish Bhagwati considers the passage of the 1988 trade bill as already pushing ourselves down that dangerous and slippery slope. John Conybeare's historical treatment of trade frictions, including protectionism, provides a valuable perspective on this debate. This issue also examines Japan's new world role. We are honored to present views from two noted Japanese authors: Masaru Yoshitomi outlines an economic agenda for a new U.S.-Japan relationship, while Kazuo Nukazawa borrows the military concept of Mutual Assured Destruction in his examination of the fundamental issues of political economy inherent in the growth of regional economic blocs. After the United States and Japan, West Germany has the world's most robust economy. Elke Thiel discusses the difficult balance her country must maintain as the world's third largest economy and the leading economic power in the European Community; while addressing its own pressing domestic commitments. The global bang has also exacerbated the problem of third world debt. The outlook is stark, as nations struggle to solve the problem of repaying their loans and revitalizing their economies. Karin Lissaker's "Closing the Books on Third World Debt" provides a self-explanatory prescription for the first half of this problem. Promoting development, the other half, is covered in three articles. Margee Ensign, in an article based on extensive primary research, questions the effectiveness of the U.S. Agency for International Development's programs during the Reagan administration. Similarly, Michelle Gittelman's Cordier Essay contests the World Bank's free-market policies, using South Korea as a case study. Finally, Sunil Gulati studies the complex issue of capital flight, providing insight into the magnitude and possible answers to the problem. The book reviews section complements the issue's theme, with Martin Mayer reviewing banking and finance literature, David Spiro providing a cogent analysis of game theoretical approaches to international political economy, and Kamal Shehadi and Bianca Heredia examining a duet of economic crises literature. The kind of stimulation provided by the imagination and ideas evident in these articles might prove helpful to the incoming Congress and Bush administration in resolving many of these critical world economic issues. The 1987 crash is a reminder that world financial markets can be swift and uncompromising in their judgments, and prosperity—a favorite Bush campaign theme—is at stake for the United States and, in a larger context, the world.**41.2**

The announcement by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in 1947 of a massive aid program to rebuild the postwar economies of Europe, and in doing so to restore stability and security in the region, seemed at the time an historical impossibility. In a region torn by two major wars in thirty years, it appeared unlikely that the conquered and the liberated countries of Europe could find common ground for alliance and reconstruction. Europeans had peace, but after the Allied victory some remained wary of a perpetual American dominance of the region. American planners, however, had no such intent. While the defense relationship with the United States proved largely to be United States led, the major cash infusion of the Marshall Plan allowed the region to regain its own industrial footing. Abroad, the "made in West Germany" label on consumer products, initially a sign of shoddiness, rose to a mark of quality.

Today, the nations of Europe have developed into a highly interdependent group, a quality borne out by the relatively free flow of goods among the countries of the European Community (EC). It can also be found in the key role of each country in the defense of Europe under NATO, and in the clout of the EC in world trade, where it wields the world's fourth largest GNP. Interdependence grew quite naturally out of the Marshall Plan framework, and in the same sense is an inherent part of this issue. "Europe: The Marshall Plan Heritage" explores the formative years of the Plan and modern legacy. The Journal, incidentally, treats this topic on its own fortieth anniversary, having been founded at Columbia University amidst the international spirit that contemporaneously bore the United Nations and the Plan. Lincoln Gordon, a participant in the Marshall team from the outset, has written an essay revealing the inside machinations and maneuvering which gave us the Plan as we know it.

This first-hand look provides the launching point for this issue of the Journal, and sets the remaining articles in the context of the Plan's original goals. The American framework, which initially led to the European Coal and Steel Community (the forerunner of the EC) and NATO, bred a new atmosphere of cooperation in the region. But while this closeness led to the successful, interdependent Western Europe we see today, it also carried a price for the region. Particularly in the case of NATO, headed by an American military officer since the day it was formed, European interests were merely a factor in the global security equation. Today, the dilemma of balancing domestic and regional interests with global ones persists as a focus of European debate. The immediate security of Western Europe is in large part left to its indigenous ground forces, but this strategy has always depended on an American willing ness to defend the region with Europe-based nuclear missiles under U.S. control. The destruction of European cities and countryside, on a scale dwarfing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is an uneasy alternative for many Europeans. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (inf) Treaty may allay some fears that European war will "go nuclear" if it every breaks out, but it has amplified different ones. Germans in particular worry about the remaining short-range nuclear missiles, and all of Europe about the "de-coupling" of American and European defense.

Despite United States proclamations otherwise, Europeans doubt our willingness to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbm's) from American silos, as a last resort, to stop a rolling Warsaw Pact invasion. The question Europeans ask is, "are the Americans willing to risk retaliation on their own soil with an ICBM nuclear launch?" The issue of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDl), with its envisioned nuclear shield over the United States is inherent to the de-coupling question. We present herewith two different discussions of SDI; Wolfram Hanrieder treats German-American relations in the context of the SDI debate, while David Yost addresses the European SDI debate. The proper political atmosphere in Europe was central to American plans, and Americans did all possible to ensure that democracy took root there. The United States, however, did not have final say in the development of Europe's political institutions and parties. The critical focus of postwar rebuilding was West Germany, the conquered belligerent which was to be brought back into the "free world." The difficulty of allowing the natural development of politics in an unnaturally-divided state, all the while trying to nudge it toward the American ideal, was tremendous. Like the "Japanese miracle," the successful transition to democracy in Germany was met at first with great skepticism. But, as Peter Katzenstien tells us in his article, initial fears that democracy in West Germany would be unstable have now given way, ironically, to fears that their democracy may be too stable.

The Plan brought great success to Europe, so much so that even countries outside of the Plan's scope reaped benefits. One of these beneficiaries, as Kurt Samuelsson explains, was Sweden, a country which saw much of the Marshall Plan's commercial activity rub off. The "Swedish model," however, was drawn into the pitfalls of cooperation as well, and Samuelsson discusses the role of interdependence in the growing crises of the Sweden today. The West European alliance has proven sturdy, enough so to have prevented war in Europe for the longest time in modern history. A combination of factors, like external threats, economic necessity and the end of colonial rivalry have contributed to this phenomenon. In his essay presented here, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle addresses these and other reasons why an intra-European war is "impossible." Yet within this atmosphere of non-belligerence, European countries have developed their own indigenous defense industries. France's strong and self-sufficient defense, symbolized by its "home grown" force de frappe and by its strong conventional arms industry, seems to be an inseparable feature of the Fifth Republic.

This capability has assured France a separate but equal role in the defense of Europe. As Edward Kolodziej discusses, the success and growth of the French defense industry, to the point where France now stands as one of the world's largest arms exporters, can serve as an example for other West European industries competing in world markets. In the four decades that have passed since Marshall's speech, the European experiment in collective security and economic alliance has been a great success. The growth of interdependence in a peaceful Europe, the increasingly open inter-European markets, and the global economic power wielded by the EC, are all a testament to the remarkable heritage of the Marshall Plan.**41.1**

Throughout history, the attention of nations has shifted from one region of the globe to the next, bestowing upon each in turn the status of being the world's "new frontier," full of both promise and challenge. Whether the area in question is viewed as a lucrative new economic market, the world's future breadbasket, or, less flatteringly, the most likely starting place of the next world war, it seems that every region is destined eventually to have its moment in the international consciousness. In recent years, increasing attention has been focused on the Pacific Basin as being the next "new world" on our shrinking planet. Scarcely a day goes by that we do not hear of the seemingly ever-growing eco nomic strength of Japan, the potential latent in China's billion-strong population, the political travails of Korea and the Philippines as they walk the difficult road toward democracy, or the potential for super power conflict in the region as the Soviet Union turns its sights to the Pacific and the United States reconsiders its post-Vietnam withdrawal from the area. Yet, in light of the attention being devoted to the Pacific Basin, we must ask ourselves how great actually is our knowledge of this vast, diverse and dynamic region. Significant cultural and linguistic gaps separate much of the Pacific from what is generally referred to as "Western" society. When one adds to this the West's long-held stereo type of the Pacific nations as being exotic and mysterious, it can readily be seen how misunderstanding or misinterpretation may follow. This issue of the Journal aims at providing the reader with a sound background upon which to build a clearer understanding of some of the key issues facing the nations of the Pacific Basin.

To this end, we have invited a group of distinguished scholars to probe various political, economic and social aspects of the Pacific Basin community. Our first two articles address issues confronting a subgroup of Pacific states, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. Sometimes considered to be a Pacific version of the European Community, ASEAN provides an interesting study in regional organization. In ASEAN's twenty years of existence, a consensus has developed among observers that the Association has been a generally successful experiment in regionalism; to be sure, an organization that has endured for two decades must be yielding some positive results. There are, however, significant geographic, economic and political differences among ASEAN's six members. Given these disparities, what has held the organization together this long, and what are its prospects for the future? In an innovative article, Donald Emmerson addresses these questions, hypothesizing that ASEAN's success has in fact been due to a large extent to the differences between its members. Among the ASEAN states, economic wealth and geographic size are inversely related. Thus, no single state has yet been able to emerge as a dominant regional hegemon: Singapore, small and economically powerful but possessing virtually no natural resource base, is balanced by large and resource-rich, but economically underdeveloped, Indonesia. This pattern of what Emmerson terms "balanced disparity" has re quired the nations of ASEAN to work in peaceful concert to the benefit of all involved. Sheldon Simon elaborates on the regional security issues confronting ASEAN. While the Association's members have largely been able to iron out differences among themselves, external challenges, both new and longstanding, remain. Among these are continuing conflict in Cambodia, increased Soviet activity in the Pacific, the spectre of an increasingly powerful China and the uncertain fate of U.S. bases in the Philippines.

While to date ASEAN has developed into a reasonably successful economic and military security community, its future remains uncertain. The economic potential of ASEAN, like that of other Pacific states, is noteworthy. However, it must be realized that such potential can only be slowly developed, often at great expense and with extensive outside capital. While it may seem axiomatic that most foreign aid to the Pacific comes from the United States or the Soviet Union, a surprising amount originates from a source much closer to its regional recipients: Japan. Indeed, the extent of its aid programs has been such that Japan has become the world's largest source of financial resources for developing countries; the greatest part of this aid is distributed to Japan's Pacific neighbors. Robert Orr takes an in-depth look at the sources and uses of Japanese development assistance to ASEAN, Korea and the smaller states of the Pacific Basin. Japanese foreign aid policy has undergone an evolutionary process, moving from a connection with war reparations to eventual use as a strategic political instrument. This latter us age has led to controversy over such issues as aid being tied to trade patterns or political interests.

Nevertheless, Japanese aid to the Pacific will no doubt continue, as Tokyo views its economic assistance programs as being among its most effective foreign policy instruments. While foreign aid can often assist a nation along the road to development, the achievement of economic success does not always spell the end of a country's problems, especially when wealth and power are not adequately shared among the people. Nowhere in the Pacific is this more evident than in South Korea. Clive Hamilton and Richard Tanter address what they have termed "the antinomies of success" in that nation. Korea has become one of the world's leading industrial nations, with great potential for further growth. However, the benefits of what has been accomplished thus far have not accrued to the general population; their rising economic and political expectations stand in contrast to the actual distribution of wealth and power within the nation. While the Korean elections may hold some hope for future improvement, the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a few large corporate entities, the continuing militarization of the nation and deeply rooted suspicion on the part of many Koreans toward the government may make such change a difficult and complex, albeit vitally necessary, process.

Korea is, of course, the site of another conflict, one which involves many outside actors as well as the Koreans themselves. This is the North Korean-South Korean standoff, unresolved since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Due to the Korean peninsula's strategic location, many outside powers have developed a stake in the intra-Korean conflict. Joo-Hong Nam closely examines the dynamics of this conflict, noting that, for all their interest and efforts, none of the great powers entangled in the Korean conflict has been able to impose a solution. Nam maintains that for a solution to become possible, North and South Ko rea must first drop their respective demands for the elimination of the other and embark on an era of "antagonistic cooperation" characterized by the concept of "two states in one nation," following the East West German model. This, combined with a regional balance of power among the United States, China, the Soviet Union and Japan, would provide a peaceful atmosphere in which to attempt resolution of the North-South conflict. While most of the attention paid to the Pacific is focused on Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states, it must be remembered that there are other actors in the region as well. Included among these are the island microstates that dot the Pacific Ocean, nations that, while small, are fascinating and surprisingly vital. Norman Meller's article demonstrates that despite their small size and reputation as idyllic paradises, the island nations are prey to a host of problems; terrorism, political instability, trade imbalances, superpower conflict, controversy over the presence of nuclear weapons and ethnic strife have all made their presence felt.

The Pacific microstates face a difficult and uncertain future, and it would be a grave mistake to dismiss them as being unimportant and insignificant in the scheme of world events. Elements of ethnic strife mentioned in Meller's article are studied further in our final contributions. First, Leo Suryadinata examines the role of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian economics and politics. Often referred to as the "Jews of Asia" due to their economic influence, their "outsider" status in their adopted nations and the hostility with which they are frequently regarded by their hosts, the ethnic Chinese have been viewed with suspicion and distrust by native populations. Feared for several reasons, many of them unfounded, the Chinese have been seen as wielding economic power disproportionate to their numbers, threatening national integration by refusing to assimilate into the native culture, or suspected of acting as agents of Beijing or Taipei. Suryadinata examines the extent to which these accusations are true and the steps that the nations of Southeast Asia have taken to acculturate their Chinese minorities. Finally, Peter Bacho provides a look at the Muslim secessionist movement in the Philippines. Christian-Muslim relations in that nation have never been good, and have at times degenerated into open war fare. Although largely dormant since the mid-1970s, the movement for the establishment of an autonomous Muslim homeland in the southern Philippines still threatens to be a problem for the Aquino government.

Negotiations and the terms of the new Philippine constitution offer some hope for peaceful settlement, but many obstacles, such as the opposition of the Catholic Church and the role of the military, may stand in the way of resolution. The Pacific Basin is a vast and diverse area, home to many nations facing a host of challenges and opportunities. Long ignored or misunderstood by the West, the region certainly holds a great store of potential economic and political might. Whether the world is indeed entering upon "the century of the Pacific" remains to be seen, but whatever the future of the Pacific Basin, its very diversity make its study worthwhile. We hope that this issue of the Journal has contributed to the study of this dynamic and fascinating region.**40.2**  
The phenomenon of political opposition is both universal and unique. It is universal in that it exists throughout the world, pervading the state system that characterizes international politics. No government, no matter how broadly supported, just or enduring, is ever free of popular dissent, although that dissent may not be loudly or even freely expressed. In fact, it seems impossible that opposition could ever *n*o*t* exist: there will always be people who are not content with the status quo, who feel that things could and should be better, and who set about to make such changes.

At the same time, political opposition is unique in that its means and ends differ from country to country, reflecting the individual nature of each polity. Opposition can take many forms: terrorist bombings in India, student demonstrations in South Korea, riots in South Africa, election campaigns in the Philippines, all of these are expressions of dissatisfaction with the policies of incumbent governments, actions taken by opponents of the ruling regime intent on effecting some type of political change or reform in their countries.

It is this dichotomy of universality and unique ness that makes the study of political opposition so important and so informative. The study of the goals of various opposition groups, the methods employed by them and the degree to which they are successful can provide us with valuable insights into other cultures and other political sys tems. The universality of opposition enables us to benefit from the experiences of others. Not only might we discover what may be the most effective means of opposition or how best to catalyze political change, but we may also gain a greater understanding of human behavior in general.

With these points in mind, the *Journal* has asked several noted scholars to explore various aspects of opposition and political change, taking both case-study and theoretical approaches. In the first article, Lisa Anderson explores the roots of opposition in the Middle East, a region that has long been a hotbed of political unrest and that is notorious for the prevalence of lawless forms of opposition, such as terrorism. Because of the cultural and political diversity of the region, this ex amination provides a useful insight into several features of political opposition. Anderson focuses on opposition as a response to the exercise of political power, breaking down her study into examinations of opposition to the ruler, to policy, to the regime and finally, to the state itself.

The political activists of the Middle East certainly do not hold a monopoly on the exercise of political opposition. Other regions, however, are characterized by different conditions and different actors. In an important article on the Korean opposition, Wonmo Dong focuses on what may well prove to be the decisive group in effecting change in South Korea: the country's radicalized university students. While the mention of student protest may evoke memories of the turbulent 1960s, student activism and protest are everyday realities in contemporary South Korea. The most striking feature of the Korean student movement is that its various groups are so well-organized.

These are not aimless renegades or mere rabble rousers: the student movement has allied itself with intellectuals, labor unions and the working class to form a strong opposing force to the government of President Chun Doo Hwan. Dong concludes that in the absence of substantial reform on the part of the regime, the student movement will grow in strength, as Chun's intransigence only serves to increase public support for the students. 

Even the fall of a repressive regime and its re placement with a new and more popular government does not spell the end of all opposition. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Philippines, where the departure of Ferdinand Marcos can hardly be said to have resulted in a unified, dissent-free nation. The government of Corazon Aquino, while no doubt enjoying an immense degree of popular support, faces its own political opponents. In an article written late last autumn as a speculative piece on the possible outcome of Philippine events, Peter Bacho examines two forces that the Aquino government must deal with: Marcos loyalists and rural revolutionaries. Bacho postulates that the remaining vestiges of Marcos support will merely provide an annoyance for the new government the real threat to Philippine stability comes from the Communist rebels in the Philippine countryside. He contends, however, that this threat can be managed through negotiation and conciliatory actions on the parts of both the rebels and the Aquino government.

Pravin Patel's article on India's Punjab separatist movement provides an interesting look at an opposition group that began with modest aims and peaceful methods, but evolved into a violent terrorist organization responsible for hundreds of deaths to date. This process was the result of a complex interplay of longstanding ethnic, social and religious tensions, the frustrations encountered by the opposition political party in attempting to implement its programs, and mismanage ment of state-central government relations by all groups involved.

If any lessons are learned from the Indian experience explored by Patel, perhaps they may be applied to what is doubtless today's most explosive political situation, that of South Africa. As in India, longstanding tensions have given rise to ever-increasing violence, with no real end in sight, as both the government and its opponents are locked into what Heribert Adam terms a "violent stalemate." But after analyzing some of the options for settlement of the South African di lemma, Adam concludes that that all-out civil war is not the only possible, or indeed even the most likely outcome of this stalemate. This is due to the fact that the essential problem in resolving the South African situation lies not in eliminating color barriers or racist ideology, but rather in ensuring that each group will have a fair share of political power in the post-apartheid nation. Because this is open to negotiation, the chances for peaceful settlement are greater than many expect. However, there will have to be compromises by all parties involved, and, as in the Indian case. careful management of the situation is necessary if further violence is not to ensue.

Many opposition groups derive some type of Support, be it political, economic or military, from outside sources, often the superpowers. In this issue, Galia Golan examines Soviet assistance to various Third World anticolonial and separatist movements. While Western propaganda may depict the Soviet Union as the coordinator of a well-organized world-wide revolutionary movement, Golan finds that the Soviets have been anything but "exporters of revolution." In fact, Soviet pol icy toward such opposition groups has been cautious, and aid, particularly economic and military. has not been liberally dispensed.

The issue concludes with two theoretical articles. The first, by Ekkart Zimmermann, examines the use of violence by opposition movements. In his detailed study. Zimmermann maintains that the choice of violence as an opposition strategy indicates the relative Weakness of the group that resorts to it. In addition, the choice of violence is made more likely if the regime has suffered a loss of legitimacy or has lost control over its coercive instruments, such as its police force. Violence, however, is found to be ineffective when used as the sole strategy: it seems to yield results only if used in combination with other strategies.

Finally, Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips address the question of the opposition leaders themselves. What compels some men and women to take great risks to effect political change? Popular wisdom often views the revolutionary as a crazed, bomb wielding anarchist, while his counterpart in the government is seen as a solid, upstanding citizen. While this may lead to the belief that revolutionaries and loyalists may be characterized by specific psychological makeups, we must remember that figures as diverse as George Washington and Fidel Castro were both "revolutionaries." Did these men in fact share a common psychological makeup? And does "the psychology of revolution" differ significantly from the psychology of loyal ism?" Examining the psychological and political behavior of a broad spectrum of revolutionary and loyalist figures, Rejai and Phillips find that the two groups are in fact similar in many respects; differences in their political activities were more likely to stem from non-psychological factors, such as economic status.

It is difficult to present a comprehensive examination of a topic as broad as political opposition in a single publication. Nevertheless, the topic is both important and enduring. As long as governments exist, there will be citizens dissatisfied with their makeup or their policies, who will resort to a wide variety of means to effect changes in those governments. It is therefore worth our while to study this broad topic, as it influences so many of our lives.

P.W.

**40.1**Fear of the potentially catastrophic effects of the nuclear arms race overshadows discussion of the substantial global trade in conventional weapons. Yet conventional weapons are and will continue to be the primary currency of the world’s conflicts. As the products of the global arms market become ever more sophisticated and lethal, natural resources and technology are channeled away from other needs and contribute instead to man’s capabilities for death and destruction.

Thankfully, the overall level of trade in arms seems to have diminished in recent years. This is due less to any reduction in the level of conflict in the world or interest in weapons than to an increased inability of Third World importers to afford new arms purchases. Despite the quantitative reduction, however, the arms market continues to create new channels of covert and overt delivery, and has spawned a new breed of producers dependent upon arms exports to fulfill a variety of economic and political needs.

Once the unique domain of the superpowers, control of the international arms market is now shared with a variety of small and mid-range suppliers. These new suppliers are motivated more by domestic economic and security concerns than foreign policy considerations. In recent years, the number of suppliers and the importance of the arms sector to their respective economies have increased, diminishing the prospects of limiting the scope and size of the weapons trade. Also of concern is the degree to which promotion of arms exports is shaping foreign and domestic policies in these new supplier nations. Finally, the threat that a conventional conflict will escalate into a superpower confrontation and/or an exchange of nuclear weapons continues to argue for controlling the trade in arms.

In this issue we have asked a group of leading policy-makers and arms experts to assess the significance of recent changes in the global arms trade and analyze the effects which they may have on the future of international relations. We begin with an overview article by Michael Klare discussing general trends in the global arms market. His contributions provides a context in which the other articles in this issue can be examined. After analyzing the new directions the market has taken in recent years, Klare concludes with a discussion of the possibility of renewing multilateral negotiations on controlling the flow of conventional arms.

The bulk of the world’s trade in arms continues to flow to the nations of the Middle East. Arms sales to this region have been the source of much controversy and political debate in the United States. Senators Richard G. Lugar and Claiborne Pell present their views on what should be the appropriate grounds for sale of the U.S. weapons to other nations. Lugar contends that arms sales, though a valuable foreign policy tool, are too often inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy goals and recipient country needs, and should come under greater congressional scrutiny and control.

Debate over who should have the authority to determine U.S. Arms export policy is not limited to the Congress. In his article, Noel Koch analyses the conflicts of interest between various branches of government which have led to “an inconsistent and arbitrary” arms export policy, damaging to both supplier and recipient alike. Koch calls for new guidelines for determining arms export policy and new methods of financing sales to debt-ridden Third World buyers.

Arms shipments from the world’s other major supplier, the Soviet Union, are also primarily guided by foreign policy considerations. In his contribution to this issue, sovietologist Rajan Menon examines what the U.S.S..R. hopes to gain from its sale of arms abroad. Menon argues that, lacking the economic and cultural tools of Western nations, the Soviet Union has turned to arms sales as the principle instrument of its foreign policy in the Third World. The U.S.S.R also finds arms sales an important source of hard currency. Stephanie Neuman then analyses the performance of U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms export policies in actual conflict situations. Neuman examines the types and quantities of weapons supplied and concludes that similarities outweigh differences during wartime. Both superpowers are pre-eminently concerned with avoiding the escalation of conflicts.

In recent years the rapid emergence of smaller arms producers has challenged the superpowers’ traditional hegemony in the arms market. Two of the most dramatic examples of the new producers are Brazil and Israel.

In his article on the Brazilian arms industry, Clovis Brigagao discusses the historical factors and strategic considerations which led Brazil to develop its own potent arms-producing capacity. Although the Brazilian arms sector may have helped spur technological and industrial growth, Brigagao highlights the degree to which Brazil’s economic and foreign policies are shaped by the emphasis on production and export of weapons. Aaron Klieman analyses Israel’s emergence as a major new arms producer. Klieman argues that, unlike other newly emerging producers, Israel is motivated by its unique national security concerns and diplomatic isolation to actively promote the sale of arms, even to so-called “pariah” states. However, he too raises questions about the degree to which Israel has become dependent upon arms exports in a volatile world market.

The share of the arms trade belonging to European mid-range producers has also dramatically increased in the last few years, topping 30 percent in 1985. Ulrich Albrecht discusses how growth in the arms sector has played an important role in domestic political debates over industrial policy in Germany and Italy. Albrecht’s article also high-lights recent evidence of a trend in both countries toward sharing more of their technology with Third World manufacturers.

In the final article, Leonard Spector, a leading nuclear disarmament expert, examines the potential links between the sale of advanced combat aircraft and the possibility these may provide new nuclear nations that means to effectively deliver atomic weapons. Spector argues that suppliers have not dealt adequately with the dangers posed by the sale of these aircraft to nations which are currently developing or have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and calls for increased international safeguards and monitoring.

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding the role which the arms trade plays in our world. Each nation is entitled to an adequate defense, and the trade in arms can often help establish a regional military balance conducive to maintaining peace. Contrarily, unnecessary arms shipments can lead to instability and, when introduced into a theatre of war, can fan the flames of conflict. We hope the following articles will help shed light on some important and complex issues and increase awareness of the dangers inherent in a global arms market left unquestioned by scholars, unchallenged by policy-makers and unfettered by international restraints.

**39.2**  
In this issue we examine the remarkable changes which have taken place in China since Deng Xiaoping consolidated his hold on the reigns of power in the late 1970s. No sector of society or the economy has remained untouched by the widespread reforms that have been implemented under his leadership. The Chinese Communist party. the bureaucracy. the military, agriculture and industry have all undergone radical transfor mations in the last several years.

The effects of the reforms have not been con fined to within China's borders. China's commit ment to a new open policy toward international trade and investment has altered its strategic and economic relations with the rest of the world. China's interest in protecting its modernizing economy and tapping foreign financial, technological and managerial resources have helped to shape new relations with its neighbors and the West.

China-watchers differ on what they believe to be the current leadership's commitment to reforms, the depth of the changes and how successful China will be in accomplishing its goal of modernization by following this path. However, most agree that a variety of social and political changes have become firmly rooted. Deng has been surprisingly successful in altering both the structure and the character of the party, military and government bureaucracy. One of his first actions when he assumed power was to rehabilitate 2.9 million fellow victims of the Cultural Revolution. Since then he has attempted to promote a new "third echelon" of leaders to back his efforts at reform. With younger, better educated and more reform-minded individuals now in place individuals who owe their offices to Deng and their future legitimacy to the success of reforms it is indeed difficult to imagine China reversing its course.

China's successes in some areas have been matched by failures in others. Some of the unexpected consequences of reform (corruption, nepotism and inefficiency) provide cannon fodder for Deng's more conservative opponents and may inhibit the depth at and the speed with which new reforms are introduced. For instance, Deng's de-collectivization of farming has resulted in tremendous growth in agricultural output. China has moved from a food-importing nation to a food-ex porting nation in just a few years. Yet at the same time China struggles unsuccessfully to encourage the new private investment needed to replace traditional state investment to ensure continued growth in the rural sector. China must also deal with the inequalities and ideological inconsistencies which have arisen in a socialist society now encouraging profit-making and private ownership.

Similarly. Success as well as failure have marked China's more modest reform of the industrial economy. A response to the new prosperity in the countryside, industrial reforms have included changes in planning, finance, investment, pricing and employment policies with an overall emphasis on decentralization of decision-making.

However, the success of these reforms continues to be hampered by traditional attitudes toward a centrally-planned economy and the emergence of corruption and black-marketeering, China's economic reforms also have an international component-a more open policy toward international trade, investment and finance. Trade and joint-venture agreements with many of China's partners have increased manyfold in the last three years. Guocang Huan, a scholar from China, provides us with a rare unofficial analysis of the rationale behind and the successes and failures of each component of the open policy. Two of our authors, Armand Hammer and Rong Yiren. international partners in the An Tai Bao coal mine joint venture, then give their views from either side of the Pacific of the new trade and investment opportunities which have opened up in China.

Deng's interest in importing technology and expertise to speed up China's modernization has also shaped new attitudes toward relations with other states, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Ambassador Han Xu and Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz give their respective views on how reforms are affecting a variety of issues of concern to the United States and China, including technology trade, Taiwan, Sino Soviet relations and strategic cooperation. The success of the new open policy will depend in large part on the participation of China's international partners. Piers Jacobs, secretary for eco nomic services in Hong Kong (China's second largest trading partner, behind Japan), presents his views on whether China and Hong Kong will continue to build on the successful economic relationship they have established. He discusses the impact of both the reforms and the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future status of Hong Kong.

One of the most interesting questions raised in a discussion of China's reforms is how these will affect the economic policies of other socialist countries. Already many Eastern European countries have experimented with some of the same market mechanisms now being tried in China. China's reforms, however, pose a challenge to the Soviet Union's current economic model-a model followed closely by China under Mao Zedong. A thoughtful analysis of the Soviets' reaction to the reforms, such as that undertaken by Marshall Goldman, reveals a wealth of information about the Soviets' attitudes toward reforms in their own system and the tenor of Sino-Soviet relations in general.

The influence of the new Chinese economic model on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will ultimately hinge on how smoothly and how successfully China carries out its transition to a new type of systern. However, Chinese leaders do not appear to have any ultimate blueprint for the reforms and seem to be dealing with the economic inefficiencies and ideological inconsistencies of reforms as they arise.

Yet it is apparent that political and economic reforms are affecting the foundation of state power in China and shaping a new, more functional and less revolutionary role for the Communist party and state bureaucracy. The Chinese also appear to be attempting to achieve some kind of balance between maintaining collective owner ship and encouraging private incentive. Hong Yung Lee discusses some of the contradictions inherent between the Maoist values of the party and the new "capitalist" values Chinese leaders are attempting to promote in society.

These contradictions extend into the agricultural and industrial sectors examined by Nicholas Lardy and Dorothy Solinger. Agricultural decollectivization has led to a more efficient use of resources, but threatens to widen the disparity between poorer and wealthier regions, and between advantaged and less advantaged individuals. Policy debates still rage over whether the best approach to take in the future is more private or more collective ownership, and more private or more state investment. Chinese leaders also seem to be unwilling to upset the power relations and overturn the traditions created by thirty-five years of central planning. This unwillingness prevents them from moving closer to a true market economy.

Whether or not China will successfully resolve these contradictions remains to be seen. In his analysis of the rapid transformation of the party. state bureaucracy and military. Christopher Clarke suggests that the "third echelon" of younger and better educated leaders now being promoted by Deng may not be well prepared to deal with the problems of the new Chinese economy. Trained as engineers, many of them in the Soviet Union, these leaders could be more comfortable with controlling a centrally-planned system than managing the more modern, complex, and information-oriented economy China is now developing.

These uncertainties aside, China appears to have taken brave steps to reverse the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and the trend toward tighter controls and a greater degree of centralization. The transformation which China is undergoing is far from complete, and the constant implementation of new reforms prevents our authors from providing more than an analysis of what China looks like now. Where China will be five years or ten years from today can only be hinted at. Still, it is our hope that this issue will provide interesting reading and a better understanding of the difficulties of China's bold transition to a more modern economy and an improved standard of living for its 1.2 billion citizens.

J.T.R.

**39.1**EDITOR'S FOREWORD   
Sixteen years after astronaut Neil Armstrong's "one giant step for mankind," space once again has captured the imagination of the public. Tele vised images of satellites and space shuttles, and scientist's discussions of x-ray lasers, particle beam weapons and electromagnetic rail-guns, have made yesterday's science fiction today's re Search and, perhaps, tomorrow's fact. The role of technology in space has been the subject of intense debate in the international community since the announcement in March 1983 of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—an ef*f*ort, in the president's words, "which holds the promise of changing the course of human history."

Though a myriad of space-related projects currently are underway, discussion has centered on President Reagan's controversial plan for a defense against ballistic missiles. In his "Star Wars" speech, the president announced a "comprehensive" effort to define a long-term research and development program...to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." Impatient with the doctrine of "deterrence through retaliation," President Reagan called upon the scientific community "to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

The president's speech provoked global debate concerning the problems and prospects of nuclear deterrence. Proponents of ballistic missile defense point to recent technical advances in offensive weapons, such as increased warhead accuracy and improved techniques for the detection of sub marines. In the years ahead, they argue, deterrence through assured destruction must inevitably fall victim to technological innovation. Research in defensive technologies is seen as essential to the continued efficacy of deterrence and the eventual transition to a world forever free of the threat of nuclear war.

Critics of the plan, however, question the technical feasibility of anti-satellite (ASAT) and ballistic missile defense and the effect such technologies will have on existing alliances and the balance of power. To the skeptics, the most effective defense possible would remain vulnerable to a variety of countermeasures including other ASATs, decoy missiles and the proliferation of an adversary's offensive arsenal. In one article which follows, Richard Garwin writes that "if both sides have defenses which cannot be expected to perform perfectly against a first-strike from the other side, and if both sides have a capability to destroy pre-emptively a large fraction of the strategic retaliatory force of the other side, then there is far more advantage to striking first if a defensive system is in place than in its absence."

In this view, a defensive system is most useful in an effort to blunt a weakened retaliatory attack, and therefore will be seen by an adversary as an integral component in a first-strike strategy. Should such a system be developed by one or both superpowers, each would have incentive to strike first in times of crisis, and both deterrence and crisis stability would suffer. Opponents of the SDI therefore maintain that the deployment of a defense against ballistic missiles will serve only to extend the arms race into space, leaving the United States and its allies less secure in the face of strenuous Soviet efforts to replicate and/or overwhelm the U.S. system.

Have continuing technological advances in offensive weapons made the collapse of deterrence through assured destruction imminent or will defensive technologies in fact render these weapons "impotent and obsolete?" In this issue of the *Jour nal,* the debate at large is reproduced in microcosm.

Though international attention appropriately has focused on the question of strategic defense, the impact of concurrent developments in other space technologies and space-related industries will be more immediate and perhaps more revolutionary. The successful development of reusable launch vehicles has altered fundamentally the conduct of operations in space. With a 60,000 pound payload capacity, the Space Shuttle provides the capability for rescue and repair of satellites and serves as a laboratory for limited research and manufacturing in orbit. Construction of the Space Station, scheduled for deployment in the 1990s, is intended to enhance these capabilities and provide a base of operations for future manned planetary missions. In tandem, the two may provide the infrastructure necessary for advanced construction and manufacturing, ushering in the era of commercial use of space.

Technology in space continues also to transform telecommunications on Earth. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN TELSAT), the 109 member-nation consortium which has maintained a near-monopoly over international satellite communications since its establishment in 1964, is facing new challenges from commercial firms eager to exploit opportunities created by the recent global expansion in telecommunications. Its dominant position in satellite communications already partially eroded by the establishment of supplemental regional networks, the organization now is threatened by U.S. companies seeking to construct, launch and operate satellites bypassing the INTELSAT system.

Established as a non-profit cooperative to create an integrated global network enabling all nations to benefit from satellite technology. INTELSATS constitutive agreement mandates uniform utilization charges regardless of degree of use or geo graphic location. In his article, INTELSAT's director general, Richard Colino, argues that the organization therefore is unable to compete successfully with private systems limiting service to lucrative, high-traffic routes. He warns that such a situation would impair INTELSAT's ability to provide continued service to developing countries, and might endanger the existence of the organization itself.

Scientific instruments in space doubtless will affect life on Earth as well. The Space Telescope, scheduled for launch in 1986, should provide new clues about the origin of matter, and ultimately may identify new planetary systems and, perhaps, new forms of life. Sensors in satellites orbiting the Earth will continue to furnish unique information about weather patterns, climate changes, deforestation and other ecological phenomena. Satellite data now is shared through cooperative interna tional networks which, in the future, should con tribute to the rational planning of land-use and development in resource-poor countries. It is hoped that the information gained will provide advance warning of future droughts and food shortages, helping scientists and relief agencies to mitigate damage through advance stockpiling of needed resources and the identification of areas best-suited to food production.

As newcomers, both public and private, continue to deploy technology in space, new means for allocating finite orbital resources will have to be established. New agreements, laws and regulations will be needed to govern human settlement, arms control, commercial industry and sovereignty in space. Concern must be shown also for protection of the space environment. The future remains primarily the subject of informed conjecture, but as the twenty-first century approaches, mankind seems poised to take another giant step forward into space.

R.R.B.

**38.2**  
The term "democracy" has its origins in the Greek words de*mo*s, meaning "the people," and kr*at*ein, meaning "to rule." Thus democracy means literally "rule of the people." The term's ambiguity, however, has resulted in varying interpretations. Throughout history, leaders of every type have justified their rule in the name of democracy.

Discussions of democracy must inevitably focus on the relationship between individuals and their society. In defining democracy, theorists have traditionally concentrated on normative concepts and essential preconditions. Classical theorists=of both the individualist and the collectivist schools-have focused on the concept of shared values. For the individualists, democratic government is the means through which to ensure liberty and the maximization of individual welfare. In the collectivist tradition, equality is the desired norm and societal welfare the objective.

Empiricists put forth an operational definition of democracy. The defining characteristics of a democratic system are political equality and popular control over decisionmakers, usually through direct elections. Democratic government in this view, is embodied in institutions both responsive and responsible to the majority of the electorate. Finally, there are those who look to socioeconomic indicators to determine the existence of a democratic state. For them, democracy may be found in an equitable distribution of wealth, education or privilege, or in the absence of class distinction.

This issue of the Journ*a*l combines each of the above perspectives: each author defines democracy as he or she sees fit. In the opening article, Leslie Lipson re-examines the classical governing ideals of liberty and equality and argues that the two, as absolutes, are contradictory. This dichotomy. Lipson asserts, is exemplified in contemporary party politics by the division between Left and Right-a division which complicates post-election efforts at effective democratic government. What is needed instead, writes Lipson, is a single indivisible concept which he terms freedom-equality.

Raymond Gastil defines democracy as the institutional form of freedom in the modern world, with freedom, in turn, comprised of specified political rights and civil liberties. Gastil employs The Comparative Survey o*f Freedom* to consider past trends toward democracy and the prospects for the future.

The remainder of the issue examines regional efforts to reconcile democracy with change. Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's leading political dissident, speaks on the prospects for a return to democracy in that country. on the eve of his return from exile. Carolina Hernandez examines the effects of twelve years of martial law in the Philippines and the increased popular pressure for a return to democracy in the wake of the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino.

Michael Hudson documents the collapse of the political order in Lebanon, and argues that the entry of external forces into the country was not a cause but a symptom of the disintegration of the Lebanese body politic. He attributes the breakdown of Lebanon's con sociational democracy to the failure of Shihabism in the 1960s and the inability of subsequent regimes to develop governmental institutions with broad legitimacy. Asher Arian considers the results of the recent elections in Israel, Lebanon's neighbor to the south. He discusses the nature of Israel's electoral system and the constant need tor coalition government. The tensions inherent in a democratic society in the absence of a written constitution and in which the inhabitants of the occupied territories are denied rights generally associated with citizenship are examined. Given the constant military threat that Israel faces, he asks, can representative democracy be too much of a good thing?

Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring analyze the transitions to democracy currently underway in Brazil and Argentina. They distinguish between two types of nonrevolutionary transitions: those initiated and controlled from above (Brazil) and those occurring in the aftermath of the breakdown of an authoritarian regime (Argentina). Enrique Baloyra discusses the transition in El Salvador and argues that democratization will ultimately require direct confrontation between aperturists and obstructionists. Baloyra advocates the electoral reincorporation of the Left as the least costly altenative to continued civil war.

