Fix typos

CHANGES

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
 * Update ruby_parser dependency to 3.8.1
 * Remove `fastercsv` dependency
 * Fix finding calls with `targets: nil`
-* Remove `multi_json` dependecy
+* Remove `multi_json` dependency
 * Handle CoffeeScript in HAML
 * Avoid render warnings about params[:action]/params[:controller]
 * Index calls in class bodies but outside methods
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
 * Add check for mime-type denial of service (CVE-2016-0751)
 * Add check for basic auth timing attack (CVE-2015-7576)
 * Add initial Rails 5 support
-* Check for implict integer comparison in dynamic finders
+* Check for implicit integer comparison in dynamic finders
 * Support directories better in --only-files and --skip-files (Patrick Toomey)
 * Avoid warning about `permit` in SQL
 * Handle guards using `detect`
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@
 * Remove formatting newlines in HAML template output
 * Ignore case value in XSS checks
 * Fix CSV output when there are no warnings
-* Handle processing of explictly shadowed block arguments
+* Handle processing of explicitly shadowed block arguments
 
 # 3.0.1
 
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
 * Add `-4` option to force Rails 4 mode
 * Check entire call for `send`
 * Check for .gitignore of secrets in subdirectories
-* Fix block statment endings in Erubis
+* Fix block statement endings in Erubis
 * Fix undefined variable in controller processing error (Jason Barnabe) 
 
 # 2.6.1

docs/warning_types/CVE-2011-3186/index.markdown

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Response splitting is a simple attack that can be used as part or a larger exploit chain. A malicious user sends data that causes the HTTP response header to include unintended newline characters which are interpreted as the end of the header. The attacker may then forge their own response body and an entirely false HTTP response, essentailly hijacking the entire page load.
+Response splitting is a simple attack that can be used as part or a larger exploit chain. A malicious user sends data that causes the HTTP response header to include unintended newline characters which are interpreted as the end of the header. The attacker may then forge their own response body and an entirely false HTTP response, essentially hijacking the entire page load.
 
 Versions of Rails 2 previous to 2.3.13 were vulnerable to this type of attack. The Rails 3 branch is not affected.
 

docs/warning_types/sql_injection/index.markdown

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:
 
     User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])
 
-Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatentation):
+Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):
 
     username = params[:user][:name].downcase
     password = params[:user][:password]