

Pseudo-random Generator

A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic algorithm that takes a short random seed as input and generates a long output sequence that appears random to any efficient adversary who does not know the seed.

Proof of the security of a PRG by reduction:

1. Assume that we have a PRG (G) that expands a random n -bit seed s into a longer m -bit sequence $G(s)$, where $m > n$. We want to show that **G is secure.**
2. Let D be an efficient distinguisher that takes an m -bit string as input and outputs a bit, where $D(x) = 1$ if x is the output of $G(s)$ for some random s , and $D(x) = 0$ otherwise. We want to show that the advantage of D in distinguishing $G(s)$ from a random m -bit string is negligible, meaning that it is bounded by some negligible function $\epsilon(n)$.
3. We can assume without loss of generality that D is deterministic, since if D is probabilistic, we can simply take the maximum probability over all possible random choices of D .
4. Let R be a truly random m -bit string. We can define a new distinguisher D' as follows: on input x , D' outputs $D(x)$ if x is not equal to R , and outputs 1 otherwise. Note that D' is deterministic and makes at most one query to its input.
5. We can then define the advantage of D in distinguishing $G(s)$ from R as follows.

$$|\Pr[D(G(s)) = 1] - \Pr[D(R) = 1]| = |\Pr[D'(G(s)) = 1] - \Pr[D'(R) = 1]|$$

where the second equality follows from the fact that D and D' differ only on one possible input, namely R .

6. Let $\epsilon'(n)$ be the advantage of D' in distinguishing $G(s)$ from R . Then we have:

$$|\Pr[D(G(s)) = 1] - \Pr[D(R) = 1]| = |\Pr[D'(G(s)) = 1] - \Pr[D'(R) = 1]| \leq \epsilon'(n)$$

where the inequality follows from the fact that D' is a valid distinguisher for $G(s)$ and R .

7. We can then conclude that the advantage of D in distinguishing $G(s)$ from a random m -bit string is negligible, because $\epsilon'(n)$ is negligible and we can choose R uniformly at random.
8. Therefore, **we have shown that if G is a secure PRG**, then no efficient distinguisher D can distinguish its output from a truly random string with non-negligible advantage.