Carl Rosberg and Robert Jackson discuss the pre dominance of authoritarian regimes in Tropical Africa. While decolonization was traditionally accompanied by independence democracy, Rosberg and Jackson argue that exogenous institutions were often at odds with indigenous societies. With government the sole significant source of wealth in many of the impoverished African countries, the result has been that democracy, in several countries, "has proved in practice to be almost exactly the opposite of what it purports to be in theory."

Craig Baxter examines the divergent paths taken by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh despite their common heritage of British colonial rule. He asserts that the existence of the Indian National Congress and the personal leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru provided the essential preconditions for the development of democratic government in India. Thus, at the time of independence, there existed in India an underlying consensus in favor of constitutional democracy and universal suffrage that was absent in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Andrew Arato argues against a conception of democracy based solely on the institutional framework of parliamentary pluralism. Instead, he writes that "democracy is relevant not only to political but also to social, economic and even cultural institutions" Despite the political macrostructure of one-party dictatorship. Arato argues that significant democratization can and has occurred in the Soviet-type societies of East Central Europe.

To encourage continued liberalization, Arato advocates a Western policy of "détente with strings."

The authors' differing conceptions of the meaning. preconditions and existence of democracy reflect the continuing debate over this issue among academics, policymakers and social revolutionaries. From the articles which follow, however, one conclusion seems clear: the essence of democratic government exists in the com bination of liberty, equality and popular legitimacy. No single formula emerges as the blueprint for democracy in all societies. Proponents of democracy should not confine themselves to the advocacy of Western-style parliamentary institutions or condone dictatorship as the sole alternative.

R.R.B

**38.1**

Few international economic issues of the post-war era have elicited the concern or range of response as has the international debt crisis. It involves and affects the well-being of almost all financial actors in the international arena. The interests of commercial banks, multinational enterprises, international financial organizations, central banks, national governments in industrialized and developing countries, in addition to private importers and exporters, are among those inextricably tied to the massive international lending and borrowing which has taken place during the past decade. No other issue of North-South relations makes clear the linkages between actors and events throughout the world as does the debt crisis: the links, for example between the balance sheets of medium-sized banks in the U.S. Midwest and riots in Brazil, or between an increase in the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and Mexican balance-of-payment difficulties. Some assert, as does an author in this issue of the Journal, that the linkages stretch even further into the political and military spheres.

The debt crisis evolved during the 1970s, as the debt owed by governments, government agencies, state-owned and state-supported enterprises in the developing countries expanded five-fold. Large increases in the price of oil imports, declining world trade, an expensive dollar in which most international loans are denominated and very high interest rates all combined in the latter-half of the 1970s to make it difficult for the most heavily indebted countries to service their debts. The debts had been incurred during the early 1970s as developing countries took advantage of negative or relatively low real interest rates in order to stimulate economic growth and development. Today, many of those countries in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and even Eastern Europe find that indebtedness threatens their economic development and political stability.

Carlos Diaz Alejandro, in one of the following articles, writes: “Financial crises are not primarily caused by above-average cupidity, stupidity, corruption, nor concupiscence among lenders and borrowers.” This statement challenges a popular theme of some writing on the causes of the international debt problem. Blame has been hurled at most every actor directly or indirectly involved in the present financial crisis. Developing countries’ governments have been charged with corruption and inefficiency, as well as a lack of discipline in their borrowing and spending. Worse, they are condemned for not foreseeing the current troubles when borrowing ten or more years ago. The private banks of Western Europe and the United States are reproached for extending too much credit to countries which today are obviously bad risks. In addition, there is the part played by the international financial institutions which require strict economic conditions in return for lending. The evident suffering and political turmoil in some of the largest debtor countries is blamed on the conditionality of international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund.

The debt problem is in many ways a policy problem. Count the debtor countries have approached their debts differently, given the information available and the external conditions of the 1960s and 1970s? Is it wiser to borrow heavily and quickly expand economically or to borrow cautiously and avoid the risks of large debt? When considering these questions, one ought to remember the experiences with indebtedness of some major industrialized countries and even a few large American cities. Should there be greater domestic regulation of the Western commercial banks in their foreign lending? This raises the issue of how to control the huge Eurodollar or “offshore” banking market when no single country has the authority to do so. In addition, there is the question which most directly affects the societies of the indebted countries: how can the debts be serviced and paid without undermining the political and economic structures of these countries? Finally, the problem which is of the greatest immediate importance to the bankers, bank stockholders, and government officials of the major Western countries, among others, revolves around the issue of whether the debts will every be repaid in total.

The art of policy-making is in the end the art of compromise. The governments of the indebted countries have faced difficult choices of how to stimulate and expand their economies while maintaining financial and political security. Economic growth in many countries has been achieved at the price of indebtedness. Yet, debt service in the current world environment must occur at the expense of economic expansion. In some countries, debt service will occur only at the expense of the present living standard. Regardless of how the debts are paid, there is no question that the debt crisis will have significant repercussions not only for the economic structures of the developing countries, but for their societies and political systems as well.

This issue of the Journal examines the roots of the debt crisis and the linkages involved in the international financial system. Some prospects for the future are offered and a few solutions are proposed. Some solutions would maintain the status quo and the present international financial system as it has evolved since World War II. Some require more radical procedures. In an increasingly protectionist yet interdependent world, a deeper understanding of the debt crisis is required. No simple solution will suffice not is any simple explanation of how the crisis came about enough.

“Perspectives on Global Debt” brings together the views of bankers, political scientists, economists, business leaders and government officials from national and international institutions. As the debt crisis involves a varied group of actors and institutions, some in a natural alliance and some in an uncomfortable association, this issue of the Journal presents a wide range of perspectives. The debt crisis is the specific topic of each article but the wider ramifications of recent events on international political and economic systems and historical trends form the basic theme of the issue.

**37.2**  
The international community often debates the legality of foreign policy actions. In recent years, numerous events-particularly in the area of military intervention have raised questions of the definitions of international norms and whether law has any force in the global arena. To act or not to act may be the question in foreign policy, but is it a question of legality or one of expedience? From the memoirs of some foreign policy actors, the answer seems obvious. International law is generally not mentioned in discussions of the foreign policy-making process. Law would seem to be of lesser Importance than domestic considerations and security calculations. Yet, by offering legal justifications for controversial actions, states implicitly acknowledge, though it may be after the fact, that foreign policy is subject to legal scrutiny and restrictions. Examples of such acts range from the recent U.S. use of force in Grenada to the Israel attack on Lebanon and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Justifications of treaty commitments, self defense and humanitarian intervention are countered by charges of gun-boat diplomacy, illegal aggression and trespasses on the sovereignty of small states.

Questions about the nature of international law date back to the earliest attempts to find order in international relations. Some assert that it does not exist at all. while others say that law exists, but only on a theoretical basis with little practical effect on the relations between the powerful and the weak countries of the world. Still others, mostly international lawyers and theorists, put forth the claim that international law serves as the guideline within which states determine foreign policy.

They argue that in their own self-interest states follow generally accepted international laws since those laws are based on customary state practice and an attempt to ensure world peace and stability.

The focus of this issue, however, is not a repeat of the international law yes-or-no debate, but rather an examination of how states, in terms of policy, define legal concepts such as self-defense or humanitarian intervention. Defining these concepts is in itself a political act, while at the same time establishes the custom upon which much law is based. The question of law as a moral instrument of change in the global order is also pertinent to this discussion. "The Politics of International Law" focuses on the confluence of law and foreign policy. How does law influence the formulation of foreign policy? To what extent is the foreign policy of sovereign states determined by the external restrictions of established intemational practice?

In the opening article, Oscar Schachter outlines the legally acceptable options available to the Carter Administration in the Iranian hostage crisis. As an interna tional legal authority, Professor Schachter takes the position that while the United States could use force to protect the lives of the hostages, punitive reprisals against Iran would have contradicted Article 2/4 of the UN Charter and weakened the Charter system. By overextending the limits of "self-help" allowed under international law, the United States would be damaging its own interest in maintaining international order. Another important and widely disputed concept dis cussed in this issue is the principle of humanitarian intervention. Jack Donnelly finds that this type of coercive interference in the internal affairs of another state -contrary to much popular thought-is clearly not recognized as a principle of international law. He suggests a policy, particularly for the United States, of

positive non-intervention to safeguard both self-determination and human rights in all countries.

A new human rights regime is defined by Onuf and Peterson. They systematically analyze the universalization of human rights, which have traditionally been restricted to a particular national context. A general definition of norms, rules and legal prescriptions is elaborated in a discursive fashion by Fritz Kratochwil. His analysis brings an element of philosophical tradition to the contemporary policy debate. He concludes that legal norms probably influence the outcome of decisions but it is not possible to establish theoretically to what extent or even to what conclusion noms affect events.

Since the first part of this century, when the world powers strove to abolish war by simply declaring it illegal in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, many have believed that creating laws in the form of treaties could restrict international aggression. In order to regulate aggression, however, theorists distinguish between "just" uses of force and "unjust" warfare. Terry Nardin examines the just war idea in an attempt to understand the moral basis of the law of war. As reflected in the United Nations Charter, the notion has evolved during this century that war in self-defense is "just" while aggressive warring is "unjust." Yet, the problem of defining self defense, and even aggression, remains unsolved.

In a similar vein, the difficulties of regulating nuclear and chemical weapons is studied in Charles Flowerree's discussion of the politics of arms control treaties. Joan Johnson-Freese echoes the complexities of the arms control issue as she takes the question of definitions one step further to the realm of interpretation and implementation. Negotiation and conclusion of a treaty may establish law, but in order to have effect, the law must be interpreted and interpretations vary widely.

When allies with as similar political and cultural back grounds as the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany dispute the meaning and intent of a treaty, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one be gins to comprehend the magnitude of the problem in establishing a rule of law for all states. The negotiations on the law of the sea are a prime example of how very difficult it is to coordinate the differing political, economic and value systems, in addition to the conflicting foreign policy goals of the countries of the world. Modern technology and threats of scarce resources have introduced new conflicts to the historically slow process of determining legal norms. Daniel S. Cheever considers political interests as important as legal considerations in shaping the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. He writes "new directions in the law of the sea could not have been obtained without a great deal of intricate logrolling. A rule of law cannot exist apart from a political process."

The law of the sea conventions illustrate another aspect of the international legal debate. While states and lawyers may argue the definitions and applications of laws, those concerned about inequities in the present order raise the issue of whether law can or should function as a vehicle for progressive change. This is the contemporary Third World challenge to the Western dominated legal system: Is law only to mirror the status quo or should it set a standard of justice for the entire world community ? A global order based on equity and protection of basic human rights for all people is an ideal for which some believe international law should strive. Richard Falk argues this in discussing the role the International Court of Justice should play in a future world order. As he says, "to be global in its orientation, the new judicial culture would have to reach beyond a Third World agenda of global reform to embrace ... a visionary world order for all peoples."

From this brief introduction, it becomes apparent that any discussion of intemational law and foreign policy tends to focus on two major areas of concern: security and equity. Throughout history, people have attempted to establish a practical framework for ideals of peace and human rights under the rubric of interna tional law. To accomplish these goals, the convergence of foreign policy and international law must be greater than it is today.

LJ.K

**37.1**  
Few would dispute the assertion that Japan's postwar recovery and rapid emergence as an economic super power constitute one of the major transformations in the international system since 1945. Yet, despite the revolutionary changes that phenomenal growth and prosperity have brought about in the Japanese standard of living, Japan's role in international relations has not kept pace. An active world role demands not only a powerful economic base, but also a decision to allocate resources on a national scale toward particular international goals, as well as a choice of the specific means political, diplomatic, or military-for pursuing the desired ends. At the same time, the exercise of national power on the intemational scene requires a consciousness-at least among the policymaking elite-of the state as a global actor.

Observers of international relations have foreseen a gradual restructuring of the world system, away from the strictly bipolar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of the 1940s and 1950s, toward a multipolar system in which Japan, China, and Western Europe would each make inroads into the relative strength of the superpowers. Until the recent resurgence of Soviet-American confrontation, it was widely hoped that détente between the superpowers, along with a general diffusion of world power, could engender a more stable world. While this vision may still prove viable in the long run, it has so far failed to supplant bipolarity, leading some to question its original premises.

One source of disappointment for advocates of multipolarity has been the slow pace with which Japan has assumed a responsible international political role commensurate with its status as the world's second largest market economy. Japan's current posture may appear paradoxical: Global in its economic outreach, as a major exporter to both industrialized and developing countries and as a resource-poor importer of primary products essential to its national survival, Japan remains *i*nsular in its belief that it cannot or should not project Its power politically or militarily to pursue its economic interests in an independent way. Of course, there has indeed been a movement away from the postwar role of junior partner to the United States, as evidenced in diverging positions on the Middle East and certain East-West issues. There is also a growing awareness among Japanese leaders that Japan shoul*d* in one way or another develop an active global policy, rather than merely reacting to foreign pressures and changing external circumstances. At present, however, there is no clear consensus on the road to be taken.

This paradox has been internalized, both by Japanese and foreigners. Perceptions tend to lag behind eco nomic growth. Despite a renewal of national pride in Japanese economic accomplishments and demands that Japan be treated as a full member of the Western alliance, many Japanese still view their country as small and vulnerable, incapable of having a major impact on world politics. In an age which has witnessed the limitations of American power, the United States is still widely regarded in the framework of its postwar role as a dominant senior partner on whom Japan should depend for its security and place in international relations. At the same time, there is a large body of Japanese public opinion which resents Japan's postwar dependence on

The United States and would advocate a more independent course for the post-Pax *Americ*ana period.

Americans and Europeans, on the other hand, while in awe of Japanese economic success-as clearly evidenced by the recent popularity of books on the "Japanese challenge" and business practices-have only recently and reluctantly begun to open the door to full Japanese membership in the club of advanced industrial democracies. Japanese participation in "tri lateral economic and security cooperation is barely a decade old and still far from adequate, in view of the extensive shared interests and problems.

Developing nations, especially those which were victims of Japanese expansion and colonialism prior to 1945, have understandably ambivalent feelings toward Japan. As proof that a non-Western nation can modernize and achieve prosperity, Japan is to be respected and even emulated. But such laudatory attitudes are in delicate balance with apprehensions over the potential for Japanese "economic imperialism" or even rearmament and renewed militarism.

Our authors have referred to these and other para doxes in their discussions of the many aspects of Japan's global role. They have also seen distinguishing characteristics of the Japanese experience, which form the basis for Japan's relations with other countries now and will continue to do so in the future. Many of these are well known in their broadest outlines: Japan's frenzied efforts to resist Western colonialism by rapid modernization, its overriding concern with its perceived vulnerability, the legacy of postwar reforms under American occupation, and the "special relationship" that developed between Japan and the United States. Each article includes at least passing mention of the fundamental linguistic, cultural, and institutional differences separating Japan from the Western-oriented mainstream of international relations discourse. Such differences necessarily lead to a divergence of expectations in all spheres of international relations and can easily lead to conflict if not recognized and addressed.

Japan appears unique, not only in its culture and history, but also in its postwar development into a global econ*om*ic force, without becoming a correspondingly important mili*ta*ry power. Historically, the great economic powers, almost without exception, have required great military forces to realize their aims as colonialists or prosperous global traders. A variety of circumstances particular to the postwar world, including the inclusion of an anti-military clause (Article IX) into Japan's revised constitution, the presence of the United States, a *st*atus quo power with global interests, as a guarantor of Japanese security, and an increasing open interna tional economy-have enabled Japan to pursue worldwide economic objectives without developing the military potential to enforce its position directly. Yet outside pressures for more "sharing of burdens" by Japan are mounting, as documented in many of the articles. The basic question of Japan's security needs and the proper means required to meet these needs remains unresolved.

The results of Japanese economism have included not only steadily rising domestic prosperity but also conflict with the Westem democracies. During the recent recession, tensions resulting from Japanese inroads into important Western domestic markets and perceived trade barriers have reached a critical level. Indeed, the liberal postwar trading system from which Japan and other nations have derived great economic benefit may be in danger of collapse. Protectionist measures have entered the policy arena of the Western nations in a serious way with the Japanese threat" raised increasingly often as a theme in political advocacy. Japan is being called upon with increasing urgency to share responsibility for the health of the world economy. The success of Japanese policymakers, private sector leaders, and scholars in responding to these challenges will have far-reaching consequences.

Finally, if Japan is to pursue an independent global policy, it must balance off its policies toward those areas vital to its international position: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Pacific Basin, Europe, and the Middle East. The articles in this volume attest to the complexities of adjusting relations with each of these areas to changing world circumstances. Synthesizing a coherent overall foreign policy will present an even more difficult task.

Clearly, Japan's current position is one of vast po*t*ental*i*ty. Once a national consensus has developed that a "new world role" for Japan is desirable-or at least unavoidable-the content of this role will remain to be determined by the Japanese policymaking process. Our aim in publishing this issue is to provide a glimpse into the vital debate currently underway among Japanese and Western scholars, policymakers, and private sector leaders concerning Japan's future course-a process with implications extending far beyond Japan to the entire world political system.

J.D.K.

**36.2**

In surveying the dynamic areas of the contemporary world, one finds that there are usually religious factors at work. This is equally valid for cases of international conflict as in the Middle East, political revolution a in Iran and Nicaragua, crises of non-integration as in Ireland and South Africa, and new phenomena which defy classification, such as the Polish “Revival’ and the peace movement in Western Europe and the United States. Of course, in each of these instances there are also social, political, and economic forces involved. Yet the religious component is a real one and cannot be ignored.

This should not surprise us. Religion has historically played a central role in determining how people view themselves, the world around them, and their relationship to their environment. It has led them to bestow unchallengeable legitimacy on certain political regimes, while giving them a rallying point from which to reject others. Religion has been invoked as a call to arms – and as a call to renounce arms. Political and religious forces have interacted to engender a wide array of idealistic visions and ideological formulations. The religious factor has alternatively accelerated essential historical transformations or attempted to oppose them.

Our particular age, however, is dominated by a powerful belief in the power of science. Our scholarship has exhibited a strong trend toward formulations which bear the trappings of science (especially quantitative analysis) even in areas where the fundamental assumptions are by no means firmly agreed upon. This is especially true of the social sciences, in which the quirks of human behavior and accelerating rapidity of change make accurate testing of quantitative theories a far less secure endeavor than in the natural sciences.

Admittedly, religion is not an easy subject to write about. It calls into question some of our most deeply-held beliefs and sets us in opposition which may not easily be reconciled through rational argument. Yet this is in itself a political process.

Still more difficult is objective analysis of the relationship between religion and politics. Despite the obvious connection between these two decisive forces in human history, scholars until quite recently have been loath to subject them to serious theoretical, or even descriptive analysis. Perhaps they have been afraid of losing their “objectivity” or of sullying their scientific models with such “impure” variables as religion. Perhaps religious factors are too difficult to reconcile with current social science methodology. The secular orientation of the majority of scholars naturally leads them to give short shrift to the problems of a world in which religion plays a far greater role than in the lives of the researchers. Alternatively, we should not underestimate the importance of social, and sometimes governmental pressures which might tend to make this area of research a dangerous one.

For whatever reasons, remarkably little has been published in political science journals examining the role of religion in politics, especially in international relations. This is unfortunate, since religious factors often exert their influence across national boundaries in contrast to the state-centered world system. We therefore hope that, in publishing this issue, we will focus attention on the problem of religion in international affairs and thereby stimulate further research in this area. We have attempted to bring together articles covering as many areas of the world as possible in which religion is central to politics: Iran, Latin America, Ireland, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, the United States, the Vatican, Germany, South America, Indonesia, and Poland.

The most prominent feature of the relationship between religion and politics, as conveyed through these articles, is the wide variety of roles religion has played and continues to play. In Iran, it has provided a basis for anti-Western revolution, whereas in South Africa, despite the efforts of church groups to fight apartheid, the dominant group has often justified its racism, atleast in part, in terms of the Scriptures. El Salvador and Nicaragua have experienced severe class conflict in which the church has clearly taken sides. In Ireland, the Protestants and Catholics find themselves involved in a prolonged conflict with no easy solutions. The United States is also a country with great internal religious differences that are often assumed to weigh heavily in the determination of its foreign policy. The nations of Eastern Europe have struggled to maintain their religiosity in the face of Communist domination and one important actor in this struggle (and more broadly in East-West relations in general) has been the Vatican. Now that relations are becoming increasingly strained, Rome’s role may prove to be critical. Religion can also be seen to be an important political factor in developing nations such as Indonesia.

The problems these countries face differ greatly, of course. The methodologies used by our authors in their analyses vary accordingly. Some of them clearly show their emotional attachment to one side or another in the conflict, while others prefer to maintain neutrality – at least in their articles. In any case, they have not hesitated in the face of the difficult, perhaps impossible task of relating religion and politics in scholarly discourse.

**36.1**  
The plight of the world's indigenous peoples has been coming under increasing scrutiny. Once ignored but now in the spotlight are some basic questions concerning the human rights of the original inhabitants of countries throughout the world. These include: the right to physical survival as culturally distinct communities; the right to land and resources once theirs but now owned or claimed by other, more recently settled groups; and the right to self-determination.

But the debate itself seems in danger of being Overtaken by events. Whether in the Amazon region, in the Far North or in the South Pacific, the very existence of indigenous peoples is being threatened, often with little regard to the continuing formal debate about the rights of indigenous peoples." Daniel Gross, in a general survey of the Brazilian Frontier examines how the imperatives of economic development have been used by the government to justify its actions, many of which, he feels, have simply ignored the Indians' needs. Shelly Kellman details how that regime's policies have affected one particular group, the Yanomami Indians. On the other side of the frontier, the Venezuelan government, intent on pushing ahead with the development of the oil and mineral-rich Guayana region, is also failing to come up with a humane policy toward the indigenous peoples of the region, as Nelly Arvelo-Jimenez shows in her article. Frank Salomon explores the paradox of the Andean Contrast: the fact that Indians form the majority of the population in the region, but that-through colonial "gerrymandering" of borders-they now rep resent a minority of the population in many of the nations they now inhabit. The relationship between the neglect of indigenous rights and the adoption of the tenets of liberal ideology by the modern Latin American nation state is brought out in Richard Chase Smith's paper on Peru. Frances Svensson discusses the incongruity of the way in which Soviet policy toward indigenous populations has in fact been more tolerant and gradualistic than the U.S. approach, whose emphasis on the "quick fix' she sees as no less than revolutionary in its historical impact.

At the antipodes, in the South Pacific island of New Caledonia, Melanesians, who form almost one-half of the population of this French territory, are now standing up to counter repeated denials of their rights, Jean Guiart argues. The general issues of indigenous peoples' rights in international law are scrutinized by Gudmundur Alfredsson. How international law can be interpreted as giving the Indians of Saskatchewan a *d*e *jur*e right to self-determination, and even possibly independence from the Canadian federal govern ment, is the focus of Ellen Anderson's presentation. Finally, the Student Note by John Burstein brings out the complications of the position of the Miskito people in post-revolutionary Nicaragua.

What surprisingly, emerges from these case studies is the similarity of the experience of indigenous peoples throughout the modern world. Everywhere, it seems their rights are being either ignored or insufficiently respected. The few cases where these rights have been respected demonstrate that one of the basic dilemmas is how to protect the identity and ensure the continued existence of indigenous peoples, while at the same time allowing their dignified entry into the common world. What the authors of the papers in this volume show is that one should first address the question of how to achieve the recognition, in theory and fact, of indigenous peoples rights. Only when these peoples have had restored to them what they are owed-in land, the right to cultural identity, and the right to self-determination will they really be free to take their own decisions about how to relate to the rest of the modern" world.

**35.2**This issue of the Journal examines the recent controversy in the field of international communications policy, with reference primarily to the journalistic information media. What is the nature of the debate? There is widespread agreement that the “old” information order is characterized both by an imbalance in the flow of news between developing and industrialized countries, and by shortcomings in the actual content of what is seen as Northern-dominated international journalism. In addition, Southern journalists as well as independent observers have described in dismal detail the restrictions that some Third World governments impose on news gathering. But there is much less of a consensus on the extent of imbalances, shortcomings and restrictions; indeed this is largely uncharted social-science territory. To quantify these it is necessary, not only to have large quantities of reliable data, but also to agree in the first place on a definition of the terms themselves.

To speak of “imbalance” implies reference to a norm of “balanced” news flow; to depict “shortcomings” a formulation of “good journalism” is required; and to complain of “restrictions” begs the question of what exactly a “free press” is. Finally, there is of course a wide range of answers to the question, “What is to be done?” Not surprisingly, the policy prescriptions that have emerged have depended to a large extent on what views the protagonists take with respect to the questions enumerated above.

Jerzy Oledzki supports the Third World’s position and sees in it a parallel with Eastern European complaints that the Second World, too, is poorly covered by the Western media. In the case of Poland, he also suggests that the Polish press’s failure to report significant internal developments contributed to the push for reforms in the summer of 1980. Altaf Gauhar uses the media-government relationship in Pakistan from the colonial period through to the 1980s as his backdrop for a general analysis of the problem of the development of mass communications in developing countries. On the one hand, a government hardly more accommodating with the press than was the old colonial regime seems determined to demoralize journalists and quash all creativity. On the other, an information order dominated by the industrialized world mis- and under-reports vital events in the developing countries. This aspect is also gone into by Frederick T.C. Yu, who describes the inadequacy of U.S. journalism when faced with issues of global dimensions. From a different perspective, Alcira Argumedo analyses the way in which trans-national penetration of Latin America in the communication field has slowed the process of democratization in the continent. However, Leonard Sussman stresses the actions of governments as the chief barrier to the construction of a new and freer information order.

With respect to the quantification of the issue, Richard Merritt and Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, in a pioneering piece, attempt to define and put into practice measurable indices both of imbalances in the news flow and of the reliability of present international information transfers. As the authors state, such research cannot deal with the qualitative content of news transfers; and it is here that Oliver Boyd-Barrett’s assessment of the “media imperialism” debate provides useful pointers. In the context of the activities of the “Big Four” international news services, it turns out to be extremely difficult to identify, let alone pass judgement on, the influence of these big transnational agencies, whether it be for or against the status quo, and whether or not it represents in some way a projection of the headquarter country’s foreign policy.

Considering all the acrimonious rhetoric that has been the hallmark of the issue of information flows for much of the past decade, it is gratifying to observe a certain convergence in the policy prescriptions for dealing with this international problem. Doudou Diene summarizes that debate in his paper on the role of UNESCO in the development of a “new order.” Yu tackles the policy issue head on by advocating the setting up of educational ex-changes between First and Third World news organizations, with the particular aim of educating U.S. journalists. Oledzki advocates broader and more representative coverage of world news. Gauhar not only argues for an increase in the Third World input into the Western press, but has actually been closely involved in a promising pilot scheme to allow for such input. Similarly, Argumedo sees hope in the democratization of the communication structure. The necessity for a significant transfer of technological and other communication resources from the North to the South is brought out by Sussman, who nevertheless poses the condition that such aid be on terms acceptable to the industrialized countries’ notion of “freedom” The successful resolution of the problems created by the “old” information order may hinge on the application of a combination of all of these policies in a mix that would bring about a new order acceptable to all. **35.1**  
The title of this issue of the *J*o*urn*al *of Int*e*rn*a ti*onal A*f*fair*s may be misleading. By "economic system" we are referring to trade, but not only in an economic sense. Thus in our discussions of interna tional trade in illegal goods and services we are equally interested in examining its social, political, and military aspects.

Nevertheless, some of the economic data included in this issue's articles give a good idea of the magnitude and importance of illicit trade in several national economies which, in turn, has affected "licit" international trade. In Italy, for example, it is estimated that at least ten percent of the labor *f*orce is employed in that country's underground economy. In France, pimping and procuring (the kid napping and enslavement of persons-usually women-for prostitution) is officially listed as the third largest national business. And in the United States, where the underground economy has been the object of congressional scrutiny in recent years, the outflow of dollars to drug dealers in Colombia has been equal to over eight percent of the total U.S. balance of payments deficit. Estimates of the income generated by the total underground economy in the United States begin at ten percent of GNP.

Equally impressive in illuminating international underground economic systems are the strategies used by buyers and sellers to obtain illegal goods and services. The underground nuclear materials and conventional arms trades, for instance, both take advantage of "dual-use" or "gray-area" loop holes in international agreements, which permit the sale of civilian materials having military uses as well: Another tactic used for both of these types of trade is to have materials transshipped to third countries that are not restricted by trade controls or international agreements) In both cases, however, there does not seem to be an organized group of sellers, and buying is done on an ad hoc basis. The same situation does not exist in the trade in drugs or in women, where organized gangs and syndicates predominate in both the selling and buying ends of the trade.

To realize fully the importance of international underground economic systems today, it is also necessary to discuss their effects on economies, on governments, and on individuals. In this issue we learn, for instance, how laundered U.S. funds entering Colombia have distorted that nation's banking institutions, governmental social programs, housing industry, agriculture, and wage and price levels. Arms sales to South Africa affect both the internal and external policies of that state and the states surrounding it. The procuring and enslaving of hundreds of thousands of women (and children) has denied these people their most basic right. And the illegal economy in Poland is both cause and symptom of internal economic and political deprivation as well as of external tensions.

In addition to describing the inner workings of various systems of illegal trade, the articles in this issue examine the broader policy questions of international underground economies. For example, does regulation cause the problem of underground trade, or does it provide a solution? Have such measures as taxation or, in the case of the United States, the use of the dollar as a world currency led to the burgeoning parallel systems that seek to evade governmental tax structures? Or are some regimes, both national and international, needed in order to prevent scarce resources from being di verted from the general populace's economic and social development and benefiting only small sec tors of society or to prevent nuclear catastrophe? And, in the case of regulation, should the emphasis be put on controlling supply or demand? Should coca or marijuana crops, for example, be destroyed or made unprofitable? With regard to prostitution, how should the demand market created by immigrant laborers, traveling businessmen, and the military be controlled?

A final set of questions addressed by these articles centers on whether there is a kind of political, economic, or social system that encourages the development of illegal trade. Is it the profit motive that accounts for the phenomenal growth of underground economic systems? Or is the problem one of the "legal" economy, whether planned or market, failing to provide for the basic needs of its population? Has lack of faith in government, of whatever type, led to international illegal trade? Do governments have too little control over their citizens? Or are governments, such as those seeking forbidden nuclear or conventional arms, striving to become too powerful?

These are the questions policymakers and scholars will have to address as they grapple with today's problems of inflation, unemployment, low productivity, political and social inequality, and threat of war. As we confront these problems and attempt to construct a new world order, of whatever kind, it will behoove us to consider the impact of the illegal trade phenomenon.

Lesley A. Rimmel

**34.2**Once again this journal is devoting an entire issue to an examination of the problems of the developing world. In the first issue of this volume, "International Relations of Developing Countries," we included discussions of less-developed country (LDC) foreign policies from the perspective of the LDCs themselves. In the present issue, by contrast, we are concerned with the Third World within the context of superpower competition.

The idea of Soviet-American competition in the developing world is certainly not new; it dates at the latest from the death of Stalin in 1953. But in the past few years superpower concern with Third World developments has been the central- if not indeed the sole-issue defining Soviet-American relations. Détente and the areas which were to have been influenced by it (trade, strategic arms), while also affected by such factors as U.S. human rights concerns, have now largely been eclipsed as each side seeks to check the other's interests in developing and nonaligned nations.

Although the popular emphasis of Soviet American involvement in the Third World has been on the military, it is equally important to consider political, economic, and historical factors in assessing the impact and implications of their competition. We have attempted to include all of these emphases, as well as discussions of nearly all important regions of Third World instability (and Soviet-American rivalry). Overall, the focus of these articles has been on three broad questions: (1) has there actually been Soviet-American competition, and if so, how has it manifested itself? (2) who is "winning" in that competition? (3) are there fallacies in the superpowers seeing the Third World only in terms of East-West rivalry. and how can that rivalry be controlled?

While all of the contributors address, to some extent, the first question, Rhoda Pearl Rabkin and Jiri Valenta, in their discussions of the Caribbean and the Horn of Africa, respectively, give the issue special emphasis. They examine American and Soviet decision-making with respect to involvement in these areas, taking careful note of the domestic situation in the developing countries concerned. Addressing the second question, Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier assesses Soviet economic inroads into Africa, while Karen Dawisha and Robert O. Freedman discuss Soviet and American political progress in the various parts of the Middle East; Robert Donaldson compares Soviet and American relations with South Asia, using the history of Soviet relations with India as a model. Within the third category, Evgeni Primakov and Nils Wessell examine the prospects for regulating Soviet-American competition in the developing world, basing their respective analyses on the cases of the Middle East and Yugoslavia. (Yugoslavia, besides being a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement, has been termed a "middle-income developing country" by the World Bank.) Finally, Helen Desfosses questions the whole concept of Soviet-American competition in the Third World; using Africa as the example for her arguments, she nevertheless calls on policy-makers to discard their "East-West" perspective in viewing *al*l the less-developed countries, and instead to adopt a \*\*North-South focus, in which the nations of the Third World are accepted as entities in their own right.

We hope that our survey of Soviet-American competition in the Third World, while not exhaustive, will help generate thoughtful reflection and discussion on this critical aspect of present-day international relations.

**34.1**  
Thirty years ago this journal published its fourth issue, which was entitled "Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas". Several of the scholars who contributed to that volume expressed their pessimism about the economic and political prospects for the then small group of independent developing countries, notably in Latin America, and the many colonial territories that splintered vast areas of Africa and Asia. A lead article by Ernest B. Haas questioned the sincerity and will of the western powers to correct fundamental international inequities and predicted independence would only produce new and insidious forms of neo-colonialism. In a second article Lewis N. Dembitz lamented the small levels of North-South economic transfers and wondered whether the developing countries would ever secure sufficient capital for industrialization. Arthur J. Brown raised the spector of these countries caught in a "liquidity trap" from which they might never escape. Other articles and notes addressed issues of food insufficiency, the inadequate role of private investment, and the formulation of foreign policy by the newly independent nation of India.

The pessimistic picture which emerged from that 1950 issue of the journal now seems exaggerated despite many difficulties in the transition to full political independence and the challenges to economic progress that have occurred throughout much of the developing world. Most countries have avoided the post-colonial control of their domestic economies, that so concerned Ernest Haas, through successful diversification of traditional trade, investment, and aid relations. The much discussed dollar gap" has been closed for the more rapidly industrializing countries through a flow of investment that was spurred by the post-war expansion of the United States economy and now turns on the management of OPEC surpluses which this issue's article by Mossavar-Rahmani notes is primarily a South South matter.

Furthermore, the anarchy that many anticipated in and among newly independent states generally has not occurred. *M*ost developing countries have acquired sufficient national security capabilities, discussed in the Kolodziej Harkavy article, to insulate themselves from possible external threats while permitting a relatively free hand to consolidate domestic political authority. They have reinforced their political independence collectively through such efforts as the Non-Aligned Movement described by John Graham. One question to ponder for the 1980s, however, is the extent to which traditional economic issues relating to adequate foreign supplies of energy and investment will become more highly political and treated as vital to national security by many developing countries.

Since 1950 the number of independent developing countries has nearly trebled to one hundred and twenty while the scope, volume, and complexity of their international relations have

\*For the purposes of this volume the developing world, in accordance with United Nations practice, encompasses all states except the thirty OECD and Soviet bloc countries. substantially expanded. While much has been written during the past thirty years about the internal dynamics of political and economic development, the international dimensions of these problems from the perspective of developing countries have been generally overlooked. The purposes of the current volume are two-fold: to review several of the major international concerns of developing countries, and to suggest how these issues are likely to influence their foreign policies and in turn the course of world politics in the 1980s.

This volume grew out of John Stremlau's colloquium at Columbia University's School of Interna tional Affairs on the foreign policies of developing countries. Dr. Stremlau's willingness to serve as guest editor is gratefully acknowledged. Mary L. Ryan's assistance in preparing this issue for publication is also appreciated.

David Chaffetz

**33.2**This issue on "The Politics of Labor Migration" follows naturally from recent numbers of the Journal which dealt with other resource transfers in the international system. Most recently, the first half of this Volume 33, "Technology and the New International Order," was devoted to the problem of technology transfer. The underlying controversies of resource transfer are familiar then, whatever the resource in question may be. The present economic order facilitates resource transfers on an historically unprecedented scale. These transfers of resources take place largely at the instance of individual parties, private citizens, commercial enterprises, or governments, and are an aggregate of unplanned, single events. The resulting transactions provide benefits to the contracting parties, whenever these are freely undertaken. The success of the post-war economic order derives from this unplanned market of transactions. Critics of the market maintain that while the individuals transacting resource transfers may benefit from their contracts, larger systems, states, regions, or the underdeveloped world as a whole may suffer from the unplanned, free movement of resources. Marxist critics specify classes within countries which benefit from resource transfer at the cost of general immiseration within trading countries.

It is easy to see the international movement of labor within this typology, except that where humanity is the resource transferred the issue becomes more controversial. To restate the above formulation, the controversy over migrants concerns the ability of individuals to move freely across borders in search of jobs, and the ability of an employer to hire anyone willing to work. Successful migrants accrue personal benefits, and their employers secure certain advantages. Critics of migration warn that these individual benefits may coincide with invisible costs to both the countries of migrant origin and destination. Their unstated conclusion is that if all the hidden costs of migration were realized explicitly by the individuals involved, migration would slow down or cease. Imperfections in the labor transfer process, which disguise the gains and losses of migration, are the focus of many critics. Their solution to the problem is some kind of compensating and monitoring facility which would set right the ill effects of free market movements. More sanguine proponents of such a facility admit the difficulties in making such adjustments in the complex market for migrant labor.

Even if the economic effects of migration were neutral, or neutralized by some such facility, labor migration would be far from uncontroversial. This is because of the human element involved. The problems raised by the movement of people from one state to another can be discussed in terms of the following considerations:

1. National Sovereignty Issues; nations experience a diminution of sovereignty when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements of labor exchange in that they forego full control of their employment and naturalization policies, cultural unity and even their political process. In sending a large migrant work force abroad, a country supplying labor cannot discharge its moral obligation to protect its citizens working in a foreign, often hostile society.

2. Market Structure Issues; importing labor is only one alternative available to a labor-short enterprise or industry. If migration ceases, the enterprise can undertake capital deepening, shift its production facilities to areas of labor surplus, restructure the labor force and change labor participation locally (by employing minorities, women or children, for example), or go out of business. Of particular importance is who chooses these alternatives, which have so great an effect on migration policy. The decision to generate migration, always taken in isolation, creates many ripple effects throughout the society.

3. Policy Process Issues; in seeking equity or optimality in labor migration one confronts the large number of interest groups for which an adequate system of adjudication does not exist. Ho*w* to reconcile the needs, for example, of small manufacturers in one country with the power of farm owners cooperatives in another? Migration problems must be solved in the context of sovereign states. Yet behind each state's position are hundreds of contradictory interests. Migration is visible and generates wide political awareness on the part of its opponents and proponents, but many more groups are affected by migration without being aware of it, and their interests are difficult to include in the policy process of even a single state.

Contributors to this issue take up these points and exemplify many of the advocacy positions which play a role in determining migrant policy. W.R. Böhning's piece relates the changing world order to migrant regimes. Ray Rist and Jonathan Powers treat the successes and failures of the European Community's migration policies. Mark Miller's study of Algerian workers in France points out the pitfalls of bilateral agreements. Charles Keely's article shows the inconsistent underlying architecture of U.S. immigration policy. J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair predict a catastrophic collapse of migration patterns in the Middle East. Jorge Bustamante's paper reflects on the efforts of Mexico to attain an objective assessment of the costs and benefits of its migrant relationship with the United States. Marion Houstoun and Philip Martin look forward on the durability of migration in industrial societies.

From these papers emerge a consensus, almost an orthodoxy, about the intractability of labor flows. This reflects accurately the tenacity of individuals, perhaps 20 million of them, in moving to improve their lot. Whether effective political barriers expand (as around Comecon countries) or contract, decreasing transportation costs, increased information about opportunities, and creation of wider regional labor markets promise to widen the scope of migration. The issues discussed in this number of the Journal will have clearer and clearer implications for our societies with the passing of time.

