Chapter 2



BASIC PROTOCOLS

2.1 KEY EXCHANGE

Key exchange in cryptography refers to the process of securely sharing cryptographic keys between two or more parties over an insecure communication channel. These cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communication.

Key exchange protocols are used to achieve this goal by enabling parties to agree upon a secret key securely. These protocols ensure that even if the communication channel is insecure or susceptible to eavesdropping or interception, the keys exchanged remain confidential and cannot be easily determined by malicious actors.

A common cryptographic technique is to encrypt each individual conversation with a separate key. This is called a *session key*. A session key in the context of key exchange refers to a temporary cryptographic key that is generated specifically for a single communication session between two parties. It's used for encrypting and decrypting the messages transmitted during that session and is discarded once the session is completed. Session keys are often created dynamically and are short-lived compared to long-term keys used in asymmetric or symmetric encryption systems. They provide the advantage of minimizing the potential damage caused by a compromised key since they are only used for a limited duration or a specific session.

2.1.1 Key Exchange with Symmetric Cryptography

In symmetric cryptography, key exchange for session keys involves creating and securely sharing a temporary key specifically used for a single communication session between two parties. It involves securely sharing secret keys between parties to enable encrypted communication. The shared key is used for both encryption and decryption. In this scheme, the *Key Distribution Centre* (KDC) serves as a trusted entity managing key distribution, generating session keys, securely delivering and facilitating key exchange between users, ensuring only authorized parties possess the keys required for secure communication.

Here's a simplified explanation of the key exchange process for session keys using symmetric cryptography:

1. **Initial Request:** Alice and Bob ask the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for a secret key to chat securely.
2. **KDC's Role:** The KDC creates a secret session key for them to use.
3. **Key Locking:** The KDC puts this session key in a locked box (encrypted) using a special code that only Alice and Bob can unlock.
4. **Secure Delivery:** The KDC sends the locked box to both Alice and Bob separately.
5. **Key Unlocking:** Alice and Bob each use their unique key (received secretly from the KDC) to unlock their respective boxes.
6. **Shared Secret Key:** Inside the box, they both find the same secret key, which they can use to talk privately.
7. **Secure Chat:** They use this secret key to write messages in a code that only they can understand, keeping their conversation private.
8. **Session End:** After their chat ends, they discard the secret key. It's a one-time key used only for that conversation.

Merits of Key Exchange with Symmetric Cryptography:

- *Efficiency:* Faster processing due to less computational overhead compared to public key cryptography.
- *High Speed:* Enables rapid encryption and decryption of bulk data efficiently.
- *Simplicity:* Simple implementation and operations, requiring fewer resources.
- *Practicality:* Suitable for high-speed communication systems where efficiency is crucial.

Demerits of Key Exchange with Symmetric Cryptography:

- *Key Distribution:* Requires secure initial key distribution between communicating parties.
- *Security Concerns:* Vulnerable to key interception or compromise during transmission.
- *Key Management:* Challenges in securely managing and updating keys across multiple entities.
- *Lack of Direct Secure Exchange:* Lacks inherent mechanisms for secure initial key exchange, necessitating additional secure channels or protocols for key distribution.

2.1.2 Key Exchange with Public Key Cryptography

Key exchange with public key cryptography refers to the process of securely sharing secret keys between two communicating parties without prior key sharing. In this method, each party possesses a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The public key is openly distributed, while the private key is kept confidential.

During key exchange, one party sends its public key to the other party. The sender then encrypts the session key (typically a symmetric key used for efficient encryption) with the recipient's public key. Upon receiving the encrypted session key, the recipient decrypts it using their private key, acquiring the shared session key.

Here's a detailed breakdown:

1. **Key Generation:** Two parties, say Alice and Bob, each have a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. These keys are mathematically related, and data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted with the other.
2. **Request for Session Key:** Alice wishes to communicate securely with Bob. She requests a session key for secure communication from a trusted entity (like a Key Distribution Center - KDC).
3. **Session Key Creation:** The KDC generates a unique session key specifically for Alice and Bob to use during their communication.
4. **Encryption with Public Keys:** The KDC encrypts the session key using Bob's public key (known to everyone) to create a locked package.
5. **Secure Delivery:** The KDC securely sends this locked package (encrypted session key) to Alice.
6. **Decryption by Recipient:** Alice, using her private key (kept secret and known only

to her), decrypts the locked package sent by the KDC, revealing the session key inside.

