

The Doon School Model United
Nations Conference 2018

BACKGROUND GUIDE

INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY



ABOUT DSMUN [page 3](#)

A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL [page 4](#)

A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT [page 5](#)

A LETTER FROM THE CHAIRPERSON [page 6](#)

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SAFEGUARDS

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW [page 7](#)

INTRODUCTION [page 7](#)

AGENDA I: IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

EVENTS LEADING TO THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL [page 9](#)

WHAT WAS THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL [page 10](#)

US DIPLOMACY [page 12](#)

COMMITTEE EXPECTATIONS [page 12](#)

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING [page 13](#)

AGENDA II : DENUCLEARISATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

INTRODUCTION [page 13](#)

HISTORY [page 14](#)

PRESENT SITUATION [page 15](#)

TIMELINE [page 16](#)

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER [page 17](#)

REFERNCES AND FURTHER READING [page 17](#)

POSITION PAPER REQUIREMENTS [page 18](#)

SAMPLE DRAFT RESOLUTION [page 19](#)

PREAMBULATORY AND OPERATIVE CLAUSES [page 20](#)

ABOUT DSMUN

The Doon School Model United Nations Conference is one of India's biggest and well-reputed high school MUN conferences. Since its inauguration in 2007, The Doon School Model United Nations Society has hosted an engaging, entertaining and intellectually stimulating conference annually, with each leaving behind a unique legacy. DSMUN has grown to be one of the key entries in every school's MUNning calendar. DSMUN has a history of attracting the best of both—the Indian and the international delegates—from the Pan-Asiatic Region. With each passing year, DSMUN has evolved and developed its programme, introducing new committees, creating singular crises situations and setting unorthodox agendas to challenge the delegates.

The Doon School, one of India's most reputed and prestigious institutions, is a member of the G20 Group of Schools, The Headmasters' and Headmistresses' Conference, The International Boys' Schools Coalition and the Round Square Conference. With its motto, "Knowledge Our Light", the School aims to mould its students into gentlemen of service and leaders for the future. Model United Nations is one of the largest and most popular activities in School, with over 200 students involved in it. The beautiful and serene 72 acre Chandbagh Estate, in which the school campus is set, and its heritage buildings, provide a scenic venue for the conference, ensuring that it will be an experience unlike any other MUN.

The DSMUN Secretariat is proud to host The 12th Doon School Model United Nations Conference from the 17th to the 19th of August, 2018. Popularly referred to as DSMUN '18, this year's conference intends to engage the delegates in 12 diverse committees, each of which will generate discussion on various contemporary and thought-provoking issues. There is also the promise of an opportunity to make new friends and create lifelong memories. We look forward to seeing you in Dehra Dun in August!

Crises to keep you on your toes, unforgettable memories, interesting new people to meet and an experience worth a lifetime—DSMUN '18 will have it all!



DSMUN'18

Ojas Kharabanda

SECRETARY GENERAL

Ritwik Saraf

PRESIDENT

Rajveer Kochar

CHAIRPERSON

Sanidhya Gautam

Shathaayu Patil

DEPUTY CHAIRPERSONS

THE DOON SCHOOL,
Mall Road,
Dehradun—248001,
UK, India

Phone: +919760013831

e-Mail: chair.iaea@doonschool.com

dsmun@doonschool.com

www.dsmun18.com

THE DOON SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Dear Delegates,

It is an absolute privilege and honour for me to welcome you all to the 12th edition of The Doon School Model United Nations. What was once a small regional event has evolved and grown into an international conference with a repute and prestige that extends across borders. This year, we aim to raise the bar higher, with an invigorating mix of structured GA committees like the DISEC and Security Council to dynamic crisis committees like The Third Reich.

I am a veteran of the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme, and take a keen interest in geopolitical developments across the world. I am extremely passionate about photography, and am the Editor-in-Chief of The Yearbook, which is one of the premier publications of our school. I have been involved for a considerable time in the MUNning world, and apart from winning multiple accolades, was the Vice-President of last year's conference. In a world that is becoming increasingly divisive and polarized, it is vital that we realise the special importance diplomacy and the simple willingness to hear each other out holds. Each committee is uniquely placed at a time and place to make a difference, but only if we approach each negotiation with peace as the goal will our time here be fruitful. I eagerly await your presence at Chandbagh.

