

# Genkii - The Effects of Varying Sequential Rewards for User's Motivation to Complete a Set of Crowdfunded Tasks

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## Abstract

A good abstract will leave people satisfied that they know what you did, why you did it, and what you found out. Keep it at 120 words.

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Motivation

The ubiquity of hand-held devices opened up new opportunities for research. Nowadays it is accessible to perform off-site studies, and collect data in real-time and across great geographical spans.

One of the ways to deploy these off-site studies is by using micro-tasks markets. We are specially interested in this type of crowdsourcing.

This new paradigm also gives rise to the search for new methodologies, and best practices, which may help the scientific community improve and stage new experiments, in a way that optimizes its resources.

Genkii was conceived after realizing some problems in attracting users for crowdsourced studies in Japan. The initial hypothesis for this problem in attracting users for social studies had to do with privacy issues.

We want to study the effects of varying inducements to get people to perform a determined task repeatedly.

### 1.2 Outline

## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 Crowdsourcing

1. Clearly identify the research goals;
2. Select a study method;

3. Devise an incentive mechanism;
4. Choose the target platform(s);
5. Design and develop the mobile app;
6. Prepare data collection;
7. Implement a scheme to obtain informed consent from users;
8. Distribute and promote the app;
9. Continuously monitor data collection for a designated time period;
10. Filter and analyze data to answer the research question (Henze et al. 2013).

### 2.2 Rewards and Motivation

When explicit incentives seek to change behavior in areas like education, contributions to public goods, and forming habits, a potential conflict arises between the direct extrinsic effect of the incentives and how these incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations in the run short and the long run.

(Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011)

Crowdsourcing has been often associated with Gamification, the use of game-design elements to achieve a more compelling user-experience driven by fun.

The use of rewards to induce a desired behavior has been thoroughly studied. There has been a clear separation between intrinsic rewards and extrinsic rewards, and research points out that a high focus on incentives can ultimately lead to the alienation of creative thinkers. According to (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011), there are instances where monetary rewards (extrinsic rewards), work well. Mechanical based, self-contained and well-specified tasks seem to be the primary candidates for the usage of extrinsic rewards to motivate, induce or boost the agent's performance (Ariely et al. 2009).

However there is criticism when using incentives in areas like education and forming habits, because they can hinder natural intrinsic motivation, and the dependence on rewards may lead to reward inflation, and lower the effort the agent is willing to put towards the task (Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2005).

### 2.3 Crowdsourcing Platforms

**Amazons Mechanical Turk** Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is a platform which serves as an interface for the deployment of crowd sourced tasks that are considered easier for humans than machines.

It creates a labor market in which individuals or corporations can list tasks (also known as HITs or human intelligence tasks), and a specified compensation. The workers can then elect to complete a determined task, against a deadline, and be compensated upon timely completion. The compensation for the worker is either being paid a determined amount, or a free volunteered work (Mason and Watts 2010). This model has been referred to in the literature as a micro-tasks market (Kittur, Chi, and Suh 2008).

In (Mason and Watts 2010) it is shown and discussed the potential use of Amazons Mechanical Turk for laboratory experiments for a low fee (between 0.01\$ and 0.10\$). The main advantages cited for the merit of these studies, is the convenience of the platform in reaching many users in relatively short notice. Besides it is mentioned that the average cost per user is very low, in the order of cents per task. Also it has been shown (Kittur, Chi, and Suh 2008) that, provided that the type of task is well-specified, easily measurable, and do not put a lot of emphasis on creativity, the quality of work performed on Amazons Mechanical Turk is as good, and maybe even better than, work performed by experts paid under traditional contracting arrangements.

Further experiment design recommendations offered in (Kittur, Chi, and Suh 2008) including the concern in devising the tasks such that it discourages random or malicious completion, by making a good performance require the same or less effort than a tampered one.

**Yahoo Crowdsourcing Japan** The purpose of Yahoo Crowdsourcing Japan is to

## 3 Genkii

Genkii is an application that enables gps localized satisfaction reports. Users report their ”Genkiiness”, by performing three different gestures:

- Circle meaning that the person feels happy/genkii;
- Triangle which represents an ”OK” state;
- Cross which denotes sadness.

### 3.1 Implementation

### 3.2 Crowdsourcing Campaign

Following the methodology suggested by (Choi et al. 2014), we want to perform a study where one group will be considered our baseline by receiving a fixed reward for each task over time. Besides our control group we devise a second incentive scheme, that using the same amount of points, poses

as a progressive reward system. We can compare both reward schemes on 1.

Our goal is to study this and compare these two incentive schemes, specially by studying user enrollment rates and user drop rates.

Table 1: Scheme of rewards used for the crowdsourcing campaign. Using the same amount of reward points, for our first group these rewards are the same for every task over time. On the second group we devised an increasing reward mechanism.

| Reward             | Task 1 | Task 2 | Task 3 | Task 4 | Task 5 | Task 6 |
|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Stable Rewards     | 20     | 20     | 20     | 20     | 20     | 20     |
| Increasing Rewards | 5      | 10     | 15     | 30     | 35     | 40     |

The first campaign ran from 19/06/2015 ti 26/06/2015.

### 3.3 Individual versus Group Analysis

One of the main concerns for the analysis of this experiment is whether to consider the aggregated group behavior or the individual behavior.

After all our objective is to compare two reward schemes, and test our hypothesis.

\*\* If we consider the group of users a system, then the aggregated behavior can be considered a legitimate approach, as we are interested on the overall behaviour of the system, when designing a large scale study.

An analogy is the way we study and understand temperature in Physics. Temperature is defined as a measure of the average kinetic energy of the particles in a system. We can define, derive, and predict an enormous range of behaviours, by measuring the temperature of the system. However the behaviour of an individual particle in the system, and its kinetic energy, is complex and difficult to associate with the behaviour of the group of particles.

is a measure of the average kinetic energy of the particles in a system

\*theory of ergodicity

## 4 Results

The first campaign counted with 436 genkii reports. 115 users installed the Genkii application, and 79 users provided at least one report.

The accuracy (the gesture predicted by the system being the same as the gesture confirmed), is 85.3%.

The main goal of this study is to compare the effect of rewards on the user’s reporting behaviour. At first glance in order to understand the data collected it’s important to study the overall frequency of the user reports. In the Figure 1 we can observe that in fact there seems to be considerable on-board with 39 users making 1 report.

As we can observe in Figure 2 the campaign quickly took off. During the last three days we verified a drop in the number of reports being made. Our hypothesis for this has to do with the architecture of the Yahoo crowdsourcing and a limit




Figure 1: Frequency of Reports Made by Users. As expected, the number of users that made only a single Genkii report is very large, 39.

of times the each task could be unlocked, as we were primarily interested on studying the sequential behaviour. Also users understood that given the time constraint between reports (4 hours), it was became more difficult to finish the set of 10 tasks.




Figure 2: Number of Reports made on each day of the campaign.

## 5 Discussion

Despite the inherent advantages of time and reach cost, crowdsourced studies end up forgoing the control over the experimental setting. It is difficult to assure conditions for representative demographics. This fine grained control can be replaced by large numbers in statistical sampling.

## 6 Conclusions

Future developments for Genkii include the application of the knowledge acquired to In this study we considered only the usage of monetary inducements. There's extensive literature on gamification, and the usage of other methods to keep the users engaged. Future steps include offering a version




Figure 3: User acquisition throughout the campaign.

with gamification elements, and after a similar user acquisition compare the engagement, and drop rates of the study.

## 7 Acknowledgments

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