INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
(PHL1C01)

STUDY MATERIAL

I SEMESTER
CORE COURSE

MA PHILOSOPHY

(2020 Admission onwards)

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

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PHL1C01 : INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

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M.A PHILOSOPHY

(I SEMESTER)

PHLI C01: INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

(Core)

INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy is the systems of thought and reflection that were developed by the civilizations of the Indian subcontinent. They include both orthodox (astika) systems, namely, the Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa (or Mimamsa), and Vedanta schools of philosophy, and heterodox (nastika) systems, such as Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism. Indian thought has been concerned with various philosophical problems, significant among which are the nature of the world (cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of knowledge (epistemology), ethics, and the philosophy of religion. Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is, essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. In this sense, the concern with epistemology in Indian philosophy may be said to represent a philosophy of being and knowing involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern implicit in epistemology, where the subject-object distinction in the case of a knowledge of the subject breaks down.

UNIT-I

Charvaka System – Epistemology

Introduction

Brhaspati is considered as the traditional founder of the Charvaka system. Charvaka, after whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple of Brhaspati. According to another view, Charvaka is the name of the founder of this school. According to still another view, the word 'Charvaka' is not a proper name, but a common name given to a materialist. Another synonym of Charvaka is Lokayata which means a commoner. Nastika-Shiromani or an 'arch-heretic' is another name for a materialist. They believed only in perception land in four elements. Krsnapati Mishra sums up the teachings of this system thus: 'Lokayata is only Shastra; perception is the only authority, earth, water, fire and air are the only element; enjoyment is the only end of human existence; mind is only a product of matter. There is no other world: death means liberation'. *The Sarva-darshana-sangraha* gives the following summary of the Charvaka system: 'There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the actions of the castes, orders etc. produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves and smearing one's self with ashes, were made by Natures as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to the heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?... if beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sharddha here, then why not gives the food down below to those who are standing on the house top? While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt ; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return here?. All the ceremonies are a means of livelihood for Brahmans. The three authors of Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons'.

Perception

The epistemological doctrine of the Charvaka School is that perception or *Pratyaksa* is the only means of valid knowledge. Perceptions are of two types, for Charvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. Knowledge is the outcome of contact between an external object and one of the five senses, although further knowledge may be acquired through the process of the mind operating with the sense knowledge. Ultimately, then, all knowledge is derived from the senses.

Rejection of inference

The validity even of inference is rejected. Inference is said to be a meres leap in the dark. We precede here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in perceived cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases. Deductive inference is vitiated by the fallacy of *petitio principii*. It is merely an argument in a circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise the validity of which is not proved. Inductive inference undertakes to prove the validity of the major premise of deductive inference. But induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter, is based on a causal relationship which means invariable association or vyäpti. *Vyäpti* therefore is the nerve of all inference. But the Chärväka challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it a mere guess-work. Perception does not prove this *vyäpti*. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to presuppose its validity.

Rejection of testimony

Carvaka rejects the validity of testimony too. Firstly, testimony itself is not a valid means of knowledge and secondly, if testimony proves *vyäpti,* inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge. Induction is uncertain and deduction is argument in a circle. The Chärväka accepts the validity of perception and thereby upholds the truth of the means of valid knowledge, though he rejects all other means of knowledge as invalid.

The crude Chärväka position has been vehemently criticized by all systems of Indian Philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference. To refuse the validity of inference from the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Chärväka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. The Chärväka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived; they can only be inferred. Perception itself which is regarded as valid by the Chärväka is often found untrue. We perceive the earth as flat but it is almost round. We perceive the earth as static but it is moving round the sun. We perceive the disc of the sun as of a small size, but it is much bigger than the size of the earth. Such' perceptual knowledge is contradicted by inference. Moreover, pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot be regarded as a means of knowledge unless conception or thought has arranged into order and has given meaning and significance to the loose threads of sense-data. The Chärväka cannot support his views without giving reasons which presuppose the validity of inference.

UNIT– II

Jainism- Epistemology

Introduction

The word Jainism is derived from 'Jina' which means 'conqueror —one who has conquered his passions and desires. It is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained emancipation. The Jainas believe in 24 Tirthankaras or 'Founders of the Faith through whom their faith has come down from fabulous antiquity. Of these, the first was Rsabhadeva and the last, Mahâvïra, the great spiritual hero, whose name was Vardhamâna. Mahâvïra, the last of the prophets, cannot be regarded as the founder of Jainism, because even before him, Jaina teachings were existent. But Mahâvïra gave a new orientation to that faith and for all practical purposes, modern Jainism may be rightly regarded as a result of his teachings. He flourished in the sixth century B.C. and was a contemporary of the Buddha. His predecessor, the 23rd Tirthankara, Pärshvanätha is also a historical personage who lived in the eighth or ninth century B.C.

Immediate and Mediate

The Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (*aparoksa*) and mediate (*paroksa*). Immediate knowledge is further divided into *Avadhi, Manahparyäya* and *Kevala*; and mediate knowledge into *Mati* and *Shruta*. Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is included under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. Shruta means knowledge derived from authority. Thus *Mati* and *Shruta* which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instruments perception, inference and authority, the three Pramänas admitted by Jainism. *Avadhi-jnäna, Manah- paryäya-jnäna* and *Kevala-jnäna*, are the three kinds of immediate knowledge which may be called extra-ordinary and extra-sensory perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance; *Manahparyäya* is telepathy; and *Kevala* is omniscience. *Avadhi* is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time. It is called *Avadhi* or 'limited' because it functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manah-paryäya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both *Avadhi* and

Manahparyäya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala-jnäna is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object. Besides these five kinds of right knowledge, we have three kinds of wrong knowledge—*Sarhshaya* or doubt, *Viparyaya* or mistake and *Anadhyavasäya* or wrong knowledge through indifference.

Knowledge may again be divided into two kinds, *Pramäna* or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. *Naya* means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called *'naya'*. Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in '*naya*'. There are seven '*naya*s' of which the first four are called '*Artha-naya*' because they relate to objects or meanings, and the last three are called '*Shabda-naya* because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a '*naya*' becomes a fallacy—'*nayäbhäsa'*.

The first is the '*Naigama-naya*'. From this standpoint we look at a thing as having both universal and particular qualities and we do not distinguish between them. It becomes fallacious when both universals and particulars are regarded as separately real and absolute, as is done by Nyäya-Vaishesika. The second is the '*Sangraha-naya'*. Here we emphasize the universal qualities and ignore the particulars where they are manifested. It becomes fallacious when universals alone are treated as absolutely real and particulars are rejected as unreal, as is done by Sänkhya and Advaita Vedanta. The third is the '*Vyavahära-naya*' which is the conventional point of view based on empirical knowledge. Here things are taken as concrete particulars and their specific features are emphasized. It becomes fallacious when particulars alone are viewed as real and universals are rejected as unreal, as is done by Materialism and Buddhist realistic pluralism. The fourth is called '*Rjusütra-naya*. Here the real is identified with the momentary. The particulars are reduced to a series of moments and any given moment is regarded as real. When this partial truth is mistaken to be the whole truth, it becomes fallacious, as in some schools of Buddhism. Among the nayas which refer to words, the first is called '*Shabda-naya*'. It means that a word is necessarily related to the meaning which it signifies. Every word refers either to a thing or quality or relation or action. The second is '*Samabhirüda-naya* which distinguishes terms according to their roots. For example, the word '*Pankaja* literally means 'born of mud' and signifies any creature or plant bom of mud, but its meaning has been conventionally restricted to 'lotus* only. Similarly the word 'gauh' means 'anything which moves', but has conventionally become restricted to signify only a 'cow. The third is called '*Evambhüta-naya* which is a specialized form of the second. According to it, a name should be applied to an object only when its

meaning is fulfilled. For example, a cow should be called 'gauh' only when it moves and not when it is lying down.