Warm Regards,

Ojas Kharabanda



DSMUN'18

Ojas Kharabanda

SECRETARY GENERAL

Ritwik Saraf

PRESIDENT

Rajveer Kochar

CHAIRPERSON

Sanidhya Gautam

Shathaayu Patil

DEPUTY CHAIRPERSONS

THE DOON SCHOOL,
Mall Road,
Dehradun—248001,
UK, India

Phone: +919760013831

e-Mail: chair.iaea@doonschool.com

dsmun@doonschool.com

www.dsmun18.com

THE DOON SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Delegates,

I am extremely delighted to welcome you all to the 12th edition of the Doon School Model United Nations. Over the stretch of 12 years, DSMUN has earned itself a place among the most eagerly awaited MUNs in the whole of India; this year too, we have spared no effort in meeting these expectations.

With over 12 committees, including the GA committees of DISEC and SPECPOL as well as exciting crisis committees like Board of Control, East India Company, DSMUN promises to engage the delegates in a fierce tussle of rhetoric, negotiation and documentation- areas that have come to occupy an important place in an individual's holistic development. Further, DSMUN also provides an exciting opportunity for the delegates to meet and make unforgettable memories with people from all over the country!

I currently pursue the ISC curriculum., and after having served in the DSMUN secretariat for 3 years, I am privileged to be at its helm as the President in my last year in School. As the world continues to shrink to an even smaller place, the problems that torment humanity continue to expand. Time, therefore, warrants us to step up and collectively lead the human race to a better tomorrow. And to initiate this, we must begin from a young age itself.

Looking forward to meeting you in August,

Ritwik Saraf



DSMUN'18

Ojas Kharabanda

SECRETARY GENERAL

Ritwik Saraf

PRESIDENT

Rajveer Kochar

CHAIRPERSON

Sanidhya Gautam

Shathaayu Patil

DEPUTY CHAIRPERSONS

THE DOON SCHOOL,
Mall Road,
Dehradun—248001,
UK, India

Phone: +919760013831

e-Mail: chair.iaea@doonschool.com

dsmun@doonschool.com

www.dsmun18.com

THE DOON SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

A LETTER FROM THE CHAIRPERSON

Greetings delegates!

It is both an honor and a privilege to welcome you all to the 12th Doon School Model United Nations Conference, 2018. My name is Rajveer Singh Kochar and I would be your chairperson for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) committee. I have been involved in the DSMUN in various capacities, including being deputy chairperson last year. Apart from MUNing, I have been involved in various other activities like music, debating, and chess. I am currently in the 12th grade, pursuing the IBDP curriculum, and am deeply interested in politics and international economics.

The IAEA was established as an autonomous organization on 29, July 1957, and seeks to “promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons”. As far as the committee is concerned, I expect all delegates to be thorough with the respective agendas, in order to engage in substantial debate and discussion. Moreover, my primary aim would be to challenge your endurance and your solution-forming abilities, when you are constantly ‘bombarded’ with a wide range of crises.

Both issues are extremely pertinent in the international arena, and I would again stress on the delegates being fully aware of their respective country stances and their roles in shaping up volatile situations on a global scale.

Finally, I wish you the very best of luck and hope to see you all geared-up for action this August at Chandbagh!

Warm Regards,
Rajveer Kochar

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SAFEGUARDS

Committee Overview

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also known as the “Atoms of Peace”, is an international autonomous organisation which seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The organisation came into being on 29 July 1957 with the original members of the committee being 55 countries.

The IAEA has three primary missions:

Peaceful Use: According to Article II of the IAEA Statute, the objective of the IAEA is "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world." This conveys the most important goal of the IAEA, which is preventing countries and other parties from using nuclear energy for harmful usage.

Safeguards: Article II of the IAEA Statute characterises the Organisation's twin targets as advancing serene employments of nuclear vitality and "ensuring, so far as it is capable, that help given by it or at its demand or under its watch or control isn't utilised as a part of such a path as to facilitate any military reason." To do this, the IAEA is entitled in Article III.A.5 of the Statute "to set up and oversee shields intended to guarantee that exceptional fissionable and different materials, administrations, hardware, offices, and data made accessible by the Office or at its demand or under its watch or control are not utilised as a part of such a route as to promote any military reason; and to apply shields, at the demand of the gatherings, to any reciprocal or multilateral course of action, or at the demand of a State, to any of that State's exercises in the field of nuclear vitality."

Nuclear Safety: The IAEA characterises safety as

one of its main three needs. It spends 8.9 percent of its 352 million-euro (\$469 million) budget on the spending plan in 2011 on influencing plants to secure from mishaps. Its assets are utilised on the other two needs: specialised co-task and anticipating atomic weapons manufacturing.

