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[ Contract Versions Analyzed ]
gas_coin/contract$ sha256sum *.sol
c0828747f108f506d7880212f32d1d11fb1aa9ff9e51d3048d3a6019dc2bf83b contract_gas_token.sol
b983d85cb4bc5ac1c067a71cd900504592908063ae3ac4e08d8cc0f52326324c frugal_gst2_example.sol
e8e9cf5ac59a95b85d47da9dcaa134b470034c487ae54bf4e8e47edf1a643df2 gas_token.sol
d0223c3f56cca4c2a204805056784596697415f1b6b212b9f37002ce184006fe rlp.sol
0ffab56081c08d6b03b48c6f23b3bec966b077265a0a54e22d3c2c7670c1520a test_helper.sol
[ ERC20 Exploits ]
The contract is vulnerable to the classic ERC20 anti-patterns, including the short address
and transaction ordering-based exploits.
In terms of ERC20 correctness, the contract is based on a differentially developed Hydra-based
ERC20 where one of the heads has undergone formal verification. The differential test suite
used to test both this and the official Viper ERC20, with full statement and decision coverage,
is tested against all GasToken ERC20 code.
[ Arithmetic Errors ]
- count_bytes ; Will always be called with a maximum nonce of n = 256 ** 9 (a reasonable
upper bound on the number of GST2 contracts ever created), which is required for
correctness. This invariant is shared with the mk_contract_address function, which
is the only caller of count_bytes, can can be trivially audited to call passing through
the correct value. No overflow in either *i* or *mask* is possible in this value range
by inspection. This invariant is enforced in the code by the check to the caller,
checking that the provided nonce is less than MAX_NONCE, the maximum number of contracts
ever created for GST2.
- mk_contract_address ; Will always be called with a maximum nonce of n = 256 ** 9 (a reasonable
upper bound on the number of GST2 contracts ever created), which is required for
correctness. The lines with potentially problematic arithmetic:
uint256 tot_bytes = 1 + ADDRESS_BYTES + nonce_rlp_len; (max of 21 if nonce_rlp_len functions)
uint256 word = ((192 + tot_bytes) * 256**31) +
((128 + ADDRESS_BYTES) * 256**30) +
(uint256(a) * 256**10);
uint256 word = ((192 + 21) * 256**31) +
((128 + 20) * 256**30) +
(2 ** 160 * 256**10);
max value: ((192 + 21) * 256**31) + ((128 + 20) * 256**30) + (2 ** 160 * 256**10)
(< 2^256)
if (0 < n && n < MAX_SINGLE_BYTE) {
word += n * 256**9;
} else {
word += (128 + nonce_bytes) * 256**9;
word += n * 256**(9 - nonce_bytes);
Top branch; n is at most 128; adding (128 * 256 ** 9) to word; no overflow
Bottom branch; always less than the above if nonce_bytes is truly the number of bytes
representing *n*
(ERC20 functions):
All subtractions are overflow-checked by inspection. Additions are not, but are safe assuming that value
is conserved by transfers, no exploits exist in mint/free/etc, and totalSupply never exceeds ~2 ** 255, far
higher than we require.
totalSupply(): no overhead if invariant that s_head >= s_tail. If s_head < s_tail, contract state is anyway corrupted.
mint(): loop will run exactly value times (no overflow possible in loop counter / bounds). Value is then bounded by
available gas to quite a small number, and if both balances and totalSupply are not corrupted, no overflow should occur
in the remainder of the function.
destroyChildren(): This time, value is bounded by balance of sender's account; overflow is impossible if tail + value < INT_MAX,
which is certainly the case if the loop variant is enforced (max value that can be mined in 1 block is in the hundreds).
The function is internal, so cannot be called directly; in all calls, we manually inspect that the critical overflow present in the
loop bounds of this function, that could cause the loop not to run, is guarded against by checks that the sender actually has *value*
balance available, placing implicit bounds on tail + value (as we assume supply will never exceed 5 billion).
Additional ERC20 helper functions all do subtraction after explicitly overflow checking, so are not vulnerable to overflow.
Any subtracted balances have been bound-checked, as have subtracted allowances.
mint(): as above, loop will run exactly value times (no overflow possible in loop counter / bounds by explicit overflow check).
Value is then bounded by available gas to quite a small number, and if both balances and totalSupply are not corrupted,
no overflow should occur in the remainder of the function.
freeStorage(): identical to above but with subtraction. In all calls to this internal function, it is explicitly checked that
value < sender_balance, which can be bounded at 5 billion by our supply bound invariants. storage_location_array + supply
can then not overflow; subtracting value also cannot underflow as value < supply if supply is uncorrupted.
ERC20 helpers: Identical to above.
[ Denial of Service / Gas Limits ]
We exclude ERC20 functions here; as previously described, the ERC20 functions in this contract
were duplicated from an existing ERC20, with overflow checks _removed_, making them strictly
more efficient in gas behavior and more permissive w.r.t. the class of all inputs.
- count_bytes ; Only possible DoS is while loop running infinitely, which WILL occur with
a called value of between 2^255 and 2^256-1. This however is not an issue as such values are explicitly
disallowed by the maximum nonce guard in the only caller of this internal function.
- mk_contract_address ; The only potential DoS vector is in the inline assembly, as none of the Solidity
operations in this function can throw.
assembly {
let mem_start := mload(0x40) // get a pointer to free memory
mstore(mem_start, word) // store the rlp encoding
hash := sha3(mem_start,
add(tot_bytes, 1)) // hash the rlp encoding
mload should never fail, nor should mstore; the sha3 operation is tested as working against all reasonable
inputs, which cannot be adversarially controlled (the only calls to rlp.sol's internal functions are with
controlled, monotonically increasing addresses, and our base balance). SHA3 of word should always succeed
anyway, so no operations in this function are vulnerable to DoS.
makeChild(): the only failure possible here is in create, which can fail due to OOG.