7. **Another Key for the Other Party:** Bob follows the same process: he requests a session key from the KDC, which encrypts the session key using Alice's public key and sends it to Bob.
8. **Mutual Communication:** Both Alice and Bob now possess the same session key and can use it for their encrypted communication. They can encrypt messages using this shared session key, and only the recipient with the matching private key can decrypt and read them.

Merits of Key Exchange with Public Key Cryptography:

- *Secure Key Exchange:* Enables secure communication without prior key sharing, enhancing security.
- *No Direct Key Transmission:* Eliminates the need for pre-shared secret keys, reducing vulnerability to interception.
- *Digital Signatures:* Supports digital signatures, verifying message authenticity and integrity.

Demerits of Key Exchange with Public Key Cryptography:

- *Computational Complexity:* More computationally intensive than symmetric key exchange methods.
- *Key Management:* Requires efficient management of key pairs and potential vulnerability if private keys are compromised.
- *Potential Vulnerabilities:* Vulnerable to certain attacks if key pairs are exposed or improperly implemented.
- *Performance Overhead:* Slower processing due to computational demands for key generation and encryption.

2.1.3 Interlock Protocol

The Interlock Protocol is a cryptographic key exchange protocol designed for secure communication between two parties without directly exchanging secret keys. It ensures that each party contributes to the generation of a shared secret key without revealing its individual secret to the other party. The Interlock Protocol involves a series of message exchanges where each party sends parts of their secret to the other party. These parts

interlock or combine, allowing both parties to compute the shared secret key without explicitly disclosing their individual secrets. Here's an explanation.

1. Alice sends Bob her public key.
2. Bob sends Alice his public key.
3. Alice encrypts her message using Bob's public key. She sends half of the encrypted message to Bob.
4. Bob encrypts his message using Alice's public key. He sends half of the encrypted message to Alice.
5. Alice sends the other half of her encrypted message to Bob.
6. Bob puts the two halves of Alice's message together and decrypts it with his private key. Bob sends the other half of his encrypted message to Alice.
7. Alice puts the two halves of Bob's message together and decrypts it with her private key.

The important point is that half of the message is useless without the other half; it can't be decrypted. Bob cannot read any part of Alice's message until step (6); Alice cannot read any part of Bob's message until step (7).

Merits of Interlock Protocol:

- *Enhanced Security:* Provides secure key exchange without transmitting keys, thwarting eavesdroppers.
- *Confidentiality:* Establishes shared secrets without directly revealing individual secrets.
- *Resistance to Eavesdropping:* Prevents adversaries from deriving individual secrets from exchanged information.
- *Secure Communication:* Facilitates secure communication between parties without direct key exchange.

Demerits of Interlock Protocol:

- *Communication Overhead:* Requires multiple message exchanges, leading to increased communication complexity.
- *Potential Vulnerabilities:* Incorrect implementation may lead to vulnerabilities susceptible to attacks.
- *Complexity:* May be challenging to implement correctly due to its intricate nature and protocol intricacies.

2.2 AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE

Authentication is the process of confirming the identity of communicating entities, such as users, devices, or servers. It ensures that the parties involved are who they claim to be. There are several authentication methods, including:

- **Passwords:** Users provide a secret password that should match the stored credentials on the server.
- **Biometrics:** This involves using unique biological characteristics like fingerprints, iris scans, or facial recognition for identity verification.
- **Multi-factor Authentication (MFA):** Requires multiple forms of identification, such as a password combined with a temporary code sent to a mobile device.
- **Certificates:** Digital certificates issued by trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) to validate the identity of a server or client in SSL/TLS connections.