Each naya or point of view represents only one of the innumerable aspects possessed by a thing from which we may attempt to know or describe it. When any such partial viewpoint is mistaken for the whole truth, we have a '*nayâbhâsa*' or a fallacy. The 'nayas' are also distinguished as 'Dravyarthika or from the point of view of substance which takes into account the permanent nature and unity of things, and as 'Paryäyäthika' or from the point of view of modes which takes into account the passing modifications and the diversity of things. When a thing is taken to be either as permanent only or as momentary only, either as one only or as many only, fallacies arise.

Syadvada

syädväda which is also called *Sapta-bhangi-naya* is the theory of relativity of knowledge. *Sapta-bhangi-naya* means 'dialectic of the seven steps or 'the theory of seven-fold judgment. The word '*syät*' literally means probable, perhaps, may be. And *Syädväda* is sometimes translated as the theory of probability or the doctrine of the may-be. But it is not in the literal sense of probability that the word *syä*t is used here. Probability suggests scepticism and Jainism is not scepticism. Sometimes the word 'syät is translated as 'somehow'. But this too smacks of agnosticism and Jainism, again, is not agnosticism. The word 'syät is used here in the sense of the relative and the correct translation of Syädväda is the theory of Relativity of knowledge. Reality has infinite aspects which are all relative and we can know only some of these aspects. All our judgments, therefore, are necessarily relative, conditional and limited. 'Syät or 'relatively speaking or 'Viewed from a particular view-point which is necessarily related to other view-points must precede all our judgments. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation both are wrong. All judgments are conditional. This is not a self-contradictory position because the very nature of reality is indeterminate and infinitely complex and because affirmation and negation both are not made from the same standpoint. The difficulty of predication is solved by maintaining that the subject and the predicate are identical from the point of view of substance and different from the point of view of modes. Hence categorical or absolute predication is ruled out as erroneous. All judgments are double-edged. Affirmation presupposes negation as much as negation presupposes affirmation. The infinitely complex reality (*ananta-dharmakam vastu*) admits of all opposite predicates from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal (*sadasadätmakam).* It is universal as well as particular (*vyävrty- anugamätmakam*). It is permanent as well as momentary (*nityänitya- svarupam*). It is one as well as many (*anekamekätmakam).* Viewed from the point of

view of substance, it is real, universal, permanent and one; viewed from the point of view of modes, it is unreal, particular, momentary and many.The Jainas are fond of quoting the old story of the six blind men and the elephant. The blind men put their hands on the different parts of the elephant and each tried to describe the whole animal from the part touched by him. Thus the man who caught the ear said the elephant was like a country-made fan; the person touching the leg said the elephant was like a pillar; the holder of the trunk said it was like a python; the feeler of the tail said it was like a rope; the person who touched the side said the animal was like a wall; and the man who touched the forehead said the elephant was like the breast. And all the six quarreled among themselves, each one asserting that his description alone was correct. But he who can see the whole elephant can easily know that each blind man feels only a part of the elephant which he mistakes to be the whole animal. Almost all philosophical, ideological and religious differences and disputes are mainly due to mistaking a partial truth for the whole truth. Our judgments represent different aspects of the many-sided reality and can claim only partial truth. This view makes Jainism catholic, broad-minded and tolerant. It teaches respect for others' point. We can know an object in three ways through *durniti*, *naya* and *pramäna*. Mistaking a partial truth for the whole and the absolute truth is called '*durniti*' or 'bad judgment', e.g., the insistence that an object is absolutely real (*sadeva*). A mere statement of a relative truth without calling it either absolute or relative is called 'naya' or 'judgment, e.g., the statement that an object is real (sat). A statement of a partial truth knowing that it is only partial, relative and conditional and has possibility of being differently interpreted from different points of view is called '*pramäna*' or 'valid judgment. Every naya in order to become pramäna must be qualified by *syät*. *Syät* is said to be the symbol of truth. It is relative and successive knowledge. It removes all contradictions among different points of view. To reject '*syät*' is to embrace unwarranted absolutism which is directly contradicted by experience.

Everything exists from the point of view of its own substance, space, time and form and it does not exist from the point of view of other's substance, space, time and form. When we say 'This table exists', we cannot mean that this table exists absolutely and unconditionally. Our knowledge of the table is necessarily relative. The table has got innumerable characteristics out of which we can know only some. The table exists in itself as an absolutely real and infinitely complex reality; only our knowledge of it is relative. For us the table must exist in its own matter as made of wood, in its own form as having a particular shape, length, breadth and height, at a particular space and at a particular time. It does not exist in other matter, other form and at other space and time. So a table is both existent and non-existent viewed from different standpoints and there is no contradiction in it.

The Jaina logic distinguishes seven forms of judgment. Each judgment, being relative, is preceded by the word '*syät*'. This is *Syädväda* or *Sapta-bhangi-naya*. The seven steps are as follows:—

(1) *Syädasti*: Relatively, a thing is real.

(2) *Syännästi*: Relatively, a thing is unreal.

(3) *Syädasti nästi* : Relatively, a thing is both real and unreal.

(4) *Syâdavaktavyam* : Relatively, a thing is indescribable.

(5) *Syädasti cha avaktavyam*: Relatively, a thing is real and is indescribable.

(6) *Syânnâsti cha avaktavyam*: Relatively, a thing is unreal and is indescribable.

(7) *Syadasti cha nästi cha avaktavyam* : Relatively, a thing is real, unreal and indescribable.

From the point of view of one's own substance, everything is, while from the point of view of other's substance, everything is not. As we have just remarked that we can know a thing in relation to its own matter, form, space and time as a positive reality, while in relation to other's matter, form, space and time it becomes a negative entity. When we affirm the two different stand-points successively we get the third judgment—a thing is both real and unreal (of course in two different senses). If we affirm or deny both existence and non-existence simultaneously to anything, if we assert or negate the two different aspects of being and non-being together, the thing baffles all description. It becomes indescribable, i.e., either both real and unreal simultaneously or neither real nor unreal. This is the fourth judgment. The remaining three are the combinations of the fourth with the first, second and third respectively.

UNIT- III

Nyaya-Vaishesika - Epistemology

Introduction

The Vaishesika system is next to Sähkhya in origin and is of greater antiquity than the Nyäya. It may be prior to and is certainly not later than Buddhism and Jainism. The word is derived from 'Vishesa' which means particularity or distinguishing feature or distinction. The Vaishesika philosophy, therefore, is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of Vishesa or particularity is dealt with at length in this system, and is regarded as the essence of things.

The founder of this system is Kanada who is also known as Kanabhuk, Ulüka, and Kâshyapa. This system is also called after him as Kanada or Aulüka darshana. He was called Kanada because he used to live as an ascetic on the grains picked up from the fields. Kana (in addition to meaning 'grain') also means a particle or a particular and the word Kanada suggests one who lives on the philosophy of particularity— vishesa. Prashastapâda has written his classical Padärthadharmasahgraha which is called a Bhäsya or Commentary on the *Vaishesikasütra* of Kanada, but is really a very valuable independent treatise. It has been commented upon by Udayana and Shridhara. The Vaishesika was, later on, fused together with the Nyäya which accepted the ontology of the former and developed it in the light of its epistemology. Thus Shivädítya, Laugäksi Bhaskara, Vishvanätha and Annambhatta treat of the two systems together.