The IAEA itself says that at the beginning of 1986, in light of the atomic reactor blast and catastrophe in Chernobyl, Ukraine, the IAEA tried harder in the field of atomic wellbeing. The IAEA says that the same occurred after the Fukushima calamity in Fukushima, Japan.

On June 2011, the IAEA chairperson said he had "expansive help for his intention to fortify worldwide wellbeing in keeping an eye on atomic power plants to help dodge any rehash of Japan's Fukushima emergency".

Introduction

Nuclear safeguards are a set of technical measures enacted by the IAEA that verify that States are honouring their international legal obligations to use nuclear material and technology only for peaceful purposes. *"Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to play an indispensable role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons."*

Atomic safeguards, employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, depend on the standards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was formalised in the spring of 1970 when over 40 nations ratified it and has, since then, consistently been the focal point of worldwide endeavours to prevent the spread of atomic weapons. Today, it is the agreement most broadly followed in the field of demilitarisation. In spite of the fact that the IAEA

isn't directly affiliated to the NPT, it assumes the role of giving its consent to the mechanisms of the treaty. Under Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear state directly responsible to the NPT is required to close a 'concurrence deal' with the IAEA for it to confirm its commitment of not creating, fabricating, or procuring atomic weapons or other atomic hazardous gadgets. Therefore, the implementation of the safeguards serve as important confidence-building measures through which a State can harness its support to disarmament and can be assured that nuclear energy is being used only for peaceful purposes.

The objective of IAEA Safeguards is to deter the spread of nuclear weapons by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or technology. The IAEA Safeguards and Verification includes a variety of components which are ultimately essential in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the maintenance of peace. This year, the committee will plan to delve deep into the controversial and recent happenings regarding the Iranian Nuclear Deal which originally was first negotiated by countries in 2015.

The Iranian Nuclear deal is a historic negotiation, as it is considered as one of the most substantial and pressing conflicts regarding the production of nuclear weapons. The deal was originally supposed to curb Iran from emerging as a regional power. The agenda indirectly questions the controversy regarding the technical measures which restrict a country from using nuclear energy for arms and ammunitions (nuclear safeguards) and US diplomacy. The United States spearheaded international efforts to financially isolate Tehran and block its oil exports to raise the cost of Iran's efforts to develop a potential nuclear-weapons capability

and to bring its government to the negotiating table. This is what led to signing of the Iranian Nuclear deal between the P5, Germany, the EU and Iran where all nuclear economic sanctions would be lifted off Iran.

Our second sub-agenda will be regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. 'The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula' was initially an agreed action item between South Korea and North Korea signed on January 20, 1992. The declaration never entered into force. However, the DPRK still remained party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This year, Kim Jong-un and the South Korean president met after 35 years, bringing in the possibility of denuclearising the Korean peninsula once and for all. The committee shall explore the NPT and discuss the viable solutions under which DPRK and South Korea, along with the other member states, agree to denuclearise themselves and stop the production of nuclear weapons.

Until now, the IAEA has largely played an administrative role in the 'Iran Nuclear Deal' as well as the 'Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula'. The agency primarily offers a number of 'confirmation exercises' and 'bookkeeping checks'. The goal of the bookkeeping checks are to guarantee that the bookkeeping records of an office are analysed for consistency with what has been accounted for by the State to the IAEA. When all the information has been verified as 'correct and complete', it can be evaluated for the purpose of drawing safeguards conclusions.

The IAEA also assumes the role of 'verification' and 'compliance'. Since the IAEA has agreed to 'actively contribute' to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula after the conclusion of all political arrangements between states, it will resume its nuclear verification process in DPRK.

However, it has also stated that these inspections will be 'long and 'challenging'.

As far as the Iran nuclear deal is concerned, the IAEA has pledged to ensure an 'unprecedented, thorough and robust surveillance system'. As stated by the agency's director general, Yukiya Amano, "The IAEA is closely following developments related to the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As requested by the United Nations Security Council and authorised by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2015, the IAEA is verifying and monitoring Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA...". This primarily means that the IAEA will provide its firm support in order to prevent the deal from falling through.

AGENDA 1: IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Events leading to the Iran Nuclear Deal

The Iran nuclear deal is a historic deal which imposed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and enhanced monitoring in exchange for removing nuclear and economic sanctions on it. In order to inquire into the details of this deal, it is imperative to know what circumstances led to this controversial deal.