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is the exchange of session key in a key exchange protocol which also authenticates the identities of parties involved in key exchange. It is a way for two parties to securely talk to each other, ensuring they both know who they're talking to and can keep their conversation private. Let's imagine Alice and Bob want to have a secret conversation over the internet. They want to be sure that nobody else can listen in or pretend to be them during their chat. They use an AKE protocol to achieve this.

2.2.1 Wide-Mouth Frog Protocol

The Wide Mouth Frog protocol is a computer network authentication protocol designed for use on insecure networks (the Internet for example). It allows individuals communicating over a network to prove their identity to each other while also preventing eavesdropping or replay attacks, and provides for detection of modification and the prevention of unauthorized reading.

The protocol can be specified as follows in security protocol notation, where user A is verifying itself to user B using a server S:

- Where the identities of user A, user B, and the trusted server are A, B, and S respectively.
- Timestamps generated by user A and server S are TS1 and TS2 respectively.
- A Symmetric key KAS that is only known to A and S.
- A generated symmetric key KAB, which will be the session key of the session between user A and user B.
- A Symmetric key KBS that is only known to B and S.

A → S: A, {T{S1}, B, K{AB}} K{AS}

S → B: {T{S2}, A, K{AB}} K{BS}



To understand the working let's consider the example of the Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol:

M1 A → S: {T{S1}.B.K{AB}} SKey(A)

M2 S → B: {T{S2}.A.K{AB}} SKey(B)

Here the server shares two different keys that are SKey(A) and SKey(B) with A and B; the purpose of the protocol is to establish a session key K{AB} between user A and user B, and to verify A to B. After that user A creates a session key and directs it to the server along with a timestamp TS1; the server then sends the key to user B along with a new timestamp TS2. Timestamps are generally used so that the users can obtain indications that the messages they have received were created recently. It should be noted that for passing and for this mechanism to work the different users' clocks need to be synchronized; each user's clock is crucial to the security of the protocol.

2.2.2 Yahalom Protocol

The Yahalom protocol is a cryptographic key exchange protocol designed to ensure secure communication over an insecure network. The protocol is used to establish a shared secret session key between two parties while providing authentication and integrity.

The Yahalom authentication protocol is like a secret handshake between two people who want to talk securely over a not-so-safe area.

Imagine two friends, Alice and Bob, who want to chat privately even if someone might be listening. Here's how they might use the Yahalom protocol:

1. **Start**: Alice says, "Hey Bob, let's talk securely." She sends a message with her name and a secret code to Bob.

2. **Bob's Turn**: Bob gets Alice's message and creates his own secret code. He responds to Alice by sharing his name, a timestamp (like a time stamp on a letter), and a special code that only Alice and Bob can read.
3. **Double Check**: Alice gets Bob's message and makes sure it's really from Bob. She sends back a message confirming this by using the secret code they both share.
4. **All Set**: Bob receives Alice's confirmation. If everything matches up, they both have a shared secret code now. They can use this secret code to talk to each other safely without anyone else understanding.

The Yahalom authentication protocol involves various steps and uses encryption and hashing techniques. Let's break down the protocol steps into equations using mathematical notation and an example:

Suppose Alice (A) wants to securely communicate with Bob (B) using the Yahalom protocol:

1. Initialization:

- A sends a message to B: $A \rightarrow B: ID_A, N1$
- Here, ID_A represents Alice's identity, and N1 is a randomly generated nonce by Alice.

2. Response:

- B generates its own nonce: N_2
- B responds to A with: $B \rightarrow A: ID_B, TS, \{K_{AB}, N_1, N_2\} K_{BS}$
- ID_B is Bob's identity, TS is a timestamp, and $\{K_{AB}, N_1, N_2\}K_{BS}$ is a message encrypted with Bob's secret key (K_{BS}). This message contains a shared key K_{AB} between Alice and Bob, along with the nonces N_1 and N_2.

3. Confirmation:

- A confirms to B: $A \rightarrow B: N_2$ encrypted with the shared key (K_{AB}).

4. Finalization:

- B verifies the confirmation from A using the shared key K_{AB}.
- If the verification succeeds, Alice and Bob have established a secure shared key K_{AB} to communicate securely.

