


ADVANCED DNS SECURITY MONITORING WITH SPLUNK SPL



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1. PROJECT OVERVIEW

1.1 Goal

The primary goal of this project is to perform DNS log analysis using Splunk Enterprise to:

Extract key fields from raw DNS log data.

Identify the most frequently queried Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs).

Determine the most active source IP addresses (clients) generating DNS requests.

1.2 Data Source

The project utilizes DNS logs ingested into a Splunk index.

Source: dns.log.gz

Sourcetype: dnslogs (This is inferred from the search queries and events).

Index: index=sources/pendnslogs (This is inferred from the search queries).

2.FIELD EXTRACTION PROCESS

Since the raw DNS logs did not have all the desired fields automatically extracted, a Field Extraction process was required. This was done using the Splunk Field Extractor utility.

2.1 Starting the Extraction

The field extraction process begins from an event search, by selecting the "Extract New Fields" option.

2.2 Extracted Fields

The following critical fields were manually extracted to enrich the log data:

Field Name	Description
src_ip	The IP address of the client making the DNS request.
src_port	The source port used by the client for the DNS request.
dst_ip	The IP address of the destination DNS server.
fqdn	The Fully Qualified Domain Name being queried.

Splunk 10.0.1 Search Results

Search: source=dns.log.gz host=DESKTOP-AQTDNNB sourcetype=dnslog | regex _raw="(\?)/b/(dns|domain|query|response|port 53)/b"

0 events (before 12/3/25 8:29:22.000 PM) No Event Sampling

No results found.

Splunk 10.0.1 Search Results

Search: source=dns.log.gz host=DESKTOP-AQTDNNB sourcetype=dnslog

422,130 events (before 12/3/25 8:26:17.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events (422,130) Patterns Statistics Visualization

+ Extract New Fields

Time	Event
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817951.970000 Cw588TGeff5z1rc9 192.168.202.122.137 192.168.202.255.137 udp 33787 LABADMIN-641491.1 C_INTERNET 32 NB - - F F T
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817979.880000 C0rdrf1y1btv@058 192.168.202.83.45561 192.168.207.4.53 udp 12572 44.286.168.192.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 3 NXDOMAIN
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817955.838000 C42d93281GYY1dg2k 192.168.202.88.68538 192.168.206.44.53 udp 36843 dr..dns-sd..udp.0.48.16.172.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 5
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817959.838000 CGRgZ3jgwSlwMk7 192.168.202.88.58547 192.168.206.44.53 udp 38842 dr..dns-sd..udp.0.282.168.192.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 5
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	REFUSED F F T F 0 - - T
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817959.838000 C12L140v1HvVjgb 192.168.202.88.58845 192.168.206.44.53 udp 28561 b..dns-sd..udp.0.48.16.172.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 5 REFU
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817959.838000 C0NDE3Nq9tJx7std 192.168.202.88.65208 192.168.206.44.53 udp 58791 1b..dns-sd..udp.0.48.16.172.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 5
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	host = DESKTOP-AQTDNNB source = dns.log.gz sourcetype = dnslog
12/3/25 8:26:06.000 PM	1332817958.390000 CP9CA182kvS3at8 192.168.202.83.35836 192.168.207.4.53 udp 63787 44.286.168.192.in-addr.arpa 1 C_INTERNET 12 PTR 3 NXDOMAIN

The screenshot shows the 'Select Fields' step of the Splunk Field Extractor wizard. The sample event contains the value '192.168.202.83' at index 45561. A red box highlights this value. The 'Field Name' input field is set to 'src_ip'. The 'Extract' button is visible.

The screenshot shows the 'Select Fields' step of the Splunk Field Extractor wizard. The sample event contains the value '45561' at index 45561. A red box highlights this value. The 'Field Name' input field is set to 'src_port'. The 'Extract' button is visible.

The screenshot shows the 'Select Fields' step of the Splunk Field Extractor wizard. The sample event contains the value '192.168.207.4' at index 53. A red box highlights this value. The 'Field Name' input field is set to 'dst_ip'. The 'Extract' button is visible.

2.3 Post-Extraction Verification

After the field extraction was completed, the new fields (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, fqdn, etc.) appeared in the "Interesting Fields" sidebar, confirming successful extraction and availability for further searches and analysis.

3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The extracted fields were used with Splunk Search Processing Language (SPL) commands to perform the required analysis.

3.1 Most Frequent FQDNs Queried

This analysis identifies the domain names that were queried most often in the log set, providing insight into the most commonly accessed external resources or internal services.

SPL Query Used:

```
index=* OR index=sources/pendnslogs | top limit=20  
fqdn
```

- The top command is an efficient way to find the most frequent values in the fqdn field.
- limit=20 ensures that only the top 20 results are displayed.

The top command automatically calculates the frequency (count) and the percentage of the total events (percent).

Results (Partial): The search results successfully list the top 20 most frequent FQDNs. The output table clearly shows the domain name, the total count of times it was queried, and the percent this count represents of the total search results.