**33.1**

Commentators who wish to demonstrate their intuitive grasp of the rhythm of the modern industrial age and its societies inevitably single out "technology" as a dynamic and powerful force unique to these times. Their judgement, as such, is undeniably accurate. But unless further elaborated (and so often they are left in this simplistic form), such statements are unenlightening. At the base of our instinctive agreement with the praise and awe of modern technology is the presence in our daily lives of devices of astounding utility and complexity, particularly in the fields of communication and transportation, whose exact operations remain incomprehensible to most of the individuals who use them. At the same time, our agreement with any assertion of the power of technology is clouded by confusion about the practical content of this abstraction. What is technology*?*

At a fundamental level of economic analysis, technology refers to the proportions and manner in which the basic factors of production, land, labor, and capital, are combined. Technology is the function and the product of the entrepreneur, who causes the means of production to be brought together and put to work in a certain way. In more realistic and descriptive terms technology ultimately involves the application of new inputs, such as acid in the Bessemer steel making process, one of the key innovations launching the industrial revolution.

Another of the essential truths which the popular abstraction of technology suppresses has to do with its social antecedents. Only through major contingent and preceding changes in English society was the successful application of industrial techniques made possible. Examples include the destruction of smallholder farming by means of the enclosure movements, forcing peasants off the land to allow large scale agriculture, and to create a "free" labor force upon which the burgeoning industrial centers could draw. Later came the socialization of laborers to the routine of regular working hours and the conditions of assembly-line manufacturing (extreme specialization of labor in minute parts of a larger task).

It is precisely this last point which permits a convenient access to the discussion of the role of modern technology in the development of the economies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The fact that society must be prepared historically for infusions of modern technology was not grasped clearly in early attempts to promote rapid industrialization in the Third World. As a result, dismay at the adverse social effects of transplants of technology was widespread. An additional com plication was the necessary integration of developing areas into an increasingly unified global system of trade. This trend allocated tasks of primary resource production to the Third World, activities whose contributions to furthering the appearance of secondary industries like manufacturing, the backbone of modern prosperity, were Minimal.

The knowledge and experience required for the establishment of dynamic and diversified industrial sectors lay in the hands of private enterprises based in the North, for whom there was little natural incentive to transfer their advantages to the developing economies. What little success in diversification was achieved in the South was (and still is) hampered by protective trade legislation designed to protect domestic employment and strategic industrial firms and so on.

The elaboration of the basic issue of modern technology and its application to the huge problem of development is the focus of this symposium. The component parts of this elaboration are as follows. First, the politics of recent international organizations and conferences center around the dilemma of access to foreign technology, on the one hand, and its promotion and development indigenously, on the other. Anila Graham's review of political events within the context of the struggle to establish technological elements of the New International Economic Order sets the stage. Erskine Childers treats the concept of South-South interchange and communication from an historical perspective. Debra Miller's examination of global intellectual property regimes traces the progress of another stream of this field. Volker Rittberger proposes alternative paradigms for analysis of the approaching United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD).

Second, developing country policies as a function of international activities of their own firms and in the context of their social value structures are addressed by Sanjaya Lall and Denis Goulet respectively. Finally, the attitudes and policies of the United States, long the world's dominant technological and economic power, are tackled by Ward Morehouse and Henry Nau, with particular reference to the declared American position for the UNCSTD conference.

The overwhelming emphasis of this symposium upon technology, as opposed to science, will be recognized easily by those with prior familiarity with the issues involved. Technology, insofar as it has any meaning as a generalized abstraction, should be viewed as the economic and social instrument of science, Technology is, loosely speaking, the application of pure scientific research. Studies of technology alone therefore barely scratch the surface: selection of scientific discoveries for use by engineers and planners must presently work backward from socio economic goals toward a given stock of scientific knowledge. The redirection of science itself toward the habit of taking into account the needs, strictures, and momentum of societies is a concern which is still embryonic in conception and still farther from expression in policy. Practitioners of the creation, distribution, and application of scientific knowledge are coming to realize the scope of their power for social transformation, both creative and disruptive. The pace and intensity of modern research, communication, and business entrepreneurship have increased this power enormously, sometimes without enhancing the practitioner's sense of responsibility or society's control of this process. Higher quality in public discussion of the application of science and technology to development can only aid in the search for more effective societies in developed and developing countries alike.

Stephen M. Douglas

**32.2**The topic "Leadership Succession in Communist States" was selected in April 1978 with an awareness of its immediate importance in the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China. By the close of the year, events have directed upon this normally rather esoteric subject the glaring light of public curiosity. With regard to the Soviet Union, informed commentary on the precarious state of Leonid Brezhnev's health has changed its tone from that of cautious speculation to the flip frankness of common knowledge. The notable lack of evidence of Politburo preparation for the demise of Brezhnev has only heightened fascination with the spectacle in the West. In Yugoslavia, the ninth decade of the remarkable life of Josep Broz Tito draws to a close; the groundwork for a smooth, if complicated, succession apparently has been laid. However, the turbulent history of this multinational Balkan state cannot be submerged entirely by an appearance of growing prosperity and sturdy nonalignment during the last twenty years. Ethnic discontent rumbles beneath the renewed firmness of the control exercised by the Yugoslav League of Communists. In the vast and mysterious People's Republic of China foreigners have witnessed start ling criticism of the ruling system and even of the memory of Mao Tse-tung himself. Throughout the latter half of November 1978 and sporadically up to the present moment, provocative and open displays of reassessment have appeared on wall posters and shouts for democracy" have rung in the streets of Peking, Shanghai and several other cities. Surely the succession in China is not a closed book; the effects of the death of Mao in 1976 have yet to run their course.

The weightiness of such imminent change is difficult to overestimate. What shifts of emphasis can be expected in Soviet strategic thinking in the post-Brezhnev era? Will an unstable Yugoslavia become a focal point of superpower confrontation in the 1980s? What are the implications of a newly awakening China for international relations-economic and strategic? The articles in this symposium will attempt to provide useful clues in the search for such larger images of the future through the access point of the study of leader ship succession.

*Charisma and Communist Leadersh*i*p*

Successive developments in socialist theory after Marx have continually reaffirmed the existence of a complex relationship between historical forces and the initiative of individual leaders. Nevertheless, the exact nature of this dialogue has long been a central point of contention. In some sense, leaders of communist movements are relieved of the necessity of exercising charismatic fascination over their followers by Marx's high lighting of irresistible social and economic forces. The theory itself has powerful charismatic qualities; leaders may lean upon and followers share in this euphoric sense of purpose and assurance. At the same time, history requires and communist movements have generated a striking tradition of individual leadership, the virtuosity of which consists in the response to local conditions while remaining within the (rather loose) constraints of Marxist philosophy. In passing, one may observe that gymnastic attempts to demonstrate the conformity of these actions with existing theory are ultimately spurious and usually end with the publishing of more volumes of the particular leader's own theory, the assumptions of which may not be reproducible in practice.

Indeed, charismatic leadership often requires the breach of fixed rules, if these prove a hindrance to effective control. According to Max Weber, the charismatic hero derives his authority not from an established order ... [but) gains and retains it solely by proving his powers in practice." Complicating two of the successions discussed in this volume is the dual role of Tito and Mao as warrior-founders of their respective states as well as long-time leaders for whom successors must be found. As Weber remarks, "For charismatic leadership ... if it wants to trans form itself into a perennial institution, the first basic problem is that of finding a successor to the prophet, hero, teacher or party leader. This problem inescapably channels charisma into the direction of legal regulation and tradition." In the Yugoslav and Chinese cases, this seems to trans late as a posthumous deification of Tito and Mao, and the mystical attribution to their successors of charismatic qualities as a result of their status as holders of the former leader's office. But as Myron Rush points out in his introductory article, dead communist leaders historically have rarely escaped denigration at the hands of their successors. Again following Weber's analysis: "It is the fate of charisma ... to recede with the develop ment of institutional structures." In centrally planned economies, it is difficult to reconcile the tactical vagaries of charismatic leadership with the necessity of huge administrative mechanisms. Therefore, repudiation of charisma and with it, criticism of the leader-founder, is a likely prospect.

*Routinization or the Ren*ewa*l of Charisma?*

In the Soviet Union, it is clear that recent leader ship has adopted predictable and even rigid patterns of behavior. As Seweryn Bialer's article demonstrates amply, advanced age and the caution inherent in the personalities of the survivors of Stalin's purges who presently head the Soviet government augur for mere incremental ism and not innovation, as long as they continue to hold power. However, the simultaneous and extreme senescence of an entire generation dams up pressure for a period of inevitably rapid replacement of top personnel at some future time. Alec Nove's rather unique treatment of the Soviet economy stresses the urgent need for radical reform while downplaying its likelihood. Dmitri Simes points out the entrenchment of bureaucratic interests as evidence that Soviet military doctrine is not likely to be moderated; indeed, spending on arms will probably increase as a direct result of coalition building efforts within the elite in a succession period. This impression of immobilism is tempered by a nuance of alarm; gradualist orthodoxy may fail, particularly with regard to domestic economic policy. On the other hand, a generally perceived cynicism within Soviet society militates against the success of a charismatic renewal, even should an attempt at one occur.

Tito's Yugoslavia represents an example of the routinization of charisma in ritual. Most citizens may hide a wry smile at the announcement of the aged Marshal's annual bear hunt, but such regular references to his personal prowess serve the important function of evoking images of the proud history of the Yugoslav communist move ment and its embodiment by its leader. Such unity of sentiment as results is counterbalanced by continuing pressure for increased autonomy by the country's ethnic groups, manifested in demands for linguistic and cultural rights. These aspirations, for all their vagueness and obscurity, pose profound dangers for the country's stability. Tito's acute consciousness of the quandary has been revealed as much by a willingness to accommodate national feeling within certain limits as by his swift and brutal suppression of the Croatian disturbances of 1971. But as Bogdan Denitch concludes, the answer to the question of who will succeed Tito is an anticlimactic one. It is an institutional structure which will guide the country (with a heavy party responsibility) and a collective bureaucratic and party leadership which must fan the dying flames of Tito's glorious past.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a new era of openness is dawning in China, with unforeseeable opportunities and risks. In the fall of 1978, the Cultural Revolution was discredited openly (although thus far unofficially), and many of its most prominent victims, living and dead, rehabilitated. Authors of wall posters in Peking have referred obliquely to the products of Mao's aging mind as "metaphysical thinking". A flurry of political opinion written on a wall near Hsi Tan Street called for democracy and demanded a style of life which would compare more favorably with those of Taiwan and the United States. The Hsi Tan "democracy symposium" earned the praise of deputy Premier Teng Hsiao P'ing, the durable modernizer twice cashiered from important positions in previous purges, as a good thing". But Teng also demanded moderation of criticism of present Chairman and Premier Hua Kuo-feng and of Mao Tse-tung. In the closing days of 1978, Peking activists (behaving like anything but sheep) established a daring new unofficial publication entitled *Peking Spring*. The *People's Dai*l*y*, in the glow of celebration of the re-establishment of Sino-American relations, called upon Chinese citizens to "Emancipate your minds!" Revellers, Chinese and foreign, responded at the American embassy with disco dancing and California champagne on New Year's Eve.

It is uncertain whether an official impetus lies behind the new outspokenness in the People's Republic, but continued public support for a modernizing China open to foreign trade, invest ment and technology appears spontaneous. Teng's leading role in management of the early events of this process displays charismatic characteristics; he must continue to exhibit daily a capacity for orchestration of mass response as well as maintenance of the support and allegiance of his official superiors within the Peking Politburo.

The quick advance to a renewal of diplomatic relations with the United States and the enthusiastic public greeting given to this action already have contributed enormously to Teng's personal political security and legitimacy. However, the massive problem remains of Mao's place in history; as such, the situation parallels that of the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin. The world can only await with awe the potentially transforming effects of these events upon the nature of world trade and relations among states.

*Limitations of Elite An*al*ysis*

Can the behavior of elites be taken as an accurate representation of the political affairs of systems as complex as those of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China? Further, it must be asked whether the study of leadership alone can hope to fathom the depths of social structure, history and tradition and account for their effects, except in the most general fashion. Scholars of interna tional affairs will acknowledge with humility gaps in our understanding of these societies, particularly with reference to China. Such caution should not be allowed to degenerate into pessimism about the value of prediction, but should act to moderate the temptations of hasty or shallow judgment.

Finally, the examination of elite behavior and particularly of leadership succession in a time of impending change clearly must run the risk of being overtaken by events. This proviso is particularly germane in the case of material on China presented here. The indulgent reader will bear in mind that these articles (by Kenneth Lieberthal, Chu-yuan Cheng, and Jonathan Pollack) were completed in late 1978 and thus cannot reflect the full wisdom of hindsight bestowed by an aware ness of events in the intervening period. Nevertheless, specific judgments of the authors are in the main borne out rather than contradicted by experience and are all the more noteworthy for their validity *post hoc*. The interested reader will discover a wealth of useful information and insight to deepen understanding of the latest developments.

Stephen M. Douglas**32.1**On May 9 1978, the bullet-riddled body of Aldo Moro was discovered in the back of an automobile by Italian police. The kidnapping and murder, which are typical of an increasingly violent political tradition in Italy and elsewhere, were attributed to the Red Brigades, a large, well-organized and armed group of ultra-leftist urban guerrillas whose membership, some authorities estimate, exceeds 1,500 individuals.

During the fifty-four days of the ex-Italian Premier’s abduction, the Italian people, and indeed the entire world, were witnesses to an extraordinary series of events which in many ways illustrate the fundamental methods and objectives of modern terrorist groups: committing spectacular crimes, generating intense publicity, instilling fear in the public at large and reducing the credibility of government’s power to control such acts. In the case of Mr. Moro, the Italian Government declined to negotiate with the Red Brigades under any circumstances, and responded instead with one of the most massive manhunts in history Despite the consensus among most segments of Italian society that Mr. Moro’s abduction was a despicable and monstrous act, some Italians criticized the Government’s behavior as excessive and inept. Moreover, the pathetic letters written by Mr. Moro to many of his colleagues and associates in government, pleading for accommodation and his very life, underscored a great personal tragedy that was too often obscured by the shrill headlines in the world press. The combined forces of the Italian Government were insufficient to save Mr. Moro’s life and, on May 10, the day after his body was discovered, literally thousands of newspapers and magazines across the world carried the gruesome photograph of Mr. Moro’s crumpled body in the back of a stolen automobile, demonstrating the difficulty which modern and highly sophisticated states cope with acts of organized terror.

**International Terrorism**

Terrorism is the use of threat of violence to instil fear. When such violence has as its ultimate objective, the intimidation, subversion or destruction of structures and processes of public authority, we speak of political terrorism. In nearly all cases of political terrorism, violence against individuals and property does not result in political change. Rather, the fear induced amongst influential segments of society may achieve what the terrorists themselves cannot: radical changes in the ways by which governments behave and, and thereby, a loss of popular confidence and legitimacy in established patterns of order.

Political terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon. Walter Laqueur notes in his book, The Terrorism Reader, that the sicarii, a highly organized terrorist group, was quite active in the first century A.D. Zealot struggles in Palestine. What is new with regard to political terrorism, however, is that today it is increasingly and international phenomenon.

Much of today’s terrorism can be viewed as international in several respects. For instance, the goals of many terrorist groups are international, aimed at the creation of new states (the Croatian terrorists in Yugoslavia or the Front de Liberation du Quebec in Canada), the destruction of existing states (Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine in the Middle East), the liberation of some territories from the control of other states (the Armed Forces for National Liberation of Puerto Rico in the United States and the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland), the subversion of particular regimes (anti-Castro exiles in Cuba) or the complete transformation of the world political order (the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany and the Weathermen in the United States).

Because so many of their goals are international, the audience of terrorist acts is also global. The current state of communications technology, which permits instantaneous world-wide transmission of terrorist acts, is cited by law enforcement officials, scholars and even terrorists as the terrorists’ most valuable weapon. If fear and intimidation are the terrorists’ immediate goals, technology permits the achievement of these goals on a global scale. There are probably few people who did not see the last gruesome photograph of Mr. Moro and who were not impressed with the message of frustration and vulnerability that it conveyed.

Because their goals and audiences are international, the targets of many terrorist attacks are often international in nature. Hijacking international commercial airliners or kidnapping employees of multinational corporations are only two of the most obvious examples. Attacking diplomats in foreign missions, thereby embarrassing home and host governments alike, is another. The 1975 attack on the Vienna headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a conspicuous example of how vulnerable international organizations may be to terrorism, and how much publicity can be gained for terrorist causes by disrupting their activities.

Today’s terrorists are also globally mobile. Terrorists rely upon rapid means of transportation not only for the commission of their acts but also to escape punishment. The 1972 massacre at Tel Aviv’s Lod International Airport, in which members of Japan’s United Red Army managed to kill twenty-seven people and injure seventy-eight others, demonstrates the relative ease with which terrorists travel from one country to another. And in 1975, when Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (the infamous ‘Carlos’) forced several high-ranking OPEC oil ministers to accompany him and his associates in an Austrian-provided airliner after the attack on OPEC headquarters, the jet gave the terrorists the means to quickly and successfully seek asylum in friendly countries, first Libya and finally Algeria.

But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of today’s terrorism is the growing international network of individuals and groups engaged in such activities. Although few of these groups share tactical objectives, or ideologies, many of them do share resources, diplomatic influence, launching bases, training facilities and support from various governments. An international black market for sophisticated arms provides a central locus for people with similar beliefs to discuss common needs and objectives and, although there are no known international “master-minds” or central organization, the increasing professionalization of terrorists would tend to suggest closer international cooperation and collaboration among them in the future.

Examples of such international linkages abound. The Tuparmaros guerrillas in Uruguay set an example of terrorist organization and tactics for many other groups around the world. The United Reg Army attack upon Lod International Airport was coordinated with, and supported by, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Some Italian officials believe that the Red Brigades may have been assisted by German terrorists in their abduction of Aldo Moro. And some American law enforcement officials have asserted publicly that the Weathermen may have received training from the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia. While there is no publicly available evidence to support the latter assertion, there is somewhat more evidence to suggest that the American government supported Cuban exile terror against the regime of Fidel Castro, and that the governments of Libya, Syria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea and the Soviet Union may have provided training and arms to various European, Middle Eastern and Latin American terrorist organizations.

Terrorism and the Study of International Affairs

Terrorism is clearly and international reality in today’s world. As such, it deserves, and has increasingly received, attention from scholars of international affairs. True, terrorism claims fewer victims than more conventional forms of warfare between states, and its ultimate impact upon strategic world politics and the world order may be less than significant. Nonetheless, the modern state, with its increasing responsibilities for national economic and physical security, can ignore such acts only at the risk of losing credibility and popular support. But neither can any one state hope to control terrorist groups alone. International cooperation in regard to terrorism may be an objective necessity in today’s world, a necessity unfortunately not easily realized as illustrated by the disagreements among the delegates of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism.

Scholarly approaches to terrorism have taken three basic forms, all of which are represented in this issue of the Journal: the historical, the normative/instrumental and the behavioral. The historical approach involves the collection of data on past acts of terrorism, often relating such acts to the unique socio-political characteristics of the participants and victims. The articles of Bard E. O’Neill and Richard N. Lebow present excellent historical narratives of Palestinian and Irish terror, respectively, while the article by Brian M. Jenkins uses past trends in terror to extrapolate future trends in such activities. The normative/instrumental approach begins with the attitude that terrorism poses a major threat to today’s political order and proceeds to analyze and suggest means whereby such activities can eb controlled or eliminated. The essays by Stephen Sloan, Paul A. Tharp, Jr., and Yonah Alexander deal, respectively, with the contributions that social scientists can make to law enforcement, possible legal regimes for the control of terrorist activities and the responsibility of the media in free societies to report terrorism, not encourage it. The behavioral approach is designed to isolate certain similarities and differences in terrorist organizations, capabilities, characteristics and tactics so that this phenomenon can be more objectively understood as a form of political expression and behavior, however repugnant it may be. The typology presented by Richard Shultz is an original and important attempt to classify and analyze terrorist behavior using rigorous scientific methodology. In addition to his historical narrative, O/Neill successfully applies this typology to the case of Palestinian terror in his essay. And, in his article on mass destruction, Robert K. Mullen dispassionately considers the range of weapons available to terrorists who seek to commit such acts and then evaluates the utility of these weapons in light of typical terrorist skills and objectives.

It should be noted that no analysis of international terrorism ever fits neatly into one category or another, and that various emphases are placed on these approaches in each of the essays presented there. This is probably as it should be, for all three approaches have much to recommend themselves; perhaps only through a combination of all can the phenomenon of international terrorism be better understood.

Hopefully, social scientists, governments and the public-at-large are attaining a more sophisticated and enlightened awareness of terrorism, the kinds of individuals who commit such acts and the causes of this behavior. Although terrorism must be condemned for the brutal suffering it inflicts upon innocent people, this suffering is insignificant compared to that resulting from conventional warfare between states, systematic government repression and even the distress occasionally caused by governments acting in good faith (consider, for example, the behavior of various governments and international organizations during the widespread famines and epidemics in Ethiopia during the early 1970s). Terrorists are not always base criminals, but are frequently well-educated professionals from prosperous backgrounds. And the cause of this activity is seldom violence for its own sake; rather, it may be a reaction to violent and systematic political repression or a particularly invidious form of extortion. While it is important that we not romanticize terrorism, it is equally important that this phenomenon be viewed in a way that reflects the complex nature of the world’s political realities. We hope this issue of the Journal will contribute to such an understanding.

**31.2**

The articles in this issue of the Jou*rn*al concern the future world order. At a more fundamental level, however, they raise serious questions about the scholarly analysis of international affairs.

The concept "world order" embraces the global political, social, economic and cultural relationships which characterize humankind at any point in time. These relationships may be formal or informal, func tional or dysfunctional, broad or narrow in scope, stable or volatile. They may have quite different impacts on different segments of humanity, and they may or may not reflect a cosmopolitan consensus of values.

World order, broadly defined, has long been a concern of scholars of international affairs. To be sure, the ancient Greek philosophers were concerned with the nature of political and social relations among au tonomous political communities, even if they were ignorant of the many lands and cultures of their day. F.H. Hinsley has eloquently described early analyses of world order dating back as far as Dante in the 12th century which took as their focus the relations between monarchs, church hierarchies, principalities, city-states and nations.' Today, world order is at least an implicit concern of all international relations theory.

And yet, the essays presented in this volume consider world order in ways that are radically different than those of mainstream scholars. In fact, the essays in this issue are so different as to suggest the beginnings of a 'scientific revolution" in the study of international affairs, to borrow a concept from Thomas S. Kuhn. In the opinion of Kuhn, science develops historically not through the accumulation of empirical data, but rather through the revolutionary destruction of prevailing scientific paradigms. These paradigms, which delimit the scope of accepted scientific inquiry and provide the elemental framework of scientific knowledge, are eventually undermined by the conduct of "normal science"; that is, research geared toward the elaboration and testing of paradigms frequently makes observations or reveals phenomena which are unaccounted for in those paradigms. As these anomalies" become more difficult to explain, the intellectual basis of the original paradigm becomes untenable and a new, revolutionary paradigm is conceived to explain observed phenomena. In a sense, such a process may be underway in the study of world order and international affairs.

For instance, the accepted paradigm for the study of world order, at least since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), has been based on the concept of a nation-state system comprised of autonomous and sovereign political entities. Indeed, the phrase "international affairs" unabashedly reveals the national bias of this paradigm. Not only has the pre-eminence of the nation state system been taken for granted by scholars, but its role in the global affairs of humankind has been considered largely natural and positive. Consequently, normal scientific inquiry into world order has focused on such topics as balance of power politics, decision making, international law, war and deterrence, interna tional organization, diplomacy, foreign policy and nationalism.

As with most paradigms, the nation-state perspective on world order studies has revealed a number of anomalies. For instance, balance of power politics have prevented few wars, and current military technologies make traditional components of national power anachronistic. Successful attempts at international integration reduce the saliency of national interest as an explanation of elite behavior. The growing interdependence of the world's system of production and consumption, and the increasing influence of non-governmental, transnational actors, have broadened the agenda of controversial global political issues. The new uncertainty about the long-term viability of the global eco sphere has weakened most peoples' image of the world as an infinite expanse of lands, customs, climates and resources. Indeed, one need only consult a standard text on international relations to understand the extent to which scholars have come to disagree on the proper approach to world order as well as the "image and reality of international affairs."

The essays presented here generally reject the nation-state paradigm for the analysis of world order. Instead, they begin with a view of the world as a whole, as a tiny spaceship" in which humankind faces com mon global problems and, in all likelihood, a common fate. They view world order not so much as a frame work for the pursuit of national goals and interests, but as a global structure for the satisfaction of basic human needs. In this paradigm, nation-states are artificial creations relevant perhaps only to current historical conditions, creations which may not be best suited for the management of global affairs.

This "spaceship earth" view of world order appears to constitute a new scientific paradigm with corresponding standards for normal science and the conduct of research. The essays presented here all reflect this new mode of inquiry, albeit to different degrees. In general, the spaceship earth paradigm is characterized by the following emphases:

*Holis*tic. Humankind is viewed as a whole, rather than as a collection of autonomous political entities. Cultural and political differences exist, to be sure, but increasing social interdependence wrought by advancing technologies has nearly eliminated the ability of one society or government to live and act in isolation from others.

Syste*mi*c. Growing interdependence not only ties people together physically, but it also tends to result in the linkage of new social and economic issues to traditional political and diplomatic concerns. Scholars are now coming to realize that world peace and security may depend on the equitable distribution of economic goods or the eradication of apartheid, or that the fragility of the global ecosphere requires political, in addition to technical, cooperation at the global level. For the spaceship earth paradigm, world political issues cannot be fully understood without references to social, cultural and economic issues.

*Transdi*s*ciplin*a*ry*. Because of the issue-linkage resulting from interdependence, the simple skills of political scientists do not suffice for an understanding of world order. Other disciplines are required as well; the collection of political, economic and sociological essays presented here attest to that need. The days when world order studies were the exclusive domain of political scientists may well be at an end, or at least should be.

*N*o*rm*ative. As with all new paradigms, the spaceship earth view is explicitly normative, if for no other reason than that it consciously refutes many of the assumptions found in the old, anomalistic paradigm. But it is normative in another sense as well; it openly questions the legitimacy and utility of the current world order system. Values obviously have greater significance in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, since the affairs of men may be more amenable to choice than the nature of matter and energy. Certainly in international relations theory, ideas are frequently transformed into policies. It is no surprise, therefore, that the spaceship earth paradigm promotes a more explicit accounting of the scientist's values, as well as an acknowledgement of the distance between one's preferences and things as they are. The four values embodied in the program of the World Order Models Project (peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecological balance) may not be untypical of an emergent global consensus on basic world order values.

F*u*turistic. Finally, the spaceship earth paradigm promotes research on the future of humankind, often involving complex projections of various trends for periods of one hundred years or more. This perspective derives not only from the paradigm's assumption that forms of world order are likely to change in the future, but also from the paradigm's explicit normative content. The dilemmas facing today's world cannot be overcome immediately, and the transition to a preferred world order can only be realized at a future time. But, in the spaceship earth perspective, futurism involves more than a simple-minded analysis of human kind's "range of choice": it involves the creation of a practical and relevant strategy to alter such ranges when necessary.

It is not at all certain that the spaceship earth paradigm will supplant the nation-state paradigm and thus constitute a true scientific revolution. There are powerful social forces with a vested interest in the global status quo, forces which are likely to resist the destruction of a paradigm which legitimates their power. Indeed, perhaps neither the nation-state nor spaceship earth paradigms will prove adequate to deal effectively with the empirical anomalies in today's world. It is nonetheless clear that traditional and current approaches to world order have not succeeded in answering important questions nor solving the global dilemmas of war, poverty and hunger, ecological destruction, allienation, repression and inhumanity. The study of world order is in desperate need of re-evaluation, and the essays in this volume constitute a novel approach to this need.

Alan D. Buckley

**31.1**In medieval Europe, the common referred to designated areas of uncultivated pasture, forest, and meadows where all were free to graze their livestock and hunt. These place stood in contrast to permanently occupied private lands, or *t*he close, where unauthorized intrusions could bring heavy penalties including confiscation of property, dismemberment, and even death. The tradition of the common persisted in Europe through the nineteenth century, but by then most of the desirable property had been appropriated by a burgeoning landowning class. The so-called commons, or public lands, became largely confined to outlying, less exploitable wastes.

In many respects the modern concept of the g*l*obal commons is analogous to the conventional notion of the commons referred to above. Global commons are the areas or resources of the world which do not fall under the internationally recognized sovereignty of any state. They are generally regarded as belonging to all states together (res com*mu*nis) or to no state at all (res n*u*ll*ius*). The oceans, Antarctica, outer-space, and the atmosphere are most often thought of in this category, but living and non-living resources recovered in these areas are now also included.

The increasing significance of resources as global commons is very much a product of our times. Until recently the sea, sky, and outer-space seemed vast but unproductive frontiers. Their importance to commerce, national defense, and science was unquestioned, but their potential as sources of food and raw materials was usually overlooked. The recognition of this potential, especially in the case of the oceans, accounts for much of the attention being given the commons today.

In another era, the idea that nations, like people, had a common right to certain territories and resources stemmed from prevailing notions of natural law as well as from practical strategic considerations. Nature, it seemed, had decreed that these areas be the world's common heritage by rendering them incompatible with permanent human habitation. Queen Elizabeth declared in 1580: "The use of the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people or private man, for... neither nature nor regard for the public use permitteth any possession thereof...."

So long as interest in the commons was restricted to problems of transporting goods and soldiers around the world, no broader or more elaborate nexus with the commons was sought. Several historical developments have, however, changed earlier perspectives and a world-wide scramble to define and execute national policies with regard to the commons resulted.

Foremost among these trends has been the phenomenal growth in global consumption, particularly in the industrialized countries. This trend, rising dramatically over the last twenty-five years, has nearly exhausted reserves of some key raw materials and threatens many others. The problem cannot be solved by simply stepping-up production to match demand because the raw materials themselves are becoming more difficult to find in the usual places. Massive world-wide shortages are inevitable unless new supplies or substitutes are found.

Twentieth-century technology, for better or worse, seems to provide at least a short term solution by opening previously untouched realms to exploration and development. For instance, advances in fishing technology, including the use of sonar and space satellites, has boosted annual harvests enormously. Mineral riches on the ocean floor are recoverable and oil and natural gas are already being systematically drawn from the continental shelf. Weather modification and relocation of polar ice promise a remedy to extended droughts and a boon to agricultural develop ment of desert zones.

The conquest of outer-space presents its own set of potentialities. Here technical capacity and adventuresome spirit combine to produce exotic solutions pressing terrestrial problems. Encapsulated colonies, solar wind-mills, interplanetary travel, and commercial enterprises are as much reality as science fiction to children of the Space Age.

Such advances, however, almost always entail grievous cosis. This becomes apparent when problems of exploiting the global commons are considered. Fish and mammal species are threatened with extinction because of an unbridled search for protein. One can scarcely imagine the ecological consequences that stripping the sea-bed or dumping tons of petroleum into the oceans could bring. More philosophically, technical capacity often breeds contempt for limitations, promoting the view that they are always conquerable rather than sometimes insurmountable.

Economic and technological problems in commons areas are compounded by political differences. Use of global commons requires compromises among the competing claims of nations. With the scramble for resources, principles for deciding who gets what, when, and how must be established. These must, in turn, be made to operate in regulating disputes between nations.

The commons idea clearly suggests that benefits de riving from the commons should be shared equally. This notion, however, runs squarely into the fact that nations do not participate equally in exploiting the commons, nor are they always willing or able. The idea also suggests that no single country or group of countries should pre-empt or unduly influence deliberations on commons problems for its own benefit. Yet countries do, and will continue to wield power differently. in different ways, to different ends, to different degrees. These elements of world politics will likely make confrontation, rather than cooperation, the dominant feature of most inter-nation encounters over commons problems.

It would be unwise to suggest a single approach to the study of the global commons. Many disciplines stake their claim to some aspect of the subject. Commons problems at once raise questions in the areas of economics, politics, history, geography, and philosophy. They also raise technical, legal, and strategic questions which require somewhat more specialized knowledge. Then one must resolve the level of-analysis problem, choosing between or among national, regional, or global perspectives. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the global commons share few similarities. Account must therefore be taken of their significant differences.

In this issue of the Jou*rn*al a comprehensive treat ment of the global commons was not possible. Diversity in content and approach is emphasized as a survey of the articles and their authors" backgrounds will indicate. Perhaps this will give the reader a better feel for the complexity and depth of the subject matter. Most of the articles are written from may be called a "Western internationalist" perspective, and each explores to some degree the political basis of the commons problem or problems in question. Emphasis is also given to \* commons regimes," or possible institutional solutions to the commons problems available to the international community.

In deference to the plethora of information pouring forth on the subject, an article specifically treating Law of the Sea issues is not included. This is in part to redress the (perhaps justified) imbalance between the exposure given Law-of-the-Sea topics and that granted the more exotic commons areas.

Departing from normal practice, this issue includes two articles not related to the main theme. René Albrecht-Carri*e*'s contribution illuminates contempo rary world-power relationships by drawing apt com parisons between today's scene and those which pre ceded the two world wars. William T. R. Fox offers a comprehensive essay on the world's population problem and its special implications for international politics. The Board of Editors welcomes these two valuable contributions.

Douglas Cardon, Editor-in-Chief

**30.2**

The concept of modernization has been used to apprehend a whole cluster of seemingly interrelated processes which together account for some of the dramatic transformations which, by now, have affected most of the world. Modernization encompasses a diverse set of processes including economic rationalization, increasing literacy, diffusion of knowledge, technological innovation, media participation, secularization, industrialization, bureaucratization, urbanization, and mass political participation. Depending upon one's location in space and time, these same processes might well be taken as the critical dimensions of development. The study of developmental change would then be understood as the analysis of these phenomena in terms of the factors that set them in motion, the linkages which exist among them, and the effects that they produce in society.

Although attempts to sort out the effects of develop ment on various kinds of human sub-groups (especially socio-economic classes, elite and underprivileged groups, ethnic and racial clusters, and regionalized populations) have become more commonplace in recent years, rarely has the effort been made to control for the impact of the world's most obvious and fundamental cleavage: sex. Studies aimed at correcting this glaring oversight, have consistently produced a pro found and far-reaching observation: the social, eco nomic, and political changes that usually accompany development appear to almost always occur more rapidly for men than for women. In fact, it is often observed that, in terms of women's status in society, development has had a regressive effect. This unexpected phenomenon often escapes detection because it is obscured by the advances made by other groups.

These remarkable tendencies lend credence to the often-heard claim that women have come to represent, by far, the world's most underprivileged class. That the huge efforts to foster development throughout the world may have contributed to a relative deterioration in the position of one-half of humankind, emerges as one of the truly great ironies of our age.

Singling women out for special attention in this issue, implies an acknowledgement that their experience with development differs markedly from that of other human sub-groups, particularly men. But the term "women's experience" is, in a way, very misleading. Within any female population, experiences range widely with variations in certain cultural, social, political, and economic criteria. Nowhere is this variety of experience more pronounced than among women in the developing world.

In order to bring out some of that diversity, articles have been selected which treat one or more aspect(s) of women's relationship to development in important Third World areas. Articles were also selected which demonstrate perspectives and approaches that will enhance the creativity and insight with which future research and policy, with regard to women, is formulated and carried out.

By way of departure it might be pointed out that, in the developing world of today, women function as both independent and dependent variables with regard to development. They both contribute to and respond to the changes which transform their environment. Because the specific circumstances of a given female population must always be prior to any change which affects them, we may expect that even where women are most oblivious to matters of development they exert some influence on its course. Indeed, it may be found that the passivity and isolation of a country's women will have a very telling effect on its development prospects.

For those who must struggle with the development problems of the Third World, the deleterious effects of widespread exclusion and isolation of women from productive modern sectors prove most frustrating. Those frustrations, when joined with the longer-standing moral and welfare concerns about women, appear to have provoked important national and international initiatives aimed at the integration of women into the modern economic sector. In certain countries, then, the prospect that women will become more active and assertive in development questions appears much improved. It is also encouraging to see more and more attention being given to the economic worth of labors women have conventionally performed.

Yet, development is rarely synchronized across all of its dimensions. While the various aspects of develop ment may be conceptually related, there is far too much evidence that they bear no necessary connection in the real world. Therefore, the successful integration of women into the economic sphere, may do little for them when it comes to political and social status. As may be discovered below, a woman earning as much as å man has no guarantee that she will be accepted as his equal in other respects. This is especially likely in countries where a patrimonial ethos is firmly emplanted and fostered.

Many of the pressing problems which women in developing contexts face are, then, ultimately reducible to issues that are not easily resolved. Hopefully, discussions and analyses, such as those presented here, will contribute to the understanding and solutions which are needed.

Douglas Cardon, Editor

**30.1**

The *Journal* of *International Affair*s has for the second time in two years attempted to change its "look". The editors sincerely hope that this change will be a permanent one and that readers will become familiar with the new streamlined format. This type of "soul searching" is inevitable in an organization having the rapid turnover in staff that the Jo*urn*al has, and we believe that it is healthy. Perhaps it is simply a manifestation of the search for-identity-cult that pinnacled in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The editors of the Jo*urna*l feel that it has finally found its identity a little late, in true form.

The change in format is not one intended only to improve the commercial viability of the Jo*urnal*, but reflects a basic change in philosophy. The editors believe that while the study of international affairs remains to a large extent in the hands of academicians and statesmen, it is, and should remain, domain for every individual who is concerned about the world in which he or she lives. So, while we hope the Jo*urn*al will retain its scholarly appeal, the editors will attempt by the choice of topics presented, to broaden its audience to include those not as well versed in the theories of international relations.

Not only was this a year of visible changes, but the internal structure of the Journal itself was considerably improved, and this vast undertaking drew its support from the distinguished group of men-scholars in international affairs and well respected in their areas of specialization-who make up the staff of editorial advisors. The editors hope that such structural changes, by bettering efficiency, will assure Jou*rn*al readers of having a dynamic and timely publication when the issues it covers are "hot" and still worthy of debate.

In the interests of deserving scholarly attention while bringing to the fore a topic of broader appeal, this issue of the *Journa*l has been devoted to a study of the recent alterations in the international economic system and how they have effected European - United States relations. Four of the included papers (Malgren, Cohen, Moran, and Warnecke) were originally presented at the 1975 Columbia - CUNY (City University of New York) joint political economy conference. This conference, supported by an NDEA European Studies grant from the U.S. Office of Education, and which brought together several noted experts, Columbia and CUNY faculty and graduate students, was administered by the Institute on Western Europe at Columbia University. Two of the papers (Spero and Kohl) were written by Institute faculty and the issue in large part reflects its activities.

To complete the new picture, some final acknowledgements must be made. The initial stimulus for many changes was given to the editors by Warren D. Manchel editor and publisher of *Foreign Polic*y, whose thoughtful suggestions began the *Jour*nal on its new road. Thanks must also be given to Jim Waters and Paul Chinelli of Moose Graphics, whose patience and artistic talents have seen this issue through completion.

-Ed.

