MUNUM'19

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Universidad Militar Nueva Granada

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Consejo editorial:
Camila Chavez
Maria Fernanda Lanzazuri
Laura Gonzalez

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Valentina Bermúdez

Texto Base:
Laura Manrique Lara
Laura Otálora Guerrero

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS (GGE ON LAWS)

MUNUM'19

BIENVENIDA DE LA SECRETARIA GENERAL

Familia MUNUM 2019, Soy Maria Camila Chávez, estudiante de noveno semestre de Relaciones Internacionales y Estudios Políticos de la Universidad Militar, y es un honor poder continuar como Secretaria General en este viaje que representa MUNUM en su tercer año como Modelo de Naciones Unidas, este es un proyecto que hemos venido construyendo entre amigos a lo largo de los años y que este año tuve la fortuna de liderar, en el que no solamente se pondrán a prueba los conocimientos académicos que tenemos, sino la responsabilidad de crear un espacio en el cual podremos dar lo mejor de cada uno, espero puedan llevarse gratas sorpresas en el 2019 con este proyecto que hemos creado para ustedes, junto con nuestro equipo académico, logístico y de prensa quienes han puesto lo mejor de sí mismos para lograr que vivamos la mejor experiencia. Estén atentos, porque esto apenas empieza. ¡Bienvenidos a MUNUM 2019!

MUNUM 2019 family, I am Maria Camila Chavez, currently I am in my 9th semester of the undergraduate program International Relations and Political Studies at the Military University Nueva Granada. It is a honor for me to guide you through this journey as your General Secretary of MUNUM 2019. This is a project that we have been creating with friends all of this years, also it is an opportunity not only to develop our academic skills but to create a family where we can develop all of our personal skills. I hope we can surprise you with new challenges that our team has been creating for you, encourage you to take risks during the third version of the United Nations Model in 2019 and make you proud to be part of an amazing experience. I'm looking forward to work with you and stay tuned, because this is just beginning. Welcome to MUNUM 2019!

Atentamente:

María Camila Chavez
Secretario General
Sg.munum@gmail.com

CARTA DE LA SUBSECRETARIA GENERAL

Mi nombre es María Fernanda Landazuri, es para mí un honor ser la Subsecretaria General de MUNUM19, estoy a punto de graduarme como profesional en Relaciones Internacionales y Estudios Políticos. Sobre mi quiero compartirles que unos de mis planes favoritos de fin de semana son los MUNs y las premiaciones de Hollywood.
En la familia MUNUM hemos trabajado incasablemente para que disfruten este evento, cada uno de los comités de esta versión fue especialmente pensado para brindarles la mejor la experiencia.

No duden en contáctame con cualquier tipo de duda que tengan, recuerden investigar y planear sus outfits suficientemente de anticipación.

My name is María Fernanda Landazuri, it is an honor for me to be the Assistant Secretary General of MUNUM19, I am about to graduate as a professional in International Relations and Political Studies. About me I want to share with you that one of my favorite weekend plans are the MUNs and the Hollywood awards.
In the MUNUM family we have worked tirelessly to enjoy this event, each of the committees of this version was specially designed to give you the best experience.

Do not hesitate to contact me with any type of doubt you may have, remember to investigate and plan your outfits sufficiently in advance

Atentamente:

María Fernanda Lanzazuri
Subsecretaria General
subsg.munum@gmail.com

CARTA DE BIENVENIDA DE LA COORDINADORA ACADÉMICA

Un saludo a todos! Soy Laura Camila González Salazar, Politóloga e Internacionalista de la Universidad Militar Nueva Granada y voy a estar acompañándolos desde la Coordinación Académica para la tercera versión de MUNUM. Espero que, como yo, reciban con entusiasmo la realización de éste proyecto y que sea para ustedes una posibilidad de crecer personal y académicamente. ¡Bienvenidos/as a la familia MUNUM'19! Una oportunidad para forjarse como líderes y transformar realidades

Greetings for all! I'm Laura Camila Gonzalez Salazar, Professional in International Relations and Political Studies of the Military University Nueva Granada and I will be with all of you from the Academic Coordination on the third version of MUNUM. I hope that like me, you receive with enthusiasm this project and that this become a possibility for you to grow personally and academically. Welcome to the MUNUM'19 family! An opportunity to become leaders and transform realities.