The protocol ensures that only Alice and Bob can generate and understand the shared ecret key K_{AB} and that they can confirm each other's identity through the exchange of onces and encrypted messages.

2.2.3 Needham-Schroeder Protocol

The Needham-Schroeder protocol is a cryptographic protocol used for secure communication over an insecure network. Its primary goal is to allow two parties to establish a secure communication channel without the risk of a third-party eavesdropping or tampering with the information being exchanged.

In simple terms, here's how the Needham-Schroeder protocol works:

Let's say we have three entities: Alice, Bob, and a trusted server, which I'll call Server.

1. Initialization:

- Alice and Bob both share a secret key with the Server.
- Alice wants to communicate securely with Bob.

2. Requesting a Session Key:

- Alice sends a request to the Server asking to communicate with Bob.
- This request includes:
  - ✓ Alice's identity (let's call it "A")
  - ✓ Bob's identity (let's call it "B")
  - ✓ A random number generated by Alice (let's call it "Na").

3. Server's Response:

- The Server receives Alice's request and generates a session key.
- The session key is encrypted using Alice's secret key and then sent back to Alice.
- This encrypted message includes:
  - ✓ Bob's identity ("B")
  - ✓ The random number sent by Alice ("Na")
  - ✓ The session key encrypted with Alice's secret key

4. Alice forwards the Session Key:

- Alice decrypts the message received from the Server using her secret key to obtain the session key.
- Then Alice re-encrypts the session key with Bob's secret key and sends it to Bob.
- This message includes:
  - ✓ Bob's identity ("B")

- ✓ The random number sent by Alice ("Na")
- ✓ The session key encrypted with Bob's secret key

5. Authentication by Bob:

- Bob receives the message from Alice.
- Bob decrypts the message using his secret key to obtain the session key.
- Bob then sends a message to Alice to confirm the session key using the random number ("Na") that was included in the message from Alice.

6. Secure Communication:

- Now both Alice and Bob possess the session key, allowing them to communicate securely by encrypting and decrypting their messages using this shared key.

The equations involved in this protocol mainly focus on encryption and decryption using the secret keys. For instance:

- Encryption of a message "M" with a secret key "K" can be represented as Encrypted_Message = Encrypt (M, K).
- Decryption of an encrypted message "EM" with a secret key "K" can be represented as Decrypted_Message = Decrypt (EM, K).

This protocol ensures that even if a malicious entity intercepts the communication, they won't be able to derive the session key without possessing the respective secret keys of the legitimate parties involved.

2.2.4 Kerberos Protocol

The Kerberos protocol can be seen as a variant of the Needham-Schroeder protocol with additional features specifically designed for network authentication. Kerberos provides a centralized authentication server whose function is to authenticate users to servers and servers to users. In Kerberos Authentication server and database is used for client authentication. Kerberos runs as a third-party trusted server known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC). Each user and service on the network is a principal. Here's an explanation of Kerberos based on its similarity to the Needham-Schroeder protocol:

1. Initial Setup:

- **Key Distribution:** In Kerberos, before any communication begins, Alice (the user) shares a secret key with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), which acts as the trusted server and performs initial authentication.

2. Authentication and Ticket Generation:

- **Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) Request:** When Alice logs in, she sends her username to the KDC along with her password.
- **TGT Issuance:** The KDC verifies Alice's credentials and, if valid, creates a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) for Alice. This TGT is encrypted using a key derived from Alice's password.

3. Service Authentication and Ticket Issuance:

- **Service Ticket Request:** When Alice wants to access a specific service (let's say a file server), she sends her TGT to the KDC along with the name of the service.
- **Service Ticket Issuance:** The KDC verifies the TGT and, if valid, issues a Service Ticket for Alice to access the requested service. This Service Ticket is encrypted using a session key shared only between Alice and the requested service.

4. Service Access:

- **Accessing the Service:** Alice sends the Service Ticket to the file server.
- **Service Authentication:** The file server decrypts the Service Ticket using its secret key and verifies the session key within it. If the ticket and session key are valid, the file server grants Alice access to the requested service.