**29.2**

The most compelling development in world affairs in the seventies is the challenge of the developing nations to the structure of international eco nomic relations. The critical stimulus was war in the Middle East in 1973 and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices. OPEC's success at fixing the price of a virtually unsubstitutable commodity demonstrated that a potent source of economic power had passed into the hands of a few nations in the Third World. It nearly derailed the industrial economies of the northern hemisphere, giving the cartel of oil producers unprecedented claims on the financial assets of this "First World." But it also afflicted the "Fourth World"—the poorest of the oil-consuming nations in the south ern hemisphere—already suffering from the escalation of costs of food and fertilizer, with bills for energy they could not afford. The result of the oil producers' actions revealed the dependence of all countries on trade in raw materials and dramatized the case for moderating heretofore extravagant demands for growth and consumption which the planet could not support. OPEC's achievements also inspired the developing countries in both the Third and Fourth Worlds to use their diplomatic influence in the United Nations and to galvanize their aspirations into a radical program of demands for a new international economic order. The rhetoric of the Group of 77 railed against a "neo-colonial" economic system rigged against their needs for development in favor of special privileges for the industrial powers. Viewing themselves as victims of imperialism and the rivalries of the nuclear giants, these new nations joined to readjust the rules for managing the resources of the earth and for distributing the fruits of its productive capacities. These efforts can be compared in part to the struggle that began well over a century ago in Britain between the interests of labor and of the managers of capital enterprises for allocating the benefits of industrialization. Today what we witness internationally are developing countries organizing into commodity-producing unions and voting blocks in multilateral institutions to bargain, as the world's new international proletariat, for concessions from the industrially advanced nations which depend on raw materials to fuel their economies. Whether or not these egalitarian reforms represent a substantive change in the role of power and sovereignty in the political relations among states, it may well be that the principle of laissez-faire in economic relations will be replaced by one based more on social welfare and redistributive justice. This turn of events can also be understood in the larger perspective of the course of contemporary world history. This century opened with Europe at the fulcrum of international diplomacy in control of vast colonial empires. Two wars in thirty years to contain Germany's ambitions, however, were a fatal bloodletting. Europe was thus reduced during the cold war to one of the arenas in a worldwide contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. Then came the talks to stabilize the relationship between the superpowers and the rout of American forces in Southeast Asia. But meanwhile, the leaders of the newly independent nations, as heirs of the liberation movements and nonaligned bloc of the fifties and sixties, united in an anti-colonial protest against the terms of the international order in the seventies. It is within the broader context of these shifts in the balance of forces, that this issue of the Journal deals with the new standing of the prominent nations in the developing world. The first article by James W. Howe assesses the means by which developing countries exert collective pressures to secure their ends, both through OPEC's economic might and through parliamentary majorities in international forums. William Epstein, on the other hand, addresses his study to military dimensions of the Third World's position in an analysis of the failures of the Non Proliferation Treaty and of the possibility of other countries acquiring nu clear weapons. The other articles consider the foreign policies and internal conditions of the most powerful nations in the developing world. The articles on Iran, Brazil, and Nigeria by R. M. Burrell, Riordan Roett, and Ibrahim Gambari, respectively, portray nations playing dominant roles in their regions under stable, authoritarian regimes with ambitious plans for industrialization, for making use of their rich supplies of raw materials, and for securing the local influence and international recognition com mensurate with their size and natural wealth. Unlike these emerging powers in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, however, India, as discussed by B. Sen Gupta, is a land poor in resources, striken with poverty, ruled by a regime desperate to cling to power, and, despite a strong military and a key place on the subcontinent, frustrated by the major powers and its neighbors from exercising the regional influence it covets. Consideration of the problems and policies of these individual countries should not draw attention from the larger theme of this issue. It is hoped that these essays will contribute to an understanding of the deeper changes in the pattern of world power which underlie the interests of the developing world in reforming the postwar practices of international eco nomic relations. This is the environment in which diplomacy will be con ducted in the last quarter of this century. The task will be to accomodate the legitimate interests of everyone in a world economy that is both fair and prosperous. And that will require building the institutions and mustering the political will for a progressive international order that provides for a peaceful adjustment to the rising stature of developing nations.**29.1**

Diplomacy, we are told, is the art of negotiating. It is the means by which states manage their relations and adjust their differences without war. It is also certainly true that the modern world has transformed the conditions under which classical diplomacy was carried out. Many negotiations now procédé in large multilateral forums with many participants, instant press coverage, and a keen sensitivity to public opinion. The special problems of managing interdependence in today's world also prove especially resistant to diplomatic solution. Yet it can probably still be said that bargaining among diplomats is a basic process in the practice of international relations. Negotiations have long played a vital role in the conduct of foreign affairs, but it is nevertheless remarkable to note the variety of issues now subjects of negotiations. Discussions in the European security conference continue in Vienna. Arms control is the issue in the strategic arms limitations talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the meetings in Helsinki for "mutual and balanced force reductions" in Europe. The Middle East—the familiar scene of Secretary of State Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy—awaits a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, while, in Africa, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa works to arrange a detente with leaders of the Organization for African Unity over the status of Rhodesia and Namibia. The fixing of petroleum prices is the problem to be discussed in the coming meetings between OPEC and the oil consuming countries. Recent multilateral negotiations include the United Nations conferences on food, population, the environment, and the law of the seas. It is hardly necessary then to justify devoting an issue of the JOURNAL to a study of negotiations. To assess the process of negotiations sharpens our thinking about the means by which international relations are carried out. To examine the actual practice of current negotiations clarifies our insight into the critical issues in world affairs. Yet the significance of these essays on negotiations goes beyond their contribution to understanding the issues and the process of contemporary diplomacy. They have special bearing on the very terms of the interna tional order in which we find ourselves. It is not inconceivable that the next generation of students of the role of the United States in interna tional history may well choose to characterize these years as "an era of negotiations." Proclaimed by President Nixon in his first inaugural address, this phrase identified a conception of the posture of the United States toward the rest of the world that would orient the diplomacy of his administration. Henry Kissinger, the mentor and manager of its major diplomatic initiatives, organized a fundamental realignment in policies that engaged American power and ideological commitment in the containment of communism around the globe. The implicit armistice between the superpowers, once called peaceful coexistence, evolved into formal accords under policies of detente. The SALT agreements, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, and the state visit to Peking signaled to many that a truce to the cold war was at hand. Meanwhile, the recovery of Europe and Japan after the Second World War placed severe strains on the monetary arrangements engineered after Bretton Woods. Devaluation of the dollar and suspension of its convertibility into gold unhinged the postwar economic order and brought it near collapse. If a structure of peace was really to emerge from the end to decades of confrontation between the superpowers, then the agenda in Washington would have to include progress toward securing a new foundation for the world's economy. New forces were nonetheless at work that threatened to undermine the order that Nixon and Kissinger conceived. Coming to terms with the legacy of the cold war without recognizing the sources of new tension would not assure stability. The dangers of the contest between the nu clear giants may indeed be defused, but structural changes in the interna tional environment have transformed the nature of the challenges that command our attention in the mid-seventies. It is now common to say that we live in an interdependent world. We think about how we can afford to fuel our economies and whether there will be enough food to go around. Inflation combined with recession still flourishes without respect to national boundaries. Conservation has taken on a new meaning as we realize the earth is a finite commodity and environmental deterioration a dangerous possibility. Moreover, the consequences of accepting that growth is not inevitable and economic dislocation not improbable when no one remains aloof from a scramble for scarce resources shakes the confidence of some in the survival of democratic government. At the same time, the nonaligned nations make their influence felt in the world in new ways. As OPEC flexes the economic muscle of the Third World, the rhetoric from the conferences held by the United Nations demonstrates the urgency of its new bargaining power. The spread of nu clear weapons to the less developed countries has become as frightening as the arsenals of the superpowers. Underlying this tangle of issues raised by recent events, one can almost detect new fault lines in the structure of the international order. Points of confrontation seem increasingly to lie on an axis dividing north from south, rich from poor. Midway in the seventies then we witness the demise of the postwar order and the advent of another that will define our foreign-policy choices for the last quarter of the century. It is within this historical frame that the following essays treat the conduct of negotiations in general and the issues and players in current international negotiations in particular. The first and last articles consider the bargaining process itself. The re marks by W. Averell Harriman that open the issue and set its tone glean the wisdom of nearly half a century of negotiating experience. I. William Zartman, on the other hand, perceives in his article the "dynamic pattern" in the course of many negotiations through the conceptual perspective of political science. The actual practice of negotiations is the concern of the other articles. The studies of SALT and the Vladivostok agreements, the international mechanisms for financing oil payments, and the bargainings between the Israelis and Arabs after the October war shed light on the vital negotiations of our day. The authors of these essays—Gerard C. Smith, Paul A. Volcker, and William B. Quandt—have themselves participated in the earlier phases of the very negotiations they write about. John D. Montgomery in turn writes from Harvard where the leading player in these negotiations, Henry Kissinger, began his "education." This analysis compares the concepts and assumptions developed in the writings of the professor with the performance of the secretary of state. Finally, Arthur Lall, a former envoy to the primary international forum for negotiations, rounds out the issue by discussing the problems of negotiating in the UN General Assembly where recent votes register less the divisions of the cold war than those of the new "development war." Taken together, the articles in this edition of the JOURNAL consider both the crucial international negotiations of our day as well as the process through which these negotiations are carried out. But, more broadly, it is to an understanding of the issues at this juncture between an era of negotiations and era of interdependence that this issue is addressed.**28.2**

During the past several years, detente has been one of the most widely discussed topics in the field of international politics. Most writings concerning this issue have dealt with changing relations among the superpowers and other groups of states. Detente has been discussed in terms of the SALT talks, increasing commercial ties between the Soviet and Western blocs, the development of relations with the People's Republic of China, etc. This issue of the JOURNAL approaches the study of detente from a slightly different direction—that of detente as an influence on the theory and practice of communism. The articles which follow examine various communist parties (and, when necessary, related non-communist groups as well) to determine what effect American-Soviet-Chinese detente has had on their ideology, leadership, domestic posture, and foreign affairs. In the lead article, Walter Clemens discusses detente as it relates to the two largest and most important communist parties, those of the Soviet Union and China. After providing a definition of detente as it is understood by the Soviets and Chinese, Clemens summarizes the international developments that led to the adoption of detente policies. He then looks at events within the CPSU and the CCP, dealing particularly with the positions of Brezhnev and Chou En-lai, as well as the ideological justifications that have allowed the Soviets and Chinese to deal with the supposedly most hated foe of communism, the United States. Clemens concludes by drawing up a balance sheet of detente's accomplishments thus far, and poses questions that must be considered for the future. Next, Charles Gati analyzes the effects of detente on Eastern Europe. Reflecting the coincidence of party and state policies in communist-ruled nations, Gati dwells first on improved relations with the West and then on the position of the East European communist states as satellites of the Soviet Union. He points out that on the whole detente has not resulted in a relaxation of Soviet dominance. Rather, controls have if anything been strengthened—events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are seen as a normal and repeatable expression of Soviet determination not to allow any interference with its hegemony over East Europe. On the other hand, the Korean Workers' Party has been determined to free itself of domination by either the Soviet Union or China. Writing on North Korea, B.C. Koh places detente in the context of recent moves toward reconciliation with South Korea. He argues that while detente among the great powers provided an important impetus for North-South talks, the results of these contacts have been far more dependent on internal politics in the two Koreas. Ideologically, the KWP remains governed by the concept of juche (independence) rather than the posture of its neighbors. Turning to non-ruling communist parties, Ronald Tiersky examines recent developments among the French communists. Tiersky's analysis dwells on a point common to other non-ruling CPs—the dual role of the PCF as a domestic political party and as a member of the international communist movement. He also calls attention to the problem of relations between the French and Russian communists on the one hand, and the French and Soviet governments on the other. In light of these issues, Tiersky discusses the influence of detente on the PCF in terms of such questions as disarmament and the development of the European Community. Australia provides an example of a smaller communist movement that still has some measure of political influence. In his article on Australian communism, Justus van der Kroef first traces the evolution of that country's several Marxist parties and then discusses the impact of detente on Australian communist politics. Fie concludes that despite the formation of pro-Moscow and pro-Peking splinter groups, recent changes in American-Soviet-Chinese relations have had only marginal influence on the Australian communists. Finally, Martin Needier discusses communism in Latin America. His article makes it clear that repression, insignificant size, internal struggles, and concentration on local issues have left the Latin American communists comparatively isolated. Only the Cuban communists seem to have any important stake in detente. Needler's lengthy treatment of Chile provides an interesting commentary on Allende's ill-fated regime. Whether detente itself is truly a long-range state of affairs or merely a tactical ploy is still an open question. The answer is not made any clearer by the responses of various communist parties to this latest change in their international environment, responses which further demonstrate the diversity of the communist movement. Still, detente has prompted some significant developments in both communist ideology and policies. We hope that our present issue provides some explanation of them.**28.1**

As political-military topics dominated international affairs literature during the 1960s, so economic issues promise to be the focus for the 1970s. Current interest in such problems as the future of America's partnership with the European Community and Japan, the commercial aspects of detente, and the implications of oil diplomacy all point to the ultimate inseparability of political and economic considerations in foreign relations. In recent years, there has been a marked transition in the U.S. from confidence to apprehension over America's position in world affairs. There are few areas in which this trend has been more evident than that of trade relations. Forums for discussion of trade policy have ranged from the White House to subway posters, indicating a degree of concern perhaps unprecedented since the 1930s. Bearing this in mind, our current issue is devoted to a survey of U.S. trade policy. The following articles and book reviews have been written to provide the reader with an introduction to the problems of international trade that affect this country's foreign relations. However, our interest lies not so much in the economics of trade as in the development of trade policy. The regional approach chosen for our presentation emphasizes the interdependence of political and economic inputs that must be considered by U.S. policy-makers. While trade and monetary theory is not covered in any detail, the issue's introduction outlines the influence of theoretical questions in policy formulation. It also briefly reviews the evolution of postwar U.S. trade policy and offers suggestions for further reference. Following the introduction, Werner Feld discusses trade between the U.S. and the European Community. After summarizing the development of U.S.-EC trade, Professor Feld turns to the yet unresolved problems in this relationship as well as proposals for their resolution. Throughout his article, Feld views these issues of economic policy from the perspective of a wider American-West European partnership and stresses that the future of U.S.-EC trade is an inseparable part of what he calls the "changing power relationship" among the U.S., the EC, and the Communist bloc. This leads to the widely discussed question of detente. Its economic ramifications in the form of East-West trade are presented here by Walter Krause and F. John Mathis. Their article traces the growth of East-West trade relations from the cold war period through the recent transition of U.S., Soviet, and Chinese policies. Krause and Mathis then analyze the actual flow of goods and services brought about by the development of this trade and discuss its future prospects. A crucial problem for U.S. trade policy lies in its treatment of American-Japanese commerce. Drawing on his extensive experience as an economic journalist and government advisor, Yasuo Takeyama outlines the significant characteristics of U.S.-Japan trade. His article is particularly valuable in presenting a Japanese interpretation of the political-economic frictions that complicate America's most vital relationship in the Pacific. A further note on U.S. trade policy in the Pacific Basin is provided by Richard Kosobud and Houston Stokes in their proposal for a Pacific free trade area. Following a summary of recent developments in the region's economic relations, the authors discuss the mechanics of a free trade area and the advantages of such an arrangement for its potential partners. While conceding that a more tightly-knit regional bloc (e.g., an Asian Common Market) is infeasible for the present, Professors Kosobud and Stokes conclude that the gradual evolution of a free trade area is both possible and highly desirable. In concentrating on its economic relations with other developed countries, the U.S. has been criticized for neglecting the interests of less developed nations. Robert L. Curry, Jr. approaches the subject of U.S.-developing country trade through an examination of business practices in advanced nations that harm the growth of LDC exports—a growth vital to economic development. Professor Curry describes these "restrictive business practices" as well as efforts by such organizations as UNCTAD to cope with them. He concludes by proposing policies through which the U.S. government can promote LDC exports and discourage practices that serve contrary interests. Over the past few years, it has been observed that the competitive edge held by American business overseas has significantly declined—weaknesses in the U.S. economy and the strengthening of competition from Europe and Japan have eroded what Servan-Schreiber called "the American challenge." In writing on the interests of business in trade policy, Lewis Young of Business Week rebuts the "climactory" thesis of U.S. business abroad. He argues that continued American advantages in technology, economic difficulties in other industrial nations, and most recently, the consequences of the oil crisis, have once again brought U.S. business to the forefront of world trade. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in organizing a serious discussion on such a topic as trade policy is that sudden twists in the course of events can render information or arguments obsolete before they even appear in print. As the reader will see, a few sections in our articles have been affected by this problem. Nonetheless, we feel that their value in providing background and reference on a subject crucial to U.S. foreign policy has been preserved. The Editors wish to thank Professor Richard N. Gardner for his assistance in preparing the introduction. However, responsibility for any shortcomings in content rest with G. Rubinstein, W. Liesman, U. Lächler, and M. Wall of the staff. We regret that, for reasons beyond our control, the scheduled article by Dr. Geza Feketekuty of the Council of Economic Advisers will not appear.**27.2**

Political integration is the process where by political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. ERNST B. HAAS— The Uniting of Europe The Berlin Airlift, the Korean "police action," and "Bloody Sunday" in Ulster have all served to highlight the plight of multi-state nations. More recently, the seating of the two Germanies at the UN, the placement of the "Korean question" on the current UN agenda, and the warning issued by the British government that Northern Ireland might be "integrated" into Britain along the lines of the Welsh model (if local Protestant and Catholic leaders failed to form a working coalition in the new regional assembly) all served to reaffirm the capacity of multi-state nations to generate headlines. Yet, despite their ability to capture the public's attention in time of crises, they have received scant attention as a class of political phenomena. A little less than a decade ago, the JOURNAL touched on this question when it published an issue entitled "The Politics of Partition" (Vol. 18, no. 2). In his foreword to the issue, Aaron Klieman stated that "partitions past and present, to an overwhelming extent, share two characteristics: each led to dislocation of people; each proved to be more of a short-term expedient than an enduring contribution to peace and security." Since the multi-state nations are generally the product of partitions resulting from the cold war and/or the breakup of colonial empires, they presumably also share some common characteristics (e.g., the above-mentioned dislocation). We seek to determine these similarities in order to facilitate a better understanding of the essence of a multi-state nation and how it is likely to react in given situations. Given the tendency of these nations to become the focal point of crises of crucial interest to the world community, this understanding is long overdue. To begin with, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between a nation and a state (a point well taken by Professor Walker Connor in our last issue, "Political Integration in Multinational States"). A nation is "a social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity" while a state is "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government" (see Jack C. Piano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary). Thus, a nation can comprise part of a state (as in the case of the multinational states, where several nations occupy territory in a single state), be coextensive with a state (as in the case of the ideal type of the nation-state), or extend beyond the borders of a single state (as in the case of the multi-state nation which we have chosen to examine). It is in this context that the concept of "national self-determination," often touted as one of the prime motive forces in international politics, can be seen as a link between the problems of multinational states ("one state, many nations") and those of multi-state nations ("two or more states, one nation"). Just as the call of "national self-determination" often prompts a nation in a multinational state to secede and form its own state (thus hopefully achieving the ideal type of the nation-state), so too it acts as a powerful stimulus to a multi-state nation to attempt reunification (thus approximating the nation-state). That brings us back to the question posed by Klieman: was the creation of these multi-state nations more of a short-term expedient than an enduring contribution to peace and security? In order to answer this question and thus further the study of multi-state nations, we asked our authors to examine the feasibility, probability, and desirability of the reunification of three multi-state nations: the Germans, the Koreans, and the Irish. While one cannot exclude the possibility of reunification by conquest, we have chosen to focus on reunification through some means of "political integration." By way of definition, we have adapted Haas's description of "political integration," as quoted above. For our purposes, we will define political integration of a multi-state nation as the process by which political actors (sharing a common national identity) in two distinct states are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states. According to Philip Jacob and James Tascano, political integration "generally implies a relationship of community among people ... a feeling of identity and self-awareness . . . [and] the essence of the integrative relationship is seen as collective action to promote mutual interests" (see their The Integration of Political Communities, pp. 4-5). By definition the multi-state nation possesses the sense of community (without which it ceases to be a nation-a possibility that has to be explored in light of the prolonged division of our three examples) required for political integration, but the separate political structures of the states in which it resides generally inhibit or are hostile to any collective action or articulation of mutual interests (e.g., the Abgrenzung policy of East Germany). Our authors attempt to gauge the utility of homogeneity in reunification efforts and speculate on what areas are open to delineation of mutual interests. In his introductory essay, Ray Johnston points out that despite its broad contemporary scope and lengthy historical lineage, political partition is the victim of a great deal of conceptual confusion. Having examined the relevant literature concerning historical instances of partition and unification, Professor Johnston concludes that conflict has been the ever-present midwife to both. He further observes that partition and unification appear to be two sides of the same coin, with the label attached to the process dependent on the ideological position one brings to the subject. In an effort to explain partition's causes and effects as empirical phenomena, Professor Johnston offers a series of requisite variables for integration, as well as a model explaining the inter-relationship of partition, unification, and conflict. Reflecting on the possibilities of unification, he concludes that divided nations (his designation for the multi-state nations) have two options if they choose this course of action: reunification by conquest or reunification by the slow process of social mobilization and integration (i.e., the creation of a new nation, not the resurrection of the old). The first of our case studies deals with the Germans, the multi-state nation that over the past twenty-eight years has probably attracted the most attention. But, as Joachim Remak demonstrates, the division of the German nation goes back much further than the cold war partition at the end of World War II. In fact, since 1815 there has been one major change in borders and political organization every twenty-one years. Thus, there are profound historical reasons for doubting the permanency of the current, "two Germanies" arrangement. According to Professor Remak, the idea of German unity (the idea of owing loyalty to more than one's native Bremen, Baden, or Bavaria) has survived for centuries and its potential for continued survival is strong. Arrayed against it, at the moment, are the Soviet Union's interest in maintaining a German nation shorn of its Bismarckian power and an underlying Western discomfort (despite lip service to the contrary) with the thought of a restored German nation of eighty million. The recent treaty between East and West Germany involved a mutual recognition of sovereignty, but Professor Remark indicates that the F.R.G. and G.D.R. are no more likely to be the final stage in the development of the German nation than the Deutsche Bund or the North German Confederation were. In his examination of the German nation, Arthur Hanhardt, Jr. reaches a very different conclusion. Arguing that the division of Germany has been conditioned and maintained by the forces of international politics, Professor Hanhardt claims that after twenty-eight years we should acknowledge that the partition will probably continue indefinitely. He mentions that the status quo precluding reunification was confirmed by the Basic Treaty between the F.R.G. and G.D.R. For this reason, he proposes that we concern ourselves not with what he feels is the moot question of reunification but rather with an examination of the impact of division upon the social and political systems of the G.D.R. and F.R.G. He cites a recent study that indicates a growth of a distinct national consciousness in both the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. With the instruments of political socialization in each state (but especially the G.D.R.) being used to inculcate this separate new consciousness, the differences between East and West Germans will, in Professor Hanhardt's estimation, become more pronounced and lasting. Another example of a nation sundered by cold war partition are the Koreans. According to Gregory Henderson, they are probably the most striking testimony to the socio-political capacity of almost any national group to divide. Furthermore, Professor Henderson argues that there were no convincing internal or external reasons for the political division at the 38th parallel. He sees this lack of explicit basic reasons for division and the homogeneity of the Korean nation as the bases for any hope for ultimate reunification. However he acknowledges several key difficulties. Of primary interest to our general study of multi-state nations is Professor Henderson's speculation that the talisman of homogeneity may be counter-productive in the quest for reunification; it may serve to increase rather than decrease hostility since the more homogeneous the environment, the more hostility has to be inflated to combat homogeneity's subjective arguments for unity. He further contends that, so long as the break is effective, loyalties apparently tend to regroup around newly separated entities almost regardless of how they may have been formed or in spite of homogeneity. Having cast doubt on the effectiveness of homogeneity as a spur to reunification, Professor Henderson proposes that the great powers will have to play as great a role in reunifying the Koreans as they did in dividing them. Only the Soviet Union among the great powers seems reticent and this is primarily because of the possible repercussions of Korean unification talks upon Germany whose reunification Moscow fears. However, Professor Henderson feels that a neutralized Korea whose unity and independence are guaranteed by the great powers represents the solution of the Korean question with the best chance of success. The role of the great powers in Korean reunification also figures prominently in the analysis by Soon Sung Cho. The emergence of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea, according to Professor Cho, owed much to such external influences as the detente between the U.S. and the two communist giants, China and the U.S.S.R. Highlighting this apparent relationship is the chronology of the North-South talks; the first official contact between North and South began only after the announcement of President Nixon's trip to China. South Korean fears of a reduced U.S. presence in Asia and North Korean fears of closer Japanese-South Korean cooperation were also factors. While both North and South Koreans agree on the goal (i.e., unification of the fatherland), they differ greatly on the appropriate means. South Korea favors a functional step-by-step gradualism. North Korea, on the other hand, favors a direct political solution (i.e., a North-South Confederation). Despite this conflict over means, Professor Cho states that the best chance for Korean unification is now, while the formation of a multipolar balance in Asia is still in progress and the great powers view reunification as a means to defuse a powder keg. However, once the balance has been solidified, the attempted unification of Korea may be viewed as the injection of an unstable element into the mainstream of Asian affairs, with the concurrent loss of great power support. Thus, with great power support somewhat ambiguous, Professor Cho (unlike Professor Henderson) chooses the bonds of homogeneity of the Korean people as the prime motive force for unification Though its lineage is older than that of either of the cold war divisions, the Irish partition has only recently begun to capture as much attention. As Thomas Hachey explains, two questions have dominated the situation in Ireland since the seventeenth century: (1) the internal question of the relations between Roman Catholic and Protestant, and (2) the external question of the relations between Ireland and Great Britain. The partition represented a fusion of these two questions. The decision of the British government to create Northern Ireland by combining six counties in north-eastern Ireland and according them their own government was not a response to a demand for self-determination in this area; instead, it was (in the opinion of the British government) the most plausible solution for harmonizing the rival aspirations of the nationalist (and largely Roman Catholic) majority and the unionist (and largely Protestant) minority. Since there was no indigenous constituency favoring partition it might seem that reunification could be easily accomplished. However, as Professor Hachey points out, the two Irish states, which began over fifty years ago with the same laws and a common history, have followed widely divergent lines of development. Therefore, the crucial element for unification, in Professor Hachey's opinion, is commitment, a commodity which he feels is demonstrably lacking in both North and South. In order to foster this sense of commitment, Dublin could offer more than religious and economic guarantees to Ulster. Professor Hachey speculates that by re-joining the British Commonwealth (an act which would present no real constitutional difficulty—as India demonstrated when it became a republic in 1949), the Irish Republic could go a long way toward eliminating the reservations of many (both Catholic and Protestant) in the North about reunification. The end of partition, therefore, seems to hinge on the foresight of Irish statesmen (in both North and South). Focusing his analysis of the Irish question on the situation in Northern Ireland, Richard Ned Lebow observes that all the parties to the conflict appear to be locked into historically determined roles from which the British have so far been unable to encourage significant deviation. Professor Lebow also outlines six proposals put forward as possible solutions to the current "troubles" but concludes that only one has any real chance for success: the restoration of a semi-autonomous regional government with specific mechanisms built in to guarantee effective minority participation and rights. Reunification is seen as the victim of double veto: UDA opposition to such a "sell out" and general reluctance among Northerners (Catholic and Protestant alike) to sacrifice their British standard of living (including social services) for that of the Irish Republic. The British government, according to Professor Lebow, has reached a similar conclusion which is reflected in its White Paper of 20 March 1973. With the creation of a new regional assembly as one of its key proposals, the White Paper appears to represent the only currently viable blueprint for restoring peace to Ulster. The elections to the new Assembly were held recently and though, as Professor Lebow cautions, it is too early to make concrete predictions, there is reason to hope that a shaky moderate coalition of Catholics and Protestants may defuse the tensions. If not, the alternative scenarios (from an Ulster declaration of independence à la Rhodesia to an occupation by troops of the Irish Republic) are grim indeed. Therefore, it would seem that while our authors generally agree that, in the short run, the reunification of the multi-state nations appears infeasible, improbable, and (in the opinion of most of the involved parties) undesirable, there is some disagreement concerning the long-run possibilities. In the matter of the Germans, our authors split. One doubts any improvement in the prospects for reunification, while the other declares that change from the status quo is historically inevitable and reunification is only one of many future possibilities. As regards the Koreans, again our authors vary somewhat in their projections. One expresses confidence in the long-range prospects for reunification, while the other sees the middle-range as the propitious time, with decreasing great power support (after a multipolar balance of power is achieved) making reunification less likely after that point. Finally, in the case of the Irish, our authors diverge once more. One gives qualified support to the inevitability of unification, while the other views its peaceful accomplishment as a prospect only in a future so remote as to preclude serious current consideration. In addition to their varied evaluations of the prospects for reunification, our authors have also assigned different weights to the influence of homogeneity and external pressures for unification. They agree however that the two are inextricably intertwined and concede that neither, by itself, can achieve any meaningful reunification. In summary, it would seem that the multi-state nations still remain more of an expedient than a final solution to the pressures that led to their creation. However, while the arguments for reunification still retain much of their validity, there is now a growing body of research to back the contention that loyalties have grown up along the lines of division, creating a new situation that must be acknowledged. We hope that this issue will offer some insights into the nature of multi-state nations and the problems confronting them. Perhaps the viewpoints expressed here, coupled with the wide range of work now being undertaken in the study of nationalism and conflict regulation, can lead to a better understanding of these focal points of international tension.

**27.1**

If anyone should doubt that political integration in multinational states is far from being a given attribute on the world stage today, he need only reflect on some of the events of recent years. Our northern neighbor, Canada, is plagued by separatist feelings among many of its francophone citizens. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, in the midst of its celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the "solution" of its nationalities problem, has had to contend with a resurgent Jewish self-awareness and rejection of assimilation. Finally, General Amin has expelled those Asians who failed to opt for Ugandan citizenship at the time of independence. A little over a decade ago, during the rush to independence by many of the former colonies in Africa, the JOURNAL published an issue entitled "Nation-Building: The Order of the Day" (Vol. 16, no. 2). In it, Professor Arnold Rivkin posed a question: "Does grouping together territorial units which have not yet... forged a national consciousness, found a national consensus and evolved a national identity aid or hinder the task of nation-building?" (p. 133) By modifying Professor Rivkin's words to read "... a common national consciousness... a common national consensus. . . and a common national identity," this question will serve as the focus for our current issue. In his introductory essay, Walker Connor pinpoints the concept of "national self-determination" as the underlying cause behind much of the unrest that troubles today's multinational states. Having traced the evolution of the idea from Locke and Rousseau, through Marx, to Woodrow Wilson (the man largely responsible for the term's current popularity), Dr. Connor concludes that the seeming hypocrisy of statesmen advocating self-determination for colonial territories while denying the same option to minority ethnic groups within their own countries stems from a mistaken tendency to use the terms nation and state interchangeably. Through their loose rhetoric, statesmen have provided justification for the demands of minority nations in multinational states to be allowed to "opt out" and form a state in which they will be the ruling nation. Dr. Connor is less than optimistic about the abilities of today's states to cope effectively with this upsurge of what he has christened "ethnonationalism." The first of our case studies deals with the efforts of the Soviet Union to solve the riddle of the nationality question. As Roman Szporluk indicates, the Soviet leaders believe that, through the dialectic of the "flourishing" (rastsvet) and "drawing together" (sblizheniye) of all Soviet nationalities, a common Soviet, rather than Russian, Ukrainian, or Uzbek, national, or perhaps more properly, supranational identity will evolve. Unfortunately, according to Professor Szporluk, since the death of Lenin, the Soviet regime has generally mistaken Russification for the promotion of a new Soviet national identity. In examining India, a state at least as ethnically diverse as the U.S.S.R., Ainslie T. Embree argues that elements such as the complex social structure and linguistic, religious, and class divisions of Indian society that make it a seemingly "uneasy mosaic," while dysfunctional in isolation, interact to perform an integrative function. They provide the resiliency that has allowed India to weather internal and external crises which, according to Western observers, should have torn it asunder. That the length of time nations jointly occupy a given territorial unit is relatively unimportant in the effort to forge a common identity is demonstrated by the essays on Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Malaysia. Though joined since 1840, under the Act of Union, the anglophones and francophones in Canada appear to be growing further apart, rather than closer together, according to Richard Pious. Separatist sentimenl continues to gain support in Quebec and brings closer the day on which the anglophone elites will have to decide finally whether to acquiesce or crush it. In contrast, the Czechs and Slovaks, thrown together in the aftermath of World War I after a thousand-year separation, found their reunion rather trying, and it took the intervention of Soviet troops in 1968 to offer an external "them" threatening enough to foster a common "us" in Czechoslovakia. The question for the Czechs and Slovaks under Husak, in the estimation of M. George Zaninovich and Douglas A. Brown, is whether they can keep alive their new-found unity, perhaps by means of the recently-instituted federal political structure. Finally, there is the relatively new state of Malaysia which, as Nancy Snider points out, appears to have shelved efforts to foster a Malaysian identity for fear of shattering the ruling tripartite coalition. Real hope for the future, therefore, would seem to lie in promoting inter-ethnic understanding rather than resurrecting assimilation efforts, whether into a Malayan or Malaysian identity. Even states which one would assume to be mono-ethnic, such as Israel, often turn out to be further proof of the wide scope of the problem of political integration in multinational states. Here, for example, as Don Peretz demonstrates, even a seemingly monolithic entity like the Jewish community is split into contending groups. The efforts of the Sephardim to achieve equal status with the Ashkenazim have many of the same characteristics as the struggle of ethnic minorities in other states. Of particular interest are those instances in which the Sephardim find themselves closer to the Israeli Arabs than to their fellow Jews. One must remember that, though we speak of nations, the key to the self-identification process that determines whether an ethnic group is self-aware (and therefore usually active) is the individual. Ali A. Mazrui's discussion of the "dependency complex" focuses on the relations of two African leaders with their former imperial masters, but many of the characteristics noted can be just as readily attributed to a Ukrainian trying to cope with being Russified or Sovietized. Thus, it should be kept in mind throughout the discussions of various efforts at social engineering in this issue that they all rest on the ability to alter the mental set of thousands of individuals. In summary, therefore, it would appear that, with the exception of India, the lack of a common national consciousness and identity has hampered the efforts at "nation-building" or, perhaps more properly, state-building. This latter term incorporates the notion of working to create both the political structure to rule the state and the common national identity to give it its spark. We hope that this issue with its "comparison of notes" by scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of a particular multi-ethnic society will provide some useful generalizations for the further study of both political integration and multinational states. The Editors are pleased to announce the appointments of Dean Harvey Picker, Associate Dean Ainslie T. Embree, and Professor Hollis R. Lynch to the Board of Advisory and Contributing Editors.**26.2**

In thrashing one's way through the literature of world politics, it is easy to lose sight of the simple truth that individuals make foreign policy, and that they do so as representatives of other individuals. Preoccupied with the nation state, impersonal "factors"—economic, political, and military—and with the international system itself, scholars have often dismissed the role of the individual as unimportant, or as too unwieldy to be included within a concise theoretical framework. Adherents of the former view cite what they see as the dominant role of economics or giant institutions in history. Many seem led to this position out of sheer political frustration, reasoning that they might as well write letters to a computerized billing service as tilt against the timetable of world events. But most writers acknowledge the importance of individual behavior. At least they concede that it is through the human perception of objective phenomena that states are governed and foreign policy conceived, and it is the welfare of individuals that is, after all, the final end of diplomacy. Herbert C. Kelman observed in Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970) of the Journal, an issue devoted to some of the theoretical questions raised by this topic, We sometimes tend to forget that it is individual human beings who make the decisions and carry out the actions that constitute international relations. It is individuals who threaten and who feel threatened, who perceive and misperceive, who give and withhold support, who kill and who die (p. 1). The current issue of the Journal is concerned less with the theory of international politics on a "micro" level than with political biography itself. It focuses on three of the Pacific's major powers—the United States, Japan, and China (PRC)—by way of an examination of their journalists, businessmen, and government officials. In the first of three essays on the press, Alan P.L. Liu sketches the background and influence of several New China News Agency (NCNA) journalists and discusses the evolution of NCNA itself. He concludes that the ideological zeal and party loyalty of NCNA newsmen, as well as the agency's virtual monopoly over the flow of news into China, distorts Peking's perception of the world and magnifies "the tension between ideology and information" that exists in all governments. In the next article, Yukio Matsuyama examines the role of journalists in his country and explains why there are no "Lippmanns or Restons" in Japan, despite the abundance of expert newsmen there. Nathaniel B. Thayer's essay, the last in the series, singles out a State Department correspondent for the Associated Press, Spencer Davis, as one American journalist who has made his influence felt in policy-making circles. Political leaders in China and Japan provide the topics for essays by Richard C.Walker and Emerson Chapin. Professor Walker describes the personality cult that has grown up around Mao Tse-tung and suggests, in light of the terrible human costs of his rule, that history's view of the chairman might well resemble that now accorded Joseph Stalin. In the second article on political leaders, Mr. Chapin looks at the successors to the administration of Japan's retired prime minister, Sato Eisaku. After an analysis of the Liberal Democratic party's current position, he concludes that no drastic changes are likely to emerge from the recently installed Tanaka cabinet. One aspect of Japanese-American relations that has received close attention is that of trade. Gerald Curtis examines the leadership of two of Japan's major business organizations, Keidanren and Keizai Doyukai, and questions whether it will be able to adapt to the "post postwar" age. In an article on American business personalities, Roy Lockheimer writes that the efforts of such business-oriented American organizations as the Japan Society and the appointment of Robert S. Ingersoll, a leading American businessman, as U.S. ambassador to Tokyo, might lead to closer cooperation between the two countries on economic problems. In the final article, Thomas Robinson offers an analysis of alternative regime-types that may succeed the present government on mainland China. The Board of Editors would like to extend its special thanks to Eddie Wang and Nobuo Yamamoto of the East Asian Library at Columbia University for their assistance in translations.