Atentamente:

Laura Camila González
Coordinadora Académica
Academica.munum@gmail.com

LETTER FROM THE DIRECTORS OF THE COMMITEE

Dear delegates,

It is a great honor for me to be directing with Laura Otálora, the exciting and promising Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in MUNUM 19. The rapid phase at which artificial intelligence and robotics move has been creating important challenges and grey zones in various spheres, from which the military dimension is not excluded. I hope that you are as excited as us to be discussing the main debates within the field of autonomous weapons and be interested in reaching consensus on this matter.

I majored in International Relations at Universidad del Rosario and I'm currently doing the second year of my Master's in Economics of Public Policy. When I was a freshman I began to be moved by debates on multiple issues of international relevance. I participated in national conferences and I chaired twice, in MUNUR 18 and MUNUM 18. I was part of my university's MUN team that participates at the Harvard National Model of United Nations, which I attended twice. I was the SGA for specialized and regional bodies at MUNUR 17 and now I'm closing my MUN life cycle with MUNUM 19.

If you have any doubts do not hesitate to contact me or Laura, remember that our job is to provide you with some guidance and be the facilitators of the discussion.

See you soon!

Sincerely,

Laura Manrique Lara
Universidad del Rosario
laura.manriquel@urosario.edu.co

Hello everyone,

I would like to welcome you to MUNUM 19's Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS), my name is Laura Otálora and it's my pleasure to be directing this committee along Laura Manrique. With that said, I anticipate fruitful committee sessions and exciting debates. At the end of the day, my only hope is that you walk away with a memorable experience and great time.

To briefly introduce myself, I'm currently studying the seventh semester of International Relation and Political Studies at the Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. I've been part of the MUN community for one year, actually my first experience was here, in MUNUM 18', since then I've been an active participant of this world and I can tell you that this is an ideal space to learn, grow intellectually, and evolve as a person

I cannot wait to meet all of you, if you have any questions or concerns, do not hesitate to contact me or Laura. Until then, I wish you again the best of luck in your research and preparation, I encourage you to research for unique and applicable policy solutions, and to use MUNUM as a platform for making new friends and learn.

Sincerely,

Laura Otálora Guerrero
Universidad Militar Nueva Granada
laura07og@gmail.com

COMMITTEE

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The progress in the area of battlefield technology has not stopped, which has had effects in both the civilian and military domains. Recently there has been a trend towards the automation of weapons, until now this "automation" has included the presence of a human operator somewhere in the 'sensing–decision–action loop' but now with the integration of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the weapons made this topic an important one, where the use of these kinds of weapons, marks the beginning of a new stage in the history of conflicts. We are then in a moment where not only should we limit too sophisticated weapons systems, instead we should expand to the use and implementation of artificial intelligence into the weapons, better called "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems" (LAWS). "These weapons are expected in the near future to provide realistic options for LAWS that could be deployed in dynamic and complex environments, and complete sophisticated and adaptive offensive tasks with little or no human input or supervision" (Boulaning, 2016). It was only natural that these advances in the intelligent autonomy of digital systems would attract the attention of governments, scientists and civil society concerned about the possible deployment and use of lethal autonomous weapons where the possible deployment and indiscriminate use of such weapons can cause irreversible damage to humanity.

The United Nations Office at Geneva UNOG -the second largest of the four major offices of the UN- hosts the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, that holds a large number of conferences and meetings of States parties to conventions on disarmament-related matters, such as the Convention on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, commonly known as "CCW" which "seeks to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately." (UNOG, 2010). Currently, the CCW has five protocols, Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments; Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices; Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons; Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons; and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Always based on the international humanitarian law (IHL) principles such as proportionality and distinction between civilians and combatants. "The Convention itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object of the Protocols annexed to the Convention." (UNOG, n.d.)

Then the expert subsidiary body of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), from 2014 to 2016 held an informal meeting to discuss the emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). One of the conclusions was that the CCW is the perfect framework for discussion. These meetings raised awareness of the complex dimensions of the issue, such as the humanitarian, ethical, military, legal, security issues and the military-op-

erational matters. But at the end of these meetings we could say that they didn't find an agreement on what LAWS are instead, they dedicated to generate a common understanding of the various issues. "Delegations generally admit to still being in a learning phase and agree that more needs to be done to delineate the issues" (Boulaning, 2016). Afterward, they decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) with a formal mandate to assess questions related to these emerging technologies and begin to construct common understandings about it.