Prior to the deal, Iran was constantly trying to build nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Iran's decision to finally build nuclear weapons was still unconfirmed, but to question its competency regarding their manufacturing meant underestimating the Middle-Eastern country. The development of a range of technologies (including uranium enrichment, warhead design and delivery systems) would give Iran the option of building nuclear weapons in a relatively short time frame, and is testament to Iran's abilities. At this time, Iran claimed that its nuclear activities were totally peaceful and only for constructive purposes.

As early as the 1970s, Iran's nuclear demands for substances (such as uranium enriched to 93%) were supplied by the US. Iran also, in the same year, ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. With the formation of the Atomic Energy

Organisation of Iran, Iran targeted to produce 23,000 megawatts of energy over 20 years, including the construction of 23 nuclear power plants and the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle. These activities brought Iran under the suspicion of the IAEA for its possible intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons. On September 12, 2003, The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which demanded Iran to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. The resolution required Iran to declare all material relevant to its uranium-enrichment program and allowed IAEA inspectors to visit any site they deemed suspicious. In response to this resolution, Iran even agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and ratify an *additional protocol* which asked of Iran to declare all its nuclear activities and also gave the IAEA broader rights to visit sites in the country. Later in 2004, Iran refused to suspend its enrichment-related activities as it had previously promised to.

For the first time, in 2006, the notion of the nuclear deal was brought up. China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the P5+1, referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) proposed a framework agreement to Iran, offering it incentives to put

an end to its enrichment program for an indefinite period of time. In 2008, this proposal was updated and made more comprehensive. Iran's refusal to the agreement and the continuation of its nuclear activities gave way to the various sanctions imposed upon Iran. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which tightened U.S. sanctions against firms investing in Iran's energy sector and imposed new sanctions on companies that sold refined petroleum to Iran, was seen in 2010. Moreover, the EU agreed to further impose sanctions against Iran and also passed a decision which banned all member countries from importing Iranian oil in 2012.

Finally, in 2012, Iran agreed to begin negotiation talks with the P5+1. Later in 2014, the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was announced by Iran and the P5+1 collectively. In July, 2015, The Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act was announced by the Obama government and the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution endorsing the nuclear deal and the lifting of UN Security Council nuclear sanctions once Iran started implementing provisions in the deal.

In October 2015, Iran and the P5+1 formally adopted the nuclear deal. Iran began taking steps to restrict its nuclear program. The United States issued voluntary relinquishment on nuclear-related sanctions to come into effect on implementation day. The EU also announced that it had agreed to lift nuclear-related sanctions on implementation day.

What was the Iran Nuclear Deal?

The Iran Nuclear Deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was formally adopted on October 18, 2015. Under its accord, Iran agreed to limit its enormous nuclear

activities as well as allow regular inspections instituted by international inspectorates in return for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions.

The deal imposed restrictions on Iran's production of enriched uranium. Enriched uranium is a certain kind of Uranium which is not only used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants (requires low-enriched uranium) but also required for the production of nuclear weapons (requires 90% enriched uranium). The original plan was to reduce Iran's uranium stockpile by 98% to 300kgs in 15 years. This figure was not to be exceeded until 2031. The stockpile's level of enrichment would also be incredibly low. Another provision in the JCPOA demanded Iran to limit the installing of the number of centrifuges to 5,060 (which had to be the oldest and least efficient centrifuges) out of the 20,000 centrifuges at the two Iranian facilities (Natanz and Fordo).

Prior to the deal, Iran had also been building a heavy-water nuclear facility near the town of Arak. Spent fuel (radioactive waste) from a heavy-water reactor contains plutonium suitable for a nuclear bomb. The world powers originally wanted to dismantle Arak because of the proliferation risk, but under the Interim Nuclear Deal (a temporary deal initiated by Iran to get rid of the sanctions) made in 2013, Iran decided not to commission or fuel the reactor. After the introduction of JCPOA, Iran said it would redesign the reactor so it could not produce any weapons from the plutonium.

When the JCPOA was introduced, the Obama-led government expressed confidence that the JCPOA would prevent Iran from building a nuclear programme in secret. Iran had also committed to "extraordinary and robust

monitoring, verification, and inspection". The IAEA also had to continuously monitor Iran's declared nuclear sites and verify that no nuclear material was moved covertly to a secret location to build a bomb. Moreover, Iran also agreed to implement the additional protocol to their IAEA safeguards which allowed inspectors to access any site which they deem suspicious.