The sage Gotama is the founder of Nyäya School. He is also known as Gautama and as Aksapada. Nyäya means argumentation and suggests that the system is predominantly intellectual, analytic, logical and epistemological. It is also called *Tarkashästra* or the science of reasoning; *Pramänashästra* or the science of logic and epistemology; *Hetuvidyä* or the science of causes; *Vädavidyä* or the science of debate; and Ânvïksikï or the science of critical study.

Nyäya is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaishesika system which is regarded as '*Samänatantra*' or similar philosophy. Vaishesika develops metaphysics and ontology; Nyäya develops logic and epistemology. Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as bondage of the soul

and in regarding liberation which is absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaishesika takes up the exposition of reality and Nyäya takes up the exposition of right knowledge of reality. *Nyäya* mostly accepts the Vaishesika metaphysics. But there are some important points of difference between them which may be noted. Firstly, while the Vaishesika recognizes seven categories and classifies all reals under them, the Nyäya recognizes sixteen categories and includes all the seven categories of the Vaishesika in one of them called *Prameya* or the Knowable, the second in the sixteen. The first category is Pramäna or the valid means of knowledge. This clearly brings out the predominantly logical and epistemological character of the Nyäya system. Secondly, while the Vaishesika recognizes only two *Pramänas*—perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal authority to inference, the Nyäya recognizes all the four as separate—perception, inference, comparison and verbal authority.

Perception

Knowledge (*jnäna*) or cognition (*buddhi*) is defined as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (*anubhava*). Nyäya, being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object which are quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects (*arthaprakäsho buddhih*). Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge (*pramä*) is defined as the right apprehension of an object (*yathärthänu- bhavah*). It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyäya maintains the theory of correspondence. Knowledge, in order to be valid, must correspond to reality. Valid knowledge is produced by the four valid means of knowledge—perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid knowledge includes memory (*smrti*), doubt (*samshaya*), error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning *(tarka*). Memory is not valid because it is not presentative cognition but a representative one. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul, but only indirectly recalled. Doubt is uncertainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is no real knowledge. It is arguing like this—'if there were no fire, there cannot be smoke'. When you see a rope as a rope you have right knowledge. If you are uncertain whether it is a rope or a snake, you have doubt. If you recall the rope you have seen, you have memory. If you mistake the rope for a snake, you have error.

Knowledge is produced in the soul when it comes into contact with the not-soul. It is an adventitious property of the soul which is generated in it by the object. If the generating conditions are sound, knowledge is

valid; if they are defective, knowledge is invalid. A man of sound vision sees a conch white, while a man suffering from jaundice secs it yellow. Correspondence with the object is the nature of truth. If knowledge corresponds to its object, it is valid; if it does not, it is invalid. Valid knowledge corresponds to its object (*yathärtha* and *avisamvädi*) and leads to successful activity (p*ravrttisämarthya*). Invalid knowledge does not correspond to its object and leads to failure and disappointment (*pravrttivisamväda*). Fire must bum and cook and shed light. If it does not, it is no fire. Knowledge intrinsically is only a manifestation of objects. The question of its validity or invalidity is a subsequent question and depends upon its correspondence with its object. Truth and falsity are extrinsic characteristics of knowledge. They are apprehended by a subsequent knowledge. They arise and are apprehended only when knowledge has already arisen. They are neither intrinsic nor self-evident. Validity and invalidity of knowledge arise (*utpattau paratah prämänyam*) after knowledge has arisen, and they are known (*jnaptau paratah prämänyam*) after knowledge has arisen and they have also arisen. Correspondence is the content and successful activity is the test of truth. The Nyäya theory of knowledge, therefore, is realistic and pragmatic; realistic as regards the nature and pragmatic as regards the test of truth.

Perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge. Let us consider them one by one. Gotama defines perception as 'non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well-defined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. Hence Vishvanätha has defined perception as 'direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. This definition includes ordinary as well as extra-ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense-organs, the objects, the *manas* and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the *manas*, the manas with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The contact of the sense-organs with the objects is not possible unless the manas first comes into contact with the sense-organs, and the contact of the *manas* with the sense-organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas. Hence sense-object contact necessarily presupposes the *manas*-sense contact and the self-*manas* contact. The sense-organs are derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are manifested by them. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense-organs, the objects, the *manas* and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the *manas*, the *manas* with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The contact of the sense-organs with the objects is not possible unless the *manas* first comes into contact with the sense-organs, and the contact of

the *manas* with the sense-organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the *manas*. Hence sense-object contact necessarily presupposes the manas-sense contact and the self-*manas* contact. The sense-organs are derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are manifested by them. The *manas* is the mediator between the self and the sense-organs. The external object through the senses and the *manas* makes an impression on the self. The theory, therefore, is realistic.

The Naiyäyika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or *nirvikalpa* and the second, determinate or savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later stages in the same complex process of perception. These two stages arc recognized by Gotama in his definition of perception quoted above. Perception is 'unassociated with a name' (avyapadeshya) which means 'indeterminate', and it is 'well-defined' (*vyavasayatmaka*) which means 'determinate'. All perception is determinate, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Nvâva recoenizes the fundamental fact about knowledge which is said to be the distinct contribution of Kant to western philosophy that knowledge involves both sensation and conception. 'Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty.' Perception is a complex process of experience involving both sensation and conception. All perception we have is determinate because it is perceptual knowledge or perceptual judgment. Sensation is the material and conception is the form of knowledge. Bare sensation or simple apprehension is *nirvikalpa* perception; perceptual judgment or relational apprehension is *savikalpa* perception. Nyäya avoids the fallacy of the psychical staircase theory that we have first sense-experience, then conception and then judgment. Perception is a complex presentative-representative process in which we cannot really separate direct awareness from relational judgment. Indeterminate perception forms the material out of which determinate perception is shaped, but they can be distinguished only in thought and not divided in reality. *Nirvikalpa* perception is the immediate apprehension, the bare awareness, the direct sense-experience which is undifferentiated and non-relational and is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The consciousness of the 'that is not yet determined by the consciousness of the 'what'. But as the 'that cannot be really known as separated from the 'what', the 'substance cannot be known apart from its 'qualities', we immediately come to *savikalpa* perception where the mere awareness of the 'that' and the 'what' and their 'inherence' as something undifferentiated, unrelated, dumb and inarticulate, is transformed into differentiated, relational, conceptual and articulate knowledge involving assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. For example, when we go, from broad daylight, into a dark cinema hall to see a matinée show, we first do not see the seats or the audience clearly, but have only a dim sensation of the objects present there which gradually reveal themselves to us ; the dim sense-experience of the objects in the hall is indeterminate perception while the clear perception of them is determinate perception. The

mere apprehension of some object as something, as the 'that', is indeterminate perception, while the clear perception of it together with its attributes is determinate perception. We see in dusk a straight something lying on the road and find out by going near it that it is a rope. We see a white moving object at a distance and when it comes near we see it is a white cow. The earlier stage is indeterminate and the later one determinate perception. We are in a hurry to go somewhere and want to finish our bath before starting. We do not know whether the water was cold and the bath refreshing, though we did feel the coolness of water and the refreshing character of bath. We feel water and we feel its coolness but we do not relate the two. Indeterminate perception presents the bare object without any characterization. In determinate perception we relate the substance with its attributes. The feeling of indeterminate perception is psychological, but its knowledge is logical. As bare awareness, as mere apprehension, we sense indeterminate perception, we feel it, but the moment we try to know it even as 'bare awareness* it has passed into conception and has become determinate. Hence all our perception being a cognition is determinate and is a perceptual judgment. We can separate indeterminate from determinate perception only in thought and not in reality. Hence, though we feel indeterminate perception as a psychological state of sense-experience, its knowledge even as indeterminate perception is a result of logical deduction. We do feel it directly but only as an awareness, not as a cognition. Mere apprehension, being infra-relational, cannot be cognized. As cognition it is inferred afterwards when conception has transformed mere sensation into a perceptual judgment.

Vätsyäyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception; if it is perceived without its name, we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universal as separate and indistinct something and is devoid of any association with a name, while determinate perception apprehends all these together with a name. Gangesha Upädhyäya defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object devoid of all association of name, genus, differentia etc. Annam Bhatta defines it as the immediate apprehension of an object as well as of its qualities, but without the knowledge of the relation between them. The substance and the qualities, the 'that' and the 'what are felt separately and it is not apprehended that those qualities inhere in that substance or that the 'what characterizes the 'that. Indeterminate perception is 'mere acquaintance which William James calls 'raw un-verbalized experience', while determinate perception is relational apprehension.

Perception, again, may be ordinary (*laukika*) or extraordinary (*alau- kika*). When the sense-organs come into contact with the objects present to them in the usual way, we have *Laukika* perception. And if the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is in an unusual way, i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium, we have *Alaukika* perception. Ordinary perception is

of two kinds—internal (*mänasa*) and external (*bähya*). In internal perception, the mind *(manas*) which is the internal organ comes into contact with the psychical states and processes like cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place when the five external organs of sense come into contact with the external objects. It is of five kinds—visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory and olfactory, brought about by the sense- organs of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively when they come into contact with the external objects. The external sense-organs are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether and therefore each senses the particular quality of its element. Thus the sense-organ of smell is composed of the atoms of earth and perceives smell which is the specific quality of earth and so on.

Extra-ordinary perception is of three kinds—*sämänyalaksana, jnänalaksana* and *yogaja. Sämänyalaksana* perception is the perception of the universals. According to Nyäya, the universal are a distinct class of reals. They inhere in the particulars which belong to different classes on account of the different universals inhering in them. An individual belongs to a particular class because the universal of that class inheres in it. Thus a cow becomes a cow because it has the universal cowness inhering in it. Ordinarily we perceive only the particulars and not the universals. We perceive particular cows but we do not perceive a 'universal cow. Hence the Nyäya maintains that the universals are perceived extraordinarily. Whenever we perceive a particular cow we first perceive the 'universal cowness' inhering in it. The second kind of extraordinary perception is called *jnänalaksana* perception. It is the 'complicated' perception through association. Sometimes different sensations become associated and form one integrated perception. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation. For example, I look at a blooming rose from a distance and say 'I see a fragrant rose'. But how can fragrance be seen} It can only be smelt. Fragrance can be perceived by the sense-organ of smell and not by the sense-organ of vision which can perceive only colour. Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory the idea of fragrance by association, which was perceived in the past through the nose. The perception of the fragrant rose through the eye, therefore, is called *jnänalaksana* perception or perception revived in memory through the cognition (*jnäna*) of the object in the past. Other examples of it are: 'the piece of sandalwood looks fragrant', 'ice looks cold', 'stone looks hard', 'tea looks hot', etc. etc. The theory of illusion accepted by Nyäya called '*Anyathäkhyäti* is based on this kind of perception. When we mistake a rope for a snake» the idea of snake perceived in the past is imported in memory through this extraordinary j*nänalaksana* perception and is confused with the object (i.e., rope) which is directly presented to the sense-organ. When shell is mistaken for silver the idea of silver perceived in the past in a shop (*äpanastha*) (or anywhere else) is revived in memory through jnanalaksaiia perception and is confused with the object (i.e., shell) which is directly presented to the sense-organ. The past impression represents the

object to our mind. Error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word '*anyathä*' means 'elsewise and 'elsewhere and both these senses are brought out in an erroneous perception. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. The shell and the silver, the rope and the snake are both separately real; only their synthesis is unreal. The shell and the rope are directly presented as the 'this (when we say: 'this is silver or 'this is a snake), while the silver and the snake exist elsewhere and are revived in memory through jnänalaksana perception. The third kind of extraordinary perception is called yogaja perception. This is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present and future, possessed by the Yogins through the power of meditation. It is like the *Kevalajnäna* of the Jainas, the Bodhi of the Buddhists, the Kaivalya of the Särtkhya-Yoga and the *Aparoksänubhüti* of the Vedäntins. It is intuitive, supra-sensuous and supra-relational.

Inference

The second kind of knowledge is *anumä* or inferential or relational and its means is called *anumäna* or inference. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a 'mark, the 'middle term *(linga or hetu*) which is invariably connected with the 'major term (*sädhya*). It is knowledge (*mäna*) which arises after *(anu*) other knowledge. Invariable concomitance (*vyâpti or avinäbhävaniyama*) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called paksadharmatä. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called *vyâpti*. The knowledge of *paksadharmata* as qualified by *vyâpti* is called *parämarsha*. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through *parämarsha*, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor (*paksa- dharmatä*) and is invariably associated with the major (vyäpti). Like the Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called *sädhya, paksa* and *linga* or hetu respectively. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire (vyäpti) and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill is the minor term; fire is the major term; smoke is the middle term. From the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of fire in the hill. This is inference. Indian logic does^not separate Reduction from induction. Inference_is a complex process involving both. Indian logic also rejects the verbalist view of logic. It studies thought as such and not the forms of thought alone. The formal and the material logic are blended here. Verbal form forms no integral part of the inference. This becomes clear from the division of inference into *svärtha* (for oneself) and *parärtha* (for others). In the former we do not require the formal statement of the different members of inference. It is a psychological process. The latter, the parärtha which is a syllogism, has to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others. There are five members in the Nyäya syllogism. The first is called Pratijnä or proposition. It is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is Hetu or 'reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is called *Udäharana* which gives the universal concomitance together with an example. The fourth is *Upanaya* or the application of the universal concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is *Nigamana* or

conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five propositions of the Indian syllogism are called 'members or *avayava*s. The following is a typical Nyäya syllogism:

(1) This hill has fire (*pratijnä*).

(2) Because it has smoke (*hetu*).

(3) Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven (*udäharana*).

(4) This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire (*upanaya*).

(5) Therefore this hill has fire (*nigamana*).

If we compare it with the Aristotelian syllogism which has only three propositions, we will find that this Nyäya syllogism corresponds to the Barbara (AAA) mood of the First Figure which is the strongest mood of the strongest figure. Though the Nyäya syllogism has five and the Aristotelian has three propositions, the terms in both are only three— the *sädhya* or the major, the *paksa* or the minor and the *hetu* or the middle. Out of the five propositions, two appear redundant and we may easily leave out either the first two or the last two which are essentially the same. The first coincides with the fifth and the second with the fourth. If we omit the last two the first three propositions correspond with the conclusion, the minor premise and the major premise respectively. Or, if we omit the first two, the last three propositions correspond to the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism. Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyäya syllogism which are contained in the last two, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism in the First Figure:

(1) All things which have smoke have fire (Major premise).