SCOPE AND MANDATE

The first formal meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems was held in Geneva from 13 to 17 November 2017 where they adopted a set of conclusions and recommendations, an important one was that the IHL applies fully to the potential development and use of LAWS.

Then in 2018 the GGE stepped up its work in two sessions in April and in August, they made significant progress in reaching common understandings on the quality and depth of the human-machine interface required not only for ensuring respect with IHL but also for the eventual construction of more ambitious outcomes on human responsibility and accountability. In april they focused on the characteristics of the weapon system and the human involvement in LAWS throughout its development and use. Then in August the meeting culminated in a set of 10 possible guiding principles included applicability of IHL; non-delegation of human responsibility; accountability for use of force in accordance with international law; weapons reviews before deployment; incorporation of physical, non-proliferation and cybersecurity safeguards; risk assessment and mitigation during technology development; consideration of the use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS in compliance with IHL; non-harm to civilian research and development and use; the need to adopt a non-anthropomorphic perspective on AI; and the appropriateness of CCW as a framework for dealing with the issue. It was affirmed that international law, in particular the UN Charter and international humanitarian law as well as relevant ethical perspectives should guide the continued work of the Group. Finally this year the group will meet to 25-29 March to continue dealing with this relevant topic and the second session is scheduled for 20 to 21 August 2019.

The GGE on LAWS has been mandated to explore and agree on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. This might include possible regulatory options as regards the use of emerging technologies in weapons systems with increasingly autonomous functions to ensure compliance with international law, International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and other provisions of international law, including on the protection of the environment (European Union External Action, 2018).

The delegates have to find consensus on the different issues, taking into account the developments that have

taken place in the past meetings and study a possible legally binding constraint, which can be constructed using the agreed guiding principles in the 2018's meeting. The delegates have the responsibility to continue working in a focused and participative manner on options for addressing possible humanitarian and international security challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

PROCEDURE

For MUNUM 19, the GGE on LAWS will function as a traditional committee with an open agenda so that delegates can freely discuss the issues they consider most convenient. The traditional committee format allows the motions and points used by the delegates to comply with the provisions of the MUNUM 19 ' handbook. However, it should be clarified:

Delegates are expected to submit a Position Paper of their countries' national position on the issues we will mention in this academic guide. Bear in mind that in real life the participants of the GGE on LAWS are encouraged to submit a Working Paper on their national position, which is why we clarify that in MUNUM our equivalent to that Working Paper would be the Position Paper.

Even if we will not having a close agenda with mandatory issues to be discussed, delegates are expected to reach partial agreements on the issues that they believe are most relevant and crucial for the development of the debate. In this academic guide we will provide you with the topics discussed in previous GGE on LAWS meetings, but we encourage you to broaden the suggested agenda if you consider it relevant. These partial agreements on each of the topics that the delegates believe convenient, should be presented in the form of a MUN Working Paper by theme.

In addition, in MUNUM 19 we will simulate the last GGE on LAWS meeting, which was held on March of 2019. We encourage you to read the most recent documentation, statements and working papers of your assigned actor and be ready to be challenged in this committee.

PURPOSE OF THE COMMITTEE

It is expected for this committee that the delegates deliver a final report as they have always been carried out at the close of the meetings of the GGE on LAWS, where they will have to detail what was discussed through the days and the conclusions reached and additional recommendations for the next meeting. Following the traditional structure used by them at the end of each plenary meeting.
The partial agreements together will constitute the body of the final report of the GGE on LAWS, remembering the possibility of the delegates to make reservations on subjects in which they have not been satisfied.
The voting procedure of the final report will be that contemplated in the MUNUM 19 handbook.

TOPIC DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Autonomous Weapons Systems are capable of transforming the battlefield's future in which the final decision is delegated to a machine that can perform advanced functions, including targeting and application of force, with little or no human oversight. These machines have prompted a debate among military officers, policymakers, scientist, legal scholars and roboticists about the development and deployment of these weapons. A possible scenario related to an unregulated deployment of these weapons can lead to violations of the Law of War and IHL and increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation in a conflict.