Before the signing of the deal, Iran had enough resources and equipment to prepare 8 to 10 nuclear bombs. The Obama-led US administration estimated that if Iran needed to build a nuclear weapon, it would need 2-3 months to acquire enough resources (90% enriched Uranium) to prepare the weapon. This time period was called the 'break-out time'. The JCPOA decided to remove the key elements Iran would require to build the nuclear weapon and also increase its break-out time to one year or more. Iran also agreed not to engage in

activities, including research and development, which could contribute to the development of a nuclear bomb.

Sanctions previously imposed by the UN, US and EU in an attempt to force Iran to halt uranium enrichment crippled its economy, costing the country more than \$160 billion in oil revenue from 2012 to 2016 alone. Under the deal, Iran gained access to more than \$100 billion in assets that were frozen overseas, and was able to resume selling oil on international markets and using the global financial system for trade. The violation of any aspect of the deal by Iran would lead to the re-imposition of all the nuclear and economic related sanctions by the UN, US and EU for a minimum period of 10 years with an option of a five year extension. These were the brief provisions under the JCPOA, which was implemented in 2015.



US Diplomacy

President Trump announced earlier in 2018 that he would decertify Iran's compliance with the Iran Nuclear deal. However, before pulling out of the agreement, he placed his demands on the table that if the deal was not renegotiated to permanently stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, he would pull out of the historic deal. As the deal between the US and Iran is decertified, it could possibly worsen relation between US and its allies and possibly put Iran back on the path toward obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Donald Trump's main reasons for detesting the deal are that Trump believes that Iran has been violating the spirit of the deal as it still continues to work against US interests. Mr Trump also feels that the certain restrictions on Iran's nuclear program has sunset clauses which allows Iran to obtain nuclear weapons once the constraints are

lifted.

Moreover, Trump feels that there is a better alternative to this deal which should be implemented by both sides. He has also argued that the Obama administration focused on Iran's nuclear program while giving insufficient attention to many other of Iran's activities, including its support for President Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria and other such activities.

In response to President Trump's activities, many diplomats have also felt that USA's actions pertaining to this deal have not been well thought of as United States might lose international credibility. Iranian officials have strongly indicated that they might abandon the agreement, or at least no longer feel bound by its nuclear limitations. Although at the same time, the Iranian government remains extremely confused and reluctant to take such a step because it could jeopardise the economic relationships it has developed or revived with other parties to the deal, most notably in France and Germany.

Britain has also pledged that it will not leave the deal if Iran complies with it. It also demanded "concrete proposals" from US on how to now curtail Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions after Donald Trump decertified the agreement. President Trump's actions has also put America at a tight spot with Britain, France, Germany, China and Russia

Committee Expectations

The committee is expected to come up with a viable, comprehensive and everlasting solution for the problem at hand. It is to be made clear to the delegates that after 1st June, any more actions taken by the global community will not be incorporated into the proceedings of the



committee. It will entirely depend on the delegates and the discussion they indulge into to give the direction the committee shall take. I would also urge the delegates to be well versed with their country's foreign policy and also to be prepared for any situation that arises in the committee. The delegates are also expected not to deviate from their country's stand. The delegates are also requested to include the answers to the following questions during the discussion in the committee-

- Is the Iran Nuclear deal relevant and effective in the current world scenario? How is it or how is it not relevant and effective in today's world.
- Is the Iran Nuclear Deal necessary at all?
- Should the countries renegotiate the Iran Nuclear Deal
- Does a better alternative to this deal exist?
- How will the alternative option to this deal be negotiated?

References and Further Reading

- <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-timeline.html>
- <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran>
- <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-main-points-of-agreement/index.html>

AGENDA 2: DENUCLEARISATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Introduction

For a long period of time, the United States and the global community have attempted to negotiate an end to North Korea's atomic and rocket advancement and its fare of ballistic rocket innovation. These efforts have been combined with times of emergency, stalemate, and conditional advance towards denuclearisation with North Korea being a key test for the worldwide atomic restraint administration.

The United States has sought after an assortment of strategy reactions to the expansion challenges posed by North Korea, incorporating military collaboration with U.S. partners in the area, boundless approvals, and non-multiplication systems like trade controls. The Assembled States have additionally been occupied with two noteworthy political activities

to have North Korea relinquish its atomic weapons endeavours as an end-result of help.