There are a few possible cases here:
- There is not enough gas for the CREATE itself (the 32k required gas). In this case, the outer call
frame OOGs, no vulnrability occurs.
- There is enough gas for the CREATE to run, but the constructor or storage of the constructed contract to
OOG. Both these operations together require <7k gas, which we have empirically checked. Two SSTOREs need to
occur in the outer frame, which costs at minimum 10k gas (the minimum cost for a storage update is 5k gas).
Therefore, OOGing in CREATE will cause an OOG in the outer call frame.
A potential uncaught OOG in a CREATE in makeChild could be serious, as it could credit a user for minting
a token without debiting the requisite gas. This would essentially break GasToken, allowing attackers to
arbitrarily create tokens at will. Today, the security of GasToken relies STRONGLY on the current gas rules
of the EVM, and could at any time be compromised by their modification.
create can potentially fail for reasons other than OOG, such as a hash collision causing an existing contract
to exist at that address or indexing corruption in the outer contract, though these are unlikely eventualities.
A similar pattern exists in free / destroyChildren by inspection, though we do not analyze this because a failure
here results only in a user losing their refund (and can for example surely occur due to compiler bugs such as , which create is not vulnerable to by virtue of its inability
to take custom gas amounts)
There are no operations vulnerable to failure, by inspection, in the ERC20 helper or mint functions,
unless the balances array is corrupted (in which case service can obviously be denied to victims of this
No variable-gas or potential DoS vulnerabilities (arbitrary throws, etc.) are possible in any of the functions by
inspection. The only exception is the overflow check on mint loop bounds, which if an attacker can trigger to always
throw, would deny service to token generation. This is not a security issue, as existing users can still transfer
or free tokens, and is only possible with corruption of totalSupply (as totalSupply + value + 0xDEADBEEF must overflow).
There are no operations vulnerable to failure, by inspection, in the ERC20 helper or mint functions,
unless the balances array is corrupted (in which case service can obviously be denied to victims of this
Other operations like SSTORE can only fail due to OOG, which will propagate a failure in the outer frame.
[ Inheritance Shadowing ]
The only inheritance in the codebase is GST2 extending RLP, which has been manually
inspected and does not contain any shadowing.
[ Upgradeability ]
Contracts are explicitly non-upgradeable. See: "Human in the Loop".
[ Stuck Ether ]
No payable functions exist in the contract, so no stuck Ether is possible.
[ Timestamp / RNG ]
No timestamp or RNG functionality is included in any of the analyzed contracts.
[ Human in the loop ]
We explicitly place no human in the loop on these contracts, warning clients in our website documentation.
Human in the loop would be undesireable for this contract, where it would give the human an ability to
deny service to stored gas or redistribute stored gas, violating the intended purpose of the contract.
[ Game Theoretic Bugs ]
Outside the scope of this review.
[ Re-entrancy / recursive send ]
The only external call in any of the contracts potentially vulnerable to re-entrancy is on line
162 of GST2:
mk_contract_address(this, i).call();
If an attacker is able to control the output of mk_contract_address to the extent that it generates
an adversarially chosen address, the attacker would be able to exploit the following re-entrancy bug:
Call free -> re-enter into fre from destroyChildren's call -> call free -> (...)
Essentially allowing them to free a larger amount of contracts than should be enabled by their
balance, "stealing" gas refunds from legitimate users of GST2.
Note that mk_contract_address only has a single call anywhere in GST2, and is otherwise marked
internal (cannot be called externally). In this call, the base address of "this" is used, which
will always resolve to the deployment address of GST2 (0x0000....). The nonce / "i" value is also
not user controlled; it will sweep from s_tail+1 to tail + value inclusive. It is therefore
unlikely that, barring hash collisions, a user will be able to deploy arbitrary code at freed
addresses, assuming the correctness of the mk_contract_address function given its inputs.
Because there are relatively exhaustive tests for this in the suite, the probability of
exploitability is low.
[ Stack issues ]
Solidity will primarily loudly fail on stack overflows, with the exception of the "unchecked
call/create pattern". We use this pattern in only two locations in the entire audited codebase,
both in GST2. We rely on the built-in protection of Tangerine Whistle to prevent critical failures due
to silent stack overflow failure, e.g. in the mint function where it would allow for creation of
unbounded tokens. We analyze these "unchecked sends" w.r.t. gas exhaustion in the DoS section,
and argue that they are benign, but recommend asserting the create in the mint function for
added redundancy (a change that has been made for ETC but deemed not-secutity-critical for ETH).
[ Input-Controlled Jumps ]
No jumps that are controlled by user inputs (that would allow for example accessing of internal functions).
This includes default functions, which are not present in any of our contracts (eg contracts will throw
with unknown data).
[ Incorrect / Missing Modifiers ]
The following modifiers are critically used in our code: payable, public, internal (pure is also used but
not security critical so out of scope of this brief analysis; all instances where pure is used have
been checked to not have side effects, and access only constants from global storage that do trigger
some false positives on static analysis tools).
Public functions are: ERC20 functions and helpers, mint and free.
All other functions are internal.
The above has been manually validated on all files.
[ Function-Level Correctness / Testing Analysis ]
We exclude full correctness analysis and testing analysis from the scope of this report due to limited time;
any external investors should do their due diligence w.r.t. the provided tests and their completion.
Several of the non-ERC20 tests do not check all boundary values or have full branch/decision coverage,
and we recommend remedying this before trusting the contract with funds.