For years many governmental and nongovernmental experts have been worried about the security dangers that it represents. Given the rapid pace of development of military robotics and the pressing dangers that these pose to peace and international security and to civilians in war, the international community was motivated to start a discussion on a weapons control regime to reduce the threat posed by these systems. For that reason, the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems has been discussing the effects of these emerging technologies.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As it was stated previously, the implications of the use of autonomous weapons in warfare has generated discussions on many aspects and related issues. In 2013, Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of the Human Rights Council made a report where he recalled the attention on issues that may emerged from the use of Lethal Autonomous Robotics (LARs - which are now-a-days referred as LAWS). He signaled the potential challenges on the moral, international humanitarian law and re-stated the need for a inter alia group of experts to discussed how the development of LARs should be made (2013). A year after, in 2014, the informal meetings at the UN began. In the most recent meeting, held in March 25th to 29th of this year, the agenda and discussion focused on the characterization of the LAWS, the human-machine interaction with the LAWS, the challenges that LAWS pose to the IHL and the military applications of these technologies.

In this section we seek to provide the delegates with some basic understanding of the broad debates on LAWS and some crucial concepts.

To begin with, for decades efforts have been made to develop autonomous weapons that can help in armed conflicts. We can observe a new trend in the armed conflicts to use advanced systems of autonomous weapons. This wave means a technological breakthrough that should lead to imminent use of these systems in contemporary as well as future conflicts.

The first experiments with weapons systems without human crew took place already at the end of the First World War, with the U.S. "Bug" (a gyroscope-guided winged bomb) and the German FL-7 wire-guided motorboat. Then, after a long road in the development of these systems in 1978, a GPS is used to guide an unmanned aerial vehicle for the first time. This represented a significant moment towards the use and development of drones in the war.

In 1994 "the U.S. government awards General Atomics a contract to build the RQ-1 Predator drone, which will transmit video footage in real time over satellite link, guided by ground-based controllers who can be thousands of miles away." (Foreign Policy, 2014) The first drone of the Predator type was produced only for exploratory purposes. It was first directly put into service in 1999 during the so called Kosovo crisis. Drones become a regular tool in the U.S. war on terrorism. Since then the development of such weapons has never stop.

DEFINITIONS

It is of paramount importance that delegations participating at the GGE on LAWS have a common understanding of what lethal autonomous weapons systems are. Although a single and universal definition has not been reached yet, there is a shared understanding, at least in minimum technical requirements and specifications, of what LAWS are.

The concept of "autonomous" is complex to conceptualize rather than the others because it changes with the context in which we are talking, in this case, it refers to technological capabilities in which we found an important distinction, automation, and autonomy. The first means "the ability of software to operate without human involvement. A machine that is automated, but not autonomous, "follows a script" that dictates the outcome of all scenarios. This script is a set of instructions in the software programming that controls the machine's actions. The script can be simple and merely instruct the machine to carry out a few moves that it repeats until told to stop." (Bills, 2015) On the other hand, Autonomy means" allows machinery to replicate the human decision-making process by giving machines the capacity to integrate new information and reach their own improvised outcome, outside the confines of a script." (Bills, 2015). Drones, although they are remotely operated, are not considered autonomous weapons since the decision of shooting is taken by the operator, not by the machine.

Currently LAWS do not exist yet, instead, the discussion is being framed around the emerging technologies on autonomous weapons. We can make out the degree of an existing weapons autonomy, that's what separates it from LAWS. With that in mind, we can distinguish the LAWS into three categories: in the loop, on the loop, and off the loop. Based on the level of human involvement in the use of the weapon. "In the loop" is when the weapon is capable of acting only after human authorization. "On the loop" happens when a human is continuously monitoring and they are capable of overriding the weapon's actions but that not means to require a human to

make the final decision, it, itself, decides to deploy lethal force or not. Finally, "Off the loop" are fully autonomous weapons, it means that it no require any decision made by a human. If we entirely refer to Autonomous Weapons we have to take into account that, in general, are capable of "locating, selecting and eliminating human targets without human intervention".

We will provide what we consider is a guiding framework of what autonomy is. Autonomous machines are capable of developing a task without external control. There is a general consensus on the fact that autonomy should be considered as a spectrum and that depending on the functions that the machine has, there may me variation on the autonomy level. Three areas of autonomy should be considered: the task being performed, the relationship between the machine and the human, and the intelligence capacity the machine has.