In 1994, in light of North Korea's expectation to pull back from the Non- proliferation treaty (NPT), which required non-atomic weapon states to renounce the improvement and procurement of atomic weapons, the United States and North Korea marked the Concurred System. Under this system, Pyongyang focused on solidifying its illegal plutonium weapons program in return for aid. The second major conciliatory exertion was witnessed at the Six-Party Talks held in August of 2003 which included China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. During mid-crisis times of stalemate and emergency, those discussions landed at basic leaps forward in 2005, when North Korea promised to relinquish "every single atomic weapon and existing atomic projects" and re-affirm its membership in the

NPT. In fact, in 2007, the involved parties were summoned to actualise the '2005' agreement.

Those discussions, in any case, separated in 2009 after differences over a universally censured North Korean rocket dispatch. Since then, Pyongyang has expressed that it could permanently stay away from such talks and never bring up the 'nuclear' issue for negotiation. However, the other five summits firmly expressed that they stay focused on the discussions and make attempts to negotiate with DPRK in order to recommit them to their '2005' denuclearisation vow.

History

The Democratic Republic of North Korea acceded to the Non-Proliferation (NPT) treaty during the year 1985. However, it failed to conclude a safeguards agreement, under the conditions of Article 3 of the NPT.

In 1992, President George Bush declared a unilateral withdrawal of all maritime and land-based strategic atomic weapons sent abroad, essentially implying the withdrawal of around a 100 U.S. atomic weapons that had been situated in South Korea. In light of the initiation of such a move by the US administration, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea reported his affirmation on the 'Denuclearisation of the Korean Landmass', under which South Korea guaranteed not to create, have, store, convey, or utilise atomic weapons. The assertion singularly restricted South Korea from having atomic reprocessing or uranium improvement establishments. If instituted, this would fulfil all of North Korea's conditions for permitting IAEA investigations at North Korean nuclear power plants. In the same year itself, the two Koreas signed the 'South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula'.

Under the assertion, the two nations agreed not to "test, make, create, get, have, store, send or utilise atomic weapons" or to "have atomic reprocessing and uranium enhancement establishments". They likewise agreed to 'shared investigations' for inspection purposes. More than six years after signing the NPT, the DPRK also complied and completed the safeguards agreement. However, these acts of negotiation turned out to be 'false promises' on behalf of North Korea when they began violating the terms of the NPT. DPRK also denied the IAEA's request to inspect two sites that were believed to contain nuclear weapons. Furthermore, DPRK announced its intentions to withdraw from the NPT but later suspended this motion. The following year, DPRK had several conflicting issues with the IAEA about the inspection of sites inside North Korea which were considered to be potential nuclear weapon storage facilities. After a long period of rising tensions and conflicting interests, DPRK finally withdrew from the NPT on the 10th January, 2003. Later that year, after four months of negotiation, US and North Korea adopted an "Agreed Framework" which allowed "special inspections" to be conducted by the IAEA. They additionally required the state



to shut down Nyongbyon and Taochon, two of the well equipped nuclear facilities of DPRK. The IAEA confirmed that these facilities were no longer operational as soon as the “Agreed Framework” was signed. In exchange for this, North Korea asked for the construction of two light weight reactors which would be funded and constructed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development (KEDO), a multinational consortium aimed at the establishment of indigenous nuclear power development centres. A number of sanctions were also imposed on DPRK between 1996 and 1999 as they were

suspected of producing and storing missiles and nuclear weapons. They were also suspected of secretly sharing nuclear parts with the 'Khan lab' in Pakistan which primarily went against the policies and terms of the “Agreed Framework”. Several inspections were taken in the region, including checks from American inspectorates. However, no traces of nuclear weapons were found in the suspected storage facilities. DPRK continued the production of nuclear weapons, with no progress made on peaceful negotiations with the USA.

Present Situation

In 2016, North Korea announced its fourth nuclear weapons test, claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb for the first time. Monitoring stations from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation detected the test’s seismic activity and suspected it to be a nuclear bomb. These tests were continued in the next year, further reinforcing the suspicious activities taking place in the nation. Within months, the seismic movements confirmed DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. The test took place in the prompt region of North Korea's Pyunggye-ri test site and

was also considered to be the nation’s biggest atomic test till date. These activities clearly violated the the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and were in clear opposition to the organisation’s intentions and expectations. In light of the seismic information, various specialists evaluated the gadget and speculated it to have a hazardous yield more than 100 kilotons dynamite-identical, which proved to be higher than that of North Korea's past atomic tests. The nation’s claim that the gadget was a nuclear bomb could not be autonomously substantiated, however, the higher yield could be an indication of an atomic gadget. Fortunately, in 2018, South Korean officials reported that North Korea "expressed its willingness to begin earnest negotiations with the U.S. to discuss denuclearisation issues," as long as its security is guaranteed as part of a five-point agreement that Kim Jong Un and South Korean envoys reached during their visit to North Korea. The two countries also agreed on a North-South Korean summit at the end of April, establishing a hotline between President Moon and Kim. This meant that North Korea would not conduct missile tests as well as not use nuclear or conventional weapons against South Korea.

