



# Authentication: Part 5

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# References

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# Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (KDC)


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# Establishing Shared Symmetric Keys

- Suppose two network nodes, Alice and Bob, want to securely communicate over a network
- Recall: they need to first agree on a shared secret key  $K_{AB}$
- One way: public key cryptography
- However, this requires public key infrastructure
- Now, assume that public key infrastructure is not available
- Want a mechanism using which any two nodes in a network can agree on a shared secret key
- One way is to use a trusted node called Key Distribution Center (KDC)

# Key Distribution Center (KDC)

- Whenever a new node is installed in the network:
  - ❑ that node and the KDC are configured (e.g., manually, via post) with a shared secret key
- If node  $\alpha$  wants to talk to node  $\beta$ :
  - ❑  $\alpha$  connects with KDC and asks for a key with which to talk to  $\beta$
  - ❑ KDC authenticates  $\alpha$ , chooses a random number, say  $R_{\alpha\beta}$ , and sends  $R_{\alpha\beta}$  after encrypting it to  $\alpha$
  - ❑ KDC also encrypts and sends  $R_{\alpha\beta}$  to  $\beta$ , with the instruction that it is to be used for communicating with  $\alpha$ 
    - Alternatively, KDC encrypts  $R_{\alpha\beta}$  and gives it to  $\alpha$  for forwarding to  $\beta$
  - ❑ Now  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  have a shared secret key  $R_{\alpha\beta}$ ; they mutually authenticate and then start exchanging data
- Above is an outline with some details omitted; we will later discuss, in detail, protocols for KDC-mediated authentication






# Advantages and Disadvantages of KDC

- Advantages:
  - ☐ When a new user is being installed into network, or a user's key is compromised and needs to be changed, there is a single location (KDC) that needs to be configured
    - Alternative: install the user's information at every server to which the user might need access (difficult)
- Disadvantages:
  - ☐ If KDC is compromised, all network resources are vulnerable
  - ☐ Single point of failure: if KDC fails (e.g., crashes), no new communication can be initiated, although keys previously distributed can continue to be used
  - ☐ KDC can be a performance bottleneck, since all network nodes frequently need to communicate with it
- Alternative that overcomes second and third of above disadvantages:
  - ☐ have multiple KDCs, which share same database of keys
- Disadvantages:
  - ☐ all copies of KDC need to be protected
  - ☐ additional cost and complexity; need for replication protocols

# Mediated Authentication Using KDC

- Consider a network in which each user has a secret shared key with a KDC
- When Alice wants to communicate with Bob, protocol shown in fig. can be used
- Shortcoming of this protocol:
  - ❑ increases load on KDC, since it needs to initiate connection with Bob and share  $K_{AB}$  with him
- Hence, instead, in message from KDC to Alice, a “*ticket*” is included, which Alice needs to send to Bob



# Mediated Authentication Using KDC (contd.)

- Fig shows revised protocol
- After protocol shown in fig., mutual authentication between Alice and Bob needs to be performed
- Can be performed:
  - ❑ using one of the protocols we discussed for mutual authentication
- However, this protocol has some vulnerabilities, e.g.:
  - ❑ Suppose an intruder, Trudy, stole Alice's key and also recorded msg. 2 when Alice contacted KDC to talk to Bob; later, Alice changed her key; but Trudy can still use the old key and recorded msg. 2 to impersonate herself as Alice to Bob
- We will discuss improved protocols

