

# A Project in Modern Cryptography

## Homomorphic Encryption Systems

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# Presentation Overview

- ▶ Personal Background
- ▶ Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption
- ▶ Project
  - ▶ Requirements
  - ▶ Construction
  - ▶ Accomplishments
- ▶ Next Steps
- ▶ Acknowledgments

# Personal Background for this Project

- ▶ BS in Computer Science from Western Washington University
- ▶ Cryptography and Security Hobbyist
  - ▶ Kryptos
  - ▶ CCDC
- ▶ Independent Study
  - ▶ Parallel Elliptic Curve Cryptography

# Why I chose this Project for this Presentation

- ▶ Wide breadth of topics
- ▶ Good team
- ▶ New technology
- ▶ Difficult project

- ▶ Encryption - process of hiding information in a recoverable manner
- ▶ Ciphertext - encrypted text
- ▶ Homomorphism  $f(a \star b) = f(a) \star f(b)$ 
  - ▶ Partially - allows some operations
  - ▶ Somewhat - allows all operations but has limits
  - ▶ Fully - allows all operations
- ▶ Noise - distance of data from desired origin
- ▶ Depth of circuit - how much accumulated noise a circuit produces

- ▶ What is Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

*FHE allows arbitrary operations to be performed over encrypted data without decryption or loss of security*

$$\text{Dec}(\text{Enc}(\textcolor{red}{f}(b_i \dots b_j))) \approx \text{Dec}(\textcolor{red}{f}(\text{Enc}(b_i) \dots \text{Enc}(b_j)))$$

- ▶ Brief history

- ▶ (Unpadded RSA) This problem was posed by Rivest 1978

$$c_1 = m_1^e \bmod N$$


$$c_2 = m_2^e \bmod N$$

$$(c_1 \cdot c_2) = (\textcolor{red}{m_1} \cdot \textcolor{red}{m_2})^e \bmod N$$

- ▶ Craig Gentry 2009 (FHE)
- ▶ Dijk Gentry Halevi Vaikuntanathan (DGHV) cipher 2010

# Applications and Why this is Cool

- ▶ Ideally you can offload sensitive computation
- ▶ You can trust anyone - Mail Server
- ▶ You can trust everyone - Distributed Nodes
  - ▶ SETI@home
  - ▶ virtual supercomputer composed of large numbers of internet-connected nodes



# Project Launch

- ▶ Recruited Adviser
- ▶ Development of Course
  - ▶ Syllabus
  - ▶ Schedule
- ▶ Recruited team members from competitions



# Project Goals

- ▶ Proof of Concept
- ▶ Product
  - ▶ Functional
  - ▶ Fully documented
- ▶ First Uniform and Accessible Implementation

## ▶ Known


- ▶ Steep learning curve
- ▶ New technology
- ▶ Time (9 weeks to completion)

## ▶ Unknown

- ▶ Branching
- ▶ Data bloat - to be addressed later
- ▶ Time/Space complexity of 'basic' operations
- ▶ Network Bandwidth

# Project Requirements

- ▶ Public key (Fully Homomorphic Encryption) FHE
- ▶ Website for computing word counts WLS
- ▶ Data shipping and setup will not be part of website
- ▶ Poster and paper



# Steps for Fully Homomorphic System

1. Build a Somewhat Homomorphic System
  - ▶ Bit-wise encryption rather than block-wise
  - ▶ Well defined limits wrt. **noise** (n)
2. Bootstrapping the Somewhat Homomorphic System
  - ▶ *Size of Decryption Circuit*
  - ▶ *Circular Security*
  - ▶  $Dec_0(Enc_1(Enc_0(b_i)), Enc_1(p)) = Enc_1(b_i)$
3. Squashing the Recrypt Circuit
  - ▶ *Asymmetric Keys*
  - ▶  $Rec(Enc(pk, b_i) + \text{noise}, Enc(pk, sk)) = Enc(pk, b_i) + 0$
4. Distribute computing for space and time restrictions

# How Somewhat Homomorphic System Works I

$\lambda$  : Security Parameter is analogous to the bit-width of AES

$b_i$  : denotes the  $i^{th}$  'bit' of data

$c_i$  : denotes the cipher-text of  $b_i$

$n_i$  : denotes a  $\lambda$ -bit random number corresponding to  $c_i$   
*behaves as a 'noise' characteristic*

$q_i$  : denotes a  $\lambda^5$ -bit random number corresponding to  $c_i$   
*works as displacement of data*


$p$  : denotes a  $\lambda^2$ -bit random *odd* number (private key)

$$Enc(b_i) = c_i = p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i$$

$$Dec(c_i) = b_i = [p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i]_p \pmod{2}$$


# How Somewhat Homomorphic System Works II

AND




$$\begin{aligned}c_i \cdot c_j &= (p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i) \\ &\quad \cdot (p \cdot q_j + 2 \cdot n_j + b_j) \\ &= p \cdot \hat{q} + 2 \cdot \hat{n} + (b_i \cdot b_j)\end{aligned}$$

XOR



$$\begin{aligned}c_i + c_j &= (p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i) \\ &\quad + (p \cdot q_j + 2 \cdot n_j + b_j) \\ &= p \cdot \hat{q} + 2 \cdot \hat{n} + (b_i + b_j)\end{aligned}$$