Later this year, the U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met at the US-Japan summit. According to a White House statement, "President Trump and Prime Minister Abe confirmed their commitment to achieving the permanent and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula." Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in met in Panmunjom at the border of North and South Korea in order to initiate talks regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as well as formalise a permanent peace settlement

between the two nations after the Korean War of 1953. This clearly implies the DPRK's intentions to strike a possible 'cooperative denuclearisation settlement' ensuring the country's support of a harmonious and nuclear-free global community.

Timeline

1985

December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

1992

January 20, 1992: North and South Korea sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula

January 30, 1992: More than six years after signing the NPT, North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

April 9, 1992: North Korea ratifies the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

1993

February 9, 1993: The IAEA demands special inspections of two sites that are believed to store nuclear waste, however, North Korea turns down their request.

March 12, 1993: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the NPT.

1994

February 15, 1994: North Korea finalises an agreement with the IAEA to allow nuclear safeguards to inspect the region.

June 13, 1994: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA.

October 21, 1994: The United States and North

Korea conclude negotiations by signing the "Agreed Framework" in Geneva.

1995

March 9, 1995: The Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) is formed in New York, with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organisation's original members.

1998

April 17, 1998: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Pakistan in response to Pyongyang's transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratory.

2002

August 7, 2002: The United States urges North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguarding procedures for all its nuclear facilities without any further delays.

November 14, 2002: KEDO announces that it is suspending heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea.

2007

February 8-13, 2007: The six-party talks concludes its fifth round with an agreed "action plan" of initial steps to implement the September 19, 2005 joint statement on North Korea's denuclearisation.

2009

April 16, 2009: North Korea ejects IAEA and U.S. monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

May 26, 2009: South Korea officially announces that it will participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

2011

March 17, 2011: South Korea rejects the latest

North Korean offer, calling for actions to show the sincerity of North Korea's commitment to denuclearisation before multilateral talks can begin again.

December 29, 2011: Kim Jong Un is formally declared North Korea's new leader.

2015

January 2, 2015: The United States imposes harsher sanctions on North Korean entities and individuals not involved with North Korea's nuclear programs.

2017

September 9, 2016: North Korea conducts their fifth nuclear test. The seismic activity registered a magnitude of 5.0. Richter scale.

2018

April 27, 2018: South Korean President Moon Jae-In and his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong Un issue a joint declaration regarding the 'complete denuclearisation' of the Korean peninsula in order to establish "permanent" and "solid" peace on the Peninsula .

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

1. Are there any implications to the varying interpretations of the term 'denuclearisation' offered by USA and DPRK while striking the nuclear peace settlement deal?
2. Is 'denuclearisation' the best way forward while negotiating international peace and cooperation?
3. Are there any mechanisms through which the process of 'denuclearisation' can become more efficient?

References and Further Reading

- [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron\](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron)
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons
- <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>
- <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/korean-peninsula-energy-development-organization-kedo/>
- <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/international-atomic-energy-agency/>
- <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/>
- http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/koreadenuclearization.htm
- <https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-sept-dprk/>

POSITION PAPER GUIDELINES

Position papers are usually one to one-and-a-half pages in length. Your position paper should include a brief introduction followed by a comprehensive breakdown of your country's position on the topics that are being discussed by the committee. A good position paper will not only provide facts but also make proposals for resolutions.

A good position paper will include:

- A brief introduction to your country and its history concerning the topic and committee;
- How the issue affects your country;
- Your country's policies with respect to the issue and your country's justification for these policies;
- Quotes from your country's leaders about the issue;
- Statistics to back up your country's position on the issue;
- Actions taken by your government with regard to the issue;
- Conventions and resolutions that your country has signed or ratified;
- UN actions that your country supported or opposed;
- What your country believes should be done to address the issue;
- What your country would like to accomplish in the committee's resolution; and
- How the positions of other countries affect your country's position.