(2) This hill has smoke (Minor premise).

(3) Therefore this hill has fire (Conclusion).

And the typical Aristotelian syllogism may be stated in the Nyäya form thus:

(1) Socrates is mortal (*pratijnä*).

(2) Because he is a man (hetu).

(3) Whoever is a man is a mortal, e.g., Pythagoras (udäharana).

(4) Socrates is a man who is invariably a mortal (*upanaya*).

(5) Therefore Socrates is mortal (*nigamana*).

But there are certain real differences between the Nyäya and the Aristotelian syllogism apart from the nominal difference between the numbers of the propositions in each. The Aristotelian syllogism is only deductive and formal, while the Nyäya syllogism is deductive-inductive and formal-material. The Nyäya rightly regards deduction and induction as inseparably related, as two aspects of the same process—the truth now realized in western logic. Inference, according to Nyäya, is neither from the universal to the particular nor from the particular to the universal, but from the particular to the particular through the universal. The example is a special feature of the Nyäya syllogism and illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of a real induction based on the law of causation and that induction and deduction cannot be really separated. Again, while in the Aristotelian syllogism the major and the minor terms stand apart in the premises though they are connected by the middle term with each other, in the Nyäya syllogism all the three terms stand synthesized in the Upanaya. Again, while the Aristotelian syllogism is verbalistic, the Nyäya recognizes the fact that verbal form is not the essence of inference and is required only to convince others. There are also certain fundamental differences between the two views and the view of Nyäya is accepted as better by the modern western logicians also. The view that *vyäpti*, the nerve of inference, was introduced by the Buddhist logician Dinnäga who was influenced by Greek thought is also wrong. *Vyäpti* was recognized much before Dinnäga, nor did he 'borrow his doctrine from Greece. It is more reasonable to explain the similarities between the two as due to a parallel development of thought. Indian logic has been a natural growth.

There are five characteristics of the middle term:

(1) It must be present in the minor term (*paksadharmatâ*); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.

(2) It must be present in all positive instances in which the major term is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists (*sapaksasattva*).

(3) It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist (*vipaksäsattva*).

(4) It must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (*abädhita*).

(5) It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact of being caused' should not be used to prove the 'eternality of sound (*aviruddha*).

Inference is generally regarded as of two kinds—*Svärtha* and *Parärtha* which we have already discussed. Gotama speaks of three kinds of inference—*pûrvavat, shesavat* and *sämänyatodrsta*. The first two are based on causation and the last one on mere coexistence. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause. When we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause we have *pûrvavat* inference, e.g., when we infer future rain from dark clouds in the sky. When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect we have *shesavat* inference, e.g., when we infer past rain from the swift muddy flooded water of a river. When inference is based not on causation but on uniformity of co-existence, it is called *sämänyatodrsta*, e.g., when we infer cloven hoofs of an animal by its horns. According to another interpretation, a *pûrvavat* inference is based on previous experience of universal concomitance between two things, a *shesavat* inference is parishesa or inference by elimination, and a *sämänyatodrsta* is inference by analogy.

Another classification of inference gives us the *kevalänvayi, kevalavy- atireki* and *anvayavyatireki* inferences. It is based on the nature of vyäpti and on the different methods of establishing it. The methods of induction by which universal causal relationship is established may be *anvaya, vyatireka* or both. The first corresponds to Mill's Method of Agreement, the second to his Method of Difference, and the third to his Joint Method of Agreement and Difference or the Method of Double Agreement. We have *kevalänvayi* inference when the middle term is always positively related to the major term. The terms agree only in presence, there being no negative instance of their agreement in absence, e.g.,

All knowable objects are nameable;

The pot is a knowable object;

The pot is nameable.

We have *kevalavyatireki* inference when the middle term is the differentium of the minor term and is always negatively related to the major term. The terms agree only in absence, there being no positive instance of their agreement in presence, e.g.,

What is not different-from-other-elements has no smell;

The earth has smell;

The earth is different-from-other-elements.

We have *anvayavyatireki* inference when the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. The vyäpti between the middle and the major is in respect of both presence and absence. There is Double Agreement between the terms—they agree in presence in the positive instances and they also agree in absence in the negative instances; e.g.,

All things which have smoke have fire;

This hill has smoke;

.'. This hill has fire; and

No non-fiery things have smoke;

This hill has smoke;. This hill is not non-fiery; i.e., This hill has fire.

In Indian logic a fallacy is called *hetvâbhasa*. It means that the middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the five characteristics of a valid middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

(i) *Asiddha* or *Sädhyasama*: This is the fallacy of the unproved middle. The middle term must be present in the minor term (paksadharmatä). If it is not, it is unproved. It is of three kinds—

(a) *äshrayäsiddha* : The minor term is the locus of the middle term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term cannot be present in it; e.g., 'the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus of a lake'.

(b*) svarüpäsiddha* : Here the minor term is not unreal. But the middle term cannot by its very nature be present in the minor term; e.g., 'sound is a quality, because it is visible'. Here visibility cannot belong to sound which is audible.

(c) *vyäpyatväsiddha* : Here vyâpti is conditional (*sopädhika*). We cannot say, e.g., 'wherever there is fire there is smoke'. Fire smokes only when it is associated with wet fuel. A red-hot iron ball or clear fire does not smoke. Hence 'association with wet fuel is a condition necessary to the aforesaid vyâpti. Being conditioned, the middle term becomes fallacious if we say: 'The hill has smoke because it has fire'.

(2) *Savyabhichära or Anaikäntika*: This is the fallacy of the irregular middle. It is of three kinds :

(a) Sädharana: Here the middle term is too wide. It is present in both the *sapaksa* (positive) and the *vipaksa* (negative) instances and violates the rule that the middle should not be present in the negative instances (*vipak-säsattva*); e.g., 'the hill has fire because it is knowable'. Here 'knowable is present in fiery as well as non-fiery objects.

(è) *Asädhärana*: Here the middle term is too narrow. It is present only in the paksa and neither in the sapaksa nor in the vipaksa. It violates the rule that the middle term should be present in the sapaksa (sapaksasattva); e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is audible. Here audibility belongs to sound only and is present nowhere else.

(c) *Anupasarhhäri* : Here the middle term is non-exclusive. The minor term is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksa or vipaksa; e.g., 'all things are noneternal, because they are knowable.

(3) *Satpratipakça* : Here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term. The reason is counter-balanced by another reason. And both are of equal force; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is audible and 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced. Here 'audible is counter-balanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force.

(4) *Bâdhita*: It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle. Here the middle term is contradicted by some other pramäna and not by inference. It cannot prove the major term which is disproved by another stronger source of valid knowledge; e.g., 'fire is cold, because it is a substance. Here the middle term 'substance becomes contradicted because its major term 'coldness is directly contradicted by perception.

(5) *Viruddha*: It is the contradictory middle. The middle term, instead of being pervaded by the presence of the major term, is pervaded by the absence of the major term. Instead of proving the existence of the major term in the minor term, it proves its non-existence therein; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is produced. Here 'produced, instead of proving the eternality of sound, proves its non-eternality. Here the middle term itself disproves the original proposition and proves its contradictory, while in the *savyabhichära* the middle term only fails to prove the conclusion, and in the satpratipaksa the middle term is inferentially contradicted by another middle term both of which are of equal force, and in the *bâdhita* the middle term is non-inferentially contradicted and the major is disproved by a stronger *pramäna* other than inference.