In terms of equations, the Kerberos protocol operates similarly to the Needham-Schroeder protocol, involving encryption and decryption using shared keys:

- Encryption of data with a specific key: Encrypted_Data = Encrypt(Data, Key)
- Decryption of data with a specific key: Decrypted_Data = Decrypt(Encrypted_Data, Key)

The Kerberos protocol enhances the basic Needham-Schroeder model by introducing the concept of a trusted third-party KDC for centralized authentication, simplifying and securing the process of accessing various network services securely.

2.3 FORMAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHENTICATION AND KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS

The problem of establishing secure session keys between pairs of computers (and people) on a network is so fundamental that in turn, has led to a greater and more interesting problem: the formal analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols. The formal analysis cryptography protocols involve rigorous methods to verify their security

properties and correctness. There are four basic approaches to the analysis of cryptographic protocols

1. Symbolic Model Analysis
2. Computational Model Analysis
3. Logic-Based Approaches:
4. Automated Tools and Verification

Let's discuss the uses and limitations of all these approaches.

1. Symbolic Model Analysis

Symbolic Model Analysis is a method used to formally analyze authentication and key-exchange protocols by representing them symbolically. It examines message exchanges, logical rules, and potential scenarios to verify correctness and detect vulnerabilities.

Uses: This approach scrutinizes protocol behaviors, ensuring secure interactions among participants. It verifies that only authorized entities can access sensitive information and prevents security threats like message interception or unauthorized access to keys. Symbolic Model Analysis employs formal methods, such as model checking or theorem proving, to explore all possible executions of the protocol.

Limitations: Complex protocols pose challenges due to the expansive state space, potentially making exhaustive analysis computationally intensive. Modeling intricate cryptographic operations might be challenging, and scalability issues can arise with larger protocols. Additionally, this method may not cover every conceivable attack scenario or identify all possible vulnerabilities.

Example: In the Needham-Schroeder protocol, Symbolic Model Analysis examines the message exchanges between participants to ensure the secure establishment of session keys, preventing impersonation or unauthorized access. It verifies that the protocol aligns with specified security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, to guarantee secure communication between entities.

2. Computational Model Analysis

Computational Model Analysis is a method used to assess the security of authentication and key-exchange protocols by evaluating the computational complexity of cryptographic operations. It focuses on the resistance of protocols against computational attacks and aims to ensure that cryptographic operations are sufficiently challenging to reverse-engineer the keys.

Uses: This approach assesses the difficulty an attacker would face in deducing secret keys through computational means. It verifies that the cryptographic algorithms employed in the protocol possess sufficient computational complexity, making it infeasible for an attacker to compute the secret keys from intercepted messages.

Limitations: Complexity arises in assessing the actual computational effort required by attackers, as it can vary based on resources and technology advancements. Additionally, while this analysis confirms the difficulty of computational attacks, it may not address vulnerabilities arising from other attack vectors or implementation flaws.

Example: In the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol, Computational Model Analysis evaluates the computational complexity of the discrete logarithm problem. It ensures that even with intercepted information, computing the shared secret key requires an infeasible amount of computational resources, thereby safeguarding the communication against adversaries attempting to derive the secret key.

3. Logic-Based Approaches

Logic-Based Approaches refer to using formal logics to analyze authentication and key-exchange protocols, focusing on reasoning about beliefs, knowledge, and logical inference to verify their security properties.

Uses: These approaches employ formal logics such as temporal logics or first-order logics to express and reason about protocol behaviors and security properties. They enable precise examination of protocol executions, participants' beliefs, and logical inferences, ensuring that desired security properties such as authentication and secrecy are upheld based on participants' beliefs and actions.

Limitations: Expressing certain security properties or intricate aspects of cryptographic protocols using formal logics might be challenging. Logic-based approaches might struggle to capture all nuances of complex protocols or real-world scenarios. Additionally, these methods might rely heavily on assumptions or abstractions, potentially oversimplifying or overlooking critical details.