NOT



$$\begin{aligned}1 - c_i &= (p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i) - 1 \\ &= p \cdot (-q_i) + 2 \cdot (-n_i) + (1 - b_i)\end{aligned}$$

# How Somewhat Homomorphic System Works III

A look at 'AND' wrt. **noise** ( $n$ )

$$\begin{aligned}c_i \cdot c_j &= (p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i) \cdot (p \cdot q_j + 2 \cdot n_j + b_j) \\&= p \cdot (p \cdot q_i \cdot q_j + 2 \cdot q_i \cdot n_j + 2 \cdot q_j \cdot n_i + q_i \cdot b_j + q_j \cdot b_i) \\&\quad + 2 \cdot (2 \cdot n_i \cdot n_j + n_i \cdot b_j + n_j \cdot b_i) \\&\quad + (b_i \cdot b_j) \\&= p \cdot \hat{q} + 2 \cdot \hat{n} + (b_i \cdot b_j)\end{aligned}$$

► As long as  $\hat{n} < \frac{p}{2}$ , then we can still correctly decrypt

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{AND} \\ \text{sizeOf}(\hat{n}) \approx 2 \cdot \text{Max}(\text{sizeOf}(n_i), \text{sizeOf}(n_j)) + 3 \\ \text{XOR} \\ \text{sizeOf}(\hat{n}) \approx \text{Max}(\text{sizeOf}(n_i), \text{sizeOf}(n_j)) + 1 \end{array} \right\} < \left( \text{sizeOf}\left(\frac{p}{2}\right) = \lambda^2 - 1 \right)$$

Asymmetric keys allow us to encrypt information using *public keys*, and decrypt using a *private key*.

- ▶ The public keys are a set of encrypted zeros with a few special properties
- ▶ The private key is the same
- ▶ Bootstrappable

$$\text{Dec}_0(\text{Enc}_1(\text{Enc}_0(b_i)), \text{Enc}_1(p)) = \text{Enc}_1(b_i)$$

- ▶ Recrypt

$$\text{Rec}\left(\text{Enc}(pk, b_i) + \text{noise}, \text{Enc}(pk, sk)\right) = \text{Enc}(pk, b_i) + 0$$



$$Dec(c_i) = b_i = [p \cdot q_i + 2 \cdot n_i + b_i]_p \pmod{2}$$

- ▶ Modulo and division circuits both use *division algorithm* which is too deep a circuit
- ▶ *Squashing* Circuit


$$Dec(c_i) = \text{LSB}(c_i) \oplus \text{LSB}\left(\left\lfloor \frac{c_i}{\hat{p}} \right\rfloor\right)$$

- ▶ Subset Sum Problem
  - ▶  $\hat{p}$  ends up being a vector of rationals w/ subset =  $\frac{1}{p}$
  - ▶  $\hat{s}k$  is now a encrypted 0,1 vector corresponding to hamming weight of  $\hat{p}$

- ▶ Data Bloat (decided to explore Hadoop)
  - ▶ Time consequences for logic gates
  - ▶ “Sage-cat” experiment (23 min)
    - ▶ Fast multiplication algorithm
    - ▶ Considered PyCuda
  - ▶ We spill over to Swap
- ▶ PyPy
- ▶ Memory Management in Python

	bit-size	volume	$\lambda = 8$	$\lambda = 16$	$\lambda = 64$
bidgit	1	$\approx \lambda^7$	$\approx 256$ KB	32 MB	512 GB
“cadadr”	6 Bytes		$\approx 12$ MB	1.5 GB	24 TB
Dec. of Ind.	8.5 KB		$\approx 17$ GB	2.1 TB	34 PB

- ▶ Hadoop
  - “The Apache Hadoop project develops open-source software for reliable, scalable, distributed computing.”
    - ▶ Map
      - ▶ Use of logic gates to implement strcmp
    - ▶ Reduce
      - ▶ Fixed width binary adder
- ▶ Hadoop FS data layout
  - ▶ Encrypted and split document
  - ▶ Fixed character overlap between adjacent nodes
- ▶ Circuit for word count w/ out branching



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- ▶ Highly readable code and comments
  - ▶ 2600 lines Python
  - ▶ Comments have citations to papers and page numbers
- ▶ Public key system nearly complete
  - ▶ Recrypt funny and difficult to debug
- ▶ Web site sends encrypted word to Hadoop head
- ▶ Hadoop cluster setup
  - ▶ Map and reduce functions written
  - ▶ Setup scripts written for key and data distribution
- ▶ Secure systems analysis
- ▶ Small library of circuits for use in system
- ▶ Reduced 'Sage-cat' expirement to 15 min

- ▶ Debug and clean up remaining features
- ▶ Publish article online

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- ▶ Modular reduction vs. recrypt (2010)
  - ▶ Use of generators (Jean-Sebastien Coron)
  - ▶ Provide code for known system attacks
  - ▶ Currently binary model
    - ▶ more compact n-ary systems
    - ▶ ideals in vector spaces

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- ▶ More complex user operation support
  - ▶ Huffman codes

# Acknowledgments

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