Consideration should be given to the tasks being performed by machines, since not all of them can be equally evaluated. A thermostat performs a task to regulate the temperature given a sudden change on the environment conditions, but it hugely differs from the autonomous collision system of aircraft (Scharre, 2018). As autonomy of a machine increases, the addition of more (quantitative or qualitative) tasks take off the human of the process and it relies more on the machine to perform them. Within this consideration, the "degrees of autonomy" are important. We can identify three main autonomy stages: Semi-Autonomous, Human Supervised Autonomous and Fully Autonomous[1]

Figure 1



Source:
Scharre, P. (2018).Army of None

The Semi-Autonomous functions (figure 1) refer to the scenario where the loop is broken by the human, since it is in the loop in the decision stage. Here, the machine senses but an action only occurs after the human approves a certain course of action (Scharre, 2018)

[1]We will use a close version to the military operation cycle, where the scenarios of human-on-the-loop, human-in-the-loop and human-out-of-the-loop are constantly used. The "loop" figure refers to the steps on a machine operation and decision cycle, where sensing, decision and action are the main elements of it

Figure 2



Source: Scharre, P. (2018). Army of None

Supervised Autonomous Systems (figure 2) refer to the scenario where the stages of sensing, deciding and acting are carried on by the machine by itself but the human can intervene in any moment to change the course of action. This is why the human is on the loop.

Figure 3



Source: Scharre, P. (2018). Army of None

Fully autonomous weapons refer to the scenario where the machine is capable of sensing, deciding and acting without human control. Here, once the machine is on, the human does not have the capacity to intervene nor to change the course of action, which is why the human is out of the loop.

From this characterization a prominent concern arises. In a scenario where machines can take life or death decisions without human control the accountability and responsibility aspects of those decision are diffuse and are being endangered. One of the main points discussed in the 2018 GGE on LAWS meeting was the "need to keep human responsibility in the use of force through the extension of the possibility of intervening in the operating cycle" (Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 2018). The concern here is the existence of a double reality where politicians and state representatives state the wrongness and dangers of the development of fully autonomous weapons, and at the same time military projects and military enterprises are developing technologies that may reach a fully autonomous capacity soon (or they may even exist as of now).



PROMINENT ISSUES

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

We have learnt that technological advance has improve life on earth for humans, through making tasks more efficient and developing them in a better way. It has also taught us that, when wrongly used, it may endanger the security of societies. The use of autonomous weapons has generated multiple considerations on the future of war. Common scenarios are: first, a future where war is carried on by robots, where less human lives are sacrificed. A second scenario is a (more) unbalanced conflict between robots and human armies, where artificial intelligence and robotics could provide determinant advantages to one side of the conflict.

We do not longer talk about states as the only participants in wars, and even if they may be the actors with larger capacities to develop these autonomous machines and weapons, it is not realistic to believe that only states would use this technology in conflicts. Another related issue is the fact that autonomous weapons "rely on their software, hacking make them vulnerable since enemies can discover the algorithm you are using or modify it"(Russell, 2016). Therefore, the enemy might be able to use cyber means to take control of an autonomous weapon system and direct it against friendly forces or a civilian population (Schmitt, 2013)

IS BANNING LAWS RELEVANT AT ALL? WHO HELD THE LIABILITY?

Is it an efficient prohibition for this case? There are two points of view for this idea, the first group thinks that an international treaty that prohibits these technologies is the best solution, they also agree that lethal systems should not be autonomous. The second group believes that an international ban on autonomous weapons systems can be premature, unnecessary or even immoral. The debate to date has been characterized by a succession of arguments and counterarguments by proponents and opponents of a ban.

The weapons international regime is currently governed by international law in two ways: (1) weapons can be ruled unlawful per se and (2) weapons can be ruled unlawful based on the ways in which they are used.

Per se weapons bans are based on the requirements to avoid superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and that weapons have the capacity to be aimed at a lawful military objective. Unlawful uses of otherwise lawful weapons arise when a weapon does not, in an actual attack, distinguish between a lawful military objective and an unlawful civilian objective or when the use is disproportionate to the military necessity. (Bills, 2015)

But then a legal gap remains, who could be held accountable for violations of international law norms perpetrated by LAWS? Because with LAWS is not a human who decides to attack, but rather it's a machine that complete

those functions. "There are three models of liability that could be used to ensure someone is held responsible for the misconduct of LAWS: (1) products liability, (2) command responsibility, and (3) direct responsibility of the robot. (Bills, 2015)

While a basic ban on LAWS would be possible in the framework of the CCW, the way it has operated in the past has been by regulating the use of weapons, rather than through banning technologies as such.