**26.1**

Of all the political ideas that gained popular currency in the 1960s, the military-industrial complex is the concept perhaps most gravely deformed by public mastication. The debate of 1968 and 1969 over the influence of the military establishment in the United States proved, with few exceptions, consistently unsatisfying. After all was said, the concept of the military-industrial complex remained muddled and its attendant questions of international and domestic political influence were still unanswered. In an effort to redirect the debate away from the passions of the hour and to explore serious questions from the vantage point of another social system, the Board of Editors has focused this issue primarily on the Soviet Union. Our object here has been to protect the analysis from the myopia of proximity—more to offer the reader new insights into an old but persistent problem than to present him with an explicit comparison of the Soviet and U.S. military establishments. In any event, the dearth of hard data on the U.S.S.R. would confound any attempt at definitive comparison. What emerges from the following essays (each, we hope, is fresh either in systemic, historical, or philosophical approach) defies easy summation. Nevertheless, some tentative generalizations may be offered. The military-industrial complex (if one defines it as the institutional incarnation of political and economic interests commonly held by military, industrial, and political groups) knows no one indigenous social habitat. It is symptomatic less of large-scale corporate capitalism than of industrialization and the concentration of power per se, and lends to such power a velocity undreamed of by even the most determined preindustrial practitioners of the military art. A military-industrial complex is likely to flourish whenever an ambitious foreign policy breeds an alliance of military and economic power or when a divergence of first principles renders traditional diplomacy impotent. From the point of view of policy, most of the contributors who have dealt with the Soviet Union agree that Soviet strategic power has mushroomed in recent years. There is less agreement among them, however, on how the United States should respond to the challenge. Finally, the conclusion seems inescapable that the relationship between man's technological ingenuity and his political wisdom is similar to that postulated by Malthus for human population and the food supply. In both cases the former element expands at an exponential rate, the latter at a linear rate, the one hopelessly outstripping the other. At this writing there seems no easy way out of the dilemma.**25.2**

Will the polar icecaps have melted in 30 years, due to pollution-induced climatic changes, flooding continents? Are the world's oxygen supplies, fossil energy, and mineral resources being too rapidly depleted, while radioactive waste materials proliferate? Will unequal distribution of resources and technological capabilities continue to cause conflict in an increasingly overpopulated world? Is the sovereignty of nation states eroding under the impact of multi-national corporations? Is global interdependence growing while nuclear power and the definition of security requirements remain under the jurisdiction and control of nation states? These are some questions about the future international system which analysts and statesmen are beginning to confront. Karl Deutsch has said that statesmen of the 19th century seemed to know what they were doing, but that during the 20th century runaway problems emerged. Some analysts argue that the major forces of social, ecological, and technological changes are now beyond the control of the world's political processes and leadership. If negotiations are achieving a relatively stable strategic balance despite technological advances, the most explosive division in the interdependent world seems no longer to be simply East versus West but resource-hungry rich countries versus poor. Maintenance of the ever-climbing level of living standards in the advanced countries, based on heavy energy and resource consumption, has raised the problem of somehow managing the biosphere on a global basis. The problem of political control of technology and its effects is the major theme of this issue of the JOURNAL. The contributors have tried to answer in varied ways some of the above questions which are transforming interna tional politics. In the first article, Bernard Brodie offers some insights into the difficulties involved in historical uncertainty and predictions about technology in the future international system. Rational prediction and scientific forecasting are probably the most difficult, yet among the most important, functions of the policy-maker and political scientist. Brodie points out the necessity for analysis of intention as well as capability in order to cope with the arms race realistically. He argues that there is an "asymptotic factor" limiting the political effects of technological change, and he applies this factor especially to nuclear weapons. These weapons help to deter limited war as well as nuclear war, and he discusses their role in regard to the NATO Alliance. In Brodie's view, the world's most pressing problem, which is itself a function of technology, is overpopulation. He nevertheless sees the primary potential causes of international conflict in the rich nations, not in the poor. In the second article, Robert C. North and Nazli M. Choucri probe deeply into the relationships between politics and technology, an undertaking which Brodie calls for in his conclusion. Through their "demands equation," North-Choucri propose a useful definition of the "lateral pressure" concept which portrays the technologically advanced countries as huge vacuum cleaners sucking up the world's resources. Technology is seen as the "multiplier" of power, but enormous political, social, and environmental costs result from its development. Uneven access to resources, and differences in levels of population and technological development among states, are seen as the primary causes of international conflict. This analysis is broader than the deterministic analyses of American "economic imperial ism" advanced by such revisionist historians as Gabriel Kolko, William A. Williams and Gar Alperovitz, because North-Choucri apply the concept of lateral pressure (technological imperialism) to all advanced countries regardless of ideology, political-economic system, or social structure. This lateral pressure concept also seems to contrast with the views of Herman Kahn, who has said that 95% of the traditional reasons for war among advanced nations have disappeared. The lesser developed countries of the Third World comprise the locus of the "points of intersection" of lateral pressure, the arena of Great Power competition. This view also contrasts somewhat with Brodie's, especially in regard to the Middle East. Some analysts note that two countries with rather weak ties to the Third World, Germany and Japan, had the highest growth rates in the 1950's, implying that the LDC's may have no essential short-term impact on an advanced nation's rate of growth. Others argue that the growing population in the countryside of the Third World cannot be readily mobilized, either economically or politically, and is, therefore, not of much international importance. North-Choucri argue that because international conflict is a function of the "demands equation," political scientists should study the budgets of governments and analyze resource allocation. Military allocations are seen as especially dysfunctional because they stimulate resource acquisition and depletion, thereby generating the international conflict they are intended to counteract. North-Choucri conclude pessimistically that because the basic causes of war lie deeply rooted in lateral pressures resulting from uneven resource distribution, mediation, conciliation, international law and organizations are all insufficient for the preservation of peace. Neither na tional nor international political processes can now control the underlying causes of lateral pressure, yet there seems to be a great requirement for an international security regulator to control lateral pressure itself. This in turn implies an eventual necessity for some kind of international control of technology, of access to resources, and of population growth. In the third article, Herbert S. Dinerstein takes a unique historical approach to ideology in alliance systems, comparing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement to the Catholic Church of the Counter Reformation. The comparative roles of ideology are analyzed in regard to legitimization, perceptions of reality and interests, "military-industrial complexes," the Viet Nam War, the Thirty Years' War, Czechoslovakia, Germany, China, and the Third World. He concludes that Western restraint (containment having predominated over "rollback") made the socialist camp safe for heresy and diversity, thus increasing possibilities for intra-communist schisms. These heresies and hostilities within the international communist movement are more virulent than communist opposition to "capitalist" nations, but this polycentric situation only came to be appreciated in the West after the Viet Nam War had begun. In Dinerstein's view, nuclear weapons have resulted in a stabilized "adversary" relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He concludes by suggesting a concentric circle model of the future interna tional system. In the fourth article, Eugene B. Skolnikoff posits a model for the functions of international organizations in dealing with the problems of technology in the future. He suggests that national sovereignty is breaking down, due to the growth of an international technology and culture. While agreeing with Brodie that overpopulation is the world's greatest problem, he analyzes the almost equally pressing international problems in food production, pollution, resource depletion, utilization of the seas and out er space, and climatic change. Skolnikoff concludes that solutions or palliatives for these vast and growing problems can only be found in developing the functions of international organizations, and through technology itself. In the fifth article, William D. Coplin's analysis and conclusions largely parallel Skolnikoffs. Coplin compares the development of interwar and postwar international organizations, presenting a developmental model of their roles in the international bargaining process for collectively solving the problems of technology. Coplin agrees with Brodie and Diner stein that the existence of nuclear weapons greatly decreases the likelihood of general war. He optimistically minimizes the effects of territorial, symbolic, and ideological issues upon the likelihood of future international conflict and does not consider the concept of lateral pressures by technologically advanced states. In contrast to Skolnikoff, Coplin argues that it is necessary to insulate technological problems from domestic politics in order to deal with them collectively on the international level. Increasing global interdependence should thus lead to a globalization of decision-making. Finally, Tilden J. LeMelle and George W. Shepherd, Jr. analyze the much neglected factor of racial stratification in international politics, particularly the ramifications of centripetal and centrifugal white-dominance political systems. By focusing upon racism as an underlying cause of both Western and Soviet imperialism, their analysis also contrasts with the re visionist school. LeMelle-Shepherd largely support the conclusions of North-Choucri, Skolnikoff, and Coplin concerning the necessity for international regulation of access to resources in order to lessen conflict both within the Third World itself and between advanced and poor states. They all have neglected, however, consideration of present or potential capabilities of LDC's to make use of technology and resources. Further, Le Melle-Shepherd point out the significant potentialities for revolutionary war in the Third World, examined in the previous issue of the JOURNAL. Revolutionary war is largely ignored by Brodie; North-Choucri's concept of lateral pressure also apparently fails to account for it. Revolutionary war, with racial origins, could take place in the Third World arena of Great Power competition with states or ethnic groups acting as proxies for the Powers, as Dinerstein implies. Or revolutionary war could be an in trastate phenomenon within racially stratified, exploited Third World states themselves, as LeMelle-Shepherd suggest. Their analysis of the effects of domestic racism upon foreign policy is noteworthy. Like North-Chou cri, they use Sweden as an ideal model for future social systems. Taken together, these articles offer a sound approach to understanding some of the momentous problems which will shape the future international system; but as Skolnikoff observes, this is only a beginning.**25.1**

In this issue, the JOURNAL returns to the problems of Third World modernization, development, and revolution. The subject of this issue is the global phenomenon of revolutionary war—also commonly referred to as insurgency, guerrilla war, People's War, or war of national liberation, depending upon one's perspective. Predictably, the current war in Indochina will be the dominant, though not the exclusive, focus of discussion. A vast and sometimes sensational literature has arisen on all sides of the Indochina War controversy, but despite the enormous amount of commentary few writers have dealt systematically with the nature of revolutionary war, its dynamics, or its international repercussions. The following articles offer some important and unusual perspectives on these aspects of revolutionary war, in an attempt to clarify the fundamental issues which are often approached in passionate ignorance or irrationality. These issues seem all too relevant to the future. Clearly the Indochina War is very different from past American wars. There is general agreement, however, that the policy-makers and military leaders have not adjusted to the special circumstances of revolutionary war. For too long the conventional American military response to the political challenges of revolutionary war has mistakenly been labeled "counter-insurgency," while the nature and underlying causes of the "in surgency" have been neglected. The American strategy has wrongly employed firepower and large-scale military operations to the detriment of somewhat more rational political, social, and economic programs of "counter-insurgency." The communists, however, have not been engaged in "insurgency," thev have been making a revolution. It is apparent that the revolutionary movement has successfully endured the application of tremendous military force. Many critics have observed that this conventional military response has been shaped by a militarized American political culture which continues to reflect the rigid psychology of the Cold War era. American political culture, perhaps best characterized by "technological anti-communism," conditions the biases and perceptions, and therefore the policy outputs, of the political system; manifests itself in a militarized foreign policy; and stimulates American interventionism around the globe. The constitutional structure of the American foreign policy-making process itself—"an invitation to conflict"—has decidedly detrimental effects upon policy outputs and execution. Indeed, it can be said that inefficiency and conflict between and within the Legislative and Executive branches are the constitutionally established characteristics of American foreign policy-making. U.S. foreign policy is also non-Clausewitzian: instead of military strategy being tailored to political objectives, the reverse is more usually true. Policy consensus must be built in spite of competing bureaucratic vested interests inherent in a pluralistic political system of dispersed, shared powers. The consequent necessity for bargaining, compromise and "incremental ism" places a premium upon the effective communication of information within the system; but bureaucratic conflict and competition has a distorting effect on information transmission and perceptions of reality. Thus, the critique runs, within the constraints imposed by the militarized political culture and the uncoordinated institutional structures of the foreign policy-making process, the Indochina War policy and its execution can ultimately be seen as the product of bureaucratic politics, especially interservice rivalry. Critics conclude that broadly defined "national interests" are often affected adversely in this process. Beyond the failure to achieve our objectives in Indochina, the direct consequences of the American intervention in a revolutionary war have been grossly counterproductive domestically: economic inflation, severe political cleavages, increasing governmental authoritarianism, exacerbation of racial conflict, and charges of American genocide. Historically, the politics of revolutionary wars have not been confined by national boundaries but have had far-reaching effects. Expeditionary forces have more often met defeat at home than in the field. Finally, critics hold, the moral tragedy of the Indochina War lies in the use of Draconian measures in pursuit of such limited war aims as "self-determination" for the Vietnamese people, when it is clear that sovereignty and legitimacy cannot be provided to one government by another. Indeed, there is much present agreement that the ends pursued are themselves illusory and contradictory, and certainly do not justify the means used—the expenditure of over twice the bomb tonnage dropped in World War II. In the first article, Professor Eqbal Ahmad presents an analysis of revolutionary war, arguing that American bureaucratic misapprehension of revolutionary war and interservice rivalry have resulted in four competing approaches to "counter-insurgency"—each of which cancels out the others and all of which together are inadequate to crush revolution. These four approaches represent clear manifestations of the militarized American political culture. His analysis lays bare the inadequacies of bureaucratic information processing; the cognitive dissonance embodied in "bureaucratic truths;" and the often mutually exclusive outcomes of bureaucratic politics. Ahmad's discussion of revolutionary war should be compared with a similar analysis by Sir Robert Thompson, as presented in all three of his books. (The two most recent, No Exit from Vietnam and Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1910, are reviewed in this issue by William R. Corson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC [ret.] and Colonel John J. McCuen, USA.) While their analyses converge in many respects, as on parallel hierarchies of the insurgent infrastructure and on the role of guerrilla tactics, Thompson is an avid believer in the efficacy of sophisticated "counter-insurgency." Thompson's and Ahmad's analyses diverge significantly on the following four aspects of revolutionary war: the use of terror, the role of sanctuaries and external support, the motivation of the insurgents, and the relative responsibility for constructive action by the two sides. The discussion of revolutionary war in Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century, reviewed herein by Professor Manfred Halpern, also deserves careful examination. Additionally, Ahmad points out some of the inevitable domestic re percussions of intervention in a revolutionary war, which his own situation perhaps exemplifies. Unfortunately, he was unable to update his discussion of these effects to include such phenomena as civilian surveillance activities by Army Intelligence, the tragic events of May 1970 on college campuses in Ohio, Mississippi and California, the rash of bombings by the alienated left, or the divisive 1970 Congressional campaigns. He notes significant parallels between the Algerian War and the current Indochina War, In the second article, Ambassador Robert W. Komer presents an excel lent historical summary of American "counter-insurgency" pacification efforts in Viet Nam, focusing on some often-ignored constructive results. He argues that despite the war's enormous political, military, economic, and psychic costs, there are some grounds for guarded optimism. Komer's discussion of revolution in Viet Nam and new American-South Vietnam ese policies affecting the villages, the historic foundation of Vietnamese society and politics, invites comparison with Professor Truong Buu Lam's review article of a recent book by John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and, Their Revolution. (McAlister has previously published an excellent and more thorough analysis, Viet Nam, the Origins of Revolution [New York: Knopf, 19691.) The conflict between the Ameri can military and civilian agencies over the strategic priority of "counter insurgency" is implicit in Komer's discussion. Certain other important factors in the American approach to the Indo china War have been widely noted: the ethnocentric failure to benefit from British or French experience with revolutionary warfare or to understand the Vietnamese environment; the primary focus of "pacification" upon temporary amelioration of the rural effects of the "big unit war" (such as the "generation" of over three million refugees) rather than upon the protection and political counter-mobilization of the peasantry; the failure to neutralize the crucial Viet Cong infrastructure; the lack of unity of command; the operational constraints of conventional war doctrines, tactics, and training; the political, military, and economic ramifications of the oversized ARVN, which was substantially designed by Korean War-schooled U.S. advisors; etc. If the U.S. government must persist in its counter-revolutionary reaction to an increasingly revolutionary Third World, it should forthrightly evaluate these factors, as well as the domestic repercussions of counter-revolutionary intervention. In the third article, M. Jean Baechler, a colleague of Raymond Aron, delineates some of the historical lessons of French experience with revolutionary war in Algeria and Indochina. Had the U.S. taken cognizance of the French experience, a tragic and needless duplication of errors, including intervention itself, might have been avoided in Viet Nam. Baechler skillfully employs Clausewitzian maxims in analyzing revolutionary war and French operations, and concludes that the defensive strategic advantages, political and military, of a revolutionary movement are in superable. Perhaps his most important point is that intervention in a revolutionary war by a pluralistic, democratic nation inevitably erodes and perverts (both at home and in the client state) the very democratic principles in the name of which the war is being prosecuted. Professor Walter W. Goldstein offers a startling, penetrating analysis of the American political system in light of the Indochina War experience. His pessimistic conclusion is that because countervailing powers cannot be mobilized within the institutional structure of the government, the Executive's monopoly of war-making powers will impel the nation into future counter-revolutionary interventions, unless the system is changed. While Ahmad and Baechler view the warping of democratic processes as a direct result of counter-revolutionary interventions, Goldstein sees a reverse causality. He views the foreign and domestic power of the Defense Department as a pervasive cultural phenomenon. He would argue that the causes of our intervention and subsequent failure in Viet Nam were the organization and structure of our institutions and the militarization of Manifest Destiny—our Cold War political culture. If, indeed, a compulsion toward global intervention in the wave of revolutionary wars forecast by many for the world's future is inherent in the American political system, then it is cause for some concern that the United States has not even learned the tactical lessons of present failures or designed a realistic counter-revolutionary war strategy to correct the disadvantages of the conventional response which continues to mire the U.S. in Viet Nam. Militarism: U.S.A. by James A. Donovan, Colonel, USMC (ret.), also reviewed herein by Colonel Corson, offers much evidence in support of Goldstein's argument and his characterization of American political culture. Finally, John H. Hoagland discusses some little-known consequences of great power military aid programs in the Third World. The frequency with which American-supplied weapons fall into the hands of revolutionaries should be noted by advocates of the application of the Nixon Doc trine in the Third World. Hoagland also outlines the development of "counter-insurgency" strategy in the United States during the New Frontier, and offers some interesting speculations on the entire spectrum of future political violence from urban terrorism to revolutionary wars. With this future in mind, Professor Eldon Kenworthy reviews some important new literature on Latin American revolutionary theory. It is clear that thoughtful Americans are only now beginning to com prehend the vast domestic and international implications of a counter revolutionary foreign policy, particularly its domestic costs in repression and in lost opportunities for social reform. Given the great inertia of the political culture dominated and sustained by a powerful "national security" complex, given the resulting counter-revolutionary foreign policy, and given the counterproductive consequences of the execution of this foreign policy by competing bureaucracies, some critics have suggested the obsolescence of our present constitutional and institutional govern mental structure. In the absence of reconstructive statesmanship to revive the countervailing powers provided for in the Constitution and to re define our international role, it is possible that the prevailing American role as a counter-revolutionary superpower in the international state system will exercise a continuing determinism upon our form of government and domestic politics, increasingly warping democracy and leading toward political authoritarianism. A thorough understanding of revolutionary war could lead to the abandonment of a counter-revolutionary foreign policy, or barring that, at least to more efficiency and bureaucratic coordination in the execution of what may be inevitable interventions by the United States.**24.2**

On December 19, 1961, the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations designated the 1960's as the United Nations Development Decade for the purpose of raising the vast populations of the world's underdeveloped areas several degrees above the bare Subsistence level of existence which was then their lot. By the beginning of the Second Development Decade in 1970, some progress had been made toward this goal and the underdeveloped areas had become the politically independent developing countries. A contribution of the 1960's more important than marginal material progress, however, was the realization that development was more than mere industrialization or rapid economic expansion—that it was eco nomic growth accompanied by both economic and social structural changes in the countries affected. This issue of the Journal, a direct outgrowth of the February, 1970, Columbia University Conference on International Economic Development\* organized by Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson), brings together leading economists from several continents in a discussion of the development accomplishments, failures, and lessons of the 1960's and of the development problems likely to be encountered and progress likely to be made in the 1970's. The several essays share as a common point of departure the recent Report of the Commission on International Development, Partners in Develop ment.\*\*Lester Pearson, Chairman of the Commission on International Develop ment, begins the discussion by outlining the content and dangers, given contemporary global conditions, of traditional laissez-faire and radical "clean break" strategies of international aid and development. In an attempt to balance "what can be changed with what needs to be changed," he suggests the internationalizing of the whole aid process as a key step likely to carry the developing countries past the borders of modernization and into the territory of sustained growth. Richard Jolly, contesting the analyses and conclusions of Partners in Development, argues convincingly for a pessimistic evaluation of develop ment achievements and prospects. After a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of "self-sustaining growth" as the primary objective of international aid, he suggests that a broader perspective on the entire aid and develop ment issue, institutionalized through international aid processes which give some semblance of balanced representation to both donor and recipient, will be necessary if any progress is to be made during the coming decade in narrowing the development gap between rich and poor. In his article on aid to Latin America, Laurence Whitehead documents with empirical data many of the fallacies of past aid policies discussed by Professor Jolly as well as the prevalence of political and non-developmental types of aid in the 1960's. After introducing a new method of calculating resource flows in terms of their "net contribution to external purchasing power" and discussing the quantitative insignificance of foreign aid in any measure of this sort, he suggests reorienting aid policies so as to favor governments which try to curtail such significant current account deficit items as private capital outflows and foreign investment profit repatriation. Tax allowances, foreign exchange controls, and local profit reinvestment incentives could be used to accomplish these goals, but Professor Whitehead does not rule out the possibility that in certain circumstances the policies most beneficial to all concerned in the long run may be the expropriation and nationalization of foreign assets in the developing country. Samir Amin challenges the Report of the Commission on International Development on nearly every issue on the ground that the Commissioners failed to take into account the structural changes required if meaningful development is to be achieved. By demonstrating the dangers to developing countries of integration into the world market system, he shows that any such "outward-oriented" growth can be only the development of under development and argues that meaningful development (including the con comitant structural changes) is possible only in complementary, "inward-looking," self-initiated industrial complexes encompassing large, organized, multinational areas. The essays by Michael Bruno and Stanislaw Wellisz deal in great detail with the development histories and prospects of the Middle East and the Indian-Pakistani subcontinent respectively. Professor Bruno discusses the economic potentialities of collaboration and cooperation of the Middle East—in the fields of trade, finance, technology, transport, and tourism— in light of the region's political, cultural, and strategic situation. While his conclusions can be no less uncertain than the political environment in which they were made, they are certainly less pessimistic than that environment might have indicated. Professor Wellisz, beginning with the assertion that policies which are deemed best for a country are not necessarily those which lead to the fastest possible growth, discusses the 6 percent growth target set in Partners in Development in relation to goals such as national sovereignty and political stability, social justice, efficiency, and equity. His policy proposals fall midway between the economics of laissez-faire and those of dirigisme. In the concluding essay, Max Nicholson attempts to define the interface of the developmental and environmental disciplines. He asserts that, by means of such tools as biosphere-technosphere diagrams, land capacity classification systems, and human impacts on the environment charts, the limits imposed on development by considerations of biological productivity and natural resource conservation can be taken into account in all future development planning. The goal of his exercise, as of all the essays in this collection, is to replace crudely materialistic notions of "progress" with a set of more sophisticated, moral, and universally beneficial concepts of international economic development. The review articles which conclude this issue of the Journal complete the discussion of development problems by treating such specific topics as the United States foreign aid program, the United Nations Development System, prospects for a global food and population balance in the 1970's, the "Green Revolution" and resultant transformations of peasant societies, and the behavioral characteristics of poverty shared by the poor of all nations, developed or less developed. No single volume can exhaust the possibilities which exist for new thinking in the field of international develop ment. The essays collected here are intended to promote a more realistic appreciation of what is meant by international economic development and by good development relations between rich and poor.**24.1**

Of the conceptual problems which confront the student of international relations, none is as fundamental as the levels of analysis problem. While the resolution of the problem as originally formulated required that the investigator find the primary determinants of international developments in the nature of man or in the internal structure of states or in the nature of the international state system, contemporary analysts seek to delineate the relationships among these three levels of analysis rather than to single out one as "more fundamental" than the others. The nature of man and his societal development affects the individual decision-maker's evaluation of the international situation and his definition of what is in the national interest of his state. The structure of the state determines who the decision makers are and how their attitudes are affected by pressures from within and from outside their respective states (see this Journal Vol. XXIII, No. 2, entitled National Politics and Foreign Policy ). And the nature of the international arena determines the effects of the system with which men and states interact and within which they interact with one another. While the existence of these three levels of analysis has long been ac knowledged, there has been a tendency among political scientists to emphasize the latter two macro-levels and to shy away from systematic attempts to integrate the individual psychological and predispositional micro-level factors of human behavior into schemes of international political analysis. This has been so despite the often acknowledged fact, frequently characterized as "obvious," that all action within the international system can be reduced to the action of individuals. We habitually reify nation-states by referring, for example, to 'American' behavior, 'Russian' policies, and 'Chinese' decisions, but this is in fact merely a convenient way to identify decisions made by individuals in Washington, Moscow, or Peking who have the power to commit their respective states to certain policy goals at the international level. The analyst who bases his conclusions solely on state and international level factors runs the risk of failing to take into account human beings—how they perceive and how they respond to what they perceive. While international behavior may be described and perhaps even predicted without recourse to individual human factors, no satisfactory explanation of international phenomena is possible until the links which join individual men, specifically international decision-makers, to their socio-political environment are understood. This issue of the Journal brings together scholars from the fields of psychology and political science in an attempt to go beyond the traditional political science macro-level of analysis by integrating individual psycho logical micro-level human variables into the more common institutional and macro-level frames of analysis. After two methodological articles bearing on the points of intersection between these two classes of variables —the individual and the institutional—a series of case studies is presented in which attention is focused on the forces which influence two basic constituent parts of the individual leader's psychological make-up—his definition of his own relationship to the people he leads and the forces which shape the accuracy or distortion of his perceptions of other states and of the nature of the international system. The first of these foci derives from the belief that both international and domestic peace is threatened whenever leaders and led define their relationship as less than one of a mutuality where each depends on the other for his well-being and where the well-being of men as men, and not merely as parts of the larger polity, is the primary concern of the leader. The second derives from the belief, already stated, that no satisfactory explanation of international political phenomena is possible without some attention to the individual subjective dimension of international policy processes and without some attempt to establish the relative importance of individual human variability vis-à-vis institutional factors in these processes. In the opening essay Herbert Kelman outlines the conceptual and methodological ambiguities involved in any attempt to integrate psychological data with international relations processes, and discusses the usefulness and limitations of this sort of analysis. After examining how psychological variables may be relevant at three points in international relations at which the behavior of individuals can be explored—foreign policy decision making, public opinion in the foreign policy process, and personal inter action across state boundaries—Dr. Kelman concludes that while the nation-state may remain the basic unit of analysis in international relations, human individuals constitute the ultimate locus of action. Therefore, attention to psychological and social-psychological micro-processes provides a basis for conceiving a wide range of alternative policies and institutional arrangements, and for identifying conditions necessary to produce changes in the nature of international politics. Within the framework of a discussion of the importance of human factors in political processes, Margaret Mead discusses the dangers created by the interactive relationship which exists between announced theoretical beliefs and positive political action. Specifically, she describes the conceptual pitfalls and effective consequences of widely disseminated "scientific" theories which trace human behavior to animal origins and make analogies between animal and human aggression. Dr. Mead develops the idea that all attempts to create theories of international behavior must be scrutinized not only for their adequacy as explanations or prognosticators of events, but also as effective components of the very political events which they are intended to explain. Some possible consequences of the self-fulfilling nature of theoretical perceptions discussed by Margaret Mead become clear in David McClelland's essay. In a discussion which ranges from the presentation of experimentally verified insights into the nature of charisma to the presentation of data on leadership cultivation in India, Professor McClelland traces the develop ment of two types of power motivation, one "primitive" and one "socialized." He discusses institutional, conceptual, and educational measures to be taken in order to change the "primitive" image of power-seekers which prevails in the United States. Certain steps must be taken, he asserts, if our society is not to risk floundering because of a lack of socialized leadership, a lack which our negative image of power-seekers may help to create. The essays by John Lewis and Martin Kilson highlight basic problems of leadership in Communist China and in sub-Saharan Africa. Professor Lewis combines a discussion of Mao Tse-tung's psychological make-up and revolutionary style with a carefully constructed analysis of two types of elite role in Communist China. He views the clash of leader and commissar as one between inspiration and organization, between revolution and development. His conclusions concern the place of institutionalized bureaucracy in "revolutionary" China and the dangers of relying on charisma as the sole unifying base of a polity. Professor Kilson, setting African leadership trends and dynamics in historical and evolutionary perspective, traces the development of the two basic non-military elites of Ghana—he calls them the traditional elite and the para-elite—and discusses the two fundamental lines of political cleavage which exist in Ghana and in several other new African states. He demonstrates that while cleavages based on modern post-tribal social and class distinctions are subject to rationalization and regulation, those based on traditional ethnic-tribal factors have defied rationalization by either civilian or military elites and have thus prevented African regimes from institutionalizing modern politics. As long as this situation prevails, Professor Kilson's prognosis for Africa, like Professor Lewis's for China, is instability. In the concluding essay, William Zimmerman traces the evolving nature of Soviet perceptions of the international system and the changing role which ideology plays in shaping the decisions of Soviet policy-makers. He also inspects the developments which have altered western analysis of the determinants of Soviet behavior. He lauds the fact that recent western analysis has given more weight to macro-analytic factors than was customary at the height of the Cold War. But he finds that while essential for an understanding of the major reorientation in Soviet thinking in the post Stalin period, macro-analysis provides little guidance for the full explanation and prediction of short-term Soviet behavior. This guidance must come, Professor Zimmerman asserts, from micro-analysis. "Hence," he concludes, "we have come full circle, back to the cognitive and affective maps of particular decision-makers—but at a greater level of specificity ... and within a general framework which stresses the impact of external factors on Soviet behavior." These essays concern the necessity, analytical possibilities, and conceptual and effective limitations of incorporating micro-analytic human factors into theories of international politics. They constitute an attempt to redress the neglect to which the micro-analytic level of analysis has been subject, and thereby to expand our understanding of international phenomena.**23.2**

The American study of foreign policy has undergone a slow metamorphosis from primary attention to the most formal instruments of foreign affairs—treaties and other forms of agreement between nations—to intensive analysis of the many and varied pressures and interests operating in each country that ultimately result in foreign policy. The operative assumption in this eclectic evolution is that while countries may be considered units for some kinds of international relations analysis, an understanding of foreign policy making requires more than an expostulation about what actions might be rational in terms of a country's prescribed national interest: instead, nations ought to be conceptualized as constantly changing configurations of men and institutions sensitive to many influences. Consequently, some scholars have focused on the decision-makers and the policy decision as the primary units of analysis: relying on burgeoning research in group dynamics and personality theory, they have postulated about the tensions and forces amalgamated in the final action. Other scholars have focused on the organizational component in foreign policy and have commented on the shifting political contests between departments, committees, or branches of government that temper an emerging foreign policy initiative. Some writers, like Stanley Hoffmann in Gulliver's Troubles, have returned the men and institutions—so often abstracted for analysis—to the broader milieu of national heritage, temperament, and style. This issue of the Journal continues the exploration of domestic determinants of foreign policy by presenting scholars from different disciplines who chart some significant constraints and stimuli that American politics force on the policy making process. Wilson Carey McWilliams begins the discussion by placing the recent popular protest movements—both those against the war in Vietnam and those auguring for a "new politics" of popular participation in many kinds of national decision making—into the contest of political democracy as it is practiced in the United States. He demonstrates the ineluctable injection of foreign policy issues into domestic politics as the U. S. has become a more powerful international actor and then shows how slowly and un comfortably American institutions—reflective of shifting political coalitions—have adapted to the immense tasks thrust upon them. More people in more groups are drawn into areas of decision that intrinsically demand tighter control and crisper application of policy. The task of harmonizing these forces into a stable polity belongs to political leadership; and Mc Williams faults the adaptability of American leaders over time and for a variety of reasons. Yet, as McWilliams suggests, radical protests are far more "issue-creating" than "issue-resolving": the palliative for a torn society is more vigorous, sensitive leadership and a more vigorously attentive and demanding populace. Louis Henkin demonstrates that many of the intensely debated and potentially devisive foreign policy issues were foreseen in concept, if not in substance, by the framers of the Constitution and thus that protestations of constitutional violation ought more accurately be directed to failures of political compromise by contending factions. He makes clear that alleged "usurpation" of executive authority to conclude interventionary agreements or conduct foreign wars is often a mere railing against unpopular faits accomplis by one or more dissatisfied governmental actors. In his article on bureaucratic structures Adam Yarmolinsky describes two such organizational actors: the Departments of State and Defense. His argument that the Defense Department, through structure, staffing, and raison d'etre has an inherent edge on having its policy proposals accepted and implemented over those of other departments is rich in significance for future research. It is surely a first step in any analysis of the professional civilian and military defense establishment. As a study of interest group influence, John Davis's essay on the role of black Americans in shaping American foreign policy toward Africa is especially insightful in describing the different policy prescriptions that result from the changing mood and ideology of black American organizations—the twisted path from Marcus Garvey to Stokley Carmichael. Alexander Dallin's analytical note gives valuable balance to the discussion of American domestic forces by exploring some domestic considerations that have shaped Soviet foreign policy. His essay shows both the similarities and differences of the Soviet model to American policy making. On the one hand, the Soviet process must accommodate a similar panoply of articulate interests—technology, heavy industry, military affairs, agriculture, and the professional interest groups. On the other hand, the intricate relation of ideology to policy has both served domestic aims by curtailing dissent and hindered external flexibility by requiring policy to fit (however strained) ideological explanation. The final essays explore two sides of American foreign economic policy. Michael Hudson demonstrates the play of domestic interests that precipitated American support for the Bretton Woods organizations and surveys the domestic needs served by current American policies toward the IMF and the World Bank. Charles Kindleberger explores a number of desirable economic policies to foster greater economic integration and growth for developed countries and explicitly draws conclusions about what domestic freedom the United States would have to forego to implement them. These essays are part of a body of analysis that is only beginning to develop a systematic methodology and an interdisciplinary awareness. It is hoped that they will succeed in promoting the most desirable academic goal: to stimulate new questions and provoke fresh approaches to old problems.**23.1**

The study of revolution is in many ways the study of politics. It centers on the questions of how societies cohere and how they change over time from one political configuration to another. Any inquiry so broad cannot be attacked piecemeal. It is especially demanding because it requires both the search for structure—a framework for analysis—and the judicious attention to content—the historical and evolutionary context of political change. It links philosophy to social theory, for if structure without content is meaningless, content without values is irrelevant. This issue of the Journal brings together scholars who have been concerned with different aspects of revolution in the hope of presenting new approaches and fresh insights to the study of violent political conflict. The opening essay by Hannah Arendt approaches revolution by distinguishing between the use and abuse of violence in the organization of political fife. Professor Arendt deprecates the glorification of spontaneous violence (in the writings of Franz Fanon and others) as both inimical to the " progress" of societies and incapable of explaining how societies are held together. Her article distinguishes the power sanctioned by legitimacy that orders a polity from the violence characterized by instruments that destroys it. She makes clear that although violence sometimes plays a significant role by unmasking the hypocrisy of illegitimate regimes, it always carries the intrinsic danger of destroying the relation between means and ends and irradicating society through organic self-perpetuation. Franz Schurmann's article on the causes of revolutionary conflict juxtaposes a different model of society to Hannah Arendt's. Drawing extensively on the Chinese experience, Schurmann expands the concept of class from a purely materialistic basis to essentially one of authority relationships. He shows how ideology, in the sense of a different value structure, can heighten latent class antagonisms and create a revolutionary situation. Manfred Halpern would synthesize the differences in the first two es says by reconceptualizing their crucial variables. His article is truly "revolutionary" because it presents a new schema for analyzing all inter personal, intra-personal, and international relations. Halpern defines revolution in terms of the world-wide process of modernization; a process that increasingly brings "incoherence" to developed and developing societies alike. The two articles by Douglas Chalmers and Ali Mazrui accent facets of revolution in Latin America and Africa. Chalmers points out that many "revolutionary" changes in different Latin American countries result less from the implementation of planned revolutionary programs than from the erratic responses engendered by a domestic crisis. By focusing on variegated determinants of change, he points the way toward a theory of crisis dynamics. Mazrui performs a twofold task by delineating on one hand some of the sources of revolution in different African states (arising from the colonial and post-colonial experience) and on the other hand by characterizing the peculiar demonstration effect of revolutions that sweep sequentially across the African continent. In the concluding essay Charles Hamilton focuses on race relations in the contemporary United States as reflecting a unique modern revolution which juxtaposes concepts of legitimacy, leadership style, and na tional demands in a way that presages some form of system-trans formation. These essays cannot hope to exhaust the plethora of intellectual problems encompassed by the study of revolution. However, they provide provocative theoretical frameworks, which more than mere compilations of facts, shed light on the moving process of political life.**22.2**

The term "intervention" has become extremely common in discussions of international politics, to the extent that every international conflict or relationship can be designated as some form of intervention. But the wide usage of the term has not resulted in a common understanding of the meaning of "intervention," and the concept of intervention has become as misunderstood now as "balance of power" or "splendid isolation" were decades ago. The confusion that has arisen over the concept of intervention is largely a result of the dual usage of the term. As James Rosenau suggests, "intervention" is used both as an analytical concept by political scientists and as an operational concept by diplomats and strategists. The political scientist seeks to be precise in his description of intervention, excluding some relationships and including others. The operationalist, on the other hand, uses the term in a descriptive rather than an analytical manner, and tends to define every example of influence or involvement as intervention. Intervention is even more complicated, however, than the above indicates. Oran Young suggests in his essay in this issue of the Journal that the nature and form of intervention is in fact related to the nature and form of the international system itself. So it is not possible to consider the concept of intervention, if indeed a conceptualization is possible, as static, but only as a dynamic concept that changes as the power structure of the system changes. I. William Zartman and Andrew Scott support Professor Young's thesis. Professor Zartman examines the concept of intervention held by African nations, and in so doing shows how the structure and relative development of the states system influences the nature and form of the African concept of intervention. His closing paragraphs suggest that the Western notion of intervention is suitable only for the Western state system and ideology, and may not be applicable to state relations among developing nations. Professor Scott continues this line of reasoning and contends that the current notion of intervention arose during a period when the states system was undergoing repair after 1815. But as the concept of sovereignty has been altered by changes in the states system, so, Scott argues, the concepts of intervention and non-intervention must be re considered. But the ultimate goal of political scientists is, as William T. R. Fox has written, to give guidance to policy-makers. With this admonition in mind, Max Beloff examines the principles of intervention and suggests that while American political scientists have not yet been able to provide a suitable doctrine of intervention, this is clearly their job ahead. In this sense, Professor Beloff's and Professor Scott's articles serve the purpose of transition, separating the analysts from the operationalists. We cease considering what is intervention, and become concerned with how to intervene or not to intervene. Howard Wriggins shows that economic and military assistance, long regarded as effective tools of American interventionist policies, are indeed much more subtle than their wielders sometimes recognize. The outcomes of intervention in the form of economic and military assistance may be much different from what was originally imagined, so different in fact as to cast doubt upon the effectiveness of economic and military assistance. It is clear from Professor Wriggins' article that intervention is a highly complicated policy for any government; one that may have many un expected outcomes. It is also clear that intervention needs to be carefully defined to distinguish it from cases of influence and involvement. Adam Yarmolinsky argues that the decision to intervene must be made more rational and must be continually examined in light of changes in international relationships. Morton Halperin previews the requirements for security and American interests in Asia after Vietnam, and suggests that a policy of intervention in Asia will require considerable rethinking. This will demand, he suggests, a more realistic examination of American political and security interests around the globe. The academic debate over the concept of "intervention" is bound to be prolonged by the articles in this issue of the Journal. But it is clear that events far more than words will, in the long run, teach us about the realities of intervention.