Comparison

The third kind of valid cognition is *Upamiti* and its means is called *Upamâna*. It is knowledge derived from comparison and roughly corresponds to analogy. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. For example, a

man who has never seen a *gavaya* or a wild cow and does not know what it is, is told by a person that a wild cow is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then his knowledge is due to *upamâna*. He has heard the word '*gavaya* and has been told that it is like a cow and now he himself sees the object denoted by the word '*gavaya* and recognizes it to be so. Hence *upamâna* is just the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name. It is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as a'*gavaya* when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description that 'a *gavaya* is an animal like a cow.

The Buddhists reduce *Upamäna* to perception and testimony. The Sänkhya and the Vaishesika reduce it to inference. The Jainas reduce it to recognition or *pratyabhijnä*. The Mimâmsakas recognize it as a separate source of knowledge, but their account of it is different from that of Nyäya, which will be considered in the chapter on *Mimämsä*.

Verbal Testimony

The fourth kind of valid knowledge is *Shabda* or *Agama* or authoritative verbal testimony. Its means is also called Shabda. It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (äptaväkya) and consists in understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning. The power in a word to convey its meaning comes, according to ancient Nyäya, from God, and according to later Nyäya, from long established convention. Testimony is always personal. It is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Testimony is of two kinds— *Vaidika* and secular (*laukika*). The *Vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God; secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of trustworthy persons who always speak the truth are valid; others are not. A word is a potent symbol which signifies an object and a sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These conditions are four—*äkänksä, yogyatä, sannidhi* and *tätparya*. The first is mutual implication or expectancy. The words of a sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in order to express a complete sense. A mere aggregate of unrelated words will not make a logical sentence. It will be sheer nonsense, e.g., 'cow horse man elephant. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning. 'Water the plants with fire is a contradictory sentence. The third condition is the close proximity of the words to one another. The words must be spoken in quick succession without long intervals. If the words 'bring, 'a, and 'cow are uttered at long intervals they would not make a

logical sentence. The fourth condition is the intention of the speaker if the words are ambiguous. For example, the word *'saindhava'* means 'salt as well as a 'horse. Now, if a man who is taking his food asks another to bring '*saindhava*, the latter should not bring a horse.

The Nyäya admits only these four *pramänas. Arthäpatti* or implication is reduced to inference. For example, when we say: 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during day', the implication is that he must be eating during night otherwise how can he be fat? Mïmâmsâ grants the status of an independent *pramäna* to implication. But Nyäya reduces it to inference thus:

All fat persons who do not eat during day, eat during night;

Devadatta is a fat person who does not eat during day;

Devadatta is a fat person who eats during night.

Abhâva or non-existence which also is regarded as a separate *pramäna* by Bhâtta Mïmâmsâ is reduced here either to perception or to inference. Abhâva is non-existence of a thing and the same sense-organ which perceives a thing, perceives its non-existence also. If the thing is imperceptible and can only be inferred, then, its non-existence too may be equally inferred.

UNIT – IV

Purva Mimamsa- Epistemology

INTRODUCTION

The word 'Mïmâmsâ' literally means 'revered thought' and was originally applied to the interpretation of the Vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence. The word is now used in the sense of any critical investigation. The school of Mïmâmsâ justifies both these meanings by giving us rules according to which the commandments of the Veda are to be interpreted and by giving a philosophical justification for the Vedic ritualism. Just as Sânkhya and Yoga, Vaishesika and Nyäya are regarded as allied systems, similarly Mïmâmsâ and Vedanta are also treated as allied systems of thought. Both are based on and both try to interpret the Veda. The earlier portion of the Veda, i.e., the Mantra and the Brähmana portion, is called Karmakända, while the later portion, i.e., the Upanisads is called Jnänakända, because the former deals with action, with the rituals and the sacrifices, while the latter deals with the knowledge of reality. Mimämsä deals with the earlier portion of the Veda and is therefore called Pürva-Mïmâmsâ and also Karma-Mïmâmsâ, while Vedäntä deals with the later portion of the Veda and is therefore called Uttara-Mïmâmsâ and also Jnâna- Mîmâmsâ. The former deals with Dharma and the latter with Brahma and therefore the former is also called Dharma-Mimämsä, while the latter is also called Brahma-Mïmâmsâ. There has been a long line of pre-Shankarite teachers of Vedanta of whom Mandana Mishra seems to be the last, who have regarded Mïmâmsâ and Vedânta as forming a single system and who have advocated the combination of action and knowledge, known as Karma-Jnâna-samuchchaya-vâda. According to them, the sütras, beginning with the first sütra of Jaimini and ending with the last sütra of Bâdarâyana, form one compact shästra. These teachers held that Karma (action) and Upâsanâ (meditation) were absolutely essential to hasten the dawn of true knowledge. Even the great Shankarächärya who treated action and knowledge as being absolutely opposed like darkness and light and who relegated Karma to the sphere of Avidyä, had to admit that Karma and Upâsanâ do purify the soul, though they are not the direct cause of liberation and that therefore the study of Pörva Mimämsä, though not essential for the study of Vedanta, was a good means for the purification of the soul. In this connection it is also important to remember that it is the great Mimämsaka Kumärila Bhatta himself who may be rightly regarded as the link between the Purva and the Uttara Mimämsä.

Ramanuja and Bhäskara believe that the Pörva and Uttara Mimämsäs together form one science and the study of the former is necessary before undertaking the study of the latter. Madhva and Vallabha, though they make devotion to God as a necessary prerequisite for the study of Vedanta, yet believe that Vedanta is a continuation of Mimämsä.

Purva Mïmamsâ regards the Veda as eternal and authorless and of infallible authority. It is essentially a book of ritual dealing with commandments prescribing injunctions or prohibitions. Greatest importance is attached to the Brähmana portion of the Veda to which both the Mantras and the Upanisads are subordinated. The aim of the Mîmâmsâ is to supply the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical justification for the views contained therein. The work of finding the principles for the right interpretation of the Vedic texts was undertaken by the Brähmanas themselves and mainly by the *Shrauta-sutras*. Mimämsä continues this work. But had it done only that, it would have been, at best, only a commentary on the Vedic ritual. The main thing which entitles it to the rank of a philosophical system is its keen desire to provide philosophical justification for the Vedic views and to replace the earlier ideal of the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) by the ideal of obtaining liberation (*apavarga).* It undertakes a thorough investigation into the nature and validity of knowledge and into the various means which produce valid knowledge and also into other metaphysical problems. Curious though it may seem, the Mimämsä has been much influenced by the Nyäya- Vaishesika school, many important doctrines of which it has either borrowed or rejected.

The earliest work of this system is the *Mimämsä-sutra* of Jaimini which begins with an inquiry into the nature of Dharma. It is the biggest of all the philosophical sutras and discusses about one thousand topics. Shabarasvämin has written his great commentary on this work and his commentary has been explained by Prabhäkara and Kumärila Bhatta who differ from each other in certain important respects and form the two principle schools of Mîmâmsâ named after them. Prabhäkara's commentary Brhati has been commented upon by Shälikanätha who has also written another treatise *Prakarana-panchikä*. Kumärila's huge work is divided into three parts—*Shlokavärtika, Tantravärtika and Tuptïkâ*, the first of which has been commented upon by Pärthasärathi Mishra who has also written his *Shâstradipikâ*. Tradition makes Prabhäkara a pupil of Kumärila who nicknamed him as 'Guru on account of his great intellectual powers. But some scholars like Dr. Gangänätha Jha believe that the Prabhäkara school is older and seems to be nearer the spirit of the original Mïmâmsâ.