Example: In BAN Logic, a logic-based approach, participants' beliefs and logical reasoning are analyzed to ensure secure communication. For instance, BAN Logic verifies that Bob believes he is communicating with Alice before sharing sensitive information. By checking participants' beliefs and logical implications, it confirms that only authorized entities can access certain information, maintaining the protocol's security properties based on logical reasoning about participants' beliefs and actions.

4. Automated Tools and Verification

Automated Tools and Verification involve employing software tools to analyze authentication and key-exchange protocols formally. These tools utilize algorithms and formal verification techniques to assess protocol models against specified security properties, ensuring their correctness and robustness.

Uses: These tools, like ProVerif, Tamarin, or Scyther, automatically analyze protocol models to verify security properties such as authentication, secrecy, and freshness. They employ formal methods like model checking or theorem proving to explore all possible protocol executions and confirm adherence to specified security goals. These automated tools efficiently examine various scenarios, detect vulnerabilities, and provide insights into potential threats.

Limitations: Automated tools might face limitations in handling extremely complex protocols or those involving intricate cryptographic operations. Scalability issues could arise with larger protocols, leading to computational challenges or incomplete analysis. Additionally, these tools might rely on simplifications or assumptions, potentially overlooking certain attack scenarios or real-world complexities.

Example: Using ProVerif, an automated tool, for the analysis of cryptographic protocols like the Otway-Rees protocol involves verifying that only authorized participants can access session keys. ProVerif checks for potential vulnerabilities such as message interception or unauthorized key access, confirming that the protocol meets specific security properties like authentication and secrecy by exhaustively analyzing various protocol execution scenarios automatically.

2.4 SECRET SPLITTING

Secret splitting in cryptography refers to breaking a secret into multiple parts or shares in such a way that reconstructing the original secret requires all of these parts. This differs from secret sharing, where reconstructing the secret only requires a subset of the shares.

Let's consider a simple secret splitting scheme where we split a secret into two shares using XOR operation.

Let's say Alice wants to send a secret message (represented by a string of bits) to Bob. This secret message is denoted as S and is known only to Alice initially.

For instance S=1010 (4-bit secret).

Secret Splitting Algorithm:

1. Generating Shares:

Alice breaks down the secret message into shares using a secret splitting algorithm, such as XOR operations or other cryptographic techniques.

Alice split the secret into two shares (*S*1 and *S*2) using an XOR operation:

*S*1 = Random Value 1 ⊕ *S*

*S*2=Random Value 2 ⊕ *S*

Random Value 1 and Random Value 2 are arbitrary values that act as additional security to create the shares.

Let's assume:

- Random Value 1 = 1101
- Random Value 2 = 0110

*S*1 = 1101 ⊕ 1010 = 0111

*S*2 = 0110 ⊕ 1010 = 1100

Alice sends S1 to Bob through one communication channel. Simultaneously, Alice sends S2 to Bob through a different or independent communication channel.

2. Reconstruction:

Bob receives both shares, S1 and S2, from Alice through separate channels.

To reconstruct the original secret (*S*), Bob perform XOR operation on the two shares:

S = *S*1 ⊕ *S*2 = 0111 ⊕ 1100 = 1010 = *S*

By XORing all the shares together, Bob successfully reconstructs the original secret message S.

This approach ensures that the original secret message is kept confidential during transmission. Even if an adversary intercepts one of the shares, they cannot retrieve the original secret message without obtaining all the shares and performing the reconstruction process, which only Bob knows how to execute.

2.5 SECRET SHARING

Secret sharing in cryptography involves splitting a secret into multiple parts, known as shares, and distributing them among participants. To reconstruct the original secret, a predefined number of shares, usually set by a threshold, is required.

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Let's use a simple example involving Alice and Bob. We'll illustrate secret sharing using a basic method called "Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme."

1. Generating Shares:

(a) Alice has a secret number, let's say 25, which she wants to share with Bob. She chooses a random polynomial equation of degree $k-1$, where k is the threshold (minimum number of shares needed to reconstruct the secret) and evaluates it to create shares.

