

③ Construction of Secure Encryption Scheme

For a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ which is chosen uniformly and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ PRG G is defined as

$$G: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$$

And Encryption scheme is defined as

$$\text{Enc}_k(m): c = G(k) \oplus m \Rightarrow \text{Dec}_k(c): m = G(k) \oplus c$$

Proof of Security

Since the PRG used is provably secure, and its output is being directly ~~to~~ bitwise XOR'd with the message, we can say that for ~~so~~ that for a distinguisher D , and Adversary A , the probability of the Adversary cracking the encryption scheme would be the same as the probability of distinguisher distinguishing between output of PRG & a string w chosen uniformly at random.

$$\therefore \Pr[D(G(k))=1] = \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n)=1] \quad \text{--- (1)}$$

By definition of PRG,

$$\Pr[D(G(k))=1] - \Pr[D(w)=1] \leq \text{negl}(n) \quad \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \text{ since } w \text{ is uniformly random}$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[D(G(k))=1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n)=1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

\therefore Probability of Adversary cracking encryption scheme, is at ~~at~~ ^{maximum} negligibly better than the adversary randomly guessing

\therefore Given encryption scheme is provably secure.