Perception

Both Prabhäkara and Kumârila regard knowledge itself as pramäna or means of knowledge. Jaimini admits three pramänas—perception, inference and testimony. Prabhäkara adds two more—comparison and implication. Kumârila further adds non-apprehension. Let us consider these one by one. Both Prabhäkara and Kumârila recognize two kinds of knowledge— immediate and mediate. Perception is regarded as immediate knowledge by both and both admit two stages in perception—indeterminate and determinate. Prabhäkara defines perception as direct apprehension (*sâksât pratîtih pratyaksam*). Kumârila defines it as direct knowledge produced by the proper contact of the sense-organs with the presented objects, which is free from defects. Mîmâmsâ broadly agrees with Nyäya in its view of perception. The self comes into contact with the mind (manas); the mind comes into contact with the sense-organ; and the sense-organ Comes into contact with the external object. We have already dealt with the account of perception in the Nyäya system and need not repeat it here. We may only note the main differences between the Nyäya and the Mîmâmsâ account of perception. The Mîmârhsaka regards the auditory organ as proceeding from space (dik) while the Naiyäyika regards it as proceeding from ether (*äkäsha*). Again, according to Nyäya, the indeterminate perception is a stage inferred afterwards as a hypothesis to account for the determinate perception. All perception is determinate and indeterminate perception serves no fruitful purpose; it is inferred as a necessary earlier stage in the complex process of perception. But the Mimämsaka regards it as part of normal experience.

It is the vague, indefinite and primitive stage of perception, the awareness of the ‘that without its relation to the ‘what, which gains clarity and definiteness afterwards when it becomes determinate. But like the determinate perception, indeterminate perception also serves a fruitful purpose. It is the basis of activity for children and animals and even adults whose mental growth is imperfect. Even normal adults act upon it when they are in a hurry and confusion. In determinate perception, the self apprehends the pure object (*shuddha vastu*) and though the genuine and the specific characters are given in it, their relation to the object is not perceived. It is the bare awareness (*älochana- mätra*) which is non-relational and therefore indeterminate.

Inference

Anumāṇa means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of *Anumana*. All schools of Indian Philosophy except Charvaka accept this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained as consisting of three

parts: *pratijna* (hypothesis), *hetu* (reason),and *drshtanta* (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: *sadhya* (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and *paksha* (the object on which the *sadhya* is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if *sapaksha* (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if *vipaksha* (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand *Vyapti* - the requirement that the *hetu* (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both *sapaksha* and *vipaksha*. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a *nigamana* (conclusion).

Comparison

The Mimämsä view of comparison or *Upamäna* differs from the Nyäya view. According to Nyäya, comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word (*samjnä-samjnisambandhajnäna*). It is the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a cow. The knowledge is like this—'the perceived wild cow is like the remembered cow (*gosadrsho gavayah*). The Mimämsaka refutes this account of comparison. He points out that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority (e.g., by the words of the person who tells that a wild cow is similar to a cow) and not by comparison. It is known through the recollection of what was learnt from the verbal authority of the person. And the knowledge of the wild cow itself is due to perception and not comparison. Hence comparison, according to Mimämsä, apprehends the similarity of the remembered cow to the perceived wild cow. This knowledge is like this: 'the remembered cow is like the perceived wild cow (gavayasadrshi gauh). It is the cow as possessing similarity with the wild cow that is known by comparison. A person need not be told by anybody that a wild cow is similar to a cow. Any person who has seen a cow and happens to see a wild cow himself remembers the cow as similar to the wild cow he is perceiving. This knowledge of similarity is comparison. It is distinguished from inference because the *vyäpti* or the invariable concomitance is not needed here.

Verbal Testimony

Shabda-pramana has got the greatest importance in Mîmâmsâ. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumärila divides testimony into personal (*pauruseya*) and impersonal (*apauruseya*). The former is the testimony of the trustworthy persons (*äptaväkya*). The latter is the testimony of the Veda (*Vedavâkya*). It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. It may be vitiated by doubt and error and may be contradicted afterwards. The Veda is eternal and authorless. It is not the work of any person, human or divine. The sages are only the 'seers not the authors of the Veda. The Veda is not composed or spoken even by God. The Veda deals with Dharma and the objects denoted by it cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of valid knowledge. Hence the Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. And there can be no internal contradictions in the Veda itself. Hence the Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabhâkara admits only Vedic testimony as real testimony and reduces human testimony to inference because its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. Again, testimony may give us knowledge of the existent objects (*siddhârtha vâkya*) or may command us to do something (*vidhäyaka väkya*). Kumärila admits the distinction between existential and injunctive propositions and limits the scope of the Veda to the latter (*abhihitänvayaväda*). The Veda deals with injunctions. Prohibitions are injunctions in disguise. The Veda commands us to do certain things and to refrain from doing certain things. It deals with the supra-sensible dharma or duty. If we follow the Vedic commands we incur merit and if we do not, we incur demerit. Action, therefore, is the final import of the Veda. The Veda is broadly divided into *Vidhi- väda* or injunctions and *Arthaväda* or explanations. The existential or the assertive propositions of the Veda are merely explanatory passages which explain the injunctions of the Veda which are its final import. Prabhäkara takes a strictly pragmatic view of all knowledge. Knowledge leads to successful activity. Action is the only import of knowledge. He, therefore, refuses to accept that knowledge deals with existent things. All propositions must be injunctive. All knowledge, whether Vedic or secular, points to activity. The so-called assertive or explanatory propositions in the Veda are authoritative only when they help persons to perform their duties (*anvitäbhidhänaväda*).

Testimony is verbal cognition and is derived from the meanings of words which compose sentences. To uphold the eternality and the authorlessness of the Veda, the Mimämsaka puts forward the theory that words and meanings as well as their relation are all natural and eternal. A word (*shabda*) is made of two or more letters *(varna*) and is a mere aggregate of the letters and not a whole (*avayavi*), though the letters must occur in a

particular order. A varna is regarded as an articulated sound. It is eternal (*nitya*), omnipresent (sarva-gata) and integral (*niravayava*). It is different from its sound (*dhvani*) if it is spoken and also different from its symbolic form (*rupa*) if it is written. The sound and the form are merely its accidental features which reveal it. A *varna* is eternal and immutable, while its dhvani and rüpa are momentary and changing. If many varnas are spoken, they are manifested through a temporal series of utterances; if they are written, they are manifested through a spatial series of written symbols. The sound and the symbol are only the vehicles of the manifestation of the eternal *varna*. When a *varna* is pronounced or written in ten different ways, there are not ten different varnas, but only ten different manifestations of the same *varna*. Therefore a word which is an aggregate of two or more eternal varnas is itself eternal. A word does not signify the particular things which come into existence and pass away, but the eternal universals underlying these particulars. Hence the meanings or the objects denoted by words, being universals, are eternal and unchanging. And the relation between a word and its meaning also, being natural, necessary, inseparable and internal, is eternal and unchanging. This relation is not conventional. It is due neither to God's will nor to convention as the old and the modern schools of Nyäya respectively believe. It is natural and eternal. Language is not a creation of the human or even the divine mind. Philology is a natural science. The conventional element in language is secondary (*sahakäri*) and helps the manifestation of the eternal words and their meanings, just as light helps the manifestation of sight. The Naiyäyika also believes in the authority of the Veda, but he regards the Veda as the work of God and so challenges the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda. According to him, words are not eternal and language is due to the divine will or to convention. The Mïmâmsaka refutes this view and points out that only the sounds and the symbols are created and destroyed, while the real words are eternal. Words are manifested through human efforts. The sounds and the symbols are the vehicles of the manifestation of the eternal words.