The top queried domains prominently include:

teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com

tools.google.com

www.apple.com

The screenshot shows the Splunk 10.0.1 interface with a search bar containing the query: index=_* OR index=_ sourceType=dnslogs | top limit=20 fqdn. The results table displays 20 rows of data, each showing a domain name, its count, and its percentage of the total. The columns are labeled 'count' and 'percent'. The top row is teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com with a count of 39118 and a percent of 3.34566. Other prominent domains include tools.google.com, www.apple.com, and time.apple.com.

fqdn	count	percent
teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com	39118	3.34566
tools.google.com	14951	3.34318
www.apple.com	13869	3.17361
time.apple.com	12792	2.857485
safefrowsing.clients.google.com	11381	2.781843
**.apple.com	10181	2.413352
MPAD	8993	2.149409
44.206.168.192.in-addr.arpa	7156	1.718358
IPNAME67	6785	1.672734
TSATAP	6548	1.565812
stats.norton.com	5537	1.323354
imap.gmail.com	5433	1.298537
www.google.com	5178	1.271759
WORKGROUP	5946	1.266640
rating-wrs.symantec.com	4464	1.164637
api.twitter.com	4274	1.071525
api.facebook.com	4095	0.978743
creativecommons.org	4040	0.965597

3.2 Most Active Source IP Addresses

This analysis identifies the source IP addresses (clients) that generated the highest number of DNS requests. This is crucial for identifying high-traffic clients or potentially compromised systems.

SPL Query Used:


```
index=* OR index=sources | top fqdn, src_ip
```

- This command shows the most frequent pairings of FQDNs and the src_ip that queried them.

Results (Partial): The resulting table allows for the immediate identification of the most active source IP addresses based on the sheer volume of requests they generate.

Example Output Snippets:

- The IP address 18.18.117.218 is associated with the highest volume of queries for teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com.
- The IP addresses in the 192.168.202.x range are prominent for querying domains like www.apple.com and others, indicating high client activity from these internal hosts.



3.3 Identifying Rare DNS Query Types (Security Evasion Detection)

The DNS protocol can be exploited for covert data exfiltration or Command-and-Control (C2) communication, a technique known as DNS Tunneling. Attackers often use less common record types (like TXT or SRV) instead of the standard A or AAAA records. By using the rare command, I could quickly identify these unusual types.


Recruiter Value: Demonstrates the ability to apply frequency analysis to detect subtle, potentially malicious evasion techniques and understand DNS protocol nuances.

SPL Query Used:

```
index=* OR index=* sourcetype=dnslog | rare limit=20 query_type
```

rare: This is a transforming command used to find the least common values in a specified field, serving as the inverse of the top command.

query_type: This field represents the type of DNS record requested (e.g., A, PTR, TXT).



3.4 Analysis of Unique Queried Domains per Source IP (Identifying Chatty Hosts)


This analysis is vital for identifying "Chatty Hosts"—client machines that query an unusually high number of unique domains over a short period. This behavior is often a signature of Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) malware or reconnaissance/scanning activity. Identifying these outliers is a fundamental component of proactive threat hunting.

SPL Query Used:

```
index=* OR index=* sourcetype="dnslog" | stats  
dc(fqdn) as unique_domains_count by src_ip | sort -  
unique_domains_count | where unique_domains_count  
> 100
```

- stats: Used to calculate statistics on groups of events.
- dc(fqdn): The Distinct Count function calculates the number of unique FQDNs for each group.
- as unique_domains_count: Renames the resulting count field for clarity.
- by src_ip: Groups the counts based on the source IP address.

- sort - unique_domains_count: Orders the results to put the highest counts at the top.
- where unique_domains_count > 100: Filters the results to only show potential outliers (hosts querying over 100 unique domains), making the output actionable.



The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** index=* OR index=sources/pendslogs | stats dc fqdn as unique_domains_count by src_ip | sort -unique_domains_count | where unique_domains_count > 100
- Results:** 3,998,278 events (before 12/10/25 3:01:42.000 PM) No Event Sampling
- Panel Headers:** Events, Patterns, Statistics (24), Visualization
- Table Headers:** src_ip, unique_domains_count
- Table Data:** A list of source IP addresses and their corresponding unique domain counts, ordered by count. The top few entries are:

src_ip	unique_domains_count
192.168.202.79	2628
192.168.202.138	2385
192.168.202.140	2237
192.168.202.110	1913
192.168.202.115	791
192.168.229.252	438
192.168.202.97	353
192.168.202.181	311
10.10.117.289	250
10.10.117.210	250
192.168.21.25	242
192.168.202.71	169
192.168.202.84	153
192.168.202.188	142
192.168.202.75	132
192.168.202.76	126
192.168.25.25	126
192.168.202.94	124

4. CONCLUSION

This project successfully demonstrated proficiency in leveraging Splunk Enterprise for critical DNS log analysis and proactive threat hunting. Beginning with the essential step of manually enriching raw data by extracting key fields like `src_ip` and `fqdn`, the analysis quickly established a network baseline using frequency analysis (`top`). Most notably, the project progressed to advanced security analytics by utilizing the `rare` command to identify anomalies in `query_type` (a key indicator for DNS Tunneling and data exfiltration), and applying `stats dc(fqdn)` to calculate unique domain counts per source IP—a vital technique for detecting Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)-based malware. This work validates my technical mastery of Splunk Search Processing Language (SPL), foundational knowledge of network protocol exploitation, and ability to translate unstructured logs into actionable security intelligence, which are core competencies for a modern Security Operations Center (SOC) role.