SAMPLE DRAFT RESOLUTION

Draft Resolution GA/3/1.1

General Assembly Third Committee

Authors: United States, Austria and Italy

Signatories: Greece, Tajikistan, Japan, Canada, Mali, the Netherlands and Gabon

Topic: "Strengthening UN coordination of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies"

The General Assembly,

Reminding all nations of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which recognizes the inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all global citizens, **[use commas to separate perambulatory clauses]**

Reaffirming its Resolution 33/1996 of 25 July 1996, which encourages Governments to work with UN bodies aimed at improving the coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance,

Noting with satisfaction the past efforts of various relevant UN bodies and nongovernmental organizations,

Stressing the fact that the United Nations faces significant financial obstacles and is in need of reform, particularly in the humanitarian realm,

1. *Encourages* all relevant agencies of the United Nations to collaborate more closely with countries at the grassroots level to enhance the carrying out of relief efforts; **[use semicolons to separate operative clauses]**
2. *Urges* member states to comply with the goals of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs to streamline efforts of humanitarian aid;
3. *Requests* that all nations develop rapid deployment forces to better enhance the coordination of relief efforts of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies;
4. *Calls* for the development of a United Nations Trust Fund that encourages voluntary donations from the private transnational sector to aid in funding the implementation of rapid deployment forces;
5. *Stresses* the continuing need for impartial and objective information on the political, economic and social situations and events of all countries;
6. *Calls* upon states to respond quickly and generously to consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance;
7. *Requests* the expansion of preventive actions and assurance of post-conflict assistance through reconstruction and development;
8. *Decides* to remain actively seized on the matter. **[end resolutions with a period]**

PREAMBULATORY AND OPERATIVE CLAUSES

Preambulatory Clauses

The preamble of a draft resolution states the reasons for which the committee is addressing the topic and highlights past international action on the issue. Each clause begins with a present participle (called a perambulatory phrase) and ends with a comma. Perambulatory clauses can include:

- References to the UN Charter;
- Citations of past UN resolutions or treaties on the topic under discussion;
- Mentions of statements made by the Secretary-General or a relevant UN body or agency;
- Recognition of the efforts of regional or nongovernmental organizations in dealing with the issue; and
- General statements on the topic, its significance and its impact.

Affirming	Expecting	Having examined
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Having received
Approving	Expecting	Keeping in mind
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Noting with deep concern
Believing	Fulfilling	Nothing with satisfaction
Confident	Fully aware	Noting further
Contemplating	Emphasizing	Observing
Convinced	Expecting	Reaffirming
Declaring	Expressing its appreciation	Realizing
Deeply concerned	Fulfilling	Recalling
Deeply conscious	Fully aware	Recognizing
Deeply convinced	Further deploring	Referring
Deeply Disturbed	Further recalling	Seeking
Deeply Regretting	Guided by	Taking into consideration
Desiring	Having adopted	Taking note
Emphasizing	Having considered	Viewing with appreciation

Operative Clauses

Operative clauses offer solutions to issues addressed earlier in a resolution through the perambulatory section. These clauses are action oriented and should include both an underlined verb at the beginning of your sentence followed by the proposed solution. Each clause should follow the following principals:

- Clause should be numbered;
- Each clause should support one another and continue to build your solution;
- Add details to your clauses in order to have a complete solution;
- Operative clauses are punctuated by a semicolon, with the exception of your last operative clause which should end with a period.

Accepts	Encourages	Further reminds
Affirms	Endorses	Further recommends
Approves	Expresses its appreciation	Further requests
Authorizes	Expresses its hope	Further resolves
Calls	Further invites	Has resolved
Calls upon	Deplores	Notes
Condemns	Designates	Proclaims
Confirms	Draws the attention	Reaffirms
Congratulates	Emphasizes	Recommends
Considers	Encourages	Regrets
Declares accordingly	Endorses	Reminds
Deplores	Expresses its appreciation	Requests
Designates	Expresses its hope	Solemnly affirms
Draws the attention	Further invites	Strongly condemns
Emphasizes	Further proclaims	Supports

Bibliography

Sample Draft Resolution: <http://www.unausa.org/global-classrooms-model-un/how-to-participate/model-un-preparation/resolutions/sample-resolution#sthash.15LEikZY.dpuf>

Preambulatory and Operative Clauses: <http://www.unausa.org/global-classrooms-model-un/how-to-participate/model-un-preparation/resolutions/preambulatory-and-operative->

© The Doon School Model United Nations Conference 2016

THE DOON SCHOOL,
Mall Road,
Dehradun—248001,
UK, India
Phone: +919760013831
e-Mail: chair.odc@doonschool.com
dsmun@doonschool.com
Website: www.dsmun.com