Let the polynomial be $f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x^2$, where $a0$ is the secret itself (25 in this case), and $a1$ and $a2$ are random coefficients.

She then picks a random value, say $x=1$, and computes: $f(1) = a0 + a1(1) + a2(1)^2$

Let's assume this gives Alice her share: $25 + 7 + 3 = 35$

(b) Bob also needs a share. He knows the secret is 25 but doesn't know the coefficients of the polynomial. Alice gives Bob the value of the polynomial at another random point, let's say $x = 3$:

$f(3) = a0 + a1(3) + a2(3)^2$

Let's assume this gives Bob his share: $25 + 15 + 18 = 58$

2. Reconstructing the Secret:

To reconstruct the secret (25):

(a) When Bob and Alice want to retrieve the original secret:

They share their respective parts (35 and 58). Now, using these shares, they can apply a reconstruction algorithm (like Lagrange interpolation) to find the original polynomial equation and thus the secret value.

The formula to interpolate the polynomial using Lagrange interpolation:

$$f(x)=\sum_{j=1}^{k} y_j \cdot \Pi_{i=1,i\neq j}^{k} \frac{x-x_i}{x_j-x_i}$$

Extract the constant term of the polynomial to obtain the original secret i.e. 25.

In this way, with at least k shares, we can reconstruct the original secret using polynomial interpolation, maintaining the security of the secret among the participants who possess the shares.

In mathematical terms:

1. Generating Shares:
   - Alice's share: $f(1)=35$
   - Bob's share: $f(3)=58$
2. Reconstructing the Secret:

- Using the received shares, apply a reconstruction algorithm (e.g., Lagrange interpolation) to find the original polynomial equation and compute $f(0)$ to retrieve the secret value.

The communication between Alice and Bob involves securely exchanging their shares. Both parties should ensure that the channels used for sharing these values are secure to prevent unauthorized access to enough shares to reconstruct the secret without authorization.

This approach ensures that the original secret can only be reconstructed when the required number of shares are combined.

2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION OF DATABASES

Cryptographic protection of databases involves using cryptographic techniques to safeguard sensitive information stored within databases. These approaches aim to prevent unauthorized access, maintain data privacy, and mitigate potential security risks associated with sensitive information stored in databases. The choice of approach depends on the specific security requirements and nature of the data being stored and processed. Several approaches are employed to achieve cryptographic protection of databases.

Various Approaches for Cryptographic Protection of Databases:

- **Encryption:** *Full Database* and *field level* encryption are used to protect database. In *Full Database encryption*, entire database contents are encrypted, making all data unreadable without the correct decryption key whereas, in *Field-Level Encryption*, Only specific fields containing sensitive information (e.g., credit card numbers, passwords) are encrypted within the database.
- **Tokenization:** Replaces sensitive data with tokens or surrogate values that have no meaning or relation to the original data. These tokens can be reversed by authorized parties using a mapping mechanism.
- **Hashing:** Hash functions create fixed-length hash values (digests) from data, making

it difficult to derive the original data from the hash. Often used for protecting passwords where only the hashed value is stored in the database.

- **Access Control Mechanisms:** Use cryptographic techniques to control access to the database, including authentication mechanisms (like digital signatures or certificates) to ensure only authorized users can access specific data.
- **Database-Level Encryption Features:** Many modern database management systems offer built-in encryption features, enabling administrators to encrypt data at rest or in transit.
- **Homomorphic Encryption:** Allows computation on encrypted data without decrypting it first. This enables operations to be performed on encrypted data, preserving privacy and security.
- **Secure Key Management:** Properly managing encryption keys is critical. Employing secure key management practices ensures keys are protected, rotated, and only accessible to authorized personnel.
- **Database Auditing and Monitoring:** Implementing logging and monitoring tools to track access and modifications to the database. This helps in identifying suspicious activities or potential security breaches.
- **Secure Communication Protocols:** Employing secure communication channels (such as SSL/TLS) between clients and the database server to ensure data remains encrypted during transmission.
- **Data Masking:** Partially obscuring sensitive data while retaining its format, reducing the exposure of sensitive information in non-production environments.