**22.1**

Realities in Europe force us to an examination of detente. Contacts between Eastern and Western Europe are multiplying as the division between East and West, now two decades old, is disappearing. East-West detente is no longer relegated to the playing fields of the superpowers, but is now as much a matter for Europeans as for Russians and Americans. American Soviet relations still vitally affect the tone and perhaps the pace of detente between Eastern and Western Europe, but it is hard to dispute that the process of detente within Europe is progressing with or without the blessing of the superpowers. This issue of the Journal seeks to examine all aspects of the current state of detente within Europe—in so doing it studies relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, between Europe and the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and between Eastern and Western Europe. In this way detente may be seen as a mosaic of historical, cultural, economic, and political problems that affects the manner in which current policies are formulated. The Journal has asked leading European and American scholars to focus upon the various problems and policy alternatives within the mosaic of detente, and to assess the future of East-West detente. Arnold Toynbee opens the discussion with an examination of the historical relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. stressing the importance of the worldwide power confrontation in any calculation of the future of detente in Europe. Philip Mosely and Jerzy Lukaszewski analyze different approaches the United States might take in encouraging East-West detente. Marshall Shulman and Vaclav Kotyk examine the bases of Soviet and East European foreign policy respectively, an understanding of which is essential to an assessment of detente between Eastern and Western Europe. Dr. Kotyk's closing remarks make it clear that, for East Europeans at least, the future of Germany is a central feature of their detente policy. Theo Sommer reviews and analyzes the shifts in Bonn's new Eastern policy and points to the direction this policy may take in the future. At the time of printing, talks between Bonn and Moscow were progressing on the status of West Berlin, suggesting that it will be hard to tell what developments will occur during 1968; nevertheless it is certain that German—East European relations will continue to be an important barometer of overall East-West relations. Vladimir Velebit, Bruce Smith, and Werner Feld discuss important aspects of East-West detente: the future of trade in the relationship between East and West, the importance of the non-proliferation treaty to East-West detente, and the manner in which the East European states have sought in fluence in the EEC by Communist party organization. The Editors hope that this discussion of detente, by bringing Eastern and Western scholars together in a common analysis, will not only provide a greater understanding of the politics of detente within Europe, but will also be a factor in the making of that détente.**21.2**

The pragmatic bent of Americans, their bias against the theoretical and abstract and in favor of the practical and concrete, is a commonplace. Lionel Trilling in The Liberal Imagination put it well: In the American metaphysic, reality is always material reality, hard, resistant, unformed, impenetrable, and unpleasant. And that mind is alone felt to be trustworthy which most resembles this reality by most nearly reproducing the sensations it affords. In this view, theorizing only serves to obscure reality, to distract the observer from the "hard, cold facts" that alone will enable him to grasp reality. It is such a notion of reality and the way it is apprehended that lies behind the argument, frequently heard today, that only those privy to the facts available to a government's policy-makers can fairly criticize their policies. Consideration of the current Vietnam debate reveals the flaw in that argument; for while the facts (as far as they can be ascertained) are certainly relevant, the argument over the wisdom of this country's military involvement in Vietnam really revolves around conflicting images, concepts, and theories about contemporary international relations. The difference between a critic of the war like Hans Morgenthau and a defender like Walt Rostow is more a matter of conflicting Weltanschauungs than of a disagreement over the facts. The two issues in this volume of the Journal of International Affairs have been concerned with man's apprehension of the reality of the nations and the interactions between them that constitute international relations. Articles in the winter issue, "Image and Reality in World Politics," pointed up how inevitably subjective is man's attempt to make sense of the world. Apprehending reality in international relations, as in anything else, is not simply a matter of amassing more and more facts, of somehow reproducing in one's mind a factual configuration of external reality. Rather, recent social-psychological research suggests that man's effort to comprehend reality is greatly influenced by the cognitive structure or image through which the data is mediated and ordered. Without this mental organization, this subjective shaping of reality, the data of international relations would be like Macbeth's description of life: "... a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Images necessarily distort reality. That is what makes them functional. The attempt to apprehend the reality of the structure and processes of international relations, resulting in conceptual or theoretical "images" functionally similar to the everyday images through which the average man makes sense of the world, also involves a distortion of reality.1 As James Rosenau points out in his review essay in this issue, the observer seeking to understand the universe of international-relations phenomena "must select in order to know reality, and in so doing he must distort it. He must use some method to comprehend the truth of world politics, thus inevitably rendering it subjective." Once it is realized that a theoretical statement of the way things are in international relations is simply a specialized image, then the "realistic" objection to the theory as such is seen to be irrelevant. The question, then, is not theory or reality but theory and reality. The articles in this issue—whether they deal with the nature of theoretical understanding and the limits reality imposes on it, or discuss the consequences for foreign policy when an accepted theoretical image bears little relation to reality, or show how changes in historical reality call forth new theoretical concepts, or discuss how normative theory can be relevant to the ethical dilemmas with which reality confronts the statesman, or show what good theory is by actually theorizing—are collectively designed to illuminate that relationship.**21.1**

"Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim in all these is the wise man's task." Epictetus, Discourses the gap between appearance and reality, which has been a staple of philosophers and literary men from Plato to Pirandello, has increasingly engaged the attention of students of international politics. Articles have been appearing in academic journals under titles bearing words like "perception," "misperception," and "image." And the eclectic discipline of international relations has borrowed some new concepts (and some new jargon) from the social-psychological approaches favored by many of the scholars who are studying the images held by decision-makers and the men in the mass who compose the nations they represent. "Cognitive dissonance" poses no immediate threat to balance of power as a central concept of the field, but it nevertheless must be included among the hodgepodge of conceptual tools with which scholars are patiently trying to fashion a comprehensive theory of international relations. It might be wondered what took them so long to focus on this elusive realm of image and reality that has so long intrigued philosophers, poets, and playwrights. The importance of distorted images as a cause of hostility between nations is obvious to any American who has ever compared a Chinese Communist description of the United States to the place where he lives. And any amateur student of history, reflecting on the causes of war, cannot fail to be struck by the role of distorted images and misperceptions in compounding the objective conflicts of interest that are ever present between nations. This element of blurred subjectivity is a feature of all social conflict, not merely of that between nation-states. The American Civil War provides a classic example. One does not have to side with the revisionist interpretation of the causes of the war, which denies that there was a clash of interests making for an "irrepressible conflict," to conclude that it was precipitated by images that did not square with reality. Revisionist historians of the war overstate their case that the sectional, cultural, and economic divisions between an industrial, progressive North and an agrarian, reactionary South were not crucial, or that the moral issue of slavery was a fiction trumped up in the perfervid minds of abolitionist firebrands. But the reality of these "underlying causes" notwithstanding, the onset of actual hostilities was characterized by an unreality similar to that surrounding the outbreak of World War I, which Robert North and his associates have analyzed so closely. This unreality had its foundation in the caricatured images that were held in either section of the other, which assumed their most grotesque proportions with the election of Lincoln. It was perhaps best manifested by the extreme overreaction of the Southern leadership to the largely imaginary threat that the election of a "Black Republican" was thought to pose. Indeed, their behavior during the secession crisis would seem to substantiate one of North's most interesting hypotheses, which he elaborates in this issue: "Perception of one's own inferior capability, if anxiety, fear, or perception of threat or injury are great enough, will fail to deter a nation from going to war." Historians, without concerning themselves with systematic analysis of the phenomenon, often allude to distorted images and misperceptions as part of their causal explanations for wars, as in the case of the Civil War. This is especially true of those who adhere to R. G. Collingwood's description of their proper task: "penetrating to the thought of the agents whose acts they are studying." But even most of those who do not follow Colling wood's philosophical idealism see man as the prime actor in the tragicomedy of human history. And this inevitably leads to a concern with man's views, from his Weltanschauung to his less elevated images and opinions. This perspective was not shared by the political scientists who were in the vanguard of the developing discipline of international relations, most of whom focused on the abstract entity of the state, which they saw acting and reacting, more or less predictably, to objective forces and events in the international arena. This "billiard ball" model, as Arnold Wolfers has dubbed it, and its extremely deterministic philosophical underpinnings began to give way with attempts to develop a more comprehensive theory of international relations that would include the capricious human variable. Social scientists in the field began to see the utility of the historian's focus on human actors, while of course rejecting his insistence on the uniqueness of the actors and their historical situation in an effort to develop theoretical generalizations. This "man-centered" research has been spearheaded by scholars interested in decision-making theory and in social-psychological approaches to the study of international relations. Much of it has come from the two leading research centers of the recently established scholarly industry of "peace research": the University of Michigan's Center for the Study of Conflict Resolution and Stanford University's Studies in International Conflict and Integration. Unlike earlier efforts in this vein that tended to attribute international conflict and war exclusively to man's psychological aberrations and irrational behavior, this recent research has been characterized by an acceptance of the truth of Rousseau's observation that the anarchical condition of the state system and the inevitable conflicts of interest which it generates are enough by themselves—without madmen or malefactors—to condemn its members to a "state of war." It has reflected an awareness that there can be no purely psychological theory of war or international relations, that there can only be psychological factors within a general theory. It has recognized that the relevance of the human actors and their motivations and perceptions is limited by the roles they play (and the constraints imposed by those roles) in the larger societal process and, moreover, by such givens of the international system as the distribution of power, the geographical location and international position of the state, economic conditions, and demography. Although much of the work on images that is expressly theoretical in intent is being done by scholars using behaviorist techniques (four of them —Kenneth Boulding, Ole Holsti, Robert North, and Ralph White—included in this issue), interest in the subject is by no means restricted to them. John Stoessinger, for one, is deeply interested in the theoretical implications of the gap between images and reality. Skeptical of behaviorism, he approaches the problem using the classical method, which Arnold Wolfers has aptly defined as the art of "mustering all the evidence that history, personal experience, introspection, common sense, and the gift of logical reasoning put at one's disposal." Moreover, beyond the purely theoretical considerations, the phenomenon of conflicting images of reality provides a useful point of departure for analyzing diplomatic disputes, as Stanley Hoffmann's article on Franco-American relations brilliantly demonstrates. Statesman and scholar alike can gain insights from considering difficult or hostile diplomatic relations in this context. Indeed, it is in this latter respect that this issue of the Journal is practically relevant as well as theoretically interesting. Each article points up the need to consider the subjective dimension in international conflict, to understand how and why the images held in other nations may differ from our own, and to make our images more realistic and our perceptions keener by eliminating the blinders imposed by nationalism, ideology, and rigid and hackneyed thinking. As the articles by Benjamin Schwartz, Stoessinger, and White suggest, part of this operation involves a simple act of empathy, and they show how important this act is in understanding our current conflict in Asia. However, seeing the world as others see it is an easy matter compared to seeing it as it really is. (Not the least of the difficulties are the com plex and irresolvable philosophical questions concerning "reality" that the articles in this issue necessarily beg.) Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth Boulding, and Ole Holsti point out some of the problems faced by men and governments in the effort to make their images jibe with reality: man's proclivity for myths and stereotypes, the built-in obtuseness of governmental hierarchies, and the cognitive processes that tend to sustain stereotyped images. Holsti provides a common-sense prescription for overcoming these problems in his admonition to resist "reducing complexities to simplicities, ruling out alternative sources of information and evaluation, and closing off to scrutiny and consideration competing views of reality." A conscious and concerted effort to follow that prescription should make the "pictures in our heads" bear closer resemblance to reality, a requisite for a wise foreign policy as well as for survival in the present age.**20.2**

Since World War II, a growing interest in the problems confronting newly emerging countries has led scholars to turn their attention increasingly to the process of modernization. Preoccupied with Western historical development, concerned largely with political stability and bolstered by the success of the Marshall Plan, government officials and social scientists began by placing their faith in the power of capital and technology to trans form the underdeveloped world. More recently, there has been a growing awareness on the part of scholars of the importance of political changes that occur during the transition from traditional to modern societies. The prima cy of economics has lost its sway; the political factor is no longer considered a dependent variable. Although a modern political structure cannot be logically related to any specific form of government, certain characteristics of a political system may be considered generically modern. In all modern societies, one can expect to find, inter alia, a highly differentiated and specialized governmental structure; an expanded range and magnitude of political and governmental output; and, finally, large-scale popular participation in the political system, with an interest group infrastructure to organize the socially mobilized masses. Definitions of political development are legion. Rather than borrow any single definition or add to the already lengthy list, we have chosen to employ this concept in its widest sense—political development conceived of as one aspect, albeit an important one, of the broader process of modernization—and to direct this issue, in broad terms, to such questions as mass mobilization, interest articulation and institution building. Until recently, Latin American studies in political science have tended to be isolated from current developments in comparative politics. Area studies in this discipline were restricted to a largely legal-formal approach. "Political research on Latin America," Merle Kling commented recently, "rather than flowing into the somewhat turbulent mainstream of modern political science, often appears to drift in an isolated channel of its own, with its sponsors perched along the banks of the more swift moving waters of the discipline. Authors of textbooks and treatises in the field of comparative politics therefore ignore Latin American data without evident pangs of remorse or expectations of censure for failure to recognize conspicuously pertinent research."1 It is therefore quite possible that many of the hypotheses concerning political development which have been formulated on the basis of Asian, African and even Western empirical data may prove inadequate to explain Latin American experience. It is of particular interest that several of the contributions to this issue are largely theoretical, which suggests the insufficiency of political development theory in light of Latin American experience. This issue constitutes an effort to bridge this gap. The reader should not expect to find a systematic study of political development on a continent wide or country-by-country basis, or a well-integrated theoretical analysis. Instead he will discover that the contributors to this issue have treated different aspects of political development in a relatively few countries. Our choice of material has generally been dictated by the nature of the research that is presently being undertaken in the field of Latin American studies. Recognizing these limitations, it should become obvious in the following pages that political research on Latin America is no longer completely isolated and that an increasing number of scholars in this area are now making an important contribution to the "mainstream of modern political science**20.1**

"I am convinced, that in all the sovietized countries the trend of government is identical, and that the differences are being rapidly removed. It is the similarity between the regimes, and the close imitation by all of the past history of the Soviet Union, which needs to be stressed ...It is no doubt true that beneath the surface, national characters remain as distinct as ever. But they have no direct political effects." Hugh Seton-Watson, East European Revolution (1955). "No single form of Communism, no matter how similar it is to other forms, exists in any way other than as national Communism. In order to maintain itself it must become national." Milovan Djilas, The New Class (1957)To observers of East Central Europe in the immediate postwar years, the establishment of communist governments throughout the region seemed like a complete repudiation of the past. The lives of the inhabitants of this area were transformed out of recognition. New governments modeled after the Soviet Constitution of 1936 were created. In the economic sphere, one sided emphasis on heavy industry and collectivization of agricultural pro duction drastically altered the old order of things. All spiritual and cultural life in the satellites was made to fit the Soviet pattern. A new way of life was forged to replace the old one. In short, communist rule over East Cen tral Europe was imposed from outside and from above. The old political structures were shattered, and new ones were established in their place. Continuity with the past was broken, and the states of this area seemed launched on a new course of history. It is only recently that transformations within the communist states have indicated that the importance of the change associated with the communist takeover was in fact overemphasized and that, even in the face of opposition, elements of tradition have persisted. The tight reins of Soviet control were relaxed following the death of Stalin. Later, the shock of the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet dispute cracked the monolithic communist block and permitted its East European members to orient themselves toward their national needs and interests. The various communist regimes in Eastern Europe have adapted themselves more or less to their national indigenous environment; they have selectively adapted historical phenomena and exploited them for their own purposes. The framework of power has shifted from the international sphere—that of the international communist movement—to that of the nation-state. In a sense, the very survival of the communist regime has re quired this development. Once the international tie is broken, the national communist regime must make up for the loss by means of increasing its popular support at home. This in turn involves concessions to intellectuals and managers, to consumers and laborers, concessions which strengthen the regime at the expense of the party apparatus. However, the Hungarian revolution indicated clearly the limits of political deviation: communist rule itself could not be abandoned. National communisms represent "na tional roads to socialism" rather than the true "national political roads." Aside from this consciously created or purposeful continuity, there has been a much more natural continuity with the past. A revolution, however dedicated it is to the establishment of a totally new political, economic, social and cultural system, is unlikely to "turn aside the natural path of a country's history, uproot its indigenous customs and habits and change the character traits of its citizens."1 Some continuity is inevitable. Traditional animosities have persisted into the present. For example, in Rumania, the present nationalism, manifested mainly as a latent or overt hostility to everything Russian, is an ideological expression of the traditional Rumanian intelligentsia's Russophobia. The Rumanian Communist Party has in effect absorbed part of the intelligentsia's traditional ideology. The intelligentsia in East Central Europe is divided, part of it belonging to the ruling group, while other segments constitute a distinct group with different interests and ideas.2 Whereas the former group adheres to a pure Stalinist ideology or to a watered-down version of the same, the latter holds to the liberal socialist or humanitarian socialist thinking of the inter war period. The Polish and Hungarian risings clearly revealed these ideas and aspirations. The present composition of the ruling elites of the Peoples' Democracies provides another example of a return to the patterns of the interwar period. For a time great efforts were made to train children of workers and peasants as the new intelligentsia. Children of former professional and business classes were discriminated against. By 1953, this phase had generally come to an end. Children of the former ruling class were allowed by then to compete freely with children of workers and peasants. Thus, Eastern Europe has come to be ruled today not only by a state bourgeoisie—Djilas' "new class"—but by a bourgeoisie that includes persons whose parents be longed to the pre-revolutionary private bourgeoisie. Rumania provides an interesting example of this tendency to absorb members of the interwar elites or their children into the present elite structure. In 1948, Ceausescu recorded that a large number of Iron Guardsmen had infiltrated the Party. Though many were subsequently expelled, a certain number remained and later ascended the party hierarchy. In this way, the social and political cur rents of the late thirties have been redirected but not lost. It is true that the economic systems of most East European countries have been radically transformed since 1945. Industrialization has altered the face of each country, while farm production has been collectivized—with several exceptions. However, many of the problems that plagued the East European economies in the interwar period persist today in spite of, and sometimes because of, communist efforts to solve them. While the communist system of "command industry" was appropriate for the rapid development of backward agrarian societies, there is a growing awareness that this system is not nearly so relevant for the more complex industrial economies of Eastern Europe today. Economic revisionism in East Europe has consisted of a search for a "micro-economic theory," a pursuit that has led to the establishment in several countries of overall plans which have set the major economic objectives, while their implementation has been left to the play of the market forces. Central economic management in a number of countries has been weakened, and the policies of excessive forced savings relaxed. Contrary to what one might then first expect, there has been a measure of continuity. The contributors to this issue explore at some length and with a wealth of evidence some of the areas in which past ideas, structures and problems persist at present. Viewed from the perspective of history, the period from 1945 to 1965 will not appear as simply a rupture in the continuous history of East Central Europe. Communist rule is not likely to come to an end. Nor are we likely to see a complete return to the ideas and structures of the interwar period. More probable is a process, already evident, in which communism and tradition are merged and adapted to the modern needs of a developing state. The countries of East Central Europe in 1945 were, with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia, relatively underdeveloped. It is most unlikely that either purely interwar or communist patterns and institutions will prevail in the face of modernization. Just as the former colonies of Africa and Asia will include elements from both traditional and colonial periods, transformed to suit the needs of a developing country, so too the East Central European countries will incorporate elements from both periods. To employ communist concepts, this period from 1945 to 1965 may be regarded as the antithesis—in the dialectical sweep of history—to past traditions, from which may emerge a synthesis of historical and revolutionary elements.**19.2**

Since World War II the accumulations of both capital and technology among the industrialized nations of Western Europe have produced a sober economic optimism and determinism unique in the region's history. One effect of this new positivism—enshrined in the working principles and objectives of the Rome Treaty—has been the suffusion of all social and political thinking and planning with economic solutions founded on the prospect of general growth through integration. Economics is no longer the dismal, but the hopeful, science, and under its aegis a wider view of social justice is emerging, stimulated by the rising expectations of the underprivileged and supported by the needs of industrial interests for a broader base of consumption. Thus it is that social and political as well as economic considerations have given rise to a firm rejection of islands of industrialization in a sea of rural backwardness. While immigrant labor is trampling frontiers in search of the means to better living standards, economic and social planners are at work on such schemes as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno or the Languedoc Plan which will bring new industry, introduce improved agricultural methods and open up whole new consumer markets in the backward areas of Southern Eu rope. As the possibilities for growth and grass-roots prosperity are increasing, so are the responsibilities being undertaken by the industrial core of the European Community. However, if the "rich man's burden" does not include provision for the maintenance of regional self-esteem, social mores and cultural values as well as the investment of capital and know-how, it could well deteriorate, like the "white man's burden" before it, into an un willing and unwanted millstone. The colonial powers discovered too late that even the word of God is insufficient without bread. Development economists and planners of the New Europe—and elsewhere—must, conversely, not ignore the importance of preserving cultural identities and natural assets. The tourist industry can do more than merely increase foreign exchange earnings. Investment in its expansion may be one efficient means of infra structure development. As the Greek government understands well, natural beauty and cultural distinctiveness may prove more valuable to emerging regions than many more conventional economic resources. The European Investment Bank and Development Fund, which are steadily expanding their operations outside the geographic area of the six full members of the Economic Community, are manifestations of Western European governments' new interest in and obligation to their whole body politic. The twin motivations of market needs and the desire for political stability based on socio-economic homogeneity are, in fact, coalescing into a movement which may develop a wider aim: the desire to see a technically possible prosperity and stability come to the whole Mediterranean region. Throughout the recorded history of Western Europe until recent times, the Mediterranean basin has been both the subject and source of epicentric imperialism. At the close of the nineteenth century, with the final decline of the Ottoman Empire and the precarious, yet steady balance of power in Western Europe, the states of the Mediterranean littoral found origins of independence which have bloomed in this century. But the possibility of a new, pluralistic imperialism may be on the horizon which could once again hold the Mediterranean basin in fee—that of the industrial complex of the European Economic Community. The Commission of the Six has Association Agreements with Greece and Turkey and commercial agreements with Israel and Lebanon. It has held talks with Spain, and the Mediterranean policy being discussed at the present by the Community's Council of Ministers is aimed at determining relations with the other countries that border the southern shores of the inland sea. Will this developing relationship between the Mediterranean countries and the industrial centers of the EEC evolve into a new imperialism, eco nomic in inspiration and voluntary in installation, but nevertheless tending to reduce the associates to the vassalship of offering the physical and human materials for an epicentric economy? Or will a symbiotic relationship develop, engendering the type of economic benefits for all that the governments of the Six envisioned for themselves at Messina? This issue is being tested today within the less developed areas of the Community itself. It is upon this central question, the implications of which may reach as wide as the entire Mediterranean, and indeed far beyond, that this issue of the Journal is focused.**19.1**

And that inverted Bowl we call The Sky, Whereunder crawling coop't we live and die, Lift not your hands to It for help—for It Rolls impotently on as Thou or I. —The Rubaiyat of Omar Khäyyäm The ebb of European imperialism has hastened the exposure of the ancient civilization of the Arabs to the ideas and influences of the modern world. In many respects their predicament has become that of all the emergent nations, but it has also significant differences. The Arabs are heirs to a millennial culture which was born and nurtured in their rugged environ ment, and which offers its own values and self-contained way of life. Chaucer reminds us of the great debt that Western civilization owes to the Arabs for their contributions to mathematics and astronomy, medicine and literature, which stimulated Europe in its own emergent epoch. How, then, are the Arabs, themselves the bearers of a great heritage from the past, adapting to the offerings of materialism and democracy which come from the West today? Islam's ability to provide for modern needs has been increasingly challenged from within in the last half century, while man's ability to work out his own material salvation has been spectacularly demonstrated from without. Both of these forces have helped to produce the present revolution of objectives in the Arab world. After this revolution, perhaps the most striking characteristic of the area is the wide diversity of settlements that are proposed. On the one hand an evolutionary approach to modernization by way of nineteenth century liberal notions of government and social stratification has been adopted by the traditionalist states, of which Jordan, Iran and Morocco are in the van, and against which Saudi Arabia and Libya still harbour powerful resistances. On the other hand there is a revolutionary response, precipitated by Atatürk in the 1920's, and propounded today by Nasser, Ben Bella and others, positing a secular, Marxist-socialist philosophy of government on a popular social base. Behind this dichotomy of approaches, and with enormous significance for the course of both, the retreat of Islam before the tide of modernization has strengthened the hands of radicals while weakening those of traditionalist rulers, as young intellectuals turn from the ambiguities of the Koran toward the "gospel" of Western technology, if not to its Judaic Christian ethic of individualism. The question of what political framework this technological transformation is to use is discussed predominately—and necessarily—in Western terms. But the political structure of Arab countries cannot be expected to con form to the precepts suggested by such labels. On the contrary, it is suggested in this issue that political developments in the Arab world are producing a fusion of Islamic traditions of authority with occidental political systems. The Islamic view of the ruler as the intrepreter of the will of God readily becomes the spectacle of Nasser conceiving the Weltan schauung of the United Arab Republic. Such developments may signpost the future of domestic change, but they do little to assure Arab unity in the face of the non-Arab world. Israel alone appears to have engendered such common Arab policies as at present exist, and this catalytic function of the Jewish state may not be confined only to Arab external affairs. What impetus, if any, will the existence of Israel give to modernization among its Arab neighbors? In the context of current economic and educational developments in these states, can the desire to strengthen pan-Arabism hasten democratization and increase popular support for foreign policy? Such may be the belief of the urban intellectuals of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon: how will it affect the prospects for peace in the Middle East? If peace can be maintained, by whatever precarious balance of force, is it possible that Arab modernization may eventually work side by side with the increasingly oriental origin of Israel's population—and consequently, outlook of its government—to produce a more tractable solution than is allowed by the present status belli? It is dangerous to fall into the temptation of drawing hazy parallels with the East-West detente, and it is doubly dangerous to reap premature and sanguine conclusions as to the future in this proverbially volatile area. It may not be excessively Micawberish, however, at least to reverse a metaphor, and sow the seeds of hope.**18.2**

Before I built a wall Vd ask to know What 1 was walling in or walling out, And to whom I was likely to give offence. Something there is that doesn't love a wall, That wants it down. —Robert Frost, "Mending Wall" Partition—" the action of dividing an area forming a single governmental unit into two or more areas under separate authorities"—is quite obviously not a twentieth century phenomenon of international politics. But as a direct result of intensified nationalism, a Cold War stalemate and the realities of nuclear weaponry, partition has been assigned an unprecedented degree of legitimacy and utility. Thus, if oversimplification can be deemed a virtue —or at worst, a necessity—in dramatizing those forces which combine to make this era so vibrant and unique, yet simultaneously so perilous, then our times could justifiably be labeled the Century of Partition. Originating perhaps as far back in time as the division of the Land of Canaan by Abraham and Lot, and continuing through the carving up of Alexander the Great's Empire by Ptolemy and Seleucus, the repeated dis membering of Poland, the period of European expansion in Asia and Africa, and the demise of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires following the First World War, partition is found as a recurring theme, an enduring strand in world history. It finds its modern-day expression in the partitions. de jure or de facto, which exist from Germany to the Indian subcontinent, and from Vietnam to the segmented Caribbean island of Hispaniola. Despite its obvious relevance and increasing prevalence, partition—its theory and practice—remains unrefined. It goes virtually unacknowledged as a social-political concept worthy of theoretical study and comparative analysis. Whether referred to as "Balkanization," the "carving out of empire," "divide and rule," "permanent civil war," "national self-determination," or "peaceful settlement of disputes," partition is more than merely a form of distributing political spoils and military booty. Even a summary examination of the partition experience discloses its diversity of form and motivation. On the one hand, partition may be accepted voluntarily by the native populace. This arises from the need for granting concessions to competing nationalist sentiments based on religious, political, cultural or economic criteria. Given the increase in local insurrection and civil wars, together with the growing demand by ethnic groups for political autonomy, the proliferation of partitioned areas becomes more readily understandable. On the other hand, because the Great Powers find themselves competing for ascendancy in strategic areas all around the globe, partition may be imposed upon a society from the outside. The powers may conceivably be acting either for their own interests or on behalf of world peace and stability; through bilateral agreement or with a mandate from the international community. Reluctant to endure total war and possible annihilation because of any one territorial objective, the protagonists tend to seek an alternative solution—one whjch will permit salvaging or enhancing respective national and bloc interests. Herein lies the allure inherent in partition. Adopting a rationale of "half a loaf is better than none at all," the Great Powers have increasingly found refuge in partition. But partition is an act which results in momentous reaction. It cannot be viewed as an abstract, impersonal concept, simply the drawing of an arbitrary line across a map. Partition, once implemented, has a profound and lasting effect upon the destiny of societies and cultures, and upon the lives of countless individuals and families. While conclusions about their success will vary with each case, partitions past and present, to an overwhelming extent, share two characteristics: each led to dislocation of people; each proved to be more of a short-term expedient than an enduring contribution to peace and security. Partition, at present, serves to re-emphasize the enduring importance of geography and physical boundaries, accounts for many of today's headlines, provides a key to current crises as well as to areas of potential strife, and stands as a major countervailing force to the general movement toward consolidation of political units. Consequently, in the desire to contribute toward a more penetrating and sophisticated understanding of our world, as well as in the hope of stimulating further research and discussion, this issue of the JOURNAL is devoted to one of the least appreciated yet most relevant and baffling aspects of international affairs: the politics of partition.**18.1**

In memory of John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the United States—one statesman for whom the problem of succession did not seem imminent— and in tribute to the American system of government, which demonstrated the efficiency, stability and maturity so vital for smooth transition, this issue of the Journal is respectfully dedicated. The heads of strong old age are beautiful Beyond all grace of youth. They have strange quiet, Integrity, health, soundness, to the full They've dealt with life and been attempered by it. —Robinson Jeffers, "Promise of Peace" Rarely has there been a period of history so noted as our own for its domination by septuagenarian national leaders. It is a paradox of our times that so many relatively mature and influential nations have turned to their senior citizens, rather than to more eager youthful aspirants, in quest of resolute, responsible leadership. In an age of accelerated decision-making, rapid events and dynamic innovation, people throughout much of this restive world have entrusted their confidence and hopes, indeed their very national as well as individual survival, to a select group of truly "older statesmen." By dint of their unique personalities and sheer physical fortitude, and despite their advanced age, these international patriarchs continue to enjoy virtu ally unchallenged political mandates and to exert a powerful influence over domestic events. Having long since established an intangible bond of "charisma" with their countrymen, they have come to represent an equally strong influence upon the contemporary world scene. Yet this system of trust in age and experience must inevitably lead to its own undoing. Even these great men must pay homage to the dictates of time. Consequently, if it is true that they personify the interests and security of their nations, then their imminent demise—whether voluntary or compulsory—will alter the positions and orientations of their countries. A period of internal trauma and a jarring of the present equilibrium between nations is likely to result. As these "grand old warriors," scarred by so many campaigns, prepare to relinquish power in the face of the inevitable, their important countries stand poised on the eve of a far-reaching transition. They will be replaced by a new generation—new men to cope with new problems and fresh opportunities. They will not necessarily be bound by the tradition of the past, nor will they be blinded by old fears, hates and rivalries. They may be young men who will cast off the old slogans, delusions and suspicions, or they may merely seek to follow diligently in the path of their predecessors. Aware of this air of expectancy and change, and its relevance to the world of tomorrow, the Journal presents here a study of "statesmen and succession" in ten countries. Each nation is distinguished for its central role in world politics and its emphasis upon a leadership pattern of "the cult of the individual." The leaders of these countries, in turn, are noted for their longevity as well as their durability: they average 74 years of age and have retained power for an average of 17 years. This study, it is hoped, will not only provide insight into the future of these particular countries—who is the likely "heir apparent," what domestic and foreign policy changes are likely to result—but will, in addition, succeed in demonstrating just how influential individual leaders are to the unfolding of contemporary international events. The contributors, chosen for their intimate knowledge of the countries about which they write, are to be commended for their courage in racing with Fate and in providing real insights into impending leadership changes, rather than analyzing them from a safe position of hindsight. Whether for better or for worse, these coming years promise to be an exciting period of change, with today's unknowns becoming tomorrow's leaders. Indeed, the process of leadership change has already begun. Syngman Rhee was ousted by force . . . Ben-Gurion retired voluntarily . . . Adenauer has yielded power reluctantly . . . Harold Macmillan has bowed out for reasons of health ... Pope John XXIII now belongs to the ages .... The pace is accelerating. 'Tis well old age is out, And time to begin anew. —John Dryden, "All, all of a Piece"**17.2**

In times past, the term "Asia" brought to the Western mind a distant vision of a great yet indefinite land mass inhabited by millions of tradition-oriented peoples. Few distinctions were drawn between Asians of diverse race, experience, and aspiration. However, World War II abruptly shattered that popular conception of homogeneity; it forced upon the West a quickened need to differentiate among many competing nationalisms and ideologies. The West, heretofore myopically absorbed with its own post-war reconstruction, must now shift its attention to what Mao Tse-tung so aptly called the "East Wind." Within Asia's vast confines are independent states (together with a few anachronistic colonies) in varying degrees of economic and political development; several, as in the case of China, Korea, and Vietnam, are divided against themselves. Yet, among Asian states three dramatically dominate: China, India, and Japan, which together form what we have chosen to call The Asian Triangle. These three great Asian powers confront each other with a curious blend of historic suspicion and contemporary envy. China fears yet respects Japan's industrial might; it holds India in contempt for the latter's policy of nonalignment, while being anxious that India may prove to be a more attractive model for the developing nations. India has attempted to live in peace with its militant neighbor to the north, although it voiced some reservations about the human and political costs of China's spectacular industrialization. Japan is caught in the dilemma of wishing to cement its economic ties more strongly with Asian nations, particularly with China, while being reluctant to sever its ties with the West and the United States, both militarily and economically. At one end of the triangle is Japan, its position of industrial superiority secured following a remarkable post-war recovery. Its role in the world continues to be underplayed, for the Japanese have been chastened by their failure to realign the Asian power structure according to their vision of Japan's leadership in the "arc of Asia." It is to be hoped that the new, democratically-oriented Japan will regain enough self-confidence to play a commanding role in Asian and world affairs commensurate with its wealth and responsibility. At another corner of the triangle is Nehru's Congress Party India, here tofore the self-appointed 'moral leader' of a worldwide bloc of uncommitted states. It has sought to achieve a unique position in world politics through 'pacifism' and 'democratic socialism', but the assumption upon which these policies rested was rudely shattered by the Chinese invasion of its borders last October. India, although humiliated and embarrassed in the eyes of the neutralist nations, was galvanized by the attack into an awareness that only total mobilization of its people and resources will insure survival. At the apex of the triangle is the People's Republic of China, revolutionary and imperialist, angel and ogre, heir to the Middle Kingdom and self-proclaimed herald of a nascent Utopia. China occupies today, as it once did before its extended eclipse, the central position in Asia. With its immense physical and demographic resources channeled by a purposeful and highly organized revolutionary regime, China commands a real power advantage equalled by no other Asian state. The reality of China's nuclear capability is imminent; each passing day toward that realization heightens the anxiety of every Asian and non-Asian state, since neither of China's two Asian rivals will offer a nuclear counterforce within the calculable future. It may therefore be only a question of time before China, through design or default, intensifies its drive to impose a revolutionary will on its neighbors. Adjacent to this triangle are much smaller powers which attempt to pursue their individual destinies as best their skill and fortune will allow. These include the countries of Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Korea, Pakistan, and others, all of whom appear to be more object than subject in the Asian political scene. Most of them have voluntarily or reluctantly been drawn into the major struggles of the twentieth century, particularly the Southeast Asian nations which have become the focal point of competition among China, India, and Japan. These confrontations, these interactions, these contrasts form our Asian triangle. Those forces working within and around the triangle today will determine the political and economic configuration of Asia tomorrow.**17.1**

During ten millennia of painfully slow social progress, man has sought more efficient ways of communicating with his fellow man, not only to improve his lot but to prolong his physical existence. As with inter-personal relations, so too with inter-state relations: accommodation among states is predicated on the necessity of each state to suffer the existence of its neighbor in preference to mutual annihilation. We are here concerned with the most useful instrument yet devised for regulating the relations of states—diplomacy. Of the methods by which diplomacy functions, three, alone or in combination, have proved timeless: persuasion of friend or foe, compromise with friend or foe, and threat of force or deprivation of friend or foe. On the skill with which these techniques are used rests peace or war. From the beginning of the modern state system, traditional diplomacy has served well the needs of the international community. In the early part of this century, however, it was dealt a near-mortal blow by the collapse of the European power system during World War I. The Bolshevik Revolution permanently skewed it by introducing what has lain dormant since the Middle Ages—the ideological crusade. It was assailed by idealists who saw in its secret negotiations the seeds of war and betrayal of the national interest (the untruth of this accusation is established by the paucity of genuine accommodations that have resulted from public, fish-bowl diplomacy). By mid-century, the metamorphosis of diplomacy had been greatly accelerated. Instantaneous communications seriously undercut the responsibility of the formerly self-reliant emissary. The prospect of thermonuclear extermination hangs like a pall over the negotiating table. A hundred states and pseudo-states pour their virulent nationalisms into an already disjointed world desperately trying to unite itself into a coherent whole. And finally, organs of deliberation such as the United Nations have cultivated endless (and often fruitless) public debate, vote-swapping, and distortion of basic international issues. Diplomacy indeed is in transition—some charge from better to worse. In an attempt to clarify these issues, the Journal has invited six distinguished observers of the diplomatic scene to record their impressions of significant trends in the transformation of contemporary diplomacy. "Every Christian Prince ought to lay it down as a principal Maxim of his Government, not to have Recourse to Arms for the Maintenance and Defence of his Right, until he has once tried what he can do by the Force of Reason and Persuasion. "A skillful Negotiator ought never to found the Success of his Negotiations on false Promises, and on Breach of Faith. It is an Error to believe that an able Minister ought to be a great Master of the Art of Deceit. Deceit is a Measure of the Littleness of Mind in him that practices it; and it is a Sign that he has not the Understanding large enough to find out the Means of attaining his Ends by just and reasonable Ways. Honesty is here as everywhere the best Policy, for a Lie always leaves behind it a Drop of Poison, and even the most dazzling diplomatic Success gained by Dishonesty stands on an insecure Foundation, for it awakens in the defeated Part a sense of Aggravation, a desire for Revenge, and a Hatred which must always remain a Menace to his Foe. "There is no durable Treaty which is not founded on reciprocal Advantage, and indeed a Treaty which does not satisfy this Condition is no Treaty at all, and is apt to contain the Seeds of its own Dissolution." Francois de Callières On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes (1716)**16.2**

Tennyson's poignant phrase has gained new meaning — there is indeed "so little time, so much to be done" for over a billion human beings in this mid-twentieth century world. Peoples all over the globe are totally committed to one goal, that of justifying the independence which most of them have only recently won by building up their societies, creating new opportunities for the individual, realizing social and economic progress and structuring the political framework in which all this can best be done. And there can be no question that they are about their business now, to realize results now, to ameliorate their conditions now. Even in what might be called the "older states" of the less-developed world — those which gained their independence several decades ago — new inspiration charges them to give meaning to their independence, to realize the advances which a free and in dependent people have a right to expect. This all means that a new generation has emerged on the world scene, dedicated to modernizing its heretofore "backward" societies and truly building a nation which can achieve the aspirations of its people. No longer are disparate groups to be allowed to compromise the progress of the whole; no longer can something less than the realization of full potential be accepted. All resources, human and material, are to be brought to the task of developing the economic, social and political life of the nation. To the governments directly involved, the pursuit of these objectives must proceed with all speed, for the mood of their people is impatient. But in a real sense, "the spurs of time" are upon the entire Free World. It is not enough that colonialism he ended and the form of democratic sovereignty be given to all people; the substance must follow as well. The concept of the nation has no meaning at all unless that nation can meet the needs of its people and provide for their welfare. Thus, when a democratic polity fails to meet this test, the task may well fall to another, one whose nature is inimical to individual liberty and freedom with all that this implies in the present world situation. The whole world is thus involved in this great challenge, and all free peoples must be prepared to contribute. In order to make a meaningful contribution, there must first be understanding — understanding of the significance of this fundamental struggle, appreciation of the complex and varied problems in volved in the different regions and countries, and knowledge of what tools are at hand to be used in the solution of these problems. This issue of the Journal of International Affairs is directed to these needs. The reader will find in the following pages a most helpful ana lysis and commentary on the important aspects of the problem of nation-building. Arnold Rivkin views the politics of the question from a particular empirical base. Leonard Doob considers some of the sociological and psychological barriers to modernization in the important area of Africa. Broadening the discussion, Denis Baly focuses on a much neglected matter — the role of religion in the new societies. Sir James Robertson speaks on a range of problems which the world's second largest continent offers its developers. The essential question of providing for economic growth is assessed by Bilsel Alisbah and Albert Berry. Rounding out our presentation, perhaps the two most crucial questions are posed and answers are suggested: David Horowitz considers whether economic development and democracy are compatible, and Eugene Black reflects on whether the less-developed world can close the gap between it and the developed nations. We do not propose that the reader will find here either an exhaustive discussion of the subject or definitive answers to the monumental problems raised. We do offer constructive reflection on key aspects of the question, hopeful that by doing so we will foster understanding of this most critical issue before the world today.**16.1**