UNIT-V

Sankara's Advaita System-Epistemology

INTRODUCTION

Shankara's epistemology, his followers in general accepted the point of view of the Mimamsa of Kumarila's school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, nonperception, and postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner sense in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by respective mental modifications. The truth of cognitions is regarded as intrinsic to them, and a knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not rejected as false. In perception a sort of identity is achieved between the form of the object and the form of the inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said to assume the form of the object. In their theory of inference, the Nyaya five-membered syllogism is rejected in favor of a three-membered one. Furthermore, the sort of inference admitted by the Nyaya, in which the major term is universally present, is rejected because nothing save Brahman has this property according to the system.

The quintessence of Advaita philosophy is given out by Shankara in his famous line: *Brahma satyam jaganmithya jivobrahmaiva naparah* – Brahman is real, the world is unreal and the individual self is non-different from Brahman. Let us begin with the mechanism of knowing; which involves a knower (*pramata*), means of knowing (*pramana*) and object of knowledge (*prameya*) that give rise to valid knowledge (*prama*). The means of knowledge, according to Advaita, are six and they are perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), comparison (*upamana*), postulation (*arthapatti*), nonapprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and testimony (*shabda*). A *pramana* is defined as that which gives rise to the knowledge of an entity which is hitherto unknown or concealed by *avidya* and which is not sublated subsequently. In this sense, *shabda* alone is considered to be a *pramana* which gives rise to Brahman-knowledge and all other *pramana* deal with the material world. The other means of knowledge cannot reveal Brahman since Brahman is not an object of knowledge.

Perception

According to Advaita, in the perception of an external object, the mind goes out through the sense organ, say the 'eyes' and reaches the place of the object, say a 'pot' and assumes the shape of the pot which modifies into the thought 'pot'. This modification is known as vrtti. The pervasion of vrtti removes the veil of ignorance (vrttivyapti) and the pervasion of reflected consciousness illumines the object (*phalavyapti*), which is expressed as 'This is a pot'. The capacity of the mind to illumine an object is because of the reflection of Consciousness (Brahman) in the mind. The knowledge of experiences like happiness, sorrow etc. that occur in the mind without

the aid of sense organs is known by the 'witness consciousness.' There is a mental modification internally that is expressed as 'I am happy' etc. The knowledge of self or Brahman cannot be gained by perceptual cognition since Brahman can never be objectified. When we say, words reveal Brahman, *vrttivyapti* alone functions and not *phalavyapti,* since Brahman is self-evident luminous being, hence the knowledge of Brahman is known as svarupajnana or knowledge of nature of self as opposed to *vrtti-jnana* or empirical knowledge.

Inference

Inference is the means of inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*). The latent impression of the invariable concomitance is the intermediate operation (*vyapara*). The inferential knowledge that 'the hill has fire' arises when one sees the smoke (*hetu*) in a hill (*paksha*), which arouses the latent impression of the invariable concomitance 'where there is smoke there is fire', and by this application one gains the inferential knowledge that the hill has fire (*sadhya*). Brahman cannot be known by inference because of absence of hetu to determine Brahman. According to Advaita, the falsity of the world can be shown through inference by the following syllogism:

Scriptural Testimony

The verbal testimony is defined as that 'sentence in which the relation among the meaning of words, that is the object of its intention, is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge'. According to Advaita, the purport of the scriptures is Attributless Brahman (*Nirguna Brahman*) which is known by scrutinizing the intention of scriptures based on six indicatory marks, they are, Introduction-Conclusion (*upakrama-upasamhara*), Repetition (*abhyasa*), Uniqueness (*apurvata*), Result (*phala*), Eulogy (*arthavada*) and Logical presentation (*upapatti*). A word can reveal its meaning in the primary sense and in cases where primary sense is unfitting, they are known by their secondary sense. Deriving the meaning of a word through its secondary implication is of three kinds, namely, Exclusive (*jahallakshana*), Inclusive (*ajahallakshana*) and Exclusive-Inclusive (*jahalajahallakshan*a). The identity statements (*mahavakya*), according to Advaita, reveals the identity meaning by the application of exclusive-inclusive implication.

Knowledge and action

Shankara repeatedly asserts that the Absolute can be realized through knowledge and knowledge alone; karma and *upäsanä* are subsidiary. They may help us in urging us to know Reality and they may prepare us for that knowledge by purifying our mind (*sattvashuddhi*), but ultimately it is knowledge alone which, by destroying ignorance, the root-cause of this world, can enable us to be one with the Absolute. The opposition of knowledge and action stands firm like a mountain. They are contradictory (*viparite*) and are poles apart. Those who talk of combining knowledge with action, says Shankara, have perhaps not read the *Brhadäranyaka* nor are they aware of the glaring contradiction repeatedly pointed out by the *Shruti* and the *Smrti*. Knowledge and action are opposed like light and darkness. Actions are prescribed for those who are still in ignorance and not for those who are enlightened. Knowledge only removes ignorance and then Reality shines forth by itself. A liberated sage, however, performs actions without any attachment and works for the uplift of humanity. Shankara's own life bears ample witness to this fact.

Knowledge and liberation

Ultimate Reality (*päramärthikam vastu*) can neither be asserted nor denied by knowledge. Knowledge does nothing else except removing ignorance. *Shästra* only generates right knowledge (*jnäpakam*). It does nothing else (*na kârakam*).

Knowledge of Brahman, which leads to eternal bliss, does not depend on the performance of any act, for Brahman is already an accomplished fact. Religious acts which lead to prosperity depend on human performance. Religious texts enjoin injunctions or prohibitions. Knowledge merely instructs. Knowledge of Brahman culminates in immediate experience and is already an accomplished fact. Action, whether secular or Vedic, can be done, miss-done or left undone. Injunctions, prohibitions, options, rules and exceptions depend on our thinking. But knowledge leaves no option to us for its being this or that or for its existence or non-existence. It is not in our hands to make, unmake, or change knowledge. Our thinking cannot make a pillar a man. Knowledge of Brahman, - therefore, depends on Brahman itself. It is always of the same nature because it depends on the existent thing.True knowledge is produced by Pramänas and conforms to its objects. It can neither be produced by hundreds of injunctions nor can it be destroyed by hundreds of prohibitions. Knowledge is not mental activity, because it depends not on mind but on the existent fact. There is also no succession in knowledge. Once it dawns, it dawns forever and at once removes all ignorance and consequently all bondage. Liberation, therefore, means removal of ignorance by knowledge. That blessed person who has realized Reality is liberated here and now. The *Shruti* says: 'just as a slough cast off by a snake lies on an ant-hill, similarly does this body lie.' This is Jivanmuki. Final release (*Videhamukti*) is obtained after the death of the body. The Shrudi says 'the only delay for him is the death of the body'. Just as a potter's wheel goes on revolving for some time even after the push is

withdrawn, similarly the body may continue to exist even after knowledge has dawned, though all attachment with the body is cut off. Like an arrow shot from the bow, the body continues to reap the fruits and it expires; but no new actions are accumulated.

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