QUESTIONS

Short Answer Questions

Q1. What do you mean by key exchange in cryptography?

Ans: Key exchange in cryptography refers to the process of securely sharing cryptographic keys between two or more parties over an insecure communication channel. These cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communication.

Q2. What is session key?

Ans: A session key is a temporary encryption key used to secure communication during a specific session or period of interaction between two entities, such as two parties engaging in secure communication over a network. It is generated uniquely for each session and is typically used for a limited time.

Q3. What is the Interlock Protocol in Cryptography?

Ans: The Interlock Protocol is a cryptographic key exchange protocol designed for secure communication between two parties without directly exchanging secret keys. It ensures that each party contributes to the generation of a shared secret key without revealing its individual secret to the other party.

Q4. How does the Interlock Protocol Work?

Ans: The Interlock Protocol involves a series of message exchanges where each party sends parts of their secret to the other party. These parts interlock or combine, allowing both parties to compute the shared secret key without explicitly disclosing their individual secrets.

Q5. What is authentication in key exchange?

Ans: Authentication in key exchange confirms the identities of communicating parties to ensure trustworthiness before sharing keys, preventing unauthorized access or tampering.

Q6. How does authentication affect key exchange?

Ans: Authentication ensures secure key exchange by verifying the legitimacy of involved entities, safeguarding against impersonation or interception during the exchange process.

Q7. What is the purpose and advantages of symbolic model analysis?

Ans: Symbolic model analysis focuses on representing cryptographic protocols symbolically to identify flaws or vulnerabilities. It explores possible protocol executions symbolically rather than exhaustively testing all scenarios, aiding in uncovering potential security weaknesses efficiently. Symbolic models offer abstraction, allowing analysis of complex protocols in a simplified manner. They enable the detection of protocol flaws, such as authentication failures or data leakage, facilitating effective security improvements.

Q8. What is the significance and applications of computational model analysis?

Ans: Computational model analysis provides a formal framework for evaluating

cryptographic protocols' security by simulating and analyzing protocol behavior computationally. It aids in understanding the impact of various inputs and scenarios on protocol security. Computational models find applications in cryptographic protocol verification, aiding in identifying vulnerabilities, verifying protocol correctness, and designing robust systems resistant to attacks.

Q9. What is the purpose and methodology of Logic-Based Approaches?

Ans: Logic-based approaches utilize formal logic to verify cryptographic protocols, checking properties such as authentication or secrecy. They provide a mathematical foundation to ensure the correctness and security of protocols. Logic-based approaches use formal techniques like model checking or theorem proving to analyze protocol behavior, identifying potential vulnerabilities or inconsistencies in cryptographic protocols.

Long Answer Questions

Q1. Compare and contrast the key exchange process in public key cryptography with that in symmetric cryptography, highlighting their strengths and limitations.

Ans: Refer Section **2.1.1 and 2.1.2**

Q2. What methods or techniques are used for the formal analysis of authentication and key-exchange protocols? How do these contribute to protocol reliability and security?

Ans: Refer Section **2.3**

Q3. Explain the concept of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) and its significance in secure communication.

Ans: Refer Section **2.2**

Q4. Compare and Contrast Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols, Highlighting Their Advantages and Differences.

Ans: Refer Section **2.2**

Q5. What is the purpose of secret splitting in cryptography, and how does it enhance security in sharing sensitive information?

Ans: Refer Section **2.4**

Q6. Describe the concept of secret sharing protocols and their role in distributing and reconstructing shared secrets among multiple parties securely.

Ans: Refer Section **2.5**

EXERCISE

1. How does authentication play a crucial role in key-exchange protocols?
2. Explain how logic-based approaches are utilized in cryptographic analysis to identify flaws or vulnerabilities in protocols.
3. Describe the role of public key cryptography in key exchange and its impact on secure communication
4. Discuss the challenges involved in securely sharing secret keys between communicating parties and methods used to address these challenges.
5. Explain the role of public key cryptography in the context of key exchange. How does it facilitate secure communication without the need for prior key sharing?

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