It has become commonplace since World War II for the enlightened observer of the international scene to assert that the interdependence of nations is an essential reality of our time and that this interdependence is increasingly coming to exercise positive influence on the foreign policy of individual nation-states. He then turns to Western Europe as his prime case in point : there, the great old sovereigns feel the force of the new currents and have reset their courses in order to take the best advantage of their common destiny, indeed their common imperative. Certainly if there is a geographical-political area where the inter dependence of constituent states should be appreciated by those states and should lead to effective collective institutional arrangements, Western Europe should be the place. In the main, the European nations shared great devastation as the fruit of their past pursuit of narrow national interest; they have a high degree of political and cultural sophistication ; common historical ties bind nation to nation ; and many mutual interests are readily discernible, not the least of which is self-preservation in the face of all too near an adversary. And recent history would appear to illustrate that our observer's example of Western Europe does support his case. Beginning even before World War II had ended, the Benelux Economic Union (1944 ) launched an era which has seen the establishment of all manner of regional cooperative schemes — some functional and others political, some more inclusive and others less. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1948-61), the Council of Europe (1949- ) and the European Payments Union (1950-60) followed Benelux as earlier post-war initiatives in the economic and political spheres. The Nordic Council was established in 1952. A daring venture was under taken in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951- ), later followed by the equally exciting and unprecedented European Economic Community (1957- ). Nor has the military sphere been slighted — the Pact of Dunkirk of 1947, the Brussels Pact of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949- ) and the Western European Union (1955- ) came in succession. And a plethora of functional agencies is to be found — the European Productivity Agency (1953), the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1953) and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (1954) are just a few. But what does all this mean ? It is true that the European nations ' creation of and participation in such a network of international structures reveals some appreciation of mutual interest, involvement, and perhaps dependence. But how substantial is this appreciation and what have been its achievements? When one looks around the continent, he sees many areas which appear to be on what we have called the periphery of regional developments. Even with those nations most intimately involved in the more ambitious cooperative projects — nations at the center in our terminology — there is some question whether the "marriages of convenience," as some have called these institutional arrangements, have been consummated or whether they can and will be successful. It is such thoughts that have led the Board of Editors of the Journal to present this issue. We feel that the success of Western Europe in its efforts at integration and cooperation is as important for the goal of general international cooperation as it is necessary for the realization of the best interests of the Western European states themselves. Therefore, we have undertaken here to review the extent to which national courses have been reset and common imperatives accepted. Juliân Marias reflects on the direction in which Europe is moving and that in which she must move. René Albrecht-Carrié and Anthony Nutting engage in a dialogue concerning Britain's role on the continent. John H. Wuorinen, Karl Gruber and John Davis Lodge assess the positions of Finland, Austria and the Iberian Peninsula respectively in regard to European developments. Robert A. Kann discerns some possible contemporary applications of long-standing traditions in East-West interaction on the periphery. Pierre-A. For thomme offers his views on the political implications of economic integration, and Karl W. Deutsch judges the future of European unity from the vantage point of today. We believe that the reader will find this discussion as stimulating as the events with which it deals are important.**15.2**

This issue of the Journal of International Affairs reflects the Editors' attempt to address some of the problems of what has come to be called the "ideological battle" between East and West, as well as some of the differences in ideology among the nations making up the Eastern bloc and Western bloc. The use of the word bloc in this context implies a basic unity and a stance upon common ground. It was decided that this issue should consider how far this common ground extends, and in what it consists. To do this, we posed for our authors' consideration several questions: What are the principles held in common by the decision-makers in the area under consideration or the mutually agreed-upon objectives within a given group of nations? How are they expressed? What role do they play in policy-formation ? Is policy ad hoc or long-range, and does ideology play an identifiable part in planning? It should be noted that these questions are based on the implicit assumption that the nations and blocs under discussion do in fact have ideologies. In other words, the argument that the Soviet Union, for example, behaves solely on the basis of "power politics" and national interest, and that its policies are simply continuations of those of the Tsars, has been arbitrarily dismissed. It should also be noted, however, that this bold assumption on the part of the Editors is largely ir relevant, because each author has been able to discern and describe an operative ideology in the nation or nations with which he deals. Professor Elliot R. Goodman in his article "East vs. West in Communist Ideology" perceives not only a violent ideological split between the Soviet Union and the West, but also between Moscow and Peking. It is one proof of the importance of ideology that the USSR and China, two neighboring Great Powers, should disagree not about borders or irredenta, but on ideological questions. In "Nationalism, Latin America's Predominant Ideology," Professor Robert J. Alexan der defines in one word the unifying principles of action in Latin America, a definition that would probably go far in a description of those principles in Africa as well. Still a third way of communism, that of the Yugoslav leadership, is depicted by Professor Fred Warner Neal in "Titoist Theory and Titoist Practice." In his article, "Europe, Germany, America, ' ' Mayor Willy Brandt sees as an operating ideology in the entire Atlantic Community the common heritage of Western political and cultural values that have come together from such widely separated sources as Geneva, Paris, London, Weimar and Monticello. While Professors Goodman and Neal reveal splits in the East, Mayor Brandt predicts even greater unity in the West. Mayor Brandt's note of optimism, on which this issue ends, has led to a sequel. Convinced that the subject of Western unity and diversity is one worthy of lengthy consideration in itself, the Board of Editors decided on an investigation of the economic and political relationships today between Europe's nations — central and peripheral. Eight articles on this subject will appear in the next issue of the Journal of International Affairs. **15.1**

In the year 1960, the age of colonialism in Africa ended. This does not mean, however, that all of Africa is free of colonial bonds, or that its problems are solved. It does mean that the tide of independence has grown to irresistible proportions, that the enforced order of colonial rule is being replaced by African self-determination, and that Africans themselves are seeking immediate answers to the riddles of domestic and foreign affairs. It is this situation which determines the subtitle of this issue: "Continent in Turmoil." The issue's main title, "Many Africas," speaks for itself. There is no single Africa, no unitary land of jungle and dark-skinned people about which easy generalizations can be made. Nor are there only as many Africas as there are states within it, for those state boundaries were drawn by conquering Europeans with little reference to the geographic or ethnic divisions of the continent. There are hundreds of Africas—of white, black and brown peoples, of desert, veldt, jungle, mountain, seacoast and diamond mine, of farming, hunting and manufacturing, of hundreds of languages and almost every religion known to man. The withdrawal of the colonial powers from Africa has created an almost classic example of a power vacuum. The new nations have neither the money nor the expertise to modernize and strengthen themselves as swiftly as they wish. The political questions raised by these circumstances are many. Will Africa, or more precisely, the many Africas, look to the Soviet orbit or the NATO powers for guidance and aid? Or to both blocs? Or to neither? Will the United Nations continue and extend the remarkable success it has achieved in the Congo despite severe difficulties and setbacks? Domestic questions present themselves with equal urgency. What kind of governmental institutions will this fragmented continent develop? Who is to lead the young states as they strive for economic growth, domestic security and international prestige? Are these goals attainable, and if so, how? What methods can be used to ease the racial, religious and tribal conflicts that beset the entire continent? For America, the struggle of Africa toward self-sufficiency is of special complexity. On the one hand we wish to see the emergent states gain maximum independence and strength, while on the other we wish to see them develop along the lines of Western polities. We simultaneously wish them freedom from colonialism and expect them to align themselves with the NATO countries in complete opposition to the Communist bloc. It is clearly too early for Africa to set a firm and concerted political course, because the first aim of Africans is still independence in the full sense of the word. If the United States gives aid and guidance to Africa at the right time and in the right way, it may soon become apparent that an Africa of, by, and for Africans is in the best interest of both her people and ours. No single volume could include a consideration of all the problems that face Africa, but within the limitations of available space, the authors of the articles in this issue have with great clarity analyzed representative questions concerning Africa's present and future. Francis X. Sutton and Donald S. Rothchild offer insights into African political thought, institutions and structure. William A. Hance de scribes the struggle to industrialize, in the context of West Africa. The importance of North Africa as a part of the continent is defined by Benjamin Rivlin. Illuminating case studies of Central and South Africa are provided by John Markakis and John Hatch. These six articles present a cross-section of the major problems of Africa.**14.2**

Whether it be in the form of "disaffection" in Canada or genuine anti-Americanism in Cuba, the United States has been experiencing in recent times grave difficulties in its relations with its Western Hemisphere neighbors. Fortunately, the degree of such difficulties is not as sharp or profound in Canadian-American relations as it is with Washington's ties south of the Rio Grande. It is for precisely this reason that the emphasis of this issue is focussed on the problems of United States relations with Latin America. The reasons for the current, critical state of the discontent in the Americas are, like any problem in international affairs, not only com plex but also multi-natured. No one sole cause or factor can be said to be the reason for present strains. The reasons are political, economic and social. They are political in that the United States, beset by challenges from every corner of the globe, has neglected to mend its fences with its closest neighbors; has, to a now self-evident degree, tended to take its neighbors for granted. They are economic in that the Latin American countries are in the main crippled by poverty and unable to cope with a rising population ; the tensions that underscore the economic aspects of United States-Latin American relations arc often more cogently expressed in the division between the "haves" and the "have nots." And finally, and not as is so often regarded unimportantly, the reasons are social. One has to speak to only a few of the younger generation of Latin Americans (and we speak not of any "radical fringe" but of thoughtful individuals concerned with the future of their countries) to be aware of the depth of their anxiety, and often bitterness, towards the continued United States support of such dictators as Trujillo, Stroessner and Somoza. These same younger Latin Americans will argue : how can the United States continue to preach freedom and act as the champion of democracy while at the same time continuing its acknowledgement of openly dictatorial regimes? And while we may glibly answer that it is due to economic interests or to political realities which force our hand in this matter, we must in the last analysis realize that such answers are not sufficient and indeed, that the consequences of such complacency can only lead to the calamity evident in the present Cuban situation. It is our considered view that much of the current difficulties with Cuba is due to our own making. "We do not for one minute condone the irresponsible outbursts of Dr. Castro nor do we approve of the dangerous course that his revolution has taken. But there is no doubt that much that lies beneath the surface of Cuba's present attitudes must be shared in part by the United States. We did not espouse this genuinely social and fundamental revolution as strongly as we might have ; we made few attempts to end all our connections with the former Batista regime ; we did little to promote a positive policy towards the new Cuba and we did, in short, fail to realize just how complete this revolution was and perhaps more sadly (as has so often been our attitude towards new nations striving to overthrow hated and vested interest rule) we failed to remember our own heritage of revolt and the fact that our own nation was bora out of protest to tyranny. These may be to many Americans unpalatable thoughts. But if they are then, it is suggested, they are that much more necessary to accept in a world and in a century which mirrors such extraordinary and rapid changes that they often outdistance our own thinking. For we know from many examples since 1945 — and Cuba is only one — that short-sightedness, that conservatism born out of a resistence to change and that the failure to realize the aspirations for freedom of millions of people today will only lead to the most disastrous con sequences — some of which we are at present witnessing in Cuba. The problems are not easy nor are they posed in black and white terms. But if, as you read the articles in this issue, you feel uncomfortable at the revelation of some of the past practices we have followed in respect to Latin America then it may be said that it is a measure of your sensitivity and sympathy to those who now seek similar standards of freedom and prosperity that we today enjoy in our own country. It is further a measure of your willingness to accept what we at the Journal see as a central issue in the critical struggle between our way and another way : the challenge of change. It is this challenge that the United States is confronted with today in its relations with its neighbors in the Americas. It is this challenge which America must meet everywhere with a new flexibility in its policies and a renewed strengthening of its worthy and timeless principles.**14.1**

In an address before the first meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, the Cominform's Secretary-General noted : A new alignment of political forces has arisen . . . The change in the general alignment of forces between the capitalist world and the socialist world brought about by the war has still further enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope of its activity in the international arena.1 Since 1947, the implications of such a statement have become ever more apparent and indeed, as the Soviet Union has gained growing confidence with its diplomatic successes, its vaunted military might and its technological progress, the Soviet leaders too have become bold er in their assertions to the point where they now appear to believe that the world balance of power is rapidly shifting in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies. It is precisely because of these assertions—and the West has for some time learned to listen carefully to even the wildest claims of Soviet leaders—that the Board of Editors chose to focus this issue's attention upon the present world balance of power. The term "balance of power" is one of the oldest in international relations theory. However, believing that in its classical sense it has become dangerously outmoded and believing that in the atomic age it has become very necessary to redefine the concept, we have chosen through our contributors to explore and to examine the elements which constitute the 1960 balance of power—as distinct, for example, from that fashioned by the statesmen at Vienna in 1815. Our purpose too has been to examine the Soviet challenge and assertions in this respect, to separate the propaganda and the myth from what are the facts and finally, to attempt an analysis of the meaning and significance of the present balance of power. The orientation of this study is clearly military. Such emphasis is not due to an ignorance of the increasing impact of what Mr. Adlai Stevenson has so aptly called "the revolution of rising expectations" —the aspirations and hopes of newly independent nations. Nor is it due to an unawareness of the significance of the economic challenge of two competing systems or to the ever-present threat of a powerful Communist China. Rather, such a bias is due to the limitations of space, for any consideration of the present world balance of power would be incomplete without at least keeping in mind the above-cited and enormously important factors. The military emphasis of this examination is, however, not an un real or a distorting one. In an era of atomic and hydrogen weapons, of numerous peacetime military alliances and, from time to time, of national soul-searching in the form of defense debates which has made the terminology of "missile gaps," "massive retaliation," "limited war" and so on, familiar to us all—the military factor has come to assume an increasing predominance in any consideration of world politics and in particular, in any appraisal of the world balance of power. The topic under consideration in this issue of the Journal has been approached by first providing the reader with Dr. Gulick's historical analysis of the classical balance of power and a comparison of this concept with what we seek to define as the new or contemporary "balance." The other contributions by Lieutenant-Colonel Jordan and Professors Burns, Herz and Snyder then go on to explore in more detailed fashion the elements of the new balance of power and attempt to assess what shift, if any, there has been since 1945 in this crucial balance. We do not presume in any way to assert the validity of the Soviet statements on the contemporary balance of power. Nevertheless, they should not and indeed cannot be ignored and their significance in the race to enlist the sympathy and support of the ' ' uncommitted ' ' nations should not be overlooked. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union was very much concerned with the problem of "capitalist encirclement." That view was sharply changed shortly after Khrushchev came to power. By 1956, he was asserting that the situation with respect to the world balance of power had "changed radically." In a speech of March 19, 1958, the Soviet Premier spelled out this change : I would like to draw your attention to the fact that at present the doctrine of 'capitalist encirclement' of our country itself seriously needs a more accurate definition. With the formation of the world system of socialism the situation in the world has altered radically and it has not altered, as you know, to the advantage of capitalism. At present it is not known who encircles whom. The socialist countries cannot be considered as some kind of island in a rough capitalist sea. A billion people are living in the socialist countries, out of a total world population of 2.5 billion. And how many people in other countries hold socialist attitudes? Thus, one cannot speak any more about capitalist encirclement in its former aspect.2 In Khrushchev's mind any shift in the world balance of power implies, presumably, the sum total of various forces—including, and perhaps predominantly, the military force. This he made clear in his interview with Mr. Averell Harriman in the summer of 1959 when Khrushchev noted the need to "face facts" of which the central one was the great change in the world balance of military power. Such a belief by the Soviet Premier has been reiterated by him time and again in which he has warned the West of the foolishness of any attack upon the Soviet Union or upon its allies. "Our rockets will fly," Khrushchev warned Mr. Harriman in their conversation, should the West make any overt acts of provocation towards the Soviet Union. Many of the above warnings and threats may be written off to the familiar Soviet strategy of bluff. Nonetheless the danger that propaganda, however false, if repeated enough will become an accepted truth is not an unfamiliar phenomenon. The reader must himself be left to judge the answer to the question "A New Balance of Power?" Perhaps in time the answer to this question will become as tantalizing as that to the classical question "Which came out, the lady or the tiger ? ' ' Unfortunately the answer to the former question has far graver consequences for the free world and the conclusion of a recent study on this problem is to be noted: Together these repeated references to the shifting balance of world economic, ideological and military forces and the vaunted strength of Soviet military might suggest a growing conviction upon the part of the Soviet leaders that the world balance is shifting in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies. Conversely, they appear to believe that the United States and its associates are losing influence and power in world affairs.3 While not wishing to advocate a counsel of despair, the implications of such a statement must today seriously confront the minds of every thoughtful practitioner and student of international affairs. The Board of Editors are privileged to present, for the first time in the Journal, the text of the seventh "Gabriel Silver Lecture Dedicated to International Peace" as delivered on January 19, 1960, by the distinguished French statesman and economist, M. Pierre Mendès France. The Gabriel Silver lectures are among the foremost in Columbia University's lecture series. They were established at Columbia in 1949 by the late Leo Silver, a New Jersey industrialist, in honor of his father. Mr. Silver's hope in establishing the lecture fund was that the lectures would stimulate public interest "to lead the way over the present barriers of suspicion and distrust between men and nations." He added that it had been his father's lifetime hope that, through education and understanding, men throughout the world might live in friendship and mutual respect. The donor himself felt that it was the responsibility of independent educational institutions to lead the way toward such progress. Previous Silver lecturers were Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, vice president of India; President Dwight D. Eisenhower; Sir Anthony Eden; the late Secretary of State, George C. Marshall; Mohammed Rezi Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. In his contribution to the series, entitled "The Political and Economic Problems Before the Summit Conference, ' ' M. Mendès-France displayed his profound grasp of some of the major problems facing the West today and in so doing he showed to the full his extraordinary foresight which today stamps him as a leading intellectual of his country and a much admired world figure. We are indeed proud to be able to present our readers with the complete text of his address as a special supplement to this issue.**13.2**

This issue of the Journal presents discussions of foreign policies and problems with regard to the Middle East. The contributors to this issue are scholars who have discussed certain of the numerous topics which could be considered under the title of this issue. Their views are personal and are not intended as an official view of the Journal or any government or institution. The contributors to this issue are not all in agreement with one another and the reader will no doubt disagree with some of the views expressed. It should be borne in mind, however, that- the object of this issue is to shed more light than heat on certain of the policies and problems herein discussed. The reader will profit most from the stimulating discussions which follow if he will take each view with which he disagrees and considers it from the standpoint of an analysis and interpretation rather than to treat it as a misstatement of fact from the outset. In so doing, one may discover that some of one's opinions of developments in the Middle Bast may not be too well founded ; conversely, one may also find an even greater wisdom in a view which is held as one begins to read this issue. Above all, it should be remembered that there are countless facets to the policies and problems concerning this area and that men can have honest differences of opinion about them. The fast rate and drastic nature of political change in the Middle East since the end of World War II has led some observers to the conclusion that this change is taking place without rhyme or reason and that attempts to understand it or to make predictions as to its course are futile. Similarly, numerous observers tend to view this change with a strong emotional bias which tends to interfere with the process of making objective judgements of it. None of the articles which follow could in themselves correct such views. A fuller understanding can be attained only through further reading and the foot notes provided with most articles are intended to be helpful in this respect. The Board of Editors is very grateful to Professor Majid Khadduri of the Institute for Advanced International Studies who gave generously of his time and advice during the early stages of planning this issue. They are also thankful for the encouragement and advice received from Miss Phyllis Kotite of the United States Committee for UNICEF. Neither of the above is responsible for any shortcomings which the final outline of this issue may have.**13.1**

This issue of the Journal presents studies of the impact of recent scientific developments on world politics. That this impact has been great is well illustrated by the fact that the present stage in world politics is referred to as the Atomic Age or the Space Age. Both ages derive their titles from sudden and unprecedented refinements made by man in his scientific thinking. In terms of war and peace, a twofold and principal impact concerns the fact that while man has discovered scientific techniques of warfare which threaten annihilation, he has also discovered techniques of inspection and control which can serve as insurance against annihilation. Progress in the realm of techniques of warfare has been indeed greater ; however, there has recently been considerable progress along the lines of inspection and control. It is in the realm of scientific techniques of inspection and control that man can presently see his greatest hopes for survival amidst the means of total destruction. If nations could reach political agreements for the implementation of techniques of prevention of surprise attack, disarmament inspection, the government of outer space and the like, a great assurance against annihilation would seem to be realizable. However, the logic of decisions in the field of world politics differs considerably from the logic used in the scientific laboratory. As man has continued to take giant steps forward in the realm of science, he has continued to take only baby steps in the realm of world polities. The resultant lag is an expression of the perennial gap which has existed between man's thinking and his institutions. But the possible consequences of not filling this gap have never been as great as they are today. It is heartening, as Professor Fox has indicated, that there is also an "endless frontier of politics." The contributors to this issue have used various approaches to their discussions of some of the countless ramifications of the impact of science on world politics. Professor Schilling explores the historical relationship of science to world politics and considers the variables and constants which occur in that relationship. In addition, the problems and opportunities posed by the present and prospective scientific developments are treated. Professor Field is concerned with the organization of Soviet science and research and the implications of that science for the United States. Professor Melman, whose recent book is a unique contribution to the literature on inspection for disarmament, summarizes the findings of the studies presented in his book and greatly extends his original remarks concerning the political implications of those findings. Dr. Odishaw discusses the International Geophysical Year and Mr. von Mehren discusses the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both institutions represent attempts at scientific cooperation on an interna tional scale and both institutions have been thrust into the field of world politics. In Dr. Odishaw's judgement, the instances of cooperation far outweigh the incidents of non-cooperation and the resulting major achievements of the International Geophysical Year are dis cussed in this light. Mr. von Mehren shows that the International Atomic Energy Agency is primarily a political institution, and that since agreement on that basis has been limited, the Agency has failed to attain its major objectives. The final two articles of this issue deal with two speculative aspects of the Space Age. Mr. Stillson is concerned with the problems and prospects of the military control of outer space and has enumerated the objectives for such policy planning by the United States. Mr. Wright is concerned with the government of outer space and he has critically analyzed recent discussions in the United Nations on the subject. The contributors to this issue are representative of both the natural and social sciences. However, a minimum of technical scientific information is presented. Due to the limitation of space, none of the contributors has been able to develop his particular approach to the subject of this issue as fully as both he and the Board of Editors would have desired. Nonetheless, each article enumerates the major problems of the various approaches in addition to providing references for the reader who wishes to study other literature on the subject.**12.2**

This issue of the Journal results from observing controversies dealing, in general, with the ideological and social forces and the institutions that determine the contemporary design of international relations. Examples of typical questions that arise are: Which plays a more decisive role in international affairs — morality or power ? Is religion a force transcending national loyalties today, or only a tool to strengthen the hold of one state over others of the same religion? When made known to the people, which will gain their loyalty as an ideology — the philosophy of individualism or that of collectivism ? Allowing for its existing moral and philosophical atmosphere, what does a state consider its best attitude in international relations? What are the chances for world order through world law; are existing legal systems susceptible of consolidating? What are the comparative merits of a capitalistic or a socialistic economic system? Will the present rapid advancement of science cause it to be a uniting or a dividing force in international relations? Since discussion of these questions should help in better understanding the present as well as in predicting the future, this Journal offers one possible design for international relations as a science. The design works here on two main principles: 1. That in every political society there are permanent social forces and institutions important to international relations. These are morality, religion, philosophy, politics, law, economics, and science. 2. That although these forces and institutions exist at the same time within a given political unit and constantly influence its relations with other states, there are periods when one tends to predominate, despite the continuous progress of each. By considering the stage of development and the use made of these forces and institutions in contemporary times, the following articles, written by theorists, businessmen, and students, offer material for evaluation rather than a definite answer to the overall question posed by the design of this issue. That question is: In this era of the trend toward internationalization, what are the possibilities that any or a few of the above forces and institutions show supranational appeal or may be used as rallying points for peoples with probable opposing national interests?**12.1**

The term, "Western Alliance," brings to mind several concepts. On the strategic level, it suggests a military pact among various nations of Western Europe and North America in the manner of NATO. In an economic frame, it refers to cooperation and assistance of the wealthier countries to those less well-off, as well as the relaxing of trade boundaries by means of common markets and economic unions. Politically, it is often cited as the home of democratic forms of government, of Parliaments and Congresses and individual rights. Culturally, it comprises ways of life that are comparable, despite mutual misunderstandings, in a region encompassing the Western Hemisphere and most of Europe. The Western Alliance, then, is no more than Western Civilization, that ethnic group which Toynbee finds extant and alive in a world that has witnessed many civilizations. However, if its chances for develop ment or survival are considered, the West emerges as an area not yet fully aware that a successful future may be guaranteed only by active alliance among its nations in all fields. This issue of the Journal therefore considers Western Civilization as a unique entity made up of nations similar in aspect but still somewhat divided in approach. The concept of the vital necessity of an Alliance for these Western nations underlies the first four articles, which discuss the cultural, political, economic, and military aspects of Western Civilization and which indicate the gap between public aware ness of what may be the critical situation of the West, and necessity for close cooperation and coordination of Western efforts if survival is to be achieved. The remaining articles regard the West from the view points of various Western countries and stress the current trends of their particular national policies. The Editors present this Journal to show that a Western Alliance does exist — or should exist—in the consciousness of many Western minds. It represents the modern tendency in international relations for political units of cooperation larger than the national state, a tendency imposed by scientific and technological developments which make a state inefficient in peacetime and liable to easy obliteration in time of war. However, the already established pattern of national states and national interests continues to deny the Alliance in actual practice. In the face of these opposing trends, what is perhaps needed is the gradual realization by the West of the value—and even the necessity— of the Alliance. Toward that aim this issue of the Journal is offered.**11.2**

While the United States has only recently abandoned its traditional policy of nonparticipation in European affairs, its interventionist policy in the Far East is actually a continuation of a historical tendency. The kind of role we have played there has changed, however, in both degree and detail, largely because of the fundamental change in China's position vis-a-vis the world. The change caught the United States unaware and posed problems that remain unsolved and — at least among the general public — even unacknowledged. Perhaps much of the confusion which continues to surround our Far Eastern policy is caused by the emotional reaction to the triumph of the Chinese Communists in 1949. To understand that reaction one must consider not only the fear of expanding communism and Russian influence but also the background of Sino-American relations. Throughout most of our history as a nation we have either had or fancied that we had a great economic stake in China, and we have traditionally expected that stake to grow. In the early nineteenth century there was, indeed, a brisk trade with China. Gradually it diminished relative to our trade with the rest of the world, but the vision of a greater volume of trade with China directly influenced American policy toward her. While the European powers acquired various economic and political concessions in China during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States denied herself any similar gains and insisted only upon the benefits of the most-favored-nation principle in order to protect her citizens' commercial interests there. Essentially the same approach was involved in the Open Door policy enunciated by Secretary of State Hay in 1899 following the establishment in China of spheres of influence by the European powers. Almost simultaneously with the Open Door policy, however, America became politically involved in the Far East. The acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippines, and other Pacific islands made this inevitable, but political involvement would have become necessary, in any case, for the protection of our commercial interests as the European powers and Japan became increasingly dominant in their respective spheres of influence. The First World War radically altered the power situation in the Far East — and therefore American policy, for it left Japan and America the only two contestants for primacy in the area. The two decades following the war were characterized by Japanese advance and American obstruction, a rivalry that culminated in the war of 1941-1945. Clearly, then, American policy in the Far East was compatible with Chinese interests up to 1948-49. At the end of World War II the United States had expected this history of good relations to continue. President Roosevelt's insistence that the Chinese participate in wartime conferences along with the major powers and that she be included in the Security Council of the United Nations indicates that he expected China to play the role of a friendly great power after the war. Apparently, China was to be considered the cornerstone of our post-war Far Eastern policy. The Communists' success therefore surprised us and caused considerable confusion and bewilderment. Many Americans were unable to explain it on any other grounds than betrayal of the Nationalists by Washington. Others, who felt that the new regime had the support of the Chinese people, were disappointed and resentful, for they believed that America's traditional friendship with China and our customary solicitude for her integrity had not been appreciated. Few people could resign themselves to the Communist victory without some feeling of bitterness. America's official attitude toward the new regime was directly affected by this emotional reaction. If we could not alter the situation, we could at least refuse to recognize the Communist Government while favoring the remnants of the Nationalist Government which took refuge on Formosa. This policy became more pronounced and more rigid during the Korean War, at which time the trade embargo was instituted. During the war there was, of course, no question of diplomatic recognition or commercial intercourse. After 1953, however, a number of important factors had to be considered. First, China had proved herself capable of fighting an important local war against a formidable enemy. Second, her economic power has grown with assistance from the Soviet Union. In time, she may become a major industrial power. Finally, her prestige within the Communist bloc and among the Afro-Asian countries has increased greatly, and she has undoubtedly had considerable influence on their internal and external policies. Obviously, China has become much too important to be ignored or wished away. If our policy of nonrecognition and trade embargo is to continue, we must be certain that it is based on better grounds than mere emotion. There seem to be four major schools of thought in the United States today in regard to this question. One school, refusing to believe that the Communist regime has the real support of the Chinese masses, would continue the present policy of isolating the Communist Chinese politically and economically and of keeping the Nationalists ready to return to the mainland at the opportune moment to lead a counterrevolution. A second group is diametrically opposed to the first. They believe that the regime is in firm control, that it will continue to hold the allegiance of the people, and that under its leader ship China will grow in strength and prosperity. They see no likelihood of a breach between China and Russia but expect the alliance between the two to grow stronger with time regardless of what policy-we or our friends may pursue. Their tendency, therefore, is to accept the Communist victory as an accomplished fact and to advise the re cognition of Communist China, enter into commercial relations with her, eventually seat her in the United Nations, and perhaps seek to establish Formosa as a separate country. The remaining two schools agree, in general, that the Communists are firmly in control in China and that they will enjoy some success in their domestic program. They also agree that there is a good possibility of a cleavage between the Soviet Union and China, but they disagree on the means we should employ to encourage such a break. One group maintains that the two powers can be forced apart most effectively by being pushed together most forcefully. That is, the more dependent China becomes on the Soviet Union for economic assistance, diplomatic services, raw mate rials, military support, etc., the more serious will be the strain on the Soviet economy and the more Russia will demand from China in ideological, territorial, and other concessions. The other group, who feel that the advantages of the alliance to both countries far outweigh the disadvantages and enable them to cover or compromise their points of dispute without great difficulty, contend that the best way to encourage a split is to enable China to become less dependent upon the Soviet Union. Diplomatic recognition, normal trade relations, a seat in the United Nations, and perhaps some economic aid would give China an alternative to her close relationship with Russia and would provide an atmosphere in which latent frictions could develop into significant disputes. The United States must carefully consider which approach is best. Great Britain and other countries have relaxed their trade embargoes, and others will follow. There is mounting pressure for the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, and our refusal to recognize Peiping is widely deplored and ridiculed. There seems to be a growing tendency in the United States itself to reconsider our policy. That there is such a tendency is an encouraging fact, for there has been too little tolerance, not only among the public but even in Government circles, of opposition to the present policy. Whether that policy is wise or not is beside the point in this respect. In so sensitive a matter there must be a maximum of informed, objective discussion, not an atmosphere of inhibition in which ignorance and emotion dominate our thinking. In order to encourage the discussion of American policy toward Communist China and to provide our readers with the knowledge and insight of several students of the area, the Journal devotes this issue to the question of Communist China's position in world affairs.**11.1**

The dramatic events in Poland and Hungary in the latter months of 1956 forced many scholars and statesmen to re-examine their previous assumptions and attitudes toward the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe while the layman found it necessary for the first time to distinguish between these two countries and the other satellite states. East Germany, of course, was not only better known to the public but was considered to be in something of a separate category because of West German hopes for reunification and because of the demonstrations against the Russians in June of 1953. Furthermore, the well-publicized independence of Yugoslavia served to set off that country from the others in the Communist bloc. On the whole, however, both layman and specialist tended to think of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria as a uniform group. Subsequent to the communization of these countries, United States policy reflected this lack of differentiation. The containment policy tacitly accepted Soviet control of the area with the possible exception of East Germany and the obvious exception of Yugoslavia. Not only did Soviet military power preclude any peaceful adjustment, but the very domination of the area by the Russians seemed to promise increasing identification of the peoples with the Soviet system. East European exiles warned that time was on the side of the Russians and that they were steadily indoctrinating the minds of the youth while eliminating all centers of opposition and many of the unique characteristics of the countries involved. The repetition of these warnings nourished the fear that continued Soviet domination would cause the permanent and total loss of the area to Russia. That fear, coupled with the success of the Communist revolution in China and the sharpening antagonism between the Communist bloc and the West, caused the containment policy to come into wide disrepute, an issue which figured prominently in the presidential campaign of 1952. The "liberation policy" of the new administration seemed to promise a more active approach to the situation in Eastern Europe. But subsequent events revealed that the policy was new in name only. The failure to take advantage of the East German demonstrations in 1953 (except for propaganda purposes) indicated that Washington continued to accept the status quo in Eastern Europe despite its re peated statements to the contrary. The Geneva conference of 1955confirmed the willingness of Washington to leave unchallenged the Soviet hegemony in the area in return for a relaxation of international tension. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the United States fully appreciated either the differences among the satellites (again excepting East Germany) or the factors working towards modification in some of them. Consequently, the uprisings in Poland and Hungary in October and November of 1956 took most of the Western world by surprise. Even those close observers who had sensed some ferment in the two countries were unprepared for the violence and extensiveness of the manifestations of discontent. Obviously, our assumptions had been grievously incorrect. First, the five satellites that had been dismissed readily as all of a kind proved to have some marked differences. While Poland apparently had managed to gain a significant measure of independence from Russia and while Hungary had erupted in a violent expression of hatred for the Communist regime and Soviet control, the other three countries had remained passive, at least on the surface, and had made no effort to effect a change. Second, the uprisings showed that time was not on the side of the Russians. The attempt to sovietize the economies of the satellites, an attempt which proved to be economically unrealistic, contributed to the discontent of the people because of the unavoidable strains it caused and the paucity of rewards it offered. Furthermore, the resentment engendered by Russian cultural and political domination and by the inevitable frictions arising from the presence of Soviet citizens seems to have been far in excess of any gains the Russians were able to make. Most important of all the revelations was the fact that the Communists had failed overwhelmingly in Poland and Hungary to conquer the minds and hearts of the students and the workers, the two groups that had been considered the easiest targets for Communist indoctrination. The patent falsity of our previous assumptions is unquestioned at this point. The problem is to decide what to do with our new insight, whether the revised assumptions necessitate a change in policy toward the states in the area. Washington's reaction to the Polish and Hungarian incidents was to avoid active intervention, presumably because of the fear that a stronger policy would lead to a major war. Since that initial reaction a changed attitude toward Poland seems to have emerged. The Administration appears willing to consider a closer relationship, at least in economic matters. Apart from these tentative overtures, however, there is little evidence of any change in policy toward any of the other satellites. The Editors of the Journal feel that although a continuation of a passive policy on the part of the United States and of the West in general may be justifiable for some time, the basis of that policy is no longer the same and should be recognized as being different. Even more important is the necessity of keeping in mind the lessons we have learned recently if we decide in the future to pursue a more active policy toward the satellites. The purpose of the Journal in presenting this issue is to examine in some detail the causes of the recent events in Bast Central Europe, the necessity for re-examining the previous assumptions of the West, and the adequacy of Western, particularly American, policy toward the area since the end of the Second World War. At the same time, we have presented both factual and analytical material in an effort to add to our readers' understanding of an area which has once again become a pivotal point in world history.**10.2**

Introduction By Arthur Hays Sulzberger President and Publisher of The New York Times. A newspaper publisher who attempts to evaluate the role of the press in international affairs takes a grave risk. If he says that the press has a basic role even more important than that of the State Department, he is open to the suspicion that his personal and professional interests have had an easy triumph over his sense of objectivity. Yet this general thesis, I think, stands up. In a free society such as ours, in which major foreign policy must ultimately rest on the public will, there is no instrument, official or otherwise, more important than the press. Not that the press should be measured against the State Depart ment, as if we could choose one and eliminate the other, but the very novelty of the comparison helps to focus attention on the true role of the press. This unfortunately is not widely enough understood either by readers or by publishers. In a footnote to a footnote I came upon the other day a passage written by Sir Harry Johnston in 1913. He was describing the conduct of foreign affairs in the 19th century, and wrote: In those days, a country's relations with its neighbors or with distant lands were dealt with almost exclusively by the head of the State — Emperor, King, or President — acting with the more-or-less dependent Minister-of-State, who was no representative of the masses, but the employee of the Monarch. Events were prepared and sprung on a submissive, a confident, or a stupid people. The public Press criticized, more often applauded, but had at most to deal with a fait accompli and make the best of it. The Role of the Press in World Affairs In the more than four decades that have passed since that para graph was written, the nature of negotiations between nations has been completely transformed. Diplomats today, even those representing dictatorships, are sensitive to the climate of public opinion back home and, while it is the professionals who bargain, trade and compromise, the final control has really passed into the hands of the people. It is rare indeed for a government to step outside the orbit of their consent. There are those who lament this evolution. They long to return to the techniques of the discreet, skilled coterie who played the diplomatic game without accountability to the public. It would be ever so much more efficient, they say, than letting ordinary citizens influence international matters which at best they only half understand. This is a vain hope. History's clocks will not turn back. Even if it were desirable to concentrate the full control again behind closed chancellery doors — which I doubt — there is no way of accomplishing this retrogression save through the collapse of the democratic system. The power of the voters is not going to diminish. For the foreseeable future, the will of the people will remain the foundation of our political structure. An obvious problem, therefore, confronts us. We must, as a people, become more fully informed so that our judgments in vital interna tional issues are sound. We must have sufficient knowledge of events and trends to appraise situations accurately, to support constructive programs, and to reject mere appeals to emotion, prejudice or unreason of any sort. If the masses are wrong in their apprehension of international problems, then the government, sensitive to the moods of the people, will almost certainly act wrongly, too. I would dispute the argument that the citizens of this nation are incapable of understanding the great forces that push us toward war or that help safeguard the peace. There is no denying, however, the perils that confront us if the electorate is ignorant, apathetic, or self-complacent. Then the public becomes easy prey for demagogues, rabble-rousers, self-seekers, and the men on white horses. The role of the press in this crisis becomes quite apparent. Considered in the broad sense, including all the major media of mass communication, the press is the public's only source of enlightenment in international affairs. What the public learns from the press establishes the controlling state of mind, the climate of opinion in which the State Department must operate. This, then, is the essence of the situation as I see it: We cannot solve our international problems without sound public understanding; we cannot have sound public understanding without the daily contribution of the press. The Dual Responsibility of the Press This gives a dual responsibility to all concerned with the day-to day performance of the press. First, the facts of foreign affairs must be presented fully, accurately and in proper balance. Then, because the bare facts are usually complex, subtle and many-sided, we must give our readers expert interpretation to guide them through the maze — and by ' ' interpretation ' ' I mean balanced, impartial explanation, not editorializing which should be confined scrupulously to spots clearly reserved for the expression of opinion. Considering its traditional preoccupation with local and national affairs, I think the press has been meeting this double challenge well. Surely news in the international field is getting relatively more space than before except when hot war was in progress. Nevertheless, in view of all that is at stake — our security, our way of life, the very liberty of our children and grandchildren — the press must expand and intensify still further its coverage of the international scene. How tragic it would be if free nations blundered down the path to disaster merely because the sovereign people were too meagerly informed to support the actions that lead to triumph over oppression and slavery. The gathering and presentation of international news is difficult and expensive. Reliable interpretation adds considerably to the weight of the task. Even when foreign news is conscientiously assembled, the resulting product on many days appears dry and pallid, and the editor (not to mention the circulation department) may find it difficult to resist the lure of the sensational story and headline. Still, in the face of all these obstacles and temptations, the role of the press is unmistakable. It has a responsibility to report the international scene accurately, fairly, and comprehensively. This is the only kind of press that can invigorate and strengthen the public opinion by which we shall live or die.**10.1**