MILITARY-OPERATIONAL DEBATE

The elimination of the human factor in warfare is perceived as necessary (Scharre, 2018). There is an incentive to remote the human element of the military arsenal, since machines can perform in a faster way the decision-making process. In the case of unmanned vehicles, considering the time-lag generated by the distance between the vehicle and the controler, removing the human element would improve the performance of the vehicle. Autonomous weapons can possibly make war more humane since they do not act by anger and are not moved by revenge, which decreases the exposure of combatants and civilians to unnecessary suffering situations (Hynes, 2013).

Furthermore, the consideration of scenarios where communications between machines and human controllers are threatened may generate the incentive to create machines with greater autonomous capabilities. The consideration of other states building up an army that relies heavily on AI generates uncertainty in the international system, where other states may consider necessary to develop better armies, generating an arms race. The GGE on LAWS, as stated in the 2018 meeting report, seeks to provide a platform where weapons reviews are undertaken. It is debatable if secrecy in military aspects may undermine the transparency of such process (GGE on LAWS, 2018)

POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The vision on the benefits from the autonomous weapons usage is not shared by some, such as the Human Rights Watch. This NGO believes that the non-humanity of autonomous systems is not something positive given that it threatens the respect of "international humanitarian law, specially the Martens Clause, since these weapons would be unable to apply compassion or human judgment to decisions to use force" (2019).

Furthermore, concerns regarding the blurring lines that are created as autonomy of weapons increase are central to this discussion. Given that "IHL requires human operators to use a weapon with discrimination and precaution considerations" (Hollis, 2016), and in a proportional manner to its objectives, the fact that more tasks may be done solely by the machine "creates gaps in legal and political responsibility and accountability" (GGE on LAWS, 2018). In 2018, the delegations present at the GGE on LAWS

meeting established that the IHL is fully applicable to autonomous weapons but the lack of working samples delayed the discussion. Further understanding on characterization of these systems and on the human-machine interaction is promoted and needed to have an adequate approach to LAWS.

PARTIES INVOLVED

Controversies and debates have always characterized the discussion of weapons and generally, in international security issues, reaching a consensus is hard. We would like to encourage you to be critical regarding the information you find on lethal autonomous weapons systems and to go deeper in your understanding of what are the real interests behind this discussions. As a matter of fact, the delegations of the United States, Israel, the Russian Federation and Australia blocked a broader agenda that moved from definitions on 2018. The Russian Federation representatives have stated that discussing these issues may be deemed unnecessary since no state is developing these technologies (Sharkey, 2018)

On the other hand, it is important to note that the role of NGOs in raising awareness on the risks posed by the militarization of AI. In 2012, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was created. This Campaign is a "global coalition of international, regional, and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that is working to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons" (2018). It is important to note that more than 25 states have "called for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems" (Future of Life, n.d.).

Some well-known personalities such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and some AI companies have since the beginning of the discussions stated their position on banning lethal autonomous weapons systems.



QARMAS

1. What is the approach that the international community should give to the lethal autonomous weapons systems? Please consider the following aspects to provide a comprehensive answer: technical, ethical, legal and military-operational dimensions.

2. Should the development of autonomous weapons be internationally banned with a treaty?

3. Is the lethality aspect a crucial element of the autonomous weapons systems considerations?

4. How could the use of LAWS impact on the principles of proportionality, distinction and precaution (Jus in bello)?

5. What could be the impact of LAWS on responsibility and accountability for violations of international law?

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FURTHER READINGS

- https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/PDF/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement First informal meeting 2014

- https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B5B99A4D2F8BADF4C12581DF0048E7D0/$file/2017_CCW_GGE.1_2017_CRP.1_Advanced_+corrected.pdf) Groups of Governmental Experts on LAWS 2017 meeting

- Podcast on LAWS https://www.cnas.org/publications/podcast/autonomous-weapons-and-the-future-of-war-2

- https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7C335E71DFCB29D1C1258243003E8724?OpenDocument Various documents and links

- https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4C452E8607E0FBC3C12581D400341DE1/$file/CCW+Website_Articles_LAWS_Archive.pdf Articles and papers on LAWS

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