BATCH PIR AND LABELED PSI WITH OBLIVIOUS CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION

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
¹JPMORGAN AI RESEARCH & ALGOCRYPT COE (WORK DONE WHILE AT NYU AND INTERNING AT GOOGLE)

²GOOGLE

³GOOGLE AND COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

• Client has single item x, server has $Y = \{(y_1, v_1), ..., (y_n, v_n)\}$





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 - Client wants to privately check if $\overline{x = y_i}$ in Y



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 - Client wants to privately check if $x = y_i$ in Y
 - If so retrieve v_i

 (y_1, v_1) (y_2, v_2) (y_3, v_3) ... (y_n, v_n)

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 - Client wants to privately check if $x = y_i$ in Y
 - If so retrieve v_i
 - ullet "Privately" the server should not learn what x is
- This talk: no preprocessing

$$\boxed{} v_i \text{ if } x = y_i$$

 (y_1, v_1)

 (y_2, v_2)

 (y_3,v_3)

•••

 (y_n, v_n)

- Batch Private Information Retrieval (Batch PIR)
 - Client has $X = \{x_1, ..., x_\ell\}$, server has $Y = \{(y_1, v_1), ..., (y_n, v_n)\}$
 - Client wants to privately check if each $x_i = y_i$ in Y; if so retrieve v_i
 - ullet "Privately" the server should not learn what X is

 (y_1, v_1) (y_2, v_2) (y_3, v_3) ... (y_n, v_n)

ullet Run single request PIR ℓ times



• Run single request PIR ℓ times



ullet Run single request PIR ℓ times



$$\boxed{} v_{i_2} \text{ if } x_2 = y_{i_2}$$

...

 (y_1, v_1)

 (y_2, v_2)

 (y_3, v_3)

•

 (y_n, v_n)

- ullet Run single request PIR ℓ times
 - ullet Bad: factor ℓ blowup in overhead (server comp is now $\mathrm{O}(\ell n)$)

$$v_{i_1} \text{ if } x_1 = y_{i_1}$$



$$v_{i_2} \text{ if } x_2 = y_{i_2}$$

• • •

$$(y_1, v_1)$$

$$(y_2, v_2)$$

$$(y_3, v_3)$$


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$$(y_n, v_n)$$

EFFICIENT BATCH PIR


- ullet [ACLS18] use "Cuckoo Hashing" to remove factor ℓ server blowup
- \bullet But communication increases $1.5 \times$
 - 1.5 ℓ (encrypted) PIR requests/responses; 0.5 ℓ of them "useless"
- Can we get rid of communication overhead?
 - This work: Yes Oblivious Ciphertext (De)compression

PIR Responses



 ℓ -out-of-n non-zero

• Server compresses c to c' of size $\ell+\epsilon$, ϵ small



• Client decompresses and decrypts $oldsymbol{c}'$ to $oldsymbol{m}=(m_1,...,m_\ell)$ (nonzeros of $oldsymbol{c}$)

$$m = \begin{bmatrix} 20 & 14 & 3 & 35 \end{bmatrix}$$

Server must not learn non-zero m_i 's or their locations

- Given $w \le m$, sample $m \times \ell$ matrix M column-by-column as follows:
 - Pick random starting location from 1, ..., m w
 - Pick random w-bit string
 - Embed random w-bit string at starting location; everything else 0



- Theorem [DW19]: There exists constant $\epsilon > 0$ such that if $m = (1 + \epsilon) \cdot \ell$, $w = O((\log \ell)/\epsilon)$, then randomly sampled $m \times \ell$ random band matrices have full column rank, time $O(\ell w)$ Gaussian elimination, and time $O(\ell w)$ vector multiplication, with high probability
- Our Theorem: There exists constant $\epsilon > 0$ such that if $m = (1 + \epsilon) \cdot \ell$, $w = O(\log \ell + \lambda/\epsilon)$, then randomly sampled $m \times \ell$ random band matrices have full column rank, time $O(\ell w)$ Gaussian elimination, and time $O(\ell w)$ vector multiplication, with probability $1 2^{-\lambda}$

- Intuition for full rank:
 - Each band short, so intersects with few other bands
 - But still long enough to find a pivot

```
1
0 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 0 0
```

- Intuition for fast Gaussian elimination: first sort columns by first non-zero position
 - Each band intersects with few other bands, so each row also consists of a single short band (Chernoff: length O(w))
 - Each row band (by def) intersect with few other bands
 - Thus, getting to echelon form fast
 - Also, back substitution only on $\sim w$ entries for each row

```
0
      0
```

Compress: (assume Enc is additively homomorphic)

Enc(20)

Enc(0)

Enc(0)


Enc(14)

Enc(3)

Enc(0)

Enc(35)

Compress: (assume Enc is additively homomorphic)



Enc(20)

Enc(0)

Enc(0)

Enc(14)

Enc(3)

Enc(0)

Enc(35)

M

C

Compress: (assume Enc is additively homomorphic)



Enc(20)
Enc(0)
Enc(14)
Enc(3)
Enc(35)




 $(1+\epsilon) \cdot \ell$

M

C

./ :

Compress: (assume Enc is additively homomorphic)



Enc(20)
Enc(0)
Enc(14)
Enc(3)
Enc(35)

 $= \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i \cdot M^i$


columns

M

C

,/

Compress: (assume Enc is additively homomorphic)




$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i \cdot M^i$$

M

C

c'

Decompress: (client knows nonzero indices)




M




7

Decompress: (client knows nonzero indices)




M



p'

Decompress: (client knows nonzero indices)




M'




p'

Decompress: (client knows nonzero indices)



Decompress: (client knows nonzero indices)



PIR Requests



 ℓ -out-of-n non-zero

• Client compresses and encrypts $m{m}=(m_1,...,m_n)$ to $m{c}$ of size $\ell+\epsilon$, ϵ small




• Server decompresses ${f c}$ to ${f c}'=(c_1,\ldots,c_n)$ such that if $m_i \neq 0$, c_i encrypts m_i

$$\mathbf{c}' = \begin{bmatrix} Enc(20) & Enc(5) & Enc(g_1) & Enc(g_2) & Enc(14) & Enc(3) & Enc(g_3) \end{bmatrix}$$

Server must not learn non-zero m_i 's or their (locations


- Given $w \le m$, sample $\ell \times m$ matrix M row-by-row as follows:
 - Pick random starting location from 1, ..., m w
 - Pick random w-bit string
 - Embed random W-bit string at starting location; everything else 0



• Theorem: There exists some constant $\epsilon>0$ such that if $m=(1+\epsilon)\cdot \ell$ and $w=O(\log \ell+\lambda/\epsilon)$, then randomly sampled $\ell\times m$ random band matrices have full row rank, time $O(\ell w)$ Gaussian elimination, and time $O(\ell w)$ vector multiplication, with probability $1-2^{-\lambda}$

Compress (client knows nonzero indices):

Compress (client knows nonzero indices):



20
5
0
0
14
3
0


Compress (client knows nonzero indices):



M

)


Compress (client knows nonzero indices):




M


)


Compress (client knows nonzero indices):





Compress (client knows nonzero indices):











TECHNICALITIES/ADDITIONAL RESULTS

- Cannot simultaneously use Oblivious Ciphertext Decompression and Compression in Batch PIR
 - State of the art Batch PIR uses FHE---accounting for added noise from both techniques makes ciphertexts too big
- Our techniques are compatible with "vectorization" techinques of [MR23]
 - ullet Can fit d requests/responses into a single ciphertext
- (Only) Oblivious Ciphertext Compression also applies to 2-server batch PIR
- From standard Batch PIR + OPRF => Labeled PSI framework, get better Labeled PSI



DB Entry Size	Batch Size & Schemes	Public Param Size	Request Size	Response Size	Total Server Time	Amortized Server Time	Total Client Time	Server Monetary Cost
8 KB	$\ell = 512$							
	Baseline	20.87 MB	1.81 MB	15.59 MB	840 s	1.64 s	6.1 s	\$0.00646
	LSObvCompress	$22.62~\mathrm{MB}$	1.81 MB	10.92 MB	$890 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.74 \mathrm{\ s}$	$6.7 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.00633
	LSObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	1.40 MB	$15.59~\mathrm{MB}$	$863 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.69 \mathrm{\ s}$	$6.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.00656
	$\ell = 1024$							
	Baseline	20.87 MB	$3.35~\mathrm{MB}$	31.18 MB	1,256 s	1.23 s	6.8 s	\$0.01043
	LSObvCompress	23.11 MB	$3.35~\mathrm{MB}$	$21.84~\mathrm{MB}$	$1,369 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.34 \mathrm{\ s}$	$8.2 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01025
	LSObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	2.55 MB	$31.18~\mathrm{MB}$	$1,323 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.29 \mathrm{\ s}$	$8.0 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01075
	$\ell = 2048$							
	Baseline	20.87 MB	$3.96~\mathrm{MB}$	$62.37~\mathrm{MB}$	1,750 s	$0.85 \mathrm{\ s}$	7.0s	\$0.01617
	LSOhvCompress	23.43 MB	3.96 MB	$43.67~\mathrm{MB}$	1,871 s	$0.91 \mathrm{\ s}$	$9.7 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01520
	LSObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	3.15 MB	$62.37~\mathrm{MB}$	$1,812 \mathrm{\ s}$	$0.89 \mathrm{\ s}$	$9.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01646
	$\ell = 512$							
	Baseline	20.87 MB	1.81 MB	31.18 MB	1,286 s	$2.51 \mathrm{\ s}$	6.3 s	\$0.01047
	LSObvCompress	$22.62~\mathrm{MB}$	1.81 MB	21.84 MB	$1,348 \mathrm{\ s}$	$2.63 \mathrm{\ s}$	$8.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.00999
	_SObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	1.40 MB	31.18 MB	$1,308 \mathrm{\ s}$	$2.55 \mathrm{\ s}$	$8.3 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01056
	$\ell = 1024$	6						
16 KB	Baseline	20.87 MB	$3.35~\mathrm{MB}$	$62.37~\mathrm{MB}$	1,775 s	1.73 s	7.9 s	\$0.01626
	LSObvCompress	23.11 MB	$3.35~\mathrm{MB}$	$43.69~\mathrm{MB}$	$1,929 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.88 \mathrm{\ s}$	$9.6 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01548
	LSObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	$2.55~\mathrm{MB}$	62.37 MB	$1,881 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.83~\mathrm{s}$	$9.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01681
	$\ell = 2048$							
	Baseline	20.87 MB	3.96 MB	124.74 MB	2,634 s	1.29 s	8.5 s	\$0.02694
	LSObvCompress	23.43 MB	$3.96~\mathrm{MB}$	87.34 MB	$2{,}773 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.35 \mathrm{\ s}$	$12.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.02439
	LSObvDecompress	$20.87~\mathrm{MB}$	3.15 MB	124.74 MB	$2{,}746 \mathrm{\ s}$	$1.34 \mathrm{\ s}$	$12.4 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.02752
								75

Figure 5: Evaluations of Spiral Batch PIR [14, 58] with and without our compression techniques, LSObvCompress and LSObvDecompress with $\epsilon = 0.05$. We fix the number of entries to n = 1 million for all our results.

Batch Size & Schemes	Response Size	Server Time	Client Time	Server Monetary Cost
$\ell = 512$				
Baseline	221 KB	9.63 s	$0.01 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.000076
LSObvCompress	155 KB	$9.69 \mathrm{\ s}$	$0.08~\mathrm{s}$	\$0.000070
$\ell = 1024$				
Baseline	442 KB	9.76 s	0.01 s	\$0.000096
LSObvCompress	310 KB	$9.92 \mathrm{\ s}$	$0.16 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.000085
$\ell = 2048$				
Baseline	885 KB	9.79 s	0.01 s	\$0.000136
LSObvCompress	619 KB	$10.09~\mathrm{s}$	$0.33~\mathrm{s}$	\$0.000114
$\ell = 4096$				
Baseline	1,769 KB	9.81 s	0.01 s	\$0.000216
LSObvCompress	1,238 KB	$10.53~\mathrm{s}$	$0.78 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.000172
$\ell = 8192$				
Baseline	$3,539~\mathrm{KB}$	9.82 s	0.01 s	\$0.000375
LSObvCompress	2,477 KB	11.13 s	$1.80 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.000287

Figure 7: Comparison of DPF based two server batch PIR protocol [2] with and without LSObvCompress ($\epsilon = 0.05$). We fix the number of database entries to n = 1 million and each entry size to 288 B for all our results.

Label Size & Schemes	Total Online Comm.	Total Online Time	Server Monetary Cost
512 B			
Cong <i>et al.</i> [28]	33.2 MB	169 s	\$0.00397
LSObvCompress	11.4 MB	$304 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.00279
1024 B			
Cong <i>et al.</i> [28]	66.1 MB	331 s	\$0.00787
LSObvCompress	11.6 MB	$355 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.00311
1536 B			
Cong <i>et al.</i> [28]	103.6 MB	$535 \mathrm{\ s}$	\$0.01244
LSObvCompress	11.9 MB	446 s	\$0.00367

Figure 8: Comparisons of Cong et al. [28]'s labeled PSI and our LSObvCompress-based PSI with $\epsilon = 0.05$. We fix the size of the sender's set to 1 million and the receiver's set to 512.