The contemporary problems of the nations of Southeast Asia result from the cultural impact of the West on old orders of native society incapable of coping with the complexities of life in a world dominated by advanced technical societies. Economic exploitation aside, perhaps the most valid complaint which can be lodged against the former colonial powers is that, in contradistinction to their humanitarian and religious ideals, they failed to make any great effort to provide their colonies with the economic and institutional means to cope with inherited and acquired problems. However, while the sudden exposure of indigenous social orders to Western analytical culture produced deep seated disorders in these societies, it must be remembered that the coming of the West terminated the incessant and terrible warfare between the various ethnic groups which had characterized the pre-European period, created nations where there had been no nations before, introduced ideas of parliamentary democracy, and brought about some permanent economic advancement. The success of the European invader reflected the power derived from the possession of superior technical knowledge and the rise of strong, centralized political systems in the European states. However, it is dangerous to assume that the conquerors were more advanced than the conquered in other cultural areas. European ventures in the Southeast Asia of the 16th century encountered civilizations of a high level. These civilizations possessed established and unique forms of social organization, advanced forms of religious organization and a flourishing literature, architecture and art. Such magnificent architectural legacies as the Khmer capital of Angkor-wat in Cambodia, the palaces and temples of the Burmese Empire at Pagan, Ava and Rangoon, and the Borobudhur monument of the Sailendra dynasty in Java bear silent but eloquent tribute to the civilizations which are expressed in them. Nor were the cultural achievements of Southeast Asia simple imitations of the great Chinese and Indian civilizations which flourished to either side. While it is true that Southeast Asia is heavily indebted to both, particularly the Indian, in art, religion, literature and language, the cultures of Southeast Asia achieved unique syntheses through selective absorption and adaptation of those cultural elements which they found congenial. Perhaps an illustration of this is to be seen in the fact that, except for Java, Buddhism rather than Hinduism was widely adopted throughout Southeast Asia while it died out almost completely in the country of its origin. The gradual dissemination of Buddhism (from its inception in India in the sixth century B.C. through the Christian era) in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and the introduction of Islam into the Indonesian Archipelago, the Malay States and the Philippine Islands in the 14th and 15th centuries are perhaps the most significant events in the cultural history of the area. In general, political organization in the pre-European period was characterized by personal rule and authority on the basis of established custom and tradition. Political authority was centered in the person of a ruler, often not hereditary, who delegated powers and functions to a group of ministers and administrators. The life of the masses, however, was organized around the community, generally a village community, with which, for the most part, the machinery of the central government had little contact. Thus, at this level, a considerable degree of autonomy existed, local affairs being administered by an hereditary official usually in accordance with, and to some degree subject to, the "law" of custom. Although theoretically, land was ultimately owned by the sovereign, economic life was organized around individual ownership of land held under a kind of community retainership. Production was almost entirely agricultural and was organized for a "barter and subsistence" form of economic life. The production of "cottage industry" goods, chiefly textiles of high quality, supplemented agricultural production. Social life centered around the family unit and the community. Appropriate religious institutions and personnel were maintained at the community level by the surpluses of the community economy. Edu cation was almost entirely religious in nature and was disseminated largely through community religious institutions. In Buddhist countries, at least, the religio-educational structure also served as an avenue for social mobility. Each of these aspects of community life was the product of a long evolutionary process and interacted with each of the other aspects in a highly complex manner to form a stable and relatively unchanging "way of life." II The appearance of Portuguese shipping in South Asian waters at the turn of the 15th century was an event which was to be of unparailed significance for these ways of life. Having liberated their homeland from the Moors, the Portuguese assumed the offensive in an attempt to locate and seize control of the "Spice Islands," and con currently, to destroy forever the power of the "infidel." Rapid Portuguese expansion in Southeast Asia culminated in the seizure of the port of Malacca in 1511 and with it control of the trade of South east Asia and the coastal trade moving between India and China. Prior to the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, the Portuguese had managed to restrict Spanish activity in the area to the Philippine Is lands. However, Portuguese predominance could not long withstand the crushing defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 and the decline of Spanish power at the hands of England and the Netherlands. In an extension of the European wars of liberation between the Netherlands and Spain, Dutch shipping commenced to strike at Portuguese sources of wealth in Southeast Asia, and in a campaign of ever increasing intensity, which culminated in the fall of Malacca in 1641, drove their enemies from the area. Like the Portuguese before them, the motivation of the Dutch was two-fold: defeat of a hated enemy and desire for monopoly control of the lucrative spice trade which centered around the group of islands now known as the Moluccas. In pursuance of their policy of monopoly control, the Dutch soon found it necessary to take measures against their erstwhile European ally England, whose ships had followed those of the Dutch to South east Asia and whose activities constituted a serious "leakage" in the monopoly. Such was the disparity in strength between them that, in a series of actions which took place throughout the late 17th and the 18th centuries, the Dutch were able to compel the English to restrict their activities largely to India while strengthening their own hold at strategic points throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. It was not until the late 18th and early 19th centuries — and then with the help of the Napoleonic wars — that English expansion into Southeast Asia was to take place. English settlements were established at Penang in 1786 and, following the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1796, at Malacca. Control of the Indonesian Archipelago passed temporarily into English hands between 1811 and 1816 as a consequence of Napoleon's occupation of the lowlands. A succession of Anglo-Burmese Wars in 1824-26, 1852-53, and 1885 brought Burma under English sovereignty while French rule was imposed on what are now Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in a succession of wars between 1857 and 1895. The Kingdom of Siam was permitted to exist as a buffer state between these two powers, thereby becoming the only Southeast Asian state to retain its independence. Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, control of the Philippines passed to the United States, an event aptly labeled "the great American aberration." Thus ended the period of the physical expansion of the West into Southeast Asia. Ill While the motivating force of the earlier phase of expansion was the desire for monopoly control of the spice trade, political control was considered to be desirable only where necessary to insure that trade. Gathering in the rapid maturation of the industrial revolution in Europe, however, were forces which were to change the character of colonial relations and cause profound disturbances in the social orders of the countries of Southeast Asia. Most of the major problems con fronting the nations of Southeast Asia today, arose from the impact of the dynamic economies and rationalized institutions of the West upon indigenous cultures. From the middle of the 19th Century on, a highly competitive and nationalistic Europe began to search for markets and for prestige. Both were readily available in Asia where European powers had previously established control of various areas for trade purposes. The European need for markets and later, for raw materials and fields for lucrative disposal of surplus capital, led to the organization of Asian economies for the benefit of European economies. This process involved the establishment of law and order, increased political and administrative control, the conversion of native economies to money economies, the conversion of production for subsistence to production for export, the imposition of Western legal systems derived in part from a vastly different system of economic organization, and education for secularized, commercial service rather than for religious, communal life. To trace the operation of some of these factors to their ultimate effect on the native social orders, let us start with the conversion of native economies to money economies. The emergence of a money economy was a stimulus which led to native production of surpluses and the cultivation of new land for that purpose. It presented new opportunities to groups of alien capitalists, chiefly Chinese and Indian, who were permitted to function as economic middlemen for the dominant economic interests of the Europeans. In this situation and in the importation of large numbers of aliens, chiefly Indian, as a source of cheap labor, is to be found the origin of the twin problems of the "plural societies" and the "plural economies" which so be cloud the political and economic scenes in every Southeast Asian nation today. Large-scale alienation of land was almost certain to follow the activities of the foreign economic interests in obtaining reliable sources of supply and in regulating prices, the introduction of the economic practice of credit by Indian Chettyars and other middle men, and the imposition of the Western law of contract. This is particularly so when one considers the existence of cultivators totally unfamiliar with and largely unprotected from the workings of the institutions of a money economy. Economic distress at the village level is the logical consequence of land alienation and this implies the disruption of custom; the deterioration of political control — already weakened by the direct and to some extent even the indirect assumption of political control by Europeans — at the village or circle level ; disorganization of the religious-educational structure and increasingly serious loss of social control. More specifically, economic distress at the community level brought about such things as the usurpation of communal land by individuals, the withering of the community religious structure, deterioration in the education of the young for a "way of life," disaffection among the clergy, deterioration of community cultural life, the physical movement of persons not subject to social control of any kind and serious increases in the rate of crime and litigation. In some areas, as in the Netherlands Indies, the early enaction of legislation prohibiting alienation of land, and a system of indirect administration had mitigating effects, but even in these areas a certain amount of social dislocation was inevitable, and did, in fact occur. IV The 20th century ushered in a period of even more remarkable acceleration in the transition of these colonial areas to the social, economic and political forms of the modern world. The swift defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 was an object lesson the significance of which was widely recognized throughout Asia. The interwar period witnessed the growth of Westernized native élites and the rapid spread of many Western political concepts such as the Four teen Points and ideas of self-determination, democracy and communism. The period was above all one of the rise and growth of militant nationalism. In the economic realm, the effects of the Great Depression on economies organized for primary production and de pendent on prices in the world market did not escape the attention of the politically conscious and economically observant among the indigenous populations. The pace of the transition of the Southeast Asian nations was further accelerated by the startlingly swift succession of events of the fifth decade of the 20th century. The first of these events, Japanese invasion and occupation forcibly dissolved the political ties with Europe. During the war, indigenous organizations were formed ; leaders acquired training and administrative experience in resistance groups or as collaborators in the Japanese administrative machine. With the defeat of the Japanese, well armed, organized and directed nationalist movements barred the way to easy reimposition of European political controls. As was clearly demonstrated in the Dutch "police actions" in Indonesia, political control could be imposed only at the price of protracted and bitter armed struggle. Within the decade the nations of Southeast Asia had become independent, while to the North, their massive neighbor China had become Communist. Y Nationalism in the nations of Southeast Asia is directed toward the full realization of a democracy which will ensure the liberty, dignity and prosperity of the individual. However, problems of under developed economies, population pressure on available resources, representative government, public health, education, foreign oriented minorities and open or covert aggression constitute enormous barriers to the realization of this goal. As there is no force but that of the Westernized élite to lead the way in the solution of these gigantic problems, it would seem that democracy of the type known in the free world can be achieved only through centralized government direction and control. Nor can definitive answers be posited as to the final position of these nations in the bipolar world. However, it seems fairly safe to state that the evolution and development of these new nations must continue to be accompanied by the social safeguards and institutions which presently occupy such a prominent place in the various national platforms, or the totalitarian alternative will indeed be rendered inevitable. It is hoped that this issue of the Journal of International Affairs will impart to the reader some insight into the dynamics of Southeast Asia's transition from feudalism to the social, economic and political forms of the modern world and some indication of the origin, direction and significance of the changes occurring in Southeast Asia today.**9.2**

As the United Nations enters its second decade, it is beset by serious criticisms from many sides. Some of the criticisms are extreme and attribute to the United Nations faults that are often contradictory: It is aspiring to the role of world government. It has degenerated into an impotent clearing house for propaganda, only aggravating international disputes instead of settling them. It functions in effect to promote the interests of the colonial powers. In the hands of the smaller, less developed states acting in concert it thwarts the legitimate interests of the great powers. The United States uses the UN as an alliance against the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union frustrates the purposes of the UN by misusing the Security Council veto. The list is long, and the conclusions reached are severe: The United States should withdraw from the UN. The Soviet Union should be expelled. The Charter must be rewritten to give the UN much greater powers. The United Nations must be disbanded. Fortunately, these extreme views, although often articulately expressed, are not widely held. But more moderate and justifiable criticisms abound, many of which are tied to suggestions for Charter revision. These are of greater concern today because they represent the attitudes of many UN Member States and a large number of individuals. They pose real alternatives for the United Nations, its Members, and its public. Many of the criticisms of the UN, whether extreme or moderate, overlook the manifold accomplishments of the United Nations in its first ten years. To appreciate these achievements one must retain clearly in mind the basis on which the UN was founded and the purposes it was designed to fulfill. The UN was postulated on the recognition of the sovereignty and national interest of every Member. Its successful functioning, it was agreed, required the close cooperation of the great powers as well as give-and-take by all Members. Its purposes, stated simply, were to preserve peace and end hostilities; to further economic, social, political and humanitarian progress in the world; and to harmonize the actions of nations toward these other ends. In spite of the inability of the two greatest powers to cooperate, the UN has been able to fulfill many of its functions. It has preserved peace or established truce in several bitterly contested disputes, both political and military. It has, conflicting national interests notwithstanding, ng, coordinated the efforts of the majority of nations in achieving many of its specific aims and in defining new ones. But for those who cannot be convinced, there is a minimum contribution that the UN undeniably makes — and a large and important one — in the field of economic and social development. Here, Technical Assistance and other programs offer visual certainty of the accomplishments of the United Nations. Many critics of the UN, however, do not complain about the degree of fulfillment of Charter aims, but object to the aims themselves. Some hold that they should be spelled out in greater detail. Yet a more explicit declaration will reflect no greater agreement among Member States than is already tacitly implied in the broad statements of the existing Charter. And agreement on aims is a sine qua non for effective United Nations action. Those who oppose the ideals embodied in the Purposes and Principles of the UN seem to be out of tune with the attitudes of the twentieth century. The Charter is a flexible instrument whose successful functioning depends less on the particular wording of its provisions than on the will of the UN Members to cooperate. A revised Charter can avail little if great power Members refuse to cooperate. Charter revision is not even possible if all the great powers do not agree to it. Conversely, a Member's contribution to the success of UN activities will not be increased by Charter revision but only by greater reliance, where feasible, on UN means for the adjustment of situations and greater support of UN economic and social programs. With these thoughts in mind the Editors of the Journal of Inter national Affairs present an appraisal of the United Nations after its first decade. We are honored to introduce our issue with a-statement by the Secretary-General. Our contributors present a survey of the accomplishments and the shortcomings, the prospects and the limitations of the United Nations. Although 1955 is the year determined at San Francisco for the consideration of Charter review by the General Assembly, this issue is not offered primarily as a basis for judgment as to how or whether the Charter should be reviewed. Rather, the Editors conceive of it as a testimony to the service the UN has per formed and can more effectively perform in the future provided it receives greater active support. Let us consider 1955 not as the year for reviewing the Charter but as a year for reviewing public and private attitudes toward the United Nations. Without revision, United Nations Members can increase the output of the present Charter by a greater input. It is not form, but substance that counts.**9.1**

In the past twelve months two Central American revolutions, one successful, the other not, captured the newspaper headlines in the United States and served briefly to focus the attention of North Ameri cans on the problems of Latin America. The outward manifestations of these two crises soon subsided, and simultaneously the names of Guatemala and Costa Rica disappeared from our headlines. Latin America had made two more of its notorious entrances into the North American consciousness, had shouted its lines, waved its sword, and made its exit, to be forgotten again until the next revolt or assassination should occur. This cycle of uproar and oblivion is unfortunately the only impression many North Americans have of Latin America. We write our southern neighbors off as a set of unstable military dictatorships, one hardly distinguishable from another, and, aside from the effect on the price of coffee, consider their relation to the United States of little consequence. While the North American impression of Latin America as a region of revolution and dictatorship is obviously in part true, it is by its very incompleteness an inaccurate impression. That Latin America is of immeasurable consequence to North America we are realizing more and more. The Editors of the Journal of International Affairs present this issue on Latin America in the hope that it will transform the stereotype into a new perspective and will contribute to a greater understanding of the problems faced and the progress achieved in Latin America and in inter-American relations. The great question before Latin America today is whether incipient democracy, visible in a few countries, can take firm root in soil for centuries exhausted by authoritarian tradition, and whether it can grow and spread throughout the continent. That the few democracies exist and currently are succeeding testifies to the error of the common conception of Latin America. The Editors of the Journal take pleasure in being able to present a message on Latin American democracy from one of its great exponents and few active practictioners, President José Figueres of Costa Rica. We feel that President Figueres in his article has struck to the heart of the problem and eloquently laid bare its many elements, regarding both Latin American conditions and the role filled by the United States. In separable from the question of political democracy are those of economic and social development. These three concurrent processes and their repression form the substance of Latin American affairs and a theme for this issue. They also naturally have a direct bearing on the United States and the whole question of inter-American relations, which is a second theme of the issue. It should hardly need to be mentioned that the development of democracy anywhere is of deep interest to the United States, particularly today in an era dominated by the conflict of freedom with totalitarianism. It is no less vital to us because a region in point happens to belong to our hemisphere. Apart from the specific question of democracy, but related to it, a whole range of questions affects the American republics as a group; and the United States as by far the greatest power and most developed country inescapably predominates the scene whether it participates in a particular issue or abstains. As an unequal partner the United States exerts a psychological influence on Latin America which has produced as an outward manifestation the anti-American, or better stated, anti-United States or anti-Yankee sentiment analyzed in this issue. In this context the American republics try to solve their problems, one of which is to establish a rapport of confidence between the United States and its neighbors — to find a balance between assistance and non-intervention. Inter-American cooperation to maintain peace and to further economic development is making significant progress. The rapid success of the Organization of American States in obtaining cooperation from Latin American countries and the United States to put an end to the Costa Rican crisis and the more limited but important accomplishments of the Rio Conference on economic affairs provide recent evidence. But ultimately to bring the United States and Latin America to a relationship of complete trust and cooperation requires more than international organization. It requires knowledge and understanding. This issue of the Journal of International Affairs is dedicated to the achievement of that goal. \* # # The Journal is fortunate to be able to present articles by Jesus de Galindez and Serge Fliegers on anti-American sentiment and economic development in place of the announced articles by Roberto Garcia Pena and Raul Prebisch who could not contribute.**8.2**

Perhaps at no time since the great cathedral-building period in 12th and 13th century France has so large a proportion of a free society's effort been devoted in peace time to the support of a public enterprise as has that of the United States in building up and maintaining its present huge military establishment. Finding ways of gearing its activities to the possibilities of the American economy, on the one hand, and to the necessities of American foreign policy, on the other, has thus become a central preoccupation of men in and out of government service.! By the end of World War II, the military establishment of the United States had grown to immense proportions, to a size never before equalled in the nation's history. Accompanying this physical growth was a much more important development — the great increase in influence over national policy acquired by the military. Their new position was the result of a number of developments which had rapidly changed the world power relationships. Perhaps the most significant of these was the expansion of scientific and technological progress under the stimulus of World War II. New and more destructive weapons were devised and the range of their employment was so extended that military policy has indeed come to be decided on a global basis. As the scope of military activities became world-wide, the importance of military considerations in foreign policy grew correspondingly. As the military establishment assumed new tasks and performed a more extensive function than it previously had, its influence on the planning of national policy became of vital significance. It is with these developments in mind that the Board of Editors presents a discussion, necessarily incomplete, of some of the military factors which must be taken into account in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy. The role of the military in present-day American society is far too extensive to be thoroughly and adequately assessed in one issue of the JOURNAL; a single, but extremely important, aspect of the problem is approached in this issue. The first article evaluates the implications inherent in the use of armed force as a tool of diplomacy, with specific reference to the UN experience in Korea. The second and third discuss the problems which arose when the military had to assume a task which was primarily a civilian function — the exercise of authority in the occupations of Japan and Germany. The construction and operation of the institution responsible for forming American national policy — the National Security Council—is the subject of the fourth article. The relationship between Congress and the military is discussed in the fifth; it is the Congressional "power of the purse" which greatly effects the military establishment and its role in American foreign policy. The final article considers the various strategical policy alternatives available to American planners, with reference to recent United States practice in their use. An important theme stressed in each article is the relationship between the civilian and military branches of the government. The aim of this presentation is to stimulate more serious thought and discussion on the vital topic of the role of the military, not only in the life of the country as a whole, but more specifically in the planning of United States foreign policy.**8.1**

American freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist conspiracy exists in its present scope, power, and hostility. More closely than ever before, American freedom is interlocked with the freedom of other people. President Eisenhower, State of the Union Message, January 7, 1954As one views the stated objectives of the Communist conspiracy, so clearly outlined in the writings of the Communist leaders, it becomes strikingly clear that the future of the American nation is inescapably interwoven with the future of freedom-loving peoples everywhere. Both in practice and in theory, the Soviet Union has sought to spread the principles of Marxism, which have been revised in the light of both Leninist-Stalinist practice and Russian traditions and historical development. Hiding behind expediency and temporary compromise, the goal of world revolution has colored, if not guided, Communist thinking from the earliest days of the movement. In today's highly interdependent world, events in even the remotest of areas can assume critical significance. Whenever and wherever the Soviets succeed in extending their influence, the threat to American security becomes manifoldly greater. Every subversion of freedom, no matter where it occurs, brings the goal of Communist world hegemony closer to realization. Every action by the United States in support of those countries threatened by Soviet expansionism is a formidable obstacle to this threat and greatly strengthens the American position. In order to preserve American freedoms from the menace of Soviet imperialism, it is necessary to find that policy which can best resist the expansionist activities of the Communist world. The requisite condition for establishing such a policy is a thorough knowledge of the Soviet Union and how its transforms its aims into practice. Through this presentation of the methods employed and the policies followed by the Soviet Union in response to the different conditions in the various areas of the world, the Board of Editors hopes in some small way to provide a better understanding of the tactical and strategical operation of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. The reader will also see more clearly the problems facing the makers of American foreign policy. It is only through an alert and well informed public opinion that a healthy influence can be exerted upon those leaders who are responsible for the formulation of foreign policy. While the focus of attention in this issue has been concentrated on Soviet activities in those areas where they have not yet been able to extend their influence, an illustration of the techniques which have brought success to the Soviets is presented in the article on Eastern Europe. Because of the unique conditions of the Chinese experience and the veiled character of Sino-Soviet relations since 1949, a discussion of this subject has not been included in this issue. While this is a notable omission, the Board of Editors feels that it neither defeats the purpose nor detracts from the value of this survey. It is hoped that both the discussion of the motivations of the Soviet leaders and the speculation on what can be expected from the Soviets in the future will prove provocative and challenging.**7.2**

The plethora of recent works on Africa — not all of which have been included in the bibliography appended to this issue— is a clear manifestation of the rapidly increasing significance of this area to the contemporary international scene. These studies also indicate, however, how sorrowfully lacking is any comprehensive treatment of this region which, in its complexity, is worthy of all the ratiocination it has thus far provoked. This volume does not attempt to propose solutions to the multitude of recent outbursts in Africa; it should, however, provide a succinct explanation of the many facets of those problems that have lately become so newsworthy. It was this burgeoning awareness that prompted the Journal to consider an issue devoted to a study of this area, and with the arrival of each additional article, the importance of both subject and treatment became more and more evident. It is our belief that the distinguished group of contributors to this issue have done an enviable job of research and writing, and we hope that in conveying the results to our readers we will be stimulating new lines of thought about Africa. We warmly invite our readers to comment on how adequately they feel we have accomplished this purpose. Because of the "me-too-ism" that each additional symposium appears to represent, the attempt has been made in this issue to present a survey of Africa south of the Sahara centered around the theme of the influence of South Africa upon the problems and policies of her neighbors. A word must be said about the terminology used in this issue. The stranger to contemporary Africa should find it odd, indeed, to hear "European" used synonymously with "white"; although the reason for such usage should be self-evident from even a brief history of the region, the reader must nonetheless be cautioned not to let this "new" use confuse his understanding. A further difficulty will undoubtedly arise over the use of such words as "black," "non-European," "African," "native," "Bantu." These words are reasonably interchangeable, but, as happens so often in semantic considerations, the use of each betrays the predilection of the use — a bias that should also be obvious contextually. We in the United States have become forever more sensitive to our own indigenous racial problem, and because of this, the attempt is frequently made to find analogies between South Africa and the United States. Such analogies are some small help to a preliminary grasp of the problem, but it would be wrong to confuse in the process the very different social, economic, political, historical, and moral components. As Africa becomes more urgently linked to the immediate peace of the world community, there will be further attempts to explain its unique position. It is the hope of the Editorial Board that the present issue of the Journal constitutes a significant contribution in this direction.**7.1**

More than three centuries ago, the English barrister, Sir Edward Coke, defined a man's home as his castle, his fortress, and his safest refuge. In principle this idea has survived to the present, but during the past fifty years the private domain has been invaded time and again by events that, in shaking the world, have also shaken many millions of individuals. Forced to flee when his "safest refuge" took on the qualities of a prison, re-erecting the Exodus when the fear of persecution made life intolerable, ejected from his own land to become a stranger on a foreign soil — the refugee is the product of countless tragedies. Taken as a group these "people adrift" are like Wordsworth's char acter who stood "homeless near a thousand homes . . . and near a thousand tables pined and wanted food." In popular usage the word "refugee" carries a strong emotional connotation; the legal definition, however, tries to "de-emotionalize" the term by being stricter and less general in scope. Legally the "refugee" is above all else an alien; his particular nationality or lack of nationality is basic to the definition. Furthermore, the rea sons for the refugee's leaving the State in which he formerly resided must be political in nature and must be accompanied by persecution, either real or threatened. Logically, the refugee can exist only in a multi-national society, and it is clear that subjective nationalism can influence the interpretation of criteria used to determine who is a refugee. Thùs, the very definition of "refugee" requires international agreement; to provide an effective solution to the problems engendered by these millions of refugees, national efforts must be coordinated in international programs of action. It is in this context that the term "refugee" is used in the present issue of the JOURNAL, which attempts to provide a comprehensive account of the multi-faceted refugee problem in contemporary world affairs.\* The treatment handles international as well as national programs, and coverage is given those areas where there are substantial refugee populations. If the JOURNAL sheds some light on this highly complex problem, the Board of Editors will feel more than adequately recompensed for its labors.**6.2**

After two years of fighting and stalemated negotiations, the situation in Korea may appear to be roughly the same as in June, 1950. Communist forces are still in control of the territory north of the thirty-eighth parallel; United Nations forces (supporting the Republic of Korea) are in control south of it. Intense friction remains, and the possibility of a third world war seems as strong as ever. Actually, however, the Korean experience has wrought many changes in our political, social, and economic lives. Tension between the United States and its Western allies has been revealed, many of its causes corrected, and its abatement at least temporarily assured. Relations with India were strained at one point almost beyond repair, but now, thanks to a higher degree of mutual understanding, are being conducted on a more sound basis than ever before. The political climate in Japan, once again a sovereign state and potentially the strongest in Asia, is being determined in large measure by the "police action" in Korea. The effect of Korea on Soviet expansionist aims has also been great. Pressure has been lifted to some extent from Europe and South Asia; the Communist timetable has been upset; and the United States and its allies — awakened to the very real threat — have used the two years to strengthen themselves militarily. It cannot yet be known whether the United Nations Organization has been strengthened by its precipitous entry into the Korean conflict or whether, by committing itself so completely to one side, it has nullified its peace-making potential. This issue of the JOURNAL, in examining the points raised above, does not pretend to provide solutions for the many problems arising out of the experience in Korea. It is hoped, however, that it will clarify for the reader some of the political ramifications of the conflict.**6.1**

Confusion as to the name of the area being surveyed in this issue of the Journal is not the least of the many problems which abound in its study. To some, the region occupied by Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Iran is known as the Near East. To others it is the Middle East, while a third group favors the Near and Middle East. There is seldom any agree ment, however, as to which countries should be incorporated under each designation. The Near East is frequently defined as including Greece and North Africa, and sometimes even Yugoslavia and Albania ! Afghanistan and Pakistan are often counted among the nations of the Middle East, while on the other hand one occasionally hears that Turkey now should be considered European. The term "Middle East," rightly or wrongly, is becoming increasingly popular in the United States and is gradually replacing the term "Near East," although a strong argument against this trend can be found in the article by Dr. Charles Malik (p. 32). The Editorial Board of the Journal is inclined to prefer "Near and Middle East," but the designation is an unwieldy one and a choice had to be made for our title. We have chosen Middle East and hope that those of our readers who favor Near East will not censure us too severely. It should be noted that both terms are employed in the articles com prising this issue; unless otherwise specified, both Near East and Middle East refer to the area containing the previously named states. The difficulty in securing agreement as to the name of the area is indicative of the other problems which hinder our understanding of it. There still exists in this country a regrettable lack of trained specialists on the Middle East. Partially this is the result of our long years of general uninterest in the affairs of the region; partially it is caused by such obstacles as the language barrier and the supposed undesirability of doing field work in the heat and squalor of the Middle East, rather than in the more "comfortable" environment of Western Europe. Whatever the cause, the shortage of specialists is a serious problem, because those men with the necessary training and ability are generally called upon to be so active in government and in the universities that they are frequently unable to devote the time which is needed for painstaking, scholarly research. And a considerable amount of research must be done so that we can better understand the Middle East and solve the problem of our relations with it. Another major obstacle encountered is the scarcity of reliable statistical data. The dearth of both local and foreign trained personnel, coupled with the natural complexities of the region (limited communications facilities, illiteracy, frequent lack of governmental cooperation, etc.) has made the compilation of such material exceedingly difficult. Population figures are particularly suspect, and often there is a surprisingly large gap between the estimates made by local governments and those made by outside experts. It is hoped that this issue of the Journal will stimulate a greater interest in the affairs of the Middle East and will aid in creating the understanding which is now so sorely needed. CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE W. Wendell Cleland is with the Office of Intelligence Research, United States Department of State. Channing B. Richardson is an Instructor in Government at Columbia University; he served as Camp Administrator in Gaza for the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. Abba Bban has been Ambassador from Israel to the United States since 1950 and has been Israel's Permanent Representative at the United Nations since 1949. M. Fawzi Bey has had a long and V varied diplomatic career; he is currently Egypt's Permanent Representative at the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. Charles Malik, Minister from Lebanon to the United States, is chief delegate from Lebanon to the United Nations and Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Majid Khadduri is Professor of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C.; the author of many articles, his most recent book is Independent Iraq. Maurice Harari, a student of Middle Eastern affairs, is completing the work for his Ph.D. in International Relations and Middle East Political Institutions at Columbia University. Sherwin A. Crowne is a second-year student in the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, specializing in Govern ment Affairs. Arno G. Huth has served as consultant to the United States Government and to the United Nations and has represented Unesco at major telecommunication and radio conferences. David Cohen is a second year student at the School of International Affairs, specializing in Economic Affairs.**5.2**

Propaganda in World Politics

For Authoritative Analyses of Events within the soviet orbit

The American Slavic and East European Review

Entering its tenth year as a quarterly under the editorship of scholars from nine universities

The only journal of such scope in the United States with contributions from universities in this country and abroad, from government and from private organizations.

Special attention is now given the social sciences.

Psychological Warfare in an Age of World Revolution

World Imagery and American Propaganda Strategy

Propaganda and the Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy

Propaganda and Wartime Policies

The Soviet Characterization of the Voice of America

Propaganda: An Instrument of Foreign Policy

**Notes on the International Scene**

Some Aspects of France’s Population Problem

The United States and North Africa

Current Movements in the near east

The Proper place of propaganda

India’s Kashmir Record: A Study in Inconsistency

**Book Reviews**

National Security and Individual Freedom, by Harold D. Lasswell

The Choice, by Boris Shub

The Multinational Empire, by Robert A. Kann

American Military Government in Korea, by E. Grant Meade

Why War Came in Korea, by Robert T. Oliver

The United States in World Affairs, by Richard Stebbins

Tito and Goliath, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong

The Soviet Image of the United States, by Frederick C. Barghoorn

The Theory and Practice of Communism, by R. N. Carew Hunt

International Law and Human Rights, by Hersh Lauterpacht

The Hinge of Fate, by Winston S. Churchill

The Purse and the Sword, by Elias Huzar

**5.1**

American Foreign Policy: A Critique from Abroad

The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion

The Issues Involved

Europe and America: Views on Foreign Policy

The Outlook for American economic policies

Berlin and U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Germany

Japan: The United States Redeemed

Features:

Notes on the International Scene

Book Reviews

Atomic Energy: A Way out of the Impasse?

Western Europe Looks at U.S. Foreign Policy

The Israeli Governmental Crisis

The French Rearmament Grant

The Saar: Link or Stumbling Block?

**4.2**

The Issues Involved

Imperialism and Economic Development in Asia

Financial Problems in the Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas

Economic Development And World Trade

Population and Change in Backward Areas

The Impact of Industrialization on Indian Society

Notes on the International Scene

**4.1**

The future organization of Europe after the Marshall Plan is beginning to assume tangible proportions. Significant trends indicative of this evolution are, 1) the announcement by Mr. Paul Hoffman that Europe must "integrate" her economies, which followed the pessimistic report by the OEEC that intra-European trade had fallen behind production gains; 2) the formation of the Council of Europe and its meeting at Strasbourg this summer, and 3) the elevation of Germany to a position of greater independence among the other European nations. Equally significant are the recent moves toward an economic union of France, Italy and Benelux and the joint talks on defense problems between the European powers and the US. The latter event holds special significance for the US as it represents a persistent involvement in European affairs beginning with the European Recovery Program and followed by the creation of the West German Republic, support of the formation of the Brussels Pact, adoption of the North Atlantic Pact and passage of the Military Arms Program. These trends are indicative of the main objectives of United States policy in Europe. The first of these is to help create an integrated community of free nations strong enough to resist Communist domination, and the second is to bring as many Germans as possible into peaceful association with the Western powers and prevent that country from allying itself with the Soviet Union, as it did after World War I. The Marshall Plan has made progress under this policy possible. The questions for the future are: Has the foundation for European political and economic viability been securely laid, or will the arrival of 1952 signal the need for further external aid to prevent a sharply reduced living standard in Europe? If the latter is true, what form should such continued assistance take and what kind of a quid pro quo should reasonably be required by the US? If the former is true, what are the problems that must be faced next by Europe, what are their chances of being successfully solved, and can it be said that economic integration and political union will be the solutions sought? Finally, how does the Europe east of the Stettin-Trieste line fit into future calculations? No positive answers are given to these crucial questions, but this issue does interpret the problems involved in answering them by providing a framework for their analysis and an estimate of future probabilities. As broad a problem as "Europe After the Marshall Plan" cannot be analyzed as other than a global problem. Therefore, we have included within our discussion consideration of those factors that bear upon the European question because they deal with it as an integral part of the world scene. The Spring issue of the Columbia Journal of International Affairs on "The Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas," will serve to complement the current issue by spelling out in greater detail this inter-connection between European recovery and development overseas within a wider pattern of international intercourse.**3.2**

The Américan pèople have become increasingly conscious in the Spring of 1949 of the existence and importance of regional arrangements and agencies. Most recently, the signing of the North Atlantic Defense Pact, based on the provisions of Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter of the United Nations has served to focus attention on this subject. The Board of Editors of the Columbia Journal of International Affairs is confident that the present issue contains articles which are both timely and meaningful. It is quite apparent that the emphasis on a regional approach to the great problems of peace and security differs from the conception prevalent at the San Francisco Conference in the Spring of 1945. The United Nations has faced many severe problems in the intervening four years, not always with the de sired success. At this juncture the nations of the world have turned to additional support for their security in the form of arrangements within a particular grouping of states. The problem of universalism (or globalism as Professor Leland M. Goodrich de scribes the term) versus regionalism is not new today. The League of Nations was faced with the same choice and many strong arguments were presented favoring one proposition or the other. Many of the same contentions reappear in 1949. "Nothing in the present Charter," says Article 52 of that document, ''precludes the existence of region al arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as ape appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and the practivities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." It is likely that the two contending principles, regional• ism and universalism, are not mutually exclusive. This issue of the Columbia Journal sheds some light on various aspects of the problem. Five examples of regional arrangements and activities in practice are presented along with a careful examination of the role of these agencies and arrangements within the Charter of the United Nations. Though the coverage of the problem is not exhaustive, it is hoped that these articles will help answer the question; What is the proper role of regional organizations in the world community?**3.1**

The Role of the Armed Forces in Foreign Policy

Reorganization of the State Department

The New Foreign Service

The Place of Congress in the new foreign policy

A bipartisan foreign policy

Notes on the international scene: Reflections on the Malmedy War Crimes Case; European Colonies in the Western Hemisphere; American Busines s Looks at Foreign Trade; United Nations International Internship Program.**2.2**

The administrative and training problems of the United Nations Secretariat have been overshadowed by the dramatic political struggle being waged at Lake Success. This preoccupation with the two-power dispute has tended to obscure the fact that within the Secretariat itself are representatives of some fifty odd nations working together on common problems, for a common ideal, in accordance with the oath they took on entering the international civil service. It is merely a sign of the times that the sizable contribution to world cooperation made by the Secretariat has, generally speaking, been overlooked. The concept of an international civil service reached maturity within the League of Nations. Since then, the growth in size and complexity of interna tional organizations has accentuated the problems first perceived there. Moreover, the new and direct concern of the United States in these organizations has tended to modify some older problems and to create new ones. The introduction of American administrative procedures in certain areas has caused some confusion in the Secretariat. The widely differing cultural and educational backgrounds of the personnel have made the problems of geographic representation and training much more difficult. Indeed, the idea of organized training for international administration has not yet received common acceptance; even where it is looked upon with favor, there is considerable disagreement on its method and form. It is this whole range of problems connected with the development of an international civil service that the Columbia Journal of Internationa1 Affairs. examines in this issue. The interest of the Board of Editors in this problem dates from the summer of 1947 when a group of students from the School of International Affairs participated in the first internship program of the United Nations Secretariat. This provided an opportunity to study the actual problems of training and administration of developing an international civil service --within the United Nations. This issue is essentially a product of that experience. It is to be hoped that this issue may lead to a new focus of attention on the United Nations. Much remains to be done before public apathy can be overcome to the point where the size of the United Nations budget actually reflects its importance on the world scene. At this time, therefore, the problems faced in the development of an international civil service deserve careful consideration and constructive action.**2.1**

When the Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned its London meeting, sine die, the search for a permanent solution to the problem of Germany suffered a severe setback. At the same time, efforts to meet on the Japanese treaty face serious procedural difficulties. Yet. in neither instance can the search come to an end. It is clear that the final re-integration of these two countries into the world society of nations is not possible at the moment. It is equally clear that a permanent settlement through peace treaties is essential to the attainment of interna tional stability. The disagreements that divide the Powers on the German issue are not of an insoluble nature. In principle, both sides agree to the political and economic unification of Germany; both sides recognize the justifiability of reparations; both sides understand the desirability of some form of international control of Germany's industrial potential. Of course, this agreement in principle does not extend to the total range of the Powers' German and Japanese policies. The foreign policies of the Soviet Union and of the United States reflect, as do all foreign policies, domestic national interests. These interests are now in conflict, particularly in Ger many, an area of power vacuum. The deep rift that has developed between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in the interna tional area as a whole, has militated against the willingness to compromise and the possibility of negotiating. If it is true, as Secretary of State Mar shall implied in his post-London speech, that this rift is not likely to be closed as long as the success ' of thé E, R, P. hangs in the balance, we must prepare ourselves for an extensive period during which no definite settlement of the problems of the occupied areas can be reached. Obviously, this situation places occupation as an instrument of foreign policy in a new light. Origin ally conceived as a transitional policy with limited possibilities, it has become a major diplomatic tool. That is not to say that the objectives of American occupation were ever modest. In its role as eradica tor of anti-social forces and as catalyst in the re generative process, occupation has never lacked real significance. But our occupation policy is no longer primarily catalytic in nature. Its course tends to be directed more and more in accordance with the requirements of the political contest between the powers; its accomplishments tend to be appraised almost exclusively in terms of its success in winning this contest. As a result, there appears to be a real need to examine our occupation not as a reflection of the power struggle, but as it attempts to achieve its stated objectives in the occupied areas. It is the aim of the present issue of the Journal to help fill this need.**1.1**

Graduate students in all fields of study easily succumb to the temptation of "getting into print" no matter what may be the scholarly merit of their contributions. In the field of international relations this temptation is even greater, since it is practically virgin territory and student publications in international studies are virtually non-existent. The students of the School of International Affairs at Columbia University are not unaware of the dangers of student publication of a scholarly periodical. Nevertheless we feel that, even at this immature stage of our academic development, we can offer a sufficiently fresh perspective on interna tional problems to justify this publication. The editors of the Journal, admittedly lacking in academic polish, will at least seek to avoid duplicating the editorial content of established publications. Our primary objective will be to provide the members of the School with a medium of expression and a means of publishing the results of their original work; to provide closer and continuous contact with scholars and students in international affairs, and later with alumni of the School. Each issue will attempt to deal with one aspect of international affairs through interpretive articles, factual summaries, reviews, and selected bibliographies. The theme selected for this first and experiment al issue of the Journal is Higher Education in International Affairs. As students, we have a personal stake in this fundamental issue. Education must come before intelligent action in international affairs. While we appreciate the importance of education on all levels, we feel that as a prerequisite teachers, administrators, and research workers must be trained on the higher levels. At the present time there is a glaring deficiency of trained personnel in these fields. In selecting this theme as our first, we hope that we will be able to clarify some of the issues at stake and present a broad outline of the present position of higher education in international affairs in the United States and abroad. The first issue is the only one to be published this academic year. Because it is experimental in nature both as to physical make-up and content, we should appreciate comments and criticisms from our readers. Next year we hope to publish two issues printed in standard form. The first of these will deal with the occupation